G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954 by the testator himself and need not be witnessed.
by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed
a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A".
Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of
Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in
value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A",
filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and
nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified
without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father
Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of
the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same
with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last
page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his
last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did
not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it
was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and
at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still,
because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil
Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills,
under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the
trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court
by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and
Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision;
and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to
us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a
person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed
that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943,
holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain
requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not
folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the
three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A"
because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not
even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were
signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of
Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to
sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough
that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or
leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them
should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her
witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this
Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left
margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto.
The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses
who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five
pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect
that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the
new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions
were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795
of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above
provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that
the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's
death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the
petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason
in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the
testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and
among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid
down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome
doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and
controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted
to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution
of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for
the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However,
we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the
title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the
due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding
new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By
parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should
be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by
intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which
dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am.
Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied
probate. With costs.
G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Harvey & O' Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision
of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the
last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this
appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving
party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of
a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme
Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended;
Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia,
on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the
laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and
as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a
compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in
our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American
Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil.,
156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or
published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at
the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this
point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was
nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two
competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the
supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would
then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in
West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will
and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings
orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting
to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant
presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the
documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper
writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of
Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the
oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and
ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that, in vacation,
on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed
Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward
Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the
probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the
proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts
are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal
administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no
attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question
of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has
been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place
other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded
Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of
West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant.
[Original in Spanish]
GR No. L-4113 June 30, 1952
Testament of the late William R. Giberson. LELA G. DALTON, applicant-
appellant,
vs.
SPRING GIBERSON, opponent-appealed.
The facts are related in the decision of the Court.
Messrs. CD Johnston and AP Deen on behalf of the appellant.
Mr. Francisco EF Remotique on behalf of the appellate.
PAUL, J .:
Lela G. Dalton filed 'on February 10, 1949 a request in the Court of First Instance of
Cebupidid, the legalization of a document that, according to her, is a testament by
William R. Giberson, granted on April 29, 1920 in San Francisco, California; that
Giberson was a citizen of the state of Illinois, United States, and resident of Cebu; and
that he died on August 6, 1943 in the concentration camp of the University of Sto,
Tomas, Manila, Philippines.
Spring Giberson, the legitimate son of William R. Giberson, filed an opposition
claiming that the will is apocryphal; which does not represent the true will of the late
Giberson: and which has not been granted in accordance with the law.
On July 1, 1949, the opponent filed a motion requesting the dismissal of the request,
claiming that, before a will issued in a foreign country can be legalized in the Philippine
Islands, it must be demonstrated that said will had been previously legalized in said
country , in accordance with article 1 of Rule 78; that the request does not allege that
the will had already been legalized in California.
The applicant opposed the motion for dismissal. On June 20, 1950, the Judge dismissed
the request, stating: "... Under our existing rules only those wills that have previously
been proved and allowed in the United States, or any state or territory thereof, or any
foreign country, according to to the laws of such state, territory, or country, may be
allowed, filed or recorded in the proper court of first instance in the Philippines...
" Against this order the applicant appeals.
The opponent, in support of his theory, argues that article 635 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been repealed by Rule 78, pursuant to section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Said article 635 of the Civil Procedure Code says:
The testament granted outside the Philippine Islands, which may be
authenticated and legalized in accordance with the laws of the state or country
where it was granted, may be authenticated, legalized and registered in the
Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effectiveness if it had been granted
in accordance with The laws of these Islands.
This article and has been applied in the Babcock Templeton case against Rider
Babcock, 52 Jur. Fil., 134, in which it was declared that the testament granted in
California and that could be legalized in that state, can be legalized in the
Philippines. In the case of Varela v. Varela Calderon, 57 Jur. Fil., 291, the will granted
in Paris, France, by the late Dr. Francisco Varela Calderon was legalized because it was
a will that could be legalized according to the laws of France.
A person can dispose of his property after his death by will. The granting of a will is a
legal act that can be carried out in the Philippines or abroad; if it is granted in a foreign
country, it must be done in accordance with the laws of that country, which is a
universally adopted rule.
The foreigner may dispose of his property in the Philippines after his death by testament
and it is not necessary to grant it in the Philippines; You can do it in your own country
or in another, but in accordance with the laws of the country in which you grant
it. Article 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure, respecting the testator's freedom to grant
his will anywhere, provides that the will that can be legalized in a foreign country in
accordance with the laws of that country can also be legalized in the Philippines. That
provision is substantive, it creates the rights of the beneficiaries of the will: they are
assured that they will be able to legalize in the Philippines the wills granted outside the
Islands if they can be legalized in the country in which they were granted, giving them
cause for action to judicially request the fulfillment of the testator's last will whatever
the place of its granting. Sinesa provision would be truncated the power to test.
When amending this Court the Code of Civil Procedure, only enmendo the procedural
part, but not the substantive part. "The substantive law cannot be amended by
procedural rules." (Kings v. Widow of Light, * 16 Lawyer Journal, 623.) Therefore,
article 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure remains as a substantive law.
And Article 637 reads: "Authenticated and legalized wills in the United States, or in any
state or territory thereof, or in a foreign state or country, in accordance with the laws of
that state, territory or country, may be legalized, registered and filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province in which the testator has movable property, or real estate
effected by said wills. " This article is in conflict with article 635; Actually, you are
nothing but your corollary. If a will issued in a foreign country that can be legalized in
accordance with the laws of that country can also be legalized in the Philippine Islands,
with greater reason the wills already legalized in foreign countries in accordance with
the laws of those countries, they can also be legalized in the Philippines.
Article 1 of Rule 78 is nothing more than a transplantation of Article 637 of the Civil
Procedure Code. We reproduce the two provisions:

RULE 78, - SECTION 1. Wills proved outside Philippines may be allowed

here . - Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of
such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First
Instance in the Philippines.

SEC. 637. Wills proved outside islands may be allowed here . - Wills proved
and allowed in the United States, or any State or Territory thereof, or in a
foreign state or country, according to the laws of such State, Territory, or
country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded in the Court of First Instance of
the province in which the testator has real or personal estate on which such
will may operate .

The words underlined in the second provision are those that do not appear in the first.

Article 1 of Rule 78 does not prevent a testament issued in a foreign country from being
legalized in the Philippines, if it can be legalized in accordance with the laws of that
country, nor does it require that it be previously legalized in that country. It is
unsustainable, therefore, the theory of the opponent.

The order appealed is revoked with costs against the appeal.

G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Philip M. Alo and Crispin M. Menchavez for petitioners.
Nicolas Jumapao for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of Appeals, Sixth
Division (C.A.-G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(Civ. Case No. R-3819) and ordering the dismissal of an action for partition.
The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (Petition, Annex A, pp. 2-4):
It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia
Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby
they willed that "our two parcels of land acquired during our marriage together
with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece,
whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any
child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that
"while each of the testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the
fruits of the two lands aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being
covered by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitio Bucao,
barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu. Bernabe dela Serna
died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by
said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which,
after due publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard
the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in Special Proceedings No.
499, "declara legalizado el documento Exhibit A como el testamento y ultima
voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Serna con derecho por parte du su viuda
superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora al propio tiempo segun el Exhibit
A de gozar de los frutos de los terranos descritos en dicho documents; y habido
consideracion de la cuantia de dichos bienes, se decreta la distribucion sumaria
de los mismos en favor de la logataria universal Manuela Rebaca de Potot
previa prestacion por parte de la misma de una fianza en la sum de P500.00
para responder de cualesquiera reclamaciones que se presentare contra los
bienes del finado Bernabe de la Serna de los años desde esta fecha" (Act Esp.
499, Testamentaria Finado Bernabe de la Serna) Upon the death of Gervasia
Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will
insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, being
Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of Cebu,
but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel
Potot to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed on
March 30, 1954 Spec. Proc. No. 1016-R, In the matter of the Probate of the
Will of Gervasia Rebaca).
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null
and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code
(Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on
appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the
decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive
on the due execution of the testament. Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:
... . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code).
prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of
will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has continued to be used;
and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and testament has
been admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction,
there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof
that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon vs. Saavedra,
51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the
joint will therein mentioned, saying, "assuming that the joint will in question is
valid."
Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by
the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has
conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the
Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint
testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error
thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been
corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor
the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment
rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo
vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and
sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set
litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by
the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will
cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act is valid or
void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the will was
probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.

But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future
misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the
deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share
of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the
conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her
estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a
will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was
concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint
will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the
court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as
to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for
the reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that
explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.

Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her
heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will
in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage
could not make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because
laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may
prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950).

WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. No. 23763-R is affirmed. No Costs.
G.R. No. L-6044 November 24, 1952
FORTUNATA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, BENJAMIN RODRIGUEZ,
MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ DE HALLARE, LUZ RODRIGUEZ DE CARLOS
AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and
ABELARDO RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
Godofredo C. Montesines and Antonio Rodriguez for petitioners.
Lorenzo Sumulong, Guillermo Romero and Antonio C. Masaquel for respondent.
Ramon Ozaeta as amicus curiae.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of respondent Judge dated
August 11, 1952, wherein after overruling the opposition to the institution of the
intestate estate proceedings of the late Flaviano Rodriguez, he appointed Abelardo
Rodriguez administrator of the estate upon filing a bond in the sum of P2,000.
It is averred in the petition that Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, at
Parañaque, Rizal, leaving an estate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are
the widow, Fortunata Vda. de Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and
respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into
a verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make a liquidation of the estate but to
place it under the administration of the widow with the understanding that each of the
six children would be entitled to receive a portion of the income in equal shares from
year to year for the needs of their families provided that they do not exceed the
participation to which they are entitled; that on March 19, 1952, or eight years after the
death of Flaviano Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo Rodriguez filed a petition for
administration of their intestate estate of said deceased in spite of his knowledge that the
estate had no debts and all the heirs were of age; that on June 2, 1952, the other heirs,
petitioners herein, objected to the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from
obligations and the heirs are all of age, no administration proceedings shall be allowed;
that on August 11, 1952, respondent Judge, after overruling the opposition, appointed
Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate upon filing the requisite bond.
Respondents herein, in answer to the petition, admitted the existence of a verbal
agreement entered into between the heirs in 1944, wherein they agreed not to liquidate
the estate and to place it under the administration of the widow in view of the unsettled
conditions then prevailing at the time, but they contend that while that was the
understanding the same was not carried out because in reality it was Benjamin
Rodriguez, one of the petitioners herein, who took over the administration of the estate
and in the discharge of his duties he failed and refused to give to respondent Abelardo
Rodriguez his share in the income which he badly needed for the support of his family,
for which reason he started the intestate proceedings which gave rise to the present
petition for certiorari.
The issue to be determined is whether respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining
the administration proceedings and in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as administrator
of the estate notwithstanding the fact that the estate has no debts and all the heirs
entitled to share in its distribution are all of age.
Under section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no debts and the heirs
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.
Construing the scope of said section 1, (formerly section 596, Act No. 190), this Court
repeatedly held "that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid,
his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19
Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367;
Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Utulo vs. Pasion de Garcia, 66 Phil., 302).
It, therefore, appears from said section 1, as construed by this Court, that when the
estate has no pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not
bound to submit the property to a judicial administration for the reason that it is
superfluous or unnecessary, and in most cases long and costly, in which case the way
left to the heirs is to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. But, is this pattern
mandatory upon the heirs? Should the heirs be unable to agree on a settlement of the
estate, do they have to resort necessarily to an ordinary action of partition? Can they not
choose to institute administration proceedings?
Our answer is that section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort
for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action
of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be
gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the
framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other provisions
that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not only once but in the
whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion
of the heirs.
The inquiry before us is not new. In a case where one of the heirs chose to institute
administration proceedings in court, even if the estate had no debts, and the widow
sought to dismiss the case invoking in support of her contention the doctrine enunciated
in the cases already adverted to, this Court said:

The principal ground of the opposition is that the heirs being of legal age, and
their being no proof that there is any valid and effective credit against the
deceased, no legal reason exists for the court to appoint an administrator, as
prayed for in the petition, citing in support of this contention the doctrine
enunciated in the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil., 321); Bondad
vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232); Baldemor vs. Malangyaon (34 Phil., 367).

It is true that, under section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whenever all
the heirs of a person who died intestate are lawful age and legal capacity, and
there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid, the heirs
may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise,
apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
court proceedings. But there is nothing in this section which prohibits said
heirs from instituting special proceedings for the administration of the intestate
estate if they cannot agree on the extrajudicial partition and appointment of the
same. (Orozco vs. Garcia, 50 Phil., 149, 151.)

In this particular case, however, we find that the core of petitioners' objection is not that
the heirs have erroneously instituted these administration proceedings but that the court
erred in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate. It is claimed that
Abelardo Rodriguez was appointed administrator without the petitioners having been
given an opportunity to be heard. But this claim has no basis it appearing that the parties
had been duly heard before the court issued its order now complained of. It appears that
both parties submitted the names of the persons they wanted to be appointed as
administrator and the court made its choice only after weighing the fitness and
qualifications of the persons recommended. Thus, on this point, the court said:

The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as administrator of the

estate of the deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and does not possess any of the
disqualifications. Moreover, he is one of the heirs left by the deceased.
Inasmuch as one of the oppositors appear to be more qualified to act as
administrator of the estate, the court is inclined to grant the petition presented
by Abelardo Rodriguez. (Annex D)

The petition is dismissed with costs. The preliminary injunction issued is hereby
dissolved.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente
N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14,
1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor
to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without
issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The
will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid
to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition
are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of
the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and
intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in
the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred
and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration,
but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN
DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE,
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and
of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the
time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts
admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record
show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in
the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed
there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in,
and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he
again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese
Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622,
as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-
Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly
after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which
he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the
St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided
there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to
California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering
that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state,
which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home
in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost
by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a
state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same
thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he
has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The
man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in
each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business
in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention
as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence
to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the
only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may
be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-
appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property
by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the
Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We
have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand,
relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of
Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is
that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that
Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of
the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to
the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the
foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept
the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred
the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict
of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference
back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized
be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet
there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be
the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the
rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead
that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And
still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the
Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the
woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected
the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if
both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to
land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged.
In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile
of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce,
valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises
as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of
the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an
application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds
thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination
of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to
apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the
assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own
law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-
laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of
which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is
renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to
the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is
a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them
as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many
cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The
theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining
the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may
be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of
laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law
of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well.
According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application
of foreign laws.
 (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind
its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that
said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile,
or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be
certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal
estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance
with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium
would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and
the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a
will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state
where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding
legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of
the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the
situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court
has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal
property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the
universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was
one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse
and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and
another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should
enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and
enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce
the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the
express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict
of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between
the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the
state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of
the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil.
105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil.
130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but
with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in
the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of
the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to
the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed
by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis
and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00
each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions
filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived
of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on
June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of
the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that
their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17
in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern
his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to
the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
[G.R. No. 54919. May 30, 1984.]
POLLY CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity
as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and
NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, Respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and
allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-
parte presentation of evidence by herein private Respondent.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C.
Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section
I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire
estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed
in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of
her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while
temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her
lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the
laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor;
that after the testatrix’ death, her last will and testament was presented, probated,
allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr.
Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is
also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the
appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties
of the estate located in the Philippines.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein
petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will
in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and
that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could
not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco
Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests)
stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an
ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her
lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent residence at
4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D); that when alive, Adoracion
C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b); that while
in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of
Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the United States of
America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was
admitted and granted probate by the Orphan’s Court Division of the Court of Common
Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin, all
in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of
wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any
disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the
Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
"WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is
hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section
I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the
withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order
allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the
same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss
Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection with two
Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the
withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings
case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made
several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.

On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set
Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In
this motion, the notice of hearing provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the
morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court.
Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the case for
hearing on the Oppositor’s motion to set aside previously filed."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case
was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to
vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the
respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present
evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for
lack of merit. Hence, this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will,
which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs
as, on its face patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the
executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute
herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September 13,
1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her
sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without
or in excess of his jurisdiction when:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic)
upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests
against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the ex-
parte hearing of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
"2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or
authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way of a
motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate — the law especially
providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it
has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of
Court.
"3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete
disregard of Law of Succession.
"4) He denied petitioner’s petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was
adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford
petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a denial of the due process and a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
"5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the time
of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First
Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja v. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792,
July 1955)."cralaw virtua1aw library
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal
of the petitioner’s opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was
adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the motion to withdraw was secured
through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record.
The records show that after the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later
date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition
was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the
petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case
and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The
present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was
Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being
no other opposition to the same.chanrobles law library : red
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general
rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime
which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under
Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Art. 16 par. (2).
x x x evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial
"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."cralaw virtua1aw library
Art. 1039.
"Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."cralaw
virtua1aw library
the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given
away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should
not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and
would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA
358) wherein we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.
x x x April 4, 1984).chanrobles law library
"The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis."cralaw virtua1aw library
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records
will bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until
June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the
order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to
believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce
of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing .
. ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be
embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly
devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record."cralaw virtua1aw library
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and
proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America an not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged
by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284,
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979 superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la
carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado son;
THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant, (1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados
vs. objectos de este legado;
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and
JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees. (2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de
empezar a gozar y administrar de este legado al principiar a curzar la
D. Tañedo, Jr. for appellants. Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero que
pierde el legatario este derecho de administrar y gozar de este legado
J. Palanca, Sr. for appellee. al dejar de continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de Presbiterado
(Sacerdote).

Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada

año VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis
AQUINO, J.:
padres difuntos, y si el actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO
FACTO se le despoja este legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located cargo del actual Parroco y sus sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de
at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was Victoria, Tarlac.
made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of
his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun
lo arriba queda expresado, pasara la administracion de este legado a
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to cargo del actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.
this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate
court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente
Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
todos los productos que puede tener estate legado, ganando o sacando
de los productos anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on administracion, y los derechos correspondientes de las VEINTE (20)
August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco celebrar cada año, depositando
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in todo lo restante de los productos de estate legado, en un banco, a
the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor- nombre de estate legado.
Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a
devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a project
containing the following item:
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing
supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to
palayeros situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de
the nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the
NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE
interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman
TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON; — Titulo Num. 6530, mide
Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors,
16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998
m. cuadrados de superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados the real properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:
de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de
 Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de
Title Lot Area in Tax Ass. the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's
Aquino, declared
No. No. Has. Dec. legal heirs inValue
his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions for
reconsideration.
T- 3663 1.6249 18740 P
6530 340.00
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of
December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo
T- 3445- 24.2998 18730 7,290.00
G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose
6548 C Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to
deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
T- 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00
6525 The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that
Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would
T- 3666 11.9251 18733 take the holy3,580.00
orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to
6521 enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that
since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death, the
same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code
Total amount and value — 44.1163 P13,090.00 and article 870 of the new Civil Code.

Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of
partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate (including the sum
of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the administratrix should deliver
to the devisees their respective shares.
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the
meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the
devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of
Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that
ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19,
1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition
praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased
administration Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands,
and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the
fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On
January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the ricelands
to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957
praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons
entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no
nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and
35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the
testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest inoperative
because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had studied for the
priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust. According to the
legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court. They point out that appellant
priest's change of theory cannot be countenanced in this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where
the intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained,
the primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the
case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When
his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord
with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that
his intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26
Phil. 333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life
and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving
effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209,
223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations
as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-
statement of the provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would
pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and
administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and
administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee would cease to enjoy
and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year
twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the
administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and
his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated
above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the
incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the
products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof for
his administration and the fees corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the
parish priest would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of the
devise in the bank in the name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator
intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest,
who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued
his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with
prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's
nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he
had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity
that has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the
testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only
his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his
nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to
inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens,
except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To
construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his
death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-
degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when
the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or
a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew.
But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude
what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he could
not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son
of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon
Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs.
Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the
affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who
deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not
claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos
Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his
nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not
the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he
was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second
motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's
grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a
seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that
the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had
no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to
the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that
the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death,
when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested,
rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que
estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male
relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have
known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the
efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his
nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in
grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the
seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be
entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that
event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January
31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator
in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is
untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not
support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in
the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only
when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a
priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in
this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old
Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should
be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and
those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga
efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho
de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2),
which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said
ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as
if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or
that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's
win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be
intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong
Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, SC L-5620, July 31, 1954.
25JUL
FACTS
Benedicto delos Reyes, during his lifetime, sold some of his properties to the heirs of
his executor. The said sale was challenged by the heirs of the decedent, contending
therein that said properties cannot be legally disposed by the decedent because it forms
part of his estate to be inherited by petitioners, the decedent heirs. Both the trial court
upheld the validity of the sale between decedent and the heirs of the executor having
said that the sold properties were sold before the death of the decedent and can no
longer be part of the inheritance.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled of the property sold by the decedent during
his lifetime.
RULING
It depends. The general rule is that the heirs cannot validly claim ownership over the
properties in question if alienated prior to the decedent’s death. The rights to succession
are transmitted at the moment of death of the decedent (Art. 777 of the Civil Code)
Exception is when said alienation is subsequently declared void as when there is intent
to defraud and to deprive the heirs of their legitimes. In such case, said alienation is
void. Here, the sale was declared void for being absolutely simulated and because of
intent to defraud heirs of their legitimes. Hence, said properties still form part of the
inheritance of the deceased.
Guinto v. Medina, 50 O.G. #1 p. 199, October 7, 1953.
25JUL
FACTS
Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against Santiago Medina alleging that he
has been in possession of the said parcel of land since 1934 and that Medina by means
of force and intimidation deprived him of his possession thereof. The trial court ruled in
favor of Guinto but it dismissed the prayer for damages. Pending appeal, Medina died.
Medina was substituted by his heirs. The Court awarded the damages appealed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the heirs of Medina are liable for damages, and if in the affirmative to
what extent.
RULING
YES. The action to recover damages survives notwithstanding the death of the adverse
party whom damages are sought to be recovered. In this case, the heirs of Medina are
liable to pay the damages as they are merely substituted in the place of Medina upon his
death. However, their liability is only to the extent of the value of the property, which
they might have received from the deceased defendant.
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA,
DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-
appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land
situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson
against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado,
Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left
the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his
widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in
1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands
thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria
Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby
they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation,
Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced
her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death
(Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered
decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession
of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants
interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is
likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was
merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four
illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda
died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background,
it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow
Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death"
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her
husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had
entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that
future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1
Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are
illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not
entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in
force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and
article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for
the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article
2253, new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that
rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this
is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same
origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in
this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise
thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided
said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands
that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old
Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of
the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in
a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor
children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their
mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them,
this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the
opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real
property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be
valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same
document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential
formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has
no valid effect.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972 Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator- Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA,
MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of
Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, appellant. .
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972 approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I,
in its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. Borja, Administrator".
VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant. same compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II,
in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja,
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972 Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix".

TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of
Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-appellee, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the
vs. Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not
Tangco, defendant-appellant. a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said
hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administrator in
L-28040 Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6
October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was
probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and
administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When
Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate
estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took
unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in
1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to
Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has
been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar,
some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate
of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order
to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely,
Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer,
Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and
settle, with finality, the various court litigations, controversies,
claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the
administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of
the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed
voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into and execute this
agreement under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala
properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more
specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de
la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la
Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur
con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el
Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount
of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which
represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-
rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed
de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment
and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc.
No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and
to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken
from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the
proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment
of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in
favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development
Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and
also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance
taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of
P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of
Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and
paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the
heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized
to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of
the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement
(approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de
Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for
themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators,
and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive,
remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions,
cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money,
 accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in
equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have against each
other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-
Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI
Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case
filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release
each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all
liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the
administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as
liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first
spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as
heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the
payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de
Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de
Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall
issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of
the sale of the properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this
agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise,
the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL
AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their
hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12
October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866;
and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special
Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances.
The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court
declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case
No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval
(G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963
is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the
ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on
the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3)
that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and
the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara.
74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will
for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the
basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is
likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a
decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left
no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been
submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement
was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de
Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing
provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he
left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara
vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have
already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is
a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the
probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is
apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and
Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum
of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as
the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly
conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not
applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate
of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear
object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all
her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja
and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately
from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is
ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the
contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous
agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the
Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered
settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court,
gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious
reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco
de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the
present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her
successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament
and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a
previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not
apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de
Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one
hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction
was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract,
even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference
between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the
Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil
Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in
compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A
expressed no definite period for its performance, the same
was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its
effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a
limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms
entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de
Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja,
except that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition,
Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the
following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation
of the sale of the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner
heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said
property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the
purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty
(60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and
void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a
party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been
finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963";
and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so
done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the
compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore
transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco,
P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all
surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in
Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit
Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and
supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence,
the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated
in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover
manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made
within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex
1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco
for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until
authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it,
and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality
of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the
contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to
approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was
not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she
was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding
No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant,
since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of
her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she
owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar
her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in
favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided
for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
 Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a
coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is
void because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late
Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the
agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the
text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of
her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832
(Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of
13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its
execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964,
had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that
Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed
amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order
and motion above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963,
which already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized.
What the record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had
unilaterally attempted to back out from the compromise agreement, pleading various
reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on
Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the
allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not
preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this
Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting
Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which
objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's
attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement
before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step
might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to
reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to
Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No.
28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion
of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory
compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original
compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court
order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which,
as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120
days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and,
therefore, its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has
affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of
P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is
that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest
was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had
formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the
devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561,
30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a
revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties
of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first
wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by his second
spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial)
partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio
Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the
presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil
Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de
Borja has become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court
in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of
Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de
Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between
the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees,
its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally
acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and
their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration
Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54
Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners:
the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de
Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja
(V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E.
Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay;
containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at
P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of
Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above
described declared exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer
defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his
parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the
Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and
exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that
the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late
Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be
entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda
in question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly
admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended
Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in
the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July
1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also
filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda.
de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an
inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the
"Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once
more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in
Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted
therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under
the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain
admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of
his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts,
supporting the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below
declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the
private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the
following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado
(equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal
y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire
Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount
P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that
upon receipt of a subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the
sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo)
wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo
issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would
represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by
Francisco de Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived
from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n.,
pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the
admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since
probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property,
but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his
share of the original Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can
not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the buyer,
pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
 xxx xxx xxx

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of

the husband.

We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness
Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his
share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was
merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of
ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were
already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable,
since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how
and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of
artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.

As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page
14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de
Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits
3 and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de
Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of
1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which
of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly
self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.

It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3",
"4" and "7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question;
but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the
declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such
of much greater probative weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit
"F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda
de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by
proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco.

No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for
damages should be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the
settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from
this Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-
28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.
 G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and
PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors, Petitioners,
vs. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA,
MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and
HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of
Abra, Respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.
MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil
Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions
for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned
case.chanrobles virtual law library
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First
Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.chanrobles
virtual law library
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before
the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the
complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended
complaint.chanrobles virtual law library
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said
motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the
plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her
minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing
immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party
in interest and has no legal personality to sue.chanrobles virtual law library
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing
the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal
pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel
for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff
filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the
counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff
filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming
that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but
the same was denied.chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, this petition for review.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration
of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court,
yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The
records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975
while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court
had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court
prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the
proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
"whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform
the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by
the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court
that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of
parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution,
dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to
sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be
deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The
moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the
property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being
heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died
her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs
have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest
in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.chanrobles virtual law library
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative
of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may
be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the
wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do
not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property
affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased
plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects
primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives
even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what
the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff
that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done
for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the
court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the
respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only
asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle
be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila
earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for
substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court.
This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that
under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint
a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the
deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be
appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court
has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules
of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing
the substitution of parties in the case.chanrobles virtual law library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the
respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children, who
are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a qualified person as
guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.chanrobles virtual law
library

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173292 September 1, 2010
MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1 2
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision dated 20
December 2005 and Resolution dated 21 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80355. The CA
affirmed with modification the Order3 dated 2 June 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 30, Manila (RTC).
The Antecedent Facts
The undisputed facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in
Manila a Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for
"Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages."
Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased)
Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora corner Limay
Streets, Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila; that the said lot was registered in her name under
TCT No. 63467 at the Register of Deeds of Manila; that sometime in July 1992, she
discovered that the title to the said property was transferred by appellee and the latter’s
wife in their names in August 1991 under TCT No. 0-199377 by virtue of a Deed of
Sale dated February 12, 1973; that the said deed was executed through fraud, forgery,
misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void; that she, with the help of her
husband’s relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem; that despite repeated pleas and
demands, appellee refused to reconvey to her the said property; that she filed a
complaint against appellee before the office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over
the subject property; and that since the matter was unsettled, the barangay x x x issued x
x x a certification to file [an] action in court, now the subject of controversy.
After Memoracion x x x finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October
30, 1996. Through a Manifestation, Memoracion’s counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri,
notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidenced by a
certificate thereof.
For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff’s
reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a party’s death,
pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the case
to continue would result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the
defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff in this case.
On June 2, 1997, the trial court issued the appealed Order in a disposition that reads:
"Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, this case is ordered dismissed without prejudice
to the prosecution thereof in the proper estate proceedings."
On October 17, 1997, Memoracion’s son-heir, Edgardo Z. Cruz, manifested to the trial
court that he is retaining the services of Atty. Neri for the plaintiff. Simultaneously,
Atty. Neri filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 2, 1997 Order. However, the
said motion was subsequently denied by Acting Presiding Judge Cielito N. Mindaro-
Grulla [on October 31, 2000].
Thereafter, Edgardo Cruz, as an heir of Memoracion Cruz, filed a notice of appeal in
behalf of the deceased plaintiff, signed by Atty. Neri, but the appeal was dismissed by
Judge Mindaro-Grulla, [stating that] the proper remedy being certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. On appellant’s motion for reconsideration, Judge Lucia Pena
Purugganan granted the same, stating that the remedy under the circumstances is
ordinary appeal.4
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
Petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz, represented by Edgardo Z. Cruz, filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On 20 December 2005, the CA rendered judgment affirming with
modification the RTC decision. We quote the dispositive portion of the CA’s decision
below.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION. The trial
court’s directive as to the prosecution of the action in the proper estate proceedings
is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution of 21
June 2006.6
Hence, this appeal.
The Issues
The issues for resolution in this case are:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruz’s
Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a
purely personal action which did not survive her death; and
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming with modification the RTC
Order dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance
and Damages.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the appeal meritorious.
The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance
and Damages survived the death of petitioner
The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was
elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena,7 to wit:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action
and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained
[of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental.8
If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives
the death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato,9 we held that a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property
and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of
petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.
The CA erred in affirming RTC’s dismissal of the
Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages
When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily applies, viz:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform
the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The foregoing section is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court:
SEC. 17. Death of party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within
said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased’s counsel to
inform the court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceased’s
legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending
action. As explained in Bonilla:
x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the
death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to
the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased
vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or
intestate proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,] her claim or right to the
parcels of land x x x was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs
upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent
Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.10
If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal
representative fails to appear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where
the case is pending to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to
protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the
deceased and his estate.111avvphi1
In the instant case, petitioner (plaintiff) Memoracion Z. Cruz died on 30 October 1996.
Her counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court of such death on 13 January
1997, through a Manifestation stating thus:
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully gives
notice that the plaintiff, Memoracion Z. Cruz, died on October 30, 1996, in Manila as
shown by a Certificate of Death, a certified true copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "A" hereof.
(Sgd.) EDGARDO Z. CRUZ
Plaintiff
Consistent with our ruling in Heirs of Haberer v. Court of Appeals,15 we consider such
Manifestation, signed by Memoracion’s heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining Atty. Neri’s
services as counsel, a formal substitution of deceased Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo
Cruz. It also needs mention that Oswaldo Cruz, although also an heir of Memoracion,
should be excluded as a legal representative in the case for being an adverse party
therein.16
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Court of Appeals’
Decision dated 20 December 2005 and Resolution dated 21 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80355. We REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 30, Manila, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

The legal representative of the deceased plaintiff is her son EDGARDO CRUZ whose
address is at No. 3231-E Tabora St., Bo. Obrero, Tondo, Manila.

x x x x12

On 24 January 1997, respondent (defendant) Oswaldo Z. Cruz moved to dismiss the

case alleging that it did not survive Memoracion’s death. The RTC granted the motion
to dismiss in the assailed Order dated 2 June 1997.

We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier, the
petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and property rights, and hence,
survives the death of petitioner Memoracion. The RTC was informed, albeit
belatedly,13 of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of
her legal representative, Edgardo Cruz. What the RTC could have done was to require
Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as party to the pending
case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and
established jurisprudence.

We note that on 17 October 1997, Edgardo Cruz filed with the RTC a Manifestation,
stating that he is retaining the services of Atty. Roberto T. Neri. We quote:14

UNDERSIGNED HEIR of the late Memoracion Z. Cruz respectfully manifests that he

is retaining the services of ATTY. ROBERTO T. NERI as counsel for the plaintiff.
Bough v. Modesto, 94 Phil, January 28, 1954.
25JUL
FACTS
Bruno Modesto, Bough and Restituto Anapo executed a private document whereby
Modesto agreed that he would share to the latter-parties whatever property that he will
receive by inheritance from his wife, who predeceased him eventually. It was proved in
such private document that the properties were to be divided and proportioned. Bough
and Restituto instituted the present action to secure judgment ordering Modesto to
divide the properties left by his wife in the manner and form provided for in such
private document.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contract which contains object of which is Modesto’s inheritance is
valid and binding between the parties.

RULING
YES. The contract is valid. It is well settled that rights by inheritance are acquired and
transmitted upon the death of the decedent. With this, it follows that it is perfectly legal
for an heir to enter into a contract of the nature of the document. The contract becomes
effective only when Modesto is declared as heir but his right over the inheritance
accrues from the time his wife died.
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-55000 July 23, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED,
PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO,
JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V.
BORROMEO, JR., heirs-appellants,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-62895 July 23, 1987
JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As
presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region VII,
RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp.
Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L.
ANTIGUA, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-63818 July 23, 1987
DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R, Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as Presiding
Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, as a formal party, and
ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ and NUMERIANO
ESTENZO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO
BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-65995 July 23, 1987
PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO,
and JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the Estate
of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L.
ANTIGUA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu.
G.R. No. 41171
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13,
1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the
said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed
Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof.
The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The document, drafted in
Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the deceased in the presence of
Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo who acted as
witnesses.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due trial, the
probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a
forgery.
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of the
will was affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et al. v. Crispin
Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656).
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties
came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the
intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
The following petitions or claims were filed: 2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and all his
brothers and sisters predeceased him.
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo
filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination of heirship. There 3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
was no opposition filed against said petition.
a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for
declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the death of
filed an opposition to this petition. Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios Cuenco Borromeo, who died on
March 28, 1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro, petitioners herein.
Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani Morre, Rosario
Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
petition for declaration of heirs and determination of shares. The petition was
opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme Borromeo. 4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an only
daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the following children:
4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo,
Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe Borromeo
a. Anecita Ocampo Castro
Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana
Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed
oppositions to this claim. b. Ramon Ocampo

When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following facts c. Lourdes Ocampo
were established:
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter having
predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8) children, namely, e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose
Barcenilla, Jr.
Jose Ma. Borromeo
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the
Cosme Borromeo following children:

Pantaleon Borromeo a. Marcial Borromeo

Vito Borromeo b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife, Remedios
Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam
Paulo Borromeo
c. Asuncion Borromeo
Anecita Borromeo
d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.
Quirino Borromeo and
e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.
Julian Borromeo
f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.
 The last three died leaving no issue. On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an order
declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs of the
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left deceased Vito Borromeo:
the following children:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following
children: 3. Vitaliana Borromeo

aa. Federico Borromeo 4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera

bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85) 5. Salud Borromeo

cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr. 6. Asuncion Borromeo

dd. Jose Borromeo 7. Marcial Borromeo

ee. Consuelo Borromeo 8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and

ff. Pilar Borromeo 9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo

gg. Salud Borromeo The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be
divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.

c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his children:
aa. Maria Borromeo Atega
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B.
Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito
Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. In this
same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition
the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in
the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value of the
4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's fees shall be taken and paid
from this segregated portion.

