Art. 4.

The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;

RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.

BRION, J.:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest refused to
solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Church.
The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple
took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the
couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.

The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.

The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and
2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the Family
Code provides that it shall be necessary:
1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and
2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise present
since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law,
specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

Duties of the solemnizing officer

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting
parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the
local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy
of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of
the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other than those
mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title,
and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents
and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax. (n)

Effect of Irregularity

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

Marriage Ceremony

1. Form of Ceremony

FC 3 (3)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

FC 6
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall
be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall
be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the
marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of
said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a)

Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be
performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)

FC 8
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)

Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731
FACTS: There was received in evidence at the trial what is called Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan were
married before a justice of the peace in Leyte. They executed an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is
written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of
September, 1907, signed both by Martinez and Tan, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to
enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the
marriage. Marriage was solemnized with two witnesses. The couple did not live together and when
Martinez went home to Ormoc, her relatives convinced her to file charges claiming that the marriage was
not valid since she signed the document in her own home thinking that it was a paper authorizing Tan to
ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.

ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid.

HELD: Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of them
appeared before the justice of the peace. They both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of
the document they were signing.

Morigo vs. People

GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts
for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of
letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went
back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario
Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground
that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy
and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that
his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted
second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the
bigamy case.

HELD:

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not
need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his
second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.

Place of ceremony

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a)

Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in
an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to
administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either
party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the
necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of
legal impediment to the marriage. (72a)

Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority
to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation,
whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)

Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be
performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)

Issuance of Marriage Certificate

Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall
be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall
be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the
marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of
said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a)

Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as
husband and wife, shall also state:

(1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;

(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;

(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;

(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;

(5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in
appropriate cases;

(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement
regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and

(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof.
(67a)

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting
parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the
local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy
of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of
the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other than those
mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

Madridejo v. De Leon
Facts
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and
son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived
with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that
on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio
Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child
of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father. On July 8, 1920,
Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by
the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her
son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second
husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the
marriage of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was legitmated by that marriage.
Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends that trial court erred in declaring that the marriage in question was
valid and that Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage.

Issues
Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Madridejo is valid
Whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimated Melecio Madridejo

HELD
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who
married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential
requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said
marriage did not legitimate him.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the court finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in
holding that he and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married
because there was no marriage contact executed in their wedding, hence he could be
liable only for homicide, not parricide.

Other than the stand of appellants counsel against the existence of marriage in order to
lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias Borromeo
himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid marriage between the accused-appellant and the deceased-victim?

RULING:

There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence
of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras).
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of the society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and
law.

The presumption in favor of the matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The
reason for this presumption is well settled in Perido vs. Perido, thus:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony

E. Law Governing Marriages Abroad

1. General Rule in Contracts

a. as to form

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic
of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.

b. as to substantive requirements

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

Art 17 par 3 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. (11a)

2. Special Rule on Marriage

A. Lex Loci Celebrationis
FC Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general,
consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and
the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by said consular official. (75a)

Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Yao Kee vs. Sy- Gonzales

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real and
personal properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida Sy-Gonzales,
et. al. filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration claiming among other
things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina. The
petition was opposed by Yao kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook Wah, should be the
administrator of the deceased. The CFI decided in favor of Yao Kee’s petition but was
modified and set aside by the court of appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese

Law and Custom conclusive.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage
between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity of
said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom. A custom must be proved as
a fact according to the rules of evidence and that a local custom as a source of right
cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established
by competent evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the absence of proof of the
Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as that of the
Philippines.

The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as natural

children, hence given equal rights) the decision of the Court of Appelas.
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted

as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, GR No. 196049, 2013-06-26

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;[5] and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine
if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to...
the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Principles:
Civil Law

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine
if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to...
the rules of evidence.

B. Exceptions

FC Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

FC Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
 (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order
227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)

F. Common Law Marriages

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
(144a)

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in both faith. (144a)

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3605 April 21, 1952

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BALDOMERO J. LESACA. CONSUELO F. LESACA AND

JUANA F. LESACA,executrices-appellants,
vs.
JUANA FELIX VDA. DE LESACA, claimant-appellee.

Mariano H. de Joya and Jose V. Lesaca for executrices-appellants.

Marcelino Lontok for minors-appellants.

REYES, J.:
There are three appeals registered in this case all of which have been certified to this Court by the
Court of Appeals for the reason that, in its opinion and as admitted by the parties, they involve only
questions of law. Those questions are formulated in the certification of the Court of Appeals as
follows:

1. Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold a retrovendado before
such marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property or not;

2. Whether allowances for support granted by the court to the minor heirs should or should not be
subject to collation and deducted from their respective hereditary portions; and

3. Whether a standing crop of palay planted during coverture, and harvested after the death of the
one of the consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code,
and one-half of such crop should be delivered to the surviving spouse.

