1. PEOPLE V.

CONCEPCION (300k CREDIT, INDIRECT LOAN)

FACTS:
• Through telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri Branch of
PNB, Venancio Concepcion (President of PNB), authorized an extension of credit in
favor of the firm, Puno y Concepcion, S en. C, amounting to 300k.
• The authorization was in conflict with Conception’s earlier memo (May 17, 1918) which
limited the discretional power of the local manager at Appari to grant loans, discounts,
and negotiable docs to 5k which at times can be increased to 10k. The only security
required by the credit was six demand notes.
• The firm was a co-partnership capitalized at 100k.
- Anacleto (5k)
- Clara (5k)
- Miguel/ Administrator (20k)
- Clemente (20k)
- Rosario San Agustin who is married to respondent (50k)
• Respondent was then charged and found guilty in the CFI of Cagayan for violating
Sec 35 of Act No. 2747, which prohibits the National Bank from directly or indirectly
granting loans to any members of the Board of Directors nor to agents of the branch
banks.
o Act No. 2747 was the one present during the assailed acts but such law
was eventually repealed by Act No. 2938.

ISSUES:
1. Was the granting of the credit of 300k a loan within the meaning of Sec. 35? (YES.)
2. Was the credit a loan or a discount? (LOAN)
3. Was the granting of credit an indirect loan within the meaning of Sec. 35 (YES).
4. Can respondent be made guilty for Act No. 2747 when such was repealed by a latter act
prior to the filing of the case and the rendition of judgement? (YES).
5. Is the alleged violation punished by Act No. 2747? (YES).
6. Is good faith a valid defense? (NO.)

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
• Although the exhibits speak of credit, it is still a loan.
• The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the
confidence reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise.
• A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party of a given
sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with
or without interest.
• The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to
the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit.

SECOND ISSUE:
• Discounts are liquid in nature, growing, out of an actual, live, transaction.
• To discount a paper is only a mode of loaning money, with, however, these
distinctions:
o In a discount, interest is deducted in advance, while in a loan, interest is
taken at the expiration of a credit;
o a discount is always on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-
 name paper.
• As ruled by the Insular Auditor in Willis’ letter, the law covers loans and not discounts.
However, the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were
not discount paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness, because (1) interest
was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was paid when the notes fell
due; and (2) they were single-name and not double-name paper.

THIRD ISSUE:
• Considering that the wife of the defendant (a member of the partnership) held one half
of the capital, it is an indirect loan
• Legislature’s intent was to prevent temptation and a recognition of the maxim that no
man may serve two masters because the duty of a person will suffer.

FOURTH ISSUE:
• where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former Act which
penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter
depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders charged with
violations of the old law

FIFTH ISSUE:
• Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 is on the bank, and
since section 49 punishes not the bank but on a person violating any provision of the
same, and imposing imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the prohibition contained
in said section 35 is without penal sanction.
• The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden, directors, and to each
director separately and individually.

SIXTH ISSUE
• Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts it was because he was misled by
rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. It is furthermore stated that since the loans
made have been paid, no loss has been suffered by PNB.
• Under the Act violated, criminal intent is not necessary and neither defense is
conclusive.

2. DE LOS SANTOS V. JARRA (CARABAOS)

FACTS:
• De los Santos owned 10 carabaos which he lent to Jimenea to be used in his animal
power mill in the hacienda upon the sole condition that such shall be returned as soon
as the work at the mill ends. They were not returned notwithstanding that plaintiff
claimed it after the work was finished
• Magdaleno Jimenea died and Jarra was appointed by the CFI of Neg. Occ. to be the
administratrix of his estate. De los Santos filed for the exclusion of his carabaos with
the commissioners of Jimenea’s estate which was rejected.
• Jarra was contending that although the agreement was for 10 first class carabaos,
only 3 second class animals were given to Jimenea and afterwards these were also
sold to him.
• The court ordered Jarra to reurn the remaining six carabaos or its value (120 eac
stated that Jarra had no basis in his claim and rendered judgment against to him to
give 6 carabaos or its equivalent value (720 total).
ISSUE:
W/N the carabaos should be returned to plaintiff? (YES).

RULING:

• SC held that it was fully proven from the testimonies that DLS sent the 10 animals and
that Jimenea received them. Four of the animals died of rinderpest.
• There is also no evidence of the sale between Jimenea and de los Santos. Therefore
it is not true. There were no official documents presented by the defendant to evidence
ownership of the animals.
• The carabaos delivered to be used were not returned by Jiminea upon demand. There
is no doubt that Jarra is under the obligation to indemnify delos Santos as administratix
of the estate, more so because she is in delay for failing to return the carabaos upon
demand.
• The obligation of the bailee or of his successors to return either the thing loaned or its
value is sustained by the tribunal of Spain which said in its decision.
o Although it is true that in a contract of commodatum the bailor retains the
ownership of thing loaned at the expiration of the period, or after the use for
which it was loaned has been accomplished, it is the imperative duty of the
bailee to return the thing itself to its owner, or to pay him damages if through
the fault of the bailee the thing should have been lost or injured.
• ***REGARDING THE FAILURE TO APPEAL***
o the subject matter of the case which is the exclusion from the inventory of
property of the animals, must come from a direct decision of the court where
the rights of the 3rd party and the rights of the deceased are discussed, and a
decision rendered from the evidence adduced by the admin. Of the estate and
the claimant. (Sec. 699 and 703 of Civil Pro.)

3. YAM V. MALIK (ESTAFA)

FACTS:
• Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the respondent Judge Malik of Jolu, Sulu alleging that he acted
without jurisdiction, in excess, and with grave abuse of discretion for holding that there
was a prima facie case against the petitioners, issuing the warrants of arrest, and for
conducting trial on the merits for three criminal cases against the petitioners involving
estafa through misappropriation.
• CRIM CASE M111 – respondent Rosalinda Amin charges petitioners with ETM
involving 50k but the complaint and civil complaint both state that the money was a
loan, which earned interest and was demandable six months from July 12, 1973
• CRIM CASE M183 – Tan Chu Kao charges pet. With ETM involving 30k. The
complaint also states that the money was a simple loan and so does the civil case.
• CRIM CASE M208 – Augosto Sajor v, petitioners, ETM involving 20k. The complaint
does not state it was a loan but a sworn statement submitted to Judge Malik, Sajor
states that it was a loan.

