 Land use and housing

Consultative Committee
 Justice system
delineates powers of federal  Local government units

gov't, regions  Business permits and licenses

In the Consultative Committee's draft federal constitution, there will be 18

 Municipal waters
regions to be led by a regional governor elected by their regional legislative
assembly
 Indigenous peoples' rights and
welfare
MANILA, Philippines – Days before submitting their draft constitution to
President Rodrigo Duterte, the Consultative Committee (Con-Com) finalized
its proposed delineation of exclusive powers of the federal government and  Culture and language
the regions. development
This distribution of powers is critical to the federal constitution as it shows
clearly how powers that used to be with the national government will now be  Sports development
the sole purview of the 18 proposed federated regions.
 Parks and recreation
The exclusive powers for the federal government and regional governments
are listed below, based on a presentation made by Con-Com spokesman Ding Exclusive powers of federal government:
Generoso on Monday, July 2.

 Defense, security of land, sea,

Exclusive powers of regional governments: and air territory

 Socioeconomic development  Foreign affairs

planning
 International trade
 Creation of sources of revenue
 Customs and tariffs
 Financial administration and
management  Citizenship, immigration, and
naturalization
 Tourism, investment, and trade
development  National socioeconomic planning

 Infrastructure, public utilities,  Monetary policy and federal fiscal

and public works policy, banks, currency

 Economic zones  Competition and competition

regulation bodies
  Inter-regional infrastructure and
public utilities, including
telecommunications and
broadband networks
 Postal service
 Time regulation, standards of
weights and measures
 Promotion and protection of
human rights
 Basic education
 Science and technology
 Regulation and licensing of
professions
 Social security benefits
 Federal crimes and justice
system
 Law and order
 Civil, family, property, and
commercial laws, except as may
otherwise be provided for in the
Constitution
 Prosecution of graft and
corruption cases
 Intellectual property
 Elections
Powers not listed above are considered "reserved" powers and will be given
to the federal government, said Generoso.
This proposed distribution of powers aims to give regional governments more
control over their economy and overall development, given the unique needs,
resources, and culture of each region.
"We want regions to look into their strengths and weaknesses, look at the
resources they have and plan their economic program," said Generoso.
18 regions
The Con-Com decided to retain, for the most part, today's regional
configuration when it came up with its number of proposed federated regions.
In total, there will be 18 federated regions to today's 17. The addition is the
proposed "Negrosanon federated region" composed of Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, and the province of Siquijor. The Negros Island Region
was dissolved by Duterte in August 2017, citing lack of funds.
Of the 18, 16 are "symmetrical" regions, meaning they will all have the same
types of powers and structure.
But the Bangsamoro and Cordillera regions will be "asymmetrical" regions, or
regions with more powers and a different structure owing to their "ethnic or
identity-based demands," said Generoso.
He could not yet provide the list of federated regions.
The proposed federal system means that the national government will no
longer directly supervise all provinces, cities, and towns, as it does today.
Instead, the federal government will supervise the 18 regions, while the
regional governments will supervise the provinces and cities within their
territory.
All regions will be led by a regional governor who will be elected from the
regional legislative assembly. This means the public will not directly elect
their governor. They, however, will elect their representative to the regional
legislative assembly, the pool from which the governor will be chosen.
The winning governor's running mate will automatically be the regional
deputy governor. – Rappler.com
PRRD’s federalism push in
full-swing in 2018
By Azer Parrocha December 26, 2018, 2:52 pm
MANILA -- As the first Philippines’ President from Mindanao, Rodrigo R. Duterte has
made federalism one of his major campaign promises during the 2016 elections.
However, it was only in 2018 where efforts to push for this new system of
government went in full-swing.
On Jan. 23 this year, Duterte signed the appointment of members of the
Consultative Committee (ConCom) to review the 1987 Constitution with former
Chief Justice Reynato Puno as chairman. Aside from Puno, Justices, ex-legislators,
lawyers, academics, among other experts comprise Duterte’s ConCom.
This came after Duterte, on Dec. 7, 2016, signed Executive Order No. 10 creating
the ConCom, which was tasked to study, conduct consultations, and review
provisions of the 1987 Constitution and draft a proposed federal Constitution
which is expected to distribute powers and resources among the regions.
Duterte’s ConCom held its first session on Feb. 19 this year at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC) where Puno urged its members to ensure
that the federal government will be “possessed with the power to hold together the
union in perpetuity and with the energy and the endurance to convert to robust
reality the dreams of our people, however long it takes.”
Four months after it convened, the 22-member ConCom approved unanimously, in
an en banc session on July 3 this year, the proposed federal charter which has 22
articles compared to the 1987 Constitution's 18 articles.
Among the ConCom’s federal charter’s provisions include a ban on political
dynasties and political turncoatism; a ban on monopolies and oligopolies that
lessen competition; additional powers for the Ombudsman and Commission on
Audit among others; the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights;
and the establishment of a permanent and indissoluble nation.
Also, under the draft federal Constitution, there are 18 federated regions
composed of 16 symmetrical regions-- existing regions plus Negrosanon Federated
Region and two asymmetrical regions -- Bangsamoro and Cordillera. Bangasamoro
and Cordillera have different designs from other regions because of their “identity-
based demands.”
Puno said although there was no timeline for a plebiscite on the draft federal
Constitution since it was for Congress to decide, the best time to hold it would be
in May 2019, noting that this would give more people time to understand the
proposed new Constitution.
Bayanihan Federalism
On July 9 this year, the ConCom turned over its draft “Bayanihan” (working
together) federal Constitution to the President in a ceremony held in Malacañang
Palace. It also released the official copy to the media and the public to allow them
to freely “debate and deliberate” on every Article, every Section, every sentence,
and every word in the draft Constitution.
Hours after receiving the proposal, Duterte approved “in toto” (as a whole) the
ConCom’s draft federal Constitution and said he will endorse it to the Congress,
except for the transitory provisions which he wanted amended.
Earlier, Duterte said he was willing to lead the transition to federalism as long as it
was within the end of his term in 2022. However, he changed his mind and said he
would rather “cut” his term as early as 2019 to be coterminous with the start of the
transition period to erase suspicions about his desire to stay in power beyond the
end of his term in 2022. Duterte also said he wanted to “enable a younger leader to
take over.”
The ConCom initially wanted Duterte to lead the 10-member Transition Commission
on Federalism which will “formulate and adopt a transition plan for the orderly
shift to the new system of government, as provided for in the new Constitution.”
But the ConCom reviewed and revised the Transitory Provisions in accordance with
the President’s instructions. Eventually, ConCom's proposed federal charter barred
Duterte from running for President in the 2022 elections under the proposed
federal Constitution.
After the ratification of the proposed federal Constitution, there must also be an
election of a transition President and Vice President in tandem as provided for in
the same charter.
The ConCom presented its proposed federal charter to the House of
Representatives and Senate on July 11 and 17, respectively.
Also on July 17, the ConCom released its final and official draft of the proposed
federal charter which bars Duterte from running in the 2022 elections.
In his 3rd State of the Nation Address (SONA), Duterte thanked the ConCom for
drafting a federal constitution and submitting it to him last July 9, describing it as
“a distinct honor and privilege.”
Duterte also reiterated that has no intention to stay beyond the end of his term in
2022 regardless of what Constitution is in place.
Information drive and task force
On July 26, Malacañang said the government has around PHP90 million for its
public information drive to explain the benefits the country will get under the
proposed federal system of government.
Of the amount, PHP50 million will come from the ConCom’s savings and additional
PHP30 million will also be set aside for the expert panel.
Meanwhile, PHP10 million will go to the Presidential Communications Operations
Office (PCOO), which will be tasked to produce information drive materials.
Prompted by his economic managers’ apprehensions on the proposed federal
charter’s economic aspects, Duterte also decided to allow the draft to be open for
public feedback to help improve the proposal.