Appeal No. 1

Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on November 8, 1946. He was survived by his
second wife (Juana Felix), two minor children by the latter, two children by his marriage, and three
acknowledged natural children by a third woman. In his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and
Consuelo F. Lesaca, his children by his first marriage, co-executrices.

Proceedings for the probate of the will and for the administration of the estate of the deceased
having been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, that court, at the instance of the widow
but over the opposition of the co-executrices and the three acknowledge natural children, granted
each of the two minor children a monthly allowance of P100 for the living expenses, "plus an extra
sum of P300 for their matriculation and uniforms," and later ordered the co-executrices to deposit in
court all the allowances in arrears. The co-executrices refused to make the deposit, contending that
if any amount were to be paid for the support and education of the minors the same should be
charged against their share of the inheritance. But the court took a different view and issued an
order, dated March 11, 1949, holding that the amounts it had authorized to be paid to the minors
should be considered allowances for support, to be deducted from hereditary portion only insofar as
they exceed what they are entitled to as fruits or income, and requiring the co-executrices to deposit
in court " all the amounts due the said minors, namely P2,955.83, if and when the financial condition
of this estate under administration so warrants." This is the order involved in the first appeal and the
question presented is whether the allowances for support granted by the court to legitimate minor
children of the deceased pending liquidation of his estate are subject to collation and deductible from
their share of the inheritance.

Obviously, the answer should be the affirmative in view of Article 1430 of the Civil Code of 1898 (re-
enacted as Article 188 of the new Civil Code) which provides that "the surviving spouse and his or
her children shall be given an allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending the
liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share has been delivered to them, but it shall be
deducted from their portion insofar as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as fruits or
income."

Counsel for the appellant minors, however, contends that Art. 1430 should be harmonized with Art.
1041, which provides that "allowances for support, education, attendance and illness, even though
unusually expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary presents are not subject to
collation," because the allowances mentioned in the later article refer to no other than the
allowances for support given to the children of a deceased person. This contention is without merit.
Article 1041 is found under the section on "Collation," which refers only to property or rights received
by donation or gratuitous title "during the lifetime of the decedent." (Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. I, p.
1125), and is based on the philosophy that such donations in no way impoverish the donor or in
reach the donee since ordinarily they are not taken from the capital but rather from the fruits thereof
which would anyway have been consumed or spent during the life of the donor and therefor would
form no part of his inheritance. (7 Manresa, 5th ed., p. 625.) But allowances given to the heirs
pending the liquidation of the estate of the decedent stand on a different footing. As Manresa
observes:

Despues de la muerte del cuasante todo varia: los frutos del capital se agrarian a este,
formando parte del mismo, y por esto se deben a la herencia, ya provengan de las cosas
donadas sujetas a colacion, o de derechos de disfrute, ya constituyesen el objeto mismo de
la liberalidad, como en case de renta o pension, cesion de productos o frutos, perdon de
intereses, etc. (7 Manresa 5th ed. p. 576.)

Appeal No. 2

This appeal is taken by the co-executrices from another order of March 11, 1949, declaring that the
sum of P2,500 received by them as repurchase price of land bought by the deceased before the
marriage is conjugal property and directing that one-half of said sum be paid to the widow.

It appears that the deceased and his widow, Juana Felix, had lived together maritally since 1924 but
were not married until December 18, 1945; that is, less than a year before his death; that in 1930
Ramon Garcia conveyed to the deceased three parcels of land for P2,500 under a pacto de
retro sale; and that on September 25, 1947 the co-executrices, with the approval of the court,
reconveyed the said parcels of land to Ramon Garcia for the same sum of P2,500. Claiming that this
sum was conjugal property the widow petitioned the court to order the co-executrices to give her
one-half thereof. The co-executrices opposed the petition, claiming that the money paid to Ramon
Garcia for the land in question came from the products of the property left by their mother. But after
hearing, the court granted the petition in an order dated March 11, 1949, holding that the sum in
dispute was conjugal property, "considering that the reconveyance was affected after the marriage."
This order is the subject of appeal No. 2, which presents the first of the three questions stated in the
beginning, to wit:

Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold a

retrovendendo before such marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property or
not.

