Before going into the substantive issues, the
Court shall first dispose of some procedural
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 113
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
*
G.R. No. 138822. January 23, 2001.
EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION,
respondent.
Actions; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Words
and Phrases; Estoppel by laches arises from
the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it; A party cannot be considered as
estopped from assailing the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the other party’s
counterclaim where such issue was raised
with the trial court itself—the body where
the action is pending—even before the
presentation of any evidence by the parties
and definitely, way before any judgment
could be rendered by the trial court.—
matters raised by the parties. Petitioner
claims that respondent is estopped from
questioning her non-payment of docket fees
because it did not raise this particular
_______________
* THIRD DIV ISION.
114
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
issue when it filed in its first motion—the "
Motion to Strike out Answer Compulsory
Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In
Default”—with the trial court; rather, it was
only nine months after receiving petitioner’s
answer that respondent assailed the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s
counterclaims based on the latter’s failure to
pay docket fees. Petitioner’s position is
unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises
from the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it. In the case at bar, respondent
cannot be considered as estopped from
assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction over
petitioner’s counterclaim since this issue was
raised by respondent with the trial court
itself—the body where the action is pending
—even before the presentation of any
evidence by the parties and definitely, way
before any judgment could be rendered by
the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Although the lack
of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the action, a party may be
estopped from raising such questions if he
has actively taken part in the very
proceedings which he questions, belatedly
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the
event that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him.—
Meanwhile, respondent questions the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the
appeal filed by petitioner from the 18
September 1990 and 28 February 1991
orders of the trial court. It is significant to
note that this objection to the appellate
court’s jurisdiction is raised for the first time
before this Court; respondent never having
raised this issue before the appellate court.
Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the action, a
party may be estopped from raising such
questions if he has actively taken part in
the very proceedings which he questions,
belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction
in the event that that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In
this case, respondent actively took part in
the proceedings before the Court of Appeals
by filing its appellee’s brief with the same.
Its participation, when taken together with
its failure to object to the appellate court’s
jurisdiction during the entire duration of
the proceedings before such court,
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case by such tribunal and
accordingly, respondent is now most
decidedly estopped from objecting to the
Court of Appeals’ assumption of jurisdiction
over petitioner’s appeal.
Same; Counterclaims; Words and
Phrases; “Compulsory Counterclaim,”
Explained.—The basic issue for resolution
in this case is whether or not the
counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or
permissive in nature. A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable
by the
115
 VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 115
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
regular courts of hustice, arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of
the opposing party’s claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Criteria or Tests in
Determining Whether a Counter-claim is
Compulsory or Permissive; “Compelling Test
of Compulsoriness”; Words and Phrases;
Under the “compelling test of
compulsoriness,” “a logical relationship
between the claim and the counterclaim is
required, that is, whether conducting
separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the parties
and the court.”—In Valencia v. Court of
Appeals, this Court capsulized the criteria or
tests that may be used in determining
whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive, summarized as follows: 1. Are
the issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and counterclaim largely the same? 2.
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant’s claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? 3. Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
claim as well as defendant’s counter-claim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the
claim and the counterclaim? Another test,
applied in the more recent case of
Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the
“compelling test of compulsoriness” which
requires “a logical relationship between the
claim and counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by
the parties and the court.”
Same; Same; Docket Fees; Rule on the
Payment of Filing Fees.—There is no need
for petitioner to pay docket fees for her
compulsory counterclaim. On the other
hand, in order for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. The rule on the
payment of filing fees has been laid down
by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion—
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. 2. The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third-
party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and
unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is
paid. The court may allow payment of said
fee within a reasonable time but also in no
case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary
116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
period 3. Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in
the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute
a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee.
Same; Same; Same; The trial court
should give the defendant a reasonable
time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglemen-tary period, to pay
the filing fees for her permissive
counterclaim.—The above mentioned ruling
in Sun Insurance has been reiterated in the
recent case of Suson v. Court of Appeals. In
Suson, the Court explained that although
the payment of the prescribed docket fees is
a jurisdictional requirement, its
nonpayment does not result in the
automatic dismissal of the case provided the
docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming
now to the case at bar, it has not been
alleged by respondent and there is nothing
in the records to show that petitioner has
attempted to evade the payment of the
proper docket fees for her permissive
counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after
respondent filed its motion to dismiss
petitioner’s counterclaim based on her
failure to pay docket fees, petitioner
immediately filed a motion with the trial
court, asking it to declare her counterclaim
as compulsory in nature and therefore
exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to
declare that respondent was in default for
its failure to answer her counterclaim.
