Historical background

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “Every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable. An accused have the right to file a counterclaim arising from the damages
incurred during the court proceedings. Counterclaim is any claim which a defending
party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which,
being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action
before the Regional Trial Court, necessarily connected with the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third
persons over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if
not set up in the same action."A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is
not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case . Under
this provision, a counterclaim may be filed in any damages action brought within the
statute of limitations period, before the pleadings in such action are finally closed. (The
remainder of CGS §52-584 establishes time limits for bringing an action to recover
damages for injury to the person or property, caused by negligence, reckless or wanton
misconduct, or certain professional malpractice.)
 The counterclaim provision was enacted in 1943 as part of Public Act 152, Senate Bill
121. There is no available legislative history. Based on the few cases interpreting the
provision, it would appear that a counterclaim may be filed before the pleadings are
closed, even if the defendant's underlying causes of action would otherwise be barred by
the statute of limitations. When the pleadings are finally closed is not clear from the
provision itself, nor has it been definitively addressed by the courts. However, it would
appear to occur upon the filing of the plaintiff's reply, once the pleadings have
“terminated in an issue or issues of fact decisive of the merits of the case'” Seletsky v. Roy,
23 Conn. Supp. 139, 145 (Conn. C.P. 1961)). APPLICABLE LAW ON
COUNTERCLAIMS A counterclaim is a cause of action which the defendant has against
the plaintiff, on which the defendant might have secured affirmative relief had he sued the
plaintiff in a separate action, and which will defeat or limit the relief to which the plaintiff
would otherwise be entitled (Williams v. Dumais, 34 Conn. Supp. 247, 249-50 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1977)). Under section 116 of the Superior Court Rules for civil cases, a
defendant may file a counterclaim against the plaintiff in any action for legal or equitable
relief if the counterclaim arises out of at least one of the transactions which is the subject
of the plaintiff's complaint. Prior to the enactment of CGS §52-584's counterclaim
provision, the cases made clear that the defendant's filing of a cause of action as a
counterclaim did not save the cause of action if it was otherwise barred by a statute of
limitations (see Mulville v. Brown, 9 Conn. Supp. 387 (Conn. C.P. 1941)). The courts
treated counterclaims as independent actions to which the statute of limitations applied as
if separate suits had been brought (see Solomon v. Rosol, 10 Conn. Supp. 4 (Conn. C.P.
1941)). Since the enactment of the counterclaim provision, the courts appear to treat as
timely those counterclaims filed before the pleadings are closed, even if the counterclaims
would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. In Seletsky v. Roy, 23 Conn. Supp.
139 (Conn. C.P. 1961), the plaintiffs opposed a motion to amend the answer to the
complaint, asserting that the counterclaim at issue was barred by CGS § 52-584 because it
was not filed (1) within one year of the accident, nor (2) before the pleadings were closed.
The court held that the first issue was decided in Solomon v. Rosol, and thus the filing of
the counterclaim was barred by the statute of limitations. With respect to the second issue,
the court determined that the pleadings had been closed, and thus CGS § 52-584
precluded the filing of the counterclaim at this time. Because the court could have ruled
the first issue to be dispositive of the second, but did not, it would appear that the court
viewed the CGS § 52-584 counterclaim provision as an exception to the limitations period
otherwise applicable to the defendant's causes of action. In Williams v. Dumais, 34 Conn.
Supp. 247, 249 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977), the court considered “whether § 52-584 permits
cross claims to be interposed between the codefendants before the pleadings are closed
and thus, pragmatically and legally speaking, shields the suing codefendant . . . from a
claim that the statute of limitations has run as it shields one who proffers a
`counterclaim'”. While the court rejected the argument that CGS § 52-584 applies to cross
claims as well as counterclaims, it did not disagree with the assertion that the section
entitles a defendant to a late filing beyond the normal statute of limitations period. Thus,
while the courts have not explicitly ruled that the CGS § 52-584 counterclaim provision is
substantive rather than procedural, such a ruling is at least implicit in these decisions. As
the Seletsky court pointed out, when exactly the pleadings are “finally closed” within the
meaning of CGS § 52-584 is undecided (23 Conn. Supp. at 144). In that case the court
rejected the defendant's contention that the filing of an amended answer containing a
counterclaim would constitute a closing of the pleadings as to allow the filing of the
answer. As the court noted, this would lead to bizarre results, e.g., that even after
judgment, a counterclaim could be allowed. Examining the particular facts of the case, the
court stated that all pleading which would have made the counterclaim admissible was
contained in the original complaint, and that nothing subsequently filed added any new
relevant material. The court concluded that the pleadings were closed upon the filing of
the plaintiff's reply, when the pleadings “` terminated in an issue or issues of fact decisive
of the merits of the case'”. Under this rationale, if the court allows a plaintiff to file
additional pleadings with new allegations, the pleadings might be considered closed upon
the filing of the plaintiff's reply to the defendant's answer to those allegations. The nature
of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure
result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent
adjudication of the court, provided that such counterclaim states a sufficient cause of
action and does not labor under any infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal.
Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to be
valid on its face, including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the
dismissal of the main action. The court’s authority to proceed with the disposition of the
counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the
counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the
court based on its own merits and evidentiary support. In Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte
Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporartion,29 a case on all fours with the present one, we
expounded our ruling in Pinga and pointed out that the dismissal of the counterclaim due
to the fault of the plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
any pending counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or separate action, thus: Based
on the aforequoted ruling of the Court, if the dismissal of the complaint somehow
eliminates the cause of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive.
Conversely, if the counterclaim itself states sufficient cause of action then it should stand
independently of and survive the dismissal of the complaint. Now, having been directly
confronted with the problem of whether the compulsory counterclaim by reason of the
unfounded suit may prosper even if the main complaint had been dismissed, we rule in the
affirmative. It bears to emphasize that petitioner's counterclaim against respondent is for
damages and attorney's fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent's
Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may have very well already
incurred damages and litigation expenses such as attorney's fees since it was forced to
engage legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons
upon it.