Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No.

L-45081, July 15, 1936

DECISION
(En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution
confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said
resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the
petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not
submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of
respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II.    THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DENIED  the petition.]

NO, the  Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the
earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to
limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
Bondoc vs Pineda
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 thDistrict of Pampanga. Pineda was
a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party
(NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to
Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He
confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to
Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further
prayed that a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new
representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by
HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court
(SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal
is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating
the doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the
legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being
complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a
decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving
Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the
tribunal has already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become
moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura
should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid
cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1
coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17.      The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
G.R. No. L-44007             March 20, 1991

THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, EASTERN EXTENSION AUSTRALASIA and CHINA TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
LTD.,respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

The petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue challenges the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals
dated February 18, 1976 in CTA Case No. 2498 entitled "Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Co. Ltd.
v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue." The dispositive portion of said decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed from is reversed.
Respondent's income tax assessment of P21,523,288.37 issued against the petitioner is hereby cancelled
and declared to be without any legal force and-effect. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 71)

Petitioner also seeks annulment of the Resolution dated June 18, 1976 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
abovementioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 1976 to be without
sufficient legal and valid justification, the same has to be, as it is hereby, DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo,  p. 99)

From the records, the antecedents facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent, Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Co., Ltd. is a foreign corporation, organized
and existing under the laws of Great Britain and is engaged in international telecommunications. By a Royal Decree of
the Spanish Government dated March 30, 1898, petitioner was given a concession for the construction, operation and
maintenance of submarine telegraph cable from Hongkong to Manila.

On June 21, 1952, when the concession expired, Republic Act No. 808 was approved granting to respondent
corporation a legislative franchise "to land, construct, maintain and operate at Manila in the Philippines a submarine
telegraph cable connecting Manila with Hongkong." Section 8 thereof granted to the Corporation a tax exemption from
the payment of an taxes whether municipal, provincial, or national except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings
and the tax on its real property. Thus —

Sec. 8. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the Grantee shall pay to the Republic of
the Philippines during the life of this franchise a tax of five percent of the gross earnings derived by the
grantee from its operation under this franchise and which originate in the Philippines. Such tax shall be due
and payable annually, within ten (10) days after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in
Section seven of this Act, and shall be in lieu of all taxes of any kind, nature or description, levied, established
or collected by any municipal, provincial or Republic Authority except that the Grantee shall pay the tax on its
real property in conformity with existing law.  (Emphasis supplied) (Rollo, p. 180)

On May 2, 1967, Republic Act No. 808 was amended by Republic Act No. 5002 by enlarging the scope of the
franchise granting respondent corporation a franchise to land, construct, maintain and operate telecommunications by
cable or other means known to science or which in the future may be developed for the transmission of messages
between any point in the Philippines to points exterior thereto.

Respondent corporation, pursuant to the provisions of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 808 which was not amended by
Republic Act No. 5002, had duly reported its gross Philippine earnings and paid the corresponding franchise tax
thereon beginning the year 1952 to the General Auditing office.

The controversy commenced on November 25, 1971 when petitioner assessed private respondent in the amount of
P7,122,571.61, representing private respondent's deficiency income tax, inclusive of surcharges, interests and
penalties thereon for the years 1965 to 1970. It is obvious that petitioner made its assessment in view of its belief that
respondent corporation's franchise under Republic Act No. 808, later amended by Republic Act No. 5002 is
inoperative for failure of the latter to conform with the constitutional requirement that it be organized under Philippine
laws with 60% of its capital owned by Filipinos. The provision of Section 8, Art. XIV of the 1935 Constitution provides
as follows:

Art. XIV. Sec. 8. — No franchise, certificate or any other forms of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizen of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under
the laws of the Philippines sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor
shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires.
(Rollo, p. 58)

Petitioner contends that since private respondent is 100% owned by British citizens, it is illegally operating its business
in the Philippines it being a fact that private respondent is engaged in the operation of a public utility. Private
respondent through counsel questioned and disputed this assessment by means of two letters dated 17 and 18
January 1972. The letter questioned petitioner's authority to assess income taxes against private respondent pointing
out the franchise and its exclusive tax feature. It contends further that the assessment is incorrect and without basis
and that prescription had set in on part of the assessment assuming that the assessment is valid.