ISSUE: W/N it was ETM?

RULING:
• NO. ETM is found in Art. 315 1b which requires that the offender must have the
obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods, etc. that he received under an
obligation. Petitioners did not have such.
• The loans were simple loans so the petitioners acquired ownership of the
money.
• Malik failed to distinguish commodatum from mutuum.
• ***THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JD ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS ESTAFA
BECAUSE THE AMOUNTS INVOLVED EXCEEDED 6K AND EXCEED PRISION
CORRECIONAL. IT IS THE CFI WHO HAS JD.***
• TRO is now permanent, crim complaints are dismissed, and warrants are
recalled.
• Judge is rebuked.

4. PRODUCERS BANK V. CA (STERELA BUSINESS)

FACTS:
• PetRev on Certiorari of the CA Decision, and its reso denying MR of petitioner.
• Private respondent Franklin Vives was asked Angeles Sanchez to help her friend Col.
Arturo Doronilla, in incorporating his business, the Sterela Marketing and Services
• Sanchez asked Vives to deposit in a bank 200k in the bank account of Sterela for
purposes of its incorporation. She assured private respondent that he could withdraw
his money from said account within a month’s time.
• After Vives issued a check, Mrs. Vives, Sanchez and Estrella Dumagpi, the secretary
of Doronilla, went to the bank to open an account with Mrs. Vives and Sanchez as
signatories. There was an autho. Letter from Doronilla authorizing Sanchez and others
to open an account for Sterela. A passbook was then issued to Mrs. Vives.
• Subsequently, private respondent learned that Sterela was no longer in its original
address. Upon going to the bank to verify, it was learned that part of the money was
withdrawn and only 90k remained. Mrs. Vives could not also withdraw said remaining
amount because it had to answer for some postdated checks issued by Doronilla who
opened a current account for Sterela and authorized the bank to debit the savings acc.
For the amounts necessary to cover the overdrawings in the current account.
• In opening the current account, Sterela through Doronilla also obtained a loan of 175k
which he tried to pay with three postdated checks but were all dishonored.
• Doronilla could assign or withdraw the money bc he was the sole proprietor of Sterela.
• Vives was able to receive a check from Doronilla as payment for the 200k but it was
dishonored.
• Vives referred the matter to a lawyer, who made a written demand upon Doronilla for
the return of his client’s money. Doronilla issued another check for P212,000.00 in
private respondent’s favor but the check was again dishonored for insufficiency of
funds.
• Vives instituted an action for recovery of sum of money in RTC Pasig against Doronilla,
Sanchez, Dumagpi and petitioner. The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondent
which was also affirmed by the CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. W/N CA ERRED IN SAYING THAT THE TRANSACTION WAS A COMMODATUM

AND NOT A MUTUUM? (NO).
2. W/N ATIENZA CONNIVED WITH THE OTHERS IN DEFRAUDING VIVES? (YES).
3. W/N CA ERRED IN ADOPTING THE ENTIRE RECORDS OF THE RTC
CONSIDERING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC WERE BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS? (ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW)
4. W/N THE BANK SHOULD BE SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE OTHER
DEFENDANTS FOR DAMAGES? (YES).

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
• NO. Although the gen. rule is that consumable things are mutuum, there are
instances where a commodatum may have a consumabe thing. (merely for
exhibition, Art. 1936)
• The intent of the parties show that the money was merely an accommodation on
the part of Vives to make it appear that Sterela had sufficient capital for
incorporation and that the money in the bank would not be touched and returned
within 30 days.
• The payment of 212k by Doronilla did not convert the loan into a mutuum bc it was
not the intent of the parties and the 12k corresponds to the fruits of the lending of
212k.
o Article 1935 provides that the bailee does not acquire use of the fruits.
Hence it was proper for Doronilla to remit to Vives the interest accruing to
the latter’s money.

SECOND AND FOURTH ISSUE:

• YES. The facts show that the petitioner bank through its assistant manager
Atienza, was partly responsible for the loss of Vives’ money and is thus liable for
its restitution.
• It was expressly stated in the bank’s rules that deposits and withdrawals will not
be permitted except upon presentation of the passbook. However, Atienza allowed
Doronilla to withdraw several times without the passbook.
o Defendants insisted that the money had to be deposited in the Makati
branch where Atienza was.
o Atienza knew beforehand that the money was not Doronilla’s and was
owned by the Vives’ and was merely given to accommodate the business.
o The account was in the name of Sterela but the records show that the
people with the power to withdraw were Inocencia Vives and Angeles
Sanchez since they were the signatories. However, he did not follow the
procedure since Doronilla was the owner of Sterela.
o The transfer of money from the savings to the current account was done
without the passbook as it was made to appear in a certification that a
duplicate passbook was issued to Sterela bc the orig. was in the Makati
Branch in view of a loan accommodation.
▪ Atienza knew that the orig was not surrendered and that Dumagpi
had no authority so the certification has no bearing.
• Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be held primary and
solidarily liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks.
o It must be shown that an employer-employee relationship exists and that
the employee was acting within his tasks.
5. SAURA IMPORT V. DBP (bags from local raw materials, Kenaf mill plant)

