CONSTI CASES PAGE 2

A. Power of Judicial Review

1. Judicial Review
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd,
Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared
elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day
for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the
protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l
Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;

RULING:
YES.
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election
protest filed by Ynsua.

DISCUSSION:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of
the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further
check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly
operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is
essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the governments of the government.

Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 25, 1991

Facts:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and EmigdioBondoc of the NP were
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is
composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of
Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had
been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC
Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing
him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On
the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal
that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issues:
 1.) Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of t e dominant political party therein,
may h change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely
reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.
2.) May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

Held:

1. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of
party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by
the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore,
null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation
with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election contests and qualifications concerning
members of Congress For HRET to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, it must be independent and
impartial, a separate body from the legislative HRET members are entitled to security of tenure
regardless of any change in their political affiliations HRET members cannot be removed for disloyalty to
a party.

2. YES. It is the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or
executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. That duty is a
part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the
courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President
and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of
inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable
controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such
action, as in this case. 
 2. Who may exercise the power

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

Facts:
Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order
decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the
case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal
Industry (AI) may also see fit. 

Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated by
the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from
ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed
validity. 

On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a
right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE
a. Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.
b. Who may exercise the power of Judicial Review?

HELD:

a. YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests
of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b)
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court
has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so
to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the
method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive.
The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance
of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention
of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the
second requirement. 

Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The
object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of
the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty
in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. 

Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it
amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no
trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as
forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly
dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. 

However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of
the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of
the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers
mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. 

The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are
nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise
prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.

B.) The SC ruled that the lower courts are not prevented from resolving constitutional questions. We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to “review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or rules of court may provide,” final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures. “

CIR v. CTA, G.R. No. L-44007, March 20, 1991

FACTS:
Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Co., Ltd. is a foreign corporation, organized and existing
under the laws of Great Britain and is engaged in international telecommunications and was given a
concession for the construction, operation and maintenance of submarine telegraph cable from Hongkong to
Manila by a Royal Decree of the Spanish Government dated March 30, 1898. Upon the concession's
expiration in 1952, RA No. 808 was approved granting Eastern Extension a legislative franchise "to land,
construct, maintain and operate at Manila in the Philippines a submarine telegraph cable connecting Manila
with Hongkong." Section 8 thereof granted to the Corporation a tax exemption from the payment of taxes
whether municipal, provincial, or national except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and the tax on
its real property. In 1967, RA No. 808 was amended by RA No. 5002 leaving Sec. 8 unchanged.

In 1971, CIR assessed Eastern Extension with a deficiency income tax for the years 1952 to 1971 on the
ground that RA No. 808 as amended is inoperative for it violates the Section 8, Art. XIV of the 1935
Constitution. Said provision provides that corporations or other entities to be granted franchise for public
utility should be organized under the laws of the Philippines 60% of the capital of which is owned by citizens
of the Philippines. CIR argued that since private respondent is 100% owned by British citizens, it is illegally
operating its business in the Philippines. On the other hand, Eastern Extension questioned CIR's authority to
assess it pointing out the franchise and its exclusive tax feature. It contends further that the assessment is
incorrect and without basis and that prescription had set in on part of the assessment assuming that the
assessment is valid.
Eastern Extension filed a complaint against CIR questioning the legality of its assessment. The CA ruled that
while the franchise was unconstitutional, CIR's assessment has no legal effect because it was made beyond
the prescribed period required by the Tax Code. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutionality of the legislative franchise granted to the respondent Corporation should
have been passed upon by the respondent Court when it was not an issue raised in the pleadings;

RULING: YES

It has been the persistent contention of the petitioner that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 808 was never
raised as an issue by either party. Moreover, petitioner argued that said issue was not necessary in the
resolution of this case. On the other hand, both public and respondent corporation maintained that the issue
was properly raised during the trial. Respondent tax court, in its resolution dated June 18, 1976 stated as
follows:

The constitutionality of the legislative franchise granted to petitioner (now private respondent) under
Republic Act No. 808, as amended, is not only an indispensable issue in this case but a prejudicial
question to be resolved by the Court. 

