THE DILLEMAS INHERENT IN DDR

AND SSR DURING PEACEBUILDING

PROCESSES; AN INTRASTATE
SPECIFIC CASE STUDY

BY

NATASHA.C.MWANSA, 2018196600
Supervised by Aaron Siwale

An essay Submitted to the University of Zambia in Partial

Fulfilment of the Requirement of the Degree of Arts in Media and
Communication Studies with a Minor in Political Science.

UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA

LUSAKA

2022
 INTRODUCTION

Prior to the 1980s, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration - DDR was thought to be primarily a
military endeavor. DDR was implemented for and by the military in order to decommission, downsize, and
reform formal military structures. However, by the late 1980s, the United Nations – UN had gradually begun
to support DDR initiatives, particularly in the context of peacekeeping operations and the promotion of
democratic oversight of military institutions. As the concept of DDR gained traction in the 1990s, it was
applied to a wide range of contexts and regions, and it became widely recognized as an essential component
of the transition from war to peace.

The UN peacekeeping operations are the primary international partner of national institutions implementing
DDR initiatives, as well as developing context-specific programs for members of armed groups. Any
government's sovereign right and responsibility is to provide security to its people. However, in fragile
countries, many women and men do not have the protection that their armed forces, police, border guards,
customs, and other officials should provide. As a result, the UN assists Member States in undertaking SSR in
order to achieve effective and accountable security for the state and its citizens, without discrimination and
with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.

However, despite the efforts made by the United Nations, today's peace-building processes and interventions
are fraught with varying complications. Some of these complications include a lack of an adequate
constitutional framework, failure to adequately self-govern states into a proper peace building transition,
corruption, failure to address SSR within a broader governance framework, and even gaps between affected
populations and UN Mission leadership in affected countries as was the case with Liberia.

Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to identify and critically discuss the dilemmas inherent in the DDR and
SSR processes of peace building. In the process, it will explain the impact of externally assisted SSR
processes on achieving a well-governed security sector.

LINK BETWEEN DDR AND SSR

Since the Cold War's end, attempts to use DDR have typically occurred in intrastate conflicts involving a
diverse range of combatants, including regular government forces, paramilitaries, armed gangs, and guerrilla
forces (Klare, 1999).

Both DDR and SSR are recognized as critical components of post-conflict peace building. DDR has a direct
impact on the prospects for SSR because disarmament and demobilization, which are frequently carried out
before SSR, lay the groundwork for future reform efforts by establishing the size and nature of the security
sector. A successful DDR program could negate the allocation of important resources for SSR (Bryden,
2007). Decisions regarding the mandate, structure, and composition of security forces can have an impact on
the number of personnel who must be demobilized and reintegrated into society.

It can also be argued that DDR is typically SSR in the sense that, when necessary, demobilization is a form of
defense reform, with decisions often made by former warring parties and reflecting concerns such as
rewarding loyalty or removing troublemakers. Depending on who is demobilized or retained, this may result
in improved performance, but it may also contradict the overarching goal of developing effective or
accountable armed and security forces loyal to the state and its citizens rather than the regime in power
(Bryden et al). This in itself is a dilemma that impedes the successful implementation of DDR and SSR.

DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES OF DDR

DDR frequently occurs following the conclusion of an intrastate conflict involving two or more parties,
though determining when this stage begins is debatable because ex-belligerents may continue hostilities even
after a formal peace agreement is reached. (Wulf, 2004). DDR may be attempted in societies emerging from
civil war or in cases where there has been widespread and prolonged violence, such as in Ethiopia, Haiti or
Afghanistan (Pouligny, 2001).

The surrender of weapons, ammunition, and military supplies and equipment held by belligerents in a given
conflict, as well as their subsequent restriction from ex-combatants, is generally defined as disarmament
(Berdal, 1996). In post-Cold War intrastate conflicts, such weaponry has largely consisted of small arms and
light weapons – SALW. However, disarmament has proven difficult to achieve in over sixty DDR programs
since the end of the Cold War's (Muggah, 2010).

