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Brigade Troops Battalion Operations: MARCH 2005 Expires March 2007 Headquarters, Department of The Army
Brigade Troops Battalion Operations: MARCH 2005 Expires March 2007 Headquarters, Department of The Army
61
BRIGADE TROOPS
BATTALION OPERATIONS
MARCH 2005
EXPIRES MARCH 2007
Contents
Page
PREFACE ..............................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................vi
Chapter 1 THE BRIGADE TROOPS BATTALION MISSION AND STAFF FUNCTIONS 1-1
Section I - Role of the Brigade Troops Battalion .......................................... 1-1
Section II - Command and Staff Functions.................................................... 1-2
Section III - The BTB Command Group .......................................................... 1-2
Brigade Troops Battalion Commander............................................................... 1-2
Brigade Troops Battalion Executive Officer ....................................................... 1-3
Section IV - Personnel Staff ............................................................................ 1-3
Command Sergeant Major ................................................................................. 1-3
Chaplain ............................................................................................................. 1-4
Section V - Coordinating Staff ........................................................................ 1-4
Human Resources Section (S1)......................................................................... 1-4
Intelligence Section (S2) .................................................................................... 1-4
Operations Section (S3) ..................................................................................... 1-5
Sustainment Section (S4)................................................................................... 1-6
C4 Communications Section (S6) ...................................................................... 1-6
Section VI - Special Staff ................................................................................. 1-7
Fires NCOs (Operations and Intelligence Section) ............................................ 1-7
Chemical Officer ................................................................................................. 1-7
Physician’s Assistant (PA).................................................................................. 1-7
Chapter 2 ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED ORGANIZATIONS ........................................... 2-1
Section I - Headquarters and Headquarters Company, BTB ...................... 2-1
BTB Headquarters Section................................................................................. 2-1
Maintenance Section .......................................................................................... 2-3
Section II - Headquarters and Headquarters Company, HBCT.................... 2-4
Section III - The Military Intelligence Company ............................................. 2-6
Section IV - The Network Support Company............................................... 2-10
The Network Support Company (NSC)............................................................ 2-10
Headquarters and Network Support Platoon ................................................... 2-11
i
FMI 3-90.61
Figures
Figure Intro-1. Today’s Army................................................................................................... viii
Figure Intro-2. Restructuring Today’s Army ..............................................................................ix
Figure Intro-3. Modularity and the Army’s Need to Change...................................................... x
Figure Intro-4. UEy and UEx .....................................................................................................xi
Figure Intro-5. From Divisions to Brigades...............................................................................xii
Figure Intro-6. UEy Organization.............................................................................................xiv
Figure Intro-7. UEx Organization..............................................................................................xv
Figure Intro-8. Heavy BCT...................................................................................................... xvii
Figure Intro-9. Fires Brigade ...................................................................................................xix
Figure Intro-10. UEx Aviation Brigade......................................................................................xx
Figure Intro-11. BFSB Brigade ................................................................................................xxi
Figure Intro-12. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade ................................................................. xxii
Figure Intro-13. Sustainment Brigade ................................................................................... xxiii
Figure 1-1. The Brigade Troops Battalion Organization Chart............................................... 1-1
Figure 2-1. HBCT HHC Organization ..................................................................................... 2-1
Figure 2-2. BTB HHC ............................................................................................................. 2-5
Figure 2-3. Military Intelligence Company ..............................................................................2-6
Figure 2-4. Network Support Company Organizational .......................................................2-11
Figure 3-1. Command and Support Relationships ................................................................. 3-2
Figure 3-2. BTB Organic Unit Support to the HBCT Battle Staff............................................ 3-3
Figure 3-3. BTB Battle Staff Support to the HBCT Battle Staff for Rear Operations ............. 3-6
Figure 3-4. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Support to the HBCT Battle
Staff..................................................................................................................... 3-7
Figure 3-5. Specified Tasks for the Brigade Troops Battalion ............................................... 3-8
Figure 3-6. The Operations Process. ...................................................................................3-10
Figure 3-7. MICO Planning Phase Tasks.............................................................................3-13
Figure 3-8. MICO Assets Positioned Throughout the HBCT Area of Operations ................3-15
Figure 3-9. MICO Preparation Phase Activities Requiring BTB Staff Monitoring and
Coordination......................................................................................................3-16
Figure 3-10. MICO Execution Phase Activities Requiring BTB Staff Monitoring and
Coordination......................................................................................................3-17
Figure 4-1. Recent and On-going Insurgent Activity .............................................................. 4-6
Figure 4-2. Initial Array of HBCT Forces ................................................................................ 4-9
Figure 4-3. Deployment of MICO Assets..............................................................................4-10
Figure 4-4. Deployment of Network Support Company RETRANS Assets .........................4-11
Figure 4-5. HBCT Unassigned Areas...................................................................................4-12
Figure 4-6. Rear Area Security Tasks ..................................................................................4-13
Figure 4-7. Initial Array of HBCT Forces ..............................................................................4-16
Figure 4-8. MICO and Network Support RETRANS Assets in the BTB Area of
Operations.........................................................................................................4-17
Figure 4-9. BTB Area of Operations Security Tasks ............................................................4-18
Figure 4-10. HBCT Defensive Operations ...........................................................................4-19
Tables
Table 4-1. HBCT Rear Area Critical Asset Analysis Worksheet ........................................... 4-3
Table A-1. Danger Close Ranges for Attack Helicopter Engagement................................. A-18
Table B-1. Five Ss and T Method of Detainee Field Processing........................................... B-3
Table D-1. Environmental Assistance....................................................................................D-1
SECTION I - PURPOSE
An interim field manual (FMI) is a Department of the Army publication that provides expedited
delivery of urgently needed doctrine. This FMI is one of six being prepared to meet the doctrinal
requirements of the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT). This FMI applies to the
transformational force across the full spectrum of military operations: peacetime military
engagement (PME), small-scale contingencies (SSCs), and major combat operations (MCO).
The doctrine contained in this FMI is approved for immediate use in training and operations.
Operational concepts described in this manual are based on decisions by the Army Chief of Staff
to reorganize the Army to a brigade-based force and to quickly implement “good enough” designs
that will be refined over time. The material provided in this FMI is considered good enough to
satisfy the requirements of the Army’s transforming organizations.
The intended audience for this publication is leaders and staff sections within transforming
units. These leaders include those in combined arms chains of command, field and company
grade officers, middle grade and senior noncommissioned officers, and battalion and squadron
command groups and staffs. This manual provides guidance for unit of employment (UEx)
leaders and staffs executing training and employment of the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT)
for the purpose of conducting close combat in offensive and defensive operations. This
publication may also be used by other Army organizations to assist in their planning for support
to HBCTs.
This FMI applies to the active component (AC), reserve component (RC), and Army civilians. It
builds on the collective knowledge and experience gained through recent operations, numerous
exercises, and the deliberate process of informed reasoning. It is rooted in time-tested principles
and fundamentals while accommodating new technologies and diverse threats to national
security.
This FMI will expire after 2 years from its approved publication date. Throughout its life,
proponents should collect feedback to refine emerging doctrine and incorporate it into new or
revised field manuals.
In this environment, war is the norm, and peace is the exception. Our adversaries seek adaptive
advantage through asymmetry. America has near peer competitors in niche areas, and
conventional force on force conflicts are still possible. There is an enormous pool of potential
combatants armed with irreconcilable ideas, and our homeland has become part of the
battlespace.
Historically, conventional terrorism and threats directed at US citizens and property were
conducted outside of US borders. The events of 9/11 demonstrated that the threat to the US
homeland from transnational organizations and groups with regional agendas is very real.
The Army must be able to defuse crises and/or defeat aggression early to prevent escalation and
limit damage. To meet the requirements of the current operational environment, we need
flexible, rapidly deployable forces and sufficient depth and strength to sustain multiple,
simultaneous operations.
The Army must adapt to these challenges NOW. We are generating more versatile combat power
because:
We have extended worldwide commitments.
We will remain at war for the foreseeable future.
We must be more responsive to the needs of regional combatant commanders
(RCCs).
We must execute offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as part of
an integrated joint force.
We are seeking a campaign-quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. This new
expeditionary mindset recognizes we are an Army in contact, engaged in ongoing operations, and
ready to respond to the next crisis as it evolves. Transformation is an attitude and spirit—
infused across the entire force—that embraces a forward-leaning, modular, joint interdependent
and capabilities-based Army led by aggressive, intelligent, and empowered Soldiers. This team
of teams will transform to an Army that will ultimately win the war on terror and provide long-
term security for the Nation.
Army transformation is a comprehensive effort intended to reinvent the Army at strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. Formations will be redesigned to provide modular, capabilities-
based organizations, increasing their relevance and responsiveness to RCCs.
Changing the organizational structure of units must be logically consistent with future force
concepts but tempered by the technological and current force capabilities that are reasonably
available in the near term. This force will be strategically responsive, networked, and fight with
a precision capabilities-based maneuver force that is dominant across the range of military
operations envisioned for the future global security environment.
Delivering the right Army forces at the right place and time is vital to the joint force
commander’s ability to defeat any enemy. As the Army repositions and reconfigures its forces,
the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace will be
expanded. Keeping the Army relevant and ready is about anticipation and not about preparing
for yesterday's challenges. The world is changing and the Army is responding to these changes
and positioning itself for the challenges of the future strategic environment with forces that will
be more effective in combat missions, more capable of stability operations, and far better at
interacting with other service tactical elements of the joint force.
MODULARITY
Modularity is the foundation for building a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary
capabilities. Often, commanders require a function to be performed that does not warrant the
deployment of an entire unit. However, deploying portions of units can render the remaining
elements of the parent organization incapable of performing their mission due to a lack of key
personnel and equipment
Modularity provides a force design methodology that aids in solving these dilemmas. It enhances
the Army's ability to rapidly respond to a wide range of global contingencies with a force
possessing needed functions and capabilities, while deploying a minimum of troops and
equipment. It is a methodology that puts the right amount of the needed capabilities at the right
place at the right time. At the same time, it also leaves behind the remainder of an organization
that can be deployed later or can provide mission-capable support elsewhere if needed.
Modularity is about packaging units into flexible configurations, creating more cohesive and
capable units, and adjusting the types and mix of AC and RC units (See Figure Intro-2). Modular
units are rapidly deployable, responsive, agile, tailorable, and discrete packages of land force
combat power.
The object of modularity is to provide superior tactical units that are more responsive and
provide greater mission potency for the joint force commander.
Modularity provides the methodology for the Army to achieve a force structure that will optimize
rapid assembly of mission-oriented contingency forces that are effective and efficient; while
providing a means of rapidly identifying, mobilizing, and deploying doctrinally sound,
Modularity will apply to force elements, including command and control (C2) headquarters
performing missions across the range of military operations (peacetime, conflict, and war) and
force elements participating in joint, combined, multinational, and interagency operations.
MODULAR HEADQUARTERS
Since 1999, the US military has undergone a sweeping evolution driven by operational
experience and new capabilities. In the past, the conduct of operations was divided into loosely
linked major land, sea, and air operations, often conducted with different objectives. Today, joint
operations form an integrated joint fabric, and increasingly, operations are integrated at the
tactical level. The nature of modern land operations has changed in terms of geography and
time. In general, operations have become more distributed in space and more simultaneous in
time. At tactical and operational levels, subordinate units operate in noncontiguous areas of
operations and conduct nonlinear operations as a matter of routine. This change is the result of
smaller and more agile forces, significant improvements in C2, and continuing integration of
joint capabilities at lower echelons. Army forces continue to increase their lethality. The
integration of advanced information technologies multiplies the effectiveness of the individual
weapon systems by many times. All these factors support Army forces executing offensive land
operations early in the campaign by introducing forces capable of maneuvering to operational
depths as part of an integrated joint force.
The operational environment requires Army forces that are much more responsive and tailored
to the needs of the combatant commanders. Army forces must be capable of executing a full
range of military operations from theater war through smaller contingencies to humanitarian
assistance. To meet joint requirements, the Army is reorganizing its echelons above brigade.
Between now and 2010, two higher headquarters will replace the existing structure of divisions,
corps, and echelons above corps. These new headquarters are currently designated units of
employment (UE), specifically a UEx (primary warfighting) and a UEy (theater operational land
force and joint support) echelon (See Figure Intro-4). While the tendency is to think of these
echelons as linear improvements to the division and corps, they are not. Both higher echelons
will be complementary, modular entities designed to employ tailored forces within integrated
joint campaigns.
Units of employment execute offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations on land as
part of an integrated joint force. The UEx will become the principal warfighting headquarters of
the Army, exercising operational control over brigades employed in tactical engagements. The
UEy will focus primarily on the Army component responsibilities, supporting the entire theater
and the operational forces (joint, interagency, and multinational) as required by the combatant
commander.
The new brigade designs achieve three goals set by the Army’s Chief of Staff. This new design
will:
• Increase the number of combat brigades available to the Army while maintaining combat
effectiveness that is equal to or better than that of current divisional brigade combat
teams.
• Create smaller standardized modules to meet the varied demands of RCCs and reduce
joint planning and execution complexities.
• Redesign brigades to perform as an integral part of the joint team. This makes them
more capable in their basic ground close combat role, able to benefit from other service
support, and able to contribute more to other service partners.
The fundamental transforming idea behind the Army’s reorganization is to organize Soldiers
into powerful and modular brigade combat beams (BCTs) with dramatically improved C2
systems. This pairing of better combat potential with superior C2 will give the brigades the
ability to gather more information faster and more reliably and to fight as a networked team of
teams internally and with teammates in the other services. This will give the new maneuver
brigades significantly greater combat power than that of contemporary ones.
The principal tactical unit of the modular Army will be the BCTs, which will be made up of
battalion-sized and company-sized subunits. Brigade-based, modular units are rapidly
deployable, lethal, responsive, agile, tailorable, and discrete packages of land force combat
power.
Today’s varying types of divisional and nondivisional BCTs will be reduced to three variants.
Two standard BCT designs will replace the task-organized combinations formed inside today’s
divisions. One variant is a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), and the other is an infantry
brigade combat team (IBCT). Selected IBCTs will be organized along the standard design but
will retain the ability to conduct forced entry operations by vertical envelopment (air assault and
airborne). The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is the third type of maneuver BCT available
to the UEx commander.
These BCTs will be standing combined arms formations and will include organic battalion-sized
maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistics subunits. In contrast to current divisional
brigades, the modular force BCTs will be fixed base table of organization and equipment (TOE)
units.
With the fielding of BCTs, the Army will shift from a division-based stance to a brigade-based
posture. The Army shifts from generating and employing divisions in decisive land operations to
providing the joint commander the right mix of BCTs and appropriate C2 as part of an
integrated joint operation. Rather than providing some derivative of a division, as the Army does
now, the Army will provide a mix of capabilities, controlling headquarters, and an appropriate
commander to meet the requirements of the joint force commander, which will be driven by the
threat and mission requirements.
Despite their organizational similarity to present maneuver brigades, the transformed modular
BCTs are organized to maintain combined arms teamwork more effectively under intense stress.
Advanced C2 tools, increased reconnaissance capabilities with improved sensors, and better
precision weapons add significantly to the effectiveness of the new brigade combat teams.
These BCTs will magnify the effects of all the elements of combat power—maneuver, firepower,
protection, leadership, and information—in new ways. As their fighting systems improve over
the next decade, combat units will generate significant increases in combat power and
significant advances in the focus, discrimination, and precision of combat effects.
Lethality in combat is determined less by the total number of shooters in an organization than
by the number it can bring to bear and the accuracy with which they fire. While the shooters in
the brigades’ direct and indirect fire systems are familiar (120mm and 25mm cannons; small
arms, machineguns, grenade launchers, and antitank/antimateriel/antiair missiles; 60mm,
81mm, and 120mm mortars; and 105mm or 155mm howitzers), their effectiveness has been
substantially improved through better situational understanding (SU) and fire control tools.
To support the new heavy, infantry, and Stryker BCTs, five types of supporting brigades will be
organized to provide supporting aviation; artillery fires; sustainment; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR); and protection. These supporting brigades are organized to perform
specific combined arms support functions.
The supporting brigades are flexibly organized to meet mission demands. Each brigade includes
a mix of organic and assigned battalions. Each can be tailored for the specific set of mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC) conditions of a major operation or contingency and can be task
organized in size from a brigade-sized element down to platoon-sized or section-sized elements.
These supporting brigades provide the means to weight the decisive operation or to tailor BCTs
for specific missions.