Although We sustain the respondent tax court's finding that the constitutional issue was squarely raised by
the parties, We find merit with the contention of the petitioner that it is not necessary for the disposition of
this case. The fact that constitutional question was properly raised by a party is not alone sufficient for
the respondent court to pass upon the issue of constitutionality. This is supported by recent Supreme
Court rulings which oblige every court to approach a constitutional question with grave care and considerable
caution. Thus:

It is a well-settled rule that no constitutional question will be heard and resolved unless the following
requisites of a judicial inquiry are present: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function
be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed
upon in order to decide the case" (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95
SCRA 400 [1980]; National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657 [1989]).

Undoubtedly, the last criterion is not present. This case can be resolved based on the other available
grounds obtaining in this case. Respondent court should have avoided the issue and instead maintained
the presumption of constitutionality. A law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined
to be constitutional before it was finally enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive .
Accordingly, this Court gives high respect for the acts of the other departments of the government and, as
much as possible, avoids deciding the constitutional question.

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

Facts:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition(Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
 violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her
senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of
petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J.
Garcia, 3 years old.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and
her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPOon March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30)
days,

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPOseeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO. Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner
movedfor the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the
TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

In its Order dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10)
days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,however, that he has not received a copy of
private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Orderdated October 6,
2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Orderdated a day earlier, October 5,
had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection
Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and
continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petitionfor prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted
product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order(TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of
petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is
clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a
petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral
attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution dated August
14, 2007, petitioner is now the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is an undue delegation of judicial power to the barangay officials in relation to RA
9262.

HELD:
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law"
and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. The pertinent
provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection Orders
(BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a
BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the
basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay
Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal
service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain
facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that
these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of
a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even be labor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very
unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already
stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to
enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A.
9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001

Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols'
sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The
Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the
payment of their obligations to it. President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine
Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance
PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to
the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners
asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans
from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to
settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim. Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds,
insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained
adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings
from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a
suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

Ruling: yes

It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute, presidential decree, or executive order.The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

Furthermore, B.P. BIg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or
treaties with the Constitution, thus:

"SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of pecuniary estimation;"

The pivotal issue, which we must address, is whether it was proper for the trial court to have exercised
judicial review.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that it was improper for the trial court to have
declared P.D. No. 57912 unconstitutional, since petitioners had not complied with Rule 64, Section 3, of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that said Rule specifically refers only to actions for declaratory relief and
not to an ordinary action for accounting, specific performance, and damages.

Petitioners' contentions are bereft of merit. Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. - In any action which involves the validity of a statute, or
executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute,
executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question."

This should be read in relation to Section 1 [c] of P.D. No. 478,which states in part:

"SECTION 1. Functions and Organizations  - (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall...have the
following specific powers and functions:

xxx

"[c] Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, executive order or
proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment his intervention is necessary or when requested
by the court."

It is basic legal construction that where words of command such as "shall," "must," or "ought" are employed,
they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. 14 Thus, where, as in Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, the word "shall" is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.

The purpose of the mandatory Notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the
Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that,
contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory
relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just
actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the true, there is no
room for constnlction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the trial court ever
require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the
constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the
required notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned
presidential decrees.

3. Functions of Judicial Review

Salonga v. Pano, G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985

FACTS:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process
clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for
subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron
arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the
Philippines.

The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of
August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary
Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating
that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December
12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting
evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was
lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the
charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas,
dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as
amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. 

On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure
of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano
(Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. 

On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the
Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said
judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. 

It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of
evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
(2) Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court

HELD:

1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been
arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on
January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice,
the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of
the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.

The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft
ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s crowded
agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this
decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on
several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection
given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:

“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be
created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter
pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article
XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and
academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the
most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

4. Political question
Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101
FACTS:

Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano
J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes,
restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices
respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito
restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes, pending this action. Petitioners likewise prayed that judgment be rendered ousting
respondents from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be
altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary injunction permanent.

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the
legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents,
likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of
jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal

ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?

HELD:

NO.

[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to
decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination .. of the party
having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political
question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are
claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass
upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and,
 particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or
statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine
the principal issue raised by the parties herein.

Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 16, 1998

FACTS

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore,
and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the “minority.”
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate “minority,” Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that
the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority
— had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering
privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By
virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto,
alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and    exercising the position of Senate minority
leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?

HELD

FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was
deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for
reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) “in the light of subsequent events
which justify its intervention;” and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President
(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court’s power of judicial review).
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators
was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate’s “full discretionary
authority,” but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it
clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to
consider and determine the issue.

SECOND ISSUE
There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support
from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter
says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself,
not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color
of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action
may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a
clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion
has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion – such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of
the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this
party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both
sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of
“an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.” Where no provision of the Constitution,
the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS: 
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization established for
the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the
Second World War.Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked
villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were
bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered.
Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly
raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the
petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental
and emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

ISSUE:

Did respondents commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them?

HELD:

Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure." Certain types of cases often have been found to present political
questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct
of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."

Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but
to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace
of 1951.The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail
the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our country's
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed. DISMISSED.
 Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

FACTS

HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

 The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative’s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the
Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended
portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became involved
in project identification.
 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called “Support for
Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or “hard projects”
but also covered “soft projects” such as those which would fall under education, health and
livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was
revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas Development Fund”.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”). The CDF was
meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies
subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen
could identify any kind of project from “hard projects” such as roads, buildings and bridges to “soft
projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the
first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.
 Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF.
Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how,
where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food
Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with
members of Congress for the release of funds.
  In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required
prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also
allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel
benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently
chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts
allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on
realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were
also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and
release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
 The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (“PD”)
No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money regularly
went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks.
 In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded
the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a
dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners
 have legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-
delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties,
(f) local autonomy.

RULING

PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
 The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their utilization
are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to
nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
 The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering that: (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system
presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a
practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and
the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to sue
 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
 The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez because the Philconsa case was
a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
  On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation
between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those related to the
area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering that
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form
of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be exercised by individual
members of Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already
been passed.
 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management does
not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and
hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been violated.
 The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive
department.
 Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities
and the ― regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
 That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law.
 Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature.
They even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before
the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated
 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress.
 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
 The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them
determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary
that they themselves also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
 receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
 It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing
the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda
and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
 In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of checking
itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
 The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government,
because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.
 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
 Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy
 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development.
 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
 The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
 This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already legally mandated to―assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
  Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing
local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law”, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable
amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a Special
Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any
and all sources.
 It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings
be less than P150,000,000.00.
 It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of legislation
powers.
 The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section
8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
 This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of
the law.
 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
 The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility.

Corona v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012

FACTS:
A verified complaint for impeachment was filed against Chief Justice Renato Corona by respondent
Members of the House of Representatives (HOR). The complaint was transmitted to the Senate which
convened as an impeachment court.

Petitioner Corona received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption:
a. when he failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth as
required under Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution;
b. by failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII, Section 7 (3) of the
Constitution that provides that “[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence” in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a
counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases;
c. in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to
office; and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court; when he
blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo ante” order
against the HOR in the case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-
Gutierrez;

d. through wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of res
judicata in the cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island
into a province;
e. by arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and jurisdiction to
improperly investigate a justice of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such
authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the Constitution in the HOR via impeachment.

f. through his partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband in order to give them an opportunity to escape
prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court decision on the
effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the conditions of the Supreme
Court’s own TRO.

g. when he failed and refused to account for the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Special
Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) collections.

The Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s request for subpoena directed to the officers of two
private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies. PSBank filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the Impeachment Court and the
HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized
representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the opening documents for
petitioner’s alleged foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas
including the bank statements showing the year-end balances for the said accounts.

This Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing the Resolution and
subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, both
dated February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for the inhibition of

Justices Carpio and Sereno “in the absence of any applicable compulsory ground and of any voluntary
inhibition from the Justices concerned.”

On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it proceeded to trial on the basis of the
complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for
lack of probable cause. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is
being violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the cold
neutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned SenatorJudge
Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further
called attention to the fact that despite the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution which
disallowed the introduction of evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for
reconsideration would be entertained, “the allies of President Aquino in the Senate abused their authority
and continued their presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of objection”.

