International Peacekeeping

ISSN: 1353-3312 (Print) 1743-906X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/finp20

UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the

peacebuilding consensus

Oliver P. Richmond

To cite this article: Oliver P. Richmond (2004) UN peace operations and the dilemmas
of the peacebuilding consensus, International Peacekeeping, 11:1, 83-101, DOI:
10.1080/1353331042000228403

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1353331042000228403

Published online: 24 Jan 2007.

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 UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of
the Peacebuilding Consensus

O L I V E R P. R I C H M O N D
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What is the nature of the ‘peace’ that is being installed in conflict zones through
UN peace operations? It tends to be assumed that UN peace operations contribute
to the construction of a liberal international order made up of democratic states.
In practice this has often resulted in a ‘virtual peace’ based upon contested
attempts to import liberal democratic models. This essay argues that much of the
impetus for this type of thinking arises from a liberal desire to ‘resolve’ conflict –
to reproduce a positive peace through contemporary peace operations rather than
the negative peace that was supported by more traditional peacekeeping. ‘Peace’
in some cases now legitimates and rests upon long-standing and deep interven-
tions in conflict zones via a ‘peacebuilding consensus’. This lies in a peace consti-
tuted by a specific form of external governance. Understanding these
developments clearly shows how important peace operations are in creating
forms of peace as a contribution to the remaking of the global order.

‘Peace is the tranquillity of order.’ (Saint Augustine)1

‘Without Contraries there is no progression’. (William Blake)2
This essay discusses the nature of the ‘peace’ that is being installed in con-
flict zones around the world through UN peace operations. It asks what
the implications of peace operations for global and local order are.
These questions are rarely asked because it is assumed that UN peace
operations contribute to the construction of a liberal international
order (that is, an ‘international community’) made up of democratic
states.3 This is conceptualized, as Pugh has pointed out, through a
problem-solving model that initially aims to stabilize the existing order,
and more recently has endeavoured to enhance it within a liberal inter-
national society.4 In practice this has proved to be highly ambitious,
often resulting in a ‘virtual peace’ based upon contested attempts to
import liberal democratic models via military intervention, and political,
social, and economic institution building and reconstruction.5
As this essay attempts to show, this can be seen in various different
ways as these practices have evolved. The assumptions surrounding
peace that now exist have been legitimated by a broad international
International Peacekeeping, Vol.11, No.1, Spring 2004, pp.83–101
ISSN 1353-3312
DOI:10.1080/1353331042000228403 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
 84 P E A C E O P E RAT IO N S A N D GL OB AL OR DE R

(though far from universal) consensus implicit in UN consensus building.

Despite the weakness of this consensus, and the lack of resources made
available for its implementation, it has increasingly been seen by some
states, agencies, and NGOs as legitimizing a multilateral – and even
unilateral – use of force if necessary. This tension between the use of
force and the creation of peace, initially constructed by the same actor
(as can be seen with the role of the UN in Somalia in the early 1990s)
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has now led to a separation of functions where the use of force and
peacebuilding are coordinated by different actors. This can be seen
in the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan more
recently.
Furthermore, the UN itself (more specifically the Secretariat, agencies,
and institutions) has accepted that the ‘ends’ provided by the liberal, humani-
tarian, developmental, and democratic conception of peace are often more
pressing and legitimate than allowing the arguments for or against huma-
nitarian intervention to impede the establishment of peace operations,
humanitarian missions, advisory missions, democratization processes, and
political reform under its auspices. The recent reluctance to accept the US
and UK attempts to renegotiate the norm of non-intervention for reasons
related to humanitarianism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on
the part of some Security Council members, the Secretariat, and
members of the General Assembly on account of their stance against poss-
ible unilateralism (in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kosovo, for
example), has not diminished the resolve of the UN that it should be
involved in post-conflict peacebuilding in line with its Charter. Indeed,
the UN Charter itself reflects thin mix of liberalism and realism.
This essay argues that much of the impetus for this type of thinking
arises from the evolution of an idealist UN, agency, NGO and liberal
desire to ‘resolve’ (as opposed to ‘manage’) conflict – to reproduce a posi-
tive peace through contemporary peace operations rather than the nega-
tive peace which was supported by more traditional peacekeeping. Even
so this form of intervention is based upon a mixture of national interest
formulations, political reform, and humanitarian requirements, which
result in inconsistent intervention6 and a complex installation of peace.
It is part of the liberal-institutionalist collusion with strategic thinking
on constructing a peace which has been beneficial to liberal states post-
World War I and World War II; with Wilsonianism, with the experience
gained from the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after 1945 (and
Europe in general), democratic peace theory, humanitarianism and
human security, and development and economic reform discourses.
This consensus among academics and liberal state, International Organ-
ization (IO), and Non-Governmental (NGO) actors indicates that if a
 U N P E A C E O P E R AT I O N S A N D T H E P E A C E B U I L D I N G C O N S E N S U S 85
reversion to war is to be avoided, certain forms of governance need to be
instituted in post-conflict zones through multiple interventions.
Consequently, the evolution of the intellectual debates about ending
conflict, which have been associated with UN peace operations from
early examples of peacekeeping to the multidimensional examples of the
1990s is examined in this essay. It then makes the case that ‘peace’ in
some situations now legitimates and rests upon long-standing and deep
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interventions in conflict zones constructed through long-term reconstruc-

tion and conflict transformation via peacebuilding approaches, often
resting on defensive or offensive military intervention.7 The emergence of
humanitarian intervention and the related ‘peacebuilding consensus’8 is
illustrated to some degree in the evolution of peace interventions from
Cambodia in the early 1990s to Kosovo in the late 1990s9 which seem to
resemble what Mandelbaum has called the ‘Wilsonian Triad’.10 This evol-
ution has occurred in the context of the privatization or subcontracting of
many of these tasks to the ‘humanitarian community’,11 which often takes
on roles that would not otherwise be fulfilled.12
The culmination of these debates is then examined. This lies in a
‘peace’ constituted by a specific form of external governance with local
consent and cooperation, based upon a quid pro quo of a gradual devol-
vement of power to local institutions. Peace on the ground is simulated to
be as it is in liberal states, though in practice it may be more like the situ-
ation that existed in former colonial dependencies.13 Understanding these
developments clearly shows how important peace operations are in creat-
ing conditional forms of peace as a contribution to the remaking of the
global order.