Petitioner in a letter dated February 28, 1973, rejected the private respondent's position and declared that the Office of
the Commissioner finds no reason to withdraw much more cancel its assessment and even reassessed the private
respondent not only from 1965 to 1970 but from 1952 to 1971 in the aggregate amount of P21,523,288.37
representing deficiency income taxes, inclusive of surcharges, interests and compromise penalties.

On March 13, 1973, private respondent filed with the respondent Court of Tax Appeals a petition for review contesting
the legality of the assessment dated February 28, 1973 with prayer for a restraining order directing the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to desist from enforcing and collecting the same.

In the meanwhile, President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated on July 24, 1974 Presidential Decree No. 489
authorizing the herein respondent corporation to transfer and assign the franchise granted to it under Republic Act No.
808 as amended by Republic Act No. 5002, to the Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. Thereabout,
respondent corporation transferred its franchise to Eastern Telecommunications, Inc. a duly organized corporation
existing under the laws of the Philippines with at least 60% of its capital owned by Filipino citizens.

On February 18, 1976, public respondent rendered the assailed decision. While holding the franchise as
unconstitutional, public respondent declared the petitioner's assessment as cancelled and without any legal force and
effect, the "ratio decidendi" being that the assessment was made beyond the prescribed period required by the Tax
Code; and that the assessment which is tantamount to a revocation of the Tax on Franchise under Section 259 (now
sec. 117) of the Tax Code cannot be given retroactive effect pursuant to the provisions of Section 338- A (now Section
246) of the same code. Unable to obtain a reconsideration from the said decision, this petition for review is now before
Us raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not the constitutionality of the legislative franchise granted to the respondent Corporation should
have been passed upon by the respondent Court when it was not an issue raised in the pleadings;

II. Whether or not the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of gross receipts in lieu of
any and all taxes is unenforceable and without effect, considering that the franchise is inoperative for failure of
the respondent Corporation to comply with the requirements of the Constitution, the Corporation Law and the
Public Service Act.

III. Whether or not the respondent Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring the assessment in
question as "fantastic and fabulous" considering that there had been no trial on the merits of this case.

IV. Whether or not the assessment was issued within the period prescribed by law.

V. Whether or not petitioner's assessment against respondent Corporation is in the nature of a ruling within
the purview of Section 338-A of the National Internal Revenue Code. (pp. 11 -12, Rollo)

It has been the persistent contention of the petitioner that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 808 was never raised as an
issue by either party. Moreover, petitioner argued that said issue was not necessary in the resolution of this case. On
the other hand, both public and respondent corporation maintained that the issue was properly raised during the trial.
Respondent tax court, in its resolution dated June 18, 1976 stated as follows:
 The constitutionality of the legislative franchise granted to petitioner (now private respondent) under Republic
Act No. 808, as amended, is not only an indispensable issue in this case but a prejudicial question to be
resolved by the Court. We will first begin with the BIR Records. In their memorandum to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue dated November 2, 1972, the Investigating Revenue Examiners reported, among others, as
follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

9. That the Court of Tax Appeals has previously decided on an issue of constitutionality in the case of
Jose Ma. Espino v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA No. 1532 March 31, 1969. (Emphasis
supplied; p. 308, BIR Records).

In the statement of Mrs. Librada R. Natividad, Chief, Litigation Division of the BIR, dated October 5, 1973, she
stated, among others, as follows:

Observations and Recommendations:

1. That Eastern is operating illegally because:

(a) Eastern was not organized under Philippine law and/or licensed to do business in the Philippines;

(b) That it is wholly owned by British;

(c) It is engaged in the business of public utility; and

(d) That Republic Act No. 808 is unconstitutional. (Emphasis supplied, p. 448, BIR records)