In view of the persistent efforts of President Aquino’s Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of Presiding
Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of Article II -
for which President Aquino even thanked “his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution could not”-
petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court. In the Comment Ad Cautelam
Ex Superabundanti filed on behalf of the respondents, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petition
raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or resolved only by the Senate and HOR,
with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the respondents “without submitting themselves
to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional and exclusive
power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of the Senate to try and decide all cases of
impeachment.” Citing the case of Nixon v. United States, respondents contend that to allow a public
official being impeached to raise before this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the
impeachment complaint would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that may even go
beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what
the Constitution intended.

Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very
essence of impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to
petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of
confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this case were correctly and judiciously issued.
Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is being conducted in
accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure
that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner
allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed that the
present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or
incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of
right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.

RULING:

Impeachment, described as “the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,”14 was foreseen as
creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger
that “the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.”15 Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the
separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in
this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally
entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or
arbitrariness.

Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct
as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its
roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law
on the Framers of the US Constitution.

Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner
was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was
accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the
alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the
hearings.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the
behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or
allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole
power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these
constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the
actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when
sitting as an Impeachment Court, SenatorJudges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the
witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of
partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or
not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.

In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without
any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening
applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice
within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.

5.Requisites of Judicial Review

a. Actual case or controversy

Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998

FACTS:

In 1995, the (NBI) conducted an The investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national
and local government officials in “jueteng” and other forms of illegal gambling which has also been the
subject of a legislative inquiry/investigation by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of . . . national
and local politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the Government’s “Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Program.” Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in his capacity as Chairman of
the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG) during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino until his
resignation in 1989. He also revealed that he and members of his family were in danger of being liquidated,
facing as he did the formidable world of corruption with a well-entrenched hold on Philippine social, political
and economic systems.

After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, the Department of Justice admitted Roque to the program.

On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr. and
Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his stint as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG),
several gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered him
money and other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids
on their respective gambling operations.

On the basis of Roque’s sworn statement, the sworn statement and supplemental affidavit of one Angelito H.
Sanchez, and the sworn statement of Gen. Lorenzo Mateo, then NBI Director Mariano M. Mison forwarded
the result of their investigation on the “jueteng” scam to the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommending the
filing of the following charges against Pineda and other persons . . . .

x x x           x x x          x x x

The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling (composed of the petitioner-prosecutors), created by petitioner
Secretary Teofisto Guingona on November 24, 1995 (Annex “F”), conducted a preliminary investigation of
the case and subpoenaed all the respondents.

On December 21, 1995, Roque executed a supplemental sworn statement. 

On January 5, 1996, Pineda filed a “Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to
the Witness Protection Program,” which was denied by petitioner Secretary. On January 23, 1996, Pineda
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of Appeals.

x x x           x x x          x x x

In the meantime, petitioner-prosecutors proceeded with their preliminary investigation, and on February 2,
1996, they issued a resolution finding probable cause to charge private respondent Pineda with several
offenses. On February 5, 1996, three (3) Informations for corruption of public officials were filed against him
in the Manila and Pasig City Trial Courts. He was subsequently arraigned on February 28, 1996 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 of the City of Manila presided by Judge Enrico Lanzanes, and on March 14,
1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, of Pasig City, presided by Judge Benjamin Pelayo.

On March 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals came up with a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining both trial
courts from hearing the criminal actions in the meantime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a witness’ testimony requires prior or simultaneous corroboration at the time he is admitted
into the witness protection, security and benefit program. 

HELD: 

The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant the exercise of
judicial power.

No Actual Controversy

Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition fundamentally defective. The
Constitution provides that judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.” 6 According to Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, a noted constitutionalist, courts are mandated to settle disputes between real conflicting parties
through the application of the law. 7 Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands
the following: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question
must be ripe for adjudication; 8 and (3) the person challenging must have “standing”; that is, he has personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury. 9

The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power.
Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned
problems 10 or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests. 11 Courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. 12 As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between
litigants must first exist. 13

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable
controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only
advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 14

Closely related to the requirement of an “actual case,” Bernas continues, is the second requirement that the
question is “ripe” for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 

The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its
duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, Justice Laurel asserted, “will neither direct nor
restrain executive or legislative action . . . .” 19 The legislative and the executive branches are not allowed to
seek its advice on what to do or not to do; thus, judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meantime. Before
a court may enter the picture, a prerequisite is that something has been accomplished or performed by either
branch. Then may it pass on the validity of what has been done but, then again, only “when . . . properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.” 20
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of
the appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roque’s testimony, inasmuch as
the assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this
suit out of fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage
witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this
particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.