From Peacekeeping to UN Peace Operations

‘Peace’ Keeping
Peacekeeping as it evolved via the work of Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester
Pearson14 implies that there was prior peace on the ground which could
be ‘restored’. In fact, an examination of early peacekeeping operations
seems to show that often there was not a local peace that could be
revived and that such interventions were more likely to be for the advan-
tage of regional or global actors, which either had no interests at all in a
particular conflict or required its de-escalation. As Schmidl has demon-
strated, peacekeeping’s antecedents can be observed during the nineteenth
century as part of the balance of power system operated by the great
powers.15 As it came into being with the UN Emergency Force (UNEF)
in 1956, peacekeeping had a clear imperial provenance though of course
 86 P E A C E O P E RAT IO N S A N D GL OB AL OR DE R

it was also intended to dismantle imperialism.16 The relationships

between former colonial powers and the superpowers with local actors
in conflict zones such as in Egypt and later in Cyprus illustrated the ten-
sions that existed between the former and the latter. Indeed, in the context
of UNEF, Britain and France – imperial competitors in the region – had
key roles in overseeing the unravelling of their historical claims to the
Suez Canal through the UN Security Council.
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Cold War UN peacekeeping was supposed to prevent overt violence,

prevent the global and regional escalation of localized conflicts, and
provide the conditions of stability in which peacemaking could occur.
As Galtung has pointed out, these processes tended to focus on direct,
rather than structural violence.17 Such approaches often led to controver-
sial situations based on a post-conflict status quo. UN peacekeeping in the
Cyprus case amply illustrates this.18 Indeed, in the case of Cyprus recent
events in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots have peacefully exchanged
unregulated visits into each other’s zones belies the rhetoric of the
island’s nationalist leaders over the last 30 years. The idea that the two
sides could not mix became an ethno-nationalist rhetoric upon which
the UN based its mission in Cyprus after 1974.19 This seems to indicate
that the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has indeed indirectly endorsed
and institutionalized an elite-led ‘cold war’ on the island. In this case,
peace was understood to be a reduction of violence and a settlement
process that ultimately failed to prevent ethnic division.
In the cases of Cyprus and in the Congo peace was constructed around
an attempt to support a failing government and constitutional structures,
to ‘restore law and order’ and effect a ‘return to normal conditions’.20
This language obscured a reality on the ground that was far removed
from the liberal conception of a pre-existing peace that could be restored
and did little to lessen fears of imperial continuities, particularly in the
case of the UN Organization in Congo (ONUC).21 Indeed, Macqueen
argues that ONUC actually escalated the Congo conflict for a variety
of unforeseen reasons, in an environment in which there was no peace
to keep.22 Other UN interventions, for example in Egypt, Syria, and
Kashmir did not aim to have a major impact on importing a liberal
peace though it can clearly be argued that by aiding in the prevention
of wider conflagrations, they did facilitate a less violent status quo on
the ground. There is general concurrence on this point.
Such approaches revolved around the protection of the Westphalian
international system and addressed the shortcomings of that system
through Westphalian tools, ultimately replicating that system and its
explicit legal positivism. While this appeared to offer the hope of order
and justice, it is also inherently status-quo oriented, providing grey
 U N P E A C E O P E R AT I O N S A N D T H E P E A C E B U I L D I N G C O N S E N S U S 87
areas in which abuses regularly occur, particularly in the context of the
status that sovereignty offers, the differences between popular and legal
understandings of self-determination, and the lack of clarity on the defi-
nition, treatment, and monitoring of national minorities. Consequently,
early peacekeeping strategies focused on preventing open violence and
monitoring ceasefires and status quos, and demilitarization and policing –
as much of the Cold War literature on peacekeeping illustrates. They were
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also to provide conditions for diplomatic settlement processes to occur.

This limited view of peacekeeping is clearly quite unsatisfactory when
one considers that the ‘negative peace’ being created in conflict zones was
beneficial mainly to regional and international rather than local actors, as
one can see when examining the sites of peacekeeping of this sort, from
Cyprus to the Congo. However, clearly limited goals meant a level of
success was more easily achieved. Perhaps it was for these reasons that
after a flurry of peacekeeping activities in the 1960s, the UN then
turned to ‘détente management’ or was not used at all until the late
1980s when it started to become engaged in the liberal-democratization
project of the liberal international community.23

‘Peace’ Building and UN ‘Peace’ Operations

The basic assumptions underlying peacebuilding approaches, and which
have contributed to the conceptualization and practice of UN Peace
Operations during the 1990s24 and after, are equally problematic.
Peace is understood to lie in the establishment of reconstructive and trans-
formative processes that culminate in states that mirror the liberal-
democratic state. Using this logic, given that we now ‘know’ what peace
is, what is now required is ways of building it. However, there is a clear
continuity with earlier approaches in the sense that the intention was a
restoration of a perhaps fictitious peace requiring the creation rather
than restoration of that same image of peace. What is now very different
however, are the opportunities and problems this new position creates.
Two key questions arise here. If there is an agreement on what peace
should look like, what limitations are there on the methods of interven-
tion that can be applied to attain it? This, of course, raises the issue of
the use of force. The second question lies in the nature of the peace
that this sort of intervention actually creates on the ground.
This type of discourse, in association with the expediencies required
by policymakers and by the private decision-making processes of
human rights, developmental actors,25 and NGOs in responding to
conflict, has led to far more complicated multi-dimensional processes
first theorized in the peacebuilding literatures.26 This evolution into
peacebuilding approaches – institutionalized in the work of the UN
 88 P E A C E O P E RAT IO N S A N D GL OB AL OR DE R