Afghanistan’s population, for instance, remains immersed in weapons despite the fact that 100,000 weapons
had been collected by 2009 under the Afghan-Coalition DDR programme (Bhatia, 2009). The presence of
internal insecurity is one of the reasons why disarmament is so difficult to implement in post-conflict
situations. In the post 2001 Afghan case, for example, many Afghans regard civilian possession of weapons as
critical for individual and communal defense against armed criminal and or terrorist groups (Muggah &
Sedra, 2009).

Another dilemma that impedes the successful rolling out of DDR is that often, a uniform approach is applied
to varying contexts. This approach is often universal and unfit for locally needed solutions. The Afghan case
also highlights the limitations of using uniform DDR approaches. Bhatia (2009) states that immediate
disarmament was impractical in post-2001 Afghanistan because incorporating armed warlords or local
commanders into state institutions and security provision was the only viable option due to a severely
underfunded security sector.

DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Often, DDR approaches are limited in that they seem oblivious to cultural practices. For instance, disarming
civilian populations can be made more difficult in countries where gun ownership is regarded as a cultural
right, such as Haiti, where the firearm has strong symbolic and political significance (Muggah, 2005). The
fact that Small Arms and Light Weapons - SALW can be hidden by non-combatants and combatants alike in
remote or hidden locations such as transport cargoes makes SALW extremely difficult to trace and secure by
government forces and international actors (ICRC, 1999).

Another dilemma obstructing are economic incentives to maintain the status quo. For example, the Colombian
conflict provided both the National Liberation Army and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia with
numerous opportunities to enrich their members through drug trading, fraud, and abductions, as a result, arms
provided these groups with greater ability to protect these interests against rivals.

Furthermore, disarmament has been inhibited at times by armed groups taking advantage of international buy-
back schemes, whereby combatants surrender their weapons in exchange for cash (Kaldor, 2006). In Haiti, for
example, the US-led buy-back program allowed members of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of
Haiti and the Haitian Armed Forces to trade in outdated or broken weapons and equipment. The cash from the
buy-back was then used by certain members to purchase newer and better weapons or for personal enrichment
through the black market (Muggah, 2005).

Also, the fact that intrastate conflicts often spills over into neighboring countries can impede a disarmament
program because neighboring countries may be unwilling or unable to cooperate in the DDR initiative. In
Tajikistan, for example, between 1992 and 1993, the United Tajik Opposition fighters were able to use
Northern Afghanistan as a safe haven from government forces, as well as a source of income through opium
trading and weapon procurement through dealings with Tajik-Afghan commanders such as Ahmed Shah
(Massoud Torjesen & MacFarlane, 2009).

Finally, elements of the international community bear responsibility for the rapid increase of SALW in war-
torn and violent societies on occasion. In Haiti, for instance, various Western powers sought the disarmament
of local armed groups while without inevitably impeding these efforts through weapon sales (Mowle, 2006).
Muggah (2005) recalls how between 1993 and 1998, the governments of the United Kingdom, France,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands sold $26,000 in landmines, grenades, pistols, and ammunition to Haiti,
many of which found their way into the black market via corrupt government officials.
 DEMOBILISATION ISSUES

According to Berdal (1996) demobilisation, on the other hand, can be defined as the official disbandment and
reduction of regular and irregular armed organizations such as rebel or terrorist, government forces and
militias, as well as the deactivation of fighters from military operations and activities. Hansen & Tavares
(1999) adds that demobilisation implies a decline in the importance of emblems and norms that support armed
force and prestige.

The hurdles to effective demobilization vary by country, owing in part to the highly differentiated
organizational structures of various military formations in intrastate conflicts. Since 2003, the Kurdish
Peshmerga and Shia Badr militias in Iraq, for example, have remained highly trained and organized, while in
Tajikistan, on the other hand, the opposition militaries' largely non-hierarchical composition made it difficult
for central leadership to enforce adherence to the peace agreement among subordinates (Torjesen &
MacFarlane, 2009).

