II.

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Nature of the Constitution.
Interpretation/Construction of the Constitution.

In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, the Supreme Court made
reference to the use of well- settled principles of constitutional construction, namely: First, verba
legis. i. e., whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have a
common use. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio leqis et anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
In the case of Francisco v. HR, (2003) The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Carpio Morales
opined: “American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of
Garcia vs. COMELEC, "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by
different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its
origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the
colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."”
In a Separate Opinion in Francisco v. HR, Mr. Justice Adolf Azcuna remarked: “The function of the
Court is a necessary element not only of the system of checks and balances, but also of a workable
and living Constitution. For absent an agency, or organ that can rule, with finality, as to what the
terms of the Constitution mean, there will be uncertainty if not chaos in governance... This is what…
Hart calls the need for a Rule of Recognition in any legal system…”

When an Issue Considered of Transcendental Importance:

An issue is of transcendental importance because of the following:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
(2) the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by an
instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
question. (Francisco vs. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44;

6. Impeachment Case against a Supreme Court Justice.

Facts: On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment cases against the
Chief Justice and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court . The complaint was endorsed by
three congressmen and referred to the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives. On
October 22, 2003, the Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for being insufficient in
substance. The Committee on Justice had not yet submitted its report to the House of
Representatives.

On October 23, 2003, two congressmen filed a complaint for impeachment against the Chief Justice in
connection with the disbursement of the Judiciary Development Fund. The complaint was
accompanied by a resolution of endorsement/impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
congressmen.
Several petitions were filed to prevent further proceedings tin the impeachment case on the ground
that the Constitution prohibits the initiation of an impeachment proceeding against the same official
more than once the same period of one year. Petitioners plead for the SC to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

The House of Representatives contend that impeachment is a political action and is beyond the
reach of judicial review. Respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel
raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review. Briefly stated, it is the position of respondent S Speaker De Venecia et. al.
that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question,
issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial
review. For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try"
impeachment cases (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily
includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment
proceedings. They contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to
try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief
Held: That granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include
the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition
to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch
or instrumentality. The Constitution provides for several limitations to the exercise of the power of
the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. These limitations include the one-year
bar on the impeachment of the same official. It is well within the power of the Supreme Court to
inquire whether Congress committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its functions.
(Francisco v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44)
x-----x Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their
finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should
defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride
Held: “Did not the people also express their will when they instituted the safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to
the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language
of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.”

In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10,2003, the Supreme Court
ruled that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated
(i) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/ or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(ii) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/ or resolution is not sufficient in substance, or
(iii) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House clearly contravene Sec. 3(5) of Article XI of the
 Constitution, as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing”. The
Supreme Court then said that the impeachment case is deemed initiated when the
complaint (with the accompanying resolution of indorsement) has been filed with
the House of Representatives and referred to the appropriate Committee.
i) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member
thereof.
ii) Included in the Order of Business within 10 session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within 3 session days.
iia) If the verified complaint is filed by at least one-third of all the members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed. [There is no need to refer the same to the proper Committee.]
iii) The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its members, shall submit its
report to the House within 60 session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution.
iv) A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each member shall be recorded.

iv. a) This procedure will prevent the recurrence of the incident in Romulo v.
Yniguez, 141 SCRA 263 and in De Castro v. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa, G.R.
No. 71688, September 3, 1985.
b) Limitation on initiating of impeachment case: Not more than once within a period
of one year against the same official.
i) In Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra., the Supreme Court said that
considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. along with seven associate justices of this Court on
June 02, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 05, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Edilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003, violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

2011 BAR
30. Congressman Sugar Oll authored a bill called House Bill No, 0056 which legalizes
jueteng. When the Bill became law (RA 10156), Fr. Nosu Gal, a priest, filed a petition
seeking for the nullification of RA 10156 on the ground that it is unconstitutional as it
violates Section 13, Article II, of the 1987 Constitution which states that "The state
recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being". Fr. Gal filed the
petition as a concerned citizen and as taxpayer. Does Fr. Gal have locus standi?
a. No, because Fr. Gal has no personal and substantial interest that will be
prejudiced by the implementation of the law;
b. No, the law concerns neither citizens nor expenditure of public funds;
c. Yes, because the issue is of transcendental importance;
d. Yes, because as priest, Fr. Gal has special interest in the well-being of the youth.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52; and (c) Francisco vs. Houses of
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 155336,
November 25, 2004, (CHREA vs CHR)
XII. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. General Provisions.
Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions:

h) The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy.

In Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No.
155336, November 25, 2004, the Supreme Court said that the Commission on Human Rights, unlike
the three Constitutional Commissions, does not enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed Cabinet members to hold two other offices in government, in direct
contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII. The prohibition on the President and his official family is all-embracing and
covers both public and private office employment, not being qualified by the phrase “in the Government” x x x
This is proof of the intent of the Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class
stricter prohibitions.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio leqis et anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of the framers. Thus, in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, it
was held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished
and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision shall be examined in light of the history of
the times and the conditions and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.

See Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, where the Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284, which would allow Cabinet Secretaries to hold two other offices. But
when the other office is held in an ex officio capacity, there is no violation, provided that the official concerned is
not entitled to additional compensation for his services

De Facto Officer; Salary Entitlement (2009)

No.XI.b. A de facto public officer is, by right, entitled to receive the salaries and emoluments attached to the public
office he holds
SUGGESTED ANSWER: TRUE. A de facto public officer discharges his public duties under a color of title to the
office, therefore, by right entitled to salary (Civil Liberties vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317).

Prohibition Against Multiple Positions & Additional Compensation (2002) No VI.

M is the Secretary of the Department of Finance. He is also an ex-officio member of the Monetary
Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas from which he receives an additional compensation for every
Board meeting attended. N, a taxpayer, filed a suit in court to declare Secretary M's membership in the
Monetary Board and his receipt of additional compensation illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
N invoked Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. N also cited Article IX-B,
Section 8 of the Constitution, which provides that no elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. If you
were the judge, how would you decide the following: a) the issue regarding the holding of multiple
positions? (3%) b) the issue on the payment of additional or double compensation?(2%) Explain your
answers fully.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) If I were the judge, I would uphold the validity of the designation of Secretary M as ex officio
member of the Monetary Board, As stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 (1991), the prohibition against the holding of multiple positions by Cabinet
Members in Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution does not apply to positions occupied in
an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their
office.
b) If I were the Judge, I would rule that Secretary M cannot receive any additional compensation.
As stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991), a Cabinet
Member holding an ex-officio position has no right to receive additional compensation, for his
services in that position are already paid for by the compensation attached to his principal
office.
[Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 03, 1997].
d) Self-executing provisions. A provision which lays down a general principle is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action

National Patrimony; definition (1999)

No XII - What is meant by National Patrimony? Explain the concept of National

Patrimony? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: According to Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service

Insurance System, 267 SCRA 408, the national patrimony refers not only to our natural
resources but also to our cultural heritage.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.

ii) Constitutional Convention, which may be called into existence either by a 2/3 vote of all the
members of Congress, or (if such vote is not obtained) by a majority vote of all the members of
Congress with the question of whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the people in a
plebiscite [Sec. 3, Art. XVII].

iia) Three Theories on the position of a Constitutional Convention vis-a-vis the regular
departments of government:

(1) Theory of Conventional Sovereignty [Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613];

(2) Convention is inferior to the other departments [Wood’s Appeal, 79 Pa. 59];
(3) Independent of and co-equal to the other departments [Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil. 1],

3. Underlying Principle of the Doctrine. Court is bound under the doctrine of separation of powers by
the contents of a duly authenticated measure of the legislature. (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito)

Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110].

Requisites of Judicial Review/lnquiry:

A party’s standing in court is a procedural technicality, which may be set aside by the Court
in view of the importance of the issues involved. Thus, where the issues raised by the
petitioners are of paramount public interest, the Court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
brush aside the procedural barrier [Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110].

In Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334, even as it was held that the
petitioners, as members of Congress, did not have locus standi to question the bidding
and sale of the 40% block of Petron shares to Aramco in the absence of a claim that the
contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the
domain of the Legislature, nonetheless, they were allowed to bring action in their
capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, infra.

Tolentino v. COMELEC

The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party.

A taxpayer, or group of taxpayers, is a proper party to question the validity of a law appropriating public
funds [Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702]

Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30

i) The validity of the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was challenged in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, and companion cases (collectively known as the Ratification Cases). The basic
issues and the votes of the SC justices were:
(1) Whether the validity of Proclamation 1102 is a political or a justiciable question - Six justices
said it is justiciable, three said it is political, and one justice qualified his vote.
(2) Whether the new Constitution was validly ratified (with substantial if not strict compliance)
conformably with the 1935 Constitution - Six justices said no, three said there was
substantial compliance, and one qualified his vote.
(3) Whether the people had acquiesced in the new Constitution (with or without valid
ratification) - Four justices said the people had already accepted the new Constitution, two
said that there can be no free expression by the people qualified to vote of their acceptance
or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under martial law, one said he is not prepared to
state that a new Constitution once accepted by the people must be accorded recognition
independently of valid ratification, and three expressed their lack of knowledge or
competence to rule on the question because under a regime of martial law with the free
expression of opinions restricted, they have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial
certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.
(4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief - Six justices voted to dismiss the petitions,
while four were for giving due course to the petitions.
(5) Whether the new Constitution is already in force - Four said yes by virtue of the people’s
acceptance of the same, four said they could not with judicial certainty whether or not the
people had accepted the Constitution, and two declared that the new Constitution is not in
force, “with the result that there are not enough votes to declare tha the new Constitution is not
in force”. The SC decision concluded: “Accordingly, by virtue of the majority of six votes x x x.
with four dissenting votes x x x all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect. ”

Judicial Review of Amendments. The question is now regarded as subject to judicial review, because
invariably, the issue will boil down to whether or not the constitutional provisions had been followed
[Sanidad v. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333; Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 50],

Sanidad v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 529,

iiic) In Sanidad v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 529, the Supreme Court held that this power may be exercised
only over the media, not over practitioners of the media. Thus, in this case, the Supreme Court
invalidated a Comelec resolution prohibiting radio and TV commentators and newspaper columnists
from commenting on the issues involved in the forthcoming plebiscite for the ratification of the
organic law establishing the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a) But this evil does not obtain in a plebiscite, because in a plebiscite the electorate is asked to vote
for or against issues, not candidates [Sanidad v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 529].

In Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, where the authority of President Marcos to propose amendments
to the Constitution was challenged, the high tribunal said: “If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative powers of the interim (National) Assembly (which was never convened),
there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the functions of the Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, though peculiar, to its gross legislative power
x x x (W)ith the interim Natiional Assembly not convened and only the President'and the Supreme
Court in operation, the urge of absolute necessity renders it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.”

PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

Definition of a State. A community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a

definite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a government to which
a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. See: Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos
Rueda, 42 SCRA 23.

Snap presidential election of 1986.

i) A petition to prohibit the holding of the snap election was filed with the SC in Philippine Bar
Association v. Comelec, 140 SCRA 455. But the petition was dismissed because considerations other
than legal had already set in, the candidates were in the thick of the campaign, and the people were
already looking forward to the election.

In Romualdez-Yap v. Civil Service Commission, 225 SCRA 285, the Court declared that a distinction
can be made on the validity of the reorganization between a government bureau or office performing
constituent functions (like the Bureau of Customs) and a government-owned or –controlled corporation
performing ministrant functions (like the PNB). Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a
governmental, but a private sector, endeavor. It is an optional function of government. [However,
reorganization in either must meet a common test, the test of good faith.]