The Army National Guard will have the same common BCT design as the active Army but will
retain a separate scout group in addition to its heavy, infantry, and Stryker BCTs. The Army
Reserve will provide an array of supporting units.
UEY
The UEy is the Army theater-level headquarters that directly supports the RCCs. The UEy
consolidates most of the supporting functions currently executed by Army corps and Army
service component commands (theater Army) into a single operational command echelon. The
UEy will be the primary vehicle for support to the entire region as well as Army, joint, and
multinational forces deployed to a joint operational area (JOA). There will be one UEy for each
RCC, and any subunified command designated by the Secretary of Defense.
The UEy commander performs the service unique functions and tasks of the Army service
component commander (ASCC) for that RCC. In major combat operations, the UEy may become
the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and exercise operational control over
tactical forces. It can also provide the headquarters for a joint task force in smaller scale
contingencies. The UEy requires some joint augmentation to function as the JFLCC or joint task
force (JTF). The specific organization of each UEy will be based on the unique requirements of
the joint force commander/RCC and the conditions of the theater. Figure Intro-6 shows a general
regionally focused UEy C2 headquarters.
Four regionally focused commands or brigades will provide a theater base to each UEy and allow
it to support the operations of the UEx and other joint and multinational forces in the combatant
command. These supporting commands and brigades supporting each theater include a theater
sustainment command (TSC), a theater network command (TNC), a theater intelligence brigade
(TIB), and a civil affairs brigade. The situation in each theater will dictate the size of the
commands and theater-level brigades that support Army forces in theater.
The UEy receives other commands and brigades as required for execution of campaigns.
Typically, these include a medical command, air and missile defense command, theater aviation
brigade, engineer brigades, military police brigades, and one or more tailored UEx. From these
forces and based on the assigned mission, the UEy may allocate additional maneuver, fires,
aviation, surveillance, maneuver enhancement, sustainment, and other functional brigades to
the UEx during the conduct of operations.
UEX
The primary tactical war fighting headquarters will be the UEx. The UEx will combine the
functions of today’s division with the tactical responsibilities of the corps. The primary task of
the UEx will be to direct the operations of the subordinate brigades and battalions. In marked
contrast to the division, the UEx will not be a fixed formation. The UEx will not have any
organic forces beyond the elements that make up the headquarters and its special troop
battalion that includes life support and maintenance, a security company, a signal company, and
a mobile command group section. Figure Intro-7 depicts a UEx organization.
X X X X X X X X
X
X SUST
The UEx will be a completely modular C2 entity designed to exercise C2 over assigned brigades.
Fully modular, the UEx headquarters is self-contained and built for today’s expeditionary
warfare. This contrasts sharply with the current division, which is the largest fixed organization
in the Army.
The modular design envisions that the UEx can control a mix of the six basic types of brigade
formations—the BCT, the aviation brigade, the battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB), the
maneuver enhancement brigade (ME), the fires brigade, and the sustainment brigade. Since the
UEx has no fixed structure beyond the UEx headquarters, not all of these brigades may be
present in an operation. In some operations, the UEx may control more than one of a particular
type of brigade. The UEx may also control functional groups, battalions, or even companies, but
normally, these will be task organized to one of the brigades.
The UEx conducts decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations that translate operational
directives into tactical action. The UEx is organized, manned, trained, and equipped to
accomplish the following:
• Control up to six BCTs in major combat operations but may control more in prolonged
stability operations. However, the span of command may decrease to one or two BCTs
during forcible entry operations.
• Control a tailored mix of other warfighting capabilities organized under the five
multifunctional supporting brigades. The UEy may also attach or operational control
(OPCON) functional brigades to the control of the UEx commander.
• Organizes and distribute C2 assets based on METT-TC. The UEx commander may
alternate command posts (CPs) between planning and execution, assign them to
geographically dispersed operations, or allocate them to divergent types of operations
occurring simultaneously (for example, offensive and stability operations). The
commander may also organize C2 according to major functions (such as Army forces
(ARFOR), land component, tactical controlling headquarters, etc.) or purpose (decisive,
sustaining, and shaping).
• Function as an ARFOR or JTF/JFLCC headquarters for SSCs without additional Army
augmentation. The UEx may serve as both the ARFOR and JFLCC simultaneously,
although augmentation may be required for extended operations.
• Direct mobile strike and precision strike operations through mission orders to the
aviation and fires brigades, respectively.
• Normally operate independently along a line of operation or in an area of operation (AO)
during offensive operations.
Each UEx is unique not only for a particular campaign but also for different phases of the
campaign. The higher headquarters continually tailors the UEx according to the factors of
METT-TC.
While current divisions are concerned solely with tactics, the UEx can function at the
operational level of war with little or no augmentation. It can perform as the ARFOR
headquarters for a small JTF and can function as the combined or joint force land component
command (C/JFLCC) with US Marine Corps or multinational augmentation. With other service
augmentation and special training, the UEx may even serve as a JTF headquarters.
In garrison, the UEx coordinating staff is organized into a general staff that includes G1,
personnel; G2, intelligence; G3, operations; G4, logistics; G5, plans; G6, command, control,
communications, and computer operations (C4OPS); and G7, information operations. The UEx
headquarters also includes special staff and personal staff for the commander. In contrast to
current division/corps headquarters organization, all of the special staff is organic to the UEx
headquarters. The headquarters has organic liaison teams. The UEx does not depend on any
subordinate brigade to provide elements of the special staff, and it has a security company that
can provide security platoons to its mobile elements.
The HBCT reduces the complexity of deployment planning and replaces the many variations of
the divisional armored and mechanized brigades. It contains the combined arms components
normally required to rapidly achieve tactical overmatch in a single formation. Robust enough to
fight with or without external support for limited periods, the HBCT can fight “off the ramp”
across the full spectrum of operations when tactically loaded.
Compared to prior divisional heavy brigade organizations, the HBCT provides more mission
potency for the cargo weight and space. Making use of higher leader to led ratios, a more stable
(and thus experienced) staff, and enhanced C2 systems, the HBCT command teams employ the
brigade’s potential more effectively. Enhanced and expanded fire and air support elements
distributed throughout the organization and greater network connectivity allows maximum use
of lethal and suppressive air support.
The HBCT is versatile. While the HBCT is optimized for high-tempo offensive operations against
conventional and unconventional forces in mixed or open terrain, it is also adept in mixed
terrain defense, urban combat, and mobile security operations (screen, guard, and cover). In
addition to offensive and defensive operations, the HBCT can conduct stability operations,
support operations and support and stability operations.
The new modular HBCTs contribute more to the joint team. They are more effective in their
unique role of forcing a decision on enemy leaders in a broader variety of missions and
environments, and at a lower cost in supporting resources to the joint force as a whole.
The HBCT’s versatility and ability to make rapid transitions derives from its organic combined
arms composition. The HBCT’s balanced combined arms battalions (CABs) need minimal
reconfiguration from mission to mission. Engineers and fire support elements are organic to the
CABs. The HBCT makes better use of nonorganic lethal and suppressive fire support. HBCT
organizations are sufficiently robust to maintain full-time all-around security for all organic and
attached elements. Additionally, there is sufficient organic support to fight and win assigned
engagements before external support is required.
To further enhance versatility, the next higher headquarters can modify the mission capabilities
of the HBCT or weight them when they are designated as the main effort by attaching combat
support mission modules to the maneuver, reconnaissance, fires, or brigade troops battalion
(BTB). Because of similarities in the structure of the functions of the infantry, Stryker and
heavy BCTs and because the battalions are combined arms modules, the higher commander can
also tailor brigades for specific missions by exchanging battalions. However, the UEx normally
avoids detaching organic forces from the BCT, instead varying the size of the AO assigned to the
brigade or the distribution of tactical tasks between brigades. Circumstances may compel the
UEx to task organize the subordinate battalions between BCTs, but this is the exception, and
not the rule.
Fires Brigade
The organization of the fires brigade differs from currently fielded corps and division field
artillery brigades in its staff design, capacity to employ electronic warfare (EW) units and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The brigade commander performs the duties of the force field
artillery commander for the unit to which the fires brigade is assigned (UEy or UEx), providing
advice on all aspects of fires and effects employment.
Each fires brigade has an organic missile battalion. Depending on METT-TC, fires brigades are
task organized with additional long-range precision missiles, advanced cannon artillery, and
counterfire radars. Figure Intro-9 provides the fires brigade mission, showing how it is organized
with organic forces and how it could be task organized with other assigned forces. The fires
brigade may receive OPCON of EW assets selected for their ability to engage enemy C2 systems.
The fires brigade provides fires on a planned or emergency basis at the direction of the UEx.
Fires Brigade
Organic Assigned
I I II I II
HHB BSB TAB IO
Cannon
Rocket/Missile Rocket/Missile Cannon
ATK
TBD
The primary task of the fires brigade is to plan, coordinate, and execute precision strike
operations within the UEx AO. The conduct of strike operations is predicated on the ability of
the strike headquarters to control and synchronize all elements of the strike operation with all
available lethal and nonlethal fires to deliver concentrated effects on the target. The C2
capabilities of the fires brigade allow it to plan, prepare, execute, and assess precision strikes
with operational control of additional ISR and EW capabilities from the other brigades. The UEx
sends mission orders to the fires brigade specifying intended effects, additional capabilities
under the operational control of the fires brigade, and joint capabilities available for the mission.
The secondary task for the fires brigade is to provide reinforcing fires within the brigade AO.
When directed by the UEx, the fires brigade provides additional cannon or missile artillery to
support the BCT or delivers precision fires into the BCT AO as requested by the supported BCT
commander.
The fires brigade also provides reactive and proactive counterstrike operations to support the
UEx and BCTs.
Aviation Brigade
The aviation brigade supports the operations of the entire UEx with task-organized aviation
capabilities. The bulk of Army aviation combat power resides in the multifunctional aviation
brigade organized to support the UEx and the combined arms maneuver BCTs. The organization
of the aviation brigade combines a variety of battalions—attack, assault, lift, and support—
under one command.
The UEx aviation brigade is expansible and tailorable to the mission and can support multiple
BCTs. (See Figure Intro-10.) Based on METT-TC, the aviation brigade commander task
organizes available aviation resources into mission packages that are either controlled by a
supported BCT or the aviation brigade.
Aviation Brigade
Mission: Plan, prepare, execute and assess aviation and combined arms
operations to support UEx and maneuver brigade scheme of maneuver to
find, fix, and destroy enemy forces at the decisive time and place.
HVY IN
AH – 48
X OH – 60
UH – 38 UH – 38
CH – 12 CH – 12
HH – 12 MF HH – 12
Organic Assigned
I II II II II
U
HHC CL IV
ASB ATK ASLT GS
The aviation brigade receives priorities and mission orders from the UEx to conduct and support
reconnaissance, security, mobile strike, vertical maneuver, attack aviation support to close
combat, aerial sustainment, and C2 operations.
The aviation brigade plans and conducts mobile strike operations. Mobile strike operations are
extended combat operations that capitalize on the ability of attack aviation to maneuver to the
full depth of the UEx AO, deliver massed direct fire, and employ precision munitions in support.
The UEx executes mobile strikes outside of the BCT areas against targets that are capable of
maneuvering to avoid precision strikes.
The aviation brigade executes screening missions for the UEx. The aviation brigade may receive
the OPCON of ground maneuver and joint assets and capabilities to carry out these missions. It
supports other security operations; including BCTs assigned a screen, guard, or cover mission
with aviation forces. For guard and cover missions, the aviation brigade provides
reconnaissance, attack, and lift assets under the OPCON of BCTs. The aviation brigade also
supports area and route security operations conducted by the maneuver enhancement brigade.
II II I II
R
INTEL BTB SOF UAV A
Hunter
I I I I
HHC SPT LRSD
The BFSB is organized to assist the G2 in satisfying the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIR), which include priority intelligence requirements (PIR). It becomes the
eyes and ears of the UEx within its AO. The UEx commander describes the operation and
identifies the PIR. The commander’s intent and PIR become mission orders for the BFSB
commander. The BFSB commander controls all UEx-level surveillance and reconnaissance
assets not task organized or organic to another brigade.
The BFSB commander needs wide latitude to develop the situation across the UEx AO. The size
and scope of the operation will often require the UEx to complement and reinforce the BFSB
with additional assets. The UEx also focuses the BFSB through the allocation of brigade AOs.
The BFSB has the capability to reinforce the BCT collection capabilities. When circumstances
and orders from the UEx dictate, the BFSB will reinforce brigade intelligence capabilities with
additional assets.
I I II
BSB MP EOD CA MAN
E
HHC
The maneuver enhancement brigade is responsible for protection outside of maneuver brigade
combat team AOs. Tailored with MP, ADA, combat engineer and combined arms battalions, it
preserves tactical or operational freedom of action within the UEx area of operations by
performing limited offensive, defensive, and stability missions on assigned routes or in a
designated rear area. It also plans, prepares, executes and assesses protection missions for other
joint, service, and functional and multinational headquarters when required.
The maneuver enhancement brigade does not supplant unit self defense responsibilities. Units
are still responsible for self-protection against Level I and some Level II threats. The maneuver
enhancement brigade complements self defense by focusing on protection across the UEx as a
war fighting function, not a piecemeal activity.
The maneuver enhancement brigade may provide tactical combat response forces within an AO,
improve and secure lines of communications (LOC), and it may be tasked to organize base
security and defense for several base clusters. It is organized and trained to execute selected
security missions including route security and key asset or point security. It normally requires
augmentation to perform area security operations. It is not organized, trained, or equipped to do
screen, guard and cover operations.
Sustainment Brigade
The organization of the sustainment brigade is tailored with multi-functional support battalions,
each of which includes a mix of logistical capabilities (See Figure Intro-13). Specialized support
units of varying size are task organized based on METT-TC.
Sustainment Brigade
X
II II
MED
BTB SPT
I I I
HHC SPT MED FIN HR AMMO TRANS MAINT S&S
One or more tactical sustainment brigades move with and support the UEx. If more than one
sustainment brigade supports the UEx, the UEx staff coordinates their operations.
The sustainment brigade of the UEx provides distribution-based replenishment to the BCTs task
organized under the UEx, and area support to any other unit located within the UEx AO. The
sustainment brigade establishes temporary bases within the UEx AO to conduct mission-staging
operations (MSO) and to provide replenishment to the BCTs of the UEx.
The decision to create a new BTB was made after several Combined
Training Center (CTC) observer/controller and senior leader observations
of the newly fielded Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) revealed a need
to bring the many separate, enabling combat support units under the
control of one commander. The span of control in the SBCT organizational
design proved to be too extensive for effective C2 of these many enabling
eaches. The BTB organizational design allows the HBCT commander and
deputy commander to concentrate their focus on the battle in all threat
environments, without the added direct responsibilities that these small
units require.
BTB commander ensures that his assigned companies are trained and qualified for overseas
deployment around the world in full spectrum combat operations in the GWOT.
CHAPLAIN
1-8. The unit ministry team (UMT) consists of the chaplain and his assistant. The specific
responsibilities of the chaplain are consistent with those of chaplains in other type
battalions. The chaplain—
Advises the commander on issues of religion (faith, ethics and morality), including
the religious needs of all BTB personnel.
Provides commanders pastoral care, personal counseling advice, and the privilege
of confidentiality and sacred confidence.
Develops and implements the commander’s religious support program.
Exercises staff supervision and technical control over religious support throughout
the BTB.
Helps the commander ensure all Soldiers have the opportunity to exercise their
religious beliefs constructively.
Informs the commander on the overall morale and climate of the task force.
Coordinating with the HBCT S2 to obtain all intelligence products relating to the
BTB AO.
Coordinating the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for BTB staff
planning, decision making, and targeting, focusing on the BTB rear area.
Coordinating with the BTB staff and recommending priority intelligence
requirements (PIR) for the BTB commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIR).
Performs Intelligence Synchronization, nominating collection tasks for all BTB’s
collection assets to the S3.
Providing all-source intelligence that answers the commander’s CCIR.
Maintaining the current situation regarding local enemy and environmental
factors, and updating IPB and the intelligence estimate.
Identifying and evaluating intelligence collection capabilities as they affect the AO
security, counter-reconnaissance, signal security, security operations, and force
protection (includes back briefs from patrols and analysis of EPW interrogation
information).
CHEMICAL OFFICER
1-16. The BTB Chemical Officer and NBC Staff NCO are responsible for NBC planning for
the BTB and providing the BTB commander, staff and subordinate and attached units
technical advice on NBC related matters.