Even before this case was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the in investigating Revenue Examiners and
the Chief of the Litigation Division, BIR, were already certain that the only way to negate and counteract the
broad legislative grant of tax-exemption to petitioner (private respondent) from the payment of any municipal,
provincial, and national tax under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 808 was to impugn and consider petitioner's
legislative franchise invalid and/or unconstitutional; otherwise, respondent's income tax assessment against
petitioner will have no solid and justifiable legal basis to stand on. (Rollo, pp. 83-85)

x x x           x x x          x x x

It has been said that a review and analysis of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on
January 16, 1965 failed to show that the issue of constitutionality of petitioner's legislative franchise was ever
raised by respondent. It is to be noted, however, that before the formal hearing of this case on the date
abovementioned, a pre-trial conference was held in the private chamber of the undersigned Judge where
Attys. Manuel Tomacruz and Cirilo Francisco where then and there present. At the suggestion of the Court,
both counsel agreed that the prejudicial issue of whether or not petitioner's legislative franchise is valid and
constitutional should be resolved first. (Rollo, pp. 88-89)

Although We sustain the respondent tax court's finding that the constitutional issue was squarely raised by the parties,
We find merit with the contention of the petitioner that it is not necessary for the disposition of this case. The fact that
constitutional question was properly raised by a party is not alone sufficient for the respondent court to pass upon the
issue of constitutionality. This is supported by recent Supreme Court rulings which oblige every court to approach a
constitutional question with grave care and considerable caution. Thus:

It is a well-settled rule that no constitutional question will be heard and resolved unless the following requisites
of a judicial inquiry are present: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide
the case" (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 400 [1980]; National Economic
Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657 [1989]).

Undoubtedly, the last criterion is not present. This case can be resolved based on the other available grounds
obtaining in this case. Respondent court should have avoided the issue and instead maintained the presumption of
constitutionality. A law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
finally enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive. Accordingly, this Court gives high respect for the
acts of the other departments of the government and, as much as possible, avoids deciding the constitutional
question.
The evidence demonstrate quite clearly the logic of the above ruling. Republic Act No. 808 was enacted in 1952 and it
was amended in 1967 by Republic Act No. 5002. These Acts conferred the said franchise to the private respondent for
the operation of an international telecommunications system during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. This is a
persuasive indication that Congress excluded the operation of international telecommunication from the coverage of
the constitutional prohibition. The deliberations in Congress, as extensively quoted in respondent's brief, indubitably
show that a legislative franchise was granted to said private respondent on the premise that its operations were
merely that of an international airline, establishing merely a terminal or station in the Philippines. As such, it is the
opinion of Congress "that a company which operates only a cable station or a terminal in the Philippines, does not and
cannot fall under that provision of the Constitution that confines the granting of franchises, permits and other
certificates to Filipino citizens and Filipino corporations" (Respondent's Brief, p. 38; Rollo, p. 231).

It is rather unusual that in the case at bar, petitioner is the one seeking the annulment of the respondent tax court's
decision declaring R.A. No. 808 unconstitutional. It's argument is premised on the fact that despite the validity of
Republic Act No. 808, respondent corporation cannot avail of the tax exemption granted therein because of its failure
to comply with the requirements of Section 8, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, the Public Service and the
Corporation Law, which formed part and should be read into Republic Act No. 808. Respondent corporation,
according to petitioner, should have:

1) restructured its equity by transferring at least 60  per centum of its capital to citizens of the Philippines;

2) obtained the certificate of convenience and public necessity required by Section 15 of the Public Service Law; and

3) secured a license as required by Sections 68 and 69 of the Philippine Corporation Law.

In resolving this issue, this Court adverted to the terms and conditions set fourth in the said legislative franchise. Thus:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 7. The Grantee shall keep a separate account of the gross earnings from submarine telegraph cable
messages originating in the Philippines, and shall furnish to the General Auditing Office, or its successor a
copy of such account not later than the thirty-first day of January of each year for the preceding year. For the
purpose of auditing accounts so rendered, all of the books and accounts of the Grantee, or duplicates thereof,
so far as they relate to submarine telegraph cable messages originating in the Philippines, shall be kept in the
Philippines, and shall be subject to the official inspection of the Auditor General or his authorized
representatives, and the audit and approval of such accounts shall be final and conclusive evidence as to the
amount of said gross earnings, except that the Grantee shall have the right to appeal to the courts of the
Philippines, under the terms and conditions provided in the laws of the Philippines.