However, the trial court dismissed
petitioner’s counterclaim. Pursuant to this
Court’s ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial
court should have instead given petitioner a
reasonable time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period, to pay the filing fees for her
permissive counter-claim.
Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and
Practice; There is no need to file an answer
to a permissive counterclaim until the
defendant shall have paid the prescribed
docket fees for only then shall the court
acquire jurisdiction over such claim.—
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should
have declared respondent in default for
having failed to answer her counterclaim.
Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of
petitioner is concerned, there is obviously no
need to file an answer until petitioner has
paid the prescribed docket fees for only then
shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such
claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner for damages
based on the filing by respondent of an
allegedly unfounded and malicious suit
need not be answered since it is inseparable
from the
117
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 117
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
claims of respondent. If respondent were to
answer the compulsory counterclaim of
petitioner, it would merely result in the
former pleading the same facts raised in its
complaint.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the Court.
          Cruz, Durian, Alday & Cruz-
Matters for petitioner.
     Jacinto Jimenez for respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU
Insurance Corporation filed a
complaint with the1 Regional Trial
Court of Makati alleging that
petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it
P114,650.76, representing
unliquidated cash advances,
unremitted costs of premiums and
other charges incurred by petitioner in
the course of her work2 as an insurance
agent for respondent. Respondent also
prayed for exemplary damages,
3
 3
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. 5 RTC Records, 37-39.
Petitioner filed her answer and by way 6 Ibid., 46, 93.
of counterclaim, asserted her right for
118
the payment of P104,893.45,
representing direct commissions, profit
commissions and contingent bonuses 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December ANNOTATED
1986, and for accumulated premium
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In
addition, petitioner prayed for
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, tion to dismiss petitioner’s
moral damages and exemplary counterclaim, contending that the trial
damages for the allegedly unfounded court never acquired jurisdiction over
4
action filed by respondent. On 23 the same because of the non-payment 7

August 1989, respondent filed a of docket fees by petitioner. In

“Motion to Strike Out Answer With response, petitioner asked the trial
Compulsory Counterclaim And To court to declare her counterclaim as
Declare Defendant In Default” because exempt from payment of docket fees
petitioner’s answer was allegedly filed since it is compulsory and that
5
out of time. However, the trial court respondent be declared in default for
denied the motion on 25 August 1989 having failed 8
to answer such
and similarly rejected respondent’s counterclaim.
motion for 6 reconsideration on 12 In its 18 September
9
1990 Order, the
March 1990. A few weeks later, on 11 trial court granted respondent’s
April 1990, respondent filed a mo- motion to dismiss petitioner’s
counterclaim and consequently, denied
petitioner’s motion. The court found
________________
petitioner’s counterclaim to be merely
1 Branch 134. permissive in nature and held that
2 Docketed as Civil Case No. 89-3816. petitioner’s failure to pay docket fees
3 Rollo, 42-44. prevented the court from10 acquiring
4 Ibid., 53-63. jurisdiction over the same. The trial
court similarly denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration on 28
February 1991.
On 2311 December 1998, the Court of
Appeals sustained the trial court,
finding that petitioner’s own
admissions, as contained in her
answer, show that her counterclaim is
merely permissive. The relevant
portion 12 of the appellate court’s
decision is quoted herewith—
Contrary to the protestations of appellant,
mere reading of the allegations in the
answer a quo will readily show that her
counterclaim can in no way be compulsory.