After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors, Respondent Court
allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court against the
private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque’s admission to the Program is already a moot and academic
issue that clearly does not warrant judicial review.

Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated nor any claims that conflict. In fact, no
affirmative relief is being sought in this case. The Court concurs with the opinion of counsel for private
respondent that this action is a “purely academic exercise,” which has no relevance to the criminal cases
against Respondent Pineda. After the assailed Decision had been rendered, trial in those cases proceeded in
earnest, and Roque testified in all of them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his “academic
interest on how the State machinery will deal with witnesses who are admittedly guilty of the crimes but are
discharged to testify against their co-accused.”

Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case ripe for adjudication.
Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that
can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.  

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Facts:

The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the
legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the
full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an
enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s
health and population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality of RH
Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect. The Court
then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to
them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a
population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
 population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive
health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.

ISSUES:

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues:

1. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1.  Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1. Right to Life
2. Right to Health
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4. The Family
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6. Due Process
7. Equal Protection
8. Involuntary Servitude
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM

RULING:

1. Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to
resolve some procedural impediments.
1.  The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a
controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing
operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the
rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
 constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.
2. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. In
this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
3. The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a
First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are
modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has
withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
4. The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with
the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
5. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
6. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” In this case, a
textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth.
2. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.
According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it
is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of implantation as the
beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
 convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity
not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
2. A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions are self-executing.
Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.
In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
1.    x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing.  If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that –… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing. . . .

2. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body,
which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.

3. It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one’s
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint
or whether the same is right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared
that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and
rule of a church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has
authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the
State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion
of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot
refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between
Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God
the things that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an
act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the
basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
1. The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or
private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in
the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
 2. The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the
RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion.
3. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive
health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or
who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
4. The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody
of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling
state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
5. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and
validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
6. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application.  It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be
taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a
rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health care program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section
11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be
noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH
Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
“promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health.”
8. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar
means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether
to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
 bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden,
but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate
state interest. Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized
that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health
services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as “health products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food
and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as
follows:
1. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say specific solutions.

10. A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will be
the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not
absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the
local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

(check the previous digest)

PACU v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955

Facts:

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known
as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the
Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be
declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well
as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents
of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on
the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute
towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706:

“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all
private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the
public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said
Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said
schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,”

The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is
not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they
contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law
requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right 

On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the
matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional
question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is
constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.

Issue:

Whether or not there exists a justiciable controversy to authorize the courts to pass on the constitutionality of
Act 2706

Held:

None of petitioners has cause to present this issue. Where the petitioning private schools are actually
operating by virtue of permits issued to them by the Secretary of Education under Act No. 2706, who is not
shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is no justiciable controversy that would authorize the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of said Act. 

Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of
petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.  “The power of courts to declare a law
unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their
protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient.” They have suffered no wrong
under the terms of the law— and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.

Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004

Doctrine:
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper legal interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the “transcendental importance” of the case, as it
necessarily involves the application of the constitutional principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid.
The nature of the present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules
in order to resolve the case.

Facts:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment
and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the LGC.

The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-
005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG
for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for
the release thereof.

Issue:

WON the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to file the present suit

Ruling:

Yes. The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The
petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and
of the other LGUs. This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. The
petitioners constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the
automatic release to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes. Further, the injury that the petitioner
claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the assailed measures. These allegations
are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs
of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has a plain, direct and adequate
interest in the manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of
1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Quino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 197466, November 13, 2012

Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010

Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002
Funa v. CSC, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014
 Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
Fernandez v. Torres, G.R. No. 102940, November 6, 1992
Montesclaros v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002
b. Raised by the proper party
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, February 14, 2009
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, G.R. No. 112399,August 19,
1994