Amid congressional deliberations on the country’s proposed PHP3.8 billion budget

the federalism information drive took what Communications Secretary Martin
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al.,
Andanar described as a “power nap.” The Senate, in particular, insisted that it will G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
not prioritize talks on Charter Change or federalism.

A Pulse Asia Survey conducted from Sept. 1 to 7, showed that only 3 percent of DECISION
Filipinos wanted the government to focus on federalism while more than half or 63
percent of Filipinos believed the administration must first address inflation.

However, the federalism drive started to gain momentum after Duterte, under
Memo Circular No. 52 signed by Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea by
authority of the President on Oct. 31, created an Inter-Agency Task Force on
Federalism (IATF) to raise public awareness on the proposed new system of
government, amid survey results showing it is the least of Filipinos’ concerns.
Duterte’s IATF will take charge of “integrating, harmonizing, and coordinating
ongoing efforts towards federalism and constitutional reform.”
Among the inter-agency’s tasks are to develop strategies and implement such
activities necessary and proper to raise public awareness on federalism and
constitutional reform and prepare an information dissemination and public
communication plan to ensure an effective, efficient, and uniform undertaking of
advocacy activities.
Interior Assistant Secretary Jonathan Malaya expressed confidence that
awareness on federalism has increased due to the holding of roadshows
nationwide and the creation of the IATF.
He, however, acknowledged that even if more Filipinos became aware of
federalism, there is no guarantee that support will follow.
Earlier, Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo said there is still much time
left for the Senate to tackle charter change and federalism before the President
steps down in 2022.
Panelo said the Palace is still confident that the Senate will support federalism
II. THE ISSUES:
after the proposed 2019 national budget is passed. (PNA)
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act
that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA
No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM
regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections
of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule

under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show
the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections,
should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate
can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject
to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both
the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the
interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2)
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in
the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office
of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend
their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to
appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective
term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot
do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly,
then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way
it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,
we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
 where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply
where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its
own, has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o
elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated
either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of
that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of
its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure
in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act
to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our
power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration
date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is
what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall
prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure –
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as
the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant
to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on
clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and
representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment
of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were
to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character
of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM
officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should
be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, GR No. 152774,
2004-05-27
Facts:
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled "ESTABLISHING A
PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION."
The program was established to "facilitate the process of
enhancing the capacities of local government... units (LGUs) in
the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by
the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the
Local Government Code."[1] The Oversight Committee (referred
to as the Devolution Committee in E.O. No. 48)... constituted
under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local
Government Code of 1991) has been tasked to formulate and
issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its
effective implementation.[2] Further, to address the funding...
shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs and
other funding requirements of the program, the "Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization Fund" was created.[3] For 1998, the
DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by
the
Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal
surveys undertaken by the DILG.[4] The initial fund was to be
sourced from the available savings of the national government for
CY 1998. [5] For 1999 and the succeeding... years, the
corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be
incorporated in the annual GAA.[6] The Oversight Committee has
been authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations
governing the equitable allocation and distribution of... said fund
to the LGUs.
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as
unconstitutional and void the provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the
Oversight Committee's Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-
005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029... and OCD-2002-
001 issued pursuant thereto. The petitioner submits that the
assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as
they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the
LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed
conditions for the... release thereof, violate the Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates
that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be automatically released
to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government Code of
1991, which enjoin that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be
"automatically and... directly" released to them "without need of
further action" are, likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release
of the five- billion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as the
LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules
and regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines
prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution
that the LGUs' share in the national taxes "shall be automatically
released to them." The petitioner maintains that the use of the
word "shall" must be given a compulsory meaning.
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to
vest the Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the
distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA
of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as
embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed
OCD resolutions is the improper amendment to Section 285 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 on the percentage sharing of the
IRA among the LGUs
Issues:
whether the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
(1) whether the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to
file the present suit; (2) whether the petition involves factual
questions that... are properly cognizable by the lower courts; and
(3) whether the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
Ruling:
The petitioner has locus standi... to maintain the present suit
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party assailing
the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal.
Such party must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but... also that he has sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or... privilege to which
he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
of.
The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite
standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a local
government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an
interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.
The petition involves a significant... legal issue
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court
entails the proper legal interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions. Moreover, the "transcendental importance"
of the case, as it necessarily involves the application of the
constitutional principle on... local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid.
The nature of the present controversy, therefore, warrants the
relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the
case forthwith.
The substantive issue needs to be resolved notwithstanding the
supervening events. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if
there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases
moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and public.
Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the
substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide
a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review."
For the GAAs in the coming... years may contain provisos similar
to those now being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the
question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It,
thus, behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the
substantive issue now.
In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly... adopted
as a policy that:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution
confines the President's power over the LGUs to one of general
supervision.
Drilon v. Lim:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do
it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor... or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done