The HHC XO
2-5. The company executive officer is the company's second in command and its primary
internal operational planner and coordinator. He and the company headquarters personnel
serve as the company's battle staff and operate the company CP and net control station
(NCS) for both radio and digital traffic. The company executive officer's other duties include
the following:
Continuous battle tracking.
Ensures accurate, timely tactical reports are sent to the BTB TOC.
Assumes command of the company as required.
Plans and supervises the company base defense effort including CP security.
Prepares the company OPORD for the commander.
Conducts tactical and logistical coordination with higher, adjacent, and supported
units.
Conducts additional missions as required. These may include serving as OIC for
the quartering party, company movement officer, company training officer, or other
additional duties as directed by the HHC commander.
Assists the commander in preparations for follow-on missions.
Responsible for planning and coordinating contingency support operations of the
HHC Quick Reaction Force (QRF).
When designated, serves as leader of the QRF.
Performs reconnaissance for unit movements.
2-6. The HHC First Sergeant advises the HHC commander on all matters concerning the
enlisted Soldiers of the company in much the same way as the BTB CSM advises the
battalion commander. The HHC first sergeant enforces established policies and standards
concerning enlisted personnel performance, conduct, and mission preparations. He performs
other duties the commander prescribes, including receiving and orienting newly assigned
enlisted personnel and helping inspect command activities. His other duties and
responsibilities include:
Monitors and recommends actions as necessary on the morale and discipline of the
BTB, and checks key company morale factors including mail, pay, food service,
SUPPORT PLATOON
2-9. The support platoon consists of a small headquarters section. The platoon leader and
platoon sergeant plan and organize the execution of maintenance, field feeding, and Class III
operations. The support platoon leader plans and supports logistics package (LOGPAC)
convoy operations. He ensures all BTB HHC leaders have disseminated the most current
enemy situation for planning and executing BTB HHC movements. He also over-watches re-
supply operations to the CPs and the TOC. He organizes his platoon for base defense
operations including QRF missions.
MAINTENANCE SECTION
2-10. Maintenance for the HHC, HBCT and the BTB and all its assigned and attached units
is accomplished by the BTB maintenance section. This section is organic to the BTB support
platoon. The section provides wheeled, tracked, and power generator maintenance and
manages equipment repair parts. Because of its split-based modular design, the
maintenance section can operate a motor pool from a consolidated position, and provide
mobile maintenance and repair parts support to the HBCT CPs and to its assigned and
attached units.
SECURITY SECTION
2-15. The security section consists of two Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) each with three
man crew. Its mission is to provide the HBCT mobile command groups with security. When
not required to perform that security mission, the security section is available for integration
into the security plans for the HBCT CPs. The section also can defend the BTB TOC and
other security missions as directed by the HBCT commander.
these services with BTB assets, when the two TOCs are distantly separated. The HHC
commander plans, organizes, and executes security operations in support of the mobile
command groups and plans quick reaction force (QRF) employment in the vicinity of the
MAIN CP.
2-18. The HHC commander is responsible for support, security, and movement of the MAIN
and TAC CPs and for all organic HBCT staff and attached elements of the HHC. The
commander coordinates with the HHC, BTB for maintenance, fueling, and field feeding
support. He is responsible for coordinating logistical and security support and maintains
discipline and morale. He is responsible for individual, mandatory, and collective training of
the company. The HHC commander may also be designated to coordinate and negotiate with
host nation civil and military leaders and contractors.
2-19. The HHC XO coordinates with the BTB and BSB for logistics support for the CPs and
attached units and personnel and monitors the support provided for the commander. He
assists in planning HHC unit movements and base defense, under the supervision of the
HHC Commander. He monitors routine company reporting, and coordinates the activities of
liaison officers. The HHC commander positions the XO where he can best fulfill his
command responsibilities. If the TAC CP is deployed, the XO may be assigned to the TAC to
provide leadership to logistical support personnel provided to the command post by the BTB
and/or the BSB .The XO stays tactically current and prepared to assume command of the
company.
2-20. The HHC first sergeant advises the HHC commander on all matters concerning the
enlisted Soldiers of the company in the same way that the HHC, BTB first sergeant does.
The duties and responsibilities of the HHC, HBCT First Sergeant are similar to those of the
HHC, BTB first sergeant.
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS
2-22. The MICO commander responds to the tasking of the BCT commander. He organizes
for combat based on the mission, scheme of support, task organization, and specified and
implied tasks contained in the BCT's order. The MICO commander uses the order to plan,
prepare, execute, and assess the MICO's operations. Normally, the analysis and integration
platoon is co-located with the HBCT S2 and provides analysis and intelligence production
capabilities to the S2 and visualization capabilities to the commander and S3 in support of
HBCT operations. The majority of MICO’s ground collection platoon remains under the
command and control of the MICO commander and provides general support to the HBCT or
DS to subordinate elements of the BCT, dependent on an analysis of the factors of METT-
TC. The MICO commander advises the S2 and the HBCT commander on the proper
utilization of MICO ISR assets and assets attached to the MICO considering asset
availability, current location and responsiveness, and any other pertinent factors such as
maintenance or manpower. The MICO commander assists the HBCT S2 and S3, the
ECOORD, and the reconnaissance squadron commander with planning and conducting C2-
protect and C2-attack operations. The MICO CP normally locates with or near the BCT main
CP.
recognize and recommend redirection of ISR assets if required. Collaboration between the
ISR requirements section and the HBCT S2 is essential to the synchronization of the ISR
effort and presentation of the most current intelligence possible to the HBCT commander
and staff.
2-27. The ISR requirements section is the mission manager of selected sensors. As executors
and mission managers, they develop profiles, filters and alarms based on commander's
guidance and PIRs. The section conducts requirements management and integrated ISR
near term planning and support to execution.
TUAV PLATOON
2-38. The TUAV platoon consists of seven UAVs, one mission planning/control section with 2
ground control stations, and one launch and recovery section, equipped with one ground
control station. Priority of coverage provided by the TUAV platoon is to the HBCT’s overall
ISR effort dependent on phase and type of the operation; and may provide DS to the
reconnaissance squadron, fires battalion, or a specific maneuver battalion as the mission
dictates. Ground control station (GCS) positioning is likewise dependant on phase and type
of operation. GCSs must be positioned to best support the priority effort and the overall ISR
mission. The UAV platoon conducts missions in response to requirements from the HBCT S2
and receives technical steerage from the MICO. The UAV is the primary aerial asset to
provide visualization of the battlefield (routes, target acquisition, battle damage assessment)
to the maneuver commander. The UAV platoon exercises extensive flexibility and agility in
mission planning and execution.
Plans and manages the HBCT information network with the strategic NETCOM
supporting brigade, the UEx network commander, the regional DISA support team,
or the supported J6.
ICW the HBCT S6 and the strategic supporting arm of the GIG, plans and manages
HBCT IA systems (firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and access control lists).
Plans and manages HBCT content staging/Information Dissemination
Management (IDM) procedures (user profiles, file and user priorities, and
dissemination policies).
Plans and manages all IA/CND operations to include but not limited to: key
management distribution, IAVA compliance, and Intrusion Detection Device
Management (IDDM) and operations, and compliance with all directives outlined in
AR 25-2.
Deploys range extension assets to maintain connectivity and reliability of the
HBCT communications network.
Evaluates network requirements to determine needs for unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and communications relay requirements.
Aides in the execution of all NETOPS responsibilities in support of the unit
mission.
NETOPS SECTION
2-47. The NETOPS section consists of the network management and computer/network
defense (CND) teams. These teams execute all aspects of NETOPS to include CS/IDM. The
CND teams install, operate, and maintain the CND functions of the HBCT’s information
network. The NETOPS section establishes the HBCT Network Operations and Security
Center (NOSC) and collocates with one of the network extension platoons, utilizing the
JNN’s organic network management capability to configure, monitor, and manage the WAN.
The NOSC will support the S6 section in the planning, configuration, management, and
monitoring of the TOC LAN, the TI and prioritize the dissemination of information across
the WAN. The NOSC will use existing commercial management tools to manage critical
WAN functions. The NOSC coordinates with the UEx for airborne RETRANS/relay
operations and extends network connectivity through ground and satellite assets. The
NETOPS section performs the IA functions of the NSC using the IA workstations located at
the HBCT Main. The NETOPS section serves as the center for HBCT signal C2 operations
across the WAN. The network management team includes Enhanced Position Location
Reporting System (EPLRS) planning personnel for planning, configuration, and network
management of the EPLRS network. The management team will also provide frequency and
communications security (COMSEC) management functions within the NOSC.
RETRANS TEAM
2-49. The RETRANS team provides range extension and network relay support for EPLRS
and Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) very-high frequency-
frequency modulated (VHF-FM) networks. The RETRANS team is mission critical to HBCT
C2 and may necessitate the commitment of force protection assets, in the absence of an
airborne communications relay package (CRP).
SMOKE/DECONTAMINATION PLATOON
2-52. A smoke/decontamination platoon provides equipment decontamination, NBC
reconnaissance, large-area smoke, and chemical staff support... The platoon is organized
with a chemical section, a platoon headquarters, two smoke/decontamination squads, and an
NBC reconnaissance team. Smoke and decontamination missions cannot be done
simultaneously.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
2-54. Tactical-level PSYOP supports battles and engagements by bringing psychological
pressure on hostile forces and by persuading civilians to assist the tactical supported
commander in achieving the commander’s objectives. Another primary focus of PSYOP is to
reduce interference with military operations. PSYOP personnel assist the commander by
encouraging civilians to avoid military operations, installations, and convoys. PSYOP teams
support CT by decreasing popular support for terrorists, terrorist activities, and terrorist
causes. Tactical PSYOP teams (TPT) often play a role in establishing rapport with foreign
audiences and identifying key communicators that can be used to achieve U.S. national
objectives.
2-55. The TPT primary purpose is to integrate and execute tactical PSYOP into the
supported battalion commander’s maneuver plan. The TPT must also advise the battalion
commander and staff on the psychological effects of their operations on the TA in their AO
and answer all PSYOP related questions. The TPT can conduct loudspeaker operations, face-
to-face communication, dissemination of approved audio, audiovisual, and printed materials.
TPTs often play a role in establishing rapport with foreign audiences and identifying key
communicators that can be used to achieve U.S. national objectives.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
2-56. At HBCT level, a representative from the PAO assists and advises the commander as to
the command and public information programs within the command and media relations. PA
units are configured and tailored to accomplish various missions and to provide the
supported unit with several abilities. They are most important in the areas of command
information and media relations.
ENGINEER SUPPORT
2-58. Engineer augmentation may be provided, based on METT-TC. Normally engineer
augmentation to the HBCT will include horizontal capability to perform survivability tasks
for the HBCT and BTB FOBs and for Q36 and Q37 radars of the fires battalion. All military
engineer support will come from the UEx or UEy maneuver enhancement brigade and may
include additional horizontal engineering assets, vertical construction, and general
engineering specific function assets, such as well drilling detachments.
SECTION I - GENERAL
3-1. The BTB commander and staff support the HBCT during full spectrum operations. The
HBCT commander executes offense and defense operations and stability operations and
support operations to accomplish his assigned mission. The BTB supports the HBCT in each
of these types of military operations in two ways. First, the BTB’s organic units provide
functional support and selected assistance to the HBCT battle staff. Second, in addition to
executing functional mission requirements, the BTB commander and staff:
Plan, prepare and execute rear area and base security operations.
Exercise command and control (C2) over BTB organic units during the planning,
preparation and execution of HBCT directed missions.
Ensure BTB subordinate commanders and leaders conduct pre-combat inspections
(PCI) and, detailed planning and rehearsals focused on execution of assigned HBCT
tasks.
Ensure BTB organic unit assets are positioned to execute their assigned HBCT
tasks
Coordinate to ensure CSS, FHP and security are provided for BTB organic and
attached units positioned throughout the HBCT AO.
3-2. This chapter will discuss each of these except the planning, preparation, and execution
of rear area and base security operations, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Parent Unit
and Gaining
As required
Unit; gaining As required
Parent by Gaining Gaining OPCON; TACON;
C OPCON Gaining Unit unit may pass Gaining Unit by Gaining
Unit Unit and Unit GS; GSR; R; DS
O OPCON to Unit
Parent Unit
M lower HQ.
M Note 1
A
N As required
As required
D Parent by Gaining Gaining
TACON Gaining Unit Parent Unit Gaining Unit by Gaining GS; GSR; R; DS
Unit Unit and Unit
Unit
Parent Unit
As required As required
Organic/ Parent Parent
Parent Unit Parent Unit Gaining Unit by Parent by Parent Not Applicable
Assigned Unit Unit
Unit Unit
Reinforce
Parent Unit; d Unit;
S Reinforcing Parent Reinforced Reinforced
Parent Unit Parent Unit Reinforced then Not Applicable
U (R) Unit Unit Unit
Unit Parent
P
P Unit
O General Reinforced Reinforced Parent
R Support Parent Unit and as Unit and as Unit; then
T Parent Unit Parent Unit Parent Unit Not Applicable
Reinforcing Unit required by required by Reinforce
(GSR) Parent Unit Parent Unit d Unit
NOTE 1. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational unit (see TACON).
NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after
coordination with the supported commander.
3-5. The BTB commander, staff and organic units support and assist the HBCT battle staff
throughout the all phases of the various types of military operations. First, the BTB provides
planning and coordination support to battle staff cells in the main CP during the MDMP
process. Figure 3-2 links BTB staff and organic units with the supported main CP battle
staff cell.
Figure 3-2. BTB Organic Unit Support to the HBCT Battle Staff
Annex D (Fire Support). This annex identifies high payoff targets (HPTs) and
outlines battle damage assessment (BDA) requirements.
Annex L (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). Paragraph 3a, scheme of
support states the overall R&S plan, with tasks and purposes. Paragraph 3b, Tasks
to subordinate units lists each task assigned to a subordinate ISR asset. Each
listing includes:
How the unit (or asset) will get to its assigned area.
Reconnaissance objective for that unit (or asset).
Specific collection tasks (PIR with indicators) [What to look for].
Where to look (referenced by NAI and or TAI).
When to conduct the specified R&S task [When to look.].
Whom to report, on what nets, and by when.
MP PLATOON
3-9. The MP platoon leader works with the MP planner in the MANSPT Cell in the HBCT
Main CP during the MDMP process to plan and coordinate maneuver and mobility support
operations (MMSO), EPW and or detainee operations, and force protection in rear area
security operations. Specified tasks for the MP platoon can be found in several places in the
HBCT order. They are:
Paragraph 3c. Tasks to combat support units (7) military police. This paragraph
assigns priorities of effort and support.
Annex K (Military Police). Paragraph 3 describes the concept to employ MP assets.
Addresses MMSO, force protection, EPW and detainee priorities of effort and
support.
Figure 3-3. BTB Battle Staff Support to the HBCT Battle Staff for Rear Operations
3-12. The HBCT may receive other units that provide additional capabilities and enhance
the HBCT’s ability to plan, prepare and execute operations. Although the HBCT battle staff
has assigned civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) planners, the HBCT
can expect to have additional CA and PSYOP assets attached, especially during stability and
support operations. These additional CA and PSYOP teams and detachments would
maintain liaison with the assigned CA and PSYOP planners on the HBCT battle staff and
provide additional expertise as required. Figure 3-4 highlights these attached CA and
PSYOP planners/liaison officers work closely with the information operations coordinator
(IOCOORD) in the HBCT main CP fire effects cell (FEC).
3-13. Liaison officers and detachment commanders from these attached CA and PSYOP
units:
Provide input on the employment of CA and PSYOP assets through the assigned
HBCT CA and PSYOP planners to the information operations coordinator
(IOCOORD) to generate nonlethal effects to support HBCT commander’s guidance
and concept.
X
HBCT
OPORD
CP 2 (Main)
II
S3 BTB
I
S2 MI
CA
FEC
PSYOP
I
MP
MANSPT HHC
I
S6
Figure 3-4. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Support to the HBCT Battle Staff
each of the BTB’s organic and attached (if any) units. Each task they identify contributes to
the one or more aspects of the BTB’s concept of operation. Figure 3-5 provides a summary of
where the BTB staff will find specified tasks for their organic units in the HBCT order.
3-16. Since the BTB is a new organization, there is not a specified place in the current
operations order format (FM 101-5, pp. H-15 thru H-19) for the HBCT S3 to list specified
tasks for the BTB. The HBCT S3 should list the BTB in Paragraph 3b.Tasks to maneuver
units. Tasks for the BTB organic units would be listed in Paragraph 3c.Tasks to combat
support units. BTB tasks should focus on positioning and timings of the BTB’s organic units.