Sec. 8. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the Grantee shall pay to the Republic of
the Philippines during the life of this franchise a tax of five per cent of the gross earnings derived by the
Grantee from its operation under this franchise and which originate in the Philippines. Such tax shall be due
and payable annually, within ten (10) days after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in
section seven of this Act, and shall be in lieu of all taxes of any kind, nature and description, levied,
established or collected by any municipal, provincial or Republic authority except that the Grantee shall pay
the tax of its real property in conformity with existing law.

Sec. 9. The grantee shall hold the national, provincial and municipal governments of the Philippines, harmless
from all claims, accounts, demands, or actions arising out of accidents or injuries, whether to property or to
persons, caused by the construction or operation of the cable and station for transmission and reception of
submarine telegraph cable messages of the Grantee.

Sec. 10. The Grantee shall be subject to the Corporation laws of the Philippines now existing or hereafter
enacted.

Sec. 11. It shall be unlawful for the Grantee to use, employ, or contract for the labor of persons held in
involuntary servitude.

Sec. 12. The franchise hereby granted shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of
the Philippines, and the rights to use and occupy public property and places hereby granted shall revert to the
Government, upon the termination of this franchise, by such repeal, or by forfeiture or expiration in due
course.
 Unless earlier terminated by any such repeal or forfeiture, or extended, the franchise and rights hereby
granted shall terminate by expiration of time fifty years after the date of the acceptance of this Act by the
Grantee.

Sec. 13. As a condition of the granting of this franchise the Grantee shall execute a bond in favor of the
Government of the Philippines, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos; in a form and with sureties satisfactory to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the
Grantee's obligations hereunder during the first three years of the life of this franchise. If after three years from
date of acceptance of this franchise, the Grantee shall have fulfilled said obligation, or so soon thereafter as
the Grantee shall have fulfilled the same, the bond aforesaid shall be cancelled by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.

Sec. 14. Acceptance of this franchise shall be given in writing within six months after approval of this Act.
When so accepted by the Grantee and upon the approval of the bond aforesaid by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, the Grantee shall be empowered to exercise the privileges granted hereby.

Sec. 15. The Grantee shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign this franchise nor the right
and privileges acquired thereunder to any person, firm company, corporation or other commercial or legal
entity, nor merge with any other company or corporation organized for the same purpose, without the approval
of the Philippine Congress first had. Any corporation to which this franchise may be sold, transferred, or
assigned shall be subject to the corporation laws of the Philippines now existing or hereafter enacted, and any
person, firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity to which this franchise is sold
transferred, or assigned shall be subject to all the conditions, terms, restrictions and limitations of this
franchise as fully and completely and to the same extent as if the franchise had been originally granted to the
said person, firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity. (Rollo, pp. 179-182)

Undisputedly, respondent corporation duly complied with all the foregoing conditions. It accepted in writing the
franchise within the requisite period and filed the required bond. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications
in turn approved and accepted the bond. Respondent corporation further complied with the tax requirement by paying
to the Republic of the Philippines a tax of five per cent of the gross earnings from Philippine operations regularly since
its creation.

A legislative franchise partakes of the nature of a contract. In the case of the Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan
Electric Power and Light Company, Inc., (G.R. No. L-45355, January 12, 1990, 181 SCRA 38), We stated:

So was the exemption upheld in favor of the Carcar Electric and Ice Plant Company when it was required to
pay the corporate franchise tax under Section 259 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by R.A. No. 39
(Carcar Electric and Ice Plant v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 O.G. [No. 4] 1068). This Court pointed out
that such exemption is part of the inducement for the acceptance of the franchise and the rendition of public
service by the grantee. As a charter is in the nature of a private contract,  the imposition of another franchise
tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the
government and the Corporation (Emphasis supplied)

Franchises spring from contracts between the sovereign power and private citizens made upon valuable
considerations, for purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit. It is generally considered that the
obligation resting upon the grantee to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant constitutes a sufficient
consideration. It can also be said that the benefit to the community may constitute the sole consideration for the grant
of a franchise by the state. Such being the case, the franchise is the law between the parties and they are bound by
the terms thereof