bb. Luz Borromeo On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir
under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as
cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of
the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted,
dd. Rosario Borromeo in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all
other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled
to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz
natural child.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the
court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the
deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he
submitted to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his
claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary
Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong,
Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-
Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B.
Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine
heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was
opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from
asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed
before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the
distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is
void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter.
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five
declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to
Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of Vito Borromeo.
A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's order
dated December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of
the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 order, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim against the
decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which constitute all of the shares
of the heirs in the decedent's estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor.
The claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement, according to the
petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is improper. He alleges
that the claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement was filed beyond
the time allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after there
had been a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30,
1969), the approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the
administrator to partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere memorandum,
the existence of the waiver agreement was brought out.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary
Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on
June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is
without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights
before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer.
Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of
inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to
inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not
certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were,
therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article
1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their
acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the
distribution of the estate.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of
the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can
accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the
death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to
the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver document on
July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo
was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver
document itself.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the
waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or
renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the
properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of a partition of the properties of the
estate needing approval of the court because it was executed in the course of the
proceedings. lie further maintains that the probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate
only after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is
distributed to those entitled to the same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties
included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons
with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former.
Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a
right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle
established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to
which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may
elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into
possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the
moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is
vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary
portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs,
therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the
estate was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be
considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the
existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to
relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The
intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and
when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is
possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not
have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October
27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled
"Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the
case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of
Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of money
in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or
claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In
turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this
document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other
signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled
to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never
meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise,
there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention
the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of
the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared
heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This
Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June
29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia
Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an
intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for
said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of assignment) in
turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the
same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation
of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo
and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this
document on March 24, 1969.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and declared
it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on March
30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower
court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying
the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December 24,
1974, is hereby SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 55000
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974, declaring the waiver
document earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate court certified this
case to this Court as the questions raised are all of law.
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they also
question the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the action filed by
claimant Fortunato Borromeo.
The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed on July 31,
1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own any hereditary right
in the intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo because said hereditary right was
only acquired and owned by them on April 10, 1969, when the estate was ordered
distributed.
They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of waiver of
hereditary right in the present case because there was no object, which is hereditary
right, that could be the subject matter of said waiver, and, therefore, said waiver of
hereditary right was not only null and void ab initio but was inexistent.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without any formal
pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of the waiver
agreement and without notice to the parties concerned, two things which are necessary
so that the lower court would be vested with authority and jurisdiction to hear and
decide the validity of said waiver agreement, nevertheless, the lower court set the
hearing on September 25, 1973 and without asking for the requisite pleading. This
resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of December 24, 1974, which approved
the validity of the waiver agreement. The appellants contend that this constitutes an
error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary rights in
favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document tacitly and
irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by virtue of the same act, they lost their rights
because the rights from that moment on became vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no
need for a person to be declared as heir first before he can accept or repudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he is certain of the death of the person from whom
he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. At the time of the signing of the
waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain
that Vito Borromeo was already dead and they were also certain of their right to the
inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its jurisdiction to decide the
claim, the appellee asserts that on August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an order
specifically calling on all oppositors to the waiver document to submit their comments
within ten days from notice and setting the same for hearing on September 25, 1973.
The appellee also avers that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance involves no
question of title to property and, therefore, the probate court can decide the question.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The appellants
in this case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito Borromeo are contesting the
validity of the trial court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato
Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo under the waiver agreement.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can not be
validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing
intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this case.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all the eight (8)
intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs giving to the respondent
and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots was filed inspite
of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold
their hereditary rights to the respondent.
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of
assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of the deed of
assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue against the purported waiver of
hereditary rights.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the
trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement
because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 62895
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno, representative of
some of the heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate closure of Special Proceeding
No. 916-R. A similar motion dated May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora.
Both motions were grounded on the fact that there was nothing more to be done after
the payment of all the obligations of the estate since the order of partition and
distribution had long become final.
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to resolve the
aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition for mandamus
before the Court of Appeals to compel the respondent judge to terminate and close
Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending motions to compel
the petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real properties of the
estate and an accounting of the cash in his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and
that mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary function, the
appellate court denied the petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the motion filed on
April 28, 1972 for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot be justified by
the filing of the motion for inventory and accounting because the latter motion was filed
only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the
respondent judge to decide or resolve a case or matter within three months from the date
of its submission.
The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had already been
resolved when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents previously set
in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant to the resolution and restraining
order issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the
exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of
the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order dated
August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty.
Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they
are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that
40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated and
reserved for attorney's fees.
According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197,
Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine (9) declared
heirs the properties due to the following circumstances:
 1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to
segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees;
2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as
beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of the waiver agreement signed by
the heirs representing the 5/9 group which is still pending resolution by this
Court (G.R. No. 4117 1);
3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his
accounting; and
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing annotations of
notices of lis pendens on the different titles of the properties of the estate.
Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet distributed to some of
the declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending resolution of
the waiver agreement, this Court in its resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to expedite the determination of Special
Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the co-administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to
submit an inventory of real properties of the estate and to render an accounting of cash
and bank deposits realized from rents of several properties.
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial court
dated December 24, 1974;
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and
inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of
Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive,Judge of
the Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents from
further acting on any and all incidents in Special proceedings No. 916-11
because of the affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
in G.R. No. 63818.
the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to
the submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of
the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as co-administrator of the estate, if he has
not vet done so, as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This
must be effected with all deliberate speed.
G.R. No. 63818
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo filed a
motion for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, presided over
by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from further acting in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants alleged, among others, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for the
production of the certificates of title and to deposit the same with the Branch
Clerk of Court, presumably for the ready inspection of interested buyers. Said
motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its order of October 2, 1978 which,
however, became the subject of various motions for reconsideration from
heirs-distributees who contended that as owners they cannot be deprived of
their titles for the flimsy reasons advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the
motions for reconsideration, Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions for
production of titles.
7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another incident
involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of herein movants
Petra O. Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam In connection with said incident,
Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which the tion. presiding, Judge Considered
direct contempt because among others, Atty. Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon.
Presiding Judge stands to receive "fat commission" from the sale of the entire
property. Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being declared in
contempt of court with the dim prospect of suspension from the practice of his
profession. But obviously to extricate himself from the prospect of contempt
and suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose rapproachment and ultimately joined
forces with Atty. Antigua, et al., who, together, continued to harass
administrator
xxx xxx xxx
9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother of the
Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who are
agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy out the individual heirs, on
the one hand, and the herein movants, on the other, who are not willing to sell
their distributive shares under the terms and conditions presently proposed. In
this tug of war, a pattern of harassment has become apparent against the herein
 movants, especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the harassments employed
by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending motions for the removal of administrator
Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank which
seeks to invade into the privacy of the personal account of Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, and the other matters mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More
harassment motions are expected until the herein movants shall finally yield to
the proposed sale. In such a situation, the herein movants beg for an entirely
independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said incidents.
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take cognizance of this
proceeding, including the incidents above-mentioned, he is liable to be
misunderstood as being biased in favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced
against the herein movants. Incidents which may create this impression need
not be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari
and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to state
herein that respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown undue interest in
pursing the sale initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al. Significantly, a
brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is married to a sister of Atty.
Domingo L. Antigua.
17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate cannot be
legally done without the conformity of the heirs-distributees because the
certificates of title are already registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of the
agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos urged the heirs-
distributees to sell the entire property based on the rationale that proceeds
thereof deposited in the bank will earn interest more than the present income of
the so called estate. Most of the heirs-distributees, however. have been
petitioner timid to say their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose
Cuenco Borromeo have had the courage to stand up and refuse the proposal to
sell clearly favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos.
xxx xxx xxx
20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the shotgun
motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents now pending in
the court below which smack of harassment against the herein petitioners. For,
regardless of the merits of said incidents, petitioners respectfully contend that
it is highly improper for respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos to continue to
preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the following circumstances:
(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as
initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to a
brother of respondent.
(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the conformity
of the heirs-distributees, and petitioners have openly refused the sale,
to the great disappointment of respondent.
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents are
clearly intended to harass and embarrass administrator Jose Cuenco
Borromeo in order to pressure him into acceding to the proposed sale.
(d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners by
failing to resolve the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose Cuenco
Borromeo and the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims by the other
lawyers were resolved by respondent after petitioners refused the
proposed sale. (pp. 41-43, Rollo)
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking
further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also ordered the
transmission of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Region VII for re-raffling.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on April
11, 1983. Hence, the present petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P.
Burgos from further hearing the case of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders
the remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for
re-raffling.
The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because Judge
Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu sometime
before the latest reorganization of the judiciary. However, we decide the petition on its
merits for the guidance of the judge to whom this case will be reassigned and others
concerned.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been harassed. They
contend that Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual interest in the proposed sale of the
entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that
this disinterest is shown by the judge's order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of
the estate at P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the administrator to sell so
much of the properties of the estate to pay the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants.
To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos would have been unreasonable because his
orders against the failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to give an
accounting and inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. They
claim that the respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of the resolution
of this Court directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement and adjudication of the
case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the disqualification of judge
Burgos would delay further the closing of the administration proceeding as he is the
only judge who is conversant with the 47 volumes of the records of the case.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed. countered that
Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of the estate on October
11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled out to make an accounting of what t he was
supposed to have received as rentals for the land upon which the Juliana Trade Center is
erected, from January, 1977 to February 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the
withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order to bolster the agitation to
sell as proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to
a series of conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty.
Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to
cover up the projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua.
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by petitioner
Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required to file an
inventory when he has already filed one to account for cash, a report on which the
administrators had already rendered: and to appear and be examined under oath in a
proceeding conducted by Judge Burgos lt was also prayed that subpoena duces tecum be
issued for the appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,
bringing all the bank records in the name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his
wife as well as the appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda Borromeo Talam and
another heir distributee Vitaliana Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the
motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.;
Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another
subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the
Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register of Deeds
for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf of the
heirs of Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr., joined
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief of the administrator.
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and
produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court presided order by Judge Burgos.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding
Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the titles in court.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June 14, 1979,
before the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the private
respondents' motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash the subpoena.1avvphi1
It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P. Burgos is not
inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a miscarriage
of justice Because for the past twelve years, he had not done anything towards the
closure of the estate proceedings except to sell the properties of the heirs-distributees as
initiated by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate
Court had already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition, more
specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at P6,700,000.00,
where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of partiality on
the part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. In the case of Bautista v.
Rebeuno (81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first
sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the
Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may
not be legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances
appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor or of
either partly or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith
in the Courts of Justice is not impaired, "The better course for the Judge under
such circumstances is to disqualify himself "That way he avoids being
misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserve ed. what is
more important, the Ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound reasons. As
Earlier stated, however, the petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P.
Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the
remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling
should be DENIED for the decision is not only valid but the issue itself has become
moot and academic.
G.R. No. 65995
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and all
incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this petition and No.
63818. They also pray that all acts of the respondents related to the said special
proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the respondent Judge was disqualified by the
appellate court be declared null and void and without force and effect whatsoever.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all incidents in
Special Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the heirs-distributees to
the estate, of the distributed properties already titled in their names as early as 1970,
notwithstanding the pending inhibition case elevated before this Court which is
docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding No. 916-R
requires only the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants who were
individually hired by their respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees should be
legally charged against their respective clients and not against the estate.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory one and barred
by res judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No. 54232 directed the
respondent Judge to expedite the settlement and liquidation of the decedent's estate.
They claim that this resolution, which was already final and executory, was in effect
reversed and nullified by the Intermediate Appellate Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP -
11145 — when it granted the petition for certiorari and or prohibition and disqualified
Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No.
916R as well as ordering the transmission of the records of the case to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983,
which was appealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 63818).
We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the obligation of
the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired their respective lawyers.
The portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating the exhorbitantly
excessive amount of 40% of the market value of the estate from which attorney's fees
shall be taken and paid should be deleted.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No.
63818, we grant the petition.
WHEREFORE, —
(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24,
1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito
Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being
NULL and VOID;
(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver
document valid is hereby SET ASIDE;
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering the
inhibition of Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special
Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and academic. The judge who has
taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall immediately
conduct hearings with a view to terminating the proceedings. In the event that
the successor-judge is likewise disqualified, the order of the Intermediate
Appellate Court directing the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu to re-raffle the case shall be implemented:
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue seeking to
restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is
MOOT and ACADEMIC:
(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily terminate
the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an
inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash and
bank deposits by the petitioner-administrator of the estate as required by this
Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983; and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the
market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid
should be, as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should collect from the
heirs-distributees who individually hired them, attorney's fees according to the
nature of the services rendered but in amounts which should not exceed more
than 20% of the market value of the property the latter acquired from the estate
as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 24955 September 4, 1926
JULIAN SOLLA, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. URSULA ASCUETA, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Marcelino Lontok for plaintiffs-appellants.
Antonio Belmonte, Miguel Florentino, Jose A. Espiritu and Camus, Delgado and Recto
for defendants-appellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
These are two appeals by the plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
The court finds that the plaintiffs Rosenda Lagmay and Silvestra Sajor are the surviving
legatees of the testratrix Maria Solla; that the plaintiff Julian Solla and Lucia Solla are
heirs of Sergio Solla; Ambrosio Lagmay is the heir of the deceased Cayetana Solla;
Francisco Serna, 2. and Juana Baclig of the deceased Josefa Solla; Pedro Serna and
Agapita Serna of the deceased Jacinto Serna, and that Pedro Garcia is nephew and heir
of the deceased Matias Seveda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That the defendant Ursula is the widow of the deceased Leandro Serano; that the other
defendants Simeon, Cesario, Santiago, Primitiva and Maxima, surnamed Serrano, are
the children and heirs of the said Leandro Serrano, who died on August 5, 1921; that
Simeon Serrano is the executor of Leandro Serrano and possesses the property claimed
by the plaintiffs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That Leandro Serrano during his lifetime also possessed and enjoyed the said property
up to the day of his death; that this property, the possession or delivery of which is
sought by the plaintiffs, should be separated from the estate of Leandro Serrano, with
the exception of the parcel of land bought from Matias Seveda, Exhibit 5; and the
defendants, especially Simeon Serrano, are ordered to separate and deliver the same to
each and everyone of the plaintiffs together with one-half of the fruits, or the value
thereof, from September 5, 1921; that the parcels of land referred to are indicated in
Maria Solla's will Exhibit B and more particularly described in plaintiffs' Exhibit A. It is
ordered that a partition, in accordance with the law, be made of the land in which the
plaintiffs have a participation. It is also ordered that the defendants, especially, the
executor Simeon Serrano, deliver to the plaintiffs their respective share in cash or in
other property, as a legacy, with one-half of the costs against each of the two parties. It
is ordered.
In support of their appeal, the defendants-appellants assigned the following supposed
errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit: chanrobles virtual law
library
1. The trial court erred in holding that the lack of appropriate description of each parcel
of land claimed is no bar to this action, and that said defect was ignored in the
stipulation of facts; chanrobles virtual law library
2. The trial court erred in holding that at the trial of the case the attorneys for both
parties also agreed before the court that the latter might decide the case on Exhibit A is
evidence of the plaintiffs, and in holding that said Exhibit A is a correct statement of the
property left by the deceased Maria Solla and that the attorney for the defendants
admitted it as such; chanrobles virtual law library
3. The trial court erred in not considering in its judgment Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
of the defendants as evidence, and considering the document Exhibit 4 of said
defendants as deficient, weak and worthless evidence; chanrobles virtual law library
4. The trial court in not holding that the action of the plaintiffs in this case has
prescribed; chanrobles virtual law library
5. The trial court erred in interpreting and holding that paragraph 3 of Leandro Serrano's
will, Exhibit C, ordered the delivery of the legacies left by Maria Solla in her will
Exhibit B, to the plaintiffs, and that said paragraph affects each and everyone of the
parcels of land in the property deeds of Leandro Serano, Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7,
and in holding that the said paragraph 3 of Leandro Serrano's will cancels all of the
rights acquired by him, and is the immediate cause of the action brought by the
plaintiffs; chanrobles virtual law library
6. The trial court erred in not holding that the third clause of Leandro Serrano's will,
Exhibit C, refers only to the pious bequests specified in Maria Solla's will, Exhibit
B; chanrobles virtual law library
7. The trial court erred in ordering the separation and delivery of the unidentified and
undetermined estate of Leandro Serrano, together with half of the fruits or their value
from September 5, 1921, and in ordering the partition of the unidentified and
undetermined property between the parties without designating the shares; chanrobles
virtual law library
8. The lower court erred in ordering the defendants to separate and deliver the property
in question to the plaintiffs, as well as one-half of the fruits of the same from September
5, 1921; chanrobles virtual law library
9. The lower court erred in not holding the same of the property of Maria Solla was
inherited by Leandro Serrano by universal title and some by renunciation and sale by
the legatees, which title was further protected and cleared by acquisitive prescription,
and in not holding that said property of Maria Solla was merged with the estate which
passed into the hands of the universal heir Leandro Serrano; chanrobles virtual law
library
10. The lower court erred in holding that the property in question does not belong to the
estate of Leandro Serrano; chanrobles virtual law library
11. The lower court erred in issuing the order of December 13, 1924 reinstating
Rosenda Lagmay as one of the plaintiffs, and in holding that Lucia Solla is one of the
plaintiffs when her name as such plaintiff had been stricken out; chanrobles virtual law
library
12. The lower court erred in not considering the last amendment presented by the
plaintiffs to their amended complaint; chanrobles virtual law library
13. The lower court erred in not considering the amended answer of the defendants of
October 14, 1924; chanrobles virtual law library
14. The lower court erred in denying the motion for dismissal of September 3, 1924;
and chanrobles virtual law library
15. The lower court erred in denying the motion for a new trial filed by the
defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellants, in support of their appeal, assign the
following supposed errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to
wit: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) The trial court committed an error in holding that the silence of the plaintiffs leads to
the belief that they consented to the exclusive enjoyment of the said property by
Leandro Serrano; and (2) in not ordering the defendants, as heirs of Leandro Serrano, to
render an account to the plaintiffs of the products of the lands of the deceased Maria
Solla from the time the said Leandro Serrano took possession thereof as executor of the
deceased Maria Solla.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The case having been called for trial on October 15, 1924, the parties submitted the
following statement of facts and petitioned the court to render judgment thereon:
AGREEMENT
Both parties admit the following facts to be true: chanrobles virtual law library
1. Dña. Maria Solla died in June, 1883, in the municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur,
leaving a will executed and recorded in accordance with the laws then in force, but
which had not been probated in accordance with the Code of Civil
Procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. There were named in said will, as legatees, Sergio Soll, Cayetano Solla, Josefa Solla,
Jacinto Serna, Rosenda Lagmay, Silvestra Sajor and Matias Seveda, and Leandro
Serrano, as universal heir, with their shares given them by the will above-
mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. Said legatees or their descendants or heirs did not judicially claim their legacies
during the life-time of Leandro Serrano, of which he had taken possession, neither was
any testamentary proceeding instituted for the settlement of the estate left by Maria
Solla and that Leandro Serrano did not deliver the legacies in question, which he
possessed in his name until his death, having declared the property for taxation as his
own and collected the income therefrom for
himself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
4. That the plaintiffs Julian Solla, Lucia Solla, Ambrosio Lagmay, Rosenda Lagmay,
Francisco Serna, 2. Juana Baclig, Pedro Serna, Agapita Serna and Pedro Garcia are the
descendants or heirs of some of the original legatees, two of whom are the plaintiffs
Silvestra Sajor and Rosenda Lagmay; and the defendants are heirs of Leandro
Serrano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
5. That the said legacies produce 35 uyones of play net annually, and maguey, which
the plaintiffs claim amount to P1,000 as against P300 claimed by the
defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
6. That the property of the legacy situated in Cabugao passed into possession of Simeon
Serrano by virtue of Leandro Serrano's will as executor thereof, and that said legacies
have been and are mixed with other property of the estate of Leandro
Serrano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The plaintiffs present as evidence their Exhibits B and C and the defendants also present
as evidence their Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Therefore, both parties pray Honorable Court to render upon the stipulation of facts, the
facts proven by the documentary evidence, and in accordance with law, with the costs
against defeated party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Vigan, October 14, 1924.
(Sgd.) ANTONIO DIRECTO
Attorney for the plaintiffs
(Sgd.) MIGUEL FLORENTINOchanrobles virtual law library
 ANT. BELMONTE
Attorneys for the defendants
Later in the morning of the same day the parties again appeared before the court, and
the following proceedings were had:
A little after ten.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
COURT. Attorneys Antonio Belmonte and Antonio Directo again appear and ask the
court to receive their respective documentary evidence in this case. Attorney Directo
presents Exhibit A, which is certified copy of the clerk of the court and is made a part of
the complaint. exhibit B is a certified copy of Mria Solla's will and plaintiffs' Exhibit C
is a certified copy of Leandro Serrano's will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
BELMONTE. I agree with the stipulation of facts that these documents are integral
parts thereof and the court should consider them as
such.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
COURT. Have you any objection?chanrobles virtual law library
BELMONTE. There is an agreement between both parties that there will be no
objection, that is to say, that all the evidence may be admitted as part of the
stipulation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
COURT. The exhibits mentioned in the stipulation are admitted as part of the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
BELMONTE. The defense also presents Exhibit 1, as evidence and as an integral part
of the statement of facts, which is a duly registered possessory information; Exhibit 2 is
also a duly registered possessory information; Exhibit 4 is a public document wherein
the legatees renounced the legacies in question; Exhibit 5 is a deed of sale; Exhibit 6 is
a Spanish translation of Exhibit 5; Exhibit 7 is a composition title issued by the State,
all of which refer to the land in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
COURT. Each and every one of the exhibits presented by the Attorney Belmonte also
forms a part of the stipulation of facts between both attorneys and are
admitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
BELMONTE. And with this presentation of evidence we submit the case for the
decision of the court.
Exhibit A mentioned by the parties in their second appearance, consists of a list of the
property which it is said was left by the deceased Maria
Solla.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit B is the nuncupative of the said deceased Maria Solla executed on April 19,
1883.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit C is the will of Leonardo Serrano, universal heir of Maria Solla, executed
August 22, 1921.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit 1 is a possessory information proceeding covering 15 parcels of land situated in
the municipality of Cabugao, Province of Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on
April 1, 1895, and registered in the registry of deeds on April 25, 1895. Leandro
Serrano, in his application, claims to be the absolute owner in fee simple of said 15
parcels. Said petition is supported by the testimony of Julio Solla, Apolonio Solla,
Mauro Solla and Juan Solla, children of Sergio Solla, one of the legatees named by the
deceased Maria Solla.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit 2 is another possessory information proceeding covering 36 parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on
March 20, 1895 and registered in the registry of deeds on May 20, 1895. Leandro
Serrano, in his petition, also claims to be absolute owner in fee simple of the said 36
parcels ands is supported by the testimony of Juan Solla, son of the legatee Sergio
Solla.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit 3 is another possessory information proceeding covering 65 parcels situated
within the municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on March
26, 1895 and registered in the registry of deeds on April 24, 1895. Leandro Serrano, in
his petition, claims to be the absolute owner in fee of said
land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit 4 is the record of certain proceedings of the president of the municipality of
Cabugao at the instance of Leandro Serrano in which formal renunciation of their
respective legacies is made by the legatees named in Maria Solla's
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit 5 is a deed of sale made by Matias Sevedea in favor of Leandro Serrano of one
parcel of land instituted in Cabugao which he had received from Maria Solla as a
legacy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Exhibit 7 is a royal title issued by the Spanish Government in favor of Leandro Serrano
to six parcels of land situated in the barrio of Alongoong of the municipality of
Cabugao of the Province of Ilocos Sur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
It also appears from the record that Leandro Serrano took possession of the property left
by Maria Solla immediately after her death which occurred on June 11, 1883, and
continued in possession of the same until his death, which took place on August 5,
1921, having instituted possessory information proceedings, declared the property for
taxation, paid the land tax on the same and enjoyed its products
exclusively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On account of the intimate relation between them, we shall consider the first two
assignments of error together.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendants-appellants that the trial court erred in considering plaintiffs' Exhibit A
as a part of the stipulation of facts, disregarding the complete absence of a description
of the land which they to recover.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
From folio 2 of the transcript of the stenographic notes it appears that on the morning of
October 16, 1924 the attorney for the defendants, Mr. Antonio Belmonte, agreed to the
admission of all of the documentary evidence presented at that time as a part of the
agreement, among which is found the document Exhibit A, which contains a list of the
supposed legacies left by the deceased Maria Solla, to the predecessors in interest of the
plaintiffs, with their respective descriptions, which were the subject-matter of the
complaint herein, leaving to the sound discretion of the court to weigh the same. It is
true that the court found that six of the parcels described therein were the exclusive
property of Leandro Serrano and are covered by the royal title, Exhibit 7 of the
defendants, but this does not in any manner mean that the other parcels were not those
left by the testratix Maria Solla to her brothers and
nephews.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, the first and second assignments of error are
groundless.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In regard to the third assignment of error of the defendants-appellants that Exhibits 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 having been presented as evidence by the defendants and admitted by
the plaintiffs as an integral part of the stipulation of facts, it was an error not to give full
weight to said documents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The fourth assignment of error of the defendants-appellants raises the question of
prescription of the plaintiffs' action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It appears from the stipulation of facts that, aside from the renunciation mad by the
legatees of their respective legacies, according to Exhibit 4, Leandro Serrano was in
possession of the property left by Maria Solla from June 11, 1883 until August 5, 1921,
having obtained a possessory information in his favor, which was duly registered in the
registry of deeds, exclusively enjoyed the products thereof, declared it as his property
for the purpose of taxation and paid the corresponding land tax thereon, without any of
the legatees or their successors in interest having formally nor judicially claimed any
title thereto or asked for any share of the products, or contributed to the payment of the
land tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, in the possessory information proceedings wherein Leandro Serrano
claimed to be the absolute owner in fee simple of the lands involved therein, the
children of Sergio Solla, one of the legates of the deceased Maria Solla, testified in
support of the petitions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
So that under the provisions of articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil Code, as well as the
provisions of sections 38, 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs have
lost by, extinctive prescription, not only all right of action to recover the ownership of
the property left to their predecessors in interest, but also whatever right of ownership
they have had to the same because of Leandro Serrano's exclusive, open, peaceful and
continuous possession which was adverse to all the world including the legatees and
their successors, for the period of thirty-nine years under claim of ownership, evidenced
not only by his applications for possessory information, but also by his exclusive
enjoyment of the products of said property, - even if it is considered that the legatees
have not renounced their part in the legacy - has given him, by operation of law,
exclusive and absolute title to the said properties. (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857,
869.) chanrobles virtual law library
The fifth and sixth assignments of error raise the question of the true interpretation of
the provisions of the last will of the testratix Maria Solla in regard to the obligation
imposed upon the universal heir named by her, Leandro Serrano, and of the provisions
of the last will of the latter in regard to the obligation imposed by him upon his heir, and
executor Simeon Serrano, one of the herein defendants-
appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The following are the pertinent parts of Maria Solla's will:
I also and order that there be given, in the way of legacies, to my brother Sergio Solla
and sisters Cayetana Solla and Josefa Solla, to my nephew Jacinto Serna and to
Rosenda Lagmay and Silvestra Sajor whom I have raised, and to my servant Matias
Seveda, distributed in the following manner . . . I also declare that I have no forced
heirs, my parents and my two sons having died, and I am at liberty to name any their I
care to and whom I consider proper. Therefore not having anyone who inspires me with
confidence and is willing to comply strictly with my orders and requests in this will, I
desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano, my grandson, as my universal heir who is a
legitimate son of my son Modesto Solosa, and is single; and besides I have raised him
from infancy, and have not yet given him anything notwithstanding that he has always
been with me, always helping me; and I desire him to comply with the obligation to
give or deliver to the parish priest of this town a sufficient sum of money necessary for
a yearly novena for an ordinary require mass for the first eight days thereof and on the
ninth, or last day, a solemn requiem mass, with vigil and a large bier, for these masses
and for the repose of my soul and those of my parents, husband, children and other
relatives. I repeat and insist that my heir shall execute and comply with this request
without fail. And at the hour of his death he will insist that his heirs comply with all that
I have here ordered.
The pertinent parts of the will of Leandro Serrano (Exhibit C) are as follows:
Third. I command my executor to put all of my property in order, separating first the
property of his deceased grandmother Capitana Maria Solla, because she directed in her
will that her property be distributed strictly in conformity with her wishes and as she
earnestly requested the compliance of her bequests I obligate my heirs to comply with
the same; for that reason it is my wish and I really should like to deliver it to my
granddaughter, Corazon Serrano, my adopted daughter, but as she is already dead, I
deliver it to her father Simeon Serrano because among my children he is the only one
who is very obedient to me and I hope he will comply with all my orders and those of
his grandmother Maria Solla. In fact he is the only one of my children who was able to
help me in all my troubles and he is the most obedient one of them; because, although I
became angry with him and threatened him many times, he paid no attention to my
reprimands. Such is not the case with my other children, who, when I became a little
angry, each time drifted farther away and have never offered me any help, which had
accused me much pain, but, nevertheless, they continue to be my children and I do not
exclude them.
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth. On occupation of the fact that all of the property of the deceased Capitana Solla
was given to my son Simeon I order him not to forget annually all the souls of the
relatives of my grandmother and also of nine and to have a mass said on the first and
ninth days of the yearly novena and that he erect a first class bier.
xxx xxx xxx
I insistently order that the property of my deceased grandmother Capitana Maria be
disposed of in conformity with all the provisions of her will and of mine.
As may be seen Maria Solla named grandson Leandro Serrano in her will as her
universal heir to her property and ordered him to strictly comply with her orders and
requests and that at the hour of his death to make the same insistence upon his heirs to
comply with all that she has ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
As may also be seen Leandro Serrano named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor of his
will and that he directed him to put all of his property in order and to separate that
which came from his deceased grandmother Maria Solla, which he gives to his said son
Simeon Serrano and orders that same be disposed of exclusively in conformity with the
wishes of his said grandmother, not forgetting the souls of all of his grandmother's
relatives and of his own for whose repose nine masses were to be said annually during
nine days, with a solemn mass on the first and last
days.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Now, then, what are the orders and requests that Maria Solla wanted the universal heir
named by her in her will, Leandro Serrano, to faithfully comply with and to make his
heirs comply with, and what are the orders of Maria Solla which Leandro Serrano
ordered his executor and heir Simeon Serrano to comply with? chanrobles virtual law
library
In the first place, there is the distribution of the legacies given in her will to her
brothers, nephew, protegees and servant. In the second place, the delivery of a sufficient
sum of money to the parish of Cabugao for the annual novena, consisting of eight
ordinary masses and one solemn requiem mass, together with vigil and bier on the last
day for the repose of the soul of the testratix and her parents, children, husband and
other relatives; and in the third place, the order that Leandro Serrano demand, with the
same insistence, that this heirs comply with all that she had ordered. Leandro Serrano
have complied with all of these commands and orders during his lifetime, some wholly
and others partially. The orders and requests that he could and should have fully
complied with during his lifetime were to distribute the legacies and to order his heirs to
comply with all her wishes specified in her will. The order or request that he was able to
comply with only partially was to deliver to the parish priest a sufficient sum of money
necessary for the annual masses for the repose of the soul of Maria Solla and her
parents, husband, children and other relatives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It is not logical to suppose that Maria Solla in ordering Leandro Serrano to insist in his
will that his heirs after his death comply with all the requests contained in her said will,
referred to the orders and requests that he could and should comply with during his
lifetime, because neither is it logical nor reasonable to suppose that she for a moment
doubted that the person whom she had named as her universal heir - for, according to
her, he was the only person in whom she had any confidence - would comply with her
requests. If that is so, Maria Solla could not have referred to other than the pious orders
and requests, because, by reason of their nature, they were the only ones which Leandro
Serrano could not wholly comply with during his lifetime, but that his heirs would
continue to do so. And Leandro Serrano, in complying with the requests of Maria Solla
in his will by ordering his son Simeon Serrano, to whom he bequeathed all of the
property received from the former, to comply with all of the requests of the same, could
not have meant but those requests which Maria Solla wished complied with by the heirs
of Leandro Serrano which are those relating to the pious bequests. She confirms this on
the fifth clause of her will quoted above, in which she says: "On account of the fact that
all the property of the deceased Capitana Solla is bequeathed to my son Simeon I order
him not to forget the souls of my grandmother's relatives." From this is evidently
appears that Leandro Serrano bequeathed all of the property of the deceased Maria Solla
to his son Simeon Serrano only in order that he might comply with her pious requests. In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from must
Furthermore if to ease his conscience it had been Leandro Serrano's desire to deliver the be, as hereby, reversed in all its parts and the complaint dismissed, without special
aforesaid legacies to the legatees or to their successors in interest he would have done findings as to costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan
so during his lifetime or would have said so clearly in his will and would not have given
all of his said property to his son Simeon Serrano.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In order to determine the testator's intention, the court should place itself as near as
possible in his position, and hence, where the language of the will is ambiguous or
doubtful, should take into consideration the situation of the testator and the facts and
circumstances surrounding him at the time the will executed. (40 Cyc., 1392.) Where
the testator's intention is manifest from the context of the will and surrounding
circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the
language will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such
intention, as far as possible, the court may depart from the strict wording and read word
or phrase in a sense different from that which is ordinarily attributed to it, and for such
purpose may mould or change the language of the will. such as restricting its
application or supplying omitted words or phrases. (40 Cyc., 1399.) chanrobles virtual
law library

In the present case, it clearly appearing that it was Mari Solla's intention, in ordering her
universal heir Leandro Serrano in her will at the hour of his death, to insist upon the
compliance of her orders by his heirs, that the latter should comply with her pious
orders and that she did not mean her orders concerning her legacies, the compliance of
which she had entrusted to Leandro Serrano, we are authorized to restrict the
application of the words "all that I have here ordered" used by the said Maria Solla and
the words "all her orders" used by Leandro Serrano in their respective wills limiting
them to the pious orders and substituting the phrase "in regard to the annual masses"
after the words used by both testators,
respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trial court, therefore, committed an error in interpreting the order to Leandro
Serrano mentioned in his will as applicable to the provisions of Maria Solla's will
relative to the legacies and not to pious bequests
exclusively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the remaining assignments of error, they being merely corollaries of the fifth and
sixth, the points raised therein are impliedly decided in our disposition of said two
assignments last mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants, the two assignments of error
made therein are without merit in view of the foregoing considerations and the
conclusions we have arrived at with regard to the assignments of error made by the
defendants-appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.
MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO
REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the
decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will.
Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to
distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30,
2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in
Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for
probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the
decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE
and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of
PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED. 5 mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6 which denied the Motion
for Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision
of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled
"Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect
on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G.
Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page
38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco
Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s
due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause10 and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and
of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children
Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by
the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH,
CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses
LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA
LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F.
Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan],
Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who
are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath
since they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties
the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also
command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a
Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond
situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda
Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is
Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to
know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family
in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth.
Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the
United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until
her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a
petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia
and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an
Order on June 13, 200015 allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On
said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.16 The Will
was executed in her father’s (Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two
other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will
and her signatures on all its four pages.18 She likewise positively identified the signature
of her father appearing thereon.19 Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge
Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in
1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and
remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer
testify in court.21
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an
opposition22 to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of
Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest;
hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.23
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian
M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco,
Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental
Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void because ownership of
the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death
pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the
issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the
USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of
Antonio.27
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition28 asking the
RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia
was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced
to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the
Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by
some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was
forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or
trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously,
petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the
appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the
appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both Lorenzo
and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of
the USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has
not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra.
Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age
of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living
arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of
photographs when the event took place. 31
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness
stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his father’s condition. According to him his
father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate
was presented to the court to support this allegation. 32
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April
1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981
Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January
1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child
since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son;
Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time
of Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound
mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was
only given to him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was already residing
in the USA when the Will was executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of
Paciencia in three different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was
familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in her
transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation,
violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
Philippines when the same was executed.35 On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that
Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he
saw a copy of the Will only after her death.36
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21,
2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins.37 She
claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby
allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of
her service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife and his children were staying in the
same house.38 She served in the said household from 1980 until Paciencia’s departure
for the USA on September 19, 1981.39
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for
Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house.40 Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see
what that "something" was as same was placed inside an envelope.41 However, she
remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs
them.42 A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of
Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope.43 Upon going home, however,
the envelope was no longer with Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that Paciencia was
referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her wallet
in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.45 On cross examination, it was
established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that
Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on her personal assessment,46 and that it was
Antonio who requested her to testify in court.47
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.48 He identified the
Will and testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought
the same to his mother’s house and showed it to him along with another document on
September 16, 1981.49 Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the
same were still unsigned.50 According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents
pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands,51 and it was he who explained that the
documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and
other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her
properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death.52 Upon hearing this, Paciencia
allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my
properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who
should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio
advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter
purportedly replied, "I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to you.
The more I will not sign them."54 After which, Paciencia left the documents with
Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56 denying the petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b)
disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.57
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at
the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or
strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.58
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of
Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia
was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being
‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit
for executing a Will."59 Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not
able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no
concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was
tricked or forced into signing the Will.60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing
upon the CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN
IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE
RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11,
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA
WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS
ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was
sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.
 Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of
the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in
probate proceedings.64 This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, which states:
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either
real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the
right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being
of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to
wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the
attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the
witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one
another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will
may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as
well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of
the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or
forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They
likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia
was not only "magulyan" but was actually suffering from paranoia.67
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799
of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character
of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness,
there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia
was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we
find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of
Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the
Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent."69 More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of
the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New
Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof
to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month
or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia
was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier
mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby
warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to
be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary
act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the
document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be
observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from
her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON
and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and
was not included therein as devisee.70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence
and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or
testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon
his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for
his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was obtained
through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation between
Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly
repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo
as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of
relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or
spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own
children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many
family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and
those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with
Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact
that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if
the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond
between them. This unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends
to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners’ allegations of
duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and
trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete,
substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no
matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to
move the Court to uphold said allegations.71 Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to
be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly
executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on the
attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased]."72
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly
executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. – If
the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not
insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of
them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are
present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the
will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility,
the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of
other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and
attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the
witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent are AFFIRMED.
witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
(Emphasis supplied.) SO ORDERED.

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been
presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the
court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his
son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and
express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the
corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father,
Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time,
Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his daughter’s name so
that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is
well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed
any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross
examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to
satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and
of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will
may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due
execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established
rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses
declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is
that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting
witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the
manner required by law."73 1âwphi1

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties
as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the
mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought
to be before it that is controlling."74 "The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima
facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the
manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby."75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the
evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of
evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us
to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to
probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not
known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the
attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?
That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the certiorari
case in the Court of Appeals which reveal the following tangled strands of human
relationship:
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts),
Fort McKinley, married Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc. No. 7816).
They were childless. They reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza
and who considered them as his parents as shown in his 1945 marriage contract with
Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R; p. 148, Rollo of Testate Case
showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro married Marcelina in 1923).
Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the
Federal Government. That explains why on her death she had accumulated some cash in
two banks.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and
went abroad. Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife Nenita was
appointed as his guardian in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent in Special
Proceeding No. 1807 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (p. 16,
Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).
In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted
also to be his guardian in another proceeding. Arsenia tried to prove that Nenita was
living separately from Agapito and that she (Nenita) admitted to Marcelina that she was
unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63, Record of testate case).
Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and confirmed
Nenita's appointment as guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of CA case). Agapito has
been staying in a veteran's hospital in San Francisco or Palo Alto, California (p. 87,
Record).
On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan
begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de
la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina
Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her
granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.SP-08654-R). Marilyn used the
surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito.
She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati,
apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas Street.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she
was 73 years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was
illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked
by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that wig, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her
supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the
time of her death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati,
Rizal. She owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in
1966 (p. 134, Record of testate case).
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P. 97,
CA Rollo) and the executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg,
mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig Branch 25, a petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was
assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of court,
Evangeline S. Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The transcripts of the stenographic notes
taken at the hearing before the deputy clerk of court are not in the record.
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix.
On the following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two orders directing the
Merchants Banking Corporation and the Bank of America to allow Marina to withdraw
the sum of P10,000 from the savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn
Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to
Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975,
instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom
was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the
settlement of Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's house
filed on April 18 in the said proceeding a motion to set aside the order of April 11
ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the
deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and
that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter (pp. 52-68,
Record of testate case). Later, they questioned the probate court's jurisdiction to issue
the ejectment order.
In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than
Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued on April 23 an order probating her
supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-77, Record).
On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside
proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary
injunction". Nenita in that motion reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger
to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by
means of undue influence employed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of
the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.
Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the
preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix (pp. 83-91,
Record).
To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid of
Marcelina, who swore that the alleged will was falsified (p. 109, Record).
Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18) and her
omnibus motion to set aside the proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita filed the next
day, April 25, an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters
of administration. In that opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of the will and
stated the names and addresses of Marcelina's intestate heirs, her nieces and nephews
(pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not aware of the decree of probate dated April 23,
1975.
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio,
Marcelina's niece, who swore that Marcelina never executed a win (pp. 124-125,
Record).
Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted that
Marilyn was not Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and
Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's son but merely an anak-
anakan who was not legally adopted (p. 143, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the
issuance of letters of administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the
hearing. She moved for the reconsideration of that order.
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents,
Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because
Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in English which is
not known to her (pp. 208-209, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by
Nenita (p. 284, Record).
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita "filed a
case to annul" the probate proceedings (p. 332, Record). That case, Civil Case No.
24276, Suroza vs. Paje and Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned to Judge
Honrado. He dismissed it in his order of February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix
had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid, closed the
testamentary proceeding.
About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in this
Court, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of
Marcelina. The complainant reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as
shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know
English, the language in which the win was written. (In the decree of probate Judge
Honrado did not make any finding that the will was written in a language known to the
testatrix.)
Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix
had a son named Agapito (the testatrix's supposed sole compulsory and legal heir), who
was preterited in the will, did not take into account the consequences of such a
preterition.
Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed him
that the testatrix did not know the executrix Marina Paje, that the beneficiary's real
name is Marilyn Sy and that she was not the next of kin of the testatrix.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and
her cohorts to withdraw from various banks the deposits Marcelina.
She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her
access to the record of the probate case by alleging that it was useless for Nenita to
oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not change his decision. Nenita also
said that Evangeline insinuated that if she (Nenita) had ten thousand pesos, the case
might be decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly advised Nenita to desist from
claiming the properties of the testatrix because she (Nenita) had no rights thereto and,
should she persist, she might lose her pension from the Federal Government.
Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations of the
complaint. He merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of
probate and that in a motion dated July 6, 1976 she asked for a thirty day period within
which to vacate the house of the testatrix.
Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and that the
latter did not mention Evangeline in her letter dated September 11, 1978 to President
Marcos.
Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Nenita
from having access to the record of the testamentary proceeding. Evangeline was not
the custodian of the record. Evangeline " strongly, vehemently and flatly denied"
Nenita's charge that she (Evangeline) said that the sum of ten thousand pesos was
needed in order that Nenita could get a favorable decision. Evangeline also denied that
she has any knowledge of Nenita's pension from the Federal Government.
The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this Court in
the Court Administrator's memorandum of September 25, 1980. The case was referred
to Justice Juan A. Sison of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. He submitted a report dated October 7, 1981.
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a
petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of
probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void.
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the
will. He swore that the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before
him and that he notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the
condition" that said lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but
the lawyer never complied with his commitment.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and
her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari
(Suroza vs. Honrado, CA-G.R. No. SP-08654, May 24, 1981).
Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to
dismiss the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his
improper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of
justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win
should have inherited the decedent's estate.
A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or
interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order by
reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206, Revised Penal Code).
Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance for
serious misconduct or inefficiency ( Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). Misconduct implies
malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to
exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were
corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules" (In re lmpeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215).
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge
would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties
that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of
any public service (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107,
119).
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in
English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily
perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated
that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16,
Record of testate case). That could only mean that the will was written in a language not
known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory
provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language
or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to
the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial
acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the
"testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the
anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in
instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her
supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court,
respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally
conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained
whether the will was validly executed.

Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be

inexcusable.

WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a

fine equivalent to his salary for one month is imposed on respondent judge (his
compulsory retirement falls on December 25, 1981).