The Khudoiberdiev case also shows how political dynamics and considerations can inhibit demobilization.
For example, armed groups may be hesitant to demobilize if they believe it will jeopardize their political goals
in an unacceptable way. In Angola, for instance, the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accords failed to specify provisions
for a potential power-sharing arrangement following the 1992 elections; as a result, candidates from the
communist People's Movement for Liberation - MPLA and The National Union for Total Independence of
Angola –UNITA, came to view the elections as a zero-sum game that neither could afford to lose, resulting in
renewed violence soon after President do Santo's election victory (Vines & Oruitemaka, 2009).

The Angolan case also demonstrates how distrust between warring factions can impede demobilization, as
both UNITA and the MPLA kept clandestine forces after the Bicesse Accords since neither side wanted to
risk losing territory to the other if the Accords failed (Vines & Oruitemaka et al).

Diverse economic interests can influence combatants' willingness to demobilize in a variety of circumstances.
Between 2006 and 2011, for instance, many Sudan People's Liberation Army - SPLA soldiers in Southern
Sudan were hesitant to demobilize because military service provided employment and wages, whereas future
civilian employment was uncertain (Stone, 2011).

Furthermore, institutionalised and normalised violence can, in some cases, undermine demobilisation.
Decades of fighting over economic and political assets have resulted in a climate of vengeance, resentment,
distrust, and armed competitiveness among armed groups, all of which have collectively hampered
demobilization and a good example of this is Ethiopia (Marriage, 2007).

REINTEGRATION ISSUES

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants obtain civilian status and gain long-term employment
and income (Colletta, 1999). Reintegration is primarily a social and economic process that occurs in
communities at the local level. It is part of a country's overall development and a national responsibility, and it
frequently necessitates long-term external assistance (United Nations, 2008). Additionally, in the aftermath of
a civil war, ex-fighters are typically reintegrated into the state's armed forces.

Economic reintegration of ex-combatants is frequently stiffened by widespread economic devastation seen in

various DDR contexts, such as mass unemployment, inequality, and insecurity, as well as significant damage
to infrastructure such as health and education (Kreutz, Marsh & Torre, 2012)

Economic damage and underdevelopment vary in scale and nature across DDR contexts, posing different
barriers to economic reintegration in specific cases. In post-2002 Sierra Leone, for example, ex-Revolutionary
United Front members' widespread illiteracy hampered their ability not only to obtain professional
employment, such as in academia or medicine, but also to engage in political reintegration through means like
public deliberation (Mitton, 2008).

Furthermore, ex-combatants' unrealistic expectations of reintegration and what it actually is can inhibit
economic reintegration in some cases. Following Angola's Lusaka Protocol, for example, many ex-combatants
from The Angolan Armed Forces - FAA and the National Union of the Total Independence of Angola -
UNITA expressed civilian job aspirations that exceeded their qualifications or were scarce, such as doctoring
or engineering (Tavares & Hansen, 1999). Despite the fact that agricultural employment was readily available,
the concept of farming was widely avoided.

Furthermore, in some cases, the issue of political grievances can inhibit reintegration efforts. After 2002,
many Revolutionary United Front members in Sierra Leone, for example, were skeptical about being
reintegrated into the political system because they had rejected traditional hierarchies such as the government,
which they perceived as exclusive and uninterested in addressing their grievances (Mitton, 2008).

The political and economic objectives of ruling elites may occasionally also make it difficult for ex-
combatants to reintegrate into the security industry. President Kabila did this in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, when members of his family and ethnic group were assigned to senior military and security
positions at the expense of other ethnic groups (Chanaa, 2001).

Finally, international financial organizations have made reintegration more difficult on occasion. Due to IMF
budgetary constraints, El Salvador's government was unable to reintegrate former combatants through arms-
for-land programs because they were no longer feasible (Chanaa, et al).