FACTS:
• In a civ. Case, the CFI of Manila sentenced DBP to pay damages to Saura plus
interest.
• In 1953, Saura applied for an industrial loan of 500k with the Rehabilitation
Finance Corp. (Now DBP). 250k will be for the construction of a factory building
for the manufacture of jute sacks, 240.9k for the balance of the price of the jute
mill machinery and equipment, and the 9.1k as additional working capital.
o The Jute mill machinery was already purchased by Saura due to a letter
of credit extended by the Prudential Bank and Trust Co. and that to
secure its release without first paying the draft, Saura issued a trust
receipt in favor of prudential.
• 1/7/54 – RFC issued Reso. 145 granting the loan of 500k to be secured by a
1st mortgage on the factoy buildings, the land site, and the machinery.
o Saura requested a modification that instead of China engineers sign as
comakers, Saura will instead issue a bond of 123.5k equivalent to the
subscription and that Roca will substitute Arellano as the former
acquired the latter’s shares.
o RFC issued Reso. 736, designating the members of its board of
governors to reexamine all the aspects of the approved loan.
• 3/24/54 – Saura said that China Engineers had agreed to act as co signers
o also asked the necessary docs be prepared in accordance with reso
145
• 4/13/54 – the loan docs were executed: promissory note with FR Hailing
representing China Engineers as one of the co-signers and the deed of
mortgage
• Despite the execution of the loan agreement, the reexamination under Reso
736 still continued, wherein the loan was reduced to 300k. (Reso. 3989)
• 6/19/54 – FR Hailing wrote to RFC saying that they retract the loan and
considered the same as cancelled, and also requested for the registration of
the mortgage to be withdrawn.
o At the same time, Saura wrote to RFC requesting the OG loan be
granted which was denied by the latter given that China Engineers
viewed the loan as cancelled.
• 7/24/54 – Saura informed the China Engineers will reinstate their signature if
the OG loan is granted and released.
• 12/17/54 – Reso. 9083 was passed, reinstating the OG loan, it appearing that
China Engineers are willing to sign the Promissory Note. In addition, RFC
required the Dept. of Agriculture and Nat’l Resources to certify that the raw
materials needed are available in the immediate vicinity and that there is
a prospect of increased production thereof to provide adequately for the
requirements of the factory, in view of the shortage and high cost of the
imported raw materials.
o In a letter by RFC, it was relayed that the certification of the DANR was
required since the intention of the orig. approval of the loan was to
develop the manufacture of sacks on the basis of locally avail. Raw
materials.
o Saura’s letter included a study by the Bureau of Forestry saying that
kenaf will not be avail in the next years and that they request
 assurances from RFC that their company will be able to bring in suff.
Materials for operation
▪ 250k payment for trust receipt; 182,413k for purchase of
materials and equip; 67, 586k for raw materials and labor; 25k
during the opening of letter of credit; 25k for arrival of raw jute;
17, 586k as the mill is ready to operate
▪ In reply, RFC said that the Saura’s statement that they will have
to rely on the importation of jute would not be in line with their
principle in approving the loan
▪ Due to this, Saura requested RFC to cancel the mortgage which
they did and delivered the deed of cancellation to Ramon Saura
▪ The cancellation was to make way for the mortgage Saura had
with Prudential Bank involving the same property. Because
Saura failed to pay the trust receipt, Prudential sued them.
• After 9 years after the cancellation with RFC, Saura sued them for alleged
failure of the bank as predecessor to DBP to release the proceeds of the loan.
o Trial court favored Saura, saying that there was a contract and that
the bank was guilty of breach thereof.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Saura is correct? (NO.)

RULING:
• NO. Although there was a perfected consensual contract (Art. 1934) by virtue
of the loan application of Saura and the approval of the bank through its reso,
the fact that Saura was in no position to comply with the certification
requirement of the bank and the latter’s denial of Saura’s request to release
the funds, show mutual desistance between the parties which extinguished
the obligation.
o Since mutual agreement can create a contract, mutual
disagreement can cause its extinguishment.
• Saura’s cancellation of the mortgage carried no reservation of whatever rights
it might have had against RFC.
• OG JUDGEMENT IS REVERSED.

6. BPI INVESTMENT CORP V. CA (HOUSE LOAN, DELIVERY OF OBJECT)

FACTS:
• PetRev on Certiorari assailing CA decision and Resp which affirmed the
decision of RTC Pasig which held that respondents were not in default in
payment.
• Frank Roa obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and Dev’t Corp.
(predecessor of BPIIC) at an interest rate of 16 ¼%, for the construction of his
house in New Alabang Village.
• The said house and lot were mortgaged to AIDC to secure the loan.
• Eventually, Roa sold the property to ALS and Antonio Litonjua for 850k. They
paid 350k in cash and assumed the 500k balance of Roa’s debt with AIDC.
• AIDC did not offer the same interest rate to the private respondents but instead
offered a new loan of 500k to be applied to Roa’s debt, with an interest rate of
20% per annum and service fee of 1% per annum on the outstanding principle
 balance payable within 10 years in equal monthly amortization of 9,996.58 and
penalty interest rate of 21% per annum per day from the date the amortization
became due.
o Private respondents issued a mortgage deed stating that payment of
amortization shall commence on May 1, 1981.
o PR updated Roa’s balance by paying 190, 601.35 which reduced Roa’s
debt to 457.204k, which was liquidated when BPIIC applied the
proceeds of PR loan.
o September 13, 1982 - BPIIC released 7, 146k which was what was left
of their loan after full payment of Roa’s balance
• BPIIC instituted foreclosure proceedings on the ground that they failed to pay
the mortgage indebtedness which from May 1, 1981 to June 30, 1984,
amounted to P475,585.31.
o PR filed a civil case against pet. Alleging that they were not in arrears
but in fact made an overpayment as of June 30.
o They maintained that they should not be made to pay amortization
before the actual release of the P500,000 loan in August and
September 1982. Further, out of the P500,000 loan, only the total
amount of P464,351.77 was released to private respondents. Hence,
applying the effects of legal compensation, the balance of P35,648.23
should be applied to the initial monthly amortization for the loan.
• The trial court rendered judgement in favor of the PR holding that only 464k
was given.
o A simple loan is perfected only upon the delivery of the object of the
contract. The contract of loan between BPIIC and ALS & Litonjua
was perfected only on September 13, 1982, the date when BPIIC
released the purported balance of the P500,000 loan after deducting
therefrom the value of Roa’s indebtedness.
o Thus, payment of the monthly amortization should commence only a
month after the said date, as can be inferred from the stipulations in the
contract. This, despite the express agreement of the parties that
payment shall commence on May 1, 1981.
o From October 1982 to June 1984, the total amortization due was only
P194,960.43.
o Evidence showed that private respondents had an overpayment,
because as of June 1984, they already paid a total amount of
P201,791.96.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the contract of loan is a consensual contract in light of the Bonnevie case?
2. W/N BPIIC should be held liable for moral, exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees, as opposed to the rule in SSS v. CA?