Petitioner, being a government agency, is also bound by the terms of the franchise. It cannot declare the franchise as
"ineffective and unenforceable" merely by stating that the private respondent failed to comply with the requirements of
the general statutes which are not mentioned in R.A. No. 808. To allow petitioner's claim would be to defy and ignore
the superiority of a legislative franchise granted by a special enactment over a mere authorization or permit granted in
accordance with the provisions of laws of general application. Republic Act No. 808 as amended by Republic Act No.
5002, is a special law applicable only to the respondent corporation, while the Public Service Act and the Corporation
Law are general statutes. The presumption is that special statutes are exemptions to the general law because they
pertain to special charter granted to meet a particular set of conditions and circumstances (Province of Misamis
Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc., supra).

In the same vein, We cannot accept petitioner's claim that the franchise is "inoperative and unenforceable" due to the
failure of the respondent Corporation to comply with the constitutional requirement. Under Section 15 of the same act,
the respondent corporation is expressly prohibited from leasing, transferring, selling or assigning the franchise thus
granted to it, without the approval of the Philippine Congress being previously obtained. Presidential Decree No. 489
which authorized respondent Corporation to transfer to another corporation its franchise was issued only on June 24,
1974. Consequently, respondent corporation cannot be faulted in not restructuring its equity to conform with the
constitutional requirement of 60% Filipino ownership in view of its limited right to transfer its property. Why then should
the private respondent be at the receiving end or the "horses to be beaten" for its inability to comply with the "60%
Filipino ownership" when the franchise itself prohibited it from doing so. This Court is not prepared to punish the
respondent corporation which remained firm in not violating its franchise.

Petitioner claims that the respondent court had no basis in declaring the assessment as "fantastic and fabulous"
considering that there was no trial on the merits — thereby implying grave abuse of discretion. In justifying its position,
petitioner argued:

. . . Had there been such a hearing petitioner could have presented the examiners who conducted the
examination of the book of accounts and accounting records of respondent Corporation. And they would have
testified on all of the facts that they were able to gather in the course of their examination. . . . Without their
testimonies, there is really no way of ascertaining whether or not the assessment or the deficiency income tax
on respondent Corporation is "fantastic and fabulous" . . . (Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 34-35, Rollo, p. 222)

The main thrust of petitioner's argument in this regard is directed to the propriety of the respondent court's
pronouncement that the assessment is "fantastic and fabulous." The pertinent portion of the said decision reads:

The fantastic and fabulous income tax assessment of P21,523,288.37 issued by respondent (herein

petitioner) against petitioner (herein private respondent) is without sufficient legal and valid justification under
Sections 331 and 332(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 72 of the same Code
which reads as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(Rollo, p. 65) (words in parenthesis supplied)

Petitioner displayed a crude attempt to impress upon this Court that respondent tax court made a grave error and
abused its discretion in declaring the assessment "fantastic and fabulous." While such phrase is an "obiter
dictum"  petitioner capitalized on it in assailing the decision as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Assuming that the same was really made without basis, considering that there was really no trial on the merits of the
case, as the respondent court decided to avoid a tedious and prolonged litigation involving the disputed income tax
assessments, and limited its consideration only on the validity or constitutionality of the franchise, does it constitute
grave abuse of discretion which amounts to lack of jurisdiction?

The answer is in the negative. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility (Butuan Bay Wood Export Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. L- 45473, April 28,
1980, 97 SCRA 297; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Traders, Inc., G.R. No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163, SCRA 489).

The phrase "fantastic and fabulous" is a collateral matter and is not substantially material to the instant case because,
as already stated above, the court did not proceed with the merits of the case or did not deal with the factual issue to
prove or disprove the figures or amount of the assailed assessment. This case will necessarily be decided upon with
this Court simply disregarding the said phrase and by so doing, this Court perceives no substantial change in the
respondent Court's assailed decision.