The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because she is no
longer employed in the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980 she has been assistant city
fiscal of Surigao City. She is beyond this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs.
Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-CFI November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO
GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner.
Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero
Mercado dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains
the following attestation clause:
We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament
of Antero Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and
of this attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages thereof.
Page three the continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in
Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and it bears the
corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them
were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in
the presence of the testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.
(3) to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero
Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express
direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein
petitioner (who is appealing by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals) argues, however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross
written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty.
Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a
signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by this Court in the
cases of De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs. Diancin, 55 Phil., 479;
Payad vs. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848; Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and Lopez vs. Liboro,
81 Phil., 429.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of
Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature
reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and
the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a
thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a sufficient recital
in the attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the
witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner. So
In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January,
ordered.
one thousand nine hundred forty three, (1943) A.D.

gd.) NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA (Sgd.) "ROSENDA CORTES

gd.) BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of
Antero Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino
Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name.
The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all
the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at
the express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one
of the witnesses; (2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty.
Javier at the former's request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and
on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof;
G.R. No. L-15153 August 31, 1960
In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the deceased
ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIA ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants.
T. de los Santos for appellee.
Climaco and Climaco for appellants.
LABARADOR, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City admitting to
probate the will of one Anacleta Abellana. The case was originally appealed to the
Court of Appeals where the following assignment of error is made:
The appellants respectfully submit that the Trial Court erred in holding that the
supposed testament, Exh. "A", was signed in accordance with law; and in
admitting the will to probate.
In view of the fact that the appeal involves a question of law the said court has certified
the case to us.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
It appears on record that the last Will and Testament (Exhibit "A"), which is
sought to be probated, is written in the Spanish language and consists of two
(2) typewritten pages (pages 4 and 5 of the record) double space. The first page
is signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten "Por la
testadora Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate A-1167629, Enero 20,
1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga', and on the second page appears the signature of
three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino Macaso and Rafael
Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the signature of T. de los Santos and
below his signature is his official designation as the notary public who
notarized the said testament. On the first page on the left margin of the said
instrument also appear the signatures of the instrumental witnesses. On the
second page, which is the last page of said last Will and Testament, also
appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on that second
page on the left margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name
appears handwritten the following phrase, "Por la Testadora Anacleta
Abellana'. The will is duly acknowledged before Notary Public Attorney
Timoteo de los Santos. (Emphasis supplied)
The appeal squarely presents the following issue: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A.
Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana . . .,
Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the requirements of law prescribing the manner in
which a will shall be executed?
The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witness in the presence of the testator and of one
another. (Emphasis supplied.)
The clause "must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence and by his express
direction," is practically the same as the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190) which reads as follows:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing
and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of each other. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Note that the old law as well as the new require that the testator himself sign the will, or
if he cannot do so, the testator's name must be written by some other person in his
presence and by his express direction. Applying this provision this Court said in the
case of Ex Parte Pedro Arcenas, et al., Phil., 700:
It will be noticed from the above-quoted section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure that where the testator does not know how, or is unable, to sign, it
will not be sufficient that one of the attesting witnesses signs the will at the
testator's request, the notary certifying thereto as provided in Article 695 of the
Civil Code, which, in this respect, was modified by section 618 above referred
to, but it is necessary that the testator's name be written by the person signing
in his stead in the place where he could have signed if he knew how or was
able to do so, and this in the testator's presence and by his express direction; so
that a will signed in a manner different than that prescribed by law shall not be
valid and will not be allowed to be probated.
Where a testator does not know how, or is unable for any reason, to sign the
will himself, it shall be signed in the following manner:
John Doe by the testator, Richard Doe; or in this form: "By the testator, John
Doe, Richard Doe." All this must be written by the witness signing at the
request of the testator.
 Therefore, under the law now in force, the witness Naval A. Vidal should have
written at the bottom of the will the full name of the testator and his own name
in one forms given above. He did not do so, however, and this is failure to
comply with the law is a substantial defect which affects the validity of the will
and precludes its allowance, notwithstanding the fact that no one appeared to
oppose it.

The same ruling was laid down in the case of Cuison vs. Concepcion, 5 Phil., 552. In
the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan, 21 Phil., 461, we held that the important thing is that
it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction; it is
unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or
not. Cases of the same import areas follows: (Ex Parte Juan Ondevilla, 13 Phil., 479,
Caluya vs. Domingo, 27 Phil., 330; Garcia vs. Lacuesta, 90 Phil., 489).

In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written
under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a
failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself
sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence
and by his express direction.

It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are
constrained to declare that the said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be
admitted to probate.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the petition for the
probate of the will denied. With costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.
Valerio Fontanilla and Andres Asprer for appellant.
Anacleto Diaz for appellees.
CARSON, J.:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the
instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing
witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that
time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the
smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible
for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the
act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.
A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness was
in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the time when
they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of course, disposes of
the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree admitting the document to
probate as the last will and testament of the deceased.
The trial judge does not appear to have considered the determination of this question of
fact of vital importance in the determination of this case, as he was of opinion that
under the doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil. Rep., 541) the
alleged fact that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the
testator and the other describing witnesses signed the instrument in the inner room, had
it been proven, would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution of the will.
But we are unanimously of opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to
have been in the outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have
been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being
done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This because the line of vision
from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily
have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the
moment of inscription of each signature."
have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their
mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the
moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each
other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may
see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the
testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in
the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each
other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing
conditions. The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the
moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically
present and in such position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that
took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical
obstruction to prevent his doing so." And the decision merely laid down the doctrine
that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will
sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact
that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by
each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation
to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they
could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to
the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the
purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the
requisites in the execution of a will.
The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded therein to
probate as the last will and testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed with
costs of this instance against the appellant.

In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a
will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-36033. November 5, 1982.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL
OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, Petitioner, v. HON.
AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte,
(Branch III, Maasin), Respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of
Southern Leyte, Branch III, in Special Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the Matter
of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez, Deceased; Apolonio Taboada,
Petitioner," which denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration and the
motion for appointment of a special administrator.
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the
alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in Cebuano-Visayan
dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at
the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which
contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the
attestation clause by the three 13) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the
testatrix.
Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner’s compliance with the requirement of
publications, the trial court commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the
petitioner’s evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his evidence and presented
Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its
genuineness and due execution.
The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned
order denying the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its
execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required to submit the names of the
intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be properly notified
and could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.
Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation
and/or motion ex parte praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any
step to be taken as a result of the disallowance of the will. He also asked that the ten-
day period required by the court to submit the names of intestate heirs with their
addresses be held in abeyance.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the
will. However, the motion together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could
not be acted upon by the Honorable Ramon C. Pamatian due to his transfer to his new
station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were still pending resolution when
respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding judge of the
respondent court.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.
Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the
manifestation and/or motion filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion for
the appointment of special administrator was likewise denied because of the petitioner’s
failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of the intestate heirs
and their addresses.
The petitioner decided to file the present petition.
For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that
the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the
will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
"The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
"The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the with and the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
"If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them."cralaw virtua1aw library
The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a
notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but all
the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the
presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses to a will
attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient
compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin
of that page.
On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not
make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity
of the will that the signatures of the subscribing witnesses should be specifically located
at the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix. He contends that it would be
absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or
particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this space or
particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the
honest frailties of human nature.
We find the petition meritorious.
Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed
at its end by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by another person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists
in witnessing the testator’s execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally
that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that
the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the
signing of the witnesses’ names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of
such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d
911).
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that
the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of
identification.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the
will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due
execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from
the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not
assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective
permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator
more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and
restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern
tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 103).
Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were it not
for the defect in the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the
testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present
case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which
contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly
identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the
testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned
order.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to
state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect
were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is
really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of
the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while
the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as
"Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Singson v. Florentino, Et. Al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following
observations with respect to the purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause
must state the number of pages used:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The law referred to is Article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or
sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory
as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of
the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be
bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil.
405; Gumban v. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto v. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria v.
Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the
attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or passes composing
the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the
will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While
the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is
written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is
composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the
rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad
and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being
defeated by purely technical considerations."cralaw virtua1aw library
Ino v. Ino (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a similar liberal
approach:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

". . . Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses, did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the
coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was
ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and
literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single
witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained,
no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attest to the
full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. v.
Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) ‘witnesses may
sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.’"

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent
Court which denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial
of probate, and the motion for appointment of a special administrator are set aside. The
respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the will and to conduct further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement of costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192916 October 11, 2010 BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay, Cebu,
personally appeared VICENTE S. Echavez with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on
MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ, Petitioner, April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu known to me to be the same person who executed
vs. the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donartion Mortis Causa before the Notary Public
DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and THE and in the presence of the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, Respondents. before and in the presence of each other and of the Notary Public and all of them
acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and deed. [Emphasis in the
original.]
RESOLUTION

BRION, J.: THE COURT’S RULING

The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the
Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which
formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills,4 "otherwise, the donation is void
includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985,
and would produce no effect." 5 Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have
Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed
of Donation Mortis Causa.1 Manuel accepted the donation. been applied.

As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the

In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of
Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was
Dozen Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October
written.lavvphilThe exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino6 and Taboada v. Hon.
1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by
Rosal,7 cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts of this case are not similar
the previous Contract to Sell.
with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that although the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written,
On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s nephew, filed a the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual
petition for the settlement of Vicente’s intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed situation in the present case.
a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul
the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases were
Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires,
jointly heard.
we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be
merged in one statement.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuel’s petition to approve the donation
and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale.2 The RTC found that the execution
of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate
provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law
to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation. The Court of Appeals (CA)
contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is
affirmed the RTC’s decision.3 The CA held that since the donation in favor of Manuel
made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the
was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills
deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the
should have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an
instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before
attestation clause and was therefore void.
them and to the manner of its execution.81avvphi1
The Petition for Review on Certiorari
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires
Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on substantial compliance in from the instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedent’s will. An attestation
the construction of a will to Vicente’s donation mortis causa. He insists that the strict must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of
construction of a will was not warranted in the absence of any indication of bad faith, the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed
fraud, or substitution in the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. He argues embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of donation, which
contains the "import and purpose" of the attestation clause required in the execution of
wills. The Acknowledgment reads:
Finding no reversible error committed by the CA, the Court hereby DENIES Manuel’s
petition for review on certiorari.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST
WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B.
LOPEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L.
TUAZON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the March 30, 2009 Decision1 and
October 22, 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87064
which affirmed the August 26, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42 (RTC), in SP. Proc. No. 99-95225 disallowing the probate of the Last Will
and Testament of Enrique S. Lopez.
The Factual Antecedents
On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez,
and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and
the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and
Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed
a Last Will and Testament4 on August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor
and administrator.
On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will
and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters
testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported
last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. The said
opposition was also adopted by Victoria.
After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard
presented the attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana
Maria Lourdes Manalo (Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty.
Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco). The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late
Enrique read and signed the will on each and every page, they also read and signed the
same in the latter's presence and of one another. Photographs of the incident were taken
and presented during trial. Manalo further testified that she was the one who prepared
the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20
years. Prior to August 10, 1996, the latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject
will and furnished him the list of his properties for distribution among his children. He
prepared the will in accordance with Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and
the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of one another, he translated the will
which was written in English to Filipino and added that Enrique was in good health and
of sound mind at that time.
On the other hand, the oppositors presented its lone witness, Gregorio B. Paraon
(Paraon), Officer-in-Charge of the Notarial Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC,
Manila. His testimony centered mainly on their findings that Atty. Nolasco was not a
notary public for the City of Manila in 1996, which on cross examination was clarified
after Paraon discovered that Atty. Nolasco was commissioned as such for the years
1994 to 1997.
Ruling of the RTC
In the Decision dated August 26, 2005,5 the RTC disallowed the probate of the will for
failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the
attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held
that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the
form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages is
reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence
required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC
observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it
disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.
Aggrieved, Richard filed a Notice of Appeal which the RTC granted in the Order dated
October 26, 2005.6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 30, 2009,7 the CA issued the assailed decision dismissing the appeal. It held
that the RTC erroneously granted Richard's appeal as the Rules of Court is explicit that
appeals in special proceedings, as in this case, must be made through a record on
appeal. Nevertheless, even on the merits, the CA found no valid reason to deviate from
the findings of the RTC that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the
attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of the Civil Code sanctions
mere substantial compliance with the formal requirements set forth in Article 805
thereof, there was a total omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover,
while the acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages including the page on
which the ratification and acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages
including the acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence
aliunde to explain the discrepancy. Richard's motion for reconsideration from the
decision was likewise denied in the second assailed Resolution8 dated October 22, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition assailing the propriety of the CA's decision.
Ruling of the Court
pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written"10 cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8
pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliund.11 On this
score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to
wit:

The petition lacks merit.
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809
of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered;
whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can
reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be
safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to
sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation
clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.12 (Emphasis
supplied)
Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will. Moreover, it correctly
ruled that Richard pursued the wrong mode of appeal as Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court explicitly provides that in special proceedings, as in this case, the appeal
shall be made by record on appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be

interpreted to them.1âwphi1 (underscoring supplied)

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper
pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in
fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article
805.

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.9

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the
attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the
Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA
VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellee.
Rosendo J. Tansinin for oppositor-appellant Natividad Icasiano.
Jaime R. Nuevas for oppositor-appellant Enrique Icasiano.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate the
document and its duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the true last will and
testament of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the
person named therein as such.
This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance
and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of Josefa
Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor
thereof.
The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused notice
thereof to be published for three (3) successive weeks, previous to the time appointed,
in the newspaper "Manila chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof
upon the known heirs.
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her
opposition; and on November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed as a
special administrator, to which proponent objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the
court issued an order appointing the Philippine Trust Company as special
administrator. 1äwphï1.ñët
On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation
adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his
evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with
all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate
(Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. On June 17,
1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint
opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order of
July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959, oppositor
Natividad Icasiano filed her amended opposition. Thereafter, the parties presented their
respective evidence, and after several hearings the court issued the order admitting the
will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this
Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground that the same is
contrary to law and the evidence.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in
the City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa
Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter
Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and attested by
three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V.
Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and
by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco
Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually
prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and
signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio
Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental
witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament, attorneys Torres and
Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the
due execution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom
the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys
Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also testified upon
cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last
will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original
and one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously
with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and
while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the
attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate
copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is
signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of
the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and
every page thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three
mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as witnesses
(except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the
original); that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that
the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein
and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language
known to and spoken by the testatrix that the attestation clause is in a language also
known to and spoken by the witnesses; that the will was executed on one single
occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the original and the duplicate copies were
duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the same date
June 2, 1956.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original,
admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but
affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the
signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine nor were they
written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting
that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue
influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will
and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the
will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of
the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-appellees
stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not
enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look
for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix
signed both original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the
will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the
notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the
documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known
to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and
Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were actually signed; that the attestation
clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. The
opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix
appearing in the duplicate original were not written by the same had which wrote the
signatures in the original will leaves us unconvinced, not merely because it is directly
contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but principally because of the
paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion that the differences
between the standard and questioned signatures are beyond the writer's range of normal
scriptural variation. The expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures
of the testatrix besides those affixed to the original of the testament (Exh. A); and we
feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the duplicate
could not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so
since the comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are radical
differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced
age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures, and the effect of writing
fatigue, the duplicate being signed right the original. These, factors were not discussed
by the expert.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and
questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering the standard and challenged
writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting
power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find the testimony of the oppositor's expert
sufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses, Torres and
Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the United States during the trial, did not testify).
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs
are more favored than others is proof of neither (see In re Butalid, 10 Phil. 27; Bugnao
vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs. Coronal, 45 Phil. 216). Diversity of apportionment is
the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die
intestate. The testamentary dispositions that the heirs should not inquire into other
property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of
forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not suffice to prove fraud or undue
influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as
shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being
diverted into the hands of non-heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or
not is a matter to be litigated on another occassion. It is also well to note that, as
remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco vs. Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz. 168, fraud and
undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds
for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his
signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the
course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of
substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of
the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all
three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize
the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament
and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation
existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory
requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479
(decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling
it or the attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will,
which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause
and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was
aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise
satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament,
with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin,
could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite
the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make
the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil.
429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal
requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or
unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available,
the duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of
original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that
oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original is defective and invalid,
then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and
the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to
the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any
rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in
the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new
publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the
original publication of the petition for probate. The amended petition did not
substantially alter the one first filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the
existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests were involved (the
contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly
notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that the
amendment deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in
admitting the amended petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
 G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR,
Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B.
LUGAY, Respondents.
Paul G. Gorrez for petitioner.
Mario D. Ortiz for respondent Manuel B. Lugay.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu
allowing the probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. Petitioner-
appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the
allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"), alleging the will was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute
without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to
what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not
executed in accordance with law. Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the
probate of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari which was
given due course.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of the case
hinges, is whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E")
was executed in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil
Code, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the
will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will
before a notary public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr.
Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the
same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged. Reduced to simpler terms, the question was attested and subscribed by
at least three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other,
considering that the three attesting witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the same. As the third witness is the notary public himself, petitioner
argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to
acknowledge the will. On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B.
Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial
court, maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of
having at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them,
bolstering up his stand with 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227 which, insofar as
pertinent, reads as follows:
It is said that there are, practical reasons for upholding a will as against the purely
technical reason that one of the witnesses required by law signed as certifying to an
acknowledgment of the testator's signature under oath rather than as attesting the
execution of the instrument.
After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, We are inclined to
sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed
in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge
before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow
(Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil. 258, 262; Castro v. Castro, 100 Phil. 239, 247); to own
as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or
ahead of. (The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, p. 72;
Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 252; Webster's
New International Dictionary 2d. p. 245.) Consequently, if the third witness were the
notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the
will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into
two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the
making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer
absurdity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangement Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would
defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them
he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and
the validity of his own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very
purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud (Report of Code Commission
p. 106-107), would be thwarted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition,
act as a witness to the executive of the document he has notarized. (Mahilum v. Court
Appeals, 64 0. G. 4017; 17 SCRA 482; Sawyer v. Cox, 43 Ill. 130). There are others
holding that his signing merely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness
thereon (Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S. E. 2d. 346; In Re Douglas Will, N. Y. S. 2d. 641;
Ragsdal v. Hill, 269 S. W. 2d. 911, Tyson Utterback, 122 So. 496; In Re Baybee's
Estate 160 N. 900; W. Merill v. Boal, 132 A. 721; See also Trenwith v. Smallwood, 15
So. 1030). But these authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction
or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public and witnesses referred
to aforecited cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and
not as acknowledging witnesses. He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness
but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 of the Civil
Code which reads:
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court. [Emphasis supplied]

To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses
to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring
at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the
testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been said, that only two witnesses
appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstances, the law
would not be duly in observed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") is declared not
valid and hereby set aside.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Cost against the appellee.

G.R. No. L-51546 January 28, 1980
JOSE ANTONIO GABUCAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA JOSEFA G. VDA. DE YSALINA and NELDA G.
ENCLONAR, respondents-appellees.
Ignacio A. Calingin for appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of a notarial will on the
ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp.
The Court of First Instance of Camiguin in its "decision" of December 28, 1977 in
Special Proceeding No. 41 for the probate of the will of the late Rogaciano Gabucan,
dismissed the proceeding (erroneously characterizes as an "action")
The proceeding was dismissed because the requisite documentary stamp was not affixed
to the notarial acknowledgment in the will and, hence, according to respondent Judge, it
was not admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of the Tax Code, now section 250 of
the 1977 Tax Code, which reads:
SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An
instrument, document, or paper which is required by law to be
stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or transferred
without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any
copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used
in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have
been affixed thereto and cancelled.
No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall
add his jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject to
documentary stamp tax unless the proper documentary stamps are
affixed thereto and cancelled.
The probate court assumed that the notarial acknowledgment of the said will is subject
to the thirty-centavo documentary stamp tax fixed in section 225 of the Tax Code, now
section 237 of the 1977 Tax Code.
Respondent Judge refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of petitioner's
manifestation that he had already attached the documentary stamp to the original of the
will. (See Mahilum vs. Court of Appeals, 64 O. G. 4017, 17 SCRA 482, 486.)
The case was brought to this Court by means of a petition for mandamus to compel the
lower court to allow petitioner's appeal from its decision. In this Court's resolution of
January 21, 1980 the petition for mandamus was treated in the interest of substantial
and speedy justice as an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 as well as a special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no documentary
stamp was affixed to the will, there was "no will and testament to probate" and,
consequently, the alleged "action must of necessity be dismissed".
What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to
affix the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of
the will which is the taxable portion of that document.
That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-
admissibility of the document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp,
subsists only "until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and
cancelled."
Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable
document is presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs. Madrilena 49 Phil. 749). If the
promissory note does not bear a documentary stamp, the court should have allowed
plaintiff's tender of a stamp to supply the deficiency. (Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil.
67, 71. Note the holding in Azarraga vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that the lack of the
documentary stamp on a document does not invalidate such document. See Cia. General
de Tabacos vs. Jeanjaquet 12 Phil. 195, 201-2 and Delgado and Figueroa vs. Amenabar
16 Phil. 403, 405-6.)
WHEREFORE, the lower court's dismissal of the petition for probate is reversed and set
aside. It is directed to decide the case on the merits in the light of the parties' evidence.
No costs.
G.R. No. L-7179 June 30, 1955
Testate Estate of the Late Apolinaria Ledesma. FELICIDAD
JAVELLANA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
DOÑA MATEA LEDESMA, oppositor-appellant.
Fulgencio Vega and Felix D. Bacabac for appellant.
Benjamin H. Tirot for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
By order of July 23, 1953, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the
documents in the Visayan dialect, marked Exhibits D and E, as the testament and
codicil duly executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on
March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria
Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses. The contestant, Da. Matea
Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said deceased, appealed from the
decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not executed in conformity with law. The
appeal was made directly to this Court because the value of the properties involved
exceeded two hundred thousand pesos.
Originally the opposition to the probate also charged that the testatrix lacked
testamentary capacity and that the dispositions were procured through undue influence.
These grounds were abandoned at the hearing in the court below, where the issue was
concentrated into three specific questions: (1) whether the testament of 1950 was
executed by the testatrix in the presence of the instrumental witnesses; (2) whether the
acknowledgment clause was signed and the notarial seal affixed by the notary without
the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses; and (3) if so, whether the codicil was
thereby rendered invalid and ineffective. These questions are the same ones presented to
us for resolution.
The contestant argues that the Court below erred in refusing credence to her witnesses
Maria Paderogao and Vidal Allado, cook and driver, respectively, of the deceased
Apolinaria Ledesma. Both testified that on March 30, 1950, they saw and heard Vicente
Yap (one of the witnesses to the will) inform the deceased that he had brought the
"testamento" and urge her to go to attorney Tabiana's office to sign it; that Da.
Apolinaria manifested that she could not go, because she was not feeling well; and that
upon Yap's insistence that the will had to be signed in the attorney's office and not
elsewhere, the deceased took the paper and signed it in the presence of Yap alone, and
returned it with the statement that no one would question it because the property
involved was exclusively hers.
Our examination of the testimony on record discloses no grounds for reversing the trial
Court's rejection of the improbable story of the witnesses. It is squarely contradicted by
the concordant testimony of the instrumental witnesses, Vicente Yap, Atty. Ramon
Tabiana, and his wife Gloria Montinola, who asserted under oath that the testament was
executed by testatrix and witnesses in the presence of each other, at the house of the
decedent on General Hughes St., Iloilo City, on March 30, 1950. And it is highly
unlikely, and contrary to usage, that either Tabiana or Yap should have insisted that Da.
Apolinaria, an infirm lady then over 80 years old, should leave her own house in order
to execute her will, when all three witnesses could have easily repaired thither for the
purpose. Moreover, the cross-examination has revealed fatal flaws in the testimony of
Contestant's witnesses. Both claim to have heard the word "testamento" for the first
time when Yap used it; and they claimed ability to recall that word four years later,
despite the fact that the term meant nothing to either. It is well known that what is to be
remembered must first be rationally conceived and assimilated (II Moore on Facts, p.
884). Likewise, Maria Paderogao was positive that Yap brought the will, and that the
deceased alone signed it, precisely on March 30, 1950; but she could remember no other
date, nor give satisfactory explanation why that particular day stuck in her mind. Worse
still, Allado claimed to have heard what allegedly transpired between Yap and Da.
Apolinaria from the kitchen of the house, that was later proved to have been separated
from the deceased's quarters, and standing at a much lower level, so that conversations
in the main building could not be distinctly heard from the kitchen. Later, on redirect
examination, Allado sought to cure his testimony by claiming that he was upstairs in a
room where the servants used to eat when he heard Yap converse with his mistress; but
this correction is unavailing, since it was plainly induced by two highly leading
questions from contestant's counsel that had been previously ruled out by the trial
Court. Besides, the contradiction is hardly consonant with this witness' 18 years of
service to the deceased.
Upon the other hand, the discrepancies in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses
urged upon us by the contestant-appellant, concerning the presence or absence of
Aurelio Montinola at the signing of the testament or of the codicil, and the identity of
the person who inserted the date therein, are not material and are largely imaginary,
since the witness Mrs. Tabiana confessed inability to remember all the details of the
transaction. Neither are we impressed by the argument that the use of some Spanish
terms in the codicil and testament (like legado, partes iguales, plena propiedad) is
proof that its contents were not understood by the testatrix, it appearing in evidence that
those terms are of common use even in the vernacular, and that the deceased was a
woman of wide business interests.
The most important variation noted by the contestants concerns that signing of the
certificate of acknowledgment (in Spanish) appended to the Codicil in Visayan, Exhibit
E. Unlike the testament, this codicil was executed after the enactment of the new Civil
Code, and, therefore, had to be acknowledged before a notary public (Art. 806). Now,
the instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who attested the will of
1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed by the testatrix and the witnesses at
the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on
the same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that he did not do so, but
brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there. The variance does not
necessarily imply conscious perversion of truth on the part of the witnesses, but appears
rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in recalling past
events, to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs slightly from it (II Moore on
Facts, p. 878; The Ellen McGovern, 27 Fed. 868, 870).

At any rate, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the notary signed the
certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does
not affect the validity of the codicil. Unlike the Code of 1889 (Art. 699), the new Civil
Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be
accomplished in one single act. A comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil
Code reveals that while testator and witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that
is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the
certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their
actions in executing the testamentary disposition. This was done in the case before us.
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament
was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment
itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of
the testatrix and her witnesses can not be said to violate the rule that testaments should
be completed without interruption (Andalis vs. Pulgueras, 59 Phil. 643), or, as the
Roman maxim puts it, "uno codem die ac tempore in eadem loco", and no reversible
error was committed by the Court in so holding. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the
new Civil Code does not contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses
should acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.

The decision admitting the will to probate is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA
SANTIAGO, respondents.
Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners.
Angel A. Sison for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First
Division,1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R. No. 36523-R which reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed
the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. *
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No.
3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel
Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow
and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of
residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is
likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and
petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private
respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters
residence prior an- d up to the time of her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog,
appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two
(2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including
the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public
were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will
on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause, which is
found on page four, reads as follows:
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga
tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming mga
pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at
ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo
ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang
TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril,
1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang
nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika apat na
dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang
panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each
and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at kami
namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa
harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi
at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of
Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same,
under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54,
Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas.
Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged
by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)",
"Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each
page.
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery
of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all
expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies
in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her
brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina
(herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline,
Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein
private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as
"aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang
tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all
properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix
name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the
document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
 3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
and in the second alternative
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or
of some other person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial,
the court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of which read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this
Court finds:
1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the
purported will of the deceased was procured through undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of
some other person for her benefit;
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at
the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the deceased
lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the
fact that the purported will of the deceased was not executed and
attested as required by law;
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document
presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win allegedly
dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by
her three attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as
the last wig and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by
DISALLOWED.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court,
hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in question was
executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of
the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding
that the will in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on
April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of
the deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid
decision and such motion was opposed 4 by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago.
Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28, 1973,
respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for
reconsideration stating that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence
shows that the supposed last wig and testament of Isabel Gabriel was
not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on
several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the
presence of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the will in the
presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for
reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We have
carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record,
There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this
Court sought to be set aside. 7
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that
respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The
Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the
Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon, which
comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations, the issues
raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private
respondent thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the
question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the findings of fact by
respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for
Reconsideration 10 which private respondent answered by way of her Comment or
Opposition 11 filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed.
Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was
executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the
three instrumental witnesses were credible witness
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the
preparation and execution of the win Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously
furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to
type such data into the document Exhibit "F".
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines
under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond
cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible
that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or
document, to Atty. Paraiso.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde
Orobia was not physically present when the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on
April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya
and Maria Gimpaya.
VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to
the picture takings as proof that the win was improperly executed.
VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and
misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had
been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said testimonies.
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an
exercise of the power of supervision.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting
to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and testament of the deceased Isabel
Gabriel.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially
factual in character and content. Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-
repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this
Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated
in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L-
22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more recent cases of Baptisia
vs. Carillo and CA (L32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig
vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the
case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice
Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us
from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed
to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a
month later, this Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the
same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the
lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of
fact ...
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by
substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the
appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its premises
are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when
such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be
ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because only legal
questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts
as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a minute
scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidence becomes
necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some recognized
exceptions.
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to
consider petitioner's assignments of errors.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by law
when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible
witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the
witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with
before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a
credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing
in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first
established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the
term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent
under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by
Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the
Civil Code should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the
Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions
on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code
provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets
forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state:
 Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years
or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may
be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this
Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses
to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document,
perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at
any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his
testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that
the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is
not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the
Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.
We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good
standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the
witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in
the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law
where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two
character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation
for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in
a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens of the
Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473
as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they
merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to
said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the
cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings
are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental
witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent
and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent
Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon.
Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses,
much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound
mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner submits that Article 820
and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to his
qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second
Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses,
petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than just being
competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820
and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are
not synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a credible one.
She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental
witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the
community since one was a family driver by profession and the second the wife of the
driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and
his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano
teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much
less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a competent
testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil.
344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible
witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820
of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may
be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites
authorities that the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply
means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme
Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at
the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the
lost wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to
facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasis supplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court
held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of
sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and
able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision
is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer
and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to
be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if
other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said
witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There
is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental
incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin County
vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and
Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means
a 'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann.
Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means
'competent witness that is, one competent under the law to testify to
fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs.
First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889.
(Ibid, p. 342)
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will
shall be attested by two credible witnesses means competent;
witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent
to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the
will, the competency being determined as of the date of the execution
of the will and not of the timr it is offered for probate, Smith vs.
Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means
competent witnesses — that is, such persons as are not legally
disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental
incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause
excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them
incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the
particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546,
322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is
determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility
depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion
of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v.
El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme
Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be
a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may
allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but
may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We
state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to
have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy
of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established
on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are
honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to
be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental
witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court
allows the probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's
position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent
proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a
good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors,
petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding that the
preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that
Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of
the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in
holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words
"pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting
witnesses were all present in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel
could have dictated the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that
Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by
the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as
proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave
contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and
notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away.
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down
that the findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling which We
cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss
hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified
and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing
the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses
without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it
was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of
the Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and
of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior
appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for any business
transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him to help her
prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of
Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he
witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he
was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya
that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house
which was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which
testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his
wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was
executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas,
Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974
was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly
observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing of these
residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the
will on April 15, 1961, far from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the
spouses were earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel
Gabriel's will.
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of
Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from
the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of
the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car
to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the
three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel
stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they
proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the
day that. the will was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to
help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted to
execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a
Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate
from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and
disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is,
therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law office of
Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel
herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with
the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data
into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and
irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list
(containing the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates)
immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was
corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion
that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's
contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent Court held that on the occasion
of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso
and that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to
April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence
certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in
April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the
notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to
by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly executed and
signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will
duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is
a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public
and as such public document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all
these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed
by petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three
typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left
blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same
occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the
evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the
typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the only name
of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24,
1961 at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax
certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the
three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides
with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was
the appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The
technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the
numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties
disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding are indicated which Atty.
Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it
was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any
note or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly
woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a brain injury
caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after
the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is
within the competency of the respondent appellate court in determining the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and
review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that
the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to be fully
supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel,
despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed
the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself
until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval,
former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate
of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in Tagalog, a dialect
known and understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with
the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or
memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the
notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both
testimonial and documentary is, according to the respondent court, overwhelming that
Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by
the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such
factual finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is
replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed
by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano
lessons to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15,
1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been present to
witness the will on that — day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit
having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday
without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave
no piano lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of
the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to
make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in
the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano
lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that
Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the
will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary
evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment
overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on
that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by signing her name thereon
and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The
attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of
signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts
attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause
which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills,
2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding
that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win
was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that:
"Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to
what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the
photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse
of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the
will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar
Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was
signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken
which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. "
Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to
the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly
executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution
of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya
and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they
spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs wherein they all
appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was
disclosed at the cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty.
Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such
reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly
unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was duly executed
and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's
rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require
picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of
witnesses in their respective testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the
respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of
the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him meant
big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which was
Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the
name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was
Benjamin Cifra, Jr.— these are indeed unimportant details which could have been
affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by
themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution
of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the
testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other with regard
to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details.
Human experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the
details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an
evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as not all
those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in
relating their impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the
contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have
been disturbed by the respondent appellate court because the trial court was in a better
position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a
general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The
right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court
where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and
circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the
significance of which have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed.
Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when they are based on conflicting
evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses
hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court
should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals
found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances
established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record
supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note
or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could
not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have
witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only
the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the
trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the
conclusion that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire
record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing occasion was a
mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment only with Matilde
Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court
to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over the lower courts.
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions
are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as
required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel
Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya,
and a photographer proceeded in a car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the
Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel
obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso
upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be
made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in
the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a
language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote
as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after
finishing the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that
thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the
three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-
hand margin of each and every page of the document in the presence also of the said
three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at
the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the
document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya
and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the bottom of the
attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the
presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya
followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the attestation clause and at the left-hand
margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso
Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV,
Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion of the execution and attestation
of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the
testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on
said occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde
Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring with her at
least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not
know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up
at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was
not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of
Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the
date in question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that
Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or document
to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling
of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the
decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief
that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On
the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel
dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed
to said lawyer she had no note or document. This fact jibes with the evidence — which
the trial court itself believed was unshaken — that Isabel Gabriel was of sound
disposing memory when she executed her will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite
simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the
second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00
for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago
Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-
appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee the fifth was the institution of
the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general
terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate
which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of
such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which judgment is based on a no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the been identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and
al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L- revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals.
22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
any of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of
the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The SO ORDERED.
conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion
and We discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are
not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the decision of the Court of
Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed
by this Tribunal and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect,
without qualification or reservation. The above holding simply synthesize the
resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments of
error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.

The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We

find the respondent Court acted properly and correctly and has not departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power
of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not
err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the
last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.

We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation
of the evidence on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented,
we are convinced that the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the
presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing
the same in the the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then
delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and
notarial register. A few days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso
Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the
lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out
good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed
but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was performed
during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.

Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the

witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and
contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute
the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So
has the lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof,
who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand to receive