Donor countries' lack of political will and commitment has further hampered reintegration. For example,
cantoned ex-fighters were held in Somaliland encampments for six months without training or reintegration
programs, resulting in a number of ex-fighters fleeing the camps (Berdal, 1996).

IMPACT OF EXTERNALLY ASSITED SSR

External assistance has also impeded many countries' SSR in post conflict in addition to affecting DDR.
Liberia is one such country.

Liberia is one of the most challenging post-conflict reconstruction environments. Its long civil war ruined the
state, society, and economy. The formation of a transitional government, including a transitional parliament,
was called for in a 2003 peace agreement. However, a number of factors have hampered the reconstruction
process, including transitional government governance issues and corruption, incomplete disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration and a failure to address the root causes of conflict. There was no national
security policy or coherent framework for security sector reconstruction in Liberia during the transition period
of 2003 to 2005 (Bøås and Hatløy, 2008).

SSR should essentially boost operational efficiency while also promoting democratic governance. Without
effective democratic governance of the security sector, operational efficiency can lead to armed forces
oppressing the population, particularly the poor and vulnerable. This is particularly important in Liberia,
where the presidency has repeatedly exploited the security sector for personal gain.

Additionally, as international actors from various policy communities became involved in joint assistance
SSR programs, it became clear that security sector reforms involve competing goals. Even when the security
sector consumes the lion's share of state resources, it may be insufficient to meet national needs. Aid donors
have put significant pressure on a number of countries, including Rwanda and Uganda, to reduce military
spending at a time when they face significant external threats to national peace and stability (Hanneman and
Steinback, 1990).

This emphasis on expenditure by donors and international actors without regard for the quality of governance
in affected countries causes two distinct problems. For starters, this strategy avoids addressing underlying
political conflicts as well as institutional and human-resource weaknesses, of which high levels of military
spending are only one manifestation (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2001). Secondly, it creates an unintended
incentive for governments to use corrupt means to conceal portions of their spending (Williams, 2002).

Aside from that, there is often incoherence among external actors. The post-conflict security sector
environment makes it difficult for donors to set strategic objectives due to the variation in security on the
ground. Although the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance
Committee guidelines provide a general framework for understanding SSR, the concept of SSR they outline is
not universally accepted (McFate, 2008). And despite mentioning concepts such as local ownership, the
document portrays SSR as an activity that needs to be done rather than as an interactive partnership between
stakeholders and donors.

For example, the UN DDR and SSR unit in Burundi developed its own mission-specific understanding of the
process from the start of its mission. The UN's SSR strategy, on the other hand, was developed later in the
mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC and Kosovo. As seen in Bosnia, the lack of a cohesive
and clear SSR strategy has frequently resulted in duplication of efforts and a lack of coordination among
various actors and organizations.

Aside from that, tensions frequently arise between internal and external actors. With the exception of a few
cases, such as South Africa, SSR programs are initiated and funded by donor states or multilateral
organizations, which also provide the majority of implementation expertise and, more often than not, political
pressure to mobilize and move the process forward. Given this reality, it is natural for external actors to
promote their own reform models, which rarely fit neatly with the prevailing political and cultural
circumstances of the reforming state. (Bryden, Donais, and Hänggi, 2005).

Furthermore, in some cases, local actors may believe that international actors are unaccountable for their
actions or decisions, particularly to the local population (Ball, 2002). Because of their ties to specific
constituencies, local governments may be incapable or ineffective in responding to security threats.

Another impact that externally assisted SSR has had is it has led to increased outsourcing of security. Private
security companies - PSCs are a subset of non-state actors that play a contentious role in conflict and post-
conflict settings. On the one hand, the risk of subcontracting security provisions to PSCs is that it can
undermine the long-term SSR process by ignoring the need to build domestic security forces' capacity. PSCs,
on the other hand, can help bring in resources and expertise in the short term, which can be useful in
stabilizing a country, though in Iraq, PSCs have contributed to insecure territory.

