Heaviest Artillery In Congressional Arsenal

Jose C. Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated September 17, 2010 12:00 AM

This is how Lord Bryce described the power of impeachment over a

century ago as quoted by former Chief Justice Reynato Puno in his
concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Francisco vs. House of
Representatives (415 SCRA 44). According to the former Chief Justice,
this power is political in character. It is a “political proceeding and
impeachable offenses are political crimes,” said former CJ Puno in the
said case as he traced the historical roots of impeachment. Political
offenses are “those which proceed from the misconduct of public men,
or in other words from the abuse or violation of public trust”. They are
denominated as “political because they relate chiefly to injuries done
directly to society itself” (A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 65, 423-24)

Obviously, because of the political character of impeachment, some

members of the House of Representatives are now resenting, to the
point of defiance and threats of precipitating a constitutional crisis, the
recent Supreme Court order in the case filed before it by Ombudsman
Merceditas Gutierrez. The SC required them to maintain the status quo
and refrain from taking further action on the two impeachment
complaints filed against Gutierrez.
 
The defiant members of the Lower House believe that since
impeachment is political in nature, it involves purely political questions
or “those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or the
executive branch

It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality
of a particular measure (Tanada vs. Cuenco, 100 Phils. 1101). Hence
they think that as members of a co-equal branch of the government,
their actions on the Gutierrez’ impeachment proceedings are not subject
to review by the Supreme Court.

Indeed, as held in the case of Angara vs. Electoral

Commission (63 Phils. 139) the power of judicial review or the power to
review and set aside the acts of Congress and the Executive when they
infringe the Constitution, is limited by the political question doctrine.
Pursuant to this ruling, the judiciary is barred from passing upon issues
the resolution of which has been given by the Constitution to the
Legislative, the Executive or the people themselves. But is the question
raised by Gutierrez in her petition before the SC a political question?
Gutierrez went to the SC because of the two complaints filed by former
Akbayan Representative Risa Baraquel and the militant groups led by
the Bayan Party list for betrayal of public trust and for culpable violation
of the Constitution. According to her, the filing of the two complaints
violates Section 3 (5) Article XI which provides that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year”. This prohibition is also found in Rule V
Section 14 of the House Rules of Procedure in impeachment
proceedings. Obviously, the question here is whether the action of the
Justice Committee of the Lower House in accepting the two complaints
and finding them sufficient in form and substance already violates this
Constitutional provision. In other words, when the first impeachment
complaint was filed by Baraquel and accepted by the Justice Committee
as sufficient in form and substance, was an impeachment proceeding
already “initiated” such that when the second complaint was filed by
Bayan and also accepted by the Justice Committee as sufficient in form
and substance, there is already a violation of Section 3 (5) of the
Constitution?

It is quite clear that this question presented before the SC involves a

possible infringement of the Constitution by the Lower House and
therefore, not strictly a political question which the Legislative
Department alone should resolve. Apparently, there may be sufficient
reason for the eight Justices of the SC to rule that it can intervene in the
Gutierrez impeachment case and to issue that status quo ante order
until the petition is decided on its merits.

Of course the action of the eight SC justices is still controversial

precisely because the phrase “no impeachment proceeding may be
initiated” is quite vague and can be interpreted differently as the three
dissenting Justices did. But since majority of the Justices have seen fit
to intervene, the Lower House should just abide by the status quo ante
order and let the SC settle the doubt surrounding Section 3 (5) Article XI
of the Constitution.

Actually, the doubt surrounding this section revolves on when the

impeachment proceeding is “initiated”: is it upon the filing of a verified
complaint for impeachment in the Lower House or is it upon the
submission by the Justice Committee of its report with the
corresponding resolution and the vote of at least one third of all the
members of the House affirming or overriding said resolution? This is
the issue that the SC has to decide on the merits; the crux of the
controversy.
A closer scrutiny of the entire Section 3 Article XI regarding the
exclusive power of the Lower House to initiate all cases of impeachment
tends to favor the interpretation that it is upon the submission of the
Committee report and the action of one third of the House membership
when the impeachment proceeding is initiated. This view is supported
by the fact that the provision barring the initiation of impeachment
against the same official more than once within a period of one year is
only on the 5th paragraph after the action of all the members of the
House. Besides the Constitution uses the word impeachment
proceeding, not impeachment complaint. So the Gutierrez petition may
eventually be dismissed after all.