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26615. April 30, 1970.]
REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA
NATIVIDAD DE JESUS AND DR. JAIME ROSARIO, Petitioners, v. HON.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch and CONSUELO GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-26884. April 30, 1970.]
REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA
NATIVIDAD DE JESUS AND DR. JAIME ROSARIO, Petitioners, v. HON.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch V, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA, and CONSUELO GONZALES
VDA. DE PRECILLA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-27200. April 30, 1970.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF GLICERIA A. DEL ROSARIO, deceased CONSUELO
S. GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA, petitioner administratrix, v. SEVERINA
NARCISO, ROSA NARCISO, JOSEFINA NARCISO, VICENTE MAURICIO,
DELFIN MAURICIO, REMEDIOS NARCISO, ENCARNACION, NARCISO,
MARIA NARCISO, EDUARDO NARCISO, FR. LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO
JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA NATIVIDAD DE JESUS, DR. JAIME DEL
ROSARIO, ET AL., NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO-SARMIENTO and
PASCUALA NARCISO-MANAHAN, Oppositors-Appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
G.R. No. L-27200 is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(in Sp. Proc. No. 62618) admitting to probate the alleged last will an, testament of the
late Gliceria Avelino del Rosario dated 29 December 1960. G.R. Nos. L-26615 and L-
2684 are separate petitions for mandamus filed by certain alleged heirs of said decedent
seeking (1) to compel the probate court to remove Consuelo S. Gonzales-Precilla as
special administratrix of the estate, for conflict of interest, to appoint a new one in her
stead; and (2) to order the Register of Deeds of Manila to annotate notice of lis pendens
in TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 ,and 81737, registered in the name of Alfonso Precilla,
married to Consuelo Gonzales y Narciso, and said to be properly belonging to the estate
of the deceased Gliceria A. del Rosario.
Insofar as pertinent to the issues involved herein, the facts of these cases may be stated
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried in the City of Manila on 2 September
1965, leaving no descendents, ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of her death, she
was said to be 90 years old more or less, and possessed of an estate consisting mostly of
real properties.
On 17 September 1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased,
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last will and
testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario, executed on 29 December 1960, and for her
appointment as special administratrix of the latter’s estate, said to be valued at about
P100,000.00, pending the appointment of a regular administrator thereof.
The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs: (1) Rev. Fr.
Lucio V. Garcia, a legatee named in an earlier will executed by Gliceria A. del Rosario
on 9 June 1956; (2) Jaime Rosario and children, relatives and legatees in both the 1956
and 1960 wills; Antonio Jesus de Praga and Marta Natividad de Jesus, wards of the
deceased and legatees in the 1956 and 1960 wills; (3) Remedios, Encarnacion, and
Eduardo, all surnamed Narciso; (4) Natividad del Rosario-Sarmiento; (5) Maria
Narciso; (6) Pascuala Narciso de Manahan; (7) Severina, Rosa and Josefa, surnamed
Narciso, and Vicente and Delfin, surnamed Mauricio, — the latter five groups of
persons all claiming to be relatives of Doña Gliceria within the fifth civil degree. The
oppositions invariably charged that the instrument executed in 1960 was not intended
by the deceased to be her true will; that the signatures of the deceased appearing in the
will was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence the part of the
beneficiaries and/or other persons; that the testatrix did not know the object of her
bounty; that the instrument itself reveals irregularities in its execution, and that the
formalities required by law for such execution have not been complied with.
Oppositor Lucio V. Garcia, who also presented for probate the 1956 will of the
deceased, joined the group of Dr. Jaime Rosario in registering opposition to the
appointment of petitioner Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special
administratrix, on the ground that the latter possesses interest adverse to the estate.
After the parties were duly heard, the probate court, in its order of 2 October 1965,
granted petitioner’s prayer and appointed her special administratrix of the estate upon a
bond for P30,000.00. The order was premised on the fact the petitioner was managing
the properties belonging to the estate even during the lifetime of the deceased, and to
appoint another person as administrator or co administrator at that stage of the
proceeding would only result in further confusion and difficulties.
On 30 September 1965, oppositors Jaime Rosario, Et. Al. filed with the probate court an
urgent motion to require the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank to report all withdrawals
made against the funds of the deceased after 2 September 1965. The court denied this
motion on 22 October 1965 for being premature, it being unaware that such deposit in
the name of the deceased existed. 1
On 14 December 1965, the same sets of oppositors, Dr. Jaime Rosario and children,
Antonio Jesus de Praga, Natividad de Jesus and Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, petitioned the
court for the immediate removal of the special administratrix. It was their claim that the
special administratrix and her deceased husband, Alfonso Precilla, 2 had caused
Gliceria A. del Rosario to execute a simulated and fraudulent deed of absolute sale
dated 10 January 1961 allegedly conveying unto said spouses for the paltry sum of
P30,000.00 ownership of 3 parcels of land and the improvements thereon located on
Quiapo and San Nicolas, Manila, with a total assessed value of P334,050.00. Oppositors
contended that since it is the duty of the administrator to protect and conserve the
properties of the estate, and it may become necessary that, an action for the annulment
of the deed of sale land for recovery of the aforementioned parcels of land be filed
against the special administratrix, as wife and heir of Alfonso Precilla, the removal of
the said administratrix was imperative.
On 17 December 1965, the same oppositors prayed the court for an order directing the
Special Administratrix to deposit with the Clerk of Court all certificates of title
belonging to the estate. It was alleged that on 22 October 1965, or after her
appointment, petitioner Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, in her capacity as special
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Gliceria A. del Rosario, filed with Branch
IV of the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of new copies of
the owner’s duplicates of certain certificates of title in the name of Gliceria del Rosario,
supposedly needed by her "in the preparation of the inventory" of the properties
constituting the estate. The motion having been granted, new copies of the owner’s
duplicates of certificates appearing the name of Gliceria del Rosario (among which
were TCT Nos. 66201, 66202 and 66204) were issued on 15 November 1965. On 8
December 1965, according to the oppositors, the same special administratrix presented
to the Register of Deeds the deed of sale involving properties covered by TCT Nos.
66201, 66202 and 66204 supposedly executed by Gliceria del Rosario on 10 January
1961 in favor of Alfonso Precilla, and, in consequence, said certificates of title were
cancelled and new certificates (Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737) were issued in the name
of Alfonso Precilla, married to Consuelo S. Gonzales y Narciso.
On 25 August 1966, the Court issued an order admitting to probate the 1960 will of
Gliceria A. del Rosario (Exhibit "D"). In declaring the due execution of the will, the
probate court took note that no evidence had been presented to establish that the
testatrix was not of sound mind when the will was executed; that the fact that she had
prepared an earlier will did not, prevent her from executing another one thereafter; that
the fact that the 1956 will consisted of 12 pages whereas the 1960 testament was
contained in one page does not render the latter invalid; that, the erasures and alterations
in the instrument were insignificant to warrant rejection; that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the instrumental witnesses which were noted by the oppositors are even
indicative of their truthfulness. The probate court, also considering that petitioner had
already shown capacity to administer the properties of the estate and that from the
provisions of the will she stands as the person most concerned and interested therein,
appointed said petitioner regular administratrix with a bond for P50,000.00. From this
order all the oppositors appealed, the case being docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-
27200.
Then, on 13 September 1966, the probate court resolved the oppositors’ motion of 14
December 1965 for the removal of the then special administratrix, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It would seem that the main purpose of the motion to remove the special administratrix
and to appoint another one in her stead, is in order that an action may be filed against
the special administratrix for the annulment of the deed of sale executed by the decedent
on January 10, 1961. Under existing documents, the properties sold pursuant to the said
deed of absolute sale no longer forms part of the estate. The alleged conflict of interest
is accordingly not between different claimants of the same estate. If it is desired by the
movants that an action be filed by them to annul the aforesaid deed absolute sale, it is
not necessary that the special administratrix be removed and that another one be
appointed to file such action. Such a course of action would only produce confusion and
difficulties in the settlement of the estate. The movants may file the aforesaid
proceedings, preferably in an independent action, to secure the nullity of the deed of
absolute even without leave of this court:"
As regard the motion of 17 December 1965 asking for the deposit in court of the titles
in the name of the decedent, the same was also denied, for the reason that if the movants
were referring to the old titles, they could no longer be produced, and if they meant the
new duplicate copies thereof that were issued at the instance of the special
administratrix, there would be no necessity therefor, because they were already
cancelled and other certificates were issued in the name of Alfonso Precilla. This order
precipitated the oppositors’ filing in this Court of a petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-
26615, Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, Et. Al. v. Hon. Judge Conrado M. Vasquez, Et. Al.),
which was given due course on 6 October 1966.
On 15 December 1965, with that motion for removal pending in the court, the
oppositors requested the Register of Deeds of Manila to annotate a notice of lis pendens
in the records of TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737 in the name of Alfonso Precilla.
And when said official refused to do so, they applied to the probate court (in Sp. Proc.
No. 62618) for an order to compel the Register of Deeds to annotate a lis pendens
notice in the aforementioned titles contending that the matter of removal and
appointment of the administratrix, involving TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737, was
already before the Supreme Court. Upon denial of this motion on 12 November 1966,
oppositors filed another mandamus action, this time against the probate court and the
Register of Deeds. The case was docketed and given due course in this Court as G.R.
No. L-26864.
Foremost of the questions to be determined here concerns the correctness of the order
allowing the probate of the 1960 will.
The records of the probate proceeding fully establish the fact that the testatrix, Gliceria
A. del Rosario, during her lifetime, executed two wills: one on 9 June 1956 consisting
of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language that she knew and spoke, witnessed by
Messrs. Antonio Cabrera, Jesus Y. Ayala and Valentin Marquez, and acknowledged
before notary public Jose Ayala; and another dated 29 December 1960, consisting of 1
page and written in Tagalog, witnessed by Messrs. Vicente Rosales, Francisco Decena,
and Francisco Lopez and acknowledged before notary public Remigio M. Tividad.
Called to testify on the due execution of the 1960 will, instrumental witnesses Decena,
Lopez and Rosales uniformly declared that they were individually requested by Alfonso
Precilla (the late husband of petitioner special administratrix) to witness the execution
of the last will of Doña Gliceria A. del Rosario; that they arrived at the house of the old
lady at No. 2074 Azcarraga, Manila, one after the other, in the afternoon of 29
December 1960; that the testatrix at the time was apparently of clear and sound mind,
although she was being aided by Precilla when she walked; 3 that the will, which was
already prepared, was first read "silently" by the testatrix herself before she signed it; 4
that he three witnesses thereafter signed the will in the presence of the testatrix and the
notary public and of one another. There is also testimony that after the testatrix and the
witnesses to the will acknowledged the instrument to be their voluntary act and deed,
the notary public asked for their respective residence certificates which were handed to
him by Alfonso Precilla, clipped together; 5 that after comparing them with the numbers
already written on the will, the notary public filled in the blanks in the instrument with
the date, 29 January 1960, before he affixed his signature and seal thereto. 6 They also
testified that on that occasion no pressure or influence has been exerted by any person
upon the testatrix to execute the will.
Of course, the interest and active participation of Alfonso Precilla in the signing of this
1960 will are evident from the records. The will appeared to have been prepared by one
who is not conversant with the spelling of Tagalog words, and it has been shown that
Alfonso Precilla is a Cebuano who speaks Tagalog with a Visayan accent. 7 The
witnesses to the will, two of whom are fellow Visayans, 8 admitted their relationship or
closeness to Precilla. 9 It was Precilla who instructed them to go to the house of
Gliceria del Rosario on 29 December 1960 to witness an important document, 10 and
who took their residence certificates from them a few days before the will was signed.
11 Precilla had met the notary public and witnesses Rosales and Lopez at the door of
the residence of the old woman; he ushered them to the room at the second floor where
the signing of the document took place; 12 then he fetched witness Decena from the
latter’s haberdashery shop a few doors away and brought him to, the house the testatrix.
13 And when the will was actually executed Precilla was present. 14
The oppositors-appellants in the present case, however, challenging the correctness of
the probate court’s ruling, maintain that on 29 December 1960 the eyesight of Gliceria
del Rosario was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions of the
will, contrary to the testimonies of witnesses Decena, Lopez and Rosales.
On this point, we find the declarations in court of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis very material
and illuminating. Said ophthalmologist, whose expertise was admitted by both parties,
testified, among other things, that when Doña Gliceria del Rosario saw him for
consultation on 11 March 1960 he found her left eye to have cataract (opaque lens), 15
and that it was "above normal in pressure", denoting a possible glaucoma, a disease that
leads to blindness 16 As to the conditions of her right eye, Dr. Tamesis
declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q But is there anything here in the entry appearing in the other documents Exhibits 3-
B, 3-C and 3-D from which you could inform the court as to the condition of the vision
of the patient as to the right eve?
"A Under date of August 30, 1960, is the record of refraction. that is setting of glass by
myself which showed that the right eye with my prescription of glasses had a vision of 2
over 60 (20/60) and for the left eye with her correction 20 over 300 (20/300).
"Q In layman’s language, Doctor, what is the significance of that notation that the right
had a degree of 20 over 60 (20/60)?
"A It meant that eye at least would be able to recognize objects or persons at a
minimum distance of twenty feet.
"Q But would that grade enable the patient to read print?
"A Apparently that is only a record for distance vision, for distance sight, not for
near."cralaw virtua1aw library
(pages 20-21, t.s.n., hearing of 23 March 1966)
The records also show that although Dr. Tamesis operated of the left eye of the
decedent at the Lourdes Hospital on 8 August 1960; as of 23 August 1960, inspite of the
glasses her vision was only "counting fingers," 17 at five feet. The cross-examination of
the doctor further elicited the following responses:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q After she was discharged from the hospital you prescribed lenses for her, or glasses?
"A After her discharge from the hospital, she was coming to my clinic for further
examination and then sometime later glasses were prescribed.
x x x
"Q And the glasses prescribed by you enabled her to read, Doctor?
"A As far as my record is concerned, with the glasses for the left eye which I prescribed
— the eye which I operated — she could see only forms but not read. That is on the left
eye.
"Q How about the right eye?
"A The same, although the vision on the right eye is even better than the left eye."
(pages 34. 85. t.s.n., hearing of 23 March 1966).
Then, confronted with a medical certificate (Exhibit H) issued by him on 29 November
1965 certifying that Gliceria del Rosario was provided with aphakic lenses and "had
been under medical supervision up to 1963 with apparently good vision", the doctor had
this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q When yon said that she had apparently good vision you mean that she was able to
read?
"A No, not necessarily, only able to go around, take care of herself and see. This I can
tell you, this report was made on pure recollections and I recall she was using her
glasses although I recall also that we have to give her medicines to improve her vision,
some medicines to improve her identification some more.
x x x and attend to kitchen tasks shortly prior to the alleged execution of the testament
"Q What about the vision in the right eve, was that corrected by the glasses?
"A Yes, with the new prescription which I issued on 80 August 1960. It is in the clinical
record.
"Q The vision in the right eye was corrected?
"A Yes That is the vision for distant objects."cralaw virtua1aw library
(pages 38, 39, 40. t.s.n., hearing of 23 March 1966).
The foregoing testimony of the ophthalmologist who treated the deceased and,
therefore, has first hand knowledge of the actual condition of her eyesight from August,
1960 up to 1963, fully establish the fact that notwithstanding the operation and removal
of the cataract in her left eye and her being fitted with aphakic lens (used by cataract
patients), her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading
print. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that with the condition of her eyesight in
August, 1960, and there is no evidence that it had improved by 29 December 1960,
Gliceria del Rosario was incapable f reading, and could not have read the provisions of
the will supposedly signed by her on 29 December 1960. It is worth noting that the
instrumental witnesses stated that she read the instrument "silently" (t.s.n., pages 164-
165). which is a conclusion and not a fact.
Against the background of defective eyesight of the alleged testatrix, the appearance of
the will, Exhibit "D", acquires striking significance. Upon its face, the testamentary
provisions, the attestation clause and acknowledgment were crammed together into a
single sheet of paper, to much so that the words had to be written very close on the top,
bottom and two sides of the paper, leaving no margin whatsoever; the word "and" had
to be written by the symbol" &", apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was
not prepared with any regard for the defective vision of Doña Gliceria. Further,
typographical errors like "HULINH" for "HULING" (last), "Alfonsa" ;or "Alfonso",
"MERCRDRS" for MERCEDES", "instrumental" for "Instrumental", and
"acknowledged" for "acknowledge’’, remained uncorrected, thereby indicating that
execution thereof must have been characterized by haste. It is difficult to understand
that so important a document containing the final disposition of one’s worldly
possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidily written instrument; or that
the glaring spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had actually retained
the ability to read the purported will and had done so. The record is thus convincing that
the supposed testatrix could not have physically read or understood the alleged
testament, Exhibit "D", and that its admission to probate was erroneous and should be
reversed.
That Doña Gliceria should be able to greet her guests on her birthday, arrange flowers
Exhibit "D", as appears from the photographs, Exhibits "E" to "E-1", in no way proves;
that she was able to read a closely typed page, since the acts shown do not require
vision at close range. It must be remembered that with the natural lenses removed, her
eyes had lost the power of adjustment to near vision, the substituted glass lenses being
rigid and uncontrollable by her. Neither is the signing of checks (Exhibits "G" to "G-3")
by her indicative of ability to see at normal reading distances. Writing or signing of
one’s name, when sufficiently practiced, becomes automatic, so that one need only to
have a rough indication of the place where the signature is to be affixed in order to be
able to write it. Indeed, a close examination of the checks, amplified in the photograph,
Exhibit "O", et seq., reinforces the contention of oppositors that the alleged testatrix
could not see at normal reading distance: the signatures in the checks are written far
above the printed base, lines, and the names of the payees as well as the amounts
written do not appear to be in the handwriting of the alleged testatrix, being in a much
firmer and more fluid hand than hers.
Thus, for all intents and purpose of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del
Rosario was, as appellant oppositors contend, not unlike a blind testator, and the due
execution of her will would have required observance of the provisions of Article 808
of the Civil Code.
"ART. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of
the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged."cralaw virtua1aw library
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), 18 is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of
the will are properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus
making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will
should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that
the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator’s) other senses. 19
In connection with the will here in question, there is nothing in the records to show that
the above requisites have been complied with. Clearly, as already stated, the 1960 will
sought to be probated suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution.
We also find merit in the complaint of oppositors Lucio V. Garcia, Et Al., against the
denial by the probate court of their petition for the removal of Consuelo Gonzales Vda.
de Precilla as special administratrix of the estate of the deceased Doña Gliceria
(Petition, G.R. No. L-26615, Annex "B").
The oppositors’ petition was based allegedly on the existence in the special
administratrix of an interest adverse to that of the estate. It was their contention that
through fraud her husband had caused the deceased Gliceria del Rosario to execute a
deed of sale, dated 10 January 1961, by virtue of which the latter purportedly conveyed
unto said Alfonso D. Precilla, married to Consuelo Gonzales y Narciso, the ownership
of 3 parcels of land and the improvements thereon, assessed at P334,050.00, for the sum
of P30,000.00.
In denying the petition, the probate court, in its order of 13 September 1966 (Annex
"P", Petition) reasoned out that since the properties were already sold no longer form
part of the estate. The conflict of interest would not be between the estate and third
parties, but among the different claimants of said properties, in which case, according to
the court, the participation of the special administratrix in the action for annulment that
may be brought would not be necessary.
The error in this line of reasoning lies in the fact that what was being questioned was
precisely the validity of the conveyance or sale of the properties. In short, if proper, the
action for annulment would have to be undertaken on behalf of the estate by the special
administratrix, affecting as it does the property or rights of the deceased. 20 For the rule
is that only where there is no special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased may the legal heirs commence an action arising out of a right belonging to
their ancestor. 21
There is no doubt that to settle the question of the due execution and validity of the deed
of sale, an ordinary and separate action would have to be instituted, the matter not
falling within the competence of the probate court. 22 Considering the facts then before
it, i.e., the alleged deed of sale having been executed by Gliceria del Rosario on 10
January 1961, when she was already practically blind; and that the consideration of
P30,000.00 seems to be unconscionably small for properties with a total assessed value
of P334,050.00, there was likelihood that a case for annulment might indeed be filed
against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the administratrix, being the widow
and heir of the alleged transferee, cannot be expected to sue herself in an action to
recover property that may turn out to belong to the estate. 22 Not only this, but the
conduct of the special administratrix in securing new copies of the owner’s duplicates
of TCT Nos. 66201, 66202, and 66204, without the court’s knowledge or authority, and
on the pretext that she needed them in the preparation of the inventory of the estate,
when she must have already known by then that the properties covered therein were
already "conveyed" to her husband by the deceased, being the latter’s successor, and
having the contract bind the land through issuance of new titles in her husband’s name
cannot but expose her to the charge of unfitness or unsuitableness to discharge the trust,
justifying her removal from the administration of the estate.
With respect to the orders of the court a quo denying (1) the oppositors’ motion to
require the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to report all withdrawals made against the
funds of the deceased after 2 September 1965 and (2) the motion for annotation of a lis
pendens notice on TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737, the same are to be affirmed.
The probate court pointed out in its order of 22 October 1965 (Annex "H") that it could
not have taken action on the complaint against the alleged withdrawals from the bank
deposits of the deceased, because as of that time the court had not yet been apprised that
such deposits exist. Furthermore, as explained by the special administratrix in her
pleading of 30 October 1965, the withdrawals referred to by the oppositors could be
those covered by checks issued in the name of Gliceria del Rosario during her lifetime
but cleared only after her death. That explanation, which not only appears plausible but
has not been rebutted by the petitioners-oppositors, negates any charge of grave abuse
in connection with the issuance of the order here in question.
On the matter of lis pendens (G.R. No. L-26864), the provisions of the Rules of Court
are clear: notice of the pendency of an action may be recorded in the office of the
register of deeds of the province in which the property is situated, if the action affects
"the title or the right of possession of (such) real property." 23 In the case at bar, the
pending action which oppositors seek to annotate in the records of TCT Nos. 81735,
81736, and 81737 is the mandamus proceeding filed in this Court (G.R. No. L-26615).
As previously discussed in this opinion, however, that case is concerned merely with
the correctness of the denial by the probate court of the motion for the removal of
Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix of the estate of the late
Gliceria del Rosario. In short, the issue in controversy there is simply the fitness or
unfitness of said special administratrix to continue holding the trust; it does not involve
or affect at all the title to, or possession of, the properties covered by said TCT Nos.
81735, 81736 and 81737. Clearly, the pendency of such case (L-26615) is not an action
that can properly be annotated in the record of the titles to the properties.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of the court below allowing to probate
the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario is hereby reversed and set aside. The
petition in G.R. No. L-26615 being meritorious, the appealed order is set aside and the
court below is ordered to remove the administratrix, Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de
Precilla, and appoint one of the heirs intestate of the deceased Doña Gliceria Avelino
del Rosario as special administrator for the purpose of instituting action on behalf of her
estate to recover the properties allegedly sold by her to the late Alfonso D. Precilla. And
in Case G.R. No. L-26864, petition is dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS
AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE
JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.
Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.
Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.
Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C.
Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing
the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special
Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de
Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother
of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After
Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower
court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas
de Jesus. On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the
probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he
found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21,
22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and entirely written and
signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is
dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be respected although it is
not written by a lawyer. ...
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas
de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated
"FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both
recognized the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her signature. They
further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the language in which
the holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said
Will was executed by their mother.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate"
assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not
executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or
under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted
by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said Will to be her last
Will and testament at the time of its execution.
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the
probate of the holographic Will which he found to have been duly executed in
accordance with law.
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia
that the alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as
required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the
Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be
strictly complied with.
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and
disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word "dated" has
generally been held to include the month, day, and year. The dispositive portion of the
order reads:
WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will
of Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for not having been
executed as required by the law. The order of August 24, 1973 is
hereby set aside.
The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will
of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the
Civil Code which reads:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.
It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article
688 of the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year,
month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase Año mes y
dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners
submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic Will
is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must
contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent contends that Article
810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and
Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that
the required date includes the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is wanting,
the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further contends that the petitioner
cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil Code because statutes
prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills are
strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application
of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We should not
overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the
purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy —
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions
of the law on wigs in this Project consists in the liberalization of the
manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator
more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficien
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the
exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
testator.
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect to
the formalities in the execution of wills. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 103)
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos (27
SCRA 327) he emphasized that:
xxx xxx xxx
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in
his last will and testament on the ground that any disposition made by
the testator is better than that which the law can make. For this
reason, intestate succession is nothing more than a disposition based
upon the presumed will of the decedent.
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to
guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of
testamentary privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed
in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith
and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate
(Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,
xxx xxx xxx
... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are
to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the
surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the wilt and
the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in
the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean
towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer
from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. ...
(Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although
compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be
accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been expounded
by this Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of
two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the
day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such
contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith
and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There
is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was
entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to
her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children
of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that
she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The
objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic
Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will
is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too
technical to be entertained.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and
year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of
fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of
the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic
Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas,
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.
Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the
sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic
Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being
of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and
testament.
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In
accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named
provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to perpetuate my
memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix
as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed
probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the
testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in
a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full
signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect
and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3,
reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting,
the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were made
by one and the same person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the
handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question
is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to probate
although the alterations and/or insertions or additions above-
mentioned were not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix
pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends that
the oppositors are estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the
ground that they themselves agreed thru their counsel to submit the
Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The
parties did not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that the
oppositors would be in estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the
Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions,
alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by
the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will
deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the holographic
will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the
alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic
Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was
denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the
Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity for interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated
November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on
certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not the original unaltered text after
subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her
as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,
corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical commentary when he said "la
omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia
establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple
reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that
the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of
mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she
failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,
acerca del pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros accidentes
de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia alguna(l).
Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en este
ultimo fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o
entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4
alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la express voluntad del
testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la sentencia de
29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento olografo
por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo
del año en que fue extendido3 (Emphasis ours).
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge,
dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations,
erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the
altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with
the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention
cannot be determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on
Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new Civil Code was
derived:

... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la

sentencia que no declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo que
contenga palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no
salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo
tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal omision solo puede afectar
a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al testamento
mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que
determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez del testamento
olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de
que pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la parte
esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a anular este, y ya
porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en
perfecta armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado
que declara nulas las adiciones apostillas entrerrenglonados,
raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras matrices, siempre que no se
salven en la forma prevenida, paro no el documento que las contenga,
y con mayor motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o
entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni susciten duda alguna
G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.
FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
Nicanor Tavora for appellant.
Jose Rivera for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of
Miguel Mamuyac, who died on the 2d day of January, 1922, in the municipality of
Agoo of the Province of La Union. It appears from the record that on or about the 27th
day of July, 1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit
A). In the month of January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union for the probation of that will. The
probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana
Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause No. 1144, Province of La Union). After
hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said will was denied by the
Honorable C. M. Villareal on the 2d day of November, 1923, upon the ground that the
deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament.
On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was
to secure the probation of the said will of the 16th day of April, 1919 (Exhibit 1). To
said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina
Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the
second will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had
been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) that the said
will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Anastacio R. Teodoro, judge, after
hearing the respective parties, denied the probation of said will of April 16, 1919, upon
the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. Judge
Teodoro, after examining the evidence adduced, found that the following facts had been
satisfactorily proved:
That Exhibit A is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the
possession of the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before
his death as per testimony of witness Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the
testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920,
the original Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually cancelled by the testator Miguel
Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a house
and the land where the house was built, he had to cancel it (the will of 1919),
executing thereby a new testament. Narcisa Gago in a way corroborates the
testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the deceased
(Miguel Mamuyac) in 1919 was found in the possession of father Miguel
Mamuyac. The opponents have successfully established the fact that father
Miguel Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. The same Narcisa Gago,
the sister of the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when cross-
examined by attorney for the opponents, testified that the original Exhibit A
could not be found. For the foregoing consideration and for the reason that the
original of Exhibit A has been cancelled by the deceased father Miguel
Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of Exhibit A for the applicant."
From that order the petitioner appealed.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the
evidence that the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by
the law; that the same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death; that the
said will was a mere carbon copy and that the oppositors were not estopped from
alleging that fact.
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not
denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled
in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a
will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or
cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the
original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have
been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence
of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it
cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The
force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying
greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but
may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to
revoke it.
In view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the
testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been
cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in
accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden
of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its
existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the
contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which
wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of
cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator.
Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven,
however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was
executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be
admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was
not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. (Borromeo vs. Casquijo, G.R. No. L-26063.)1

After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will
presented for probate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920. Therefore the
judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. And without any finding as to costs, it is so
ordered.
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO
CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO
MALOTO, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is not the first time that the parties to this case come to us. In fact, two other cases
directly related to the present one and involving the same parties had already been
decided by us in the past. In G.R. No. L-30479, 1 which was a petition for certiorari and
mandamus instituted by the petitioners herein, we dismissed the petition ruling that the
more appropriate remedy of the petitioners is a separate proceeding for the probate of
the will in question. Pursuant to the said ruling, the petitioners commenced in the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Special Proceeding No. 2176, for the probate of the
disputed will, which was opposed by the private respondents presently, Panfilo and
Felino both surnamed Maloto. The trial court dismissed the petition on April 30, 1970.
Complaining against the dismissal, again, the petitioners came to this Court on a
petition for review by certiorari. 2 Acting on the said petition, we set aside the trial
court's order and directed it to proceed to hear the case on the merits. The trial court,
after hearing, found the will to have already been revoked by the testatrix. Adriana
Maloto, and thus, denied the petition. The petitioners appealed the trial court's decision
to the Intermediate Appellate Court which, on June 7, 1985, affirmed the order. The
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision proved to be of no avail,
hence, this petition.
For a better understanding of the controversy, a factual account would be a great help.
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a
last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736.
However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1, 1964, the
parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an agreement of
extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of
the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the
extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on
March 21, 1964. That should have signalled the end of the controversy, but,
unfortunately, it had not.
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate
of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled
"KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and
purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have
found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials
inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted
to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on April 1, 1967.
Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina
and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of
Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement
they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties,
among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor.
Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and
legatees named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for
reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the
will When the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner came to us by way of a
petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court . 3 As we
stated earlier, we dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for the
probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters
raised by the petitioners.
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or
not the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe
Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will,
contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated
that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless,
been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the
document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the
residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession,
and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. For
reasons shortly to be explained, we do not view such facts, even considered collectively,
as sufficient bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been effectively
revoked.
There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due execution
of the will. The heart of the case lies on the issue as to whether or not the will was
revoked by Adriana.
The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.
 Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in
case of wills: or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the
intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn
cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express
direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the
estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due
execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation,
or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis Supplied.)
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not
per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be
done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under
the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without
saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for
that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is
only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and
testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at
all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to
have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not
in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they
were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was
located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the private
respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the testimony of the two
witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive." We share
the same view. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses,
Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably
positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think,
believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her,
Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned
document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point
is double hearsay.
At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public interest that a
purported win is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations ...."4
The private respondents in their bid for the dismissal of the present action for probate
instituted by the petitioners argue that the same is already barred by res
adjudicata. They claim that this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure to
appeal timely from the order dated November 16, 1968 of the trial court in the intestate
proceeding (Special Proceeding No. 1736) denying their (petitioners') motion to reopen
the case, and their prayer to annul the previous proceedings therein and to allow the last
will and testament of the late Adriana Maloto. This is untenable.
The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy. For a
judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the second action,
Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. 5 We do not find here the
presence of all the enumerated requisites.
For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate
of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special
Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the intestate settlement of the estate
of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be final
with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither
is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is understandably so
because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on
the probate of the contested will . 6 After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is
founded on the presence of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution
and validity, something which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of
estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will.
Thus, there is likewise no Identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding
and that in an action for probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was
precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners instituted this
separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these
grounds alone, the position of the private respondents on this score can not be sustained.
One last note. The private respondents point out that revocation could be inferred from
the fact that "(a) major and substantial bulk of the properties mentioned in the will had
been disposed of: while an insignificant portion of the properties remained at the time of
death (of the testatrix); and, furthermore, more valuable properties have been acquired
after the execution of the will on January 3,1940." 7 Suffice it to state here that as these
additional matters raised by the private respondents are extraneous to this special
proceeding, they could only be appropriately taken up after the will has been duly
probated and a certificate of its allowance issued.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the

Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the
respondent Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana
Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the private respondents.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN
VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.
Claro M. Recto and Serafin C. Dizon for appellants.
Delgado & Flores for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal admitting to
probate the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed on
August 17, 1918. The oppositors-appellants brought the case on appeal to this Court for
the reason that the value of the properties involved exceeds P50,000.
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay,
province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending
line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de
Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and
Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y
Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another executed on June 20, 1939.
(Exhibit I). The later will executed in 1918.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition, which was docketed as special proceeding No. 8022 seeking the
probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no
opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein
oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case
was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court
rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner
failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on
February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on August 17, 1918, which was docketed as special proceeding No. 56, in the
same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three
grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of
1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that
the will has been subsequently revoked. But before the second petition could be heard,
the battle for liberation came and the records of the case were destroyed. Consequently,
a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the same was found to be impossible because
neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the copies required for its reconstitution.
As a result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14, 1946, similar to the one
destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition based on the same grounds as
those contained in their former opposition. Then, the case was set for trial, and on May
28, 1948, the court issued an order admitting the will to probate already stated in the
early part of this decision. From this order the oppositors appealed assigning six errors,
to wit.
I. The probate court erred in not holding that the present petitioner voluntarily
and deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in
special proceeding No. 8022, in order to enable her to obtain the probate of
another alleged will of Molo dated 191.
II. The court a quo erred in not holding that the petitioner is now estopped
from seeking the probate of Molo's alleged will of 1918.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that petitioner herein has come to
court with "unclean hands" and as such is not entitled to relief.
IV. The probate court erred in not holding that Molo's alleged will of August
17, 1918 was not executed in the manner required by law.
V. The probate court erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918 was
deliberately revoked by Molo himself.
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that Molo's will of 1918 was
subsequently revoked by the decedent's will of 1939.
In their first assignment of error, counsel for oppositors contend that the probate court
erred in not holding that the petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate
of the will dated June 20, 1939, in order to enable her to obtain the probate of the will
executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, pointing out certain facts and
circumstances with their opinion indicate that petitioner connived with the witness
Canuto Perez in an effort to defeat and frustrate the probate of the 1939 will because of
her knowledge that said will intrinsically defective in that "the one and only
testamentory disposition thereof was a "disposicion captatoria". These circumstances,
counsel for the appellants contend, constitute a series of steps deliberately taken by
petitioner with a view to insuring the realization of her plan of securing the probate of
the 1918 will which she believed would better safeguard her right to inherit from the
decease.
These imputations of fraud and bad faith allegedly committed in connection with
special proceedings No. 8022, now closed and terminated, are vigorously met by
counsel for petitioner who contends that to raise them in these proceedings which are
entirely new and distinct and completely independent from the other is improper and
unfair as they find no support whatsoever in any evidence submitted by the parties in
this case. They are merely based on the presumptions and conjectures not supported by
any proof. For this reason, counsel, contends, the lower court was justified in
disregarding them and in passing them sub silentio in its decision.
A careful examination of the evidence available in this case seems to justify this
contention. There is indeed no evidence which may justify the insinuation that
petitioner had deliberately intended to frustrate the probate of the 1939 will of the
deceased to enable her to seek the probate of another will other than a mere conjecture
drawn from the apparently unexpected testimony of Canuto Perez that he went out of
the room to answer an urgent call of nature when Artemio Reyes was signing the will
and the failure of petitioner later to impeach the character of said witness in spite of the
opportunity given her by the court to do so. Apart from this insufficiency of evidence,
the record discloses that this failure has been explained by petitioner when she informed
the court that she was unable to impeach the character of her witness Canuto Perez
because of her inability to find witnesses who may impeach him, and this explanation
stands uncontradicted. Whether this explanation is satisfactory or not, it is not now, for
us to determine. It is an incident that comes within the province of the former case. The
failure of petitioner to present the testimony of Artemio Reyes at the hearing has also
been explained, and it appears that petitioner has filed because his whereabouts could
not be found. Whether this is true or not is also for this Court to determine. It is likewise
within the province and function of the court in the former case. And the unfairness of
this imputation becomes more glaring when we stock of the developments that had
taken place in these proceedings which show in bold relief the true nature of the
conduct, behavior and character of the petitioner so bitterly assailed and held in
disrepute by the oppositors.
It should be recalled that the first petition for the probate of the will executed on June
20, 1939, was filed on February 7, 1941, by the petitioner. There being no opposition,
the will was probated. Subsequently, however, upon petition of the herein oppositors,
the order of the court admitting said will to probate was set aside, over the vigorous
opposition of the herein petitioner, and the case was reopened. The reopening was
ordered because of the strong opposition of the oppositors who contended that he will
had not been executed as required by law. After the evidence of both parties had been
presented, the oppositors filed an extensive memorandum wherein they reiterated their
view that the will should be denied probate. And on the strenght of this opposition, the
court disallowed the will.
If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and would make the
testamentary disposition in her favor invalid and ineffective, because it is a "disposicion
captatoria", which knowledge she may easily acquire through consultation with a
lawyer, there was no need her to go through the order of filing the petition for the
probate of the will. She could accomplish her desire by merely suppressing the will or
tearing or destroying it, and then take steps leading to the probate of the will executed in
1918. But for her conscience was clear and bade her to take the only proper step
possible under the circumstances, which is to institute the necessary proceedings for the
probate of the 1939 will. This she did and the will was admitted to probate. But then the
unexpected happened. Over her vigorous opposition, the herein appellants filed a
petition for reopening, and over her vigorous objection, the same was granted and the
case was reopened. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. Is it her fault that the
case was reopened? Is it her fault that the order admitting the will to probate was set
aside? That was a contingency which petitioner never expected. Had appellants not filed
their opposition to the probate of the will and had they limited their objection to the
intrinsic validity of said will, their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the
deceased would have perhaps been accomplished. But they failed in their strategy. If
said will was denied probate it is due to their own effort. It is now unfair to impute bad
faith petitioner simply because she exerted every effort to protect her own interest and
prevent the intestacy of the deceased to happen.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is obvious that the court did not commit
the second and third errors imputed to it by the counsel for appellants. Indeed, petitioner
cannot be considered guilty or estoppel which would prevent her from seeking the
probate of the 1918 will simply because of her effort to obtain the allowance of the
1939 will has failed considering that in both the 1918 and 1939 wills she was in by her
husband as his universal heir. Nor can she be charged with bad faith far having done so
because of her desire to prevent the intestacy of her husband. She cannot be blamed
being zealous in protecting her interest.
The next contention of appellants refers to the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will
of the deceased which was denied probate. They contend that, notwithstanding the
disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of
nullifying the prior of 1918.
Counsel for petitioner meets this argument by invoking the doctrine laid down in the
case of Samson vs. Naval, (41 Phil., 838). He contends that the facts involved in that
case are on all fours with the facts of this case. Hence, the doctrine is that case is here
controlling.
There is merit in this contention. We have carefully read the facts involved in the
Samson case we are indeed impressed by their striking similarity with the facts of this
case. We do not need to recite here what those facts are; it is enough to point out that
they contain many points and circumstances in common. No reason, therefore, is seen
by the doctrine laid down in that case (which we quote hereunder) should not apply and
control the present case.
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the
provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of
wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
said revocatory clause is void. (41 Phil., 838.)
Apropos of this question, counsel for oppositors make the remark that, while they do
not disagree with the soundness of the ruling laid down in the Samson case, there is
reason to abandon said ruling because it is archaic or antiquated and runs counter to the
modern trend prevailing in American jurisprudence. They maintain that said ruling is no
longer controlling but merely represents the point of view of the minority and should,
therefore, be abandoned, more so if we consider the fact that section 623 of our Code of
Civil Procedure, which governs the revocation of wills, is of American origin and as
such should follow the prevailing trend of the majority view in the United States. A
long line of authorities is cited in support of this contention. And these authorities hold
the view, that "an express revocation is immediately effective upon the execution of the
subsequent will, and does not require that it first undergo the formality of a probate
proceeding". (p. 63, appellants' brief .
While they are many cases which uphold the view entertained by counsel for
oppositors, and that view appears to be in controlling the states where the decisions had
been promulgated, however, we are reluctant to fall in line with the assertion that is now
the prevailing view in the United States. In the search we have made of American
authorities on the subject, we found ourselves in a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps
because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State in the
subject of revocation of wills. But the impression we gathered from a review and the
study of the pertinent authorities is that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is
still a good law. On page 328 of the American Jurisprudence Vol. 57, which is a
revision Published in 1948, we found the following passages which in our opinion truly
reflect the present trend of American jurisprudence on this matter affecting the
revocation of wills:
SEC. 471. Observance of Formalities in Execution of Instrument. —
Ordinarily, statutes which permit the revocation of a will by another writing
provide that to be effective as a revocation, the writing must be executed with
the same formalities which are required to be observed in the execution of a
will. Accordingly, where, under the statutes, attestation is necessary to the
making of a valid will, an unattested non testamentary writing is not effective
to revoke a prior will. It has been held that a writing fails as a revoking
instrument where it is not executed with the formalities requisite for the
execution of a will, even though it is inscribed on the will itself, although it
may effect a revocation by cancellation or obliteration of the words of the will.
A testator cannot reserve to himself the power to modify a will by a written
instrument subsequently prepared but not executed in the manner required for
a will.
SEC, 472. Subsequent Unexecuted, Invalid, or Ineffective Will or Codicil. — A
will which is invalid because of the incapacity of the testator, or of undue
influence can have no effect whatever as a revoking will. Moreover, a will is
not revoked by the unexecuted draft of a later one. Nor is a will revoked by a
defectively executed will or codicil, even though the latter contains a clause
expressly revoking the former will, in a jurisdiction where it is provided by a
controlling statute that no writing other than a testamentary instrument is
sufficient to revoke a will, for the simple reason that there is no revoking will.
Similarly where the statute provides that a will may be revoked by a
subsequent will or other writing executed with the same formalities as are
required in the execution of wills, a defectively executed will does not revoke a
prior will, since it cannot be said that there is a writing which complies with
the statute. Moreover, a will or codicil which, on account of the manner in
which it is executed, is sufficient to pass only personally does not affect
dispositions of real estate made by a former will, even though it may expressly
purport to do so. The intent of the testator to revoke is immaterial, if he has not
complied with the statute. (57 Am. Jur., 328, 329.)
We find the same opinion in the American Law Reports, Annotated, edited in 1939. On
page 1400, Volume 123, there appear many authorities on the "application of rules
where second will is invalid", among which a typical one is the following:
It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account of not
being executed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, or where the
testator who has not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the will is
procured through undue influence, or the such, in other words, where the
second will is really no will, it does not revoke the first will or affect it in any
manner. Mort vs. Baker University (193-5) 229 Mo. App., 632, 78 S.W. (2d),
498.
These treaties cannot be mistaken. They uphold the view on which the ruling in the
Samson case is predicated. They reflect the opinion that this ruling is sound and good
and for this reason, we see no justification for abondoning it as now suggested by
counsel for the oppositors.
It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code Civil Procedure) provides that a will
may be some will, codicil, or other writing executed as proved in case of wills" but it
cannot be said that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within the meaning of
said word, but as "other writing executed as provided in the case of wills", simply
because it was denied probate. And even if it be regarded as any other writing within
the meaning of said clause, there is authority for holding that unless said writing is
admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation. (See 57 Am. Jur. pp. 329-
330).
But counsel for oppositors contemned that, regardless of said revocatory clause, said
will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the presumption that it was
deliberately revoked by the testator himself. The oppositors contend that the testator,
after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of the recovatory clause
contained said will, himself deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for
that reason the will submitted by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is only a
duplicate of said original.
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed
the original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will he executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the
first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and
copies to the testator himself and apparently they remained in his possession until he
executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied probate on
November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney to look for another will,
she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the papers or files of the testator. She
did not find the original.
If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a
duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner, the most logical step for the
testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that it may likewise be destroyed.
But this was not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate copy remained in the
possession of petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21)
years since the first will was executed, the original of the will had been misplaced or
lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another
will containing exactly the same testamentary dispositions. Whatever may be the
conclusion we may draw from this chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact is that
there is no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the
testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by the
testator after the execution of the second will, which revoked the first, could there be
any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the
honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his
will of 1939? In other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was
but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory clause
contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect? If such
is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate
under the principle of "dependent relative revocation".
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually
applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if
made, fails of effect for same reason. The doctrine is n limited to the existence
of some other document, however, and has been applied where a will was
destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law. . . . (68 C.J.P. 799).
The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the
making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant
the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent
upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will
intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the
original will remains in full force. (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new
testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some
time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction
conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid
execution of a new will. (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 253.)
We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will
by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in
court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918
because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has
been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which this principle
is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is
clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his
wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying
testate.
The remaining question to be determined refers to the sufficiency of the evidence to
prove the due execution of the will.
The will in question was attested, as required by law, by three witnesses, Lorenzo
Morales, Rufino Enriquez, and Angel Cuenca. The first two witnesses died before the
commencement of the present proceedings. So the only instrumental witness available
was Angel Cuenca and under our law and precedents, his testimony is sufficient to
prove the due execution of the will. However, petitioner presented not only the
testimony of Cuenca but placed on the witness stand Juan Salcedo, the notary public
who prepared and notarized the will upon the express desire and instruction of the
testator, The testimony of these witnesses shows that the will had been executed in the
manner required by law. We have read their testimony and we were impressed by their
readiness and sincerity. We are convinced that they told the truth.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.1âwphïl.nêt
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER
DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177192
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP,
WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian
G. Agtarap (Sebastian)1 and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision
dated November 21, 20063 and the Resolution dated March 27, 20074 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73916.
The antecedent facts and proceedings—
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his
deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
94-4055.
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City
without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two
marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia),5 and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad).
Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died
without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria,6 Joseph,
and Teresa7). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had three
children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the
time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255).
Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had
been appropriating for himself ₱26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits,
pending the appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order
be issued (a) confirming and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who
would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the
named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c) entitling
the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate
individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing
and directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the
allegations in the petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special
administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two
subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon
Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject
properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their
late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by
Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of
Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and
mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess
the desire to earn. They claimed that the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph
be appointed as special or regular administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator of Joaquin’s estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention, alleging that
Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband.
He also averred that there is a need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but
claimed that Eduardo is not the person best qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective
proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of
Partition,8 with the following disposition—
In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of partition
and the payment of inheritance taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and there being no
claim in Court against the estate of the deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is
now consequently – ripe – for distribution among the heirs minus the surviving spouse
Caridad Garcia who died on August 25, 1999.
Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the existence of
TOTAL NET WORTH ----------------------------------------- ₱14,177,500.00
the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which
showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors
failed to contradict by evidence other than their negative allegations, the greater part of WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a
the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs total value of ₱14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from bank deposits and
thereunder. all other incomes or increments thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of
December 31, 1996, after deducting therefrom the compensation of the administrator
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting of his and other expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as follows:
administration from his date of assumption up to the year ending December 31, 1996
per Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which was approved by the TOTAL ESTATE – ₱14,177,500.00
Court. The accounting report included the income earned and received for the period
and the expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of the
CARIDAD AGTARAP – ½ of the estate as her conjugal share – ₱7,088,750.00, the
widow. In accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly
other half of ₱7,088,750.00 – to be divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:
approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 – the deceased JOAQUIN
AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the following:
1) JOSE (deceased) - ₱1,181
I LAND:
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - ₱1,181
Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030 Agtarap St., Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered with 3) MERCEDES (deceased) - ₱1,181
the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, described as follows:
4) SEBASTIAN - ₱1,181

TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL VALUE AMOUNT 5) EDUARDO - ₱1,181

38254 745-B-1 1,335 sq. m. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,675,000.00 6) CARIDAD - ₱1,181

38255 745-B-2 1,331 sq. m. ₱5,000.00 ₱6,655,000.00

The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of ₱1,181,548.30 and
who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and
TOTAL------------------------------------------------------------- ₱13,330,000.00 half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions.