In our opinion the question calls for a negative answer. According to the briefs Garcia sold the land
for P2,500 to Lesaca before the latter's marriage to Juana Felix and repurchased it to for the same
amount after said marriage. If the money paid by Lesaca was his own exclusively, surely the mere
fact that it was returned or repaid after marriage cannot convert it to conjugal property. It is true that
under Art. 1401 of the Civil Code of 1889 property obtained by the industry, wages or work of the
spouses or of either of them belongs to the conjugal partnership. But the article refers to the property
obtained during the marriage, and while counsel for the widow cites the case of Marata vs.
Dionio (G.R. No. 24449, unreported) wherein this Court held that though there is no technical marital
partnership between person living maritally without being lawfully married, nevertheless there is
between them an informal civil partnership which would entitle the parties to an equal interest in
property acquired by their joint efforts, in the present case there is no showing that the sum paid to
Garcia was earned by the joint efforts of the deceased and his widow. In the absence of such proof
the sum must be deemed to have been the property of the deceased to whom the land for which it
was given in payment was sold by Garcia. It follows that the order below adjudging one-half of the
sum in question to the widow is erroneous.
But the claim that the sum in question belongs to the co-executrices as an inheritance from their
deceased mother has not been upheld by the trial court, and as a question of fact cannot be urged in
this appeal, which, with the conformity of the parties, has been submitted to this Court as involving
questions purely of law. Moreover, as stated in the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated October
28, 1949, the Clerk of Court of First Instance certifies that no evidence has been submitted or taken
in connection with the motions that gave rise to the present appeals.

Appeal No. 3

This is an appeal from the order of April 29, 1949, which declares that the 1,040 cavans of palay of
the value of P20,800 received as rent on decedent's land for the agricultural year 1946-1947 should
be considered conjugal property so that one-half thereof should go to the widow.

It is admitted that the deceased did not cultivate his land personally but had it cultivated by one who
gave him a certain percentage of the crop every year by way of rent, and the lower court found that
the 1,040 cavans of palay in dispute was the rent or the decedent's share of the harvest from palay
planted in June or July 1946 — that is, after his marriage to Juana Felix — and which must have
already matured or been near maturity at the time when the conjugal partnership was dissolved by
the death of the deceased in November, 1946. Under Article 1380 of the old Civil Code "after the
marriage has been dissolved, the uncollected fruits or rents shall be divided pro rata between the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased in accordance of the rules which govern in case of
termination of usufruct," the conjugal partnership being considered usufructuary of the private
property of each spouse. As rents are civil fruits (Art. 355, old Civil Code) they must be deemed to
accrue from day to day and belong to the usufructuary (in this case the conjugal partnership) in
proportion to the time the usufruct may last. (Art. 474, old Civil Code.)

We gather from the findings of the trial court that the decedent's participation (as rent) in the palay
planted by the lessee in June or July and which must have been harvested on the following
November, if not before, accrued during coverture. Such being the case it should belong to the
conjugal partnership. It is immaterial that the rent was actually received after the dissolution of the
marriage through the death of one of the spouses. It is the date of accrual that is important. As
Manresa says:

Los frutos civiles se entiende devangados dia por dia; la regla en ellos no pueden ser mas
sencilla. Importa poco la epoca en que se realice el pago. Si se percibieron adelantados, el
conyuge propietario debe ala sociedad cuanto a esta correspanda, o sea, los devengados
desde el de la celebracion del matrimonio. Si las rentas, interes, productos o utiladades se
perciben o cobran despues, la sociedad debe al propietario la perte proporcional
correspondiente hasta el dia de la union. (9 Manresa, 5th ed., 508.)

. . . En lo relativo al usufracto, esa regla se contiene en el art. 474: los futos civiles se
entienden percibidos dia por dia y pertenecen al usufructuario en proporcion al tiempo que
dure el usufructo. (4 Manresa, 5th ed., 346-347.)

To the same effect is the following comment on the corresponding provision of the french civil code:

3.º. El modo de adquisicion de los frutos por la comunidad difiere segun de trato de frutos
naturales o civiles; los primeros se adquiren po su percepcion, los segundos dia a lia. La
distribucion de los frutos civelies por tanto debera hacerse sin tomar en consideracion el
momento en que hayan sido efectivamente percibidos ni aun, si se trata de alqueleres de
fincas rusticas o urbanas el momento enque han vencido: solo hay que atenerse a la epoca
a que corresponde.
 xxx xxx xxx

Asi, frecuentemente ocurre que los alquileres solamente son pagaderos el ano siguinte al de
la cosecha y aveces en various plazos. Es indudable que, si la communidad queda disuelta
antes del vencimiento, tendra derecho a la totalidad o aparte del alquiler de la finca, en
proporcion al tiempo que acquella existio en el ano dela cosecha. Asimismo, si los alquileres
han sido percibidos por anticipado, antes del matrimonio, la communidad tiene derecho a
una compensacion si esos alquileres son correspondientes a una epoca posterior al
matrimonio: infra, titulo III, comunidad de gananciales. Contra Req., mayo 27, 1879, D. I.
297, s. 80, 1, 393." (Planiol and Ripert, Tratado Practico de Derecho Civil Frances, vol. 8
p.306 [Spanish translation by Diaz Cruz]).