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. Corazon Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
Traditionally, the functions of government have been classified into constituent, which are mandatory
for the Government to perform because they constitute the very bonds of society, such as the
maintenance of peace and order, regulation of property and property rights, the administration of
justice, etc; and ministrant, those intended to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people, and which are merely optional for Government to perform.

iv) Kinds of Recognition. May be express or implied: may also be:

iva) De facto:
ivb) De jure: Extended to a government fulfilling the requirements for recognition. When there is no
specific indication, recognition is generally considered as de jure. The recognition is relatively
permanent; brings about full diplomatic intercourse and observance of diplomatic immunities; and
confers title to assets abroad. See: Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs.
Corazon Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.

Information Technology Foundation v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004
iva) A party’s standing in court is a procedural technicality, which
may be set aside by the Court in view of the importance of the issues involved.

Likewise, in Information Technology Foundation v. Comelec, G.R. No.

159139, January 13, 2004, it was held that the subject matter of the case is “a
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest”; in other words, it is of
“paramount public interest” and of “transcendental importance”. The nation”s
political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome
of the 2004 elections; accordingly, the award for the automation of the electoral
process was a matter of public concern, imbued with the public interest. This fact
alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of
this Court whenever a case involves “an issue of overarching significance to our
society”.

Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec
iii) People, through the power of initiative [Sec. 2, Art. XVI/].
Requisite: A petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein.
iiibl) In the Resolution (on the Motion for Reconsideration) in
Lambino v. Comelec, the Court noted that the majority of the justices had voted to
declare RA 6735 sufficient and adequate for a people’s intitiative. Lambino thus
effectively abandoned the ruling in Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, G.R. No.
127325, March 19, 1997, where the Supreme Court declared R.A. 6735
inadequate to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution.

**** Test for valid delegation (Santiago v. COMELEC)

1. it is complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed or implemented;
2. it fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and determinable, to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.

Bondoc vs. Pineda

E. The Power of Judicial Review.
1. Judicial Review: The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and
legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an
assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but merely an
expression of the supremacy of the Constitution [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139]. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld [Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183]. The power is inherent in the Judicial
Department, by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers.
a) That duty is part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an
express grant under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution which states: “Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of Government”
[Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792].

vi) Role of the Judiciary. The judicial power, as defined in Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse, of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”.
via) Note that when the court mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it upholds is not its
own superiority but the supremacy of the Constitution [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil 139] Read The Power of Judicial Review, supra. See also:
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183; Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792.
Q. Electoral Tribunals [Sec. 17, Art. VI].
1. Composition: Three Supreme Court justices designated by the Chief
Justice, and six members of the house concerned chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties registered under the party- list
system represented therein. The Senior Justice shall be its Chairman.
a) The HRET was created as a non-partisan court. It must be independent
of Congress and devoid of partisan influence and consideration. “Disloyalty to the
party” and “breach of party discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member. HRET members enjoy security of tenure; their membership may not be
terminated except for a just cause such as the expiration of congressional term,
death, resignation from the political party, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid causes [Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792].

Electoral Tribunal; HRET Members’ Right &

Responsibilities (2002)
No IV. In an election case, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal rendered a
decision upholding the election protest of
protestant A, a member of the Freedom Party,
against protestee B, a member of the Federal
Party. The deciding vote in favor of A was cast by
Representative X, a member of the Federal Party
.
For having voted against his party mate,
Representative X was removed by Resolution of
the House of Representatives, at the instance of
his party (the Federal Party), from membership in
the HRET. Representative X protested his
removal on the ground that he voted on the basis
of the evidence presented and contended that he
had security of tenure as a HRET Member and
that he cannot be removed except for a valid
cause.
With whose contention do you agree, that of the
Federal Party or that of Representative X? Why?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I agree with the contention of Representative X. As
held In Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991),
the members of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal are entitled to security of tenure
like members of the judiciary. Membership in it may
not be terminated except for a just cause. Disloyalty
to party is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a
Security of Tenure. Members of ET have
security of tenure. Disloyalty to the party is not a
ground for termination. (Bondoc v. Pineda) (2002
Bar Question)

Q: May a member of the HRET be ousted by his partymates through a Resolution of the House by reason of voting
against a partymate?