Finally, externally assisted SSR has led to better consideration of the role women play in peace building.
During a conflict, gender roles shift dramatically, with men and women taking on new responsibilities and
opportunities. There is often pressure to return to traditional gender roles in the post-conflict environment.
Opportunities, on the other hand, can pave the way for a call for greater female participation in public life. For
example, in response to pressure from the Nicaraguan women's movement in the 1990s, women were
integrated into the modernization of Nicaragua's national police force through special initiatives supported by
the German development organization (Banerjee and Joseph, 2005). Women now make up approximately
26% of Nicaraguan police officers. Nicaragua's modernization program has also served as a model for other
state institutions, with the reforms assisting the police in gaining legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of local
communities.

This was also seen in how the UN and Liberian officials hoped that the presence of a 103-strong all-female
Indian peacekeeping unit policing Monrovia would encourage Liberian women to join the police force.
Indeed, in the month following their deployment, the Liberian National Police Force received three times as
many female applicants (Ball, 2004).

CONCLUSION

From the above, it is safe to conclude that specific country cases exhibit unique impediments to DDR in their
respective contexts. While many cases share some common DDR impediments, the unique combination of
impediments in each case should caution against giving uniform prescriptions for DDR in all circumstances.
Second, donor mediator governments and international organizations have sometimes exacerbated and largely
ignored DDR obstacles in various societies. This emphasizes the importance of taking into account the
demographic, topographical, cultural, historical, economic, social, and political context of each case when
prescribing how DDR obstacles should be removed. For example, in one case, a pervasive gun culture may
significantly impede disarmament, whereas this may not be a significant feature in another.

It cannot be denied that the international community has exacerbated and ignored DDR obstacles in specific
cases, such as through arms sales to war-torn societies like Haiti, the imposition of harmful budgetary
constraints like El Salvador, or the neglect of cantoned ex-combatants like Somaliland. These are mistakes
that can undoubtedly be learned from. This is not to say that the international community is irrelevant in DDR
or that it exacerbates it; rather, it has a wealth of lessons to draw from in order to make future DDR missions a
success.

Furthermore, it can be drawn that externally assisted SSR has had a wide-ranging impact on Security Sector
governance, ranging from private security companies involvement to how organizations and justice
institutions like courts and the military operate, as well as shifting gender roles and ensuring that everyone,
regardless of gender, has a role to play in peace building. Externally assisted SSR has definitely played a role
in security sector governance and has the potential to do even more if SSR is viewed as a partnership rather
than an activity and all parties involved, internal and external, clearly understand their roles in this
partnership.
 REFERENCES

Alan Bryden, Timothy Donais, and Heiner Hänggi, Shaping a Security Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, November 2005)

Alan Bryden, Linkage between DDR and SSR: Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable
Peace in Africa, (Issue Paper, Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, Kinshasa,
Democratic Republic of Congo, 12-14 June 2007),

Batrice Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Programs, Centre dEtudes et de Recherches Internationales Sciences Po/CNRS, Secrétariat Général de la
Défense Nationale (France) and Program for Strategic International Security Studies (Geneva) (2004), 14;
Ball, Dilemmas of Security Sector Reform: Response to "Security Sector Reform in Developing and
Transitional Countries" (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, August
2004)

Ball, N., ‘Democratic governance in the security sector’, Paper presented at the United Nations Development
Programme Workshop on Learning from Experience for Afghanistan, New York, 5 Feb. 2002, available at
URL <http://www.undp.org/eo/afghanistan/index.html>.

Behrend, Heike (1998), ‘War in Northern Uganda: The Holy Spirit Movements of Alice Lakwena, Severino
Lukoya and Joseph Kony (1986-1997), in Clapham, Christopher (ed), African Guerrillas, (Oxford: James
Currey), pp. 107-118.

Berdal, Mats (1996), ‘Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the
Termination of Armed Conflict’, Adelphi Paper 303, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: IISS).