II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS: TERESA AGTARAP - ₱236

JOSEPH AGTARAP - ₱236

BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ------------------------------ ₱350,000.00
WALTER DE SANTOS - ₱236
BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) ----------------------------- 320,000.00
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱236
Building Improvements -------------------------------------- 97,500.00
EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱236
Restaurant ------------------------------------------------------ 80,000.00

Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:

TOTAL --------------------------------------------------------- ₱847,500.00
COMPULSORY HEIRS:
1) GLORIA – (deceased) – represented by Walter de Santos –
2) JOSEPH AGTARAP -
3) TERESA AGTARAP -
4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP -
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit ₱295,364.57.
Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first marriage
stand to receive the total amount of:
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
1avvphi1
1) JOSEPH AGTARAP -
2) TERESA AGTARAP -
3) WALTER DE SANTOS -
HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999
₱7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share
- ₱295,364.57 ₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
₱295,364.57
Total of ₱8,270,208.30
₱295,364.57
b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir
₱295,364.57
₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros
c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - ₱1,181,458.38 – as compulsory heir
₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros
d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the
surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
₱1,181,458.38
₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap SEBASTIAN – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad Garcia
₱1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
₱236,291.66 – share from Milagros Agtarap ₱ 236,291.66 - share from Milagros
₱295,364.57 – as compulsory heir of ₱5,522,854.06
₱531,656.23 Jose Agtarap EDUARDO – ₱4,135,104.10 – share from Caridad Garcia
₱1,181,458.30 – as compulsory heir
₱ 236,291.66 – share from Milagros
₱5,522,854.06
 SO ORDERED.9
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution10 denying the motions for
reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It
also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of
Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue
a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads—
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant
thereto, the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2
[TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby partitioned as
follows:
The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by TCT No. 38254
and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be distributed among the following:
Lucia Mendietta - ½ of the property. But since she is deceased, her share shall be
inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - ½ of the property and ¼ of the other half of the property which
pertains to Lucia Mendietta’s share.
Jesus Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he is already deceased (and
died without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn, be acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since she died in 1996 without
issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband
Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in
representation of Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile),
Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - ¼ of Lucia Mendietta’s share. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance
shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband
Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal
shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtarap’s estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the subject properties
and its improvements, shall be distributed as follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share shall be
inherited by her children namely Mercedes Agtarap (represented by her husband
Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her
inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos
and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
Milagros’ brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes
(represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and
Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be
acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter
de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal
shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her inheritance shall
be acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile in equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence, these
petitions ascribing to the appellate court the following errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the aforementioned
important facts12 which alter its Decision;
2. – The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the
issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
3. – The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law and in not
applying the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata.13
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED
IN DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE
LOWER COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT
NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY
OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO CON
CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE
COURT HAS NO POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD
BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS
TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT
HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.14
As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and
Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of
their father Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the
certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted, stating that the wife of their father
Jose is Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother is Priscilla. He avers that
the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as the best
evidence of Jose’s marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not authenticated and
formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also asseverates that he actually questioned the
legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as
heirs, and in his reply to their opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the
failure of Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude them
as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations therein. He points out that his motion
was denied by the RTC without a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title
of real estate properties subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Caridad Garcia, and as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof,
and thus, they are not subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a
separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that estoppel applies against
the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered any objection to the
issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate
must have already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax
by Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in
Milagros’ name and of TCT No. 8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also
alleges that res judicata is applicable as the court order directing the deletion of the
name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of Caridad, in the TCTs had long become
final and executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the
CA erroneously settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates
of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle
of settling only one estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution
of the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding
was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all
to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquin’s estate. He states that
this violated the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA gravely erred
when it affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first
marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
According to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was
not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which
properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
The Court’s Ruling
As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on the ownership of the subject real
properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the
same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16 As held in
several cases,17 a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate
action.18 Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court
is competent to resolve issues on ownership.19 Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.20
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the
parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the
subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to
settle the estate of Joaquin.1auuphi1
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial
settlement of Joaquin’s estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by
Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that
Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with
Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present
proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother title,
TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR
BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y el
Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN
AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin
Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368,
consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577
(32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and
subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that
TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which reads—
Ap-4966 – NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal como aparece,
tanchando las palabras "con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y poniendo en su lugar, entre
lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras "en segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en
complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la
Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No. 23,
G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada con el No.
4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. 32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was
crossed out and replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the
second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the
replacement of Caridad’s name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left,
as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucia’s share in the
property covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the
certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And
as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs –
Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved
by the death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the
RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to
liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should
Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the
same should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucia’s
spouse.24 Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her
compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the
CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively
show that the owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by
virtue of the registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to)
Caridad Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral
attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not
necessarily conclusive of a holder’s true ownership of property.25 A certificate of title
under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument
for the deprivation of ownership.26 Thus, the fact that the properties were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses’ coverture.27 The phrase "married to
Caridad Garcia" in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the
registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal
properties.28
Neither can Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have already been settled in
1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax,
per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90
of the Rules of Court—
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court,
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the
debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax. The records of these cases do not show that these were complied
with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice
it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose.
The RTC found that Sebastian did not present clear and convincing evidence to support
his averments in his motion to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative
allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose
was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this in
their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21, 1995
hearing.29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006
Decision.30
Also, Sebastian’s insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to
the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition,
the RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and was later
substituted in the proceedings below by her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a
daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC likewise
noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to
intervene, alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of
Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later granted the
motion, thereby admitting his answer on October 18, 1995.31 The CA also noted that,
during the hearing of the motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and
Eduardo did not interpose any objection when the intervention was submitted to the
RTC for resolution.32
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold
that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo
Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian
to present competent evidence to refute his and Eduardo’s admissions that Joseph and
Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the
participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed
to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to
participate in the estate in representation of the Joaquin’s compulsory heirs, Gloria and
Mercedes, respectively.33
This Court also differs from Eduardo’s asseveration that the CA erred in settling,
together with Joaquin’s estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes,
and Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show that
the disposition of the properties related only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above, the RTC was
specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as
well as their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate, as
enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and
Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the
settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardo’s position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin’s
estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that
a separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by
Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.34 While there has been no showing
that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from Joaquin’s estate in
favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved, prudence dictates that this
Court refrain from distributing Milagros’ share in Joaquin’s estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate
of Death.35 He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children
Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the
March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with modifications such that
the share of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until after the final determination of
the probate of her purported will, and that Sebastian shall be represented by his
compulsory heirs.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit, while the
petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision dated
November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor
of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the final determination of the probate
of her will, and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on January
15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin
Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.

These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City,
for further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased.
FAUSTO E. GAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
Benedicto C. Belran, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for appellant.
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the
University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the
City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of
first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by
the deceased, substantially in these words:
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay
nagsasalaysay na ang aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking
ipinamamana sa aking mga kamag-anakang sumusunod:
Vicente Esguerra, Sr. .............................................
Fausto E. Gan .........................................................
Rosario E. Gan .........................................................
Filomena Alto ..........................................................
Beatriz Alto .............................................................. 1 Bahagi
At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking
ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y
magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa
halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking
pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kung ito ay may kakulangan man ay
bahala na ang aking asawa ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking
kagustuhan.
(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased
had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose,
Judge,1 refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration
failed. Hence this appeal.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due
execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro
Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned to her first
cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make a will. She confided however that it would
be useless if her husband discovered or knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E.
Gan, nephew of Felicidad, who was then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter
replied it could be done without any witness, provided the document was entirely in her
handwriting, signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no time in transmitting the
information, and on the strength of it, in the morning of November 5, 1951, in her
residence at Juan Luna Street, Manila, Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic
will substantially of the tenor above transcribed, in the presence of her niece, Felina
Esguerra (daughter of Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the afternoon of that day,
Felicidad was visited by a distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to read
the will in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who again read it.
Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and Rosario Gan
5 Bahagi
Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will, again in the presence of Felina
Esguerra, who read it for the third time.
2 Bahagi
2 Bahagi
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T. Hospital for her last
illness, she entrusted the said will, which was contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra.
1 Bahagi
But a few hours later, Ildefonso Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being
afraid of him by reason of his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him.
Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to demand
it the next day shortly before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina handed it to him but
not before she had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and read the will for the last
time.2
From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been suffering from
heart disease for several years before her death; that she had been treated by prominent
physicians, Dr. Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin Liboro and others; that in May 1950
husband and wife journeyed to the United States wherein for several weeks she was
treated for the disease; that thereafter she felt well and after visiting interesting places,
the couple returned to this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred, she
suffered several attacks, the most serious of which happened in the early morning of the
first Monday of November 1951 (Nov. 5). The whole household was surprised and
alarmed, even the teachers of the Harvardian Colleges occupying the lower floors and
of by the Yap spouses. Physician's help was hurriedly called, and Dr. Tanjuaquio
arrived at about 8:00 a.m., found the patient hardly breathing, lying in bed, her head
held high by her husband. Injections and oxygen were administered. Following the
doctor's advice the patient stayed in bed, and did nothing the whole day, her husband
and her personal attendant, Mrs. Bantique, constantly at her side. These two persons
swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will, and could have made no will on
that day.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several reasons, the most
important of which were these: (a) if according to his evidence, the decedent wanted to
keep her will a secret, so that her husband would not know it, it is strange she executed
it in the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were
unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the decedent
it is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to see and read the
will several times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would have permitted Primitivo
Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely
wanted its contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable that
her purpose being to conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even
to the hospital, in her purse which could for one reason or another be opened by her
husband; (e) if it is true that the husband demanded the purse from Felina in the U.S.T.
Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it without
destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner being precisely that the will was
executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor's evidence
that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the testimony of the
oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous effort to discredit them. It appears that the
same arguments, or most of them, were presented in the motion to reconsider; but they
failed to induce the court a quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief, on the other
hand, aptly answers the criticisms. We deem it unnecessary to go over the same matters,
because in our opinion the case should be decided not on the weakness of the opposition
but on the strength of the evidence of the petitioner, who has the burden of proof.
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills along with other
forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) approved August 7, 1901, adopted only
one form, thereby repealing the other forms, including holographic wills.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. "A
person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills
under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed
by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to
attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed in their
presence and that they signed in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills, to guarantee their truth and authencity
(Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476) and to avoid those who have no right to succeed
the testator would succeed him and be benefited with the probate of same.
(Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off. Gaz., 1855). However, formal imperfections may be
brushed aside when authenticity of the instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez vs Yap,
40 Off. Gaz. 1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such
will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of
the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77).
If there is, the three must testify, if available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291;
Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From the testimony of such witnesses (and of
other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and
authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are
demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are
"entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is
reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity, and
as its own safeguard, since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be — or not to be —
in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says the New
Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting
and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be
required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting)
and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the holographic
will. They may be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting, or they may
deliberately lie in affirming it is in the testator's hand. However, the oppositor may
present other witnesses who also know the testator's handwriting, or some expert
witnesses, who after comparing the will with other writings or letters of the deceased,
have come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand of the
deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such contradictory testimony
may use its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the document, whether the will
submitted to it has indeed been written by the testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of
assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity3 —
the testator's handwriting — has disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated upon the
testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the
handwriting of the testator? How can the oppositor prove that such document was not in
the testator's handwriting? His witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not
examined it. His experts can not testify, because there is no way to compare the alleged
testament with other documents admittedly, or proven to be, in the testator's hand. The
oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper millstone of his lack of
knowledge of the will or the form thereof, and the nether millstone of his inability to
prove its falsity. Again the proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they
may have been shown a faked document, and having no interest to check the
authenticity thereof have taken no pains to examine and compare. Or they may be
perjurers boldly testifying, in the knowledge that none could convict them of perjury,
because no one could prove that they have not "been shown" a document which they
believed was in the handwriting of the deceased. Of course, the competency of such
perjured witnesses to testify as to the handwriting could be tested by exhibiting to them
other writings sufficiently similar to those written by the deceased; but what witness or
lawyer would not foresee such a move and prepare for it? His knowledge of the
handwriting established, the witness (or witnesses) could simply stick to his statement:
he has seen and read a document which he believed was in the deceased's handwriting.
And the court and the oppositor would practically be at the mercy of such witness (or
witnesses) not only as to the execution, but also as to the contents of the will. Does the
law permit such a situation?
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or
destroyed will by secondary — evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the
original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills
which could not then be validly made here. (See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art. 830-New
Civil Code.)
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will
is that it may be lost or stolen4 — an implied admission that such loss or theft renders it
useless..
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and presented to the
judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and require its identity to be established by the
three witnesses who depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written
by the testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will has
been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693). All these, imply presentation of the
will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a greater degree. It requires that the
surviving spouse and the legitimate ascendants and descendants be summoned so that
they may make "any statement they may desire to submit with respect to the
authenticity of the will." As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually
done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its
execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply
permitting such relatives to state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face
of the document itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do
unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of either
complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it
spurious.5 Such purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented for their
examination. If it be argued that such choice is not essential, because anyway the
relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct
disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if
genuine, a right which they should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof
from them.
We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document itself--in the
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925, which denied protocolization
or probate to a document containing testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of the
deceased, but apparently mutilated, the signature and some words having been torn
from it. Even in the face of allegations and testimonial evidence (which was
controverted), ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of the will. The aforesaid
tribunal declared that, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code (Spanish) the
will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect.
Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el parrafo segundo
del articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que para que sea valido el testamento
olografo debera estar escrito todo el y firmado por testador, con expression del
año, mes y dia en que se otorque, resulta evidente que para la validez y eficacia
de esos testamentos, no basta la demostracion mas o menos cumplida de que
cuando se otorgaron se Ilenaron todos esos requisitos, sino que de la
expresada redaccion el precepto legal, y por el tiempo en que el verbo se
emplea, se desprende la necesidad de que el documento se encuentre en dichas
condiciones en el momento de ser presentado a la Autoridad competente, para
au adveracion y protocolizacion; y como consecuencia ineludible de ello,
forzoso es affirmar que el de autos carece de validez y aficacia, por no
estarfirmado por el testador, cualquiera que sea la causa de la falta de firma, y
sin perjuicio de las acciones que puedan ejercitar los perjudicados, bien para
pedir indemnizacion por el perjuicio a la persona culpable, si la hubiere, o su
 castigo en via criminal si procediere, por constituir dicha omision un defecto
insubsanable . . . .
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly
the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.6
PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V, ley 15--E
depues que los herederos e sus fijos ovieren esta manda, fasta ... annos
muestrenla al obispo de la tierra, o al juez fasta VI meses y el obispo o el juez
tomen otros tales tres escritos, que fuesen fechos por su mano daquel que fizo
la manda; e por aquellos escriptos, si semjara la letra de la manda, sea
confirmada la manda. E depues que todo esto fuere connoscido, el obispo o el
juez, o otras testimonios confirmen el escripto de la manda otra vez, y en esta
manera vala la manda. (Art. 689, Scaevola--Codigo Civil.)
(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the
testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased
in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and
signature.7
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers the loss of the
holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y Ripert, Derecho Civil Frances, traduccion por
Diaz Cruz, 1946, Tomo V, page 555).
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.8
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered to adopt
this opinion as a Rule of Court for the allowance of such holographic wills. We hesitate,
however, to make this Rule decisive of this controversy, simultaneously with its
promulgation. Anyway, decision of the appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the
insufficiency, of the evidence presented by petitioner Fausto E. Gan.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike
holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or
destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee
of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing
or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing
witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the
notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their
whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by
the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted
friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to
distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of the
will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible9 only one
man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of
the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and
credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could
easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and
authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed it in
an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because
the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may
consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of
the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable
feature — feasibility of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this kind
of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish
Commentators and teachers of Civil Law.10
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing
witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of
subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would
testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion
which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the
handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing the
trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances described in the
appealed decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will
precisely to relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo
Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten
to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if
she wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she not entrust it to
her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip
to Davao, a few days after the alleged execution of the will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct"
proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.11
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.

Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by
the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes
Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following
grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will
by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the
testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a
disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect
after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as
held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with
another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the
court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the
appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the
will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an
instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and
colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied
by the court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and
rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February
23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the
original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court
held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to
suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of
authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May
13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of
the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the
original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the
decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of
Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to
law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that
the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed
the following assigned errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST

HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY
THEREOF;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE
MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING

APPELLANT'S WILL.

The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found
can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil
Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due
execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at
least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if
the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator
in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox
copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court
ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may
not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards
the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said
decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of
the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's
motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979,
dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET
ASIDE.
G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.
F. Lavides and L.B. Alcuaz for appellant.
Vicente J. Cuna and P.S. Singson for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January 1958 by the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves
the determination of the quantity of evidence required for the probate of a holographic
will.
The established facts are thus summarized in the decision appealed from (Rec. App. pp.
22-24):
"Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the petitioner; that
on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon
City, known to be the last residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola,
petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the said
holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole
heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; that witness Francisco
Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will (Exh. C) one month, more or
less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his
wife; that the witness testified also that he recognized all the signatures
appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) as the handwriting of the testatrix
and to reinforce said statement, witness presented the mortgage (Exh. E), the
special power of the attorney (Exh. F), and the general power of attorney (Exh.
F-1), besides the deeds of sale (Exhs. G and G-1) including an affidavit (Exh.
G-2), and that there were further exhibited in court two residence certificates
(Exhs. H and H-1) to show the signatures of the testatrix, for comparison
purposes; that said witness, Azaola, testified that the penmanship appearing in
the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as
well as the signatures appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in
the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are
the signatures of the testatrix; that said witness, in answer to a question of his
counsel admitted that the holographic will was handed to him by the testatrix.
"apparently it must have been written by her" (t.s.n., p. 11). However, on page
16 on the same transcript of the stenographic notes, when the same witness
was asked by counsel if he was familiar with the penmanship and handwriting
of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de Yance, he answered positively in the
affirmative and when he was asked again whether the penmanship referred to
in the previous answer as appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) was hers
(testatrix'), he answered, "I would definitely say it is hers"; that it was also
established in the proceedings that the assessed value of the property of the
deceased in Luskot, Quezon City, is in the amount of P7,000.00.
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and
his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last
will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957
and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the
signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the
lone witness presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the
will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one
witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811
does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be
denied by the adverse party.
Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:
ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
required.
In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. (691a).
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he
was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present
Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate
denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will,
none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the
existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the
control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any
three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the
testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express)
"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no
available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be
unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article
811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second
paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph,
and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
indole delicada y peligrosa del testamento olografo lo hace necesario para
mayor garantia de todos los interes comprometidos en aquel.
En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una confirmacion facultativa
del dicho profano de los testigos y un modo de desvanecer las ultimas dudas
que pudieran ocurrir al Juez acerca de la autenticidad que trata de averigaur y
declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la frase del citado ultimo apartado, (siempre
que el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido o no testigos y dudaran o no
estos respecto de los extremos por que son preguntados.

As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con independencia de los
(or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify sucesos y de su significacion, para responder debidamente de las resoluciones
to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the que haya de dictar.
deficiency.
And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed, no
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence,
the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay
established for ordinary testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; witnesses.
Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement
can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is
the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law merely directory and is not mandatory.
essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed
Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called
merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided. upon to construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served,
in our opinion, by giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence,
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if including expert witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.
the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the
Court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the records
witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is
ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if
conformity with this opinion. But evidence already on record shall not be retaken. No
no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court
costs.
may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in
fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
the noted Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd Ed., p.421), sagely remarks:

La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo apartado de dicho

precepto induce la conclusion de que siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor
parte de los casos, el Juez debe acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre
acerca de la autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten insertas en
los autos del expediente las declaraciones testificales. La prudencia con que el
Juez debe de proceder en resoluciones de transcendencia asi lo exige, y la
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999]
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL
RAMONAL, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE
SALCEDO, and EUFEMIA PATIGAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde
Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been established
and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said
will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in
question be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his
evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the
ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the
motion is granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his
right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec. 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court).
Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing the
probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.2
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a
petition3 for probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16,
1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal,
was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that
there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator,
and the will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedents property, including all real and personal property
was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.4cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery
and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a third hand of an
interested party other than the true hand of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the
holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after
every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the
will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after
the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that
the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and
trickery.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners
instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that
respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence
having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for probate of the document
(Exhibit S) on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal,
is denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.7
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal,8 and in support of their
appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses,
namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4)
Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account
of their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the
special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed. He
produced and identified the. records of the case. The documents presented bear the
signature of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the
basis for comparison of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or
admitted as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produce and
identify the voters affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters affidavit was not
produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal August 30, 1978
was her aunt, and that after the death of Matildes husband, the latter lived with her in
her parents house for eleven (11) years, from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) 2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikitan Street.
years of close association with the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature
and handwriting as she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and
the deceased always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay)
assisted the deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters August 30, 1978
of the deceased to her creditors.
3. My jewelrys shall be divided among:
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde
Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was 1. Eufemia Patigas
personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the
dispositions therein, the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased. 2. Josefina Salcedo

Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de 3. Evangeline Calugay
Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed by
the deceased in connection with the intestate proceedings of her late husband, as a result (Sgd)Matilde Vda de Ramonal
of which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda.
August 30, 1978
de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.

4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R. Calugay

The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the
application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
deceased, since the deceased signed documents in her presence, when the latter was
applying for pasture permit. "August 30, 1978

Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with 5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline R.
the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no longer around.
of time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the
signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
August 30, 1978
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:
6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.
Instruction
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
"August 30,1978
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
Gene and Manuel:
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
"Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.
Mama
Matilde Vda de Ramonal
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision9 ruling that the appeal was
meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102,
penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of
Appeals held:
x x x even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the
opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at
the execution of the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, new civil
code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses who
know the handwriting and signature of the testator and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not express) that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. There may be no available witness acquainted with the
testators hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness may be unwilling to give a
positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus
become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of
article 811 prescribes that
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if
the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found
(or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify
to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if
the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule
established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino
v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be
considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the
presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law
essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
present (art.10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed
merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Art.811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words if the
court deem it necessary, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the court
should be convinced of the wills authenticity. Where the prescribed number of
witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if
no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the court
may still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in
fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the
execution of the holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three
witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is
convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of
inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if
experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a partys failure to
offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the
testimony of the lay witnesses.10
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and
other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and
signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the
holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to
probate.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners raise the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied
upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had
been able to present credible evidence to prove that the date, text, and signature on the
holographic will were written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the
holographic will of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Q. Who sometime accompany her?
Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the
probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare A. I sometimes accompany her
that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.
Q. In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a
A. Yes, sir.13
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is
mandatory.11cräläwvirtualibräry xxx

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are referring
aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of to as one of the receipts which she issued to them?
the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals
who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. A. Yes, sir.

So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that
the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the Mrs. Binanay?
evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.
A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified
explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the case of Q. Why do you say that that is a signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal?
Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely
identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not A. I am familiar with her signature.
presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that
of the deceased.
Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de Ramonal
kept records of the accounts of her tenants?
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to
identify the signature of the deceased in the voters affidavit, which was not even
A. Yes, sir.
produced as it was no longer available.

Q. Why do you say so?

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De

Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your
Ramonal.
parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the court what was your
occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy that time?
Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?
A. Collecting rentals.
A. In handwritten.14
Q. From where?
xxx
12
A. From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets.
Q. In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and deed of
sale which you said what else did you do to acquire familiarity of the signature of
xxx
Matilde Vda De Ramonal?
A. Posting records. Q. Who was in possession of that will?

Q. Aside from that? A. I.

A. Carrying letters. Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?

Q. Letters of whom? A. It was in my mothers possession.

A. Matilde Q. So, it was not in your possession?

Q. To whom? A. Sorry, yes.

A. To her creditors.15 Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally in the
possession of your mother?
xxx
A. 1985.17
Q. You testified that at the time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a
document with its title tugon is this the document you are referring to? xxx

A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that will to
you and therefore you have that in your possession?
Q. Showing to you this exhibit S, there is that handwritten tugon, whose
handwriting is this? A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.

A. My aunt. Q. After taking that document you kept it with you?

Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt? A. I presented it to the fiscal.

A. Because I am familiar with her signature.16 Q. For what purpose?

What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which A. Just to seek advice.
she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the deceased
sign a document or write a note. Q. Advice of what?

Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that
the will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the
possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:
Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late Matilde
Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?
A. About the will.18
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from
petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her
motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.

A. Yes, sir. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she
could go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.19
xxx
Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that there are
retracings in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.
Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is
continued towards letter D.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, sir.20
xxx
Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will. Now,
you identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated January 8,1978 which is
only about eight months from August 30,1978. Do you notice that the signature Matilde
Vda de Ramonal is beautifully written and legible?
A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.
Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy was not
sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was exhausted?
A. In writing.
Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and you just
tried to explain yourself out because of the apparent inconsistencies?
A. That was I think. (sic)
Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the alleged
holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no retracing; there is no
hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid movement. x x x And in fact , the
name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned signature
appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting
themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?
A. Yes, sir.21
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in
the handwriting of the testator. She testified that:
Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo
Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the services if any which
you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?
A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to the market and then to her
transactions.
Q. What else? What services that you rendered?
A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to her
lawyer.
Q. What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?
A. I used to be her personal driver.
Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the handwriting
of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?
A. Because I lived with her since birth.22 A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.

xxx Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what
case is that, Fiscal?
Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned tugon dated Agosto 30,
1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this court whose signature A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the court
is this? before.26

A. Yes, sir, that is her signature. xxx

Q. Why do you say that is her signature? Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is marked
as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there appears a signature over the type
A. I am familiar with her signature.23 written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the A. That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never
declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document. Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?

The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that: A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.27

Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal? xxx

A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather.
Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity.
Q. Can you tell the name of the husband?
A. The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24
Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were
the other assistance wherein you were rendering professional service to the deceased
Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents
to show that I have assisted then I can recall.28

xxx xxx

Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled tugon, kindly go over this
have legitimate children? document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar with the handwriting
contained in that document marked as exhibit S?
A. As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25
A. I am not familiar with the handwriting.
xxx
Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de
Ramonal.
A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.

Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?
Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you
tell the court whose signature is this?
A. Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.
Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the
court whose signature is that?
A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature is this?
A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar.29
xxx
Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda de
Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.
Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.
You are merely supposing that it seems to be her signature because it is similar to
the signature of the project of partition which you have made?
A. That is true.30
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to
probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested
holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31 ruling that the requirement
is merely directory and not mandatory.
32
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that the object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the
will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms.
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years
before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of
the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The
only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the
lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the
signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting
expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity
of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different
when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the
testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing
and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978,33 and the
signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated
December 30, 1980,34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978,35 the strokes are different. In the
letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in
writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are
ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce
evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010
UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner,
vs.
NIXON LEE, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the August 23, 2006 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007 Resolution,2 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic
will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent
Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel
petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof
could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and
liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.3
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint
and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of
cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing
thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and
that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will
were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to
introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC
of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first
exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the
suit.4
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in
her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of
documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and
irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition—they did not prove or disprove that she
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of
mandamus.5
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.6 In its February 4, 2005
Order,7 however, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September
20, 2005.8 Hence, the petition was dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the
CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus
would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient
to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his
deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the
approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in the
proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his
mother had in her custody the original copy of the will.91avvphi1
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23,
2006 Amended Decision,10 granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the
writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled
this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had
in her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007
Resolution.11
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending
in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the
testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.12
The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides
that—
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.13
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or
to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law.14 This definition recognizes the public character of
the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.15 The writ is a
proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution.16 As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if
the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.17
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law.18 Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although
objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and
the case is meritorious.19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action
is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer,
board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which he is entitled.20 On the part of the relator, it is essential to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.21
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations.22 Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely
private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in
the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to
enforce a private right against an individual.24 The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues
only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ.25 To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the
redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.26
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.27 In other words, mandamus can be
issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are
powerless to afford relief.28 Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is
equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable
principles.29 Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of
the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a
public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and
that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court,
however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance
of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly
provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time,
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production
of the original holographic will. Thus—
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall,
within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to
the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as
executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the
testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he
obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court
having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall,
within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his
refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any
of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to
the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will
after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same,
when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and
there kept until he delivers the will.30
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it
to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court
grants the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 01100939 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a
foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas
(Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in
the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of
Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for
the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her
estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel)
and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the
petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but
in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s
will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been
executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences
of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the
estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion
with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the
RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not
Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will;
(b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the
U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American
citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,4 affirming the assailed order of the
RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to
respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified
in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule
76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the
country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case,
said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and
allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied
with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner
abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated
and allowed in the country where it was executed.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad
must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be
probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of
the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such
wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such
foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the
probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in
that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal
requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although
the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil
Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where
he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any
other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far
as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for
whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name
of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court
is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court
of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure
for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a
will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate
where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance,
since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the
present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the
foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically.1âwphi1 If the instituted heirs

do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving
them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper
court.8

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling
that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will and that,
in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The
parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testator’s
state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required
of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial court’s directive for Ernesto to
submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s will and the certified copies of the
Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978
PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-GALLONOSA and
ADOLFO FORTAJADA, the deceased Pedro Gallanosa being substituted by his
legal heirs, namely his above-named widow and his children, ISIDRO
GALLANOSA and LEDY GALLANOSA, and grandchildren named IMELDA
TECLA GALLANOSA and ROSARIO BRIGIDA GALLANOSA, children of the
late SIKATUNA GALLANOSA, son of Pedro D.H. GALLONOSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, Judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance
of Sorsogon and FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS, CASIANO G. HITOSIS,
TEOTIMO G. HITOSIS, VICTORIO G. HITOSIS, EMILIA G. HITOSIS VDA.
DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS,
FLORENTINO R. HITOSIS, VIRGINIA R. MITOSIS, DEBORAH R. HITOSIS,
EDILBERTO R. HITOSIS, LEONOR R. HITOSIS, NORMA R. HITOSIS-
VILLANUEVA, LEONCIO R. HITOSIS, minors ANGEL R. HITOSIS and
RODOLFO R. HITOSIS, represented by their legal guardian and mother
LOURDES RELUCIO VDA. DE HITOSIS, PETRONA HITOSIS-BALBIDO,
MODESTO HITOSIS-GACILO, CLETO HITOSIS, AGUSTIN HITOSIS-
FORTES, TOMASA HITOSIS-BANARES VDA. DE BORRAS, CONRADA
HITOSIS-BANARES FRANCHE, RESTITUTO HITOSIS-BANARES, DAMIAN
HITOSIS-BANARES, FIDEL HITOSIS-BANARES, SUSANA HITOSIS-
BANARES RODRIGUEZ, JOSE HITOSIS, LOLITA HITOSIS-BANEGA,
minors MILAGROS HITOSIS-BANEGA, ALICIA HITOSIS-BANEGA AND
ELISA HITOSIS-BANEGA, represented by their legal guardian and father
ERNESTO BANEGA, FELICITAS HITOSIS-PENAFLOR, GENOVEVA
HITOSIS-ADRIATICO, MANUEL HITOSIS, PEDRO HITOSIS, LIBRATA
HITOSIS-BALMES, JUANITA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GABAS, MAURA
HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GANOLA and LEONA HITOSIS-GABITO
GAMBA, respondents.
Haile Frivaldo for petitioners.
Joaquin R Mitosis for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari, filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners seek to
annul the orders of respondent Judge dated May 3 trial June 17, 1968, wherein he
reconsidered his order of January 10, 1968, dismissing, on the ground of prescription,
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2233 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.
The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in Sorsogon left by Florentino Hitosis,
with an estimated value of P50,000, trial claims for damages exceeding one million
pesos. The undisputed facts are as follows:
1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was
eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he
as survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis. His other brothers, named Juan, Tito
(Juancito), Leoncio (Aloncio) trial Apolonio and only sister, Teodora, were all dead.
2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No. 3171). The notice of hearing was duly
published. In that will, Florentino bequeathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate to
his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his
one-half share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia,
the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the care of
Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to
Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate properties consisting
of three parcels of abaca land and parcel of riceland to his protege (sasacuyang
ataman), Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.
3. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator's legal heirs,
namely, his surviving brother, Leon, trial his nephews trial nieces. After a hearing,
wherein the oppositors did not present any evidence in support of their opposition,
Judge Pablo S. Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate
and appointed Gallanosa as executor. Judge Rivera specifically found that the testator
executed his last will "gozando de buena salud y facultades mentales y no obrando en
virtud de amenaza, fraude o influencia indebida."
4. On October 24, 1941, the testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses trial Adolfo
Fortajada, submitted a project of partition covering sixty-one parcels of land located in
various parts of Sorsogon, large cattle trial several pieces of personal property which
were distributed in accordance with Florentino's will. The heirs assumed the obligations
of the estate amounting to P7,129.27 in the portion of P2,376.42 for Adolfo Fortajada
and P4,752.85 for the Gallanosa spouses. The project of partition was approved by
Judge Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13, 1943, thus confirming the heirs'
possession of their respective shares. The testator's legal heirs did not appeal from the
decree of probate trial from the order of partition trial distribution.
5. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis trial the heirs of Florentino's deceased brothers
trial sisters instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon against Pedro
Gallanosa for the recovery of the said sixty-one parcels of land. They alleged that they,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in continuous
possession of those lands en concepto de dueño trial that Gallanosa entered those lands
in 1951 trial asserted ownership over the lands. They prayed that they be declared the
owners of the lands trial that they be restored to the possession thereof. They also
claimed damages (Civil Case No. 696).
6. Gallanosa moved to dismiss the above complaint for lack of cause of action trial on
the ground of bar by the prior judgment in the probate proceeding. Judge Anatolio C.
Mañalac dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata in his order of August 14,
1952 wherein he said:
It also appears that the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors-in-interest
had intervened in the testate proceedings in Civil Case No. 3171 of
this Court for- the purpose of contesting the probate of the will of
(the) late Florentino Hitosis; trial had their opposition prospered trial
the will denied of probate, the proceedings would have been
converted into one of intestacy (Art. 960 Civil Code) and the
settlement of the estate of the said deceased would have been made in
accordance with the provisions of law governing legal or intestate
succession ... , in which case the said plaintiffs, as the nearest of kin
or legal heirs of said Florentino Mitosis, would have succeeded to the
ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question
forming part of his estate (art. 1003, Civil Code).
However, the derision of the Court was adverse to them, when it their
opposition trial ordered the probate of his will. From this decision
(Annex K) legalizing the said will, the oppositors did not file any
appeal within the period fixed by law, despite the fact that they were
duly notified thereof, so that the said decision had become final trial it
now constitutes a bar to any action that the plaintiffs may institute for
the purpose of a redetermination of their rights to inherit the
properties of the late Florentino Hitosis.
In other words, the said decision of this Court in Civil Case special )
No. 3171, in which the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-
interest had intervened as parties oppositors, constitutes a final
judicial determination of the issue that the said plaintiffs, as ordinary
heirs, have no legal rights to succeed to any of the properties of the
late Florentino Hitosis; consequently, their present claim to the
ownership trial possession of the 61 parcels of land in question is
without any legal merit or basis.
7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order of dismissal which should have set the
matter at rest. But the same plaintiffs or oppositors to the probate of the will, trial their
heirs, with a persistence befitting a more meritorious case, filed on September 21, 1967,
or fifteen years after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 trial twenty-eight years after
the probate of the will another action in the same court against the Gallanosa spouses
trial Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis trial and for
the recovery of the same sixty-one parcels of land. They prayed for the appointment of a
receiver.
8. As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses, through fraud
trial deceit, caused the execution trial simulation of the document purporting to be the
last will trial testament of Florentino Hitosis. While in their 1952 complaint the game
plaintiffs alleged that they were in possession of the lands in question, in their 1967
complaint they admitted that since 1939, or from the death of Florentino Hitosis, the
defendants (now the petitioners) have been in possession of the disputed lands (Par.
XIV of the complaint, p. 70, Rollo in Civil Case No. 555, Gubat Branch, which was
transferred to Branch I in Sorsogon town where Special Proceeding No. 3171 trial Civil
Case No. 696 were decided trial which was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 2233).
9. As already stated, that 1967 complaint, upon motion of the defendants, now the
petitioners, was dismissed by respondent Judge. The plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration Respondent Judge. granted it trial set aside the order of dismissal. He
denied defendants' motion for the reconsideration of his order setting aside that
dismissal order.
The petitioners or the defendants below contend in this certiorari case that the lower
court has no jurisdiction to set aside the 1939 decree of probate trial the 1952 order of
dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 trial that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing private respondents' 1967 complaint.
The issue is whether, under the facts set forth above, the private respondents have a
cause of action the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis trial for the recovery of
the sixty-one parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
We hold that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsideration
its order of dismissal trial in ignoring the 1939 testamentary case trial the 1952 Civil
Case No. 696 which is the same as the instant 1967 case.
A rudimentary knowledge of substantive law trial procedure is sufficient for an ordinary
lawyer to conclude upon a causal perusal of the 1967 complaint that it is baseless trial
unwarranted.
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial testament duly probated in
1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the
lands adjudicated to the defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated
will, which action is a resuscitation of The complaint of the same parties that the same
court dismissed in 1952.
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint trial from defendants' motion to
dismiss that plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense,
trial by prescription, acquisitive trial extinctive, or by what are known in the jus
civile trial the jus gentium as usucapio, longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See
Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order
that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code;
sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249).
The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for the settlement of the testator's
estate. A special proceeding is distinct trial different from an ordinary action (Secs. 1
trial 2, Rule 2 trial sec. 1, Rule 72, Rules of Court).
We say that the defense of res judicata, as a ground for the dismissal of plaintiffs' 1967
complaint, is a two-pronged defense because (1) the 1939 trial 1943 decrees of probate
trial distribution in Special Proceeding No. 3171 trial (2) the 1952 order of dismissal in
Civil Case No. 696 of the lower court constitute bars by former judgment, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in
respect to the probate of a will or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another,
the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to the thing the will
or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the
person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties trial their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating of the same thing trial under
the same title trial in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually trial necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of
the will (Sec. 625, Act 190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last
par. of art. 838, Civil Code).
That means that the testator was of sound trial disposing mind at the time when he
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence;
that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and
that the will is genuine trial is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be
questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of
the will. (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan
vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448).
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De Buenaventura, L-22797, September
22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).
In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" was not
entertained after the decree of probate had become final. That case is summarized as
follows:
Wills; Probate; Alledged Fraudulent Will; Appeal.— V. died. His
will was admitted to probate without objection. No appeal was taken
from said order. It was admitted that due trial legal notice had been
given to all parties. Fifteen months after the date of said order, a
motion was presented in the lower court to have said will declared
null and void, for the reason that fraud had been practised upon the
deceased in the making of his will.
Held: That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given
parties who are displeased with the order admitting to probate a will,
for an appeal is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but
without deciding whether or not an order admitting a will to probate
will be opened for fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal has
expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the
heirs can not, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise
questions relating to its due execution. The probate of a will is
conclusive as to its due execution trial as to the testamentary capacity
of The testator. (See Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla. 99 Phil. 1069).
On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in the
testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been
rendered in a proceeding in rem, is under the abovequoted section 49(a), binding upon
the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.
156; De la Cerna vs. Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster vs. Hentry Reissmann &
Co., 68 Phil. 142).
It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with
respect to private respondents' complaint, The 1952 order of dismissal rendered by
Judge Mañalac in Civil Case No. 696, a judgment in personam was an adjudication on
the merits (Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of Court). It constitutes a bar by former judgment
under the aforequoted section 49(b) (Anticamara vs. Ong, L-29689. April 14, 1978).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 3 trial June 17, 1968 are reversed trial
set aside trial its order of dismissal dated January 10, 1968 is affirmed. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to ask for the annulment of the
testamentary proceeding trial the proceeding in Civil Case No. 696. Obviously, they
realized that the final adjudications in those cases have the binding force of res
judicata and that there is no ground, nor is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the
final orders trial judgments in those two cases.