The HBCT S3 should list the BTB sub unit tasks in the sequence of combat support units in
Paragraph 3c. Some examples of specified tasks that may appear in sub unit instructions
paragraph for the BTB from the HBCT OPORD are:
Attach one TUAV GCS to:
HBCT Main CP at (Grid) NLT (DTG)
Reconnaissance squadron CP at (Grid) NLT (DTG) during Phase I.
Fires battalion CP at (Grid) NLT (DTG)
1st CAB vicinity H-Town (Grid) for phase II and III of the operation.
Establish TUAV L&R site at (Grid) NLT (DTG)
3-20. The BTB commander and staff use this process to ensure their organic units have
planned in detail, and conducted necessary preparations required to execute their assigned
HBCT missions.
PLANNING
3-21. These functional BTB organic units were closely involved in assisting the HBCT battle
staff in planning and preparation for operations. In many cases, these BTB organic unit
commanders and leaders have initiated and, in fact, conducted troop leading procedures
(TLPs) for their units and platoons by the time the BTB receives the HBCT order. These
units and platoons may have already:
Deduced the mission
Issued a WARNO to their subordinates
Made a tentative plan.
3-22. The MICO provides the HBCT S2 continuous intelligence analysis and integration
support that results in a comprehensive IPB and ISR plans. Using parallel planning, the
MICO commander concurrently develops tentative plans for his subordinate platoon leaders
to accomplish specified ISR tasks that will be in Annex L (ISR) of the HBCT OPORD.
3-23. Some examples are:
The TUAV platoon’s mission planning and control section coordinates continuously
with the ADAM/BAE cell to ensure the TUAV missions listed in the ISR plan are
integrated into the ATO. The mission planning and control section receives input
from GCS operators co-located with the fires battalion and the reconnaissance
squadron and those battalion S2s and S3s as well to plan those TUAV missions.
Ground collection platoon (GCP) leader identifies and focuses on tasks specified in
the ISR plan for the PROPHET section and HCTs.
3-24. For example, the MICO commander can assist the GCP leader in several ways. The
PROPHET system operates on line of sight (LOS). By using the Digital Terrain Support
System (DTSS) in the Maneuver Support (MANSPT) Cell, the MICO commander can assist
the GCP leader by refining the general positions for the PROPHET sections to precise site
selection to maximize the capabilities of the system. Secondly, the HCTs need to develop an
interrogation plan that they will use on EPWs and detainees. In this case, the MICO
commander, working through the CA planner in the FEC, can coordinate for liaison teams
from the local police, and civilian and other MI agencies to help in this effort. This action
could be critical to the HCT interrogators identifying threats against high-value targets by
getting real-time information on Level I threats. He can help coordinate for additional
linguist support for the HCTs if needed.
3-25. Like the MICO commander, the signal company commander conducts parallel planning
with his subordinate leaders. The signal company commander works with the network
support platoon leader to ensure the network operations center:
Adjusts positioning of the signal company assets to support planned positioning
and movement of HBCT units.
Coordinates movement times and routes of signal units and assets with the HBCT
S3.
3-26. The signal company’s network support platoon performs all aspects of network
operations (NETOPS). NETOPS section establishes the HBCT’s Network Operations
Support Center (NOSC). The NOSC performs three main tasks throughout HBCT
operations. They are:
Use the JNN organic network management capability to configure, monitor, and
manage the WAN.
Plan, configure, manage, and monitor the TOC LAN, the TI and prioritize
dissemination of information across the WAN.
Plan for RETRANS teams to provide range extension and network relay support for
EPLRS and SINCGARS VHF-FM networks.
3-27. Like the GCP leader, the signal company’s NETOPS section needs current LOS data to
refine and verify tentative positioning of signal assets like RETRANS to precise site
selection using data developed with the Digital Terrain Support System (DTSS) in the
maneuver support (MANSPT) cell.
3-28. Although the MP and CBRN platoons are organic to the BTB HHC, the commander
may not have the functional expertise to provide advice and assistance to aid them in
detailed planning. The MP and CBRN planners in the MANSPT cell have the relevant
functional expertise and experience and can provide functional assistance to these respective
platoon leaders who then focus on the execution aspects of the plan. For example, the MP
planner working with the CA planner, can coordinate for liaison teams from local police to
accompany the MP platoon squads and sections during MMSO and for refined intelligence
updates on possible Level I and II threats. The CBRN planner working with the staff
weather officer (SWO) can ensure the CBRN platoon leader has the most current
meteorological data. Wind speed, wind direction, temperature inversions are all weather
related variables that affect how the CBRN platoon leader employs the FOX recon system
during any given HBCT operation. Based on their input, the platoon leaders would back
brief their company commander after finalizing their preliminary mission analysis
3-29. In each of these situations, BTB commander and staff were not directly involved in the
initial planning between the HBCT battle staff and these BTB units. In order to support
their subordinate units during planning and to ensure rigorous preparation is conducted,
commanders require information from units early in the process. Detailed verbal back briefs
and copies of warning order(s) will enable the commanders to assist in this process. The BTB
command group and staff would use this information to ensure that either the commander,
XO, S3 or CSM would attend scheduled backbriefs, OPORD briefings, rehearsals and PCIs.
The warning order includes:
A time line. The time line would include when:
The unit or platoon will move (earliest movement time)
And where the OPORD will be issued.
Backbriefs will be conducted
Rehearsals will be conducted (and location)
Pre-combat inspections will be conducted (and location)
Leader’s recon will be conducted
Special Instructions. Special instructions include equipment and supplies to be
drawn. This includes rations, water, ammunition, communications, batteries, etc.
Assists the BTB staff conduct their MDMP and orders process.
3-30. The unit’s WARNO contains relevant and timely information that will allow the BTBs
leadership to monitor unit planning, provide additional guidance and initiate coordination to
support unit preparation and execution. The BTB command group and staff would use this
information to schedule backbriefs, OPORD briefings, rehearsals and PCIs for each of their
organic units. The BTB S3 would ensure that either the commander, XO, S3 or CSM would
attend these critical activities.
3-31. Additionally, this information serves as a start point for the BTB HHC commander and
Support platoon leader to initiate CSS and FHP planning to support the BTB’s organic units.
The support platoon leader needs visibility on all of the BTB’s requirements. The BTB HHC
commander assists the support platoon leader to prioritize, coordinate and execute CSS and
FHP tasks to ensure BTB organic units are prepared to execute their assigned missions.
3-32. To summarize, the BTB’s leadership use and focus on the information in their organic
unit back briefs, WARNOs and the HBCT OPORD to assist in their own mission analysis
leading to the publication of the BTB OPORD focused on:
Organic unit CSS and FHP requirements.
Unit preparatory activities identified in the mission analysis and subordinate unit
WARNOs.
Identify security, movement and CSS coordination and assistance actions that may
involve the BTB battle staff during the preparation and execution phases of the
operation.
3-33. Figure 3-7 highlights a few examples of tasks the BTB battle staff may monitor or
assist the MICO with during the planning phase of the operations cycle.
ASSESS ASSESS
Ex
ec
e
ar
ut e
ep
Pr
ASSESS
PREPARATION
3-34. During this phase of the operations cycle, the BTB has completed its OPORD, and
subordinate units are performing the following steps of the TLPs.
Initiating movement.
Conducting reconnaissance.
Completing their plans
Issuing orders
Supervising preparation; Inspecting (through PCIs, backbriefs and rehearsals); and
refining their plan.
3-35. The BTB battle staff continues to focus their support on organic units during this phase
of the operations process by exercising coordination necessary to:
Ensure their organic unit assets are positioned to execute their HBCT directed
mission and taskings.
Ensure their organic unit’s security during movement and while at their designated
position area.
Ensure their organic units have received all required supplies, and personnel to
accomplish their assigned tasks and plans are in place to ensure continuous CSS
and FHP support throughout the operation based on the command/support
relationship that each unit will operate ICW.
3-36. As in the planning phase, the BTB commander and staff need current and updated
information from their units to ensure execution is on track. The MI and signal companies
and the MP and CBRN recon platoons should provide copies of their operations order to the
BTB leadership for review and reference. The unit’s operations order and the HBCT order
contain relevant information that will allow the BTB commander and staff to monitor and
support continued unit preparation and execution.
3-37. More than likely, BTB organic unit assets will have to be positioned throughout the
HBCT’s AO and may reposition several times during the course of an operation in order to
accomplish their assigned missions. The HBCT OPORD task organization determines
responsibility for these movements, security and logistical support. Examples below describe
some of these required movements.
3-38. The signal company’s network support platoon and network extension platoons each
have a RETRANS team. These RETRANS teams provide range extension and network relay
support for EPLRS and SINCGARS VHF-FM networks. This mission is critical to the HBCT
C2 plan. However, in order to extend EPLRS and SINCGARS network range, the RETRANS
teams will have to be positioned at selected locations throughout the HBCT AO in some
unit’s battle space.
3-39. The MICO GCP PROPHET collection sections and HCTs will be located throughout the
HBCT AO. The PROPHET collection sections may or may not be located in a HBCT
subordinate unit’s AO. Likewise, the HCTs may or may not be co-located at HBCT
subordinate unit designated EPW and or detainee collection points. Allocation of all MICO
resources must be a deliberate decision based on mission priorities, economy of force, and
risks of non coverage approved by the HBCT commander.
3-40. Figure 3-8 highlights MICO elements that could likely be positioned throughout the
HBCT AO. The MICO needs to be arrayed in this manner in order to support the HBCT
commander’s plan with relevant and timely information that enhances situational
understanding among HBCT units and an accurate COP. However, the location of the unit,
and the command/support relationship determined in the HBCT task organization will
determine the exact support responsibilities of the BTB commander and the commander in
whose AO they are operating. The BTB staff and the BTB HHC commander can then plan
their scheme of support for all of the BTB elements they are responsible to support.
Figure 3-8. MICO Assets Positioned Throughout the HBCT Area of Operations
the command post support requirements will determine how the BTB HHC Commander
provides sustainment support to the subordinate elements of the BTB given his austere
capabilities.
3-44. Figure 3-9 lists some MICO specific preparation phase activities. This is not intended
to be a complete list. These are some examples that the BTB commander and staff may
monitor and coordinate during the preparation phase of the operations cycle.
Plan
ASSESS ASSESS
e
ar
ut e
ep
. Perform Prophet Pre-Ops & PCI
Pr • Configure &Test Sensor
Payload
• Occupy L&R Site
• Move HCTs to Designated
EPW and/or Detainee Site (s)
ASSESS
• Move to & Occupy Designated
Prophet Site(s)
• Move & link up TUAV GCS with
ARS & FB CPs
• Coordinate CSS & FHP Area
support for MI Elements
Figure 3-9. MICO Preparation Phase Activities Requiring BTB Staff Monitoring and
Coordination
EXECUTION
3-45. The BTB battle staff continue to support as required to their organic units during this
phase of the operations cycle. The BTB battle staff continues to exercise coordination
necessary to:
Monitor BTB units execution of HBCT directed missions and taskings
Re-positioned to execute their HBCT directed mission and taskings.
Maintain security during re-positioning movements and while at their new
designated position area.
Ensure their organic units continue to receive CSS and FHP support.
3-46. In order to do this, the BTB commander and staff need accurate and timely information
from two sources. Their organic units must submit status reports IAW unit SOPs. This will
give the BTB commander visibility on their current CSS and FHP situation. The BTB staff
must maintain continuous coordination with their counter-part HBCT battle staff planners
to maintain accurate situational understanding and current COP focusing on movement and
security coordination of BTB organic units positioned throughout the HBCT AO. This
information will also inform the BTB leadership for use in subsequent current operations
fragmentary orders where BTB support requirements may change or in planning future
operations.
3-47. Figure 3-10 lists some MICO specific execution phase activities. This is not intended to
be a complete list. These are some examples that the BTB commander and staff may monitor
and coordinate during the preparation phase of the operations cycle.
• Monitor Post-Flight
Operations Checks
• Monitor Post Mission
De-Briefs Plan
ASSESS ASSESS
Ex
• Monitor ISR Operations
ec
e
- HCT
ar
u te
- SIGINT
ep
Pr
- TUAV
• Monitor ISR Reporting
• Analyze Daily Personnel &
CSS Status Reports
ASSESS
Figure 3-10. MICO Execution Phase Activities Requiring BTB Staff Monitoring and
Coordination
SUMMARY
3-48. The interaction between the BTB subordinate companies, the HBCT staff and the BTB
itself is a new and complex relationship. The BTB must assist their organic units during the
planning, preparation and execution of HBCT directed missions and taskings by exercising
coordination necessary to:
Ensure their organic unit assets are prepared and positioned to execute their
HBCT directed missions and taskings.
Ensure their organic unit’s security during movement and while at their designated
position area.
Ensure their organic units receive continuous CSS and FHP support.
3-49. The BTB commander and staff continuously plan and coordinate efforts on these
specific tasks to simplify work for their organic units so those units can focus on detailed
planning and execution of HBCT directed missions.
Rear area and base security operations are a key element of the HBCT’s
sustaining operation. The purpose of sustaining operations is to generate
and maintain the HBCT’s combat power. The purpose of rear area and
base security is to prevent enemy detection and interference with CSS
functions. Components of rear area and base security are:
• Intelligence.
• Base and base cluster self-defense.
• Response force operations.
4-4. The HBCT commander can choose to organize his AO so that his subordinates have
contiguous or noncontiguous areas of operations. The HBCT commander bases his decision
on whether to establish contiguous or noncontiguous AOs for his subordinate units on his
analysis of METT-TC factors. Reasons why a commander might establish noncontiguous
AOs are to encompass key and decisive terrain within his area of influence when he has
limited number of friendly forces for the size of his AO; the enemy is comparatively weak and
the commander concludes that his subordinate units do not have to remain within
supporting range or distance of one another and can take advantage of superior
understanding (SU) and tactical mobility; and the enemy is concentrated in dispersed areas
and requires a corresponding concentration of friendly forces. Reasons why a commander
might establish contiguous AOs are political boundaries or enemy force concentrations
require contiguous AOs; reduce risk of being defeated in detail because of an incomplete
operational picture; and to concentrate combat power along a single avenue of approach. For
further discussion on contiguous and noncontiguous AOs refer to Chapter 2, Common
Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures, FM 3-90, Tactics.
4-5. This chapter will discuss rear area and base security operations in the context of
stability operations because the Army is currently conducting stability operations in
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and has been conducting
stability operations in the Balkans since 1996. However, our Army does have potential
adversaries capable of conducting symmetrical mid to high intensity offensive operations.
Additionally, the discussion that follows will address rear area and base security operations
in a traditional linear defensive operation.
4-6. It is also important to note that the BTB commander and staff will use existing
command and control, and decision making processes described in current doctrine to plan,
prepare, and execute rear area and base security operations. The discussion that follows will
emphasize specific steps of the mission analysis and course of action development steps of
the MDMP as described in Chapter 3, Military Decision Making Process, FM 5-0, Army
Planning and Orders Production. The focus of the discussion is how to apply these specific
steps to rear area and base security operations in the three general cases cited.
4-7. Mission Analysis, Step 7: Perform Risk Assessment provides an example of using an
existing step of mission analysis and tailoring its application for rear area and base security
operations in the three general cases cited. Risk assessment covers both accident risk
hazards and tactical risks. In this case, the focus of risk assessment is on tactical risks in the
particular operation. The HBCT commander cannot defend against every threat because he
does not have unlimited resources. The HBCT commander, assisted by his staff and with
input from other units in the HBCT AO, must establish security priorities. A technique they
may use is the criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability (CVR) methodology used to by air
and missile defense (AMD) planners to establish priorities of protection. These terms are
defined as follows:
Critical: Loss of this unit and or capability will have a significant impact on HBCT
operations.
Vulnerable: This unit and or capability are vulnerable to the likely and or
probable enemy courses of action (COA).
Recoverable: The HBCT has redundant type units and or capabilities. This also
includes available host nation support (HNS) assets and capabilities.
4-8. The product of this type of analysis is a prioritized critical asset list. HBCT units,
assets and or capabilities that are critical, vulnerable and non-recoverable must be afforded
the highest priority of protection. HBCT units, assets, and capabilities that are critical,
recoverable, and somewhat vulnerable to likely enemy COAs would be afforded the next
priority of protection. Units, assets, and capabilities that may or may not be critical, are
recoverable and not vulnerable to likely probable enemy COAs and would be afforded the
lowest priority of protection. Table 4-1, HBCT Rear Area Critical Asset Analysis Worksheet,
shows what the BTB commander and staff may have concluded in each of these general
cases.
