BATCH II

DIGESTED CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS

1. B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee. G.R. No.

L-18176 October 26, 1966LAZARO CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS:

Lorenzo Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to Chae Kyung Lee. Defendant’s
whereabouts being unknown, summons was served by publication. Not having filed
an answer, Rayray moved that defendant be declared in default, which was granted
after finding that there was no collusion between the parties. The trial court dismissed
the complaint ruling that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of Rayray’s
marriage to defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint is correct; or, WON the trial court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the marriage though such was solemnized in
Korea.

RULING:

No, the dismissal is not correct, thus, it could validly inquire into the validity of the
marriage.

1. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must
have jurisdiction over (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the
parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res. The subject-matter of
the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is
within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance, and, in Manila, of its Court of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations.

2. The court acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in
consequence of the filing of the complaint. Defendant was placed under the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication.
3. This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status
affects or binds the whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between
said parties, or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the
nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the
locus celebrationis.
******
The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an
action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled
in, or a national of, the forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it
follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the
legality of the marriage between the parties herein.

2. Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007

In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a Japanese firm, was
contracted by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise
the construction of the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered
into an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura for the latter
to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in Japan and is effective for a
period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January 2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-
Baler Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the
road project. But in February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of
Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract. Kitamura
sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was entered in
Japan hence, applying the principle of lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the
contract should be cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the
motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time invoking forum non
conveniens; that the RTC is an inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese
nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on the other hand invokes
the trial court’s ruling which states that matters connected with the performance of
contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, so since
the obligations in the ICA are executed in the Philippines, courts here have
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed.
HELD: No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance
and damages. Such case is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within
the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens.
However, such ground is not one of those provided for by the Rules as a ground for
dismissing a civil case.
 The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws should
apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there are three phases and each next phase
commences when one is settled, to wit:

1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the parties, the issues, the property, the res. Also considers,
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes
cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws must automatically apply. The court
must determine which substantive law when applied to the merits will be fair to both
parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can the resulting judgment be
enforced?

This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the RTC’s taking cognizance
of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. He
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed the
proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari. The question of which
law should be applied should have been settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not
improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR.

3. MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. v. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003

FACTS
The petition alleged the following:
- On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero fled before the Regional Trial
Court of Mania against Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical
Bank
- Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxed
charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank, (2) a returned
check worth $18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3)
unauthorized conversion of his account.
- The bank filed its Answer alleging that Guerrero’s account is governed by New
York law which does not permit any Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
- Seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, supported by an affidavit of New York attorney Alyssa
Walden.
- The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
 - The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the RTC Orders

ISSUE
Whether the Walden affidavit does serve as proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence

HELD
The Walden affidavit stated conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and
opinion of the facts of the case vis-à-vis, the alleged laws and jurisprudence without
citing any laws in particular. While the attached copies of some US court decisions do
not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of
foreign courts. Thus, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York
law and jurisprudence.

Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit and Court of Appeal’s decision is
affirmed.

4. CITIBANK, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) and INVESTORS'

FINANCE CORPORATION, doing business under the name and style of
FNCB Finance, petitioners, vs. MODESTA R. SABENIANO, respondent. G.R.
No. 156132 October 12, 2006

Doctrine: While there is no express legal requirement that the Declaration of Pledge
had to be notarized to be effective, even so, it could not enjoy the same prima facie
presumption of due execution that is extended to notarized documents, and
petitioner Citibank must discharge the burden of proving due execution and
authenticity of the Declaration of Pledge.