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
• NO. The contract of loan is a real contract which is perfected once the object
of the contract is delivered.
o In the present case, the loan contract between BPI, on the one hand,
and ALS and Litonjua, on the other, was perfected only on September
13, 1982, the date of the second release of the loan. Following the
intentions of the parties on the commencement of the monthly
 amortization, as found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents’
obligation to pay commenced only on October 13, 1982, a month after
the perfection of the contract.
• The contract also involves a reciprocal obligation.
o The promise of BPI to extend and deliver the loan is upon the
consideration that the PR shall pay the monthly amortization on May
1, 1918, a month after the supposed release of the loan.
o Neither party incurs in delay if the other does not or is not ready to
comply with his obligation.
o The payment of the monthly amortization should be counted from
October 1982 and not may 1981.

SECOND ISSUE:
• SSS ruling – acting within their duties, no gross bad faith = no moral and
exemplary damages
o Since PR were irregular in their payments, BPI cannot be held to be
in bad faith so no moral and exemplary damages.
• BUT BPI was negligent for merely relying on the entries of the deed of
mortgage without checking the amounts actually released to PR so SC
granted the respondents 25k nominal damages due to their damaged rights.

7. SPOUSES SY V. WESTMONT BANK (MOONDROPS, DENY A DOCUMENT)

FACTS:
• PetRev seeking to reverse the CA Decision which affirmed decision of
RTC Manila, finding pet. Liable.
• This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money on Aug. 30, 1999, filed
by Westmont Bank (United Overseas Bank of the Phil) against petitioners
• Westmont claims that on Oct. 21, 1997, pet. Under the tradename Moondrops
Gen. Merchandising, obtained a loan in the amount of 2, 429, 500 M evidenced
by a PN 5280 payable by Nov. 1997.
• After a month, they again obtained a loan in the amount of 4M payable on Dec.
1997 evidenced by PN 5285
o Disclosure statements were signed as well as a Continuing Suretyship
Agreement to secure any future indebtedness of Moondrops.
• Westmont claims that the petitioners have defaulted in payment and sent a
demand letter which was unheeded hence the complaint.
o On the other hand, petitioners state that Richard Sy and Ramon Sy
applied a loan with Westmont through the manager William Lao, signed
blank forms of PN and Disclosure statements. Eventually, the loan was
disapproved.
o In exchange, Lao offered to help them secure the loans from Amando
Chua in the amounts of 2.5M and 4M both payable within 3 months.
o The petitioners accepted and received amounts of 2, 429 500 and 3,
994,000.
▪ They insist that these loans were not secured through
Westmont but instead are from Amando Chua
• During trial, Westmont presented an employee which testified that the
proceeds of the loan were credited to the account of Moondrops per its loan
manifold which was never offered in evidence.
 o On the other hand, the pet. Presented cashier’s checks that were paid
to Chua.
• The RTC Manila ruled in favor of Westmont stating that the petitioners weren’t
able to deny the genuineness and the due execution of the promissory notes
which were the cause of action of the case. It also ruled that the petitioners did
not make any move to cancel the PN’s which make their obligation to
Westmont valid and binding.
o The RTC upon MR still ruled in favor of the bank while the CA did the
same adding that under Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the RoC, the PN’s were
deemed by petitioners and they created a prima facie case in favor of
Westmont which dispensed with the evidence that the petitioners
actually received the proceeds of the loan.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the petitioners failed to deny the genuineness of the docs under oath hence
deeming them admitted? (NO).

RULING:
• Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written document, the
substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading,
and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may
with like effect be set forth in the pleading. This is called an actionable
document.
• Section 8 of Rule 8 provides the proper method for the adverse party to deny
its genuineness and due execution
o To deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document: (1) there must be a specific denial in the responsive
pleading of the adverse party; (2) the said pleading must be under
oath; and (3) the adverse party must set forth what he claims to
be the facts. Failure to comply with the prescribed procedure results
in the admission of the genuineness and due execution of the
actionable document.
o In the cases of Toribio v. Bidin and Titan Construction v. David, this
rule was applied liberally by the courts even if there was no responsive
pleading since the parties consistently denied the document under
oath.
• The petitioners’ answer shows that they specifically denied the paragraphs of
the complaint regarding the promissory notes.
o They also said what they claim to be the facts. In particular, they
alleged that although Ramon Sy and Richard Sy signed blank forms of
promissory notes and disclosure statements, they were later informed
that their loans were not approved. Such disapproval led them to seek
loans elsewhere, through Lao and Chua, but definitely not with the
bank anymore.
o They asserted throughout the entire proceedings that the loans they
applied from Westmont were disapproved, and that they never
received the loan proceeds from the bank.
• Westmont also failed to show that they delivered the loan proceeds to
petitioners.
 o A simple loan is a real contract and it shall not be perfected until the
delivery of the object of the contract.
o The delivery of the proceeds of the loan by the lender to the borrower
is indispensable to perfect the contract of loan. Once the proceeds
have been delivered, the unilateral characteristic of the contract arises
and the borrower is bound to pay the lender an amount equal to that
received.
o Due to the doubtful circumstances surrounding the loan transactions,
Westmont cannot rely on the disputable presumptions that private
transactions have been fair and regular.
o In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff.
o Westmont miserably failed to establish that it released and delivered
the proceeds of the loans in the total amount of P6,429,500.00 to
petitioners.
• DECISION REVERSED.