4-9. The critical asset analysis worksheet serves both as a point of common reference and a
particularly useful tool for both the BTB and HBCT staffs during mission analysis and COA
development, as they work to make recommendations for the commander’s critical
information requirements, develop the ISR plans, and develop suitable and feasible friendly
COAs. In this case, a suitable COA will ensure every priority one asset or capability is a
defended asset against the most likely threat.
MISSION ANALYSIS
4-11. Concurrent and parallel planning between the HBCT and BTB commanders and their
staffs starts during mission analysis. A sound rear area and base security operations plan is
derived from a common understanding of the enemy situation and the specific threats it
presents the HBCT. IPB for stability operations emphasizes demographic analysis as much
as the enemy and terrain because the threat is often a group or groups of insurgents.
Intelligence is one of the key components for rear area and base security operations. The
following discussion highlights four specific mission analysis steps related to intelligence.
West Town
2
X
X
3 East Village
4
IED
South Mountain
HWY 1
HWY 3
To date, high-value targets for the insurgents appear to be any entity that is a
symbol of governmental authority and control or any non-governmental entity that
if attacked undermines the government’s credibility.
4-15. The HBCT commander’s major conclusions are:
Non-contiguous AOs may be appropriate for this situation because the absence of
insurgent activity throughout the majority of the HBCT’s AO means subordinate
units do not have to remain within supporting range or distance of one another to
take advantage of the HBCT’s superior SU and tactical mobility.
Assign the BTB responsibility to monitor unassigned areas of the HBCT AO. This
will allow the HBCT battle staff at the Main CP to focus their attention on
supporting 1st CAB (in and around West Town) and ARS (along Highway 3) on-
going operations in the west-southwest sections of the HBCT AO. Additionally, this
will allow the BSB commander and staff to focus their efforts on the combat service
support elements of the sustainment operation and security of the BSA. The BTB
CP will focus on base security, movement control and terrain management aspects
of the HBCT’s sustaining operation.
4-16. It is important to note that the BTB’s role (or roles) in HBCT operations is not fixed.
The HBCT commander assesses each situation and assigns the BTB a specific role that best
enhances the HBCT’s potential combat power for a particular operation.
in noncontiguous AOs. Figure 4-2 shows a possible initial array of HBCT units for this
situation. The gray shaded areas indicate the assigned AO for each subordinate HBCT unit.
X
East Village
South Mountain
HWY 1
HWY 3
4-25. This array of HBCT forces simplifies security concerns in the unassigned areas of the
HBCT AO. The HBCT main CP with supporting MI and signal assets, the BTB TOC and
HHC units, and the BSB are positioned in areas free from past or current insurgent activity.
Additionally, note the fires battalion is positioned not only to provide immediate fires to the
1st CAB and reconnaissance squadron but also to provide 360-degree coverage for the rest of
the HBCT. Also, the fires battalion can provide a reaction force for the HBCT Main CP as
well as provide security patrols into the western half of the South Mountain. The 2nd CAB is
positioned to provide a reaction force for the BSB and provide patrols into the eastern half of
the North and South Mountains. So, positioning can help secure identified critical assets and
establish areas for local security patrols to monitor the unassigned areas of the HBCT AO.
4-26. Also of interest to the BTB commander and staff, is the positioning of MI company
elements and assets to execute initial ISR missions and taskings assigned by the HBCT.
Figure 4-3 shows the initial array of MI assets from the TUAV platoon and the ground
collection platoon. Note that the HUMINT collection teams, TUAV GCS and TUAV L&R
sections are located in another HBCT unit’s AO. However, also note that two PROPHET
collection teams are located in unassigned areas in the HBCT’s AO. In this case, the
assessment of tactical risks for these PROPHET teams indicates it’s acceptable to position
them as such to optimize their system’s collection capabilities. Also, these positions would be
designated as no fire areas (NFAs) to prevent fratricide by indirect fire.
HWY 1
HCT
MI X2
North Mountain
HWY 2
N
E W
EPW
DET
X
GCS
MI East Village
GCS EPW
MI DET
E W
South Mountain
HWY 1
HWY 3 GCS
MI
4-27. Likewise, it was determined that the network support company needed to deploy its
two RETRANS teams in order to provide the HBCT’s range extension and network relay
support for EPLRS and SINCGARS VHF-FM networks. Each RETRANS team can operate
up to three different VHF-FM nets. Typically, these three nets are HBCT command,
operations and intelligence (O&I), and fire nets. Like the PHROPHET teams, each
RETRANS team position would be designated as no fire areas (NFAs) to prevent fratricide
by indirect fire.
4-28. Figure 4-4 shows the initial array of RETRANS assets.
HWY 1
HCT
MI X2
North Mountain
HWY 2
N
E W
EPW
DET
RETRANS
West Town BTB X
BSB
CP 2 (Main)
MI
L&R HCT
X MI
X
GCS
MI East Village
GCS EPW
MI DET
RETRANS
E W
South Mountain
HWY 1
HWY 3 GCS
MI
4-29. Response Force Operations. Before discussing specifics on how to develop a concept
of operations for securing the unassigned areas of the HBCT AO it is necessary to review a
few general but key points about response force operations. The BTB commander is
responsible to plan for (IAW CVR analysis done in mission analysis, Step 7, Perform risk
assessment) and respond to security threats in the unassigned areas of the HBCT AO, with
HBCT subordinate unit forces provided HBCT commander. Each designated base and base
cluster commander is responsible for the security of his base/base cluster and must
designate, organize, and rehearse a quick reaction force (QRF) for immediate local response
to eliminate level II threats. The BTB’s MP platoon has the capability to function as a QRF.
If apportioned to the rear fight, the MP platoon would reinforce the base defense’s initial
response to the attack by a level II threat.
4-30. Level III threats exceed the capability of the organic capability of the BTB. The HBCT
commander has two basic options. First, he can change boundaries of a CAB. For example,
the CAB’s new adjusted AO would include the area where the Level III threat is located. In
this case, the CAB would then initiate actions to destroy the Level III threat. The HBCT
commander must augment the BTB with combat assets in order to defeat a Level III threat.
The HBCT commander could attach forces from another subordinate unit to the BTB. There
could be several potential level III threats based on the BTB’s IPB. The BTB commander
must prioritize these potential level III threats for the attached combat unit commander.
The attached combat unit commander would start planning, preparation, and rehearsals
against the most likely level III threat.
East Village
EPW
DET
South Mountain
HWY 1
HWY 3
4-33. Additionally, the concept of operations for the rear operation identifies specific tasks for
HBCT units as they apply to the sustaining operation. These tasks commonly involve
reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, base and base cluster defense, and rear area fire
support. Figure 4-6 depicts tasks designed by the HBCT staff and assigned in the HBCT
order to monitor the unassigned areas in the HBCT AO in this scenario. Key tasks
associated with monitoring these unassigned areas include movement control, route security,
convoy security, and reconnaissance and surveillance to name a few. The specific tasks for
each HBCT unit in this particular example are listed after the figure.
HWY 1
1
North Mountain
HWY 2
N
6
4
BSB
CP 2 (Main)
X
X
7
MP
East Village
5
3
South Mountain
2 HWY 1
HWY 3
4-34. Examples of specific rear area security tasks for HBCT units in this scenario are:
1st CAB (#1on Figure 4-6): On order, conduct route security patrols and enforce
movement priorities along Highway 1 from West Town to the HBCT northwest
boundary.
Armed Reconnaissance Squadron (# 2 and #3 on Figure 4-6):
On order, conduct route security patrols along Highway 3 to the HBCT’s
southwest boundary.
Monitor Highway 3 during periods of limited visibility with TUAV for
indications of insurgent attempts to establish ambush sites and emplace IEDs.
Conduct area recon of South Mountain daily. Look for mortar weapons and
ammo caches and firing position preparations.
2 CAB (#4 on Figure 4-6):
nd
On order, conduct route security patrols and enforce movement priorities along
Highway 2 from East Village to the HBCT north-northeast boundary.
On order, provide convoy security for 1st CAB, fires battalion and ARS
LOGPACS.
MP platoon (#5 on Figure 4-6):
Conduct route security patrols and enforce movement priorities along Highway
1 from East Village to West Town.
Provide security escort for MECH battalion and ARS LOGPACS daily.
Escort detainees from the 1st CAB detainee holding area to the HBCT’s holding
area in the 2nd CAB AO at (Grid).
Provide quick reaction force (QRF) for the HBCT main CP.
BSB (#6 on Figure 4-6):
On order, conduct security patrol on the east end of North Mountain.
Provide LOGPAC to PROPHET and RETRANS teams on east end of North
Mountain daily.
Fires battalion (#7 on Figure 4-6):
Provide a Battery-sized TCF. Priorities of commitment are to defend the HBCT
main CP, then the BSB support area.
Monitor South Mountain during periods of limited visibility with TUAV for
indications of insurgent attempts to establish ammo caches and mortar firing
positions.
Rear Area Fire Support. Priority of fires is to the 1st CAB then the 2nd CAB
during LOGPAC convoy operations, then the TCF if committed.
4-35. The BTB TOC would coordinate for close combat attack (CCA) through the BAE and
fires through the FEC at the HBCT main CP to support HBCT units tasked with conducting
route security and convoy security and to support movement of LOGPACs and other unit
moves within the unassigned areas of the HBCT AO. The BTB would then brief these tasked
units to ensure they had the fire plan, frequencies and call signs for the designated firing
and supporting aviation units. The BTB would then monitor these units during route
security and convoy security operations.
4-36. There are other units that may be attached to the HBCT that can support the BTB in
one or more of the components of rear area and base security operations. Two noteworthy
attachments are engineers and civil affairs (CA). Engineer attachments support the BTB
during the conduct of rear area and base security operations by:
Performing engineer technical route reconnaissance.
Improving mobility along specified MSRs and other routes.
Constructing and maintaining helipads and airfields.
Improving survivability of designated critical, vulnerable, and non-recoverable
HBCT assets.
4-37. CA unit commanders attached to the HBCT assist the information operations
coordinator (IOCOORD) by contributing to the planning and coordination of nonlethal effects
in the FEC. The IOCOORD may recommend allocation of selected CA assets to support the
BTB during the conduct of rear area and base security operations. Specifically, CA assist the
BTB to:
Coordinate with host nation civil and military law enforcement agencies.
Acquire and disseminate information on threats.
Coordinate with MI HUMINT collection teams to support detainee operations.
Coordinate with HN for refugee control and assistance.
Coordinate for and acquire use of HN transportation assets.
Coordinate and acquire engineer equipment and materials.
4-38. To summarize, the BTB commander and staff need to focus on selected steps of the
MDMP to get at key issues peculiar to rear operations. Mission analysis Step 2 (Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield), Step 7 (Conduct Risk Assessment) and Step 9 (Develop
Initial ISR Annex) are applied a little differently to rear area and base security operations.
Risk assessment focuses on tactical risks in planning for rear area and base security
operations. The example used highlighted the air defense critical-vulnerable-recoverable
(CVR) methodology as a start point to assess tactical risks of HBCT units and assets in the
rear area. It is also a useful tool for making recommendations on CCIR and developing
supporting ISR plans.
4-39. This section also highlighted key differences in course of action development Step 4
(Develop the concept of operations) as well. The BTB commander’s concept of operation for
the rear operation identified specific tasks for HBCT units related to monitoring unassigned
areas of the HBCT AO, sustainment operations, and movement control based on the CVR
analysis of the HBCT AO, which is done during mission analysis. These tasks commonly
involve reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, route security, convoy security, base and
base cluster defense, and rear area fire support. The example used also highlighted how to
array HBCT units to mitigate likely and potential enemy threats in unassigned areas of the
HBCT AO and monitor those unassigned areas during a stability operation where the HBCT
is assigned a noncontiguous AO in for a non-linear operation.
MISSION ANALYSIS
4-41. As in the noncontiguous AO non-linear operations situation, the BTB commander and
staff need to focus on four mission analysis sub-steps related to intelligence, Those sub-steps
are:
Step 2: Perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
Step 7: Perform risk assessment.
Step 8: Determine initial commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)
and essential elements of information (EEFI).
Step 9: Determine initial ISR plan.
4-42. We will not repeat the discussion of the intelligence related mission analysis sub-steps
because this discussion in based on the same threat described in the stability operation
scenario. To review Step 2: Perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield, refer to Figure
4-1, Recent and On-going Insurgent Activity and Paragraphs 4-13, 4-14 (major observations),
and 4-15 (commander’s major conclusions). Refer to Table 4-1, HBCT Critical Asset Analysis
Worksheet and Paragraphs 4-7 through 4-9 to review Step 7: Perform risk assessment. Refer
to Paragraphs 4-19 and 4-20 to review the discussion of Step 8: Determine initial
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and essential elements of information
(EEFI). Refer to Paragraphs 4-21 and 4-22 to review the discussion on Step 9: Determine
initial ISR plan.
HWY 1
1st CAB
North Mountain
HWY 2
N
BTB
II
B
BT
II
CA
West Town BTB X
2nd
II
CP 2 (Main)
II BSB
B
2nd
CA
II
1 C AB
X
d
2n
X
II
II
AB
II
CA
II
1 st
ARS
S
AR
2nd
I IRS
C
A
AB
HWY 1
HWY 3 South Mountain
4-46. This array of HBCT forces leaves no area of the HBCT AO unassigned. The 1st CAB is
positioned in the western portion of the HBCT AO in order to focus their operations in and
around West Town. The 1st CAB’s operations against insurgent cells and suspected
strongholds in the vicinity of West Town would be central to the HBCT commander’s decisive
operation. The ARS is positioned to eliminate ambush activity along Highway 3 and mortar
attacks from positions on South Mountain. The 2nd CAB’s AO includes Highway 1 as far west
as Contact Point 1, Highway 2 to the HBCT’s northern boundary, and East Village. The 2nd
CAB’s inherent responsibilities include route security and convoy security along most of the
major roads in the HBCT’s AO. The 2nd CAB’s operations would be critical to the HBCT’
commander’s sustaining operation. The BTB has been assigned a comparatively small AO
that includes North Mountain. The HBCT main CP with supporting MI and signal assets,
the BTB TOC and HHC units, and the BSB are positioned in an area free from past or
current insurgent activity. The fires battalion is positioned not only to provide immediate
fires to the 1st CAB and ARS, but 360-degree coverage for the rest of the HBCT.
4-47. This array of HBCT forces simplifies the BTB commander and staff’s security planning
and coordination requirements and support for MICO and network support company assets
positioned throughout the HBCT AO. The BTB commander and staff need only focus on their
assigned AO. However, the BTB commander and staff are concerned about all MICO and
network support company assets because they are organic BTB units. The BTB commander
and staff should suggest to the HBCT S2 and S6 respectively to consider recommending
attachment of MICO assets and teams, and Network Support Company RETRANS teams
positioned outside the BTB AO to the HBCT units whose AO’s they were positioned.
Attachment to other HBCT units reduces the BTB commander’s concerns about securing and
sustaining dispersed MICO and NSC assets during operations. Figure 4-8 shows positioning
of MICO and RETRANS teams in the BTB AO.
North Mountain
N
E W
1st CAB
BTB
II
RETRANS
HWY 2
BTB
CAB
2nd I I
BTB
X
HWY 1 CP 2 (Main)
BTB
II
West Town 2nd CA
B
East Village
HWY 3
HWY 1
Figure 4-8. MICO and Network Support RETRANS Assets in the BTB Area of Operations
4-48. The BTB concept of operation identifies specific tasks for BTB units as they apply to
this case. These tasks commonly involve counter-reconnaissance, security, and base defense.
In this situation, the BTB commander has BTB HHC organic units available as dedicated
assets. Figure 4-9 depicts the MP platoon conducting security patrols along North Mountain
and manning an observation post oriented toward the intersection of Highways 1 and 3. The
Security Section is the primary asset for HBCT CP and BTB TOC security.
North Mountain
N
1st CAB
BTB
II
HWY 2
BTB
CAB
MP
II 2nd
MP
BTB
X
HWY 1 CP 2 (Main)
BTB
II
West Town 2nd CA
B
East Village
HWY 3
HWY 1
N
PL
White
X
North
Mountain
HWY 1 HWY 2
II
BSB
CP 1 (TAC)
West (-)
Town X
1 st
CA
II B
CP 2 (Main)
East BTB
2n
dC
Village
X
AB
South (-)
Mountain
TCF
X
II
HWY 3
II CP 1 (TAC)
HWY 1
X
PL White
MISSION ANALYSIS
4-50. The intelligence related steps of mission analysis will not be discussed in detail again.