Facts:
- Sabeniano is a client of both Citibank and FNCB.
- Sabeniano claims to have substantial deposits and money market placements
with Citibank, as well as money market placements with Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation(AIDC) and FNCB, the proceeds of which are directly
deposited to Sabaniano’s Citibank accounts.
- Sabeniano alleges that Citibank refused to return her deposits and the
proceeds of her money market placements despite her repeated demands.
- On August 8, 1985, Sabeniano filed a complaint against Citibank.
- RTC ordered Citibank to refund the Sabeniano $149,632.99 with legal inerest at
12% per annum compounded yearly. It also ordered Sabeniano to pay
Citibank P1,069,847.40.
- Both parties appealed. The CA rendered a decision in favor of Sabeniano.
 - Citibank did not dispute the fact that Sabeniano has substantial deposits and
money market placements. However, Citibank claims that Sabeniano is
indebted to Citibank, evidenced by promissory notes amounting to
P2,123,843.20.
- To secure the multiple loans Sabeniano executed a deed of assignment of her
money market placements, and a declaration of pledge covering all of her
present and future fiduciary placements.
- Sabeniano failed to pay her debt which led to Citibank to apply the proceeds
of the money market placements to satisfy her outstanding loan balance.
- Respondent disputes the narration of facts concerning her loans and the
alleged authority she gave for the off-set of her money market placements and
deposit accounts with petitioners against her obligation.

Issue/s: Can Citibank apply the proceeds to satisfy respondent’s outstanding loan
balance?
Held:
With regard to loan and deposit account. Yes.
Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are
creditors and debtors of each other.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary;
1. (1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the
same time a principal creditor of the other;
2. (2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter
has been stated;
3. (3) That the two debts be due;
4. (4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
5. (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to
the debtor.
- Respondent and Citibank were creditor and debtor of each other; Citibank was
creditor with respect to respondent’s loan and latter was creditor with respect to
her savings account with Citibank;
- As far as her deposit account was concerned, since bank deposits, whether
fixed, savings, or current, should be considered as simple loan or mutuum by the
depositor to the banking institution;
- Both debts consist in sum of money;
- Compensation takes place by operation of law, so even in the absence of
express authority from respondent, Citibank had the right to effect the partial
compensation of respondent’s outstanding loans with her deposit account (31k);

With regard to the money market placements and loans. No, but payment
authorized by deed of assignment.
- Proceeds of money market placements with FNCB amounted to around 1 million
pesos; - Here, respondent was creditor and FNCB was the debtor; while as to the
outstanding loans, Citibank was creditor while respondent the debtor;
- Hence, legal compensation would not apply; Citibank exercised its rights to the
proceeds of respondent’s money market placements with FNCB by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment:
- CA did not consider the deed for petitioners’ failure to produce the
original copies (in violation of the best evidence rule); SC disagrees;
- The deeds are important in establishing the authority given by respondent to
Citibank to use as security for her loans her money market placements with FNCB;
- Paragraph 2: In the event the OBLIGATIONS are not paid at maturity or upon
demand, as the case may be, the ASSIGNEE is fully authorized and empowered to
collect and receive the PLACEMENT (or so much thereof as may be necessary)
and apply the same in payment of the OBLIGATIONS;
- Paragraph 5: This Assignment shall be considered as sufficient authority to FNCB
Finance to pay and deliver the PLACEMENT or so much thereof as may be
necessary to liquidate the OBLIGATIONS, to the ASSIGNEE;

Citibank partially extinguished respondent’s obligations thru the application of the

security given by the respondent for her loans:
- Although the pertinent documents were entitled Deeds of Assignment, they
were, in reality, more of a pledge by respondent to petitioner Citibank of her
credit due from petitioner FNCB Finance by virtue of her money market
placements with the latter;
- When the PNs for the money market placements mature without them being
redeemed, Citibank collected from FNCB the proceeds thereof, and applied the
same against respondent’s outstanding loans (leaving no surplus);