8. NAGUIAT V. CA (MORTGAGE, PUBLIC DOCUMENT)

FACTS:
• PetRev of CA’s decision in favor of Queano and declaring the mortgage
void.
• Queaño applied with Naguiat a loan for P200,000, which the latter granted.
• Naguiat indorsed to Queaño Associated bank Check No. 090990 for the
amount of P95,000 and issued also her own Filmanbank Check to the order of
Queaño for the amount of P95,000; such proceeds of these checks were to
constitute the loan granted by Naguiat to Queaño.
• To secure the loan, Queaño executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of Naguiat, and surrendered the owner’s duplicates of titles of the mortgaged
properties.
• The deed was notarized and Queaño issued to Naguiat a promissory note for
the amount of P200,000 with interest at 12% per annum payable on 9/11/1980.
o Queaño also issued a post-dated Security Bank check amounting to
P200,000 payable to the order of Naguait.
o The check was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds.
o Demand was sent to Queaño. Shortly, Queaño, and one Ruby
Reubenfeldt met with Naguiat. Queaño told Naguiat that she did not
receive the loan proceeds, adding that the checks were retained by
Reubenfeldt, who purportedly was Naguiat’s agent.
• Naguiat applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. But 3 days before
the sale, Queano filed before RTC of Pasay, seeking the annulment of the
mortgage deed.
o RTC declared the Deed as null and void and ordered Naguiat to return
to Queaño the owner’s duplicates of titles of the mortgaged lots.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Queano received the loan proceeds?
RULING:
• The resolution of the issues presented involves the determination of facts, a
function which the SC does not exercise in an appeal by certiorari. Under Rule
45 which governs appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be raised.
o A question of law which the Court may pass upon must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants.
o There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts;
there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.
o ***EXCEPTIONS***
▪ grounded on speculation
▪ absurd
▪ GAoD
▪ Misapprehension of facts
▪ Findings of fact are conflicting
▪ CA goes beyond the issues
▪ CA overlooks relevant facts
▪ Findings of CA are contrary to Trial Court, mere
conclusions without evidence
• Naguiat claims that a public document enjoys the presumption of validity and
truthfulness of its contents.
o The Court of Appeals, however, is correct in ruling that the presumption
of truthfulness of the recitals in a public document was defeated by the
clear and convincing evidence in this case that pointed to the absence
of consideration
• No evidence was submitted by Naguiat that the checks she issued or
endorsed were actually encashed or deposited.
• The mere issuance of the checks did not result in the perfection of the contract
of loan.
o The Civil Code provides that the delivery of bills of exchange and
mercantile documents such as checks shall produce the effect of
payment only when they have been cashed. It is only after the checks
have been produced the effect of payment that the contract of loan
may have been perfected.
o Article 1934 of the Civil Code provides: An accepted promise to deliver
something by way of commodatum or simple loan is binding upon the
parties, but the commodatum or simple loan itself shall not be
perfected until the delivery of the object of the contract.
▪ A loan contract is a real contract, not consensual, and as such,
is perfected only upon the delivery of the objects of the contract.
• The mortgage which is supposed to secure the loan is null and void.
o The consideration of the mortgage contract is the same as that of the
principal contract from which it receives life, and without which it cannot
exist as an independent contract.
o A mortgage contract being a mere accessory contract, its validity
would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it.
 • *** ON RUEBENDFELT***
o Agency relationship between Naguiat and Ruebenfeldt is supported
by ample evidence
▪ Naguiat instructed Ruebendfelt to withhold checks pending
collateral
▪ Served as agent for loan of Queano’s friend.
▪ Accompanied them to the meeting.
o The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of an "agency by
estoppel citing Article 1873 of the Civil Code.
▪ Queaño got the impression that Ruebenfeldt was the agent of
Naguiat, but Naguiat did nothing to correct Queaño's
impression.
▪ One who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent,
and holds him out to the public as such, cannot be permitted to
deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the
prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in
good faith, and in the honest belief that he is what he appears
to be.

9. GARCIA V. THIO (CROSSED CHECKS, MARILOU SANTIAGO)

FACTS:
• PetRev of CA decision stating that there was no contract of loan.
• Thio received from Garcia a crossed check in the amount of $100,000.00
payable to the order of Marilou Santiago.
o Thereafter, Garcia received from Thio 3k US for four months and 76,
500 pesos for four months.
• Again, respondent received a check in the amount of P500,000.00 from
petitioner and payable to the order of Marilou Santiago
o Garcia received from Thio 20k for four months.
• According to pet., respondent failed to pay the principal amounts, hence a
complaint for sum of money with damages was filed in RTC Makati.
o US 100k with 3% interest from oct. 26, 1995
o 500k with 4% interest from November 5, 1995
• Respondent denied that she contracted the loand and asserted that it is
Santiago that is indebted to petitioner.
o Thio claims that she was merely asked to deliver the checks to Marilou
and that the check payments she issued were merely intended to
accommodate Garcia’s request that respondent use her own checks
instead of Santiago’s.
• The RTC ruled in favor of Carolyn but the CA reversed on the ground that there
was no loan contract between the two.
o This is due to the fact that the checks were crossed hence may not be
encashed by respondent but only by Santiago.
o *** EFFECTS OF CROSSED CHECKS***
▪ may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank
▪ may be negotiated only once (to one who has an account in the
bank)
▪ warning to the holder that the check has a specific purpose and
he must inquire to know if he is a holder in due course.
 o The receipt of the crossed check is not the delivery in contemplation
since the respondent is not the person who could take the checks as a
holder.

ISSUE:
1. Who is really indebted to Garcia?