As regards the fourth assigned error, this Court finds that respondent tax court erred in declaring that the assessment
was issued beyond the period prescribed by law. The National Internal Revenue Code then in force provides:

Sec. 331 (now Section 203). Period of Limitation upon assessment and collection. — Except as provided in
the succeeding section, internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within five years (now 3 years) after the
return was filed, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be
begun after expiration of such period. . .

It is clear from the foregoing provision that internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within five (5) years after the
taxpayer's return was filed. It is, however, undisputed that petitioner has failed to file any corporate income tax return
for a period of twenty (20) years from 1952 to 1971. With this, petitioner argued that under Section 332 (a) (now
Section 223 a of the Revenue Code, private respondent's failure to file the income tax returns authorizes him to
assess the income tax due from the private respondent within ten years  after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or
omission. Petitioner relied on Section 332 (now Section 223) of the same Code:
 Sec. 332 (now Section 223). — Exceptions as to period of limitation of assessment and collection of taxes.

(a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may
be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any
time within ten years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission. (Emphasis supplied)

The omission was discovered only in 1971 upon investigation conducted by petitioner's examiners. Accordingly,
petitioner has ten (10) years from 1971 or until 1981 within which to assess respondent corporation. The assessment
on the deficiency income tax against private respondent in the amount of P21,523,288.37 was issued on February 28,
1973 which is well within the period prescribed by law.

But while it is true that the assessment is within the prescribed period, it does not necessarily follow that it is a valid
assessment in its entirety. We have already ruled that Republic Act No. 808 is an operative act. Because of this,
private respondent is exempted from the payment of all taxes whether local, provincial or national, except franchise
and real property taxes. It goes without saying that the assessment cannot be held valid against the income derived
from private respondent's operation authorized by the franchise. It can only stand valid insofar as the assessment is
for income derived from services within the Philippines and which is beyond the scope of R.A. 808.

For example, private respondent should be held liable to pay the taxes on its income derived from the managerial
services it rendered to other corporations, like the Oceanic Wireless, Inc., a domestic corporation; and the income
derived from rentals on a leased portion of its building. Private respondent may not escape payment of these taxes by
claiming tax exemption in view of the provision of R.A. 808. To hold otherwise would open the gate to rampant tax
evasion.

Lastly, We find that respondent tax court erred in declaring that the assessment for deficiency income tax against
respondent corporation is in the nature of a ruling within the purview of section 338-A of the tax code.

The Court of Tax Appeal' decision stated:

Sec. 338 (now Section 246) of the National Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of Finance, upon
the recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations
for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the same code. One of these provisions relate to the
franchise tax under Section 259 of the aforesaid Code which reads as follows:

Sec. 259 (now Sec. 117). Tax on franchises. — There shall be collected in respect to all franchises, upon the
gross receipts from the business covered by the law granting the franchise, a tax of five  per centum or such
taxes, charges, and percentages as are specified in the special charters of the grantees upon whom such
franchises are conferred, whichever is higher, unless the provisions thereof preclude the imposition of a
higher tax. For the purposes of facilitating the assessment of this tax, reports shall be made by the respective
holders of the franchises in such form and at such times, as shall be required by the regulations of the
Department of Finance.

The taxes, charges and percentages on franchises, shall be assessed, collected by and paid to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any of his collection agents, any provision in the franchise to the
contrary notwithstanding, and shall be due and payable as specified in the particular franchise, or, in case no
time limit is specified therein, the provisions of Section one hundred eighty three shall apply; and if such taxes,
charges, and percentages remain unpaid on the date on which they must be paid, twenty-five per
centum shall be added to the amount of such taxes, charges, and percentages, which increase shall form part
of the tax. (As amended by Sec. 7, Republic Act No. 39; Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 418; and Sec. 53, Republic
Act No. 6110).

