CASE DIGESTS – SEPARATION OF POWERS

1. In Re: Manzano 166 SCRA 246 (1988)

Doctrine: Separation of Powers / Checks and Balances

IN RE: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice
A.M. No. 88 – 7 – 1861 RTC October 5, 1988

FACTS:
Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano was designated by the Ilocos Norte Governor Rodolfo C. Farinas to
be a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice. Before accepting the
appointment, he wrote a letter to the Supreme Court to ask for permission and official resolution
to accept the designation. The SC examined the executive order (EO No. 856) related to the
creation of the Provincial/City Committees on Justice and found out that among the functions of
the
Committee were:
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be
found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.

ISSUE:
Should Judge Manzano’s request be granted?

RULING:
No. The Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice discharges administrative functions and
under the Constitution (Section 12, Art VIII, Constitution), members of the Supreme Court and
other courts should not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
...
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but
only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfilment of their judicial
duties...

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
 2. Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 139

Doctrine: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It

obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department
of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of check and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

FACTS:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial
board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the
said district, for having received the most number of votes.

On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified.

Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the
Electoral Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”, alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of
the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period

Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “Answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that there is
no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a
member of the National Assembly after confirmation. The Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative
2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming
to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly

RULING:
1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted
by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.

In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And
if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework?
To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion
in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion
that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly.”

2. No. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
“SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the
Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.”

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining
to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as
the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which
prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the
majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in
the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be
sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section
4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled “Legislative Department” of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions are also significant in that it is constituted by a
majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.

If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate
the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay
down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power
to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly.
Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented
of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred
to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution.

The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably
lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious
that this result should not be permitted.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission
may abuse its regulatory authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the
disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But
the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power
that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the
remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary.

We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much
confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as
they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and
each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must
be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for
which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional
agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however
illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3,
1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
“the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly”, to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by
the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have
been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary.

As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial
board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and
to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly,
adopted December 6, 1935).

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as
a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the
present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is
an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
 3. Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533

o GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power

o EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation
o Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The
widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based
on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial
expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of
the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:

W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that
POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization,
the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not
subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797. … “The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce
it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by
“filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.
 4. Dante Casibang v. Hon. Narciso Aquino 92 SCRA 642\
FACTS: 

Respondent Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan
in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who
seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan; on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and
consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4)
open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the
1971 Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 1972, the incumbent President issued Proclamation No. 1081,
placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, on
November 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to
supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was ratified by the sovereign people of the
Philippines on January 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that “there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect” (Javellana vs.
Executive Secretary).

Thereafter or on October 1973, the petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and
in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on
the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory
Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case.
Respondent Yu contended that “… the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local
governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, local governments
should adhere to the parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution
under its Article XI.” Furthermore, he stated that local elective officials have no more four-year
term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the
New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: He contended that the New Constitution did not divest the
CFI of its jurisdiction to hear and decide election protests pending before them at the time of its
ratification and effectivity; that the ratification of the New Constitution and its effectivity did not
automatically abolish the office and position of municipal mayor nor has it automatically cut
short the tenure of the office, so as to render the issue as to who is the lawfully elected candidate
to said office or position moot and academic; that election protests involve public interest such
that the same must be heard until terminated and may not be dismissed on mere speculation that
the office involved may have been abolished, modified or reorganized; and that the motion to
dismiss was filed manifestly for delay.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: P.R. Yu contends that the election cases of the 1935

Constitution being interwoven in the political complexion of our new Constitution should be
dismissed since the adoption of the New Constitution by the people signified their intent to
adhere to a Parliamentary form of government and by reason of such adoption, the position of
Municipal Mayor has indeed been abolished. That pursuant to Sec 9 of Art XVII stating “All
officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, …” protects
only those incumbent government officials and employees and since the protestant is not such
protected government official, should he win his election protest, he would have no right to hold
such office since he does not fall within the ambit of incumbent government officials at the time
of the adoption of the New Constitution.

ISSUE: w/n the New Constitution placed the election review outside the ambit of judicial
review

HELD: No. The case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political
question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President
or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge
decides the election protest. The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

That “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for
the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the
new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every
person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under
protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9,
Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the
framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a
candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code,
commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a
proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.”‘ We rationalize that “the
Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or
protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private
respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to
question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election
victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities
prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot.” 

Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political
color. That section merely allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local
government code and any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect
until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” It is apparent
at once that such power committed by the New Constitution to the National Assembly will not be
usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the
electoral protest case. Whoever will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the
disputed office of mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in this
country; subject always to whatever change or modification the National Assembly will
introduce when it will enact the local government code.
 5. Belgica v. Ochoa November 19, 2013

FACTS:

History of Pork Barrel in the Philippines

Act 3044, or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered as the earliest form of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were
subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. In 1950, the mechanics of the public works act
was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators.

By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under
the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports, it was under the
SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each
assemblyman receiving P500,000.00.

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and
the "Visayas Development Fund". The clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators
for a similar funding prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF)
which was integrated into the 1990 GAA with an initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small
local infrastructure and other priority community projects."

It has been reported that by 1992, Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF
funds, while Senators were receivingP18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification,
and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as
roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.

In 1993, under the administration of President Ramos, the GAA explicitly stated that the release
of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified
by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an
allocation for the Vice-President. As such, Representatives were allocatedP12.5 Million each in
CDF funds, Senators,P18 Million each, and the Vice-President,P20 Million.

It was under President Estrada’s administration where Priority Development Assistance Fund"
(PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective
Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing
agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of
funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount
shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.
In 2005, the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and
projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to
the implementing agencies." Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with
respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate.

Under the present administration, 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles states that the "identification of
projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to priority list requirement. However,
as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project
from the said priority list.

Provisions on legislator allocations as well as fund realignment were included in the 2012 and
2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged atP200 Million
in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to
be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects. Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of
the House

History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

The term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have,
however, shown that the terms usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such
as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
910, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the
said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.

The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced
from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

Controversies in the Philippines

In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004
GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support
that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its
probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of someP10 Billion over the past
10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects."The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six
(6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles
(Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no
fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.

After its investigation, criminal complaints were filed before the Ombudsman charging several
public officers and NGO presidents with Graft and Corruption, Bribery and Malversation.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional. These cases were consolidated by the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Pork Barrel System is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes.

Political Law - Legal requisites for Judicial Inquiry

Actual case or controversy

The questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and
the provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the
Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

Respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform
budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their
constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."
The Court must deny respondents submission. To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing

Locus Standi

Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing
"Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is
undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of
public funds, if the Court so rules. Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the
standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

Political Law - Separations of Powers

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a
function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of
government. Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national
budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and
the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle.

Political Law - Non- delegability of Legislative Power

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.

Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have
been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the
similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

Political Law - Checks and Balances

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount ofP24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto.

Political Law - Accountability

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The
fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating
or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of
oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.

Political Law - Local Autonomy

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are
national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.

This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of
the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist
the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting
as a body.

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-
driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the
district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and
thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

Presidential Pork Barrel

Political Law - validity of appropriation

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended
by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury.

The Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and specific"
purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision
designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence,
already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under
contemplation of the Constitution.

Political Law - Undue Delegation

Petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used."

The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used.

First, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory
reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be
limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government;and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the
Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government."
Conclusion

In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in
view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates.

It has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority

in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers;
insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar
as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations
bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the
President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance
which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in
affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise
subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the
power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes
he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority
infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-
delegability.
 6. Sanidad v. COMELEC

FACTS:

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call
for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies
(“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and
length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions
that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the
citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several
proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national
referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16,
and to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting
that the power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of
the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of
October 16. They assert that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation
renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of
age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised
is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also
asserts that at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to
exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUE:

WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and
1033).

HELD:

YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained
it was of political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one.
This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments
to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly. The normal course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
president undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect,
through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment
procedure raises a contestable issue.
 7. Daza v. Singson

Doctrine: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the
several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-
Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18,
of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party. 

FACTS

Petitioner Representative Daza represents the Liberal Part (LP) in the Commission on
Appointments (CA). When Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, the
political realignment resulted in the swelling of the number of LDP members to 159 and
diminishing that of LP to 17.

The House consequently revised its representation in the CA giving Daza’s seat to respondent
Rep. Singson as an additional member from the LDP.

Daza now challenges his removal. Singson, in response, argues, among others that the question
raised by Daza is political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of this court.

ISSUE

Whether the issue raised beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

RULING

No.

What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in
removing Daza from the CA.

The issue presented is justiciable rather than political, political, involving as it does the manner
of filling the CA as prescribed in the constitution and not the discretion of the House in the
choice of its representative.
 8. ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Hon. Cesar Purisima August 14, 2008

Doctrine: It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an
enema, a first-aid measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor
is it turning a deaf ear on the plight of the masses. But it does not have the panacea for the
malady that the law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as
unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.