and international agencies, international financial institutions, NGOs,

and the many actors engaged in conflict environments – has effectively
both reopened the debate on the plausibility of outside forms of govern-
ance to mitigate and stabilize conflict, and has also revived neo-imperial
critiques of the liberal bodies engaged in such activities. Indeed, the devel-
opment and transformation of peace as a discourse has reached the point
where force and intervention (in humanitarian forms) are legitimated
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implicitly by the requirements of the installation of neo-liberal demo-

cratic institutions as the ultimate solutions to conflict which guide
peace processes. It might be argued that the construction of a neoliberal,
democratic peace both legitimizes intervention and requires intervention-
ary practices in order to expand this ‘zone of peace’.27
What seems to have emerged is that approaches to peacebuilding,
humanitarian intervention, development issues, democratization,
human rights and conflict resolution have been used to provide avenues
of legitimate intervention (sometimes forcible or by private actors) at
different levels of analysis. This is an important, though devious, part
of the increasing privatization of peace and the subcontracting of peace
activities to private actors. This is because, despite the reasons for, the
forms of, and the objectives of intervention, the assumptions underlying
a future vision of peace in conflict zones adhere to and are conditional on
a universal liberal model that is not negotiable. These developments are
implicit in the UN Agendas for the reform of international approaches
to peace published throughout the 1990s and beyond, which included
multiple actors in the reconstruction of the discourse of peace in this
period. It is notable that An Agenda for Peace was followed by An
Agenda for Democratization and An Agenda for Development.28 All
such documentation indicates a desire to deal with the underlying struc-
tural dynamics which give rise to conflict. Yet the universal assumptions
underlying these attempts are themselves indicative of a liberal hegemony
which may also lead to structural forms of violence. Indeed, what has run
through all attempts to make peace and create order has been an attempt
by hegemonic actors to preserve their own value systems and to freeze the
world’s cartographies in their favour. As Zolo has wondered, ‘can any
cosmopolitan project ever be anything other than an inherently hegemonic
and violent undertaking?’29
The key question is how far does this intellectual and policy develop-
ment of an understanding of peace resemble what has occurred on the
ground in conflicts where peace operations have taken place? An
Agenda for Peace was an attempt to improve the peace that was to be sup-
planted into conflict zones, based on universal ideals, supposedly encap-
sulated within the UN Charter.30 It envisaged early warning systems,
 U N P E A C E O P E R AT I O N S A N D T H E P E A C E B U I L D I N G C O N S E N S U S 89
preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, as
well as peace-enforcement operations in order to enable the UN to
become engaged in addressing the ‘deepest causes of social injustice
and political oppression’. Implicit in Agenda was a coordinated strategy
that spanned these approaches as part of a general commitment to a
broader notion of peace and security, involving a long-term commitment
to post-settlement environments including disarmament, the repatriation
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of refugees, the restoration of order, election monitoring, the protection

of human rights, reforming and strengthening governmental institutions,
and ‘promoting formal and informal processes of political partici-
pation.’31 UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan has continued to concen-
trate on developing UN peace operations, arguing for a
multidisciplinary approach based upon a combination of ‘coercive indu-
cement’ and ‘induced’ consent.32
The Brahimi report retained this version of peace, as have other UN
documents published recently.33 What has also been characteristic of
these developments is the emergence of democratization as a key
issue.34 Kofi Annan sees this as an attempt to construct democratic gover-
nance at the local level, particularly in conflict zones, and linked to an
even more ambitious project to ‘explore democratic principles at the
global level’.35 Essentially, peacebuilding in UN peace operations now
appears to lie in something akin to the democratic peace argument. It is
also associated with arguments about the need for development pro-
cesses. Thus, the democratization processes from El Salvador to
Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia are seen as integral to the creation
of long-term sustainable conditions of peace. As in Bosnia, Kosovo and
East Timor, transitional administrations have taken a firmer grip of this
democratization and neo-liberal development process.36
This is part of a globalization of a particular discourse of peace37
which has raised public and political pressure in the West to respond to
conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and inequalities on their periphery
and beyond. This also has an impact on how those caught up in conflict
react to intervention and peacemaking/keeping/building derived from
concepts and practices within the contemporary international system,
which are based on developing Western, neoliberal norms pertaining to
human security. These developments have been exacerbated by a realiz-
ation that certain aspects of contemporary conflict cannot be managed
by traditional state-centric apparatus. ‘New’ threats to the peace, such
as ethnic wars, and state fragmentation have raised critical questions
about the role of identity in conflict and subsequent implications for peace
in the international system, in particular in the context of competing dis-
courses produced by sovereignty.
 90 P E A C E O P E RAT IO N S A N D GL OB AL OR DE R