It can thus be seen from the said provisions that for the purpose of facilitating the assessment of the franchise tax, the
Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of respondent, may promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations. It is to be noted that the said rules and regulations will merely implement the provisions of the franchise
tax. law. Any revocation, modification or reversal of the ruling or the franchise tax law itself by the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given retroactive application. The mandatory requirement for the
prospective operation of the new ruling is explicit under Section 338-A (now Section 246) of the National Internal
Revenue Code which provides as follows:

Sec. 338-A. (Section 246). Non-retroactivity of rulings. — Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of the
rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding section or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given retroactive application if the
revocation, modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers except in the following cases; (a) where
the taxpayers deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him
 by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (b) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c) where the taxpayer acted in
bad faith. (inserted by Sec. 61, Republic Act No. 6110).

x x x           x x x          x x x

Respondent's income tax assessment against petitioner for a period of twenty (20) years is tantamount to a
revocation of the tax on franchise prescribed by Section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, supra,
because the provisions thereof were disregarded in favor of Section 24 of the same code which imposes the
corporate income tax. In such a case, the revocation of the franchise tax law shall have prospective operation
except in the following cases.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(Rollo, pp. 69-71)

(Words in parenthesis supplied)

Contrary to the Court of Tax Appeals ruling, We believe that the assessment against the petitioner cannot be likened
to a revocation of the tax on franchise prescribed in Section 259. Firstly, a ruling by a Commissioner cannot revoke a
provision of the National Internal Revenue Code, a substantive law. Secondly, the provision above stated
contemplates of a revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated for the
enforcement of the provisions of the tax code but not a revocation, modification or reversal of the tax code's provision
itself. The reason why the Commissioner issued the assailed assessment of P21,523,288.37 was not because he
wanted to revoke, expressly or implicitly, Section 259 of the Tax Code, but because the Commissioner believed that
private respondent is liable for corporate income tax by virtue of an inoperative franchise. Hence, the said assessment
should not be regarded as a ruling contemplated under Section 338-A. It should be treated as an ordinary assessment
for the payment of taxes, like any other assessment issued against any person or entity, holding a legislative franchise
and is exempted from the payment of Certain national and local taxes, including corporate income tax but,
nevertheless, found to be liable to pay the latter due to its earnings derived from sources within the Philippines but
beyond the scope of the franchise.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby modified, as follows:

1. Republic Act No. 808 is presumed to be an operative act and the decision of the respondent tax court
declaring the same to be unconstitutional is hereby SET ASIDE;

2. the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of 5% of gross receipts as franchise tax in lieu of any
and all taxes is enforceable and operative;

3. the assailed assessment was issued within the period prescribed by law;

4. the assailed assessment is not in the nature of a ruling within the purview of Section 338-A of the National
Internal Revenue Code; and

5. the decision of the respondent tax court declaring the Commissioner's assessment cancelled and without
any legal force and effect is hereby SET ASIDE. A remand of this case to respondent Court of Tax Appeals is
ordered for trial on the merits to determine the income tax liability of the private respondent corresponding to
its income beyond the scope of Republic Act No. 808.

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.
MIRASOL VS CA

Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar
production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements,
a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations
to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase
sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever
profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than
enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners
continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank.
PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real
properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could
offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to
account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. 

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor
General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not
his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such
notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the
mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself
provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a
statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause
and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to
exercise its power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the
Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe
for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. 
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts:               Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened
of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO,
private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO
and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in
futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the
modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued
by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at
the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic
social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue
delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision:         1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union,  the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally
to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of
the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation,
the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution
cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof
to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.  The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.  The same holds true
with the issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

See Justice Leonen’s concurring opinion. Interesting read! 

 SALONGA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process
clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion
against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to
harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation”
in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that petitioner
was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-
evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance
to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12
March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885,
BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani
Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On
4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga
that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He
states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule
of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court

Held:  1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived
at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985,
respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion
case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence
and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia
from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for further
deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has
been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several
occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.
It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear
and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos  (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to the
President’s legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the
preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the
Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic
did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous
decisions ever printed in the Reports.

Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly  elected
President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter,
the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,
stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for
quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues: 
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of
the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of
the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of
the Senate or even frompractices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipsofacto constitute
the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under
Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court. 
TAÑADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET.AL.

G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

FACTS:

On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats,
originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec.2
Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal
appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination
by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on
the ETare reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, as
respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Tañada's
right as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest.
Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made
permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction
to try the appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is
without cause of action since Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They
contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.