Balance still left (despite legal compensation and application of proceeds of PNs
from money market placements):
- Citibank then proceeded to apply respondent’s dollar accounts with Citibank-
Geneva against the remaining (pursuant to a Declration of Pledge);
- But SC deems the same exceedingly suspicious and irregular;
- Declaration of Pledge unnotarized; while no requirement of notarization, it could
not enjoy prima facie presumption of due execution;
- Citibank unable to establish date when Declaration of Pledge was actually
executed; it presented only a photocopy; respondent was able to secure a copy
dated September 24,1979 but she proved that she was out of the country at that
time;
- It was irregularly filled-out; in the space for pledgor, Citibank was typewritten; it
made no sense;
- Respondent denied that it was her signature on the declaration; forgery; when a
document is alleged on the basis of forgery, best evidence rule is applied; no
original document;
Dispositive: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002,
as already modified by its Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION, as follows –
1. PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are DECLARED subsisting and outstanding. Petitioner
Citibank is ORDEREDto return to respondent the principal amounts of the said
PNs, amounting to Three Hundred Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-
Seven Pesos and Thirty-Four Centavos (P318,897.34) and Two Hundred Three
Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P203,150.00), respectively, plus the
stipulated interest of Fourteen and a half percent (14.5%) per annum,
beginning 17 March 1977;
2. The remittance of One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Two
US Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents (US$149,632.99) from respondent's Citibank-
Geneva accounts to petitioner Citibank in Manila, and the application of the
same against respondent's outstanding loans with the latter, is DECLAREDillegal,
null and void. Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to refund to respondent the said
amount, or its equivalent in Philippine currency using the exchange rate at the
time of payment, plus the stipulated interest for each of the fiduciary
placements and current accounts involved, beginning 26 October 1979;
3. Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to pay respondent moral damages in the
amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00); exemplary damages
in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00); and
attorney's fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00);
and
4. Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her
outstanding loans, which, from the respective dates of their maturity to 5
September 1979, was computed to be in the sum of One Million Sixty-Nine
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Forty Centavos (P1,069,847.40),
inclusive of interest. These outstanding loans shall continue to earn interest, at
the rates stipulated in the corresponding PNs, from 5 September 1979 until
payment thereof.

5. ALONZO Q. ANCHETA VS. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON

G.R. NO. 139868, June 8, 2006

FACTS:

Spouses Audrey O’neill and W Richard Guersey were Americans who resided in
the Philippines with an adopted daughter Kyle Hill. Audrey died with a will
bequeathing her entire estate to Richard. Richard then married Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon with whom he has two children, Kimberly and Kevin. Audrey’s will was also
admitted to probate. As administrator of Audrey’s will, petitioner filed an inventory
and appraisal of properties. Richard died with a will bequeathing his entire estate to
respondent Candelaria Dalaygon except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interirors, Inc. shares which he left to Kyle Hill. Richard’s will was admitted to probate in
the U.S. and submitted for probate in the RTC of Makati City. A project of partition
was approved for Audrey’s will probate with Richard being apportioned the ¾
undivided interest in a Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc. and
P9,313.48 from a Citibank account; and to Kyle, the ¼ interest in the Makati property,
16.111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc. and P3,104.49 in cash.
A project of partition was also filed for the probate of Richard’s will which was
opposed by Dalaygon since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his
rights and interests over A/G Interiors, Inc. shares then his entire ¾ undivided interest in
the Makati property should be given to respondent. The trial court disapproved the
project of partition and adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the
Makati property to respondent.
Herein respondent Dalaygon filed before the CA an Amended Complaint for
the annulment of the trial court’s orders in approving the project of partition
contending that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati
property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and since Richard left his entire estate,
except that of the A/G Interiors, Inc. to her, then the entire Makati property should
now pertain to her. The CA rendered a decision annulling the Court’s Orders, hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the entire Makati property should pertain to respondent

Dalaygon.

RULING:

The petition is denied. The Supreme Court ruled that a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Since a will is
the testator speaking after death, the wishes of Audrey Guersey and Richard Guersey
should prevail over petitioner Ancheta’s motive of equitably distributing Audrey’s
estate. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law.

6. Beam and Beam vs. Yatco

FACTS: On or before April 26, 1937, the Collector of Internal Revenue declared and
assessed items of property of A. W. Beam and Lydia McKee Beam at the time of the
death of the latter on October 18, 1934 at P8, 100,544.91. One-half thereof, appraised
at P4, 050,272.46, was the estate to the deceased Lydia McKee Beam located in the
Philippines and transmitted to plaintiffs by virtue of inheritance, devise, or bequest,
gifts mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance and the collector
assessed and demanded inheritance taxes aggregating P343, 698.72 which the
plaintiffs paid under protest that was overruled by the collector. Plaintiffs filed a
complaint praying that the amount paid by them be refunded, but the lower court
dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding that appellant became a
resident and citizen of California in 1923.