FACTS:

Petitioners then filed a petition contending that sections 4,5, and 6 of RA 9337 (An Act
Amending Certain Sections of the NIRC) giving the President the stand-by authority to raise
VAT rate from 10% to 12% when certain conditions are met constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power to tax.

ISSUE:

Is the standby authority given to the President an undue delegation of legislative power?

RULING:

No.

The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power.

It is a simple delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of

the increase rate under the law are contingent. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the increase to a 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President.

WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.
There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A.
No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005, is LIFTED upon
finality of herein decision.

Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of
remedies for all political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously
allocated the powers of government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that
judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the three, and
zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the
others and that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either by
impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.
CASE DIGESTS – DELEGATION OF POWERS

1. Garcia v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) states that in the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security, the President, subject to limitations therein
provided, may increase xxx existing protective rates of import duty xxx when necessary.
Pursuant to the TCC, the President issued EO 475 and 478 imposing an additional duty of
9% ad valorem to imported crude oil and other oil products, and a special duty of P0.95
per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. Rep. Garcia
contests the validity of the foregoing EOs averring that they are violative of Sec 24, Art
VI of the Constitution which provides: All xxx revenue or tariff bills shall originate in the
House of Representatives xxx. He also argues that said EOs contravene the TCC because
the latter authorizes the President to, according to him, impose additional duties only
when necessary to protect local industries.

ISSUE:

Are said EOs unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. There is explicit Constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President to,
“subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose”, fix “within specific
limits tariff rates xxx and other duties or imposts xxx.”¹ Moreover, Garcia’s argument that the
“protection of local industries” is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the
exercise of the delegated authority—that which was provided in the TCC to be exercised by the
President in “the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security”—is a
stiflingly narrow one. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers is at the very
least as important a dimension of the “the interest of national economy, general welfare and
national security” as the protection of local industries but not to raise additional revenue for the
government.

Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed Executive Orders are valid. Congress may by
law authorize the president to fit tariff rates and other duties within specified limits. The issuance
of these EOs authorized by Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is
nothing in the law that suggests that the authority may only be exercised to protect local
industries. Custom duties may be designated to achieve more than one policy objective the
protection of local industries and to raise revenue for the government.
 2. People v. Vera

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial  and thereafter remanded the case to
the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for
probation to the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th
branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting
of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has
not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional
and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office."

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context,
is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the
different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not
lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various
boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to
show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the
necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation
officer without the probation system.
 3. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Doctrine: The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.

FACTS:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is
a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Executive Order is valid.

RATIO: 
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area
to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be
given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power
to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions
and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Note: The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally

speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the
ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It
has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out
of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
 4. Tablarin v. Guttierez

FACTS: 
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). 
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

ARGUMENTS & ISSUES RAISED:

VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that portion of
the MECS Order which provides that “the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the
scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after
consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges” infringes the requirements of
equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a given
school year. e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for
an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order
“arbitrary and capricious.” The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff
scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those
years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the
number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number
of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during
the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To
establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from
year to year, may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order
No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the
measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.

POLICE POWER 
This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice
of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is
also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish
to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized
medical school — for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.||

NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts.” The standards set for subordinate legislation
in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical
Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando
in Edu v. Ericta  — “The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In
the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained
as in Calalang v. Williams is ‘safe transit upon the roads.'” We believe and so hold that the
necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and
regulation of medical education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the
statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements
of the non-delegation principle.
 5. Pacific Steam Laundry Inc. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority

FACTS:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 5
September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent which showed
non-compliance. After a series of subsequent water sampling, PSL still failed to conform to the regulatory
standards. Another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002, in response to the 17 May 2002
request for re-sampling received by LLDA, finally showed compliance with the effluent standard in all
parameters. On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay indicating therein that the penalty should be
imposed from the date of initial sampling to the date the request for re-sampling was received by the Authority.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the LLDA denied.

ISSUE:
WON the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of legislative
powers.

RULING
LLDA’s power to impose fines is not unrestricted.It was only after the investigation finding the petitioner failing to
meet the established water and effluent quality standards that the LLDA imposed the penalty of P 1,000.00 per
day. The P 1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with the Amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984.

PD 984 was created and established the National Pollution Control Commission under the Office of the President.
EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR
secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution
cases. Under EO 927 (FURTHER DEFINING CERTAIN FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY), LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to
effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing, and enforcement.