Take note of the following numbered
paragraphs in her answer:
“(14) That, indeed, FGU’s cause of action which
is not supported by any document other than
the self-serving ‘Statement of Account’ dated
March 28, 1988 x x x
(15) That it should be noted that the cause of
action of FGU is not the enforcement of the
Special Agent’s Contract but the alleged ‘cash
accountabilities which are not based on written
agreement x x x.
xxxx
_______________
7 Ibid., 96-102.
8 Ibid., 110-125.
9 Judge Ignacio M. Capulong
10 Rollo, 105.
11 Fourth Division, composed of Justices
Jesus M. Elbinias, ponente and Chairman;
Eugenio S. Labitoria; and Marina L. Buzon.
12 Rollo, 36-39.
119
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 119
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
(19) x x x A careful analysis of FGU’s three-
page complaint will show that its cause of
action is not for specific performance or
enforcement of the Special Agent’s Contract
rather, it is for the payment of the alleged cash
accountabilities incurred by defendant during
the period form [sic] 1975 to 1986 which claim
is executory and has not been ratified. It is the
established rule that unenforceable contracts,
like this purported money claim of FGU, cannot
be sued upon or enforced unless ratified, thus it
is as if they have no effect. x x x.”
To support the heading “Compulsory
Counterclaim” in her answer and give the
impression that the counterclaim is
compulsory appellant alleged that “FGU has
unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant
despite repeated demands in gross violation
of their Special Agent’s Contract x x x.” The
reference to said contract was included
purposely to mislead. While on one hand
appellant alleged that appellee’s cause of
action had nothing to do with the Special
Agent’s Contract, on the other hand, she
claim that FGU violated said contract which
gives rise of [sic] her cause of action.
Clearly, appellant’s cash accountabilities
cannot be the offshoot of appellee’s alleged
violation of the aforesaid contract.
On 19 May 1999, the appellate court
denied petitioner’s
13
motion for
reconsideration, giving rise to the
present petition.
Before going into the substantive
issues, the Court shall first dispose of
some procedural matters raised by the
parties. Petitioner claims that
respondent is estopped from
questioning her non-payment of docket
fees because it did not raise this
particular issue when it filed its first
motion—the “Motion to Strike out
Answer With Compulsory
Counterclaim And To Declare
Defendant In Default”—with the trial
court; rather, it was only nine months
after receiving petitioner’s answer that
respondent assailed the trial court’s
lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s
counterclaims based on 14 the latter’s
failure to pay docket fees. Petitioner’s
position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by
laches arises from the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has
_______________
13 Ibid., 41.
14 Ibid., 332.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
15
abandoned or declined to assert it. In
the case at bar, respondent cannot be
considered as estopped from assailing
the trial court’s jurisdiction over
petitioner’s counterclaim since this
issue was raised by respondent with
the trial court itself—the body where
the action is pending—even before the
presentation of any evidence by the
parties and definitely, way before any
judgment could be rendered by the
trial court.
 Meanwhile, respondent questions objecting to the Court of Appeals’
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals assumption of 18jurisdiction over
over the appeal filed by petitioner from petitioner’s appeal.
the 18 September 1990 and 28 The basic issue for resolution in this
February 1991 orders of the trial court. case is whether or not the counterclaim
It is significant to note that this of petitioner is compulsory or
objection to the appellate court’s permissive in nature. A
jurisdiction is raised for the first time
before this Court; respondent never _______________
having raised this issue before the
appellate court. Although the lack of 15 Philippine National Construction
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at Corporation v. National Labor Relations
any stage of the action, a party may be Commission, 307 SCRA 218 (1999).
estopped from raising such questions if 16 National Steel Corporation v. Court of
he has actively taken part in the very Appeals, 302 SCRA 522 (1999).
proceedings which he questions, 17 CA Records, 88-115.
belatedly objecting to the court’s 18 ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union
jurisdiction in the event that that the Members v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
judgment or order subsequently 16
Corporation, 304 SCRA 489 (1999). See also
rendered is adverse to him. In this Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523
case, respondent actively took part in (1999); Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court
the proceedings before the Court of of Appeals, 224 SCRA 477 (1993).
Appeals by filing its appellee’s brief
17 121
with the same. Its participation, when
taken together with its failure to object
to the appellate court’s jurisdiction VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 121
during the entire duration of the
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
proceedings before such court,
demonstrates a willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case by such compulsory counterclaim is one which,
tribunal and accordingly, respondent being cognizable by the regular courts
is now most decidedly estopped from of justice, arises out of or is connected
with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not
require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom 19
the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 20
In Valencia v. Court of Appeal, this
Court capsulized the criteria or tests
that may be used in determining
whether a counterclaim is compulsory
or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law
raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant’s
claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute
plaintiffs claim as well as
defendant’s counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the
counterclaim?