Berdal, Mats and Ucko, David H. (2009), ‘Introduction: The Political Reintegration of Armed Groups After
War’, in Berdal, Mats and Ucko, David H. (eds), Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict – Politics,
Violence and Transition, (London, Routledge), pp. 1-10.

Bhatia, Michael, LeBrun, Emile, Muggah, Robert & Sedra, Mark (2009), ‘DDR in Afghanistan: When State-
building and Insecurity Collide’, Geneva Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War,
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/nc/de/security-programmes/disarmament-demobilization-and-
reintegration.html?sword_list%5B0%5D=what&sword_list%5B1%5D=is&sword_list
%5B2%5D=disarmament, accessed 6th February 2012.

Bøås, Morten and Hatløy, Anne (2008), ‘‘Getting in, getting out ’: militia membership and prospects for re-
integration in post-war Liberia’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 33–55.
Borzello, Anna (2009), ‘The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army’, in
Berdal, Mats and Ucko, David (eds), Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict – Politics, Violence and
Transition, (London: Routledge), pp. 144-171.

Chanaa, Jane (2001), ‘Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects’, Adelphi Paper 344,
(Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press, IISS).

Colletta, Nat J. (1999), ‘The world Bank, Demobilsation, and Social Reconstruction’ in Boutwell, Jeffrey and
Dipanker Banerjee and Mallika Joseph, "Security System Reform in Asia-Pacific," in Security System
Reform and Governance (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005), 102.

Klare, Michael (eds), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, (Oxford:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.), pp. 203-214.

Greene, Owen and Marsh, Nicholas (2012), ‘Introduction’ in Greene, Owen and Marsh, Nicholas (eds), Small
Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence, (London: Routledge), pp.
1-10.

Guáqueta, Alexandra (2003), ‘The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions’, in Ballentine,
Karen and Sherman, Jake (eds), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance,
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp.73-106.

Hansen, Art and Tavares, David (1999), ‘Why Angolan Soldiers Worry about Demobilisation and
Reintegration’, in Black, Richard and Koser, Khalid (eds), The End of the Refugee Cycle?, (Oxford:
Berghahn Books), pp. 198-210.

Hanneman, R. A. and Steinback, R. L., ‘Military involvement and political instability: an event history
analysis 1940–1980’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 18 (summer 1990), pp. 1–23

Hendrickson, D., Karkoszka, A. The Challenges Of Security Sector Reform. Security And Conflicts, 2001

Sean McFate, Securing the Future (Washington, DC: USIP, 2008),

Herbert Wulf, Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries (Berlin: Berghof Research
Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004).

ICRC (1999), ‘Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, (Geneva: ICRC),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0734_arms_availability.pdf, accessed 6th February 2012.

Kaldor, Mary (2006), ‘New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era’, (Cambridge, Polity Press).
Klare, Michael (1999), ‘The International Trade in Light Weapons: What have we Learned?’, in Boutwell,
Jeffrey and Klare, Michael (eds), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence,
(Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.), pp. 9-28.

Klare, Michael (1999), ‘The International Trade in Light Weapons: What have we Learned?’, in Boutwell,
Jeffrey and Klare, Michael (eds), Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence,
(Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.), pp. 9-28.

Marriage, Zoë (2007), ‘Flip-flop rebel, dollar soldier: demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’,
Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 281-310.

Mitton, Kieran (2008), ‘Engaging disengagement: The political reintegration of Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary
United Front’, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 193-222.

Mowle, Thomas S. (2006), ‘Iraq’s Militia Problem’, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 41-58.

Muggah, Robert (2005), ‘Securing Haiti’s Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for
Disarmament, Demoblisation, and Reintegration’, Geneva Small Arms Survey, (Geneva: Graduate Institute of
International Studies), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP14-
Haiti-EN.pdf, accessed 22nd August, 2022.

United Nations Secretary General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary General, A/55/985-
S/2001/574 (2001).

Williams, R., ‘Development agencies and security-sector restructuring’, Journal of Conflict,Security and
Development, vol. 2, issue 1 (2002).