Similarly, ‘newly’ identified threats to the peace, such as human rights

violations, or development issues raise questions relating to intervention
and the nature of the international economy and socio-economic issues
therein. Democratization has increasingly been seen as a vehicle
through which these types of reforms can be constructed. This has also
highlighted the significance of NGOs and the debate about global civil
society, particularly in the context of rights versus needs-based interven-
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tion. This has raised the important issue of universalism versus relativism
in the [re] construction of peace in the international system, which
has generally been dealt with in the context of the communitarian/
cosmopolitan debate. NGOs operate solely in the context of a Western
development discourse, though they do, of course, open up grassroots
participation.
Where this type of selective intervention occurs, peace is assumed to
be reconstituted by the establishment and importation of external govern-
ance frameworks associated with neo-liberal democracies. This rep-
resents a ‘thin-domination’ akin to that described by Michael Mann as
a form of imperial power.38 This is a fascinating development, presaged
by calls for a revival of the Trusteeship council,39 for the establishment
of a ‘semi-imperialism’, ‘mandates’ or ‘benign colonialism’, to assume
the governance of conflict zones.40 There has been an increasingly
vocal debate about what looks on the surface to be a return of imperial
or colonial practices in some policy, academic and media circles.41
Democratization, human rights observances, development, and free
market economic reform have been adopted as the pillars of new settle-
ments by the leading states and organizations which constitute the
liberal, cosmopolitan international community. This reflects what ulti-
mately was the post-Cold War settlement,42 and it requires strategies
involving traditional military and diplomatic tasks, and deep intervention
into the social, economic and governmental institutions of the state in
question. The sustainable resolution of conflict therefore implies deep
and multi-dimensional forms of intervention, and a liberal and cosmopo-
litan faith on the part of the interveners in the infallibility of their approach.
In other words, there must be an assumption of some broad universal
norms that enable, legitimate, and provide objectives for such interven-
tions. This has occurred, as Paris points out, through four key mechan-
isms: the insertion of political and economic liberalism into peace
settlements; providing expert advice during implementation; conditional-
ity attached to economic assistance; and proxy governance.43 These
mechanisms contribute to the processes outlined in the triptych of the
UN’s Agendas, and the neo-liberal democratization thesis upon which
interventions have become conditional.44
 U N P E A C E O P E R AT I O N S A N D T H E P E A C E B U I L D I N G C O N S E N S U S 91
This has created practices in which states (and organizations which
profess to understand what peace is) are able to intervene in conflict
in order to educate others in their ways of peace, without necessarily
renegotiating the peace frameworks that have arisen from the recipients’
experience, culture, identity or geopolitical location. In effect, this liberal
understanding of peace exists without any reassessment of the assump-
tions that lie behind it – assumptions mainly created by the outcome of
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major ‘world’ conflicts and the conduct of Western diplomacy in order

to address problems related to the preservation and advancement of con-
temporary order. Yet, as Adam Watson has pointed out, the practice of
peacekeeping and peacemaking has clearly ‘outrun’ this Westphalian
theory.45
The question of what peace might be expected to look like from the
inside (from within the conflict environment) is given less credence than
the way the international community and its organizations and actors
desire to see it from the outside, and moderates searching for peace
from within the conflict environment tend to expropriate Western
models in their search for a solution. This, as Martin Shaw has noted,
is a quasi-imperial framework related to the dynamics of the post-colo-
nial state-system, and in his view humanitarian intervention is a response
to the flaws of quasi-imperial states.46 Ignatieff describes this as ‘Empire
Lite’ and argues that nation-building rests upon a temporary imperial
tutelage required to install peace.47 Furthermore, he points out that
the language deployed in these missions betrays its continuity with the
indirect rule of the imperial project while trying to induce a growing
capacity for self-governance.48

The Peacebuilding Consensus and Peace-as-Governance

‘to correct vices and maintain justice’ (St Thomas Aquinas)49
Contemporary peace operations have aimed at the reconstitution of
liberal states. From Cambodia to Somalia and from the Balkans to East
Timor, the official focus guiding peace operations has been the creation
and recreation of Westphalian states (based upon territorial versions of
sovereignty with fixed boundaries, populations, and representative
forms of governance) in order to democratize failing states or to solve
humanitarian problems. In the former Yugoslavia and perhaps in
Kosovo and in East Timor, the focus has been on creating new states, ulti-
mately based on ethnic majoritarianism. This tendency emphasizes the
fact that states underpin the key organizations through which peace
operations occur, and the end result is the replication of the values
 92 P E A C E O P E RAT IO N S A N D GL OB AL OR DE R

associated in particular with liberal states. Thus, the creation of the

liberal peace requires an agreement on method, which can be found in
a peacebuilding consensus framed by the notion of peace-as-governance.
This occurs in the context of peace operations in which peacebuilding
recreates the state-centric order, territorial integrity and basic human
rights, while also attempting to institutionalize political, social and econ-
omic reform according to the precepts of the democratic peace, which
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have been widely accepted in the post-Cold War environment. Such

activities, by virtue of their depth and breadth require coordination
either by dominant states or by the UN. They also require a renegotiation
of the norm of non-intervention, as has been clear in US and UK rhetoric
since the Kosovo intervention,50 which culminated in an invasion of Iraq
in 2003 over the possible presence of weapons of mass destruction.
Perhaps the best example of the peacebuilding consensus is post-
Dayton Bosnia (replicated to a large degree in Kosovo), which includes
the involvement of NATO’s Stabilization Force, the UN Mission on
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), UNHCR, ICRC, UNDP, OSCE,
Council of Europe, UN Commission on Human Rights, European
Court of Human Rights, and the World Bank, partly coordinated by an
international High Representative, an intergovernmental Peace
Implementation Council, and a Five Nation Contact Group.51 These
actors have comprehensively taken control of governance in an effort
to establish a liberal peace.
As Michael Pugh has shown, local actors’ responses to the attempt to
construct a liberal peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, betrays
marked continuities with the pre-Dayton situation.52 Furthermore, the
angst of the missionary is on show for all to see, with UN officials
making reference to ‘national pathologies’ and the need for ‘radical
surgery’.53 Consequently, Pugh argues along with Chandler and others
that peacebuilding, despite being couched in the language of a liberal
peace, has overlooked the social and human consequences of the
process of constructing that peace.54 The region in general is dependent
upon external governance and outside visions of what peace should
entail, and local consensus and agreement is weak at best.
These discourses have also been prominent in post-intervention
Kosovo55 as has been well documented.56 Kosovo provides what is
perhaps the clearest example of the way in which this consensus has
been globalized, creating a coherence of macro-objectives (though not of
strategies) in the post-war environment. Indeed, Jürgen Habermas went
as far as to see the emergence of a Kantian Pacific Union as result of such
strategies.57 In Kosovo, after much wavering over the rest of the former
Yugoslavia, NATO decided to use force to facilitate its humanitarian
 U N P E A C E O P E R AT I O N S A N D T H E P E A C E B U I L D I N G C O N S E N S U S 93
commitment to the Kosovo Albanian community despite disagreement in
the UN Security Council. This set a new precedent in that the institution-
alization and coordination of a long-term peacebuilding process
through the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has obscured the earlier
disagreement on forcible intervention. The initial focus on the legitimacy
of the use of force obscured the implications of the governance processes
that were then established, which UNMIK has been responsible for pro-
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mulgating, and which led to elections in late 2001.58 It is clear that inter-
national administration will have to continue for quite some time.
Essentially, the argument here is that if states cannot provide governance,
outside actors may take on this task in order to protect vulnerable citi-
zens.59 In East Timor, devolution of power from the UN administration
to a local government occurred at a much faster rate. Even so there were
bitter complaints about the emergence of social, political, and cultural
disjunctures between the role of UNTAET and the nascent East Timorese
administration.60
The peacebuilding process in Afghanistan has been far less direct than
that in Kosovo,61 perhaps indicating a weakening of the peacebuilding
consensus during this period. However, a version of the same consensus
has still provided the foundations for peacebuilding since the fall of the
Taliban. The Bonn conference (2001) set the target of consolidating the
peace process in Afghanistan within three years, and in March 2002,
UN Security Council Resolution 1401 established the aptly named UN
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. UNAMA was given the task of inte-
grating 16 different UN agencies and their Afghan government counter-
parts and many national and international NGOs. As Marsden has
pointed out, the UN, rather than the interim government, has been
entrusted with the bulk of the funds for reconstruction set aside by the
Tokyo conference, meaning that the UN is effectively operating as a par-
allel administration.62
The UN documentation on this assistance has been very careful to
defer to the lead role of the transitional administration, but the
mandate of UNAMA includes national reconciliation, the tasks entrusted
to the UN in the Bonn Agreement, human rights, the rule of law, gender
issues, and the management of all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and
reconstruction activities.63 Even so, given the fragmented nature of poli-
tics in Afghanistan, the most that can be achieved in the medium term is
to collude with regional fiefdoms in order to construct what Ignatieff
describes as a ‘rough and ready peace’.64 This is also what may transpire
in the context of Iraq.65
These different versions of the peacebuilding consensus have been
constructed through a globalized hybridization of approaches to ending
 94 P E A C E O P E RAT IO N S A N D GL OB AL OR DE R