It is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a principle of

public policy, that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very
object for which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." (Dy
Cay vs. Crossfield and O'Brien, 38 Phil. 521: Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil, 303; De la
Cerna vs. Potot, supra).

After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the
grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment
was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for
annulling the judgment is four years from the discovery of the fraud (2 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246; Mauricio vs. Villanueva,
106 Phil. 1159).

To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court, naively adopting the theory
of plaintiffs' counsel, held that the action for the recovery of the lands had not
prescribed because the rule in article 1410 of the Civil Code, that "the action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe", applies to wills.

That ruling is a glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills trial
testaments. The trial court trial plaintiffs' counsel relied upon the case of Dingle vs.
Guillermo, 48 0. G. 4410, allegedly decided by this Court, which cited the ruling in
Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, that mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to
void contracts, a ruling elevated to the category of a codal provision in article 1410.
The Dingle case was decided by the Court of Appeals. Even the trial court did not take
pains to verify the misrepresentation of plaintiffs' counsel that the Dingle case was
decided by this Court. An elementary knowledge of civil law could have alerted the trial
court to the egregious error of plaintiffs' counsel in arguing that article 1410 applies to
wills.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-35833. June 29, 1984.]
SUSANA DE LA CERNA LAINGO, TEODORO DACUYAN, ELENA
DACUYAN and SAMSON DACUYAN, Petitioners, v. DAMIAN CAMILO and/or
JUAN MAGALLANES, Respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue raised in this petition is whether or not the execution ordered by the
respondent court conforms to the final judgment embodied in the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43920-R.
The petitioners filed a complaint as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5438 of the Court of
First Instance of Davao to recover a seven hectare portion of a twenty-two hectare
parcel of land in Malita, Davao.
The disputed property is part of a homestead applied for by Gaudencio Dacuyan
married to Susana de la Cerna and awarded in 1934 to the "heirs of Gaudencio
Dacuyan" because the applicant had died in the meantime. The title was registered in
October, 1934. In 1942, the widow Susana de la Cerna describing herself as "half owner
of the conjugal property" sold seven (7) hectares of the land to Damian Camilo,
respondent in this case. Camilo, in turn, sold the land in 1966 to the other respondent,
Juan Magallanes.
The dispositive portion of the decision in the reivindicacion case
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Dismissing the Complaint;
"2. Divesting the plaintiffs of ownership over seven hectares of the southern side of the
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1175 of the Register of Deeds of
Davao, more particularly, the portion described in the deed of sale executed by Susana
Cerna de Laingo on November 20, 1972, in the presence of Jorge Agonias and Juan
Magallanes and acknowledged before Atty. Ramon M. Kimpo, and the accompanying
sketch marked as Exhibits 1 and 1-A, respectively and vesting the same in Juan A.
Magallanes, Filipino, married to Fedilina Neri, Filipino, and residing at Malita, Davao;
"3. Directing the plaintiffs to allow Juan Magallanes to have the aforesaid land
surveyed; and,
"4. Sentencing the plaintiffs jointly and severally to pay the defendants P3,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, with costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon appeal by the petitioners, however, the Court of Appeals modified the lower
court’s decision. The dispositive portion of the appellate decision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court is constrained to modify as it now modifies the
judgment appealed from: the sale to appellees is held to be valid only as to an undivided
seven (7) hectares not of the specific portion now litigated; appellants are entitled to co-
possession thereof with appellees until the undivided seven (7) hectares to which
appellees are entitled are definitely segregated thru partition; the adjudication of
attorney’s fee is set aside; no more pronouncement as to cost."cralaw virtua1aw library
After the judgment of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory, the
petitioners filed the necessary motion with the Court of First Instance of Davao to issue
a writ of execution placing them in co-possession with the private respondents of the
seven (7) hectares being litigated.
The private respondents filed a counter motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
praying that the petitioners be ordered to execute a project of partition among the heirs
and while doing so, segregate the seven (7) hectares purchased and possessed by them
from the date of the document of sale. The petitioners, however, opposed the counter
motion emphasizing that the execution of judgment referred to an action for recovery of
possession of a specific seven (7) hectares of land and not to an action for partition of
property.
The respondents countered with a rejoinder which admitted that the judgment, while
ambiguous, confirmed their rights over seven (7) hectares of land sold to them. Since
they have been in possession of a specific seven (7) hectares of land on which they
planted coconuts already bearing fruits, the most equitable execution according to them
was for those seven (7) hectares to be the seven hectares adjudged in the decision.
The Court of First Instance decided the matter by issuing a writ of execution allowing
the respondents to enjoy possession over the entire twenty-two (22) hectares with the
petitioners. The questioned order, the second paragraph of which is assailed in this
petition reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On motion of the plaintiffs, through Atty. Ampig, and without objection of Atty.
Latorilla, counsel for the defendant, let a writ of possession issue with respect to the
seven (7) hectares, subject matter of the suit, by allowing the plaintiffs to enjoy with the
defendants possession of the same.
"On oral motion of Atty. Latorilla, let a writ of possession issue with respect to the
remainder of the twenty-two (22) hectares by allowing the defendants to enjoy with the
plaintiffs possession of the rest of the twenty-two (22) hectares.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Two motions for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners raised the case to
us directly on a pure legal issue which they state as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
THE COURT A QUO OR THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ORDERING
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION WITH RESPECT TO THE
REMAINDER OF THE TWENTY TWO (22) HECTARES BY ALLOWING THE
DEFENDANTS TO ENJOY WITH THE PLAINTIFFS POSSESSION OF THE REST
OF THE TWENTY TWO (22) HECTARES AND IN DENYING THE TWO ((2)
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID ORDER.
The reasons given by the Court of Appeals for not granting undisputed ownership of the
seven (7) hectares already possessed by the respondents are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x x x payment of compound interest he went beyond the confines of his own judgment which
"3. CONSIDERING: Now, as to this that while it is true that the Land Tax Declaration
in the name of the heirs of Gaudencio Dacuyan Exh. 3 was afterwards cancelled and
reduced from its area of 22 hectares to 15 hectares under Exh. 3-A the remaining seven
(7) hectares coming to be declared in the name of the buyer Camilo Damian under Exh.
5-A, 5-B, 5-C and 5-D, yet a scrutiny of these documents would not show any
participation of the other children of Gaudencio and Susana namely Teodoro, Elena and
Samson the co-plaintiffs in this case not even any proof that they were informed of the
sale; neither is there any evidence present in the record positive in character that they
had ever consented to a physical segregation of the seven (7) hectare portion sold by
Susana unto Camilo so that the point of laches is without any basis; it is true that
Camilo and afterwards in 1966 his successor-in-interest Juan Magallanes had been in
possession apparently exclusive since the sale to Camilo in 1942 under Exh. 1 but the
trouble is that exclusive possession by a co-owner cannot give rise to prescription; the
law has always been to the effect that between co-owners prescription cannot run,
Cortez v. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480 and in order for prescription to run between themselves the
repudiation of co-ownership must be clearly manifested which is not at all the case here
bearing in mind the undisputed fact that Camilo Damian did not even attempt to register
Exh. 1 nor notify said other children of Gaudencio Dacuyan and tell them he was
claiming the seven (7) hectare portion as solely his own; and neither should it be
overlooked that the title being a Torrens title it cannot be the subject matter of
prescription; this will mean that notwithstanding the possession apparently exclusive of
Camilo Damian for more than twenty (20) years over the seven (7) hectare portion, he
cannot under the law be permitted to claim absolute ownership therein; and as a
corollary neither can his successor-in-interest Juan Magallanes but since Susana was
entitled to at least 11 hectares; therefore her sale of seven (7) hectares if undivided
would have been valid, but a sale by her of this specific portion litigated could not bind
her co-plaintiffs; and this being the final result the adjudication of attorney’s fees must
have to be discarded;
"x x x
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, with the foregoing reasons for a seemingly
ambiguous judgment calling for a future segregation of seven (7) hectares out of the
twenty-two (22) hectares, has long become final and executory.
We agree with the petitioners that the execution ordered by the court of first instance
did not conform to the final judgment being executed.
We stated in Phil-American Accident Insurance Co., Inc. (97 SCRA 811) —
"The questioned Order cannot be sustained. The judgment which was sought to be
executed ordered the payment of simple `legal interest’ only. It said nothing about the
payment of compound interest. Accordingly, when the respondent judge ordered the
had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and which had become final. Fundamental is
the rule that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part
of the decision. Likewise, a court can not, except for clerical errors or omissions, amend
& judgment that has become final. (Jaob, Et. Al. v. Alo, et al, 91 Phil. 750 [1952];
Robles v. Timario, Et Al., 107 Phil. 809 [1960]; Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Gutierrez, Et Al., 108 Phil. 215 [1960]; Ablaza v. Sycip, Et Al., 110 Phil. 4 [1960].)
(Emphasis supplied).
At the same time, the mode of execution desired by the petitioners would be unfair to
the respondents and not in keeping with the disposition really ordained by the Court of
Appeals. As stated in Macabuhay v. Manuel (101 SCRA 835) where we cited Padua v.
Robles (66 SCRA 485):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . that the meaning, operation and consequences of a judgment must be ascertained
like any other written instrument and that a judgment rests on the intention of the Court
as gathered from every part thereof including the situation to which it applies and the
attendant circumstances."cralaw virtua1aw library
A reading of the decision and its background facts shows that the controversy litigated
and passed upon by the Court of Appeals was confined to the ownership of seven (7)
hectares of land which forms part of the twenty two (22) hectares parcel of land covered
by a torrens title in the name of the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondents are entitled to seven (7) hectares of the
property but not necessarily the seven (7) hectares possessed by them. They are entitled
to co-possession with appellees until the undivided seven (7) hectares are definitely
segregated through partition.
For us to now rule that the respondents will enjoy co-possession with the petitioners
over seven (7) hectares which belongs to the former would be inequitous even as actual
co-possession over twenty two (22) hectares would not conform to the final judgment.
There is the other consideration that segregation of the definite seven (7) hectares must
await the partition among the heirs, a procedure outside the control of the respondents.

We, therefore, rule that the co-possession mentioned in the Court of Appeals judgment
refers to the right of the respondents, already certain and vested but not yet specific,
over any seven (7) hectares of the property, in effect ranging but not specific over the
entire property. However, in the meantime that the partition is not effected and the
boundaries of the seven (7) hectares not spelled out, the respondents shall continue to
possess the seven (7) hectares they have held since the litigated sale and enjoy all its
fruits. They will have no share of the fruits of the other fifteen (15) hectares nor its
enjoyment but neither shall the petitioners have any share in the fruits or enjoyment of
the seven (7) hectares held by the respondents. It would be in the interests of all
concerned if the partition of the property among the heirs is effected immediately and
the respondents are finally given their definite seven (7) hectares as provided in the
appellate judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The second paragraph of the

questioned order is DELETED. The respondents shall continue to exclusively possess
and enjoy the seven (7) hectares actually held by them in accordance with the terms of
this decision until a partition is effected and their share is definitely segregated.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila;
MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA
GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a
partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First
Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the
Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife,
Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and
Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his
two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-
47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will
disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and
his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of
the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated
in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator
said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter,
Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel
Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a
separate will disposing of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp.
43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E.
LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court
of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs.
Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the
probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by
Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third
Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil It was issued
upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys
for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate,
Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts"
(Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as
the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley
Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by
David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and
Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita
Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as
personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was
also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for
her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa,
Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable
estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm
(par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in
the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at
least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share. A
supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-
Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three
days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel,
49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch
20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the
settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the
pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that
she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's
will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new
lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case
withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and
Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the
aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found
in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the
court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a
business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale
(pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc.,
was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco
(Annex L, p. 90, testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for
P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135,
Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers
Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado
M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the
decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2%
(pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with
Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the
project of partition. The court considered the motion moot considering that it had
already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no
longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project
was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and
that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H,
p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal
Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as
estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection to the transfer of the estate
to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity
with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement
or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through
Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be
partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar,
Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again
its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two
children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had previously appeared in
the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already
noted, the firm was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On September 8,
1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda,
filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two
wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court
be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed
executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was
illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the
partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in
his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in
this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the
two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the
annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate
(pp. 22-23, Rollo).
Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art.
838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil.
249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the
estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and
other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the
intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the
testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñë
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO
ANG, CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended
by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in favor
of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament
duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages
1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro
Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other
and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo
Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J.
Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will
that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from
his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In
fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The
testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein
petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my
aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and
daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit
to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I
have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I
cannot deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been
separated up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully
well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with
one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to
my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me,
now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full
knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as her own
husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could
not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage;
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the
Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary
should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as
the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952
until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise
because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the
Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant
to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in
question declared valid except the devise in favor of the appellant
which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are instead
passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without
pronouncement as to cost.
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for
Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of
the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The
properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares,
without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court
on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied
by the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28, 1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the
deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot
be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings
because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against
everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that
even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in
a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a
declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person
with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament
itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the
testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine
enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v.
Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also
submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the
petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the
devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles
all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective
of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or
otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for
the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or
legacy is premature.
xxx xxx xxx
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the
petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of
the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second
relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369)
xxx xxx xxx
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the
facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and
that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose
of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec.
625). The judgment in such proceedings determines and can
determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon
the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. ...
(Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the
petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will
of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void.
Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v.
Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
 The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal
validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the
will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to
withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to
have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted
correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449.
Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967,
21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA
693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will.
Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the
formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his
Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in
resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate
of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled:
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision,
Annex A of Petition.)
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals'
decision in toto.
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the
testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in
the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of
the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et
al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to
the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a
will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal
offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity
may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of
the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in
the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years
before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina
Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He
also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate
children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the
petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love
and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in
truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo
lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was
then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in
good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the
private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably
on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and
petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her
alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the
legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the
start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he
had lived with as man and wife, as already married, was an important
and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and
passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will,
it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good
faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of
August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute
the testimony of petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at
length on the meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner.
(TSN of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made
a decisive issue right at the inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the
question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner
'were deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that
petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private
respondents respectfully offer the following analysis:
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased
testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever
resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of
course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with private
respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should
be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at
that time and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not
in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was
brought concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN
of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when
they were still both single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo
married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3).
Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a
space of about 30 years in between. During those 30 years, could it be
believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry
her nor contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should
impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy,
especially so when she was already about 50 years old at the time of
marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is
by itself conclusive demonstration that she new that the man she had
openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with
already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent
Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she would not have asked Martin
Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children
and by whom? That is un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of
the deceased testator, is it possible that she would not have known
that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo
was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the
 parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that
of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?

Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable.

They are, to say the least, inherently improbable, for they are against
the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and
promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to
ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was already
married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It would be
a story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did
not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the
irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina
Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their
younger years.

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a
donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is
the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the
testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been
living in concubinage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court
of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24819 May 30, 1969
TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased, ANDRES
PASCUAL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Avelino Pascual for petitioner-appellee.
Raul Manglapus and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Sp. Proc.
No. 3312) admitting to probate the purported will of Catalina de la Cruz.
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or
ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14
January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and
sole heir of the decedent. 1
Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late
Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities
required by law were not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of
disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner;
and that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.
After hearing, during which the parties presented their respective evidences, the probate
court rendered judgment upholding the due execution of the will, and, as therein
provided, appointed petitioner Andres Pascual executor and administrator of the estate
of the late Catalina de la Cruz without bond. The oppositors appealed directly to the
Court, the properties involved being valued at more than P300,000.00, raising only the
issue of the due execution of the will.
In this instance, oppositors-appellees claim that the lower court erred in giving credence
to the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will was duly
executed, notwithstanding the existence of inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence that the will was not signed by all the
witnesses in the presence of one another, in violation of the requirement of the law.
On this point, the lower court said:
Regarding the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of
the three attesting witnesses and of the Notary Public, some of which have
been enumerated in the Memorandum of Oppositors' counsel, this Court has
taken pains in noting said inconsistencies but found the same not substantial in
nature sufficient to discredit their entire testimony on the due execution of
Exhibit "D". It is to be noted that Exhibit "D" was signed in 1954 and that the
attesting witnesses testified in Court in 1962 or after a lapse of eight years
from the date of the signing of the document. It is, therefore, understandable
and reasonable to expect that said witnesses will not retain a vivid picture of
the details surrounding the execution and signing of the will of Catalina de la
Cruz. What is important and essential is that there be unanimity and certainty
in their testimony regarding the identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the
attesting witnesses, and the Notary Public, and the fact that they were all
present at the time those signatures were affixed on the document Exhibit "D".
....
In this jurisdiction, it is the observed rule that, where a will is contested, the subscribing
with are generally regarded as the best qualified to testify on its due execution.
However, it is similarly recognized that for the testimony of such witnesses to be
entitled to full credit, it must be reasonable and unbiased, and not overcome by
competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 2 For it must be remembered that the law
does not simply require the presence of three instrumental witnesses; it demands that
the witnesses be credible. 3
In connection with the issue under consideration, we agree with the trial judge that the
contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of the witnesses and the
notary, pointed out by the oppositors-appellants (such as the weather condition at the
time the will was executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses; and the length
of time it took to complete the act), relate to unimportant details of the impressions of
the witnesses about certain details which could have been affected by the lapse of time
and the treachery of human memory, and which inconsistencies, by themselves, would
not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the due execution of the will [cf.
Peo. vs. Sigue, 86 Phil. 139-140 (3 years interval)].
In Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana, L-13781, 30 January 1960, 106 Phil. 1076, this
Court ruled:
For the purpose of determining the due execution of a will, it is not necessary
that the instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and detailed account of
the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the signing of the document by
the said witnesses. It is sufficient that they have seen or at least were so
situated at the moment that they could have seen each other sign, had they
wanted to do so. In fact, in the instant case, at least two witnesses, ... both
testified that the testator and the 3 witnesses signed in the presence of each and
every one of them (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 451; Neyra vs. Neyra, 42 Off.
Gaz. 2817; Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380.).
Neither do we believe that the fact that the witnesses were better known to proponent
Andres Pascual than to the testatrix suffices to render their testimony suspect. Under the
circumstances, considering the admitted fact that when the will was executed (1954) the
testatrix was already 83 years old, suffering from rheumatism to the extent that she had
to wear thick socks and soft shoes, it did not unlikely that she should have entrusted the
task of requesting them to act as witnesses to Andres Pascual himself, albeit the said
witnesses, testifying eight years later, should have stated that they were asked by
Catalina to witness her testament. The error of recall, considering the eight-year
interval, is consonant with the well known vagaries of human memory and recollection,
particularly since the main detail that must have stuck in his minds is that they did
witness the signing of the will, upon which their attention must have principally
concentrated. That they did so is attested by their signatures and those of the deceased
testatrix, which are nowhere impugned; nor is there any claim by appellants that the
latter was incapable of reading and understanding the will that she signed. In fact, the
evidence is that she did read it before signing. The authorities are to the effect that
friendly relations of the witnesses with the testator or the beneficiaries do not affect the
credibility of the former, 4 so that the proven friendship between the proponent and the
instrumental witnesses would have no bearing on the latter's qualification to testify on
the circumstances surrounding the signing of the will.
Appellant's main reliance is the alleged tape recording of a conversation between
instrumental witness Manuel Jiongco and oppositor Pedro B. Cruz at the latter's house
sometime in 1960 (which recording was admittedly taken without Jiongco's knowledge)
wherein said witness is supposed to have stated that when he signed the will the other
witnesses' signatures were already affixed, and were not then present, and that he
(Jiongco) signed the document in 1958 or 1959 (Exhibit 22; transcription; Exhibit 23 et.
seq.).
There are two circumstances that militate against giving credence to particular evidence.
The first is that there is no adequate proof that the declarations tape recorded were in
fact made by Jiongco. The latter denied that the voice was his, and in this respect the
trial judge stated (Record on Appeal, pages 83-84):
We do not doubt the fact that Manuel Jiongco was in the house of Pedro
Cruzon the occasion that Exhibit "23" was taken. But it is important to note
that when said recording was replayed before Manuel Jiongco in Court he
denied that the voice which uttered the above-quoted portions in the
conversation was his. So that with the denial of Manuel Jiongco, the Court was
left with no other recourse than to make its own comparison between the
natural voice of the witness, Manuel Jiongco, while testifying on the witness
stand and his supposed recorded voice in Exhibit "23". It is to be admitted that
we noted some similarity between the two voices but it was not enough to
justify a categorical and definite conclusion that the recorded voice identified
by Pedro Cruz to be that of Manuel Jiongco is in truth and in fact the voice of
the latter. Between a testimony given in Court under oath which was subjected
to and stood of rigorous cross-examination and loose statements made out of
Court which even then are of doubtful source, this Court gives full faith and
credence to the former. And this is true even if this particular witness admits
having a poor memory, and his trustworthiness is assailed due to a previous
record of an administrative case filed against him wherein he was fined for a
charge of falsification of public document (see Exh. "25"). This is so, because
the veracity of his testimony in Court regarding the due execution of Exhibit
"D" is corroborated and confirmed by the testimony of the two other attesting
witnesses to the document and the Notary Public who notarized the same.
Not having heard Jiongco testify, this court is not in a position to contradict the
appreciation of the trial court that the voice in the tape recording was not really that of
Jiongco. And considering that he denied that fact under oath, that the tape recording was
not supported by truly impartial evidence, and was done without the knowledge of the
witness, we cannot see our way clear to rule that Jiongco has been successfully
impeached, and shown guilty of false testimony. It would be dangerous to rule
otherwise.
The second point that renders incredible the alleged assertion of Jiongco in the tape
recording, that he signed the testament only in 1958 or 1959, is that in the Notarial
Registry of the notary, Gatdula, the ratification of the testament appears among the
entries for 1954, as well as in the corresponding copies (Exhibit I) filed by him with
Bonifacio Sumulong, the employee in charge of the Notarial Section of the Clerk of
Court's office, who produced them at the trial upon subpoena, and who testified to his
having searched for and found them in the vaults of the Clerk of Court's office. No
evidence exists that these documents were not surrendered and filed at the Clerk of
Court's office, as required by law, and in the regular course of official duty. Certainly,
the notary could not have reported in 1954 what did not happen until 1958.
In view of the evidence, we do not feel justified in concluding that the trial court erred
in accepting the concordant testimony of the instrumental witnesses as warranting the
probate of the will in question, taking into account the unexcelled opportunity of the
court a quo to observe the demeanor, and judge the credibility, of the witness thereby.
Furthermore, it would not be the first time in this jurisdiction that a will has been
admitted to probate even if the instrumental witness testified contrary to the other two,
provided the court is satisfied, as in this case, that the will was executed and attested in
the manner provided by law (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380; Tolentino vs.
Francisco, 57 Phil. 742; Cuyugan vs. Baron, 69 Phil. 639; Ramirez vs. Butte, 100 Phil
635). There is greater reason to admit the will to probate where only the testimony of
one witness is subjected to serious, if unsuccessful attack.
Contestants further assail the admission to probate on the ground that the execution of
the will was tainted by fraud and undue influence exerted by proponent on the testarix,
and affirm that it was error for the lower court to have rejected their claim. Said the
court in this regard (Record on Appeal, page 87):
 It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a Will was made in Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testarix, who asked Dr. Sanchez to be
favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was obtained through one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that
fraud and undue pressure or influence, for we have numerous instances where the rheumetism of the testarix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That
strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the she did not resort to relatives or friends is, likewise explainable: it would have meant
case at bar, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased the disclosure of the terms of her will to those interested in her succession but who were
Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and recriminations
considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the
la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament
with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also during her lifetime.
her sole heir to her property in her Will without any objection from Catalina
and Valentina Cruz. We conclude that the trial court committed no error in finding the appellant's evidence
established at most grounds for suspicion but fell far short of establishing actual
Before considering the correctness of these findings, it is worthwhile to recall the basic exercise of improper pressure or influence. Considering that testarix considered
principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence of this proponent as her own son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being
Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that made the sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we
so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and find nothing abnormalin her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary. As stated
make him express the will of another rather than his own (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, 42 by the Court in the Knutson case —
Phil. 596; Icasiano vs. Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964; Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753,
26 March 196); that the contention that a will was obtained by undue influence or The truth of the matter is that bequests and devises to those in whom the
improper pressure cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion, as it is enough testator has confidence and who have won his affection are more likely to be
that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it may have free from undue influence that bequests or devises to others. (In re Knutson's
been exercised (Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, L-5597, 31 May 1956); that the exercise of Will, 41 Pac. 2d 793).
improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it
was actually exercised (Ozatea vs. Cuartero, ante; Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, 26
Appellants invoked presumption of undue influence held to exist by American
March 1965); that the burden is on the person challenging the will to show that such
authorities where the beneficiary participates in the drafting of execution of the will
influence was exerted at the time of its execution (Teotico vs. Del Val, ante); that mere
favoring him; but since the will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, although nephew of the
general or reasonable influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will (Coso vs. Fernandez
proponent, we do not think the presumption applies; for in the normal course of events,
Deza, ante); nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the
said attorney would follow the instructions of the testatrix; and a member of the bar in
testator (Barreto vs. Reyes, L-5831-31, 31 January 1956), or omission of relatives, not
good standing may not be convicted of unprofessional conduct, or of having conspired
forced heirs, evidence of undue influence (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs.
to falsify a statement, except upon clear proof.
Coronel, 45 Phil. 416).
The charge of fraud, being premised on the existence of undue influence, needs no
Tested against these rulings, the circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly
separate discussion.
fail to establish actual undue influence or improper pressure exercised on the testarix by
the proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his
testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it" (t.s.n., page WHEREFORE, the decree of probate appealed from is affirmed; with costs against
7, 27 January 1962), which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that contestants-appellants.
proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that
proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testarix, placed the title in his name,
but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted thereon in bold letters to
mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such
as to overpower to destroy the free will of the testarix. Because if the mind of the latter
were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent
had no need to recourse to the deception averred.lawphi1.ñet
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.
ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales,
a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T.
Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales.
Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the
dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed
Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter),
1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in
her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial
court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a
widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the
Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in
question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by
their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate
succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided
for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him
in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by
right of representation, and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate
child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is
an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of
a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by
those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to
the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil
Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the
lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who,
although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless
a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the
estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the
subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased
Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V.
Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz —
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one whom the person represented
would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter
whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his
death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father,
Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to
pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is
not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179859 August 9, 2010
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
BASILIO SANTIAGO,
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF
RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO,
GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO, Oppositors.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages—the first to Bibiana Lopez, the
second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife
bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila,
Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents
Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and
Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.1
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second marriage
petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan2 a petition
for the probate of Basilio’s will, docketed as SP No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to
probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB,
IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at mamamahala ng
balutan na nasa Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at lupa’t bahay
sa Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang Malolos-Paombong na nasa
Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan na nasa likuran niyon, ay
ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente; nguni’t ang kita ng palaisdaan
ay siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora
o roperacion [sic], sa lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c)
ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang
pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at
nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa
habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o
kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay
ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo, Ma.
Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-
pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking
kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang
maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang
papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na
kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas
na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring
ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan
at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay
ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at
Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Datapwa’t, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at
gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong
(20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari
matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga gugol na kailangan.
Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)3
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first wife, were, on their
motion, allowed to intervene.4
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will,"5 the probate court approved the will by
Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to
register the certificates of title indicated therein.6 Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos.
786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were
transferred in the name of petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.7
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention8 with the probate court,
alleging that Basilio’s second wife was not Irene but a certain Maria Arellano with
whom he had no child; and that Basilio’s will violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil
Code.9
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its previous approval
of the "Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in Accordance with the Will."10
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for completion of
legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-90,11 against the
heirs of the second and third marriages.
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially maintained that they
were partially preterited by Basilio’s will because their legitime was reduced.12 They
thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be
conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of
all the incomes of the properties from the time of Basilio’s death up to the time of the
filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90.13
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime) in favor
of the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by Decision of
January 25, 2002,14 annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17, holding that the RTC
Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its August
14, 1978 Order approving the probate of the will constitute res judicata with respect to
Civil Case No. 562-M-90.15 Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata. Let
the Decree of Distribution of the Estate of Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
SO ORDERED.16 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate court’s decision in CA
G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 155606, which this Court
denied.17 The denial became final and executory on April 9, 2003.18
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second marriage
filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for Termination of
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the
Legatees.19 Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilio’s will, they alleged that:
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should be under
administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on September 16,
1993.
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have ceased as such
administrator[s] way back on September 16, 1993 and they should have transferred the
above said titles to the named legatees in the Last Will and Testament of the testator by
then. Said named legatees in the Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the
following:
xxxx
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also rendered an
accounting of their administration from such death of the testator up to the present or
until transfer of said properties and its administration to the said legatees.
x x x x20
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:
1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to [the]
Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the names of the designated
legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit:
1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
2) Tomas
3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar
5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano
7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
 9) Clemente at
10) Cleotilde
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)
2) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties,
including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees.
3) To render an accounting of their administration of said properties and other
properties of the testator under their administration, from death of testator
Basilio Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the present and until possession
and administration thereof is transferred to said legatees.21
Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the Final Accounting,
Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with the subsequent
issuance of certificates of title covering the properties involved, the case had long since
been closed and terminated.22
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be transferred to
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of administration only, granted the
motion, by Order of September 5, 2003,23 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Termination of Administration, for
Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees dated October 3,
2000 filed by some heirs of the testator Basilio Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the administratrix [sic] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr. Clemente Santiago are
hereby DIRECTED, as follows:
a.) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to this
Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the names of the designated
legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at
mga anak na 2.) Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano 7.)
Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all named SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties
including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of subject properties,
including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of the above-mentioned
estate of the testator or all the above said lots including the rice mill, animal
feeds factory, and all improvements thereon from August 14, 1978 up to the
present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how the parties may
actually partition or adjudicate all the above said properties including the
properties already in the name of all the said legatees xxx.
x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to cancel and
consider as no force and effects Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-249177 (RT-
46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T-249174 (RT-46296) [Lot
No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No.
838] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones
in the lieu thereof in the names of Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo
Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago,
Eugenia Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to cancel and
consider as no force and effect Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in
the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in lieu
thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the
Heirs of Cecilia Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma. Concepcion,
Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco, dated December 3, 2002, is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.24
Respecting petitioners’ argument that the case had long been closed and terminated, the
trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties cannot
actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the death of the testator Basilio Santiago
x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that something more has to be done after the approval of
said Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on
September 16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be filed after September 16,
1993. Movant’s cause of action accrues only from the said date and for which no
prescription of action has set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate proceeding which is
continuing in character, and terminates only after and until the final distribution or
settlement of the whole estate of the deceased in accordance with the provision of the
will of the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978 refers only to the accounting,
partition, and distribution of the estate of the deceased for the period covering from the
date of the filing of the petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to August 14,
1978. And in the said August 14, 1978 order it does not terminate the appointment of
petitioner[s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix and administrator,
respectively, of the estate of the deceased particularly of those properties which were
prohibited by the testator to be partitioned within 20 years from his death. Since then up
to the present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the executor and
administrator of the estate of the deceased and as such, they are required by law to
render an accounting thereof from August 14, 1978 up to the present; there is also now
a need to partition and distribute the aforesaid properties as the prohibition period to do
so has elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)25
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for reconsideration,26 which the
probate court denied, drawing them to appeal to the Court of Appeals which docketed it
as CA G.R. No. 83094.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court,27 hence, the
petition28 which raises the following grounds:
I.
"CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF"
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING ITSELF WITH
ITS PREVIOUS DECISION INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES AND
SAME PROPERTIES;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC AS IT
AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY RES
JUDICATA;
C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
HELD THAT THERE WAS RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094,
THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.
II.
"GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE COMPETENCE
AND JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S ORDER TO TRANSFER THE MANILA
PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004 TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA
LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR, RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD,
EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED
SANTIAGO."29 (emphasis in the original)
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners’ argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier CA-G.R. NO.
45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the
subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the present petition for review) fails.
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and 47 (c) of Rule
39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.30 The first, known as "bar by prior judgment,"
proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action already settled in a prior action.31 The second, known as "conclusiveness of
judgment," ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause
of action.32
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present case. The
final judgment regarding oppositors’ complaint on the reduction of their legitime in CA-
G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition, which solely tackles the propriety of
the termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the
legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of claim,
demand or cause of action between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of
judgment" cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would
only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors’ supposed preterition and
reduction of legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even
invoked, in the present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the judgment in G.R.
No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only. The records reveal, however, that
the oppositors did not appeal the decision of the appellate court in this case and were
only impleaded pro forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in CA G.R.
No. 45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain
undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit the interference of the
oppositors in the distribution of Basilio’s estate and does not pertain to respondents’
supervening right to demand the termination of administration, accounting and transfer
of titles in their names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting respondents’
Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in
the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary continuation of the August 14,
1978 Order that approved the accounting, partition and distribution of Basilio’s estate.
As did the appellate court, the Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to
become final pending the whole settlement of the estate. And final settlement of the
estate, in this case, would culminate after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the
prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila, covered by
TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as it would
contravene the testator’s intent that no one is to own the same.1avvphi1

The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilio’s will that he intended the house and
lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners’ names for administration purposes only,
and that the property be owned by the heirs in common, thus:

e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay

ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana
ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang
sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang
panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit
na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang ito’y walang
magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang magnanais
sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at
katabing mga lunsod x x x x33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

But the condition set by the decedent on the property’s indivisibility is subject to a
statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate
court, viz:

For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]’s contention, is to go

against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code,
which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last
for twenty (20) years x x x x

xxxx

x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property
for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-
ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code x x x x34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010 The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus it
disposed:
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES
P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner, WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents. 1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
DECISION
2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters1 Agnes P. N. Pascual;
Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel
N. Pascual.2 4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village
Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income thereon;
respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters
Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to
located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;
petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an
advance legitime" of petitioner.
c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta
Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
Respondent’s nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the
estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.3
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the
following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906,
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316,
Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents
C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218,
assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an advance
A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;
legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded
from determining the validity of the donation.
e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following
Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708,
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only
07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;
for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedent’s estate,4 the
probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity
of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following f. ¼ share in Eduardo Pascual’s shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;
Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:5
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the name of Nona Arellano;
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;
account of the partition.
 j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch
64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:
a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No.
181889;
b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real
properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register
of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by OCT No.
2159, to be divided equally between them up to the extent that each of
their share have been equalized with the actual value of the property
in 5(a) at the time of donation, the value of which shall be determined
by an independent appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano,
Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are
not sufficient to equalize the shares, then Francisco’s and Miguel’s
shares may be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of
stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be
divided equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
I Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF
DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED
TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL
JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.6 (underscoring
supplied)
By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioner’s appeal "partly
meritorious." It sustained the probate court’s ruling that the property donated to
petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of
division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is
subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and we
believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in
the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary
estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said
property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.8 (citation omitted; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)1avvph!1
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court,
herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by
the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the
administrator."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of properties of
the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and distribution of
the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in accordance
with the disquisitions herein.9 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration10 having been denied by the appellate
court by Resolution11 of October 7, 2009, the present petition for review on certiorari
was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO
PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT
THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED
BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL,
JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR
INTESTATE HEIRS.12 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject
to collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation
by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the
hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property
disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.13
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as
is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that
inofficious donations may be reduced.14
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded.15
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives
and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property
which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.16
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and
exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary
compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the
absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary
compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together
with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the
surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.17
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he
was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-
collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid,18 is
deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the
estate.19 There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject
to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-
siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering
the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of
the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the
Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the
case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter
to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185226 February 11, 2010
CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as administratrix of the estate litigated in the case
below, RAMIRO T. MADARANG, and the heirs of CASIMIRO R. MADARANG,
JR., namely: Estrelita L. Madarang, Consuelo P. Madarang, Casimiro Madarang
IV, and Jane Margaret Madarang-Crabtree, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG and VICENTE R. MADARANG, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on June 3,
1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value of ₱200,000.00.1 He
was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose,
Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.
In the intestate proceedings filed by the couple’s son Jose which was lodged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was appointed as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr.2
Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedent’s estate.
Jose filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot
829-B-4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
125429.
A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part of the
estate of the decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002, 3 the RTC, noting the following:
x x x The said properties appear to have been acquired by the spouses after [their
marriage on] December 27, 1931 and during their marriage or coverture. Article 160 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines (which is the governing law in this particular
case) is very explicit in providing that all properties of the marriage are presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership. This presumption, to the mind of the Court, has not
been sufficiently rebutted by the special administratrix. [Dolores] This presumption
applies and holds even if the land is registered under the wife’s name as long as it was
acquired during marriage (De Guinoo vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. L-5541, June 26,
1955) or even if the wife purchased the land alone (Flores, et.al. Vs. Escudero, et.al.,
G.R. No. L-5302, March 11, 1953).4 (underscoring supplied),
instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.
Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be referred to as
"oppositors,"5 questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six lots via motion for
reconsideration during the pendency of which motion the court appointed herein
petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her mother Dolores.
As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been transferred during
the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral
testimony, to support the allegation. Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his
Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to
him by a Deed of Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and
Casimiro, Sr.6
It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the provisional
inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.
The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003,7 thus modified its April 5, 2002 Order as
follows:
Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be excluded.
The administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to submit a revised inventory
in accordance with the Order dated April 5, 2002, as here modified; and (2) to render an
accounting of her administration of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring
supplied),
Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that since the title
to Lot 829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his parents, it should not be
excluded from the Inventory; and that the Deed of Donation in Vicente’s favor was not
notarized nor registered with the Register of Deeds. Jose’s motion for reconsideration
having been denied by Order of February 5, 2003, he filed a Notice of Appeal.
In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC erred in
excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory as "what the lower court should have done
was to . . . maintain the order including said lot in the inventory of the estate so Vicente
can file an ordinary action where its ownership can be threshed out."
Jose later filed before the appellate court a "Motion to Withdraw Petition" which his co-
heirs-oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground that, inter alia, a grant thereof
would "end" the administration proceedings. The appellate court, by Resolution of
January 18, 2008,8 granted the withdrawal on the ground that it would "not prejudice
the rights of the oppositors."
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s Motion to
Withdraw Petition was, by Resolution of November 6, 2008,9 denied in this wise:
xxxx
In the instant case, the Probate Court found that the parties of the case interposed no
objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of the estate of
Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto. x x x
xxxx
Moreover, [herein petitioners] in their appeal brief, ha[ve] extensively argued that . .
. Vicente Madarang [to whom the questioned lot was donated] and his family have been
in continuous, actual and physical possession of the donated lot for over twenty (20)
years, even before the execution of the so called donation inter vivos in 1992. . . .
Vicente Madarang has his residential house thereon and that his ownership over the
donated lot has been fully recognized by the entire Madarang Clan, including all his
brothers and sisters, except the much belated objection by the appellant (Jose), allegedly
resorted to as an act of harassment. 10 (emphasis and underscoring supplied),
thus affirming the RTC order of exclusion of the questioned lot.
Hence, the present petition for review filed by the oppositors-herein petitioners.
Casimiro, Jr. having died during the pendency of the case, he was substituted by his
wife petitioner Estrelita and co-petitioners children Consuelo, Casimiro IV, and Jane
Margaret.
Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the appellate court was
the merit of Jose’s "Motion to Withdraw Petition," it exceeded its jurisdiction when it
passed upon the merits of Jose’s appeal from the RTC order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B
from the Inventory.
Petitioners’ contention does not lie.
In their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s "Motion to
Withdraw Petition," petitioners, oddly denying the existence of a "petition," raised the
issue of the propriety of the RTC Order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory.
Their prayer in their Motion clearly states so:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Oppositors-Appellees [petitioners] respectfully
PRAY for this Honorable Court to RECONSIDER its questioned Resolution
and rendering [sic], forthwith, a decision resolving the merits of the Partial Appeal of
petitioner-appellant Jose Madarang.11 (capitalization in the original; emphasis supplied)
The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue.
More specifically, petitioners question the appellate court’s finding that as the parties
"interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of
the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto."12
A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was no accord
among the parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.
While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on questions
of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of
properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of ownership, without
prejudice to a final determination through a separate action in a court of general
jurisdiction.1avvphil
The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to
make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears stress that the
question is one of collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over which the
question of title and ownership can be passed upon by a probate court.13
As earlier reflected, Vicente’s claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-4-B rests upon
a deed of donation by his father (decedent) and his mother.
Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir and in the account of partition. (underscoring supplied)
in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as to advancement
made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order
of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been
donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should not be
excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 6, 2008 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Corazon M. Gregorio and her co-
administratrix Dolores Madarang are DIRECTED to include Lot 829-B-4-B in the
Inventory of the properties of the intestate estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr.
Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin, the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 57, which is DIRECTED to proceed with the disposition of the
case with dispatch.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA
DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the
Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed
counter-project of partition.1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children
named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein
executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven
compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory
heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr.,
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez
and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised
at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household
furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named
heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March 13,
1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to
probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix'
estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly
issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles,
Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed
in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower
court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total
appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory
heirs amounted to P129,362.11.3 (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of
legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her
property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she
devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of
her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the
real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in
her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina
(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered
to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while
the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties
respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to
complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other
hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they
 received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to
complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren
remain untouched.<äre||anº•1àw>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of
partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the
distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to
the value of one-half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-
half (½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-
Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their
favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the
appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus
other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to
them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are
adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to
reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the
devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by
the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were
proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs
and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the
legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them
in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of
partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide
that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and
satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two
projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect
to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore
the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially
result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New
Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for
reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation
of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38,
principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five
co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes,
the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment
to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been
impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the
last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal,
and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the
nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to
reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article
1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of
their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix
which is "the life and soul of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included
the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will
are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva
vs. Juico6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59
of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the
testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation,
and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's
words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate
must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and
devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute
their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental
premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was
in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will,
after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her
last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided
that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property
in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and
seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid
partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article
1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his
estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code
thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any
title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the
same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the
legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the
same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of
partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela,
Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the
testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-
appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and
received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article
1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the
present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now
permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by
act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a
testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the
formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the
amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of
partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity
and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal
provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower
court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants
whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or
legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half
of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors'
proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify
the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter
to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the
deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter,
Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by
will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the
sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in
the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the
Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of
said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the
death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657,
659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in
question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when,
as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs
..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their
favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the
words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the
respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous
conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law
and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the
estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary
dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to
be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix'
will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it
clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of
her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate
through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be
taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the
testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore
on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in
the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications
in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of
those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced
heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I
bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the
testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only
from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article
842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of
bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of
the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk
of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the
entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of
the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual
reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18
Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by
will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal
provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be
respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is
not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the
legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof
given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really
means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some
plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we
have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without
her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require
collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties
by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code
on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the
secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by
the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of
partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon,
as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as
solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The
appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by
the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there
cannot be said to be any question — and none is presented — as to fairness of the
valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated.
The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly
declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or
justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent
(Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of
then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with
every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate.
There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors,
Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per
the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in
the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that
she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making
the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment
of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been
availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors would receive their cash
differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they
could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project
of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own
decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
G.R. No. L-46903 July 23, 1987
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda
de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian
of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of
the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier
donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot
agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent
rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for
her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the
decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs
if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should
repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as
inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held
that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly
prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the
two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was
imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent
court** holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to
collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and
equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the
donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa
akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda,
may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may
pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa
nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana,
sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga
lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya
na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring
ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan,
datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga
mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa
sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang
legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang
sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang
ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly
observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli"
merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an
express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of
donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the
legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the
precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of
Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the
properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits
little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the
disputed donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express
prohibition to collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally
as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear
indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical
enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding
the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period
prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held
in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on
time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions
invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in
Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts
of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases
that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are
now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B.
LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V.
DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN,
MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS
OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 —
affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B.
Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages — is sought. in
these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was
however reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners,
and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter
given due course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These,
together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the
case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all
surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the
provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his
three (3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to
his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners
Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of
riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went
to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in
1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had
inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented
by other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union,1 which however
was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens
System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed
cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina
Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the
sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's
nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes
disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after
both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the
family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In
due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without
any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doña Catalina was
appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney
Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate
court for approval, 6 Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are
the private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the
marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña Catalina was closest to her nephew,
Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and
Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando
Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all
the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly
consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who
prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions
were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their
husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence,
nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully
cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doña Catalina began transferring, by
sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their
respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties 16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces: Aurea Locsin M. Acabado