It follows from the foregoing that the order appealed from is in accordance with the law and should
therefore be affirmed.

Wherefore, it is the decision of this Court that —

(1) The order of March 11, 1949, declaring that the allowances granted the minors pending
liquidation of the estate should be deducted form their hereditary shares in so far as they exceed
what they may be entitled to as fruits or income, is affirmed;

(2) The other order of March 11, 1949, declaring the sum of P2,500 received by the co-executrices
from Ramon Garcia as repurchase price of the three parcels of land resold to the latters is conjugal
property and that the widow is entitled to one-half thereof is reversed and the said sum is declared to
be part of the estate of the deceased;

(3) The order of April 28, 1949, declaring that the decedents share of standing crop of palay planted
during the coverture and harvested after the dissolution of the marriage are fruits and income within
the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code and, therefore, should be considered conjugal property,
of which one-half should be delivered to Juana F. Vda. de Lesaca, is affirmed.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28 SCRA 489
FACTS: Teresita C. Yaptinchay alleged that the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay had lived with her
continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 year. The deceased died without a will left
an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other
places with an estimated value of about P500,000. The deceased left three daughters, Virginia
Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, who carted away from the residences
aforesaid personal properties belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively owned by
petitioner. It was averred that in these circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take
custody and care of the interests of the deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator became
an urgent necessity.

ISSUE: Can petitioner claim ownership.

HELD: Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy
cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ
of injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting.
Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
Common-law wife was not able to prove that they jointly bought the property in Forbes Park so it belonged to the
legal marriage

Eugenio vs Velez

Facts: Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on
August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988
before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then
issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s
body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas
corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence. The court ordered that the body
should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack
of jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:

“Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or
woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
nearest kin of the deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the
Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where “a
man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband
and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions”. In addition, it requires
that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of
Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court
allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge

of “gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by

maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is
nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the
Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should
override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.
The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise
Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing
look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
“compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court

Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it
will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest
is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should
be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt
of this Decision.

G. Void Marriages

General Rule

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

1. Kinds of Void Marriages

a. Absence of Formal Requisites

FC Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
 (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of twenty-one years.

Emancipation also takes place:

(1) By the marriage of the minor; or

(2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by
the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such
emancipation shall be irrevocable. (397a, 398a, 400a, 401a)

ALCANTARA vs ALCANTARA

In Renato Reyes So vs. Lorna Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, the Supreme
Court was faced with the unique situation where the husband and the wife were
in a common law relationship for 18 long years, had 3 children, and then got
married. The husband subsequently filed a petition for annulment of marriage
based on his wife’s alleged psychological incapacity.
Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife,
without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the course of
their relationship, they had three (3) children (born in 1975, 1978 and 1984) and
established a business.

On May 14, 1996, Renato filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He alleged that their
marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He
also claimed that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage, as shown by the following circumstances:
Lorna failed and refused to cohabit and make love to him; did not love and
respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional, spiritual,
physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family
domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish
conjugal and family life with him.

The RTC nullified the marriage of Renato and Lorna in its decision of November
8, 1999. The RTC concluded that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her martial obligations.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in its Decision
dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.

The CA ruled that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s psychological incapacity.

According to the CA, Lorna’s character, faults, and defects did not constitute
psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the parties’ marriage. The CA
reasoned out that while Lorna “appears to be a less than ideal mother to her
children, and loving wife to her husband,” these flaws were not physical
manifestations of psychological illness. The CA further added that although
Lorna’s condition was clinically identified by an expert witness to be an
“Adjustment Disorder,” it was not established that such disorder was the root
cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
prosecution also failed to establish that Lorna’s disorder was incurable and
permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from complying
with obligations essential to marriage.

The CA likewise held that Lorna’s hostile attitude towards Renato when the
latter came home late was “a normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a
similar situation”; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him was not due to
any psychological condition, but due to the fact that she no longer loved him.
Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not
proper when the psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth by
the Supreme Court in the case of Molina.
Renato moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution dated October 18, 2001.