However, the utility of developing a critical asset analysis worksheet cannot be overstated.
This worksheet serves both as a point of common reference and a particularly useful tool for
both the BTB and HBCT staffs during mission analysis and COA development as they work
to make recommendations for the commander’s critical information requirements, develop
ISR plans, and develop suitable and feasible friendly COAs. As in the other general cases, a
suitable COA will ensure every priority asset or capability is a defended asset against likely
threats.
Direct Actions
Conduct Coordination
Make Recommendations
Manage Information
MONITOR OPERATIONS
4-57. The BTB staff needs to monitor three specific areas in rear area and base security
operations in the HBCT rear area. They are intelligence, base and base cluster defense and
response force operations.
Intelligence. The BTB S2’s primary asset to monitor intelligence is through ASAS.
ASAS provides the S2 a macro view of the current enemy situation throughout the
HBCT’s AO and AI. However, other sources the S2 can use are:
HUMINT. The BTB’s PIR will more than likely be refined and focused on Level
I and II threats. Information on these threats is often generated through
HUMINT sources. Besides the HUMINT collection teams in the MI company,
other valuable HUMINT sources are local government police and security
forces, and non-governmental organization (NGOs) aid workers in the area and
other HN agencies. Finally, the S2 should contact UEx and or UEy
counterintelligence units for information on potential high-value targets the
BTB should protect.
TUAV. The BTB S2 should plan for daily missions designed to provide real
time intelligence on daily routine troop movements along designated HBCT
MSRs. Normally, one of the TUAV GCS will be located at the HBCT Main CP.
The S2 needs to review planned TUAV missions and determine if any of those
can provide “in-flight” information useful to the BTB rear area security
operation. If a TUAV flight might provide such information, then the S2 or a
designated representative could be present when that particular mission is
flown. There are probably several opportunities a day to do this, as the TUAV
L&R Section may be located in the BSB area. The TUAV will probably overfly a
considerable portion of the HBCT AO during the ingress to and egress from its
MANAGE INFORMATION
4-58. The BTB staff uses current C2 processes and procedures to provide the BTB
commander with accurate, relevant and timely information. The BTB staff uses the MDMP
and IPB to help the BTB commander to visualize and describe the current and future
situations, and to establish and maintain an accurate COP. Staff processes assist in
planning, coordinating and monitoring operations. The BTB staff uses these processes to
help the BTB commander direct operations. The BTB staff relies on information. ABCS and
FBCB2 systems provide digital automation support to help the staff visualize and describe
the situation for the commander, and direct execution of the commander’s decision through a
COP.
MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS
4-60. BTB staff officers that recognize possible problems and can anticipate the potential
impact of that particular problem are ready to provide the BTB commander with a coherent
recommendation that will correct the situation. For example, commitment of the TCF is an
event-driven decision. The staff will have developed indicators and tied those to an event
template. The timings in the event template were the result of time-distance calculations
estimated by the staff, and confirmed through reduced force rehearsals by the TCF. So, in
this case, the staff would recognize indicators from early unit spot reports that the threat
may exceed the attacked unit’s capabilities. Typical staff actions include:
The S2 would know if there was an on-going TUAV mission in the general area and
contact the HBCT S2 to coordinate a re-route of the mission the get real-time
imagery of the situation.
Concurrently, the FEC working through the HBCT FEC would initiate actions to
prepare a FB firing unit to execute planned fires to support the commitment of the
TCF. He would also determine if there were any aviation assets available for CCA.
The S1/S4 would alert the BAE element in the HBCT FEC to initiate and assist
coordination for Air MEDEVAC for critical wounded casualties in the attacked
unit.
The battle captain would take the initiative to issue a WARNO to the TCF to
increase current REDCON level, brief the TCF commander on the situation, and
then immediately notify the BTB commander of the situation and actions taken
thus far by the staff.
4-61. To summarize, the BTB staff conducts coordination and direct actions in order to
synchronize intelligence, base defense and response force operations.
Responsibilities
4-63. The BTB commander, BTB HHC commander, and HBCT HHC commander all have key
roles in planning, preparing, and executing command post security. The BTB commander
has overall responsibility for planning, preparing, and executing HBCT TAC, HBCT MAIN
and BTB TOC security against likely threat action in any given situation. The HBCT HHC
commander is responsible for conducting security planning and supervising execution of
security plans for HBCT TAC and HBCT MAIN. The BTB HHC commander is responsible
for conducting security planning and supervising execution of security plans for the BTB
TOC.
4-64. The task of planning, preparing and executing command post security is simplified
when the HBCT Main and TAC, and BTB TOC are collocated in the same general vicinity
and within mutual supporting distances of each other. This situation affords the BTB
commander the opportunity to integrate and coordinate security planning with the HBCT
HHC commander and the BTB HHC commander. The BTB commander can implement
active security measures that provide collateral security for all three C2 facilities with
existing BTB organic assets. However, there are times when the HBCT TAC CP and/or the
BTB TOC will be deployed at different locations. Normally, the HBCT TAC will be the C2
facility that operates at a separate location. In these cases, the security section would serve
as the primary asset to secure the HBCT TAC CP. A section from the BTB MP platoon could
be used to supplement security in and around the HBCT Main and BTB TOC.
Organization
4-65. Security of HBCT CPs is organized like a perimeter defense. The HBCT HHC
commander assigns sectors for each assigned and attached company headquarters located in
the vicinity of HBCT MAIN. The clock method is a technique the HBCT HHC commander
can use to make establishing the HBCT CP security perimeter a routine procedure. Also, he
ensures that each element, to include the Main CP cells provide individual soldiers for use as
a quick reaction force (QRF). The HBCT HHC commander recognizes that many of these
soldiers will be performing duties that they do not routinely perform and that their absence
during rehearsals and other QRF specific training may affect operational readiness of their
section or CP cell. The BFV security section and MP platoon are organic BTB elements that
are potential response forces available for HBCT CP security.
Preparation
4-66. The most important decision in preparation is selection of HBCT CP sites and site
reconnaissance. Positioning of C2 facilities can provide passive security. Ideal CP sites are
on terrain that enhances survivability by providing natural cover; reduces potential of
detection by providing natural concealment; yet, does not reduce or degrade CP
communication systems. Implementing passive security measures allows the BTB and both
HHC commanders the opportunity to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of available
organic assets for active security measures.
4-67. The HBCT HHC commander, using factors of METT-TC decides on specific priorities of
work for any given CP site. Priorities of work may include the following:
Establishing local security and deploying a security force.
Designating sectors of fire, principal directions of fire and TRPs.
Preparing primary fighting positions.
Positioning key weapons.
Designating and preparing alternate fighting positions.
Emplacing chemical alarms.
Preparing range cards and sector sketches.
Installing night and limited visibility aids.
Designating Quick Reaction Forces (QRF).
Rehearsing QRF under day and limited visibility conditions.
4-68. For additional discussion of command post security refer to FMI 3.90.6, Heavy Brigade
Combat Team (HBCT), Chapter 10, Command Post Operations.
Mission
A-9. The heavy aviation brigade’s TOE mission is to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces using
maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power at the critical time and place, as an
integrated member of the combined arms team. This brigade (Figure A-1) destroys enemy
forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect. It conducts reconnaissance and security (R&S)
operations and provides C2 support. It conducts air movement operations, aerial delivery of
mines, and aeromedical support. See FM 3-04.111 for additional details on the heavy
aviation brigade.
Organization
A-10. The heavy aviation brigade has an HHC, two heavy ARBs, an AHB, a GSAB, and an
ASB.
Fundamentals
A-11. A heavy aviation brigade is usually assigned to a heavy UEx, and does not have any
organic ground combat forces. The brigade can perform screen operations, guard operations
when augmented, and participate in cover missions.
A-12. The heavy aviation brigade supports the UEx scheme of maneuver by facilitating
ground maneuver through aviation operations. Utility and heavy helicopters allow the
brigade to move forces and materiel quickly throughout the battlespace. Attack
reconnaissance aircraft focus on providing quick reaction fire support through CCA to
friendly maneuver forces in contact and mobile strikes against high-value targets (HVT).
Mission
A-13. The light aviation brigade’s TOE mission is to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces using
maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power at the critical time and place, as an
integrated member of the combined arms team. This brigade (Figure A-2) destroys enemy
forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect. It conducts R&S operations, air assault and air
movement operations, and aerial delivery of mines. It also provides C2 and aeromedical
support. See FM 3-04.111 for additional details on the light aviation brigade.
Organization
A-14. The light aviation brigade has an HHC, two light ARBs, an AHB, a GSAB, and an
ASB.
Fundamentals
A-15. A light aviation brigade is usually assigned to an infantry UEx. Due to the UEx’s
relative lack of firepower, it relies on security operations to reduce or eliminate the
probability of surprise engagements. The brigade can perform screen operations, guard
operations when augmented, and participate in cover missions.
A-16. The light aviation brigade supports the UEx scheme of maneuver by facilitating
ground maneuver through aviation operations. Utility and heavy helicopters allow the
brigade to move forces and materiel quickly throughout the battlespace. Attack
reconnaissance aircraft focus on reconnaissance and security missions to protect
maneuvering forces, and quick reaction fire support through CCA once enemy contact is
established.
Mission
A-17. The forced entry aviation brigade’s TOE mission is to find, fix, and destroy enemy
forces using fire and maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power to support UEx
operations. This brigade (Figure A-3) destroys threat forces using fire, maneuver, and shock
effect. It conducts R&S operations and provides C2 support. It conducts air assault and air
movement operations, aerial delivery of mines, and aeromedical support. See FM 3-04.111
for additional details on the forced entry aviation brigade.
Organization
A-18. The forced entry aviation brigade has an HHC, one heavy ARB, one light ARB, an
AHB, a GSAB, and an ASB.
Fundamentals
A-19. The forced entry aviation brigade‘s primary role is to deploy quickly into a point of
entry and provide aviation combat, CS, and CSS in support of decisive, shaping, and
sustainment operations. The brigade may deploy into multiple, unimproved points of entry,
using force to overwhelm hostile anti-access capabilities.
Mission
A-20. ARSOAR’s mission is to plan, support, and conduct special air operations by
clandestinely and covertly penetrating hostile and denied airspace. ARSOAR supports
special operations forces (SOF) conducting joint, combined, interagency, and coalition
operations in regional crises, major conflicts, or as directed by the President and Secretary of
Defense. ARSOAR organizes, equips, trains, validates, sustains, and employs assigned
aviation units for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. See Chapter 1, FM 3-04.111
for additional details
Organization
A-21. The ARSOAR (Figure A-4) consists of an HHC, three battalions, separate forward-
deployed companies, a special operations aviation training company (SOATC), and a systems
integration and maintenance office (SIMO). The ARSOAR rotary-wing aircraft include the
AH/MH-6, MH-60, MH-60 variant known as the defensive armed penetrator (DAP), and MH-
47. ARSOAR units are designed to plan, conduct, and support special operations missions
unilaterally or jointly in all theaters and at all levels of conflict. To accomplish this mission,
ARSOAR units are task-organized according to the unit they will support, the theater of
operations, and expected missions. ARSOAR task organizations are formed around one of the
regiment’s battalions.
Fundamentals
A-22. ARSOAR units are trained and equipped to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate U.S.
SOF and other designated personnel. Training is tailored specifically to profiles that support
the SOF mission. Units prefer to operate at night, using night vision goggles (NVG) or night
vision systems (NVS) and low-level flight profiles. Training is conducted in all operational
environments and terrain. Inherent in the training is the ability to operate from maritime
platforms. Emphasis is placed on precise navigation over long range and under adverse
weather conditions.
AVIATION BATTALIONS
Organization
A-25. Each UEx aviation brigade has two ARBs. An ARB consists of either all AH64s or all
OH-58Ds. The distinction between heavy and light ARBs is that a heavy ARB consists of
24x AH-64s and a light ARB consists of 30x OH-58Ds.
A-26. Each heavy and light ARB has a HHC, a forward support company (FSC), three attack
reconnaissance companies (ARC), and an aviation service company (ASC).
Mission
A-27. The battalion’s primary missions are reconnaissance, security, and the destruction of
enemy forces through CCA and mobile strike.
General
A-28. The fundamentals, mission, and organization of the AHB are relatively the same
whether it is part of a heavy, light, or forced entry, aviation brigade. The AHB’s primary role
is to plan, execute, and logistically support operations. The two basic fundamental tasks
common to each AHB include air assault and sustainment. In the sustainment role, the AHB
provides support to the air assault operation first, then to UEx. The AHB can also provide
aircraft for GS missions when available. See FM 3-04.113 for additional details.
Organization
A-29. UEx aviation brigades have one AHB. Three-star-level UEx aviation brigades have
two AHBs. The Air Assault UEx, however, has two aviation brigade s each with its own
AHB. The AHB at all echelons consists of a HHC, a FSC, three assault companies, and an
ASC (Figure A-5).
Mission
A-30. The primary mission of the AHB is to move the combat elements of a combined arms
battalion (CAB) in one lift, augmented as necessary by CH-47 aircraft from the GSAB and to
extend tactical reach of the maneuver commander, negate effects of terrain, seize key nodes,
achieve surprise, and isolate or dislocate enemy forces. The battalion also conducts
numerous other missions as described below.
General
A-31. The fundamentals, mission, and organization of the GSAB are relatively the same
whether it is part of a UEx, or theater level aviation brigade.
Organization
A-32. Each aviation brigade has one GSAB. Each GSAB consists of a HHC, a FSC, a general
support aviation company (GSAC), a heavy helicopter company (HvyHC), an aeromedical
evacuation company (MEDEVAC), an ATC, and an ASC (Figure A-6).
Mission
A-33. The mission of the GSAB is to conduct general aviation support, to provide airborne
C2; to provide air transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies; to conduct aerial
sustainment operations; to support air assault operations as required; and to provide
MEDEVAC support throughout the applicable area of responsibility (AOR).
onward movement, integration into the force (RSOI), the military decision-making process
(MDMP), combat operations, redeployment, reintegration, reconstitution and retraining
(R4).
RESPONSIBILITIES
A-38. The BAE provides:
Integration and synchronization of aviation into the BCT commander’s scheme of
maneuver,
Focus on incorporating aviation into the commander’s plan.
Direct coordination with aviation brigade(s).
Close integration/synchronization with the air liaison officer (ALO) and ECOORD
(fires and effects coordinator).
Employment advice and planning for the reconnaissance and attack elements,
assault helicopters, airborne command and control assets, heavy helicopters,
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs).
Army airspace command and control (A2C2) planning, coordination, and airspace
deconfliction for combined arms, joint, interagency and multi-national (JIM)
operations.
RESPONSIBILITIES
A-42. LNO teams maintain and provide current—
Aviation unit locations.
Aircraft / equipment status.
Crew availability and fighter management cycle status.
Class III/V status.
Mission essential task list (METL) training status.
Continuous updates to the aviation commander and staff on the BCT’s plan.
GENERAL
A-43. Aviation brigades are tailored to execute operations that support the unit to which
they are assigned. The principal role of the brigade is to set the conditions for success for its
units. The aviation brigade can employ other combined arms elements conducting ground
operations, and can operate semi-independently, or as a part of a joint force.
A-44. Based on METT-TC, the aviation brigade commander task organizes available
aviation resources into mission packages that are either controlled by a supported brigade
combat team or the aviation brigade
A-45. Aviation conducts missions across the full spectrum of operations from stability
operations and support operations (SOSO) to major combat operations (MCO), and provides
the force missions of attack (mobile strike and CCA); reconnaissance and security; air
assault/air movement; airborne C2; support to command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); A2C2; personnel
recovery; MEDEVAC; and maneuver sustainment support. See FM 3-04.111 for additional
details.
A-46. Aviation units operate within the framework of the ground regime. As fully integrated
members of the combined arms team, aviation units conduct combat, combat support, and
combat service support operations 24 hours a day across the entire length and breadth of the
AO. The aviation TF supporting the HBCT primarily conducts reconnaissance, security and
close combat support for the HBCT. Each aviation brigade or aviation battalion task force is
tailored for specific missions. However, each brigade or battalion task force accepts other
organizations and performs missions not necessarily defined in the TOE mission statement.