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES 17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481
favor of Mariano Locsin 19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000
Jose R. Locsin 1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello Rosario whose maternal
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian grandfather was Getulio
Locsin
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
favor Aurea Locsin, 2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
Matilde L. Cordero in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
and Salvador Locsin Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045
Refinery were assigned to
favor Aurea Locsin,
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Matilde L. Cordero
Cornelio
and Salvador Locsin

Of her own properties, Doña Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin, nieces and others:
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio 2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio resurveyed)
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
in favor of Francisco M.
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -
Maquiniana
favor of Aurea B. Locsin

26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300

7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -
favor of Francisco
favor of Aurea B. Locsin
Maquiniana
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000
Aurea Locsin
favor of Ireneo Mamia
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750 entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin,
favor of Zenaida Buiza being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan
and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500 Catalina;
favor of Felisa Morjella
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000 and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina
favor of Inocentes Motocinos J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory
of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500 initio;
favor of Casimiro Mondevil
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to
cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties,
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200
subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives
favor of Juan Saballa
therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey
of Rogelio Marticio
ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs,
together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered,
Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977. and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the
estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action; and
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that
ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for
her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them,
no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them also with legal interest from the filing, of this case
under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still
alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador (5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
Lorayes, proceeded to distribute. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00
each as moral damages; and
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and
nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, (6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and
filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to
7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and
intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doña
Catalina did not join the action. Costs against the defendants.9

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs
rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's
(Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
decision.
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and
The petition has merit and should be granted.
against the defendants:

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and
nephews and nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties
Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the
which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those
properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs
until such time.11 Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other
persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death
to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that
remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if
those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain
circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's
gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are
compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and
nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to
her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended
that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired
by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was
an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate
subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of
the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all
relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by
law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation,
the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected.
(634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña Catalina was already 90 years old
when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may
have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's
nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had
inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doña Catalina had
already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she
received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his
nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she
passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R.
Locsin.14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot
2020 to Julian Locsin.15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doña Catalina, Julian
Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete.17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the
other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due
execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito
Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-
owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doña, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of
property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975.18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina was mentally
incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be
made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she
was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians?
She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death)
one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold
another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin.19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives
and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza
Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio
Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to Don
Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make
that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally
competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife,
from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate
consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth
of Doña Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the
private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at
the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42
are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have known better
than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is
safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under
oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court
of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and
counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory
that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to
inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don SO ORDERED.
Mariano died, he and his wife (Doña Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their
respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the
trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he would
not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doña Catalina's
nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador
Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-
Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco
and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of
property which she made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their
advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doña Catalina acted
as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners.
In fact, considering their closeness to Doña Catalina it would have been well-nigh
impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle
manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doña Catalina's
niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her
house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her
properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were
prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1)
deed of donation dated November 19,
197423 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4,
1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9,
1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is
married to Doña Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married
to another niece, Maria Olbes.26 The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on
July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those
circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but free and voluntary
acts on her part.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred
in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of
prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six
(6) years after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject
transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property,28 whether considered an action
based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private
respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the
deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world.29

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of
properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi
City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
G.R. No. 165748 September 14, 2011
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely: CONRADO B. URETA,
MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA,
RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B. URETA,
LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely:
MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T.
URETA, and BERNADETTE T. URETA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO
URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE
F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F. URETA,
and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA
PARADERO, namely: WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U. PARADERO,
CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA, EDNA P. GALLARDO,
LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely: EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T.
URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M. URETA; ADELA URETA-GONZALES;
HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely: BENILDA V. URETA, ALFONSO
V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V. URETA;
MERLINDA U. RIVERA; JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA
U. TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165930
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO
URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE
F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F. URETA,
and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA
PARADERO, namely: WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U. PARADERO,
CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA, EDNA P. GALLARDO,
LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely: EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T.
URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M. URETA; ADELA URETA-GONZALES;
HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely: BENILDA V. URETA, ALFONSO
V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V. URETA;
MERLINDA U. RIVERA; JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA
U. TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely: CONRADO B. URETA,
MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA,
RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B. URETA,
LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely:
MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T.
URETA, and BERNADETTE T. URETA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure assail the April 20, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), and its October 14, 2004 Resolution2 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71399, which
affirmed with modification the April 26, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC) in Civil Case No. 5026.
The Facts
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato,
Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda,
Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are
opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s children and their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).
Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a
fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling
of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish
schooling and instead worked on his father’s lands.
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio,
Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was
then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their
father should make it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children.
Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land
in favor of Policronio,4 Liberato,5 Prudencia,6 and his common-law wife, Valeriana
Dela Cruz.7 The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio,
covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration
was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the administrator of his
father’s estate. He was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her
daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels
transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never
turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso
and, later, to the administrators of his estate.
Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither
Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,8 which
included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were
previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son,
representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in
behalf of his co-heirs.
After their father’s death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name
covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of
Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the
July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded
from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably
settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of
Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession,
Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages9 against the Heirs of Alfonso before
the RTC on November 17, 1995 where the following issues were submitted: (1) whether
or not the Deed of Sale was valid; (2) whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition was valid; and (3) who between the parties was entitled to damages.
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 26, 2001, the RTC dismissed the Complaint of the Heirs of Policronio and
ruled in favor of the Heirs of Alfonso in a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in favor of the
defendants, hence the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.
The counterclaims are likewise DISMISSED.
With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that the Heirs of Alfonso clearly established that the Deed of Sale was
null and void. It held that the Heirs of Policronio failed to rebut the evidence of the
Heirs of Alfonso, which proved that the Deed of Sale in the possession of the former
was one of the four (4) Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his 3 children and
second wife for taxation purposes; that although tax declarations were issued in the
name of Policronio, he or his heirs never took possession of the subject lands except a
portion of parcel 5; and that all the produce were turned over by the tenants to Alfonso
and the administrators of his estate and never to Policronio or his heirs.
The RTC further found that there was no money involved in the sale. Even granting that
there was, as claimed by the Heirs of Policronio, ₱2,000.00 for six parcels of land, the
amount was grossly inadequate. It was also noted that the aggregate area of the subject
lands was more than double the average share adjudicated to each of the other children
in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition; that the siblings of Policronio were the ones who
shared in the produce of the land; and that the Heirs of Policronio only paid real estate
taxes in 1996 and 1997. The RTC opined that Policronio must have been aware that the
transfer was merely for taxation purposes because he did not subsequently take
possession of the properties even after the death of his father.
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, on the other hand, was declared valid by the RTC
as all the heirs of Alfonso were represented and received equal shares and all the
requirements of a valid extra-judicial partition were met. The RTC considered
Conrado’s claim that he did not understand the full significance of his signature when
he signed in behalf of his co-heirs, as a gratutitous assertion. The RTC was of the view
that when he admitted to have signed all the pages and personally appeared before the
notary public, he was presumed to have understood their contents.
Lastly, neither party was entitled to damages. The Heirs of Alfonso failed to present
testimony to serve as factual basis for moral damages, no document was presented to
prove actual damages, and the Heirs of Policronio were found to have filed the case in
good faith.
The Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the Heirs of Policronio appealed before the CA, which rendered a decision
on April 20, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision, dated
26 April 2001, rendered by Hon. Judge Dean R. Telan of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
1.) The Deed of Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta, Sr., dated 25 October 1969,
covering six (6) parcels of land is hereby declared VOID for being
ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED;
2.) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated 19 April 1989, is ANNULLED;
 3.) The claim for actual and exemplary damages are DISMISSED for lack of
factual and legal basis.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper partition of
ALFONSO URETA’S Estate in accordance with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. No costs at this instance.
SO ORDERED.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the Deed of Sale was void. It found the
Deed of Sale to be absolutely simulated as the parties did not intend to be legally bound
by it. As such, it produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the
parties. The CA also noted that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner
even after the execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he remained in
possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed their produce until his death.
Policronio, on the other hand, never exercised any rights pertaining to an owner over the
subject lands from the time they were sold to him up until his death. He never took or
attempted to take possession of the land even after his father’s death, never demanded
delivery of the produce from the tenants, and never paid realty taxes on the properties. It
was also noted that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his
children, as they were, in fact, surprised to discover its existence. The CA, thus,
concluded that Policronio must have been aware that the transfer was only made for
taxation purposes.
The testimony of Amparo Castillo, as to the circumstances surrounding the actual
arrangement and agreement between the parties prior to the execution of the four (4)
Deeds of Sale, was found by the CA to be unrebutted. The RTC’s assessment of the
credibility of her testimony was accorded respect, and the intention of the parties was
given the primary consideration in determining the true nature of the contract.
Contrary to the finding of the RTC though, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition due to the incapacity of one of the parties to give his consent to the contract. It
held that before Conrado could validly bind his co-heirs to the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, it was necessary that he be clothed with the proper authority. The CA ruled
that a special power of attorney was required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the
Civil Code. Without a special power of attorney, it was held that Conrado lacked the
legal capactiy to give the consent of his co-heirs, thus, rendering the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition voidable under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code.
As a consequence, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for the proper
partition of the estate, with the option that the parties may still voluntarily effect the
partition by executing another agreement or by adopting the assailed Deed of Partition
with the RTC’s approval in either case. Otherwise, the RTC may proceed with the
compulsory partition of the estate in accordance with the Rules.
With regard to the claim for damages, the CA agreed with the RTC and dismissed the
claim for actual and compensatory damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied by
the CA for lack of merit in a Resolution dated October 14, 2004.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, the Heirs of Policronio argued that the RTC
violated the best evidence rule in giving credence to the testimony of Amparo Castillo
with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale, and that prescription had set in
precluding any question on the validity of the contract.
The CA held that the oral testimony was admissible under Rule 130, Section 9 (b) and
(c), which provides that evidence aliunde may be allowed to explain the terms of the
written agreement if the same failed to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto, or when the validity of the written agreement was put in issue.
Furthermore, the CA found that the Heirs of Policronio waived their right to object to
evidence aliunde having failed to do so during trial and for raising such only for the first
time on appeal. With regard to prescription, the CA ruled that the action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract did not prescribe under Article 1410 of
the Civil Code.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Alfonso argued that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
should not have been annulled, and instead the preterited heirs should be given their
share. The CA reiterated that Conrado’s lack of capacity to give his co-heirs’ consent to
the extra-judicial settlement rendered the same voidable.
Hence, the present Petitions for Review on Certiorari.
The Issues
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Policronio in G.R. No. 165748 are as
follows:
I.
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the Deed of
Absolute Sale of 25 October 1969 is void for being absolutely fictitious and
in relation therewith, may parol evidence be entertained to thwart its
binding effect after the parties have both died?
Assuming that indeed the said document is simulated, whether or not the
parties thereto including their successors in interest are estopped to
question its validity, they being bound by Articles 1412 and 1421 of the
Civil Code?
 II.
Whether prescription applies to bar any question respecting the validity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 October 1969? Whether prescription
applies to bar any collateral attack on the validity of the deed of absolute
sale executed 21 years earlier?
III.
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in nullifying the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition because Conrado Ureta signed the same without
the written authority from his siblings in contravention of Article 1878 in
relation to Article 1390 of the Civil Code and in relation therewith,
whether the defense of ratification and/or preterition raised for the first
time on appeal may be entertained?
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Alfonso in G.R. No. 165930
are as follows:
I.
Whether or not grave error was committed by the Trial Court and Court
of Appeals in declaring the Deed of Sale of subject properties as absolutely
simulated and null and void thru parol evidence based on their factual
findings as to its fictitious nature, and there being waiver of any objection
based on violation of the parol evidence rule.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Conrado
Ureta’s lack of capacity to give his co-heirs’ consent to the Extra-Judicial
Partition rendered the same voidable.
III.
Granting arguendo that Conrado Ureta was not authorized to represent
his co-heirs and there was no ratification, whether or not the Court of
Appeals was correct in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional
Trial Court for partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta.
IV.
Since the sale in favor of Policronio Ureta Sr. was null and void ab initio,
the properties covered therein formed part of the estate of the late Alfonso
Ureta and was correctly included in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
even if no prior action for nullification of the sale was filed by the heirs of
Liberato Ureta.
V.
Whether or not the heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. can claim that estoppel
based on Article 1412 of the Civil Code as well as the issue of prescription
can still be raised on appeal.
These various contentions revolve around two major issues, to wit: (1) whether the
Deed of Sale is valid, and (2) whether the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is valid.
Thus, the assigned errors shall be discussed jointly and in seriatim.
The Ruling of the Court
Validity of the Deed of Sale
Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there
was sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and
regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the
transaction’s validity, except that it must yield to the evidence adduced.10
As will be discussed below, the evidence overcomes these two presumptions.
Absolute Simulation
First, the Deed of Sale was not the result of a fair and regular private transaction
because it was absolutely simulated.
The Heirs of Policronio argued that the land had been validly sold to Policronio as the
Deed of Sale contained all the essential elements of a valid contract of sale, by virtue of
which, the subject properties were transferred in his name as evidenced by the tax
declaration. There being no invalidation prior to the execution of the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition, the probity and integrity of the Deed of Sale should remain
undiminished and accorded respect as it was a duly notarized public instrument.
The Heirs of Policronio posited that his loyal services to his father and his being the
eldest among Alfonso’s children, might have prompted the old man to sell the subject
lands to him at a very low price as an advance inheritance. They explained that
Policronio’s failure to take possession of the subject lands and to claim their produce
manifests a Filipino family practice wherein a child would take possession and enjoy
the fruits of the land sold by a parent only after the latter’s death. Policronio simply
treated the lands the same way his father Alfonso treated them - where his children
enjoyed usufructuary rights over the properties, as opposed to appropriating them
exclusively to himself. They contended that Policronio’s failure to take actual
possession of the lands did not prove that he was not the owner as he was merely
exercising his right to dispose of them. They argue that it was an error on the part of the
CA to conclude that ownership by Policronio was not established by his failure to
possess the properties sold. Instead, emphasis should be made on the fact that the tax
declarations, being indicia of possession, were in Policronio’s name.
They further argued that the Heirs of Alfonso failed to appreciate that the Deed of Sale
was clear enough to convey the subject parcels of land. Citing jurisprudence, they
contend that there is a presumption that an instrument sets out the true agreement of the
parties thereto and that it was executed for valuable consideration,11 and where there is
no doubt as to the intention of the parties to a contract, the literal meaning of the
stipulation shall control.12 Nowhere in the Deed of Sale is it indicated that the transfer
was only for taxation purposes. On the contrary, the document clearly indicates that the
lands were sold. Therefore, they averred that the literal meaning of the stipulation
should control.
The Court disagrees.
The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the CA that the Deed of
Sale is null and void for being absolutely simulated. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place
when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal
their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation,
when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real
agreement.
Valerio v. Refresca13 is instructive on the matter of simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties
have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is
that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in
any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated
or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may
have given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract
to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are
still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract
are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the
agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest.
Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a
valid and enforceable contract.14 Thus, where a person, in order to place his property
beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really
intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of
transfer is but a sham.15 Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to
Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over
the subject lands.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of
the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the
parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from the express
terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the
parties.16 The true intention of the parties in this case was sufficiently proven by the
Heirs of Alfonso.
The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence17 that the Deed of
Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely simulated Deeds of Sale which involved no
actual monetary consideration, executed by Alfonso in favor of his children, Policronio,
Liberato, and Prudencia, and his second wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes.
Amparo Castillo, the daughter of Liberato, testified, to wit:
Q: Now sometime in the year 1969 can you recall if your grandfather and his children
[met] in your house?
A: Yes sir, that was sometime in October 1969 when they [met] in our house, my
grandfather, my late uncle Policronio Ureta, my late uncle Liberato Ureta, my uncle
Francisco Ureta, and then my auntie Prudencia Ureta they talk[ed] about, that idea came
from my uncle Francisco Ureta to [sell] some parcels of land to his children to lessen
the inheritance tax whatever happened to my grandfather, actually no money involved
in this sale.
Q: Now you said there was that agreement, verbal agreement. [W]here were you when
this Alfonso Ureta and his children gather[ed] in your house?
A: I was near them in fact I heard everything they were talking [about]
xxx
Q: Were there documents of sale executed by Alfonso Ureta in furtherance of their
verbal agreement?
A: Yes sir.
Q: To whom in particular did your grandfather Alfonso Ureta execute this deed of sale
without money consideration according to you?
A: To my uncle Policronio Ureta and to Prudencia Ureta Panadero.
Q: And who else?
A: To Valeriana dela Cruz.
Q: How about your father?
18
A: He has.
The other Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his children Prudencia and
Liberato, and second wife Valeriana, all bearing the same date of execution, were duly
presented in evidence by the Heirs of Alfonso, and were uncontested by the Heirs of
Policronio. The lands which were the subject of these Deeds of Sale were in fact
included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition executed by all the heirs of Alfonso,
where it was expressly stipulated:
That the above-named Amparo U. Castillo, Prudencia U. Paradero, Conrado B. Ureta
and Merlinda U. Rivera do hereby recognize and acknowledge as a fact that the
properties presently declared in their respective names or in the names of their
respective parents and are included in the foregoing instrument are actually the
properties of the deceased Alfonso Ureta and were transferred only for the purpose of
effective administration and development and convenience in the payment of taxes and,
therefore, all instruments conveying or affecting the transfer of said properties are null
and void from the beginning.19
As found by the CA, Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after
the execution of the Deeds of Sale. It was undisputed that Alfonso remained in
possession of the subject lands and enjoyed their produce until his death. No credence
can be given to the contention of the Heirs of Policrionio that their father did not take
possession of the subject lands or enjoyed the fruits thereof in deference to a Filipino
family practice. Had this been true, Policronio should have taken possession of the
subject lands after his father died. On the contrary, it was admitted that neither
Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands from the time they
were sold to him, and even after the death of both Alfonso and Policronio.
It was also admitted by the Heirs of Policronio that the tenants of the subject lands
never turned over the produce of the properties to Policronio or his heirs but only to
Alfonso and the administrators of his estate. Neither was there a demand for their
delivery to Policronio or his heirs. Neither did Policronio ever pay real estate taxes on
the properties, the only payment on record being those made by his heirs in 1996 and
1997 ten years after his death. In sum, Policronio never exercised any rights pertaining
to an owner over the subject lands.
The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete absence of an
attempt in any manner on the part of the ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership
over the subject properties. Policronio’s failure to take exclusive possession of the
subject properties or, in the alternative, to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of
ownership. Such failure is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction
void. 20
It is further telling that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to
his children. This, coupled with Policronio’s failure to exercise any rights pertaining to
an owner of the subject lands, leads to the conclusion that he was aware that the transfer
was only made for taxation purposes and never intended to bind the parties thereto.
As the above factual circumstances remain unrebutted by the Heirs of Policronio, the
factual findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, remain binding and
conclusive upon this Court.21
It is clear that the parties did not intend to be bound at all, and as such, the Deed of Sale
produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The
Deed of Sale is, therefore, void for being absolutely simulated pursuant to Article 1409
(2) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
xxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
xxx
For guidance, the following are the most fundamental characteristics of void or
inexistent contracts:
1) As a general rule, they produce no legal effects whatsoever in accordance
with the principle "quod nullum est nullum producit effectum."
2) They are not susceptible of ratification.
3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be
waived or renounced.
 4) The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute
nullity is imprescriptible.
5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a
person whose interests are not directly affected.22
Since the Deed of Sale is void, the subject properties were properly included in the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso.
Absence and Inadequacy of Consideration
The second presumption is rebutted by the lack of consideration for the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer,23 the Heirs of Alfonso initially argued that the Deed of Sale was void
for lack of consideration, and even granting that there was consideration, such was
inadequate. The Heirs of Policronio counter that the defenses of absence or inadequacy
of consideration are not grounds to render a contract void.
The Heirs of Policronio contended that under Article 1470 of the Civil Code, gross
inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or
contract. Citing jurisprudence, they argued that inadequacy of monetary consideration
does not render a conveyance inexistent as liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid
contract, whereas fraud or bad faith may render it either rescissible or voidable,
although valid until annulled.24 Thus, they argued that if the contract suffers from
inadequate consideration, it remains valid until annulled, and the remedy of rescission
calls for judicial intervention, which remedy the Heirs of Alfonso failed to take.
It is further argued that even granting that the sale of the subject lands for a
consideration of ₱2,000.00 was inadequate, absent any evidence of the fair market value
of the land at the time of its sale, it cannot be concluded that the price at which it was
sold was inadequate.25 As there is nothing in the records to show that the Heirs of
Alfonso supplied the true value of the land in 1969, the amount of ₱2,000.00 must thus
stand as its saleable value.
On this issue, the Court finds for the Heirs of Alfonso.
For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void. It states that
Policronio paid, and Alfonso received, the ₱2,000.00 purchase price on the date of the
signing of the contract:
That I, ALFONSO F. URETA, x x x for and in consideration of the sum of TWO
THOUSAND (₱2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to me in hand paid by
POLICRONIO M. URETA, x x x, do hereby CEDE, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, by
way of absolute sale, x x x six (6) parcels of land x x x.26 [Emphasis ours]
Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by valuable
consideration, the RTC found that there was no money involved in the sale.27 This
finding was affirmed by the CA in ruling that the sale is void for being absolutely
simulated. Considering that there is no cogent reason to deviate from such factual
findings, they are binding on this Court.
It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states that the purchase
price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for
lack of consideration.28 Thus, although the contract states that the purchase price of
₱2,000.00 was paid by Policronio to Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been
proven that such was never in fact paid as there was no money involved. It must,
therefore, follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of consideration.
Given that the Deed of Sale is void, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue on the
inadequacy of consideration.
Parol Evidence and Hearsay
The Heirs of Policronio aver that the rules on parol evidence and hearsay were violated
by the CA in ruling that the Deed of Sale was void.
They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and,
specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a position to prove the terms outside of the
contract because they were not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in
question. Thus, it is argued that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol
evidence rule.
Stemming from the presumption that the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the
contract, it is also argued that the parol evidence rule may not be properly invoked by
either party in the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit
is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not
base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the
relation established thereby.29
Their arguments are untenable.
The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time,
as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will
be understood to have been waived. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection
must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if
the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer.30 In this
case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo
and they are, thus, deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the testimony of Amparo
Castillo, their argument would still fail.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
[Emphasis ours]
Paragraphs (b) and (c) are applicable in the case at bench.
The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
was clearly put in issue in the Answer31 of the Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It was
alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment of estate and
inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is
allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent
is clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears to be on its face.32 As the true
intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it now prevails over what
appears on the Deed of Sale.
The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was precisely
one of the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution.33 The operation of the parol
evidence rule requires the existence of a valid written agreement. It is, thus, not
applicable in a proceeding where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute,
such as when a contract may be void for lack of consideration.34 Considering that the
Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lack of
consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement.
The Heirs of Policronio must be in a state of confusion in arguing that the Heirs of
Alfonso may not question the Deed of Sale for not being parties or successors-in-
interest therein on the basis that the parol evidence rule may not be properly invoked in
a proceeding or litigation where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a
privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established
thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then the Heirs of Policronio would
themselves be precluded from invoking the parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence
of the Heirs of Alfonso.
Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires that the case be between
parties and their successors-in-interest.35 In this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and the
Heirs of Policronio are successors-in-interest of the parties to the Deed of Sale as they
claim rights under Alfonso and Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule
excluding evidence aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the present case falls
under two exceptions to the rule, as discussed above.
With respect to hearsay, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the rule on hearsay was
violated when the testimony of Amparo Castillo was given weight in proving that the
subject lands were only sold for taxation purposes as she was a person alien to the
contract. Even granting that they did not object to her testimony during trial, they
argued that it should not have been appreciated by the CA because it had no probative
value whatsoever.36
The Court disagrees.
It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be
given credence for having no probative value.37 This principle, however, has been
relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the
subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other
circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue. In Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc.
v. ECED S.A.,38 this Court held:
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an injunction suit
(Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any
other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. (Smith v.
Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should warn
of the undesirability of issuing judgments solely on the basis of the affidavits submitted,
where as here, said affidavits are overwhelming, uncontroverted by competent evidence
and not inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the allegations of the
respondents regarding the multifarious violations of the contracts made by the
petitioner.
In the case at bench, there were other prevailing circumstances which corroborate the
testimony of Amparo Castillo. First, the other Deeds of Sale which were executed in
favor of Liberato, Prudencia, and Valeriana on the same day as that of Policronio’s were
all presented in evidence. Second, all the properties subject therein were included in the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Third, Policronio, during his
lifetime, never exercised acts of ownership over the subject properties (as he never
demanded or took possession of them, never demanded or received the produce thereof,
and never paid real estate taxes thereon). Fourth, Policronio never informed his children
of the sale.
As the Heirs of Policronio failed to controvert the evidence presented, and to timely
object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, both the RTC and the CA correctly
accorded probative weight to her testimony.
Prior Action Unnecessary
The Heirs of Policronio averred that the Heirs of Alfonso should have filed an action to
declare the sale void prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They
argued that the sale should enjoy the presumption of regularity, and until overturned by
a court, the Heirs of Alfonso had no authority to include the land in the inventory of
properties of Alfonso’s estate. By doing so, they arrogated upon themselves the power
of invalidating the Deed of Sale which is exclusively vested in a court of law which, in
turn, can rule only upon the observance of due process. Thus, they contended that
prescription, laches, or estoppel have set in to militate against assailing the validity of
the sale.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.
A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is, therefore, null
and void; in such case, no independent action to rescind or annul the contract is
necessary, and it may be treated as non-existent for all purposes.39 A void or inexistent
contract is one which has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it has never been
entered into, and which cannot be validated either by time or ratification. A void
contract produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; it does not
create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.40 Therefore, it was
not necessary for the Heirs of Alfonso to first file an action to declare the nullity of the
Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Personality to Question Sale
The Heirs of Policronio contended that the Heirs of Alfonso are not parties, heirs, or
successors-in-interest under the contemplation of law to clothe them with the
personality to question the Deed of Sale. They argued that under Article 1311 of the
Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Thus,
the genuine character of a contract which personally binds the parties cannot be put in
issue by a person who is not a party thereto. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso were
not parties to the contract; neither did they appear to be beneficiaries by way of
assignment or inheritance. Unlike themselves who are direct heirs of Policronio, the
Heirs of Alfonso are not Alfonso’s direct heirs. For the Heirs of Alfonso to qualify as
parties, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, they must first prove that they are either
heirs or assignees. Being neither, they have no legal standing to question the Deed of
Sale.
They further argued that the sale cannot be assailed for being barred under Article 1421
of the Civil Code which provides that the defense of illegality of a contract is not
available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected.
Again, the Court disagrees.
Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, x x x
Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose
interests are not directly affected.
The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the
parties, as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons
who are directly affected by the contract. Thus, where a contract is absolutely
simulated, even third persons who may be prejudiced thereby may set up its
inexistence.41 The Heirs of Alfonso are the children of Alfonso, with his deceased
children represented by their children (Alfonso’s grandchildren). The Heirs of Alfonso
are clearly his heirs and successors-in-interest and, as such, their interests are directly
affected, thereby giving them the right to question the legality of the Deed of Sale.
Inapplicability of Article 842
The Heirs of Policronio further argued that even assuming that the Heirs of Alfonso
have an interest in the Deed of Sale, they would still be precluded from questioning its
validity. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso must first prove that the sale of
Alfonso’s properties to Policronio substantially diminished their successional rights or
that their legitimes would be unduly prejudiced, considering that under Article 842 of
the Civil Code, one who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided that
he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of
said heirs. Having failed to do so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should be
precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale.
Still, the Court disagrees.
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any
part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.
This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in
the case at bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of
Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition substantially diminished their
successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes.
Inapplicability of Article 1412
The Heirs of Policronio contended that even assuming that the contract was simulated,
the Heirs of Alfonso would still be barred from recovering the properties by reason of
Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which provides that if the act in which the unlawful or
forbidden cause does not constitute a criminal offense, and the fault is both on the
contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract or
demand the performance of the other’s undertaking. As the Heirs of Alfonso alleged
that the purpose of the sale was to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes, they cannot
take from the Heirs of Policronio what had been given to their father.
On this point, the Court again disagrees.
Article 1412 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what
he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s
undertaking;
Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to
contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter.42 This article presupposes the existence
of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious or simulated contracts which are in reality non-
existent.43 As it has been determined that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the
provision cannot apply to it.
Granting that the Deed of Sale was not simulated, the provision would still not apply.
Since the subject properties were included as properties of Alfonso in the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, they are covered by corresponding inheritance and estate taxes.
Therefore, tax evasion, if at all present, would not arise, and Article 1412 would again
be inapplicable.
Prescription
From the position that the Deed of Sale is valid and not void, the Heirs of Policronio
argued that any question regarding its validity should have been initiated through
judicial process within 10 years from its notarization in accordance with Article 1144 of
the Civil Code. Since 21 years had already elapsed when the Heirs of Alfonso assailed
the validity of the Deed of Sale in 1996, prescription had set in. Furthermore, since the
Heirs of Alfonso did not seek to nullify the tax declarations of Policronio, they had
impliedly acquiesced and given due recognition to the Heirs of Policronio as the rightful
inheritors and should, thus, be barred from laying claim on the land.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.
Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
This is one of the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts.44
As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity, even
if filed 21 years after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it is
imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute
nullity cannot be waived or renounced.45 Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be
precluded from setting up the defense of its inexistence.
Validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition

(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has The Court now resolves the issue of the validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised
him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without Unenforceability
any obligation to comply with his promise.
The Heirs of Alfonso argued that the CA was mistaken in annulling the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition due to the incapacity of Conrado to give the consent of his co-heirs for
lack of a special power of attorney. They contended that what was involved was not the
capacity to give consent in behalf of the co-heirs but the authority to represent them.
They argue that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not a voidable or an annullable
contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, but rather, it is an unenforceable or, more
specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the Civil
Code. As such, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not be annulled but only be
rendered unenforceable against the siblings of Conrado.
They further argued that under Article 1317 of the Civil Code, when the persons
represented without authority have ratified the unauthorized acts, the contract becomes
enforceable and binding. They contended that the Heirs of Policronio ratified the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition when Conrado took possession of one of the parcels of land
adjudicated to him and his siblings, and when another parcel was used as collateral for a
loan entered into by some of the Heirs of Policronio. The Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition having been ratified and its benefits accepted, the same thus became
enforceable and binding upon them.
The Heirs of Alfonso averred that granting arguendo that Conrado was not authorized to
represent his co-heirs and there was no ratification, the CA should not have remanded
the case to the RTC for partition of Alfonso’s estate. They argued that the CA should
not have applied the Civil Code general provision on contracts, but the special
provisions dealing with succession and partition. They contended that contrary to the
ruling of the CA, the extra-judicial parition was not an act of strict dominion, as it has
been ruled that partition of inherited land is not a conveyance but a confirmation or
ratification of title or right to the land.46 Therefore, the law requiring a special power of
attorney should not be applied to partitions.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Policronio insisted that the CA pronouncement on the
invalidity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not be disturbed because the
subject properties should not have been included in the estate of Alfonso, and because
Conrado lacked the written authority to represent his siblings. They argued with the CA
in ruling that a special power of attorney was required before Conrado could sign in
behalf of his co-heirs.
The Heirs of Policronio denied that they ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
They claimed that there is nothing on record that establishes that they ratified the
partition. Far from doing so, they precisely questioned its execution by filing a
complaint. They further argued that under Article 1409 (3) of the Civil Code,
ratification cannot be invoked to validate the illegal act of including in the partition
those properties which do not belong to the estate as it provides another mode of
acquiring ownership not sanctioned by law.
Furthermore, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the defenses of unenforceability,
ratification, and preterition are being raised for the first time on appeal by the Heirs of
Alfonso. For having failed to raise them during the trial, the Heirs of Alfonso should be
deemed to have waived their right to do so.
The Court agrees in part with the Heirs of Alfonso.
To begin, although the defenses of unenforceability, ratification and preterition were
raised by the Heirs of Alfonso for the first time on appeal, they are concomitant matters
which may be taken up. As long as the questioned items bear relevance and close
relation to those specifically raised, the interest of justice would dictate that they, too,
must be considered and resolved. The rule that only theories raised in the initial
proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should refer to independent,
not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action.47
In the RTC, the Heirs of Policronio alleged that Conrado’s consent was vitiated by
mistake and undue influence, and that he signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
without the authority or consent of his co-heirs.
The RTC found that Conrado’s credibility had faltered, and his claims were rejected by
the RTC as gratuitous assertions. On the basis of such, the RTC ruled that Conrado duly
represented his siblings in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
On the other hand, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition under Article
1390 (1) of the Civil Code, holding that a special power of attorney was lacking as
required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code. These articles are as
follows:
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
xxx
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or
acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration;
xxx
(15) Any other act of strict dominion.
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may
have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They
are susceptible of ratification.
This Court finds that Article 1878 (5) and (15) is inapplicable to the case at bench. It
has been held in several cases48 that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of
property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or
right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and
receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which
belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be
considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not
necessary.
In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors
are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does
not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering
that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership
but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.49
Neither is Article 1390 (1) applicable. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a
party to give consent to a contract. What is involved in the case at bench though is not
Conrado’s incapacity to give consent to the contract, but rather his lack of authority to
do so. Instead, Articles 1403 (1), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code find application to
the circumstances prevailing in this case. They are as follows:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
Art. 1404. Unauthorized contracts are governed by Article 1317 and the principles of
agency in Title X of this Book.
Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the
latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
Such was similarly held in the case of Badillo v. Ferrer:
The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an annullable contract
under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if
one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting
party’s consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
xxx
The deed of extrajudicial parition and sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an
unauthorized contract under Articles 1403(1) and 1317 of the New Civil Code.50
Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so
as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but
unenforceable against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been entered into without their
authority.
A closer review of the evidence on record, however, will show that the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition is not unenforceable but, in fact, valid, binding and enforceable
against all the Heirs of Policronio for having given their consent to the contract. Their
consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition has been proven by a preponderance of
evidence.
Regarding his alleged vitiated consent due to mistake and undue influence to the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado testified, to wit:
Q: Mr. Ureta you remember having signed a document entitled deed of extra judicial
partition consisting of 11 pages and which have previously [been] marked as Exhibit I
for the plaintiffs?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Can you recall where did you sign this document?
A: The way I remember I signed that in our house.
Q: And who requested or required you to sign this document?
A: My aunties.
Q: Who in particular if you can recall?
A: Nay Pruding Panadero.
Q: You mean that this document that you signed was brought to your house by your Q: And why is it that you did not read all the pages of this document because I
Auntie Pruding Pa[r]adero [who] requested you to sign that document? understand that you know also how to read in English?

A: When she first brought that document I did not sign that said document because I A: Because the way Nay Pruding explained to me is that the property of my grandfather
[did] no[t] know the contents of that document. will be partitioned that is why I am so happy.

Q: How many times did she bring this document to you [until] you finally signed the xxx
document?
Q: You mean to say that after you signed this deed of extra judicial partition up to the
A: Perhaps 3 times. present you never informed them?

Q: Can you tell the court why you finally signed it? A: Perhaps they know already that I have signed and they read already the document
and they have read the document.
A: Because the way she explained it to me that the land of my grandfather will be
partitioned. Q: My question is different, did you inform them?