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of evidence
presented by Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations. The Supreme Court did not give much
credence to the testimony and report of Renato’s expert witness. According to
the Supreme Court:

Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions leads us to

conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts
on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by
the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to
us that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her with the
awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not
at all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the
psychologist appeared at the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them
was not pro bono. While this circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her conclusions must be
read carefully with this circumstance and the source of the facts in mind.
In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the “Particulars” and the “Psychological
Conclusions” disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be
exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than
from continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a
running account of the respondent’s life from which her whole life is totally judged.
Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be
reliable. . .

As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the
petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 –
developments that show a fair level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree
of intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry
and joined her husband in the communications business – traits that do not at all
indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had
been strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s Memorandum itself
is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner
interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the relationship
between the petitioner and respondent was going well,and future marriage between the
two was not an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents.”

The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s psychological
disorder was incurable:

. . . the psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s
behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established
jurisprudence requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. . .

In Molina, we ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and

occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.” In the present case, the
psychologist simply narrated adverse “snapshots” of the respondent’s life showing her
alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent
incapacity to meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological
illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this psychological illness and
consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was celebrated.

Given the foreoging, the Supreme Court ruled that based on the evidence,
psychological incapacity was not proved:

Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties
who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and
who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide the
support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable
psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital
support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give
up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for
some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This
simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited
remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage
could have validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a
grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated,
did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any
permanent remedy.

In Renato Reyes So vs. Lorna Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, the Supreme
Court was faced with the unique situation where the husband and the wife were
in a common law relationship for 18 long years, had 3 children, and then got
married. The husband subsequently filed a petition for annulment of marriage
based on his wife’s alleged psychological incapacity.
Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife,
without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the course of
their relationship, they had three (3) children (born in 1975, 1978 and 1984) and
established a business.

On May 14, 1996, Renato filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lorna. He alleged that their
marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He
also claimed that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage, as shown by the following circumstances:
Lorna failed and refused to cohabit and make love to him; did not love and
respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional, spiritual,
physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family
domicile; and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish
conjugal and family life with him.

The RTC nullified the marriage of Renato and Lorna in its decision of November
8, 1999. The RTC concluded that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her martial obligations.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in its Decision
dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.

The CA ruled that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s psychological incapacity.

According to the CA, Lorna’s character, faults, and defects did not constitute
psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the parties’ marriage. The CA
reasoned out that while Lorna “appears to be a less than ideal mother to her
children, and loving wife to her husband,” these flaws were not physical
manifestations of psychological illness. The CA further added that although
Lorna’s condition was clinically identified by an expert witness to be an
“Adjustment Disorder,” it was not established that such disorder was the root
cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
prosecution also failed to establish that Lorna’s disorder was incurable and
permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from complying
with obligations essential to marriage.

The CA likewise held that Lorna’s hostile attitude towards Renato when the
latter came home late was “a normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a
similar situation”; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him was not due to
any psychological condition, but due to the fact that she no longer loved him.
Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not
proper when the psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth by
the Supreme Court in the case of Molina.
Renato moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution dated October 18, 2001.

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of evidence
presented by Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations. The Supreme Court did not give much
credence to the testimony and report of Renato’s expert witness. According to
the Supreme Court:

Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions leads us to

conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts
on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by
the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to
us that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her with the
awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not
at all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the
psychologist appeared at the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them
was not pro bono. While this circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her conclusions must be
read carefully with this circumstance and the source of the facts in mind.

In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the “Particulars” and the “Psychological
Conclusions” disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be
exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than
from continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a
running account of the respondent’s life from which her whole life is totally judged.
Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be
reliable. . .

As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the
petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 –
developments that show a fair level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree
of intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry
and joined her husband in the communications business – traits that do not at all
indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had
been strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s Memorandum itself
is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner
interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the relationship
between the petitioner and respondent was going well,and future marriage between the
two was not an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents.”

The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s psychological
disorder was incurable:

. . . the psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s
behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established
jurisprudence requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. . .

In Molina, we ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and

occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.” In the present case, the
psychologist simply narrated adverse “snapshots” of the respondent’s life showing her
alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent
incapacity to meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological
illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this psychological illness and
consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was celebrated.

Given the foreoging, the Supreme Court ruled that based on the evidence,
psychological incapacity was not proved:

Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties
who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and
who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide the
support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable
psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital
support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give
up on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for
some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This
simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited
remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage
could have validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a
grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated,
did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any
permanent remedy.

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24,
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they
had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for
annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the

law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also
ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.