RULING:
• THIO.
• ***THIS CASE IS AN EXCEPTION TO FACT REVIEW SINCE CA AND RTC
HAVE CONFLICTING FINDINGS***
• A loan is a real contract, not consensual, and as such is perfected only upon
the delivery of the object of the contract. This is evident in Art. 1934 of the Civil
Code.
o Upon delivery of the object of the contract of loan (in this case the
money received by the debtor when the checks were encashed) the
debtor acquired ownership of such money or loan proceeds and is
bound to pay the creditor an equal amount.
• It is undisputed that the checks were delivered to Thio. However, these checks
were crossed and payable to the order of a certain Marilou Santiago.
• The Court agrees with petitioner. Delivery is the act by which the res or
substance thereof is placed within the actual or constructive possession or
control of another.
o Although Rica did not physically receive the proceeds of the checks,
these instruments were placed in her control and possession under an
arrangement whereby she actually re-lent the amounts to Marilou.
Such is supported by several factors:
▪ Petitioner did not know personally Santiago. This was admitted
by Respondent, hence, it is not possible for Garcia to grant
loans in such big sum of money even without any
acknowledgment of debt. It was Thio who had transactions with
Marilou prior.
▪ Leticia Ruiz admitted that respondent’s plan was to get a loan
with 3% interest from Garcia then loan the same to Santiago at
5% to progfit from the 2% difference.
▪ It is unbelievable that Rica would put herself in a position where
she would be compelled to pay interest out of her own funds for
loans she never contracted.
• for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself such as the common experience of
mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.
▪ When Marilou filed a petition for insolvency, it was Thio who
was listed as a debtor.
▪ Respondent never presented as a witness.
• “Evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced.”
 • *** ON INTEREST***
o The court doesn’t agree that respondent should pay the monthly
interest since the agreement was only verbal and Article 1956 of the
Civil Code provides that no interest shall be due unless it is written.
o However, there can be legal interest under Article 2209 of the Civil
Code which states that when an obligation is breached involving
money, the interest would be what could have been stipulated
▪ Such interest shall earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded
▪ Absent a stipulation, the rate shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default.
• JUDGEMENT REVERSED.

10. REPUBLIC V. BAGTAS (BULLS)

FACTS:
• ***Only questions of law are raised in this case
• May 8, 1948: Jose V. Bagtas borrowed from the Republic of the Philippines
through the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls: a Red Sindhi with a book
value of P1,176.46, a Bhagnari, of P1,320.56 and a Sahiniwal, of P744.46, for
a period of 1 year for breeding purposes subject to a breeding fee of 10% of
the book value of the bulls
• May 7, 1949: Jose requested for a renewal for another year for the three bulls
but only one bull was approved for the duration of May 8, 1949 to May 7, 1950,
while the others are to be returned.
• March 25, 1950: He wrote to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay
the value of the 3 bulls and reiterated his desire to buy them at a value with a
deduction of yearly depreciation to be approved by the Auditor General.
• October 19, 1950: The Director of Animal Industry advised him that the book
value cannot be reduced and that they either be returned or their book value
should be paid not later than October 31, 1950 which he was not able to do.
• An action at the CFI was commenced against Jose praying that he be ordered
to return the 3 bulls or to pay their book value of P3,241.45 and the unpaid
breeding fee of P199.62, both with interests, and costs.
o Through his counsel, petitioner answered that because of the bad
peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley, particularly in the barrio
of Baggao, and of the pending appeal he had taken to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the President of the Philippines,
he could not return the animals nor pay their value and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
o RTC sentenced him to pay the 3.6k value of the bulls a nd the 626
pesos breeding fees with interest and costs.
• December 1958: granted an ex-parte motion for the appointment of a special
sheriff to serve the writ outside Manila
o Felicidad M. Bagtas, the surviving spouse of Jose who died on October
23, 1951 and administratrix of his estate, was notified.
o She filed a motion saying that the 2 bulls where returned to the Bureau
of Animal Industry and the 3rd bull died from gunshot wound inflicted
during a Huk raid and prayed that the writ of execution be quashed and
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.
 ISSUE:
1. W/N they are still liable?

RULING:
• YES. It is true that the other 2 bulls were returned by her son as evidenced by
a memorandum receipt signed by the superintendent of the NVB station of the
Bureau.
• She is still liable even if the last bull was killed due to an alleged force
majeure.
o The loan of the bull was subject to the 10% breeding fee and Bagtas
contends that since the contracts was commodatum, the Bureau
retained ownership and should thus suffer its own losses due to the
fortuitous event.
o Commodatum is essentialy gratuitious. If the breeding fee be considered
a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull.
▪ Under article 1671 of the Civil Code, the lessee would be
subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith,
because she had continued possession of the bull after the
expiry of the contract.
▪ And even if the contract be commodatum, still the appellant
is liable if he keeps it longer than the period stipulated and
bc the thing has been delivered with appraisal of its value.
▪ There was no stipulation that in event of a force majeure, the
wife of the defendant is no longer liable.
• Bagtas’ civil personality still exists pursuant to Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which state that the court shall order the legal rep. of the deceased to
substitute him.
o After the defendant’s death, his counsel failed to comply with section
16, rule 3 which requires that the court be notified of such death and
they be informed of the name and residence of the legal rep. of the
deceased.
o The notice by the probate court and the pub. In Voz de Manila was not
sufficient notice.
• The estate of Bagtas is only liable for the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull
which has not been returned because it was killed while in the custody of the
administratrix of his estate
• Special proceedings for the administration of Bagtas, as instituted in the CFI,
the money judgment rendered in favor of the appellee cannot be enforced by
a writ of execution but must be presented to the probate court for payment by
the appellant, the administratrix appointed by the court.

11. QUINTOS V. BECK (RETURNING FURNITURE)

FACTS:
• ***This action was brought in order to compel the defendant to return certain
furniture that she lent to him.***
• ***This is an appeal from the judgement of the CFI of Manila which ordered the
ff:***
o return of 3 gas heaters and 4 electric lamps,
o that plaintiff call for the other furniture at her own expense,
 o she is also to shoulder the costs that the sheriff may charge for the
deposit of the furniture.
• The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff and the latter occupied plaintiff’s
house on MH Del Pilar Street No. 1175
• When the contract of lease was novated, the plaintiff offered the defendant the
use of the furniture mentioned upon the sole condition that it shall be returned
upon the plaintiff’s demand.
• The plaintiff eventually sold the leased property to Maria and Rosario Lopez
and they all notified the defendant of such and gave him 60 days to vacate the
premises pursuant to one of the clauses in the contract of lease.
• The plaintiff then required the return of the furniture
o Defendant repeatedly responded through letters that the plaintiff may
call for them in the house where they are found.
o Defendant also wrote that he can’t return the gas heaters and the
electric lamps because he needs to use them until the 15 th or at the
expiration of the lease.
o The plaintiff refused to get the furniture due to the fact that defendant
declined to make delivery.
• The defendant, on the expiration of the lease, deposited the furniture with the
Sheriff which are now in the warehouse at Rizal Ave.