but only to conform to the prescribed... rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000... and 2001 and
the OCD resolutions violate the... constitutional precept on local
autonomy
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision
mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a "just share" in the
national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be determined by law;
and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released to the
LGUs.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature
of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the National internal revenue.
As a rule, the term"SHALL" is a word of command that must be
given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
IMPERATIVE.
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs
without the Oversight Committee's prior approval. Further, with
respect to the portion of the LGSEF allocated for various projects
of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999; P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2
billion for 2001), the
Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid
down guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs had to comply
with before they could avail of funds from this portion of the
LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding... based on the criteria laid down by
the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project
proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project proposals that
passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight
Committee for review, evaluation and approval.
It was only upon approval thereof that the Oversight Committee
would direct the DBM to release the funds for the projects.
To the Court's mind, the entire process involving the distribution
and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The
LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the
national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the
vagaries of the... implementing rules and regulations, including
the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the
Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
OCD resolutions, makes the release not... automatic, a flagrant
violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the
"just share" of the LGUs "shall be automatically released to
them." The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight
Committee.
Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, et. al. vs. Judge Cader P. Indar, et. al.
December 21, 2009
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Digest by Clark Uytico
SUMMARY
This case stemmed from an election protest by incumbent Mayor Sampiano against his uncle Ogka.
Pending the resolution of the “double proclamation” election protest, COMELEC allowed Sampiano
to temporarily assume the duties of a Mayor “to prevent paralysis to the Public Service.” However,
Ogka wrote to PNB thru PNB’s chief legal counsel, Atty. Alvin C. Go, to suspend the release of the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. Atty. Go however
allowed the release of IRA. To prevent the release, Ogka filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibiton and
Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same day (October 11, 2004), Judge issued
ex parte a TRO which lasted for 11 days total. SC subjected the judge to disciplinary fine of 10,000
pesos for violating the Rules of Court. Ex-parte TROs can only last 72 hours, and a 20-day TRO only
after a summary hearing. The SC also stated that the automatic release of the IRA from the national
treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release thereof to
particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights
of the parties to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary
injunction while such rights are still being determined.
FACTS
Administrative case against Judge Cader P. Indar of the RTC Branch 12 of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, by
Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, charging him with
gross and wanton ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and serious acts
of impropriety.
Prior to that, Sampiano filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/TRO against his rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle Ogka, and the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur composed of Vadria Pungginagina and
Zenaida Mante. The Comelec issued an order allowing Sampiano to act, perform and discharge the
duties, functions and responsibilities as mayor "to prevent paralysis to public service" pending
determination and final resolution of the controversy involving the mayorship of the Municipality of
Balabagan.
Ogka however filed for an MR of the said COMELEC order and informed in writing PNB’s Chief Legal
Counsel, Atty. Alvin C. Go, not to release the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for Municipality of
Balabagan pending the resolution of double proclamation. Go however directed PNB to release the
IRA. Aggrieved, and to prevent the release, Ogka filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibiton and
Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same day (October 11, 2004), Judge Indar
issued ex parte a TRO which lasted for 11 days total.
Sampiano’s arguments:
1. The October 11 order is in the nature of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. As such prior
notice and hearing are required. He added that a TRO has a limited life of 20 days while a writ of
preliminary injunction is effective only during the pendency of the case and only after posting the
required injunction bond. This is the ex-parte issuance of the October 11, 2004 order freezing the
IRA of the Municipality of Balabagan "unless ordered otherwise by the Court."
2. Said Order was issued in violation of Section 286 of the Local Government Code (LGC), which
provides for the automatic release of the share of the local government unit from the national
government. This is so as not to deprive the officials and employees of the Municipality of Balabagan
from receiving their hard earned salaries, but the Judge did not heed the said request.
3. Judge has no jurisdiction as the same belongs to COMELEC.
Judge Indar’s arguments:
1. The October 11, 2004 order DID NOT FREEZE the IRA but merely HELD or DEFERRED its release
to any person. Since said proclamation was neither annulled nor invalidated by the COMELEC
pending resolution of the petitioner Ogka's Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned 3
orders. Since petitioner Ogka was left with no alternative to protect his interest in the IRA and to
prevent irreparable injury, he filed the instant petition with the prayer for the issuance of TRO and
preliminary injunction.
2. The provision on the automatic release of IRA is not a shield or immunity to the authority of the
courts to interfere, interrupt or suspend its release when there is a legal question presented before
it in order to determine the rights of the parties concerned.
3. His court assumed jurisdiction as it is a petition for prohibition and injunction and not an
enforcement of election laws. While he considered the said petition as an improper remedy, hence,
the court should not have taken cognizance of the case, he had nevertheless acted on it since the
petition prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, both an
auxiliary remedy which concerns the "enforcement of legal right or a matter that partakes of a
question of law" and not the enforcement of election laws.
ISSUE
1. WON RTC has jurisdiction
2. WON the October 11 order freezing the release of the IRA is valid.
3. WON the said order partakes of a TRO.
4. WON the Order contravenes the automatic release of funds to LGUs
HELD
1. YES. RTC has jurisdtion.
2. YES. But Judge violated the Rules when the TRO extended to 11 days, when only a 72-hour TRO is
allowed ex-parte.
3. YES. It is obviously one of the prayers prayed for which is subsequently granted by the judge.
4. NO. This automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper
court from deferring or suspending the release.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the penalty of a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby
imposed on respondent Judge for the above-mentioned violation of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO
1. The petition prayed, among others, that Go should cease and desist from ordering PNB-Marawi