conflict, including peacekeepers, sometimes the use of force (as seen in

Bosnia and Kosovo), officials working on democratization, development
agencies, humanitarian agencies and NGOs, and a plethora of inter-
national and regional institutions and organizations working in an ad
hoc manner, though attempting to coordinate their activities where poss-
ible. This complex network of actors comprises and contributes to this
peacebuilding consensus, creating a perception that ever-broadening
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attempts to intervene, reconstruct, liberalize and democratize failed

states is a liberal imperative bounded only by strategic imperatives. Of
course, such ambitions are complicated, as MacQueen has pointed out,
by the UN’s adherence to the ‘no blame’ principle of peacekeeping.66
This peacebuilding consensus depends on third parties imposing on
all disputants the choice of integration into the global arena via very
specific qualifying moves (the adoption of free markets, elections,
human rights and so on). Disputants that fail to accept this become
excluded economically and politically, despite the fact that this may be
their ‘choice’, and thus may suffer from the weight of the political and
economic asymmetries that international consensus against them can so
easily produce. The more difficult it is to get local actors to cooperate,
the more governance functions are taken on by external actors. Often,
as in the case of various rebel, secessionist and guerrilla groups around
the world which seek recognition and representation upon terms which
are unacceptable to the international community, they become caught
up in the undercurrents of ‘new wars’ in which micro-level violence, eth-
nonationalism, and crime interact on an un/official and transnational
basis.67
This is indicative of the fact that the state can no longer control the
sole legitimate use of force. From the point of view of the international
community, many of these conflicts become typified by the rejection of
international norms, globalization and interdependence by the disputant
identified as intransigent and therefore deviant. This can even occur in a
post-conflict peacebuilding process, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
2002 elections.68
As Chandler has pointed out this means that peace is seen as ending
conflict through governance, often on the grounds of human rights viola-
tions.69 This provides external actors with both an ethical obligation to
intervene if they are to live up to the human rights and humanitarian
rhetoric of liberal states, but also an opportunity to intervene to establish
democratic governance.
Caplan has argued that this may not be a perfect solution but that ‘less
interventionist measures, in some cases, are worse alternatives’70 despite
the fact that there is strong evidence that conflict zones are ill-suited to
 U N P E A C E O P E R AT I O N S A N D T H E P E A C E B U I L D I N G C O N S E N S U S 95
democratization processes (at least during short-term transitionary
periods).71 Yet, as outlined in the Brahimi report, peacebuilding has
essentially become a process where establishing democracy is seen as
the ultimate goal.72 However, the installation of a liberal democracy
resting on human rights, humanitarianism, an agreement on what consti-
tutes development, and a globally integrated economy is the only govern-
ance formula the international community will invest in. When this
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installation undercuts the interests of vital groups in peace processes,

consent is often lacking, as can be seen in the contemporary situation in
the ‘international protectorates’ of Bosnia and Kosovo.73 This means
that there is often external consent for the principle of this sort of interven-
tion, but that internal consent is clouded by particularistic political, social
and economic practices. The evolution of humanitarian intervention in the
1990s, and in Iraq in 2004, seems to underline exactly this conundrum.
This debate carries overtones of neo-colonialism74 similar to the much
criticized and now rejected notion of the Washington Consensus, which
has often been used as a synonym for neoliberalism and ‘market funda-
mentalism’.75 Indeed, it has much in common with the ‘post-Washington’
consensus,76 which offers a more flexible version of neo-liberalism. The
peacebuilding consensus implies a broad and deep approach to interven-
tion, impinging upon high politics as well as the full range of social,
political, cultural and economic issues that affect societies caught up in
war.77 This has become a cosmopolitan position (as envisaged by
Kaldor, for example78) and requires a way around the classical
approaches to non-intervention, and that the social, political and econ-
omic roots of conflict are addressed. Some commentators have argued
that this development of peace-as-governance indicates a return of inter-
national protectorates based upon the ideological formulations of the
1990s.79 In this context, UN peace operations can be described as
agents of a ‘mission civilisatrice’ in which the recipients of intervention
may lose the right to rule themselves.