Another test, applied in the more
recent case
21
of Quintanilla v. Court of
Appeals, is the “compelling test of
compulsoriness” which requires “a
logical relationship between the claim
and counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would
entail a substantial duplication of
effort and time by the parties and the
court.”
As contained in her answer,
petitioner’s counterclaims are as
follows:
(20) That defendant incorporates
and repleads by reference all
the foregoing allegations as
may be material to her
Counterclaim against FGU.
(21) That FGU is liable to pay the
following just, valid and
legitimate claims of defendant:
______________
19 Rule 6, section 7; BA Finance v. Co, 224
SCRA 163 (1993); Javier v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 609 (1989).
20 263 SCRA 275 (1996).
21 279 SCRA 397 (1997).
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

(a) the sum of at least P104,893.45 plus
maximum interest thereon
representing, among others, direct
commissions, profit commissions and
contingent bonuses legally due to
defendant; and
(b) the minimum amount of
P500,000.00 plus the maximum
allowable interest representing
defendant’s accumulated premium
reserve for 1985 and previous years,
which FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit
to defendant despite repeated demands in
gross violation of their Special Agent’s
Contract and in contravention of the
principle of law that “every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.”
(22) That as a result of the filing of this
patently baseless, malicious and unjustified
Complaint, and FGU’s unlawful, illegal and
vindictive termination of their Special
Agent’s Contract, defendant was
unnecessarily dragged into this litigation
and to defense [sic] her side and assert her
rights and claims against FGU, she was
compelled to hire the services of counsel
with whom she agreed to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and
stands to incur litigation expenses in the
amount estimated to at least P20,000.00
and for which FGU should be assessed and
made liable to pay defendant.
(23) That considering further the
malicious and unwarranted action of
defendant in filing this grossly unfounded
action, defendant has suffered and
continues to suffer from serious anxiety,
mental anguish, fright and humiliation. In
addition to this, defendant’s name, good
reputation and business standing in the
insurance business as well as in the
community have been besmirched and for
which FGU should be adjudged and made
liable to pay moral damages to defendant in
the amount of P300,000.00 as minimum.
(24) That in order to discourage the filing
of groundless and malicious suits like FGU’s
Complaint, and by way of serving [as] an
example for the public good, FGU should be
penalized and assessed exemplary damages
in the sum of P100,000.00 or such amount
as the Honorable Court may22 deem
warranted under the circumstances.
Tested against the abovementioned
standards, petitioner’s counterclaim for
commissions, bonuses, and
accumulated premium reserves is
merely permissive. The evidence

required to prove petitioner’s claims
differs from that needed to establish
respondent’s
_______________
22 Rollo, 61-62.
123
VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 123
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
demands for the recovery of cash
accountabilities from petitioner, such
as cash advances and costs of
premiums. The recovery of
respondent’s claims is not contingent
or dependent upon establishing
petitioner’s counterclaim, such that
conducting separate trials will not
result in the substantial duplication of
the time and effort of the court and the
parties. One would search the records
in vain for a logical connection
between the parties’ claims. This
conclusion is further reinforced by
petitioner’s own admissions since she
declared in her answer that
respondent’s cause of action, unlike her
own, was not based upon the Special
23
23
Agent’s Contract. However,
petitioner’s claims for damages,
allegedly suffered as a result of the
filing by respondent
24
of its complaint,
are compulsory.