ATTACK
A-47. The aviation brigade has the organic capability to strike an enemy throughout the
depth of the corps area of operations (AO) from multiple directions, either in support of the
BCTs, or independently in non-contiguous battlespace. Attack reconnaissance aircraft carry
a combination of missiles, rockets and conventional ammunition to destroy high priority
targets, shield the maneuver forces as they move out of contact, and enable shaping of the
battlespace. In addition to the traditional attack functions, the attack reconnaissance unit
executes all the functions that air cavalry has performed throughout the history of Army
Aviation. As an armor killer, it is deadly against massed moving targets, and is also effective
against enemy field artillery, air defense, communications, logistics units, and point targets
(bunkers, caves, windows in buildings). The attack reconnaissance unit cannot occupy
terrain; however, it can deny terrain for a limited period of time with direct and indirect
fires. Attack reconnaissance aircraft provide a highly mobile and lethal attack capability
against selected targets. Attack reconnaissance units also make an excellent reserve or quick
reaction force for the supported commander
A-48. The mobile strike capability of the aviation brigade, particularly when coupled with
Army and joint fires and effects provides the commander with a significant capability to
extend the battle to the maximum range of organic and supporting sensors. The aviation
brigade headquarters has the inherent staff planning experience to support maneuver, the
synchronization and integration of joint effects, and the ability to control mobile strike
operations.
A-49. Maneuver brigades are designed around close combat. The UEx will normally conduct
mobile strike operations outside the maneuver brigade areas against targets that are
capable of maneuvering to avoid precision strikes. These operations are extended combat
that capitalize on the ability of aviation forces to maneuver to the full depth of the UEx AO.
A-50. The UEx does not directly control aviation teams or task forces, but directs mobile
strikes through mission orders to the aviation brigade. Aviation brigades will plan and
conduct mobile strikes. To conduct of mobile strikes, the aviation brigade will normally have
OPCON those assets (such as Fires and RSTA BDE) needed to conduct the mission.
A-51. Even with a sound decision and the battlefield shaped for decisive action, executing an
effective mobile strike operation is difficult. Conducting mobile strikes at the BCT level is
problematic and should not be the norm. When the BCT is assigned an AVN BN TF the BCT
CDR will have the responsibility for the detailed planning, preparation, and coordination
necessary for a successful aviation mobile strike. The expertise required for this type of
precision operation will not reside at the BCT level.
A-52. (Close combat attack is discussed at paragraph 1-68.)
RECONNAISSANCE
A-53. Attack reconnaissance aircraft are employed to support the commander’s scheme of
maneuver and significantly extend the battlespace of both the BCT and echelons above the
BCT. Attack reconnaissance aircraft assist in locating the threat, building and sharing the
common operational picture (COP), enhancing force protection, enabling freedom of
movement, clearing the way for air assault and aerial mining missions, securing routes for
aerial/ground resupply, and allowing the commander to focus combat power at the decisive
point and time. Sensor video recording capability can provide the supported commander
excellent reconnaissance and BDA information.
A-54. Attack reconnaissance assets can fight for information. They can work through and
counter enemy deception efforts, provide an expedient and reliable means of assessing
terrain that the enemy is trying to configure to his advantage. They can further develop the
situation, and can effectively disseminate real-time information to commanders. The organic
weapon systems of attack reconnaissance aircraft enhance the synergy achieved through
employment of external fires and effects that gives commanders at all levels a robust
counter-reconnaissance capability.
SECURITY
A-55. The aviation brigade or ARB TF supporting the BCT can conduct security operations.
Each can accomplish screen, guard, and cover security operations with augmentation for the
latter two operations. Security operations are particularly valuable during early entry
operations when the COP is degraded and when the dynamics of the battlefield change
faster than expected. The combination of attack reconnaissance aircraft and UAVs enable
commanders at all levels to quickly move or deploy interactive and interpretive intelligence
collectors over great distances to provide early warning and gain and disseminate a timely
picture of the battlefield. These aircraft can quickly transition from a
reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance or security mission to an economy of force or attack
mission to provide reaction time, maneuver space, and protection for air-ground operations.
dislocate or isolate the enemy. The aviation brigade at the UEx level has the organic
capability to air assault the dismounted elements of a combined arms battalion and its
required support equipment in a single lift and to provide air assault security. Forward
arming and refueling points (FARP) emplaced by lift aircraft and ground assets enable
aviation to support and sustain operations throughout the area of operations. Additionally,
heavy lift helicopters are capable of transporting internal and external cargo in a variety of
configurations to meet the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
requirements of both the BCT and echelons above.
A-57. (Air assault/movement for the heavy maneuver battalion is discussed at Appendix J of
this FMI)
casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations when medical aircraft are inadequate or not
readily available.
Combat Missions
A-66. Aviation combat missions include:
Reconnaissance.
Security.
Air assault.
Close combat attack.
Mobile strike.
must not be hampered by the question of how to find the unit. It is found by one of the
various methods already practiced in training.
(Omit data not required. Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard
unless otherwise specified. *Denotes minimum essential in limited communications
environment. BOLD denotes readback items when requested.)
9. Egress direction:
(Cardinal direction not over threats)
(Threats, restrictions, danger close, attack clearance, SEAD, abort codes, hazards)
A-76. Danger close ranges for armed helicopter weapons are in Table A-1. FM 3-09.32 (FM
90-20) has additional information. Engagements at ranges danger close or short of danger
close require extreme close coordination and positive identification. Crews must take special
precautions when delivering direct fires on targets within these ranges but are not
prohibited from delivering at ranges short of danger close. Accurate delivery of munitions is
essential when engaging at danger close ranges and requires higher crew training
standards.
A-77. Time is a primary constraining factor for coordinating direct fires in close combat.
METT-TC dictates how coordination between the commander in contact and the AMC is
accomplished. Face-to-face coordination is preferred but is rarely possible in CCA situations.
A-78. In the hasty CCA—to take advantage of targets of opportunity or assist ground units
under pressure—coordination is usually accomplished by radio.
TARGET ENGAGEMENT
A-79. A potential target may seem lucrative because of its apparent location and activity,
but visual acquisition and activity do not mean positive identification. If there is no
immediate threat from a specific target and it is not positively identified, aircrews do not
shoot until all possible measures to identify are taken. Before the armed helicopter team
engages, the target must be confirmed by the aircrew and friendly unit in contact.
A-80. During engagement, open communication and continuous coordination with friendly
ground elements are required to ensure the desired effect. Coordination of the direct and
indirect fires from all participants produces the most efficient results in the least amount of
time, with the least risk to all. This coordination includes CAS and any non-lethal methods
that may be employed.
How far is the target from the ground unit and in what direction is it? If the
observer is not familiar with meters, aircrews ask the observer to try football or
soccer field lengths to estimate distances.
What is the target? Is the target personnel, vehicles, equipment, or buildings?
What is the size of the enemy force, and what is it doing?
A-84. Aviators may have to fly helicopters near friendly troops to deliver ordnance onto the
target. Factors that can reduce the potential for fratricide include the following:
Precision-guided munitions.
Fire support coordination measures.
Planned or hasty coordination and control measures.
Knowledge of the ground tactical plan.
Knowledge of the exact location of friendly troops.
Knowledge of the exact location of aircraft.
Positive identification of targets.
Familiarity between the supported unit and the aviation unit.
PURPOSE
B-1. This appendix provides guidance on field processing detainees.
GENERAL
B-2. There will be times when US forces capture and detain detainees or other individuals
who may pose a threat to US personnel or security.
B-3. Detainee is a term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an
armed force. JP 1-02, AR 190-8, FM 3-19.40, and international law (including the Law of
War and the Geneva Conventions) address legal requirements, policy, procedures, planning
factors, and responsibilities for handling detainees. The Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War and Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War are the Geneva Conventions most applicable in detainee operations.
B-4. Detaining personnel carries with it the responsibility to guard, protect, and account for
them. All persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in US Armed Forces custody must
receive humane care and treatment. Further, to the extent permitted by the military
situation, all detainees must be afforded protection from the effects of the conflict. US forces
are obligated to protect detainees against all acts of violence, including murder, rape, forced
prostitution, assault, theft, insults, public curiosity, photographing, filming/videotaping for
other than administrative purposes, bodily injury, and reprisals of any kind. The inhumane
treatment of detainees is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or by deep
provocation.
B-5. Any act or allegations of inhumane treatment by US or coalition/allied personnel or by
other persons must be promptly reported through the chain of command to Headquarters,
Department of the Army, as a serious incident report, thoroughly investigated, and where
appropriate, remedied by corrective action. Inhumane treatment is punishable under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Abuse detracts from mission accomplishment and
intelligence collection efforts.
Include military police in their task organization. (DoDD 2310.1 states that
detainees shall be turned over to military police as soon as possible.)
Ensure clear delineation of the interdependent and independent roles of those
Soldiers responsible for custody of the detainees and those responsible for any
interrogation mission.
Ensure resources allocated to provide the support required by regulation and law.
Routinely consult their supporting brigade operational law team (BOLT) during the
planning and execution of detainee operations.
Prepare for additional planning considerations, which may include site selection of
collection point/holding area, construction materials (engineer support), sanitation
requirements, medical support, transportation considerations, public affairs, and
legal support.
Action Description
Search Search each captive for weapons, items of intelligence value, and items that would make escape
easier or compromise US security interests. Confiscate these items. Prepare a receipt when taking
property. Note: When possible, conduct same gender searches. When not possible, perform mixed
gender searches in a respectful manner. Leaders must carefully supervise Soldiers to prevent
allegations of sexual misconduct.
Captives may keep the following items found in a search:
• Protective clothing and equipment that cannot be used as a weapon (such as helmets,
protective masks and clothing) for use during evacuation from the combat zone.
• Retained property, such as ID cards or tags, personal property having no intelligence value
and no potential value to others (such as photos, mementos, etc.), clothing, mess
equipment (except knives and forks), badges of rank and nationality, decorations, religious
literature, and jewelry. (Personal items, such as diaries, letters, and family pictures may be
taken by MI teams for review, but are later returned to the proper owner.)
• Private rations of the detainee.
Confiscate currency only on the order of a commissioned officer (AR 190-8) and provide a receipt and
establish a chain of custody using DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) or any other
field expedient substitute.
Silence Silence the detainees by directing them not to talk. Gags may be employed if necessary (ensure
detainee can breathe after application).
Segregate Segregate detainees based on perceived status and positions of authority. Segregate leaders from the
remainder of the population. Segregate hostile elements, such as religious, political, or ethnic groups
hostile to one another. For their protection, normally segregate minor and female detainees from adult
male detainees.
Safeguard Safeguard the detainees. Ensure detainees are provided adequate food, potable water, clothing,
shelter, and medical attention. Ensure detainees are not exposed to unnecessary danger and are
protected (afforded the same protective measures as the capturing force) while awaiting evacuation.
Do not use coercion to obtain information from the captives. Provide medical care to wounded and/or
sick detainees equal in quality to that provided to US forces. Report acts or allegations of abuse
through command channels, to the supporting judge advocate, and to the US Army Criminal
Investigation Command.
Speed to a Evacuate detainees from the battlefield as quickly as possible, ideally to a collection point where
Safe military police take custody of the detainees. Transfer custody of all captured documents and other
Area/Rear property to the US forces assuming responsibility for the detainees.
Tag Use DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag (Figure K-3))or a field expedient
alternative and include the following information:
• Date and time of the capture.
• Location of the capture (grid coordinates).
• Capturing unit.
• Circumstances of capture. Indicate specifically why the person has been detained. Use
additional documentation when necessary and feasible to elaborate on the details of
capture.
• Documentation should answer the five Ws—who, what, where, why, and witnesses.
• Use a form, such as a DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement) or an appropriate field expedient,
to document this information.
• List all documents and items of significance found on the detainee.
Attach Part A, DD Form 2745, or an appropriate field expedient capture card to the detainee’s clothing
with wire, string, or another type of durable material. Instruct the captive not to remove or alter the tag.
Maintain a written record of the date, time, location, and personal data related to the detention. Attach
a separate identification tag to confiscated property that clearly links the property with the detainee
from whom it was seized.
PERSONNEL
B-12. MP Soldiers shall be in the task organization for a mission likely to result in detaining
personnel.
B-13. Consider including interpreters or linguists to support the operation. These assets can
assist greatly in tactical questioning and screening of detainees.
B-14. Ensure Soldiers know to consult with their supporting BOLT for advice on compliance
with legal requirements. At all times, detainees will be treated in a humane manner,
regardless of the circumstances or environment.
Figure B-3. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag (Front)
Figure B-4. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag (Back)
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
C-1. Commanders must plan on the media being present throughout their operational area
and embedded in unit operations. Modern news reporting provides instant coverage of
military operations and can turn minor tactical events into international events with
strategic implications. National and international media coverage will result in defense
policy decisions at the highest level, profoundly influence external public support, and
impact the behavior of all audiences – military and civilian—within the operation’s area of
interest. Effectively planned, resourced and executed, media activities can be a force
multiplier, leveraging global influence, and enhancing command credibility. Media
operations also can be a disaster if they are not planned, resourced or executed properly.
Engaging the media serves the best interests of the Army, your soldiers and their families as
you share the story of the mission you are executing. Media operations is a related activity to
information operations (IO) and therefore media coverage and IO plans must be mutually
coordinated and synchronized to ensure that they are complementary and do not result in IO
Fratricide—where one message kills another message.
understanding of, and opinion about, the military, political, and social situation. You can
work with the media or have them work against the command message and suffer the
consequences. Not engaging the media means that they will tell their story without your
input.
C-5. Media representatives will cover the deployment of Army forces, their arrival in the
area and their initial conduct, and remain as long as the story is of interest. Some home
station media will be interested in deploying with local units and being “embedded” with
them. Commanders should refer all media requests to the BCT and UEx Public Affairs
sections with the full understanding that accredited media will probably be escorted down to
Battalion level to get the Soldier’s story. The UEx commander will only allow embedded
media in units that he has confidence will take care of the media and stay on the command
message (Public Affairs Guidance (PAG)). Media may build long term relationships with
units and their leaders that endure past current circumstances. Joe Galloway’s (United
Press International) close ties to 1st Squadron 7th Cavalry from their action in the Ia Drang
Valley in Vietnam continues forty years after the battle.
C-6. There are three types of media that a battalion commander may engage in the
operational area.
Embedded—Media reside with a unit for an extended period (defined in Operation
Iraqi Freedom as 72 hours or more). Embedded media are governed by ground rules
that define working relationships.
Accredited/registered—Media have been vetted by the PA staff at brigade level or
above, and are normally issued written credentials reflecting coordination to cover
units within the command.
Unilateral—Media that do not seek military public affairs credentials or
registration. Absent credentials, unilaterals are only accorded the access granted to
local nationals.
Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with
the reporting process.
Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride
on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be
responsible for the transportation of pools.
Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to
enable timely, secure compatible transmission of pool material and will make these
facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases
when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any
other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated
by news media organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in
battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
C-12. Before accepting media into the operational area, the commander must insure that:
Media are not exposed to classified information. If media will accompany units on
combat operations there must be agreement on the restriction of the release of
operational information. Commanders must consider the FFIR as a baseline of
what is not releasable.
Know the definitions:
On the record–reporter uses everything you say and attributes it to you by name
and title.
Off the record–reporter should not use any thing you say. Go off the record only if
the information is vital to the reporters understanding of the situation. However,
some media consider nothing to be off the record.
Background—the reporter will use the information but will not attribute it to you.
The term An Army spokesman may be used based upon agreement between you and
the reporter.
Media must agree not to release casualty information and comply with the
directives and timelines associated with the release of casualty information (24
hours following the confirmed notification of Next of Kin).
Media are safeguarded and not allowed to constitute an operational risk to friendly
forces.
Media understand that violation of the operational guidelines may result in the loss
of accreditation and military support (only General Courts-Martial Authority can
withdraw accreditation).
Media are debriefed with the reminder of the operational sensitivity of the
information that they have been exposed and based on their association with the
unit.
Media Do’s:
Take every opportunity to tell your unit’s story.
Set the ground rules for the interview and terminate the interview if you feel
that the ground rules have been violated.
Be ready to answer the questions (who; what; when; where; and why).
Discuss only matters of which you have personal knowledge. You may talk
about individual responsibility, expertise, and personal experiences. You may
also discuss unclassified information about general missions, training, weapons
and equipment and transportation. You may use your name and hometown in
interviews, but you also have the option to use only your first or last name or
refuse to be identified at all.