ISSUES:
• Plaintiffs contend that the court erred:
o By ruling they viol. The contract when they didn’t call for the furniture
when the defendant put such at their disposal
o By not ordering the defendant to pay the value of the furniture in case
they are not delivered
o That they should get the furniture at their own expense
o That they should pay half of the fees claimed by the Sheriff
o That they should pay their respective legal expenses
o In denying MR and motion for new trial
• W/N the defendant complied with his obligation to return the furniture upon the
plaintiff’s demand? (NO).
• W/N the plaintiff is bound to bear the deposit fees? (NO).

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
• Since the contract is a commodatum where the P leased furniture to D, D had
the obligation to return such to P upon the latter’s demand.
o Clause 7 of the Contract
• This means that D should have returned such to P’s house and not merely put
them at P’s disposal. Hence, D failed to comply with his obligation. The
trial court erred in saying that P viol. The contract when she failed to get
the furniture.

SECOND ISSUE:
• Since D voluntarily undertook to return the furniture, the court can’t compel P
to pay for deposit of the furniture.
• D, as bailee, did not have the right to place such on deposit and neither did P
have the duty to accept.
 • The costs should be borne by the defendant only because the plaintiff is the
prevailing party (SEC. 487 of Code of CivPro) and since D was the one who
breached the contract.
• *** AS TO THE VALUE OF THE FURNITURE***
o P is not entitled to the value since D has not agreed to the correctness
of the value
o It should be determined by the Court through evidence

12. REPUBLIC V. GRIJALDO (BANK OF TAIWAN)

FACTS:
• In 1943, Grijaldo obtained 5 loans from the Bank of Taiwan Bacolod Branch in
the total amount of 1,281.97 with an interest of 6% per annum, compounded
quarterly
o Such are evidenced by five PN’s without due dates executed by
Grijaldo in favor of the bank. But since they were crop loans, they were
due a year after they were incurred:
▪ 6/1/43 – P600
▪ 6/3/43 – P159.11
▪ 6/18/43 – P22.86
▪ 9/9/43 – P300
▪ 9/13/43 – P200
o To secure the loans, Grijaldo executed a chattel mortgage on the crops
on his land in Hacienda Campugas
• Vesting Order No. P-4 and the authority provided for in the Trading with the
Enemy Act, the assets in the Philippines of the Bank of Taiwan, were vested
in the Government of the United States.
o Pursuant to the Philippine Property Act of 1946 of the United States,
these assets, including the loans, were transferred to the Republic by
the US under Transfer Agreement dated July 20, 1954.
o These assets were among the properties that were placed under the
administration of the Board of Liquidators created under EO 372 and
RA Nos. 8 and 477 and other pertinent laws.
• Republic, represented by the Chairman of the Board of Liquidators, made a
written extrajudicial demand upon the appellant for the payment of the account.
o The record shows that the appellant had received the written demand
but he failed to pay.
o The principal amount, computed under the Ballantyne scale of values
as of the time that the loans were incurred, was P889.64; and the
interest due was 1,457.39, a total of P2,377.23.
• Republic filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court of Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, to collect from the appellant the unpaid account.
o The Justice dismissed the case on the ground that the action had
prescribed.
o Republic appealed to the CFI of Neg. Occ. and the court a
quo rendered a decision ordering the appellant to pay the total amount
as of December 31, 1959, plus interest at the rate of 6% from the date
of the filing of the complaint until full payment.
▪ The appellant was also ordered to pay the sum equivalent to
10% of the amount due as attorney's fees and costs.
 • Grijaldo appealed directly to SC but died during the pendency of the appeal
o His legal heirs were ordered by the court to substitute him in acc. with
Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court

ISSUES:
1. W/N Republic has a cause of action? (YES).
2. W/N it has prescribed? (NO).
3. W/N defendant should pay?

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
• Appellant contends that Republic has no privity of contract since the
transaction was between him and the Bank of Taiwan.
o The contention has no merit since pursuant to the Trading with the
Enemy Act, EO 9095, ad Vesting Order P-4, the properties of the Bank
which was in the jurisdiction of the enemy country, japan, were vested
in the US.
o And because of the Phil. Property Act and Transfer Agreements
between the US and the PH, such assets were transferred to the PH,
making the Republic the successor of the rights, title, and interest of
the loans; creating a privity of contract.
▪ Privy – one who subrogates or becomes an assignee to the OG
parties
• The confiscation of the assets by US was an involuntary act of war which made
the US succeed to the rights of the Bank.
o As successor in interest and transferee of the rights, the Republic
became a privy to the OG loan contracts. Hence, they have a legal
right to bring the present action.
• Grijaldo contends that since his loans were secured by a chattel mortgage on
the crops ad such were destroyed through enemy action, his obligation to pay
is also extinguished.
o The argument is wrong since the chattel was merely a security and his
obligation was not to give the crops or the value of such, but was an
obligation to deliver a generic thing, which is the money representing
the sum of the loans.
▪ Article 1263 of the CivCode provides that loss or destruction of
a generic thing doesn’t extinguish the obligation.