There is no need for petitioner to
pay docket fees
25
for her compulsory
counterclaim. On the other hand, in
order for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, petitioner is bound 26
to
pay the prescribed docket fees. The
rule on the payment of filing fees has
been laid down by the Court in the
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Hon. Maximiano Asuncion —
27
1. It is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable
 prescriptive or reglementary 3. Where the trial court acquires
period. jurisdiction over a claim by the
2. The same rule applies to filing of the appropriate
permissive counterclaims, pleading and payment of the
third-party claims and similar prescribed filing fee but,
pleadings, which shall not be subsequently, the judgment
considered filed until and awards a claim not specified in
unless the filing fee prescribed the pleading, or if specified the
therefor is paid. The court may same has been left for
allow payment of said fee determination by the court, the
within a reasonable time but additional filing fee therefor
also in no case beyond its shall constitute a lien on the
applicable prescriptive or judgment. It shall be the
reglementary period. responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and
_______________
assess and collect the
23 Ibid., 58-59, 60. additional fee.
24 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla,
294 SCRA 382 (1998); Intestate Estate of Amado The above mentioned ruling in Sun
B. Dalisay v. Marasigan, 257 SCRA 509 (1996). Insurance has been reiterated in the
25 Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, supra. recent case
28
of Suson v. Court of
26 Suson v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 284 Appeals. In Suson, the Court
(1997). explained that although the payment
27 170 SCRA 274 (1989). of the prescribed docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, its non-
124 payment does not result in the
automatic dismissal of the case
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
provided the docket fees are paid
ANNOTATED within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. Coming now to
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation the case at bar, it has not been alleged
by respondent and there is nothing in has paid the prescribed docket fees for
the records to show that petitioner has only then shall the court acquire
attempted to evade the payment of the
proper docket fees for her permissive _________________
counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after
respondent filed its motion to dismiss 28 Supra. See also Cabaero v. Cantos, 271
petitioner’s counterclaim based on her SCRA 391 (1997).
failure to pay docket fees, petitioner 29 RTC Records, 110-125.
immediately filed a motion with the 30 Rollo, 342-343.
trial court, asking it to declare her
125
counterclaim as compulsory in nature
and therefore exempt from docket fees
and, in addition, to declare that VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 125
respondent was in default for29 its failure
Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation
to answer her counterclaim. However,
the trial court dismissed petitioner’s 31

counterclaim. Pursuant to this Court’s jurisdiction over such claim.

ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial
court should have instead given
petitioner a reasonable time, but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period, to pay the
filing fees for her permissive
counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the trial
court should have declared respondent
in default for having failed to answer
30
her counterclaim. Insofar as the
permissive counterclaim of petitioner
is concerned, there is obviously no
need to file an answer until petitioner
Meanwhile, the compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner for damages
based on the filing by respondent of an
allegedly unfounded and malicious
suit need not be answered since it is
inseparable from the claims of
respondent. If respondent were to
answer the compulsory counterclaim of
petitioner, it would merely result in the
former pleading32the same facts raised
in its complaint.
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 23 December 1998 and
its 19 May 1999 Resolution are hereby
MODIFIED. The compulsory that opportunity having been
counterclaim of petitioner for damages foreclosed by the trial court, on the
filed in Civil Case No. 89-3816 is dismissed counterclaim which could
ordered REINSTATED. Meanwhile, form
the Regional Trial Court of Makati
(Branch 134) is ordered to require _______________
petitioner to pay the prescribed docket
fees for her permissive counterclaim 31 Gegare v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 587
(direct commissions, profit (1998).
commissions, contingent bonuses and 32 Ballecer v. Bernardo, 18 SCRA 291 (1966);
accumulated premium reserves), after Navarro v. Bello, 102 Phil. 1019 (1958).
ascertaining that the applicable 33
33 Suson v. Court of Appeals, supra.
prescriptive period has not yet set in.
126
SO ORDERED.

          Melo (Chairman), Vitug, 126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, ANNOTATED
JJ., concur.
People vs. Magabo
Judgment and resolution modified.
Compulsory counterclaim reinstated. part of the records to be reviewed by
the appellate court. (Santo Tomas
Notes.—A counterclaim for University Hospital vs. Surla, 294
attorney’s fees partakes of the nature SCRA 382 [1998])
of a compulsory counterclaim.
(Intestate Estate of Amado B. Dalisay ——o0o——
vs. Marasigan, 257 SCRA 509 [1996])
An appeal from the dismissal of the
counterclaim, although not totally
unavailable, could well be ineffective, if
not futile, as far as the petitioner is
concerned where no single piece of
evidence has yet been presented by it, © Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.