RULING: NO. The finding of the lower court is fully supported by the testimonies of A.
W. Beam and John W. Haussermann, wherein the first stated that in 1923 he bought a
house in Oakland, California, and used it as a residence until December, 1930, when
he built another in Piedmont, California, which he has used and occupied as a
residence since then, and his children were in school in California and Mrs. Beam
wanted to be with them and made a home for them, and it was his intention to live in
California and from 1923 on, his family spent most of their time in California, where he
himself used to take long vacations, and that he never really intended to live
permanently in the Philippines, while Haussermann testified that A. W. Beam left the
Philippines somewhere along 1923 and 1924 when he established a home for his wife
and children on Kenmore Avenue, Oakland, and he went there frequently. Also,
because the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to establish their right to recover, in
view of the fact that they had failed to establish that right based on their alleged
Utah citizenship to invoke the laws of the state which, it is alleged, to the effect that
properties acquired by the spouses during marriage belong to them separately, the
dismissal of the complaint is fully justified, and the defendant is entitled to take
advantage of the plaintiff's failure to present sufficient proof and of the evidence
adduced by themselves. Where plaintiffs themselves show a state of facts upon
which they should not recover, whether defendant pleaded such fact as a defense
or not, their claim should be dismissed. Evidence introduced without objection
becomes property of the case and all the parties are amenable to any favorable or
unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence .As correctly stated by Yatco, even
granting appellant's contention that the deceased became a resident of California
only in 1934, she was a citizen of that state at the time of her death and her national
law applicable to the case, in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code, is the law
of California which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is to be presumed to be the
same as the Philippine law.

7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380

October 5, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition
for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in
Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady
Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was
naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his
wife in the States – that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree.
Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par.
2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that,
petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the
instant case.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Held:

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent
evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.

“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under the Philippine laws.”

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of
Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason
must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed
and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and
injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a
daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as

allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
8. VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding
Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay
City and RICHARD UPTON, respondents October 8, 1985

FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in
1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and
they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to
Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the
petitioner’s business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged
that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets?

RULING:
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens
may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided
they are valid according to their national law.
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them
with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.

9. ARTICLE 15 – NATIONALITY THEORY

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner,
vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The
second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters
of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an
order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati
City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. The Court of Appealsreversed and set aside the orders of the trial court,
and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148
of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

10. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010

Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for review on
certiorari

Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian

citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked
of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he
registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the
foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage
as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC
denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case
was filed before the Court.

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Decision: The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26
of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the
Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the
Family Code.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized
Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of
foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of
divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial order
recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court
ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of
the ruling.

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS AND SOLICITOR-GENERAL

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Facts: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian
citizen through naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent
(Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner went back
to Canada due to work commitments; however, when he came back he was
shocked to discover that the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus,
petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that
he wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the petitioner went to the Pasig
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the
respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
official of the National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the
marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and
to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his petition,
hence this recourse by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS & OSG

GR 186571

Facts
Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization
He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City
Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he returned to the Philippines he found
out that his wife was having an affair with another man
He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the same was granted
After two years from the effectivity of the divorce decree, Corpuz found a new
Filipina to love
Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the divorce decree on
his and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate
Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce before the RTC
RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy
under Art. 26(2) of the Family Code
Issue
W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree

Ruling
The alien spouse can claim no right undert Art. 26(2) of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is “to avoid the absurd situation whre the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse”. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree
Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
Art. 26(2) of the Family Code provides the direct exception to the rule and serves as
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse
An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree) whose status and
legal capacity are generally governed by his national law
Remedy Available to Alien Spouse
The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
the alien spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgment (Please see pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule 132)

* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the recording of the divorce
decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate as legally improper. No
judicial order yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree, thus, the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree of Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Corpuz (Please
see Art. 407 of the New Civil Code and the Law on Registry of Civil Status -Act No.
3753)