SECOND ISSUE:
• Appellant contends that the action has prescribed since the loans became due
on June 1, 1944; and when the complaint was filed on January 17,1961 a
period of more than 16 years had already elapsed — far beyond the period of
ten years when an action based on a written contract should be brought to
court.
• This contention of the appellant has no merit.
o Firstly, the complaint was brought by the Republic not as a nominal
party but in the exercise of its sovereign functions to protect the
interests of the State over a public property.
 ▪ Under paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code:
prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run
against the State.
o Secondly, the running of the period was interrupted by the moratorium
laws (Executive Orders No. 25, dated November 18, 1944;
Executive Order No. 32. dated March 10, 1945; and Republic Act
No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948).
▪ The loans in question were incurred in the year 1943 during the
period of Japanese occupation of the Philippines. This case is
squarely covered by Executive Order No. 25, which became
effective on November 18, 1944, providing for the suspension
of payments of debts incurred after December 31, 1941.
▪ The period of prescription was, therefore, suspended beginning
November 18, 1944.
▪ This Court, in the case of Rutter vs. Esteban, declared on May
18, 1953 that the Moratorium Laws, are unconstitutional; but in
that case, the Court ruled that the laws had suspended the
prescriptive period until May 18, 1953. This ruling was
categorically reiterated in the decision in the case of Manila
Motors vs. Flores,
▪ The cause of action arose on June 1, 1944. The complaint in
the present case was filed on January 17, 1961, or after a
period of 16 years, 6 months and 16 days when the cause of
action arose.
▪ Deducting the period of suspension from that which actually
elapsed shows that the prescriptive period ran for only 8 years
and 16 days. There still remained a period of one year, 11
months and 14 days of the prescriptive period when the
complaint was filed.

THIRD ISSUE:
• Appellant contends that the Ballantyne Scale should be applied at the
time the loans were due and not when they were incurred.
• The total of the loans was P1,281.97 in Japanese war notes. Computed under
the Ballantyne Scale of values as of 1943, this is equivalent to P889.64
o P2,377.23 was arrived at after computing the interest on the principal
sum of P889.64 compounded quarterly from the time the obligations
were incurred in 1943.
• Republic believes that the Ballantyne should be applied as of the time the
obligation was incurred, and that was in June 1943. This stand of the appellee
was upheld by the lower court;
o The lower court is supported by the ruling of SC in Hilado vs. De la
Costa that contracts involving payments in Japanese warnotes may be
enforced in PH courts and in order for the party to recover the actual
value in PH currency, the debtor or bank should pay the Japanese
notes in relation to PH currency on the date where the obli. Was
incurred unless they agree otherwise.
13. TAGAYTAY DEV’T COMPANY V. OSORIO (BARTER OF LANDS)

FACTS:
• Marina Osorio de Ysmael and her husband Halim Ysmael, Antonio E. Osorio,
represented by his attorney-in-fact Leonardo Osorio, Leonardo Osorio and
Natividad Osorio entered into a contract of barter, set out in the public deed
marked Exhibit A, with Tagaytay DevCom (TDC).
o The former conveyed a land measuring 30sqm situated in Indang,
Cavite described by TCT # 9911 issued by the registrar of deeds of
Cavite.
▪ N – Provincial road
▪ S – TDC and Baldamero Roxas
▪ E – Carmen de Melencio
▪ W – Concepcion Aure
o TDC conveyed a land of 30sqm situated in Talisay, Batangas which is
described in TCT #704 issued by the registrar of deeds in Cavite.
• The barter was temporary since the portions have not yet been subdivided and
the technical descriptions are still unknown.
o When the subdivision is done and the necessary plan is approved, the
expenses shall be shouldered by TDC then will a permanent barter take
place.
• TDC then ordered the subdivision and surveyor prepared plan PSD 12907
along with the technical descriptions which were approved by the Director of
Lands and by the Chief Surveyor of the Gen. Land Regis. Office.
o TDC submitted it to the court and it was approved.
• When the final deed of barter was given to the Osorios, Antonio Osorio refused
to sign saying he did not authorize Leonardo Osorio to barter his share but
rather to sell it definitely.
o TDC put a motion in the same case, asking the court pursuant to
Sec.112 of Act No. 496 to compel Antonio to sign or Leonardo if the
former refuses and to register it in the registrar of deeds, while the said
official is to issue the TCTs.
o Antonio once again objected reiterating his reasons and adding that
him signing would put him in estoppel in a case involving his and his
brothers’ rights over the land bartered to TDC.
• After trial, the court ordered Osorio to sign within 5 days and Leonardo, as his
attorney in fact, if the former fails to do so. If they don’t sign, the court shall
order the registrar to register the deed and to issue the TCTs.
o The Osorios’ MR was denied hence this appeal.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the court has jurisdiction over the motion? (YES).
2. W/N the barter is void since Leonardo had no authority? (NO).
3. W/N Antonio cannot sign due to estoppel? (NO).

RULE:
FIRST ISSUE:
• Osorio argues that the court, acting as a land registration court, had no JD
since it was an ordinary civil action to compel him to sign.
 o He invokes Art. 1279 where parties may compel each other, by
ordinary action, to comply with an extrinsic formality required by a
contract.
• The court ruled that the law is unapplicable. Although the purpose was to make
him sign, the motion also had the purpose to eliminate real rights which have
already ended and to record new real rights and interests that have arisen
after the issuance of the decrees and TCTs, which is authorized under Sec.
112 of Act. 496.
o The contract between the parties was already a perfected contract of
barter since the lands were described with sufficient clearness and
accuracy, and was consummated when they took possession of such
lands.

SECOND ISSUE:
• Leonardo, his attorney in fact, also had the proper authority, which was
conformed from New York
o In the contract of agency Antonio executed, he expressly authorized
Leonardo to dispose of his share in any manner which can be
presumed to include barter.
o There is also no longer doubt as to the authority since Antonio signed
with his brothers a memorandum agreement when they leased a piece
of land to Manila Hotel which included the land they received from TDC.
▪ Antonio’s act constitutes a ratification of Leonardo’s authority
and the validity of the barter.

THIRD ISSUE:
• The pendency of the civil case is not a bar to the remedy available to TDC, by
virtue of the motion he put in the registration case.
• The right given by Sec. 112 of Act 496 is independent of the judgement in the
Civil Case.