Conclusion
Debates about peace in liberal states at both the official and unofficial
level have concurred about what peace is and how it should be consti-
tuted. This has evolved from the ‘negative peace’ scenarios created by
early peacekeeping into an attempt to create a positive peace though col-
lusion between liberal states and their organizations, agencies, and NGOs,
along with a more traditional military component. The objectives of this
can be found in the peacebuilding consensus typified by UN and agency
 96 P E A C E O P E RAT IO N S A N D GL OB AL OR DE R

documentation on peacebuilding, democratization and development. Yet,

much of the evidence suggests that despite the broader objectives and
capabilities engendered in such processes, a negative peace continues to
prevail in many conflict zones. Often policy makers and electorates are
satisfied by a virtual peace in which structural violence may be present
if they believe it is ‘virtuous’, despite the fact that the actors that peace
has been visited upon may not agree themselves. This means that the
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internationals and custodians involved in developing new governance

structures act upon the peacebuilding consensus. This ‘virtual’ peace is
acceptable as long as it is in neo-liberal democratic form, even if it
requires direct and indirect forms of governance to be taken over by
outside actors like the UN or EU, agencies and NGOs. UN peace oper-
ations incorporating peacekeepers provide a high degree of legitimacy
for such endeavours from the point of view of the liberal international
community as was the case in post referendum East Timor. However,
when force is used this legitimacy declines, though even in this case the
liberal international community often seems satisfied with a virtual
peace that is superficially virtuous when viewed from the outside, as
may indeed be the case in the context of Kosovo.
The peace that is constructed through the medium of UN peace oper-
ations, such as in Bosnia or Kosovo, certainly is a virtual peace when com-
pared to the objectives stated in their mandates. Despite this there is a
clear progression in terms of humanitarian work and institution building
when compared, for example, to the situation in Cyprus since 1964 where
there has been a state of ‘cold war’ bearing little resemblance to the inten-
tions of the original mandate.80 Such tasks have been left to the Cypriot
disputants, enabling them to perpetuate the conflict through the insti-
tutions of state. As Hobsbawm has pointed out, war and peace are
often not easily distinguishable.81
If this is so the only way in which ‘peace’ can be attained is through
the establishment of particular forms of governance. Yet, in this
context the progress gained in the Balkans is at great cost, in terms of
both legitimacy and resources. Furthermore, the liberal account of the
peace that is being produced in these conflict zones seems not yet to be
reflected upon the ground, and assertions that progress is being made
are both optimistic and overly ambitious to many ears.
Yet, governance, and the construction of the requisite capacity and
institutions, has become the ‘new vocabulary’ of peace and of the inter-
ventions that are now geared towards the resolution of war via a peace-
building consensus. Governance is now defined as a multi-level,
‘multilayered’ process incorporating aspects of civil society, state and
global politics, operating with public as well as private instruments.82
 U N P E A C E O P E R AT I O N S A N D T H E P E A C E B U I L D I N G C O N S E N S U S 97
Chandler has described this as a rehabilitation of imperial duty,83 while
others see it as a liberal imperative. This appears to require a shift from
sovereign interests dictating intervention to private and state actors pro-
viding social, political, economic reconstruction to those that need it in
order to retain the legitimacy of the peacebuilding consensus. This con-
sensus requires the use of humanitarian intervention if necessary, which
is legitimated by its intention to establish a long-term peacebuilding
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process. The unspoken bargain is that governance will be devolved to

local inhabitants once a sustainable outcome can be expected. But this
might never happen. Thus, the peacebuilding consensus might lead to a
permanent ‘peace-as-governance’ – a form of ‘empire lite’ as described
above by Ignatieff or as ‘UN protectorates’ by Kaplan, which risks admin-
istrative and donor dependency.84 The alternative is ongoing and open
conflict or the failure of traditional peacekeeping approaches.
Consequently, UN peace operations are now about ‘peace-as-govern-
ance’ through the creation of a peacebuilding consensus. This consensus
is based upon a perhaps pseudo-consensual military intervention fol-
lowed by the intervention of varied actors working on a vast swathe of
activities designed to construct a liberal state. The tendency towards a
separation of functions, with the use of force perhaps carried by actors
other than the UN, protects this peacebuilding consensus even if there
is no agreement on ‘preventive war’. The implications for order of
these activities lie in the construction of a democratic peace based
ultimately upon the will and resources of hyper-liberal actors, construct-
ing states in which a virtual peace from the outside seems sufficient
justification.
Viewed from the inside ‘peace’ in states such as Bosnia, Afghanistan,
and in Kosovo looks very flimsy however, and is dependent upon the long-
term engagement of the actors involved in the peacebuilding consensus.
This implies that peace-as-governance rests upon long-term governance
from the outside, and that in these conflict zones the transfer of the own-
ership of peace to local actors and institutions may be extremely difficult
for reasons pertaining to both the custodians’ interests, and perhaps
because local actors’ and institutions’ ‘readiness’ for transfer will prove
a moving target. Foucault and Orwell’s aphorism that war is peace illus-
trates the dilemma of what Kipling called ‘savage wars of peace’, which
seem to be a reality even now.85

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sections of this article draw on a presentation for a panel on ‘New Wars’ at BISA, London
School of Economics, 14–16 December 2002. Thanks to the participants of the panel, and
 98 P E A C E O P E RAT IO N S A N D GL OB AL OR DE R

Ali Watson, Ian Hall, Nick Rengger, Roland Bleiker, Costas Constantinou, Paul Williams
and Alex Bellamy.