ISSUES:

1.WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter

2.WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate

HELD:

1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate compelling them to
allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects its
members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power
was exercised (constitutionality).The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said discretionary powers.

2. No. RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate members in the ET must be
followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against
partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law (modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be
accepted; although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The contention that
petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at
issue, the power to waive is inexistent. Tañada never led Primicias to believe that his nominations on behalf of the CP
are valid. WHEREFORE: The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the proper party, nor can the
majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and the
election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the staff members are valid as it is a
selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion of the Chairman. PARAS DISSENTING: The procedure or
manner of nomination cannot affect Consti mandate that the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of
seats (9) must be held fixed, since the Consti must have consistent application. There is no rule against the minority
party nominating a majority party member to the ET. Furthermore, the Senate, and not the parties, elect on the ET
members, brushing aside partisan concerns. LABRADOR DISSENTING: The petition itself is unconstitutional under
Art. 6 Sec. 2 because:1.9-member ET mandate violated2.right to elect of Senate held in abeyance by refusal of
minority party to nominate3.process of nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v. Senate power)4.SC
arrogation of power in determining Con Con’s proviso of <9 ET member sunder certain circumstances The refusal of
Tañada to nominate mustbe considered a waiver of privilege based on constitutionality and reason, in order to
reconcile two applications of Art. 6, Sec. 2.
VINUYA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010

FACTS

Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped
the women as part of the destruction of the village. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the
petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental emotional
suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA
and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, said officials declined to assist the
petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by
Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also argued that the
comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They alleged that the
prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible, as such, the
Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.

ISSUE

Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioner’s claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING 

No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a
foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would
be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a
claim on the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states
own rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is
granted, and when will it cease.

                        The Court fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as
legally prohibited under contemporary international law. However, it does not automatically imply that the Philippines is
under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes. Absent the consent of the states, an applicable
treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against
Japan. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the
question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
[G. R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003] JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION

Facts:R.A. No. 7227 likewise created and grantedthe Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importation
s, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and busin
ess climate.

And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the 
concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered 
respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay
.

On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp J
ohn Hay.

In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ econ
omic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamati
on is merely implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activity 
or investment.

 Issue:WON Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within and grantin
g other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ

 NO!

Nowhere in RA 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas, unlike the grant un
der Section 12 which provides for tax exemption to the established Subic SEZ. The tax exemption grant to John Hay 
SEZ contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “No law granting any tax exem
ption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.

Furthermore, it is the Legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, which has the full power to exe
mpt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to ta
x. The grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is VOID for being vio
lative of the Constitution.
 
IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,

vs.

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.

3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy

3. Facial Challenge

4. Locus Standi

5. Declaratory Relief

6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge

3. Locus Standi

4. Declaratory Relief

5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It
must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual
case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail
the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses
the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines
the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must
be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The
valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view
that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should
be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature
from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this
intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using
the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its
mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it
will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
“safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However,
the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To
allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or
the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against
the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)
(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies
the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be
filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect”
and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH
Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers
to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private
and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is
imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit
with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to
life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation,
the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing
to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the
Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by
the operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the
petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and
moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions
for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients
and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law
and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa

710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government – Invalid Delegation

Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly
known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations
from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure
projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for
the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by
the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel
comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around
since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated
by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit
and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following
principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive
may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was
enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act
of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund,
was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of
the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative
power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the
Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy
in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further,
nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is
approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how
can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the
GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development
Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the
PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a
congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance
where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s
all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part
of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not
from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as
amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall
form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development
and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a
General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case
of PD 910 and PD 1869.
DUMLAO VS COMELEC

5 SCRA 392 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – “Equal Protection” – Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office.  Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed
the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the
eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different issues. The
suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of
office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars  persons charged for crimes
from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been merged.
Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites
so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null
and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable
and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65
years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than
65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For
one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a
retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in
the challenged provision.
PACU VS SEC OF EDUCATION

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of  Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private
schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of
Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the
Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides
that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law
requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that
such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any
injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools.  The Constitution provides for
state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit,
the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in
the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of
the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.