through its branch manager to release the IRA for the month of October 2004 and the succeeding
months to Sampiano and Macabato or their agents. The issue here involves the determination of
whether Ogka is entitled to the issuance of a TRO or an injunction and not the application or
enforcement of election law. Undeniably, RTC has jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129.
2. Judge issued the October 11, 2004 Order on the very same day it was filed, and without any
hearing and prior notice to herein complainants. Respondent was allowed by the Rules to issue ex
parte a TRO of limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a hearing to determine the propriety of
extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent conducted the hearing of the petition on October 14, 2004 or on the third day of the
issuance of a TRO ex parte. The October 11, 2004 Order was lifted in an Order dated October 27,
2004 issued by the latter. Hence, the TRO issued ex parte was effective for 11 days from October 11,
2004 until October 22, 2004 in violation of the Rules. Only a TRO issued after a summary hearing
can last for a period of 20 days. It is worthy to note that the said October 11, 2004 Order was
subsequently lifted by the succeeding judge on the ground that the requisites for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction were not present.
3. A cursory reading of the said Order reveals that it was in effect a TRO or preliminary injunction
order. The Order directed PNB's Go and Disomangcop to hold or defer the release of the IRA to
Sampiano and Macabato while the petition is pending resolution of the trial court and unless
ordered otherwise by the court. This Order was merely consistent with the relief prayed for in
respondent's petition for prohibition and injunction.
4. The automatic release of the IRA under Section 286 is a mandate to the national government
through the Department of Budget and Management to effect automatic release of the said funds
from the treasury directly to the local government unit, free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by
the national government. However, this automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does
not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release thereof to particular local
officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the parties
to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction while such
rights are still being determined. This should be considered an exercise of judicial functions and
judicial prerogatives in the most cautious manner taking into account the factual and serious
circumstances obtaining between petitioner Ogka and his Uncle Mayor Sampiano whose family were
already at war with each other.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and NELSON ALCANTARA vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA and SECRETARY CORAZON JULIANO-
SOLIMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD)
G.R. No. 195770 July 17, 2012
FACTS:
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the
poor as target beneficiaries.Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino," it was pre-pilot tested in
the municipalities of Sibagat and Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; the municipalities of
Lopez Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga Region; and the cities of
Pasay and Caloocan upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos under a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget and Management.
On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued AO 16, series of 2008, setting the implementing
guidelines for the project renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps), also
referred to as CCTP, which provides cash grants to extreme poor households to allow the
members of the families to meet certain human development goals.” Eligible households
selected from priority target areas are granted health and education benefits for a total
annual subsidy of P15k.
AO 16 also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among DepEd, DOH,
DILG, the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and LGUs. DSWD as lead
implementing agency “oversees and coordinates the implementation, monitoring, and
evaluation of the program” while the LGU is responsible for the availability of health and
education supply, and providing technical assistance for the Program implementation,
among others. DSWD executed MOAs with each participating LGUs to outline the
obligation of both parties during the 5-year implementation period. Congress then
provided funding for the project as follows: P298K in 2008, P5 Billion in 2009, P10
Billion in 2010, and P21 Billion in 2011.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CCTOP budget allocation under the DSWD violates Article II,
Sec. 25 and Article X, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sec. 17 of the LGC of
1991 by providing for the recentralization of the National Government in the delivery of
basic services already devolved to the LGUs
RULING: No
The LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services. The national government is not
precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national
development programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with
the LGUs concerned.
The petitioners argued that the manner by which CCTP is implemented is questionable. It
is the LGU’s responsibility to deliver social welfare, agriculture, and health care services.
Giving DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the manner by
which services are to be delivered or conditionalities are to be complied with would have
enhanced its delivery of basic services. This results in the "recentralization" of basic
government functions”, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and the
avowed policy of decentralization.
The court ruled that Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving
the invalidity of the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The Constitution declares it a
policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments ( Sec 3, Sec 14 Art 10
1987 Constitution). To fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy
that would develop them into self-reliant communities, Section 17 LGC vested upon the
LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities.
However, par (c) of Sec 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
o Decentralization of administration - when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and make local governments ‘more responsive and
accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities.’ The President exercises ‘general
supervision’ over them, but only to ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law.’ He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
o Decentralization of power - involves an abdication of political
power in favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. This amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.
It is thus clear that the LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services. The
national government is not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation
and implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals - while it is through a system of decentralization that the State
shall promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure, the
concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into
"mini - states." With local autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than "to break up
the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of the local government" and,
thus, did not intend to sever "the relation of partnership and interdependence between
the central administration and local government units."
Sec 3, Sec 14 Art 10 1987 Constitution:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization xxx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils
or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional
heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives
from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region.

Section 17 of the LGC:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall xxx discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise xxx discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary to xxx provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign
sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services.