NOTES

1. Saint Augustine, City of God, XIX, 13, 1, London: Penguin Classics, 1991.
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2. William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Oxford Paperbacks, 1975.
3. For an elaboration of this point see Oliver P.Richmond, Maintaining Order, Making
Peace, London: Palgrave, 2002, esp.Ch.VI.
4. Michael Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, BISA, London School of Economics,
18–18 December 2002, p.1. Pugh argues that ‘Modern versions of peacekeeping can be
considered as forms of riot control directed against unruly parts of the world’. Ibid., p.2.
5. See, among many others, Kofi A. Annan, ‘Democracy as an International Issue’, in
Global Governance, Vol.8, No.2, p.135.
6. Chris Brown, Selective Intervention: A Defence of Inconsistency, Paper presented at
University of St Andrews, 11 November 2002.
7. I use the term ‘peacebuilding’ to denote multilevel and multidimensional approaches to
ending conflict as denoted. See also: Kofi Annan, ‘Annual Report of the Secretary
General on the work of the Organisation’, UN doc. A/53/1, 27 August 1998, para. 28.
8. Mike Pugh has also described what he calls the ‘New York consensus’. See Pugh (n.4
above), pp.6–9. These conceptions are similar to, and perhaps familiar as the ‘Washing-
ton Consensus’, which has often come to be used as a synonym for neoliberalism and
‘market fundamentalism’. See John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Institute for Inter-
national Economics, ‘What Should the Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?’,
Paper prepared as a background to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000,
July 1999, www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsaug00/pdf/(6)William-
son.pdf, p.1.
9. Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘The Political and Moral Limits of Western Military Intervention
to Protect Civilians in Danger’ in Colin McInnes and Nicolas J. Wheeler (eds.), Dimen-
sions of Western Military Intervention, London: Frank Cass, 2002, p.3.
10. This is essentially what Mandelbaum calls the combination of peace, democracy and
free markets. Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas that Conquered the World,
New York: Public Affairs, 2002, p.6.
11. For a critique of this, see in particular, Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New
Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London: Zed Books, 2001.
12. Wheeler, ‘The Political and Moral Limits’, p.5.
13. Indeed, Michael Ignatieff has recently called this ‘Empire Lite’. Michael Ignatieff,
Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, London: Vintage,
2003, pp.22–3.
14. See Dag Hammarskjöld, Summary Study of the Experience Derived From the Estab-
lishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General, in Official
Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session: Annexes. A/3943, 9 October
1958. New York: UN, July 1960, pp.8–42.
15. Erwin A. Schmidl, Peace Operations Between Peace and War, London: Frank Cass,
2000, pp.7–9.
16. Pugh (see n.4 above), p.5.
17. Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means Peace and Conflict, Development and Civili-
zation, London: Sage, 1996, p.viii.
18. For an elaboration of this point see, for example, James A. Stegenga, The United
Nations Force in Cyprus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1968.
19. The UN implicitly began to work for a federal solution after the territorial division of
the island in 1974. See, for example, General Assembly Resolution 3312(XXIX), 1
November 1974.
 U N P E A C E O P E R AT I O N S A N D T H E P E A C E B U I L D I N G C O N S E N S U S 99
20. See the language of UN Security Council resolutions establishing these forces’ man-
dates. See UN Security Council Resolution 143, 4 July 1960 and UN Security
Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964.
21. Norrie Macqueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960, London:
Longman, 2002, p.44.
22. Ibid. pp.49 89.
23. Ibid. p.105. By international community here, I am referring to those liberal states,
international and regional organizations and institutions, agencies and NGOs which
operate on the basis of such liberal assumptions in theory (though they are clearly
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not consistent in practice).

24. For a good overview see Michele Griffin, ‘Retrenchment, Reform, and Regionalization:
Trends in UN Peace Support Operations’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.6, No.1,
1999.
25. Paris argues that the inclusion of development means that peacebuilding is effectively a
new era in developed-developing world relations. Roland Paris, ‘International Peace-
building and the “Mission Civilisatrice”’, Review of International Studies, Vol.28,
No.4, 2002, p.638.
26. For one of the best known examples, see J. Lederach, Building Peace –
Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 1997.
27. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order, New Jersey: Chatham
House Publishers, 1993, p.3. Singer and Wildavsky divide the world up into zones of
peace and turmoil; in the latter zone stability is a ‘meaningless goal’, this being a
classic example of the problematic analyses that Realist assumptions often produce.
Ibid., p.9.
28. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-keeping, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992; An Agenda for Development:
Report of the Secretary-General, A/48/935, 6 May 1994; An Agenda for Democratiza-
tion, A/50/332 AND A/51/512, 17 December 1996.
29. Danilo Zolo, Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government, Cambridge: Polity Press,
1997, pp.14–15.
30. For a development of this line of thought see François Debrix, Re-Envisioning UN
Peacekeeping, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p.56.
31. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para. 55.
32. Kofi Annan, cited by Philip Wilkinson, ‘Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace
Support Operations and Complex Emergencies’, in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Rams-
botham, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, London and Portland, OR: Frank
Cass, 2000, p.63.
33. Letters from the Secretary General to the President of the General Assembly and the
President of the Security Council, Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, A/
55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
34. Annan (see n.5 above), p.135.
35. Ibid. p.135. This is in line with David Held’s thesis about the lack of global democracy
hindering domestic democratization. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p.72.
36. The UN has also established the Electoral Assistance Division in 1992 to guide states
making a transition to democracy. See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/46/137,
9 March 1992.
37. As Paris points out, this entails the globalization of the very notion of a state; Paris
(n.25 above), p.639.
38. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol.2, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986, p.55.
39. See William Bain, ‘The Political Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International
Equality’, International Relations, Vol.17, No.1, 2003.
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40. See L. Kyle, International Trusteeship – A Concept Due For Revival?, Royal College of
Defence Studies, www.mod.uk/rcds/kyle.htm.
41. See Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ‘The Clash of Governmentalities: The Fall of the UN Republic
and America’s Reach for Imperium’, ‘Exploring Imperium’, University of Sussex, 11
December 2002; Martin Shaw, ‘Exploring imperia: Western-global power amidst the
wars of quasi-imperial states’ ‘Exploring Imperium’, University of Sussex, 11 December
2002, www.theglobalsite.ac.uk.
42. Ian Clark, ‘Another Double Movement: The Great Transformation after the Cold
War?’, Review of International Studies, Vol.27, Special Issue, 2001, p.248.
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43. Paris (n.25 above), pp.642–5.