A: As held in Bondoc v. Pineda, the members of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are entitle to security of
tenure like the members of the judiciary. Membership in it may not be terminated except for just cause. Disloyalty to
party is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Its members
must discharge their functions with impartiality and independence from the political party to which they belong.

Bondoc v. Pineda
The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are
politicians. The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though
not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the
limits of its authority, an independent organ.

Valid grounds for termination of membership to the tribunal. (EDRR)

 Expiration of Congressional term of office

 Death or permanent disability
 Resignation form political party which one represents in the tribunal
 Removal from office for other valid reasons

Political Questions, Definition

Guidelines for determining whether a
question is political.

Functional Kind
2. Lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it;
3. Impossibility of deciding a case
without an initial determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
Bondoc v. Pineda: The Court invalidated the
Example:

expulsion of a member of the House Electoral

Tribunal.

Mirasol v. Court of Appeals,

E. The Power of Judicial Review.

2. Who may exercise the power. Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution
recognizes the power of the Supreme Court to decide constitutional questions. On
the issue of whether the power can be exercised by lower courts, see:

In Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001, it

was held that the Constitution vests the power of judicial review not only in the
Supreme Court but also in Regional Trial Courts (RTC). Furthermore, BP. 129
grants RTCs the authority to rule on the conformity of laws and treaties with the
Constitution. However, in all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty,
presidential decree, order or proclamation — and not just in actions involving
declaratory relief and similar remedies — notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory, as required in Sec. 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The purpose of
this mandatory notice is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not
his intervention in the action is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such
notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court.

Salonga vs. Paño

3. Functions of Judicial Review

a) Checking
b) Legitimating
c) Symbolic [See: Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438] –
Symbolic - to educate the bench and the bar as the controlling principles and concepts on matters
of great public importance.
iii) However, the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts from resolving a case. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., it was held that courts will still
decide cases otherwise moot and academic if: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution
[Province of Batangas v. Romulo, supra.]; (b) there is an exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest is involved [Lacson v. Perez, supra.]
(c) the constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar and the public [Salonga v. Pano, supra.];
iiib) The Court also exercised the power of judicial review even when the issue had become moot and
academic in Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438, where it was held that the Court had the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules, and the
symbolic function to educate the bench and the bar on the extent of protection given by the
constitutional guarantees. Likewise, in Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, although the
issue had become moot and academic because the policemen (alleged whistle-blowers) had already
been removed from the Witness Protection Program, the Court still decided the case for the future
guidance of the bench and the baron the application of RA 6981, and for the proper disposition of the
issue on whether the two policemen should return whatever monetary benefits they may have received
under the program.

“The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.”
(Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438, 1985)

Enrile vs SET

Requisites of Judicial Review/lnquiry:

a) Actual case or controversy.
The issues raised in the case must not be moot and academic,
or because of subsequent developments, have become moot and academic.

Thus, in Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Pimentel,

G.R. No. 132986, May 19, 2004, because the term of the contested position had
expired on June 30, 1998, the electoral contest had become moot and academic,
and thus, there was no occasion for judicial review. In Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No.
147780, May 10, 2001, where cases were filed questioning the declaration by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila (under
General Order No. 1), the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions because on May
6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the “state of rebellion”, and, thus, the
issue raised in the petitions had become moot and academic. Likewise, in
Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, where the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional
Reform (PCCR) was questioned, the Court dismissed the petition because by then
the PCCR had ceased to exist having finished its work and having submitted its
recommendations to President Estrada. Subsequent events had overtaken the
petition and the Court had nothing left to rule upon. Similarly, in Guingona v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998, the Court declared that since witness
Potenciano Roque had already been admitted into the Witness Protection
Program and had actually finished testifying, the petition contesting the side
opinion of the Court of Appeals that the admission of Roque into the program could be made
only if his testimony is substantially corroborated on material points, was held to
have raised an issue which had become moot and academic. The same conclusion was reached in
Atlas Fertilizer v. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 93100, June 19, 1997, because
Congress had already passed amendatory laws excluding fishponds and prawn farms from the
coverage of CARL, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed provisions had become moot and
academic, and therefore, not ripe for judicial review.