EMBEDDED MEDIA
C-13. Embedding media at battalion level is now routine, so coverage of your operations can
be a force multiplier as you gain positive coverage for your community, strengthen local
media relations and improve morale for your soldiers and their families. Before accepting
embedded media, commanders need to know the rules to stay out of trouble.
EMBEDDING RULES
C-14. Transportation. Congress gave DOD very stringent guidance on using government
aircraft to fly media anywhere. Here are some of the important points from AR 360-1, Army
Public Affairs Program. Take a moment to review them before making any commitments to
local media:
Military transportation will not compete with commercial carriers when the public
affairs objectives of the proposed travel can be accomplished through the use of
commercial carriers.
Travel or transportation may be authorized in connection with an assignment to
cover an Army program or operation when travel is an integral part of the story
and is provided on a space-available basis.
Non-local travel by all news media representatives must be approved by OASD-PA.
All local travel or transportation requests for national media must be brought to
the attention of HQDA OCPA.
Travel or transportation for public affairs purposes must be primarily in the
interest of DA or the DoD.
No commitment of military transportation for public affairs purposes will be made
until the request has been coordinated and approved.
Invitational Travel Orders covering transportation will be issued by the command
with primary interest.
C-15. If you prepare each news media travel request, (local or non-local) in accordance with
AR 360-1, it will stand up to both congressional and public scrutiny.
C-16. Support. Keep these points in mind as you develop your planning and coordination
checklist:
The deploying unit must agree to sponsor the media when they deploy and while
they are in country.
The deploying unit must agree to provide aircraft seats on the unit's flight to the
area of operations in coordination with the supporting USAF command.
The deploying unit agrees to provide media escorts (to go with them and stay with
them). Accredited media will be accorded all courtesies and privileges as equivalent
grade of O-4 for messing and billeting. However media will carry their own bags
and provide all of their professional materials and supplies.
The UEx and UEy headquarters must agree to support the media and coordinate
approval from the joint task force public affairs.
Before any warning or execute orders are ever issued, survey your media and find
out who may be interested in going with your unit should they be deployed. Let
them know in advance what will be required.
Up-to-date visa and passport.
Immunizations and statement of medial health.
Basic military training (first aid and actions under direct/indirect fire).
Personal and professional equipment.
Approximate costs, to include a return commercial flight if military flights are
not available.
Signing Hold Harmless and Not to Sue Agreements as well as agreement to
reimburse for any lost or damaged government issued equipment (helmet, body
armor, protective mask, etc).
Signing release from responsibility agreement with each service that provides
transportation (Army helicopters, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy
transports).
Once theater requirements have been confirmed, the UEx should prepare
Invitational Travel Orders (ITO) for media who will likely be embedded.
Have a plan that will ensure coverage of your unit from your embedded media and
work with your higher headquarters to market products coming out of theater
insuring that the media messages support the UEx Information Plan.
All unit members must be familiar with PAG, embedding ground rules, the role of
embedded media, and what actions to take if classified or sensitive information is
disclosed.
C-17. The sample request below for embedded media lays out much of the coordination and
support agreements required to gain approval from Department of the Army.
SAMPLE REQUEST
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF NON-LOCAL MEDIA TRAVEL TO SWA AND TRAVEL
CLEARANCES RMKS/1. THIS HQ PROPOSES TO EMBED MEDIA WITH A DEPLOYMENT
OF THE 3D ID SCHEDULED TO DEPLOY TO THE SWA THEATER OF OPERATIONS ON
APPROXIMATELY XX MAR ON AN AIR FORCE CRAFT. REQUEST APPROVAL AND
THEATER AND COUNTRY CLEARANCES FOR THE NON LOCAL TRAVEL OF THE
FOLLOWING NEWS MEDIA FROM FORT STEWART TO SWA AND POTENTIAL RETURN.
REQUEST THEATER CLEARANCE FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (NMRS) AND
MEDIA TRAVEL IN AND OUT OF THE OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH AREA OF
OPERATION.
PERTINENT INFORMATION IS IN NAME/ORGAN/SSAN/PASSPORT NUMBER FORMAT.
2. MEDIA HAVE AGREED TO REMAIN WITH THE UNIT FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN
DAYS AND WILL PROVIDE CRITICALLY NEEDED HOMETOWN, FORT STEWART AND
ARMYWIDE COVERAGE OF 3D ID TO FAMILIES, THE FORT STEWART CIVILIAN WORK
FORCE AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. REPORTERS HAVE AGREED TO COVER
PORTIONS OF AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO 3D ID UNITS WHILE IN TRANSIT. REPORTERS
WILL TRAVEL ON A USAF C5 FROM HUNTER ARMY AIRFIELD TO SWA. REPORTERS
WILL STAY WITH THE 3D ID IN BASE CAMP. 3D ID PAO HAS AGREED TO SUPPORT
MEDIA TRANSPORT IN AND OUT OF THE BASE CAMP TO COVER FIELD TRAINING AND
UNIT OPERATIONS IN THEATER.
COMMANDER
D-1. Commanders must instill an environmental ethic in their subordinate leaders, staffs,
and Soldiers. They train and counsel subordinate leaders to monitor potential environmental
hazards to the environment and enforce compliance with laws and regulations.
D-2. Logistics commanders have unique environmental concerns and responsibilities. They
supervise maintenance activities and nuclear, biological, and chemical (CBRN) and Class III
and V operations. Table D-1 shows points of contact available to assist commanders in
environmental matters.
STAFF
D-3. Primary staff officers and NCOs integrate environmental considerations into the
military decision-making process (MDMP) in operations and training. At battalion and above
level, the commander appoints an assistant staff officer to serve as the environmental
compliance officer (ECO) for the unit. Nevertheless, all staff officers must integrate
environmental considerations into their activities. The support operations officer, S3, S4 and
special projects officer have the major responsibilities.
BRIGADE/BATTALION SURGEON
D-4. The surgeon monitors potential environmental hazards that could affect the health of
Soldiers in the command. When deployed, monitoring could include regional health matters
such as water quality, air pollution, and environmental, endemic, and epidemic diseases. He
monitors environmental considerations—such as smoke, chemical, and biological weapons—
that the enemy could impose on the friendly force. He monitors field sanitation to ensure
elimination of unnecessary environmental disruption and danger to Soldiers from
unsanitary conditions.
SUBORDINATE LEADERS
D-11. The role of leaders in environmental stewardship centers on building an
environmental ethic in their Soldiers by training, operating, and maintaining/sustaining in
an environmentally responsible manner. Leaders counsel subordinates, lead by example, and
enforce compliance by holding Soldiers accountable. Leaders do the following:
Communicate the Army environmental-friendly ethic while training Soldiers to
operate properly.
Develop and sustain a positive and proactive commitment to environmental
protection.
Identify environmental risks associated with individual, collective, and mission
essential task list (METL) performance.
Plan and conduct actions and training that sustain and protect the environment
and integrate environmental considerations into daily unit activities.
Analyze the influence of environmental factors on mission accomplishment.
Train peers and subordinates to identify the effects of plans, actions, and missions
on the environment.
SOLDIERS
D-12. Soldiers have the inherent professional and personal responsibility to understand and
support the Army’s environmental program. They must do the following:
Comply with environmental requirements in unit and installation SOPs.
Maintain environmental understanding throughout daily activities.
Provide recommendations to the chain of command on techniques that ensure
compliance with environmental regulatory requirements.
Identify the environmental risks associated with individual and team tasks.
Support recycling programs.
Report HM and HW spills immediately.
Make sound environmental decisions based on guidance from the chain of
command, training, and personal concepts of right and wrong.
Wear adequate protective equipment.
turn, may affect flight visibility, friendly and enemy force identification, and laser
designation and range-finding.
Course-of-Action Approval: When choosing the most likely friendly COAs,
consider whether slight plan modification would reduce environmental impact
without affecting the mission.
Orders Production: Include environmental impacts and precautions in the
OPORD’s coordinating instructions of the execution paragraph or Annex F
(Engineer), Appendix 2 (Environmental Considerations).
RISK MANAGEMENT
D-20. Preparation is key to successful environmental understanding and protection in daily
operations and training. Commanders (company and above) must designate an
SUMMARY
D-22. Unit leaders use environmental risk assessments to estimate the potential effect of
unit activities on the natural and physical environment. This process applies to routine
activities, training, mobilization, or deployment. The environmental risk assessment allows
leaders and their staffs to identify potential environmental problems. The process also allows
unit leaders to identify and manage residual risk.
BACKGROUND
E-1. An early lesson learned in the digitization of the Army is that the complex digital
communications systems have to be checked for proper connectivity and functional
integration throughout the entire digital architecture before the commander can digitally
communicate with confidence. The digital command and control rehearsal (DC2R) was
developed as a step-by-step check of the individual and collective functioning of the Army
Battle Command Systems (ABCS) (the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
(FBCB2) System through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS)) to validate the
architecture, troubleshoot the system, and provide warmup training for the digital operators.
When the DC2R is not conducted and the digital system placed under load points, system
failure will frustrate both the users and commanders.
WHAT IS A DC2R?
E-2. A DC2R is a deliberate step-by-step establishment and load test of the digital
communications architecture that validates the systems in the architecture and the ability to
correctly pass digital messages. The technique described is only one way to approach the
problem, and all units should tailor the DC2R technique to meet their requirements.
FD functional description
FDC fire direction center
FDMA frequency division multiple access
FDO fire direction officer
FDRP first destination reporting point
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FEC fires and effects cell
FECE fires and effects coordination element
FED forward entry device
FEEM fires and effects execution matrix
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FESP fires and effects support plan
FFAR folding-fin aerial rocket
FFE fire for effect
FFIR friendly forces information requirements
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP force health protection
FHPO force health protection officer
FID foreign internal defense
FIST fire support team
FLD field (graphics)
FLE forward logistics element
FLIR forward looking infrared
FLO fighter liaison officer
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual; frequency modulated
FMC fully mission capable
FMI field manual-interim
FMT field maintenance team
FMTV family of medium tactical vehicles
FO forward observer
FOB forward operations base
FOS forward observer system
FP force protection
FPF final protective fires
FPL final protective line
FPOL forward passage of lines
FRAGO fragmentary order
FRCP flatrack collection point
FRG family readiness group
H high (risk)
HA hasty attack; holding area
HAVECO have complied
HAZMAT hazardous materials
HBCT heavy brigade combat team
HCA humanitarian and civic assistance
HCLOS high capacity line of sight
HCP health care package
HE high explosive
HEAT high explosive, antitank
HEMTT heavy expanded mobility tactical truck
HEP high explosive, plastic
HERCULES heavy equipment recovery combat utility lift and evacuation
HET heavy equipment transport
HF high frequency
HHB headquarters and headquarters battery
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HHT headquarters and headquarters troop
HIMAD high-to-medium-altitude air defense
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
HM hazardous materials
HMMWV high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HNS host nation support
HPT high payoff target
HPTL high payoff target list
HQ headquarters
HR human resources
HRS heavy reconnaissance squadron
HSSO health services support operations
HTU handheld terminal unit
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high value target
HvyHC heavy helicopter company
HW half wave; hardware; hazardous waste
IA information assurance
IAW in accordance with
IBCT infantry brigade combat team
IBS integrated broadcast service
ICM improved conventional munitions
ICW in coordination with
ID identification
IDMM isolate, dominate, maintain, multidimensional-multiecheloned
IED improvised explosive device
IETM interactive electronic technical manual
IEW intelligence and electronic warfare
IFF identification, friend or foe
IFOR Implementation Force
IFSAS Interim Fire Support Automation System
IFTE Integrated Family of Test Equipment
IFV infantry fighting vehicle
IHFR improved high frequency radio
IMETS Integrated Meteorological System
IMINT imagery intelligence
INC interface network controller
INFOSYS information systems
INMARSAT international maritime satellite
INS inertial navigation system
INTSUM intelligence summary
IO information operations
IOCOORD information operations coordinator
ION input/output node
IP internet protocol; initial position
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPS intelligence production support
IR information requirements; infrared; intelligence requirements
IREMBASS Improved Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System
ISB Intelligence Systems Board; intermediate staging base
ISG information systems group
ISM intelligence synchronization matrix
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ISSO information services support officer
ISYSCOM integrated system control
ISYSCON(V)4 Integrated System Control (Version) 4
IT information technology
ITAPDB Integrated Total Army Personnel Database
ITO invitational travel orders
ITV in transit visibility
IV intervisibility; intermediate voltage; inventory variance
IVIS Intervehicular Information System
JAAT joint air attack team
MB maneuver battalion
BA main battle area
MBCOTM mounted battle command on the move
MBSA maneuver battalion support area command post
MC movement control; medical company
MC4 medical communications for combat casualty care
MCG mobile command group
MCL mission configured load
MCM multicapable maintainer
MCO major combat operations; movement control office; movement control
officer
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCS Maneuver Control System; maintenance control section
MCS-L Maneuver Control System-Light
MCSR Mission Condition Status Report
MCT movement control team
MDMP military decision-making process
ME maneuver enhancement (brigade)
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEDLOG medical logistics
MEDSUP medical supply
MES medical equipment set
METL mission-essential task list
METSAT meteorological satellite
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations
MFR memorandum for record
MGB medium-girder bridge
MGRS military grid reference system
MGS mobile gun system
MH mental health
MHE materials handling equipment
MI Co military intelligence company
MI military intelligence
MIA missing in action
MIC/HIC mid-intensity/high-intensity conflict
MICLIC mine clearing line charge
MICO military intelligence company
MILVAN military van
MKT mobile kitchen trailer
TRMT treatment
TRP target reference point
TSC theater sustainment command
TSM TRADOC systems manager; TRADOC systems management
TSOP tactical standing operating procedures
TSS target selection system; target selection standard
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TUAV tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
TVS television sensor
TWV tactical wheeled vehicle
UA unit of action
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UBL unit base load
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UEx unit of employment x
UEy unit of employment y
UGR-E unitized ground rations-express
UGR-H&S unitized ground rations-heat and serve
UGR unitized ground rations
UGR-A unitized group ration-A
UGR-B unitized group ration-B
UH utility helicopter
UHB ultrahigh brightness
UHF ultrahigh frequency
UHN unit hub node
UJTL universal joint task list
ULLS Unit-Level Logistics System
ULLS-(A/G/S4) Unit-Level Logistics System- (Air/Ground/Logistics)
ULLS-G Unit-Level Logistics System-Ground
UMCP unit maintenance collection point; unit maintenance control joint
UMO unit movements officer
UMT unit ministry team/unit maintenance technician
UN United Nations
UO urban operations
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
USAR United States Army Reserve
USMC United States Marine Corps
UTO unit task organization
UXO unexploded ordnance
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
AR 25-2. Information Assurance. 14 November 2003.
AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees. 1 October 1997.
AR 200-1. Environmental Protection and Enhancement. 21 February 1997.
AR 200-2. Environmental Effects of Army Actions. 23 December 1988.
AR 360-1, Army Public Affairs Program. 15 September 00.
DA Form 2028 Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 2823. Sworn Statement.
DA Form 4137. Evidence/Property Custody Document.
DD Form 2745. Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag.
FM 1-113. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. 12 September 1997. (will be revised
as FM 3-04.113.)
FM 3-0. Operations. 14 June 2001.
FM 3-09.32 (FM 90-20). (J-Fire) Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of
Firepower. 29 October 2004.
FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111). Aviation Brigades. 21 August 2003.
FM 3-04.613 (FM 1-613). Army Fixed Wing Operations.
FM 3-19.40. Military Police Interment/Resettlement Operations. 1 August 2001.
FM 3-90, Tactics. 4 July 2001.
FM 4-01.011 (FM 55-65). Unit Movement Operations. 31 October 2002.
FM 4-01.30 (FM 55-10). Movement Control. 1 September 2003.
FM 4-01.41 (FM 55-20). Army Rail Operations. 12 December 2003.
FM 3-100.4. Environmental Considerations in Military Operations (will be revised as
FM 4-04.4).
FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. 29 January 2005.
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
12 April 2001 (as amended through 14 August 2002).
JP 3-63. Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations. 27 July 2004.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
DoDD 2310.1. DOD Program For Enemy Prisoners of War (POW) and Other Detainees
(Short Title: DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program). 18 August 1994.
DoD Directive 5122.5. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASDPA),
27 September 2000.
CALL Newsletter 99-9, Integrating Military Environmental Protection. August 1999.
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
SANDRA R. RILEY
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0506004
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Not to be distributed.
Electronic Means Only.
PIN: 082291-000