44. This is essentially what Mandelbaum calls the combination of peace, democracy and
free markets; The Ideas that Conquered the World, p.6.
45. Adam Watson, ‘Foreword, Forum on the English School’, Review of International
Studies, Vol.27, No.3, p.469.
46. Martin Shaw, ‘Post-Imperial And Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era’,
Millennium, Vol.31, No.2, pp.327–36.
47. Ignatieff (n.13 above), p.vii. Indeed, he argues that this ‘humanitarian empire is the new
face of an old figure: the democratic free world, the Christian west’, ibid., p.17.
48. Ibid. p.98.
49. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, II –II, 158, 1, ad 3.
50. See President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair, and Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s appar-
ent agreement that sovereignty should not override the need for humanitarian interven-
tion at the Millennium Summit, 6–8 September 2000. For the declaration see, Report
of the Secretary-General, ‘We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21st
century’ (A/54/2000).
51. For a fascinating evaluation of this complex operation see Elizabeth M. Cousens,
‘Building Peace in Bosnia’, in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, Peacebuilding
as Politics, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp.113–52.
52. Michael Pugh, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina in South-east Europe’, in War Economies in
Their Regional Context: The Challenge of Transformation. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner for the IPA, 2003, pp.235–6.
53. UNDP Resident Representative, cited by Pugh, ibid., p.256.
54. Ibid. p.267.
55. For example, see Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned,
Independent Commission for Kosovo, Oxford University Press, 2000.
56. See David Chandler, Faking Democracy, London: Pluto Press, 2002.
57. Jurgen Habermas, ‘Bestialität und Humanität’, Die Zeit 18:1, 1999.
58. Richard J. Goldstone, ‘Whither Kosovo? Whither Democracy?’, Global Governance,
Vol.8, No.2, p.144.
59. See Richard Falk, Human Rights Horizons, London: Routledge, 2000, p.68.
60. Xanana Gusmao, East Timor’s first president, has regularly complained that UN inter-
vention has entailed attempts to construct a value system that may not even have been
attained in the Western states where many of the ‘internationals’ come from. Cited in
Simon Chesterman, ‘East Timor in Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State-Build-
ing’, International Peace Academy, 2001, p.26.
61. For more on this, see UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
for Reconstruction, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID ¼ 22325, 24 February 2002. See also
Lakhdar Brahimi, cited in Ignatieff (n.13 above), pp.96–7. Brahimi says that he
has tried to make such that UN activities are coordinated, and that Afghanistan is
not flooded with ‘out of work nation-builders’ from Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor.
He has made sure that the Afghan government is in control rather than the
internationals.
62. Peter Marsden, ‘Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process’, International Affairs,
Vol.79, No.1, 2003, pp.94– 7.
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63. See UN Security Council Resolution 1401, 28 March 2002.

64. Ignatieff (n.13 above), p.92.
65. Graham Day and Christopher Freeman have argued that what is required in this case is
‘policekeeping’, an approach based upon ‘Chapter VII and-a-half’ of the UN Charter in
which the responsibilities of ‘cosmopolitan humanitarianism’ leads to military inter-
vention followed by regional policing and reconstruction along the lines suggested by
the peacebuilding consensus. See Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, ‘Policekeep-
ing is the Key: Rebuilding the International Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq’,
International Affairs, Vol.79, No.2, 2003, p.301.
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66. By this he means neutrality and a tendency not to differentiate between victims and
aggressors. Macqueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960, p.12.
This excellent volume also provides a useful analysis of the shortcomings of the role
of the UN in Africa, which he argues relates to a gap between the peacekeeping
model and the operational realities of conflict in African ‘neo-patrimonial’ states;
ibid. pp.12, 23.
67. Ibid. p.3.
68. BBC News, ‘Nationalists prosper in struggling Bosnia’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/europe/2304653.stm, 7 October 2002.
69. David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Interven-
tion, London: Pluto, 2002, p.194. Ignatieff also agrees with this analysis (see n.13
above), p.93.
70. Richard Caplan, A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn
Territories, Adelphi Paper No.341, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.84.
71. Roland Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International
Security, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, p.79.
72. UN, Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, www.un.org, 21 August 2000.
73. For an interesting discussion of this, see Alexandros Yiannis, ‘The Creation and Politics
of International Protectorates in the Balkans’, Journal of International Relations and
Development, Vol.5, No.3, 2002, pp.258–74.
74. Paris (n.25 above), p.638. Paris argues that peacebuilding missions attempt to trans-
plant the values and institutions of the liberal democracies in the domestic affairs of per-
ipheral states.
75. George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism, Boston: Little, Brown, 1998.
76. See J. Stiglitz, More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving towards the Post
Washington Consensus, Helsinki: UN University, 1998.
77. Chandler has commented that such deep interventions, based upon ‘massive intrusions
by foreign states and bodies’ are profoundly undemocratic. See Edward S. Herman,
‘Introduction’ in Chandler (n.69 above), p.x.
78. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1999, esp. Ch.7.
79. Yiannis (n.73 above), p.263.
80. See UN Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964.
81. Eric Hobsbawm, ‘War and Peace’ The Guardian, 23 Feb. 2002.
82. Yiannis (n.73 above), p.289.
83. Chandler (n.69 above), p.190.
84. Caplan (n.70 above), pp.7, 11.
85. Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, London:
Penguin, 1989, p.65; George Orwell, 1984, London: Signet Classic, 1969, p.164;
Rudyard Kipling, ‘The White Man’s Burden’, in John Beecroft (ed.), Kipling: A Selec-
tion of His Stories and Poems, Vol.II, NY: Doubleday, nd, pp.444–5.