Q: When you signed this document were your brothers and sisters who are your co- A: The document sir? I did not tell them.
plaintiffs in this case aware of your act to sign this document?
Q: Even until now?
A: They do not know.
A: Until now I did not inform them.52
xxx
This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the finding of the RTC that Conrado’s
Q: After you have signed this document did you inform your brothers and sisters that explanations were mere gratuitous assertions not entitled to any probative weight. The
you have signed this document? RTC found Conrado’s credibility to have faltered when he testified that perhaps his
siblings were already aware of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. The RTC was in the
No I did not. 51 best position to judge the credibility of the witness’ testimony. The CA also recognized
that Conrado’s consent was not vitiated by mistake and undue influence as it required a
special power of attorney in order to bind his co-heirs and, as such, the CA thereby
xxx
recognized that his signature was binding to him but not with respect to his co-heirs.
Findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding to
Q: Now you read the document when it was allegedly brought to your house by your this Court.53
aunt Pruding Pa[r]adero?
Furthermore, this Court notes other peculiarities in Conrado’s testimony. Despite claims
A: I did not read it because as I told her I still want to ask the advise of my brothers and of undue influence, there is no indication that Conrado was forced to sign by his aunt,
sisters. Prudencia Paradero. In fact, he testified that he was happy to sign because his
grandfather’s estate would be partitioned. Conrado, thus, clearly understood the
Q: So do I get from you that you have never read the document itself or any part document he signed. It is also worth noting that despite the document being brought to
thereof? him on three separate occasions and indicating his intention to inform his siblings about
it, Conrado failed to do so, and still neglected to inform them even after he had signed
A: I have read the heading. the partition. All these circumstances negate his claim of vitiated consent. Having duly
signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado is bound to it. Thus, it is
xxx enforceable against him.
Although Conrado’s co-heirs claimed that they did not authorize Conrado to sign the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf, several circumstances militate against
their contention.
First, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was executed on April 19, 1989, and the
Heirs of Policronio claim that they only came to know of its existence on July 30, 1995
through an issue of the Aklan Reporter. It is difficult to believe that Conrado did not
inform his siblings about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition or at least broach its
subject with them for more than five years from the time he signed it, especially after
indicating in his testimony that he had intended to do so.
Second, Conrado retained possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him
and his co-heirs in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Third, after the execution of the partition on April 19, 1989 and more than a year before
they claimed to have discovered the existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition on
July 30, 1995, some of the Heirs of Policronio, namely, Rita Solano, Macario Ureta,
Lilia Tayco, and Venancio Ureta executed on June 1, 1994, a Special Power of
Attorney54 in favor of their sister Gloria Gonzales, authorizing her to obtain a loan from
a bank and to mortgage one of the parcels of land adjudicated to them in the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition to secure payment of the loan. They were able to obtain the loan
using the land as collateral, over which a Real Estate Mortgage55 was constituted. Both
the Special Power of Attorney and the Real Estate Mortgage were presented in evidence
in the RTC, and were not controverted or denied by the Heirs of Policronio.
Fourth, in the letter dated August 15, 1995, sent by the counsel of the Heirs of
Policronio to the Heirs of Alfonso requesting for amicable settlement, there was no
mention that Conrado’s consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was vitiated by
mistake and undue influence or that they had never authorized Conrado to represent
them or sign the document on their behalf. It is questionable for such a pertinent detail
to have been omitted. The body of said letter is reproduced hereunder as follows:
Greetings:
Your nephews and nieces, children of your deceased brother Policronio Ureta, has
referred to me for appropriate legal action the property they inherited from their father
consisting of six (6) parcels of land which is covered by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
October 25, 1969. These properties ha[ve] already been transferred to the name of their
deceased father immediately after the sale, machine copy of the said Deed of Sale is
hereto attached for your ready reference.
Lately, however, there was published an Extra-judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso
Ureta, which to the surprise of my clients included the properties already sold to their
father before the death of said Alfonso Ureta. This inclusion of their property is
erroneous and illegal because these properties were covered by the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of their father Policronio Ureta no longer form part of the estate of
Alfonso Ureta. Since Policronio Ureta has [sic] died in 1974 yet, these properties have
passed by hereditary succession to his children who are now the true and lawful owners
of the said properties.
My clients are still entitled to a share in the estate of Alfonso Ureta who is also their
grandfather as they have stepped into the shoes of their deceased father Policronio
Ureta. But this estate of Alfonso Ureta should already exclude the six (6) parcels of land
covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta.
My clients cannot understand why the properties of their late father [should] be
included in the estate of their grandfather and be divided among his brothers and sisters
when said properties should only be divided among themselves as children of
Policronio Ureta.
Since this matter involves very close members of the same family, I have counseled my
clients that an earnest effort towards a compromise or amicable settlement be first
explored before resort to judicial remedy is pursued. And a compromise or amicable
settlement can only be reached if all the parties meet and discuss the problem with an
open mind. To this end, I am suggesting a meeting of the parties on September 16, 1995
at 2:00 P.M. at B Place Restaurant at C. Laserna St., Kalibo, Aklan. It would be best if
the parties can come or be represented by their duly designated attorney-in-fact together
with their lawyers if they so desire so that the problem can be discussed unemotionally
and intelligently.
I would, however, interpret the failure to come to the said meeting as an indication that
the parties are not willing to or interested in amicable settlement of this matter and as a
go signal for me to resort to legal and/or judicial remedies to protest the rights of my
clients.
Thank you very much.56
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the allegation of Conrado’s vitiated
consent and lack of authority to sign in behalf of his co-heirs was a mere afterthought
on the part of the Heirs of Policronio. It appears that the Heirs of Policronio were not
only aware of the existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition prior to June 30,
1995 but had, in fact, given Conrado authority to sign in their behalf. They are now
estopped from questioning its legality, and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is valid,
binding, and enforceable against them.
In view of the foregoing, there is no longer a need to discuss the issue of ratification.
Preterition
The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence of the Heirs of Policronio in
the partition or the lack of authority of their representative results, at the very least, in
their preterition and not in the invalidity of the entire deed of partition. Assuming there
was actual preterition, it did not render the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable.
Citing Article 1104 of the Civil Code, they aver that a partition made with preterition of
any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, but the heirs shall be proportionately
obliged to pay the share of the person omitted. Thus, the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition should not have been annulled by the CA. Instead, it should have ordered the
share of the heirs omitted to be given to them.
The Heirs of Alfonso also argued that all that remains to be adjudged is the right of the
preterited heirs to represent their father, Policronio, and be declared entitled to his share.
They contend that remand to the RTC is no longer necessary as the issue is purely legal
and can be resolved by the provisions of the Civil Code for there is no dispute that each
of Alfonso’s heirs received their rightful share. Conrado, who received Policronio’s
share, should then fully account for what he had received to his other co-heirs and be
directed to deliver their share in the inheritance.
These arguments cannot be given credence.
Their posited theory on preterition is no longer viable. It has already been determined
that the Heirs of Policronio gave their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
and they have not been excluded from it. Nonetheless, even granting that the Heirs of
Policronio were denied their lawful participation in the partition, the argument of the
Heirs of Alfonso would still fail.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the
inheritance.1âwphi1 It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory
heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving
him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if
he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.57 Preterition is thus a concept of
testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at bench, there is no will
involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.
Remand Unnecessary
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is in itself valid for complying with all the legal
requisites, as found by the RTC, to wit:
A persual of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition would reveal that all the heirs and
children of Alfonso Ureta were represented therein; that nobody was left out; that all of
them received as much as the others as their shares; that it distributed all the properties
of Alfonso Ureta except a portion of parcel 29 containing an area of 14,000 square
meters, more or less, which was expressly reserved; that Alfonso Ureta, at the time of
his death, left no debts; that the heirs of Policronio Ureta, Sr. were represented by
Conrado B. Ureta; all the parties signed the document, was witnessed and duly
acknowledged before Notary Public Adolfo M. Iligan of Kalibo, Aklan; that the
document expressly stipulated that the heirs to whom some of the properties were
transferred before for taxation purposes or their children, expressly recognize and
acknowledge as a fact that the properties were transferred only for the purpose of
effective administration and development convenience in the payment of taxes and,
therefore, all instruments conveying or effecting the transfer of said properties are null
and void from the beginning (Exhs. 1-4, 7-d).58
Considering that the Deed of Sale has been found void and the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition valid, with the consent of all the Heirs of Policronio duly given, there is no
need to remand the case to the court of origin for partition.1ªvvph!1
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No.
165930 is GRANTED. The assailed April 20, 2004 Decision and October 14, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71399, are
hereby MODIFIED in this wise:
(1) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989, is VALID, and
(2) The order to remand the case to the court of origin is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, deceased.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
J. Salonga and L. M. Abellera for oppositor and appellee.
Carlos Dominguez, Jr. for executor-appellee.
M. R. Sotelo for appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died
leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954. In that same
decision the court declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to
as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. The declaration was appealed to
this Court, and was affirmed in its decision of February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484).
In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased's estate, the trial court
approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the
will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia
appealed from the order of approval, and this Court, on January 31, 1963, reversed the
same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by
Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the
partition be made as provided by said law (G.R. No. L-16749).
On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving
the project of partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the
properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan
(named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as
merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his
daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his
death. The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been
preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the
properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the
legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved
by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.
The case is once more before us on appeal, this time by Lucy Duncan, on the sole
question of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to
Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted
heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen
Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate.
The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others, the following clauses which
are pertinent to the issue in this case:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid
to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, is exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now
residing, as aforesaid, at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime; Provided, however, that should the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY at anytime prior to her decease having living issue,
then and in that event, the life interest herein given shall terminate, and if so
terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY the rest, remainder and residue of my
property with the same force and effect as if I had originally so given, devised
and bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that should the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without living issue, then, and in that
 event, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my
property one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOUISE C.
BORTON, now residing at No. 2124, Twentieth Street, Bakersfield,
California, U.S.A., and one-half (1/2) to the children of my deceased brother,
JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs. Carol F. Ruggaver, of Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A., and Joseph Raymond Christensen, of Manhattan
Beach, California, U.S.A., share and share alike, the share of any of the three
above named who may predecease me, to go in equal parts to the descendants
of the deceased; and, provided further, that should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise
C. Borton die before my own decease, then, and in that event, the share of my
estate devised to her herein I give, devise and bequeath to her children,
Elizabeth Borton de Treviño, of Mexico City Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips,
of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and Richard Borton, of Bakersfield,
California, U.S.A., or to the heirs of any of them who may die before my own
decease, share and share alike.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been preterition of
Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the
institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition, but is
governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom
the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that
the same be fully satisfied." Appellant also suggests that considering the provisions of
the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but
left to her a legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime, she was
in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918, which reads:
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause
the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those
set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited; but the devices and legacies and other
testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the
legitimate.
Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and 918, Helen Garcia is entitled
only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the
succession were intestate.
Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil Code; and Article 906
of Article 815. Commenting on Article 815, Manresa explains:
Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede presumirse ignorancia o
falta de memoria en el testador; en el de dejar algo al heredero forzoso no. Este
no se encuentra plivado totalmente de su legitima: ha recibido por cualquir
titulo una porcion de los bienes hereditarios, porcion que no alcanza a
completar la legitima, pero que influeye poderosamente en el animo del
legislador para decidirle a adoptar una solucion bien diferente de la señalada
para el caso de pretericion.
El testador no ha olvidado por completo al heredero forzoso; le ha dejado
bienes; pero haciendo un calculo equivocado, ha repartido en favor de extraños
o en favor de otros legitimarios por via de legado donacion o mejora mayor
cantidad de la que la ley de consentia disponer. El heredero forzoso no puede
perder su legitima, pero tampoco puede pedir mas que la misma. De aqui su
derecho a reclamar solamente lo que le falta; al complemento de la porcion que
forzosamente la corresponde.
... Dejar el testador por cualquier titulo, equivale a disponer en testamento por
titulo de herencia legado o mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de alguna
cantidad o porcion de bienes menos que la legitima o igual a la misma. Tal
sentido, que es el mas proprio en al articulo 815, no pugna tampoco con la
doctrina de la ley. Cuando en el testamento se deja algo al heredero forzoso, la
pretericion es incompleta: es mas formularia que real. Cuando en el
testamento nada se deja el legitimario, hay verdadera pretericion. (6 Manresa,
7th Ed., 1951, p. 437.)
On the difference between preterition of a compulsory heir and the right to ask for
completion of his legitime, Sanchez Roman says:
La desheredacion, como expresa, es siempre voluntaria; la pretericion puede
serlo pero se presume involuntaria la omision en que consiste en cuanto olvida
o no atiende el testador en su testamento a la satisfaccion del derecho a la
legitima del heredero forzoso preterido, prescindiendo absoluta y totalmente de
el y no mencionandole en ninguna de sus disposiciones testamentarias, o
no instituyendole en parte alguna de la herencia, ni por titulo de heredero ni
por el de legatar o aunque le mencionara o nombrara sin dejarle mas o menos
bienes. Si le dejara algunos, por pocos que sean e insuficientes para cubrir su
legitima, ya no seria caso de pretericion, sino de complemento de aquella. El
primer supuesto o de pretericion se regula por el articulo 814, y produce accion
de nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo, o de complemento de
legitima por el 815 y solo original la accion ad suplementum, para completar la
legitima. (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2, p. 1131.)
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming
him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.
Manresa continues:
Se necesita pues (a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso; (b) Que la
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.1äwphï1.ñët
xxx xxx xxx
B. Que la omision sea completa — Esta condicion se deduce del mismo
Articulo 814 y resulta con evidencia al relacionar este articulo con el 815. El
heredero forzoso a quien el testador deja algo por cualquier titulo en su
testamento, no se halla propiamente omitido pues se le nombra y se le
reconoce participacion en los bienes hereditarios. Podria discutirse en el
Articulo 814 si era o no necesario que se reconociese el derecho del heredero
como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvanece esta duda. Aquel se ocupa de
privacion completa o total, tacita este, de la privacion parcial. Los efectos
deben ser y son, como veremos completamente distintos (6 Manresa, p. 428.)
La privacion de la legitima puede ser total o parcial.
Privar totalmente de la legitima es negarla en absoluto al legitimario,
despojarle de ella por completo. A este caso se refiere el articulo 814. Privar
parcialmente de la legitima, es menguarla o reducirla dejar al legitimario una
porcion, menor que la que le corresponde. A este caso se refiere el articulo
815. El 813 sienta, pues, una regla general, y las consecuencias del que
brantamiento de esta regla se determina en los articulos 814 y 815. (6 Manresa
p. 418.)
Again Sanchez Roman:
QUE LA OMISSION SEA TOTAL. — Aunque el articulo 814 no consigna de
modo expreso esta circunstancia de que la pretericion o falta de mencion e
institucion o disposicion testamentaria a su favor, sea total, completa y
absoluta, asi se deduce de no hacer distincion o salvedad alguna empleandola
en terminos generales; pero sirve a confirmarlo de un modo indudable el
siguiente articulo 815, al decir que el heredero forzoso a quien el testador haya
dejado por cualquier titulo, menos de la legitima que la corresponda, podria
pedir el complemento de la misma, lo cual ya no son el caso ni los efectos de
la pretericion, que anula la institucion, sino simplemente los del suplemento
necesario para cubrir su legitima. (Sanchez Roman — Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p.
1133.)
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only
to the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is
it necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by any title," as by legacy, be
granted to him in his capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In other words,
should he be recognized or referred to in the will as heir? This question is pertinent
because in the will of the deceased Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not
mentioned as an heir — indeed her status as such is denied — but is given a legacy of
P3,600.00.
While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave an affirmative answer to the
question, according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. 436) and Sanchez Roman
(Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937), that view was changed by Article 645 of the "Proyecto
de Codigo de 1851," later on copied in Article 906 of our own Code. Sanchez Roman,
in the citation given above, comments as follows:
RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO DE LA LEGITIMA. — Se inspira el
Codigo en esta materia en la doctrina clasica del Derecho romano y patrio (2);
pero con alguna racional modificacion. Concedian aquellos precedentes legales
al heredero forzoso, a quien no se le dejaba por titulo de tal el completo de su
legitima, la accion para invalidar la institucion hecha en el testamento y
reclamar y obtener aquella mediante el ejercicio de la querella de inoficioso, y
aun cuando resultara favorecido como donotario, por otro titulo que no fuera el
de heredero, sino al honor de que se le privaba no dandole este caracter, y
solo cuando era instituido heredero en parte o cantidad inferior a lo que le
correspondiera por legitima, era cuando bastaba el ejercicio de la accion ad
suplementum para completarla, sin necesidad de anular las otras instituciones
de heredero o demas disposiciones contenidas en el testamento.
El Articulo 851 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se ajusta a la unica
necesidad que le inspira cual es la de que se complete la legitima del heredero
forzoso, a quien por cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo que le
corresponda, y se le otorga tan solo el derecho de pedir el complemento de la
misma sin necesidad de que se anulen las disposiciones testamentarias, que se
reduciran en lo que sean inoficiosas conforme al articulo 817, cuya
interpretacion y sentido tienen ya en su apoyo la sancion de la jurisprudencia
(3); siendo condicion precisa que lo que se hubiere dejado de menos de la
legitima al heredero forzoso, lo haya sido en el testamento, o sea por
disposicion del testador, segun lo revela el texto del articulo, "el heredero
forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado, etc., esto es por titulo de legado o
donacion mortis causa en el testamento y, no fuera de al. (Sanchez Roman,
Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937.)
Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated January
16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one of those cases the
testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but
without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the
estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated in this
that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. decision, that is, by giving to oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no
(6 Manresa, pp. 438, 441.) more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of
the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the imposed in the will of the decedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code.
testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his Costs against appellees in this instance.
will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her
share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to
possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during
his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and
that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was
expressly recognized by him.

The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185, is cited by appellees in
support of their theory of preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it
referred to a will where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children
by his second marriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his
first marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some of them." In the case at bar the
testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of
P3,600.00.

The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares of stocks
in the Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4)
of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of
her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code),
she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof
subsequently accruing. These include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings.
The contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to the
terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right of
ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime.

One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has been made in
the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate
bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. This
substitution results in effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is
entitled only to the income from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have
living issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property
will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding this,
point, since it is not one of the issues raised before us, we might call attention to the
limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution, particularly that which says
that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the
legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.

Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving the project of
partition as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951,
some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the
probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection
thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid"
and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the
probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law
prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise
or legacy therein.1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below
and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a
nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will
be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears
in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After
all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion
below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will
and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the
property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34,
residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this
seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
provides:
 ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article
814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a
necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le
nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya
heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los
bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su
muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A.
342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony
provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to
nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs.
Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va.
283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending
line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will
completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly,
they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la
institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here
institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or
bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir,
en todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en
el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto
prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la
anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que
le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de
la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete
la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de
herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque
asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como
efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results
in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal
heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will
tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
"Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion
expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun
caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en
Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado,
debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
 consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado
llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de
otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en
legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en
materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con
repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta
voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para
que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria,
dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya
institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la
voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para
modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos
y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca
mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para
convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este
procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment
notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so
instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in
addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies
apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the
two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the
institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies
and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren
a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese
dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate
succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather
than one of preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854
"does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction
between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is
a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for
a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la
legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that
disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to
be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported
by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different
from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat,
"shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there
are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall
also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated
yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in
commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one
hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a
todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the
inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in
the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of
the children by the second marriage should be treated
as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but
merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of
Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may
be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the
bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding
total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and
will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained
in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments
would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus,
instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
Code.
 The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general
from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only
provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the
institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from
legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because
they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in
themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed
by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be
taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity".
Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir".
Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is
null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is
hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all
surnamed Reyes y Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.
Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil
Case No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the
same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties
receivea by his deceasea wife under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto,
consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than
P200,000.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the
barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the share of
plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of
plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors."
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime
they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989,
31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his
share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia
Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and
Felisa Barretto and his nephew anä nieces® The usufruct oæ the fishponä situateä iî
barrio Saî Roque¬ Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his
widow, Maria Gerardo® Iî the meantime¬ Maria Gerardo was appointeä administratrix.
By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her
own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition
was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The
distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith.
As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured
the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her
own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in
the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5,
1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of
which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in
the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros
Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the
first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the
lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her
husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the same.1
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir
of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the
deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.
Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not
only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered
to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of
Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of
partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the
fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title
thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant, who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared
the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be
null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto,
predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano
Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the
basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has
been included, shall be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano
Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his
will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such
free part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano
Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and
successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the
provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that
property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real
owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the properties received
under the project of partition previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros
Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this
appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been
misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto
admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be
one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and
was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak
of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary
or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator
does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for
Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he
chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,
Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her
legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition,
or total ommission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322,
invoked by appellee, is not at all applicable, that case involving an instance of
preterition or omission of children of the testator's former marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil
status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is
erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through
mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano
Barretto, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the
testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a
compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the
parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is
merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is
the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons
entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629,
643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court),
and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees.
If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same
should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its
binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for
lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the
estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of
partition becomes irrelevant.
It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate of
the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud
Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian of the
minor Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs,
nor were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have no greater
validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the nature
of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is
invoked in support of the proposition. That case is authority for the proposition that a
judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon
petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise
agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In the case before us,
however, the agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of
distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the
deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before
the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not apply.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that
the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact,
even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in conformity with the
probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection had been
made. In fact it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939,
provided: .
SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is thus allowed, the court
shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all
the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of
according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue,
if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in these
Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.
(Emphasis supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed
the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without
jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court ruled
in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and 742:
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally
intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not
only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well. As this
 Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding for
probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over
all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by
section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is binding against
all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of
distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees". (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva
Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary
doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence
not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is
reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period,
instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as
in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order
already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of.
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs.
Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the
partition, and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian.
The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor. (Secs. 3
and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere statement in the project of partion
that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are
pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian had not yet been
appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet been
terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a
guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already appointed when she signed
the project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in
the project of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings,
which shows that Maria Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project
of partition as guardian of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and,
consequently, no ground for the contention that the order approving the project
of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in
these proceedings.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a
party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through
her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First
Instance which settled her father's estate.
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo)
could not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said
widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees
rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place, there is no evidence that when the
estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor,
Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was
committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither
Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor. In the
second placegranting that there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained
within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long
ago.
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit
24), she became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action
accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father's estate
and the four-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act.
190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946
(Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the
action was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim in this
case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that
appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to
reconvey the properties received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable
evidence of the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on the oral assertions of
Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no mention of such
promise in the decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise
was made, the same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the
real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of
disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as to
them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55
Phil. 136, 142).
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for
being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that
Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred
by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a
possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the properties
inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the
plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have
been given due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is
reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee
Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in said decision, and the same is
affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records be
returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action for partition
of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits thereof, as
prayed for in the complaint No costs.
 [G.R. No. 4359. September 24, 1908.] deducted:

The credit above alluded to admitted

EMILIO ESCUIN Y BATAC, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO ESCUIN, ET AL., defendants. — JULIA by the commissioners P1,321.40
BATAC, appellant.
10 per cent remuneration due to

|| the administrator P826.80

TORRES, J p:
All legal expenses paid and
On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos
executed a will before a notary public of Sevilla, Spain, stating therein that he was approved P1,105.01
a native of Cavite, the son of Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, the latter
being deceased; that he was married about six months previously to Maria Teresa ________ P3,253.21
Ponce de Leon, and that he had no lawful descendants; the testator, however, stated
in clause three of his will, that in case he had a duly registered successor, his child _________
would be his sole and universal heir; but that if, as would probably be the case,
there should be no such heir, then in clause four he named his said father Francisco
Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon his universal heirs, they to divide
the estate in equal shares between them. Deducting this amount from the funds
The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899, as certified to by the
5,014.81
municipal court of Magdalena, Sevilla, on the 20th of March, 1900. of the estate, there remains a balance
Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners were That the said credit of P1,321.40, equivalent to 3,696.50 pesetas, allowed
appointed to consider claims against the estate, and, according to a report presented by the commissioners, is the only claim presented within the legal term against the
to the Court of First Instance on the 20th of June, 1907, one claim was allowed estate; that Francisco Escuin, the father of the testator, his wife or widow, Teresa
amounting to 3,696.50 pesetas. Ponce de Leon, and his natural child, the minor Emilio Escuin y Batac, represented
by his mother and guardian Julia Batac, are entitled to the succession; that, by
On the 10th and 12th of July, 1907, the attorney for the widow, Ponce de
setting aside one-third of the estate in favor of the natural son recognized in
Leon, and the attorneys who represented the guardian of the minor, Emilio Escuin y
accordance with article 842 of the Civil Code, there only remains the question as to
Batac appealed to the Court of First Instance from the findings of the aforesaid
how the remaining two-thirds of the inheritance shall be bestowed, taking into
commissioners. Matters stood thus, and without there appearing any decision of the
account the directions of the testator in his will; that the same does not disclose that
court as to the appeals, the attorney for the administrator, by a writing dated the 3d
he had left any child by his wife; that the latter, as the widow of the testator,
of September, following, moved for the approval of the proposed partition of the
besides being a designated heir entitled to one-half of the hereditary funds, is
estate provided for by the court; by the first additional request (otrosi) he asked that
entitled to the usufruct of the portion fixed by the law, and that the funds to be
the remuneration for the services of the administrator of the estate be fixed, and that
apportioned are composed wholly of cash or ready money.
he be authorized to draw such amount from the funds of the estate; and by a second
additional request he asked that the accounts made up on the 31st of August, On these grounds the partition and adjudication was proceeded with of the
previous, be approved. sum of P5,014.81 into three shares of P1,671.60 to each one of the parties in
interest, that is, the natural son, Emilio Escuin y Batac, in full control as general
It appears in the proposed partition of the 3d of September, 1906,
heir; the widow, Teresa Ponce de Leon, as legatee of one-half of the two-thirds of
that, according to the opinion of the administrator by whom it was
the funds of free disposition; and the said widow the usufruct of the other half of
signed and the result of the proceedings, the property left by the
the aforesaid two-thirds of free disposition, the bare ownership of the last third held
testator, in accordance with the accounts passed upon by the court,
in usufruct by the widow being adjudicated to Francisco Escuin, as legatee taking
amounted to P8,268.02
into account the provisions of article 817 of the Civil Code upon making the
From said sum the following must be division.
 On the 12th of September, 1906, the representative of the minor natural
child of the testator objected in writing to the partition proposed by the
administrator, and for the reasons he set forth asked that the same be disapproved,
and that in lieu thereof the entire estate be adjudicated to Emilio Escuin y Batac,
the said minor.
Upon a hearing for the approval of the said proposed partition, the
representative of the minor presented as evidence a certified copy of the complaint,
the answer, and the final judgment rendered in civil case No. 3210 of the Court of
First Instance.
It appears from the said certified proceedings that the representative of the
minor, as plaintiff therein, asked on the 12th of January, 1905, that an allowance be
granted to him for subsistence for account of the estate of the late testator, Emilio
Escuin de los Santos, and that the same be paid him monthly in advance; that
judgment be entered declaring that the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is a natural
child of the testator; that the said minor, as the only natural son of the same is his
general heir; that it be held that the said testator had died without either lawful
ascendants or descendants; that the designation of heirs made under his above-
mentioned will be declared null and void; and that the defendants be sentenced to
pay the costs in case they did not conform to the complaint, with any further
remedy that the court might consider just and equitable.
The administrator, Ricardo Summers, in answer to the complaint denied
all and every one of the facts alleged in all and every one of its paragraphs.
On the 30th of September, 1905, the court below found that Emilio Escuin
y Batac was the recognized natural child of the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos,
had by Julia Batac; that the testator was also the natural son of the defendant
Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, and was recognized by his father; and
that the plaintiff minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is one of the heirs of the late
testator.
By an order of the lower court dated the 30th of October, 1906, in view of
the accounts and proposal of partition presented by the administrator of the estate,
the judge below expressed an opinion that a natural child is only entitled to one-
fourth of the hereditary property, the clause in the will being annulled only in so far
as the amount to be divided should be reduced, taking into account the share due to
the natural son and the right of the father and the widow of the testator, each to
one-half of the remainder of the property of the estate. The court approved the
account presented, but disapproved the project of partition of the hereditary
property that was objected to by one of the parties in interest. Counsel for the minor
Emilio Escuin y Batac excepted to the above resolution; a copy of the proceedings
was submitted to this court together with the appeal that was interposed.
On the 10th of July, 1907, the representatives of the administrator, and of
the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, respectively, stated in writing to the lower court
that, in view of the fact that the order of October 30, 1906, did not constitute a final
judgment of partition (since the said proposal having been rejected, another
partition should be effected by commissioners) the court was requested to appoint
commissioners to present a new project of partition in substitution for the one
presented by the administrator, the new proposal to be submitted to the court for
approval.
On the 22d of August, the attorney for the administrator filed a written
request for the appointment of said commissioners as stated above, and further
requested that the remuneration of the petitioner for his services as administrator be
fixed by the court, and that he be authorized to draw from the funds of the estate
such sum as might thus be assigned to him.
On the 24th day of the said month of August, the court below issued an
order with respect to the foregoing requests and held that, for the reasons stated in
the order, the appointment of commissioners for the mere propose of determining
what each one of the heirs should receive in accordance with the order of the 30th
of October, 1906, was not necessary, inasmuch as the property of the estate
consisted of ready money, and the administrator was thereby authorized to
distribute the funds among the heirs in the amount stated in the said order. From
this decision the representative of the minor Emilio Escuin y Batac took exception,
and to this effect presented a bill of errors together with a copy of the proceedings
for review on appeal.
While the appeal s interposed against the report and resolution of the
commissioners were still pending in the lower court, the partition of the hereditary
funds could not be ordered, notwithstanding the fact that the same consisted of
ready money, because the amount of the estate subject to division had not yet been
determined in order to comply with the law and the will of the testator.
Until all the known creditors and the legatees have been paid, it shall be
understood that the estate is under administration, says article 1026 of the Civil
Code, and in conformity with this legal provision the supreme tribunal has
established the doctrine that "only after payment of all the obligations of the estate
can the net amount divisible among the heirs be known." (Decision of March 2,
1896.)
Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure confirms the provision of the
Civil Code and the legal doctrine mentioned above, inasmuch as it provides that,
after payment of the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, and the
allowances for the expense of maintenance of the family of the deceased, the court
shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming the
persons and proportions or parts to which each is entitled, etc.
As to the aforesaid appeals from the resolution of the commissioners,
section 776 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that:
"Upon the lodging of such appeal with the clerk, the
disputed claim shall stand for trial in the same manner as any other
action in the Court of First Instance, the creditor being deemed to
be the plaintiff, and the estate the defendant, and pleadings as in
other actions shall be filed."
 So that by reason of the claims made by the creditor of the estate of Emilio legal portion of his general heir was not thereby impaired, the two former persons
Escuin de los Santos and by her natural son, duly recognized by his father, an being considered as legatees under the will.
ordinary action should have been brought before the Court of First Instance, from
The above-mentioned will is neither null, void, nor illegal in so far as the
whose judgment appeal may be taken to this court by means of the corresponding
testator leaves two-thirds of his property to his father and wife; testamentary
bill of exceptions under the provisions of section 777 of the Code of Civil provisions impairing the legal portion of a general heir shall be reduced in so far as
Procedure; and while the ultimate decision in the matter of the said claims against they are illegal or excessive. (Art. 817, Civil Code.) The partition of the property of
the resolution of the commissioners has not become final, and until all the
the said testator shall be proceeded with in accordance with the foregoing legal
obligations of the estate have been paid, there can really be no inheritance, nor can
bases.
it be distributed among the persons interested therein according to the will of the
testator, or under the provisions of the law. The record does not show that the decision of the commissioners became
final or was consented to by the parties in interest, or that this point was alleged and
The foregoing refers to the first error assigned in the certified copy of the
discussed in the first instance; therefore, such circumstance as alleged by the
proceedings and in the brief of the representative of the minor Escuin y Batac, and
appellee can not now be considered.
also to the questions of the form of procedure.
By virtue of the foregoing considerations it is our opinion that the orders
With respect to the questions which form the basis of this litigation and of the court below, of October 30, 1906, and August 24, 1907, should be reversed,
refer to the second assignment of errors, it should be noted that the late testator did
and upon receipt of a certified copy of this decision the court below shall take
not leave any legitimate descendants or ascendants, but did leave a recognized
action in accordance with the law and the terms herein contained with respect to the
natural child, the appellant minor, and a widow; that the said minor, Emilio Escuin
claims and appeals from the resolutions of the commissioners pending judicial
y Batac, is the general heir of his natural father, the said testator, who recognized
decision. So ordered.
him while living (art. 807, Civil Code), and in the present case is entitled to one-
third of his estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural child (art. ||| (Escuin y Batac v. Escuin, G.R. No. 4359, [September 24, 1908], 11 PHIL 332-340)
842 of the said code); and for the reason that the minor was ignored by his natural
father in his will, the designation of heirs made therein was, as a matter of fact
annulled by force of law, in so far as the legal portion of the said minor was thereby
impaired. Legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not illegal,
for the reason that a testator can not deprive the heirs of their legal portions, except
in the cases expressly indicated by law. (Arts. 763, 813, 814, Civil Code.)
As has been seen, the testator wished to dispose of his property in his will,
designating as heirs his natural father, Francisco Escuin, and his wife, Maria Teresa
Ponce de Leon, altogether ignoring his recognized natural child who is his general
heir. In view thereof, and for the reason that he exceeded his rights, the said
designation of heirs became void in so far as it impaired the right of his general heir
and deprived him of his legal portion; the will, however, is valid with respect to the
two-thirds of the property which the testator could freely dispose of. (Arts. 763,
764, 806, 813, 842, Civil Code.)
Notwithstanding the fact that the designation of heirs is annulled and that
the law recognizes the title of the minor, Escuin y Batac, to one-third of the
property of his natural father, as his lawful and general heir, it is not proper to
assert that the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate in order to establish
the conclusion that his said natural recognized child is entitled to succeed to the
entire estate under the provisions of article 939 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as in
accordance with the law a citizen may die partly testate and partly intestate (art.
764, Civil Code). It is clear and unquestionable that it was the wish of the testator
to favor his natural father and his wife with certain portions of his property which,
under the law, he had a right to dispose of by will, as he has done, provided the
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX
BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.
Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother,
Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in
Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay,
Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in
English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the
"southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two
parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her
desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties
(Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was
eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which
she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the
conjugal assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix
Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of
the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix
Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his
wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their
six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife
had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the
manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18,
1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect
to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973
it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973
on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the
southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate
by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his
counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its
order of October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming
to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty.
Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw
probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by
intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not only
of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal
assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the
probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate
proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice
to creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their
comments dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the
issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being
contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a
notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the
view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28,
1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate
proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its
prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on
April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's
motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion
dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of
February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the
petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter
dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they
terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for
the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated
reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The
lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared
the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not
because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which
the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial
court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if
on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with
Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs.
Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1äwphï1.ñët
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will
was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary
rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not
result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the
testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had
not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are
valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the
invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is
contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate
and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and
Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It
may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among
her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes
should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail
himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the
legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned be
paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the
other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the
provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at
most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are
compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of
the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the
conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations
prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be
adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime
should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically
valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors
and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon
the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably
divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's
will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a
part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the
partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of
the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it
expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil
Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator
erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though
not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by
whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true
that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil
Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had
assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become
valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted
as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it
preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides
that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies,
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents
annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and
devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not
produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where
the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon
the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838,
Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs.
Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is
in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be
distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if
legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties
affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972,
46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in
the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify
a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate.
So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of
the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the
purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA
754, 762).
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and
the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-
19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will
because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs.
Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to
creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record
reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if
only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims
against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly
contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a
special administrator.
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against
the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule
88, Rules of Court).

We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch
clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it
might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots
in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or
devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to
hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to
his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's
estate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside
and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed.
The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in
consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S.
GARCIA, respondents.
Benjamin H. Aquino for petitioner.
Alfredo Kallos for respondents.
MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment rendered by the former Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch
II, in Civil Case No. 3956, an action for Recognition.
On July 7, 1969, Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS), claiming to be
illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton SOLANO, filed an action for recognition against
him. In his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. On February 3, 1970, during the
pendency of the suit, SOLANO died. Petitioner ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered
substituted for the DECEDENT as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will
and Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death, in Special
Proceedings No. 842 of the same Court. ZONIA entered her formal appearance as a
"substitute defendant" on March 4, 1970 claiming additionally that she was the sole heir
of her father, SOLANO, and asking that she be allowed to assume her duties as
executrix of the probated Will with the least interference from the GARCIAS who were
"mere pretenders to be illegitimate children of SOLANO".
On April 6, 1970, the GARCIAS filed their "Reply to ZONIA's Appearance and
Supplemental Cause of Action" impugning the recognition of ZONIA as an
acknowledged natural child with the prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an
adulterous child of the DECEDENT. ZONIA did not file any responsive pleading and
the case proceeded to trial. The GARCIAS further moved for the impleading of the
SOLANO estate in addition to ZONIA, which was opposed by the latter, but which the
Trial Court granted in its Order dated April 15, 1970. 1
In the hearing of May 13, 1970, the Trial Court specified the legal issues to be treated in
the parties' respective Memoranda as: 1) the question of recognition of the GARCIAS;
2) the correct status of ZONIA, and 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of
the probated Will. 2
On July 14, 1970, the Trial Court, presided by Judge Ezequiel S. Grageda, rendered
judgment the dispositive portion of which decrees: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiffs
Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia and the defendant Sonia
Ana Tuagnon as the illegitimate children of the late Dr. Meliton
Solano under the class of ADULTEROUS CHILDREN, with all the
rights granted them by law. The institution of Sonia Ana Solano as
sole and universal heir of the said deceased in the will is hereby
declared null and void and the three (3) children shall share equally
the estate or one- third (1/3) each, without prejudice to the legacy
given to Trinidad Tuagnon and the right of any creditors of the estate.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Appealed to the Court of Appeals by ZONIA, said Court affirmed the judgment in
toto (CA-G.R. No. 49018).
ZONIA seeks a reversal of that affirmance in this petition, which was given due course.
At the outset, we should state that we are bound by the findings of fact of both the Trial
Court and the Appellate Court, particularly, the finding that the GARCIAS and ZONIA
are, in fact, illegitimate children of the DECEDENT. The oral testimony and the
documentary evidence of record inevitably point to that conclusion, as may be gleaned
from the following background facts: SOLANO, a resident of Tabaco, Albay, married
Pilar Riosa. The latter died. On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly Gorand, who
became his second wife in 1928. The union was short-lived as she left him in 1929. In
the early part of 1930, SOLANO started having amorous relations with Juana Garcia,
out of which affair was born Bienvenido Garcia on March 24, 1931 (Exhibits "A" &
"3"); and on November 3, 1935, Emeteria Garcia was born (Exhibits "B " & "2"). Their
birth certificates and baptismal certificates mention only the mother's name without the
father's name. The facts establish, however, that SOLANO during his lifetime
recognized the GARCIAS as his children by acts of support and provisions for their
education.
In 1935, SOLANO started living with Trinidad Tuagnon. Three children were born out
of this relation but only petitioner ZONIA Ana Tuagnon, born on July 26, 1941, is
living. In her Birth Certificate, her status was listed as "illegitimate"; her mother as
Trinidad Tuagnon; her father as "P.N.C. " (Exhibit "V"), or "padre no conocido".
During the Japanese occupation, SOLANO obtained a divorce from Lilly Gorand on
November 29, 1943 (Exhibits "R-1" and "S-1"). On December 22, 1943, SOLANO and
Trinidad Tuagnon executed an "Escritura de Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural"
(Exhibit "Q"; "7"), acknowledging ZONIA as a "natural child" and giving her the right
to use the name ZONIA Ana Solano y Tuagnon. The document was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar on the same date.
On January 18, 1969, SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad y Testamento" (Exhibit
"11"), instituting ZONIA as his universal heir to all his personal and real properties in
Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in the province of Albay, except for five parcels of
land in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, which were given to Trinidad Tuagnon in usufruct
Upon SOLANO's petition (Exhibit "10"), the Will was duly probated on March 10,
1969 in Special Proceedings No. 842 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II,
in a Decision also rendered by Judge Ezequiel S. Grageda (Exhibit "12").
As above stated, these facts are not in question.
Petitioner maintains, however, that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I Appearance of ZONIA ... and Supplemental Cause of Action ... "vigorously denying
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring substitute
defendant Zonia Ana Solano, now petitioner, an illegitimate child of
the late Dr. Meliton Solano in an action where private respondents, as
plaintiffs in the Court below, sought recognition as natural children of
Dr. Meliton Solano.
II
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the division of the
estate of Dr. Meliton Solano between the petitioner and private
respondents, when said estate is under the jurisdiction and control of
the probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 842.
III
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring nun and void the
institution of heir in the last will and testament of Dr. Meliton Solano,
which was duly probated in special proceedings No. 842 of the Court
of First Instance of Albay, and in concluding that total intestacy
resulted there from. 3
Directly challenged is the jurisdiction of the lower Court, in an action for recognition:
1) to declare ZONIA as an illegitimate child of SOLANO; 2) to order the division of the
estate in the same action despite the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 842; and 3) to
declare null and void the institution of heir in the Last Win and Testament of SOLANO,
which was duly probated in the same Special Proceedings No. 842, and concluding that
total intestacy resulted.
It is true that the action below was basically one for recognition. However, upon notice
of SOLANO's death, the Trial Court ordered his substitution by ZONIA, "the only
surviving heir ... as of as of now" 4 In her "Appearance of Substitute Defendant Zonia
Ana T. Solano ... Sole and Universal Heir", ZONIA specifically prayed that she be 6
allowed to assume her duties as executrix and administratrix of the probated will and
testament of the late Dr. Meliton Solano, under Special Proceedings No. 842, which is
already final and executory, with least interference from the plaintiffs (GARCIAS) who
may be classified for the moment as only pretenders to be illegitimate children". In
other words, ZONIA did not only rely upon SOLANO's Answer already of record but
asserted new rights in her capacity as sole and universal heir, "executrix and
administratrix, "and challenged the right of the GARCIAS to recognition. Thus, she was
not defending the case as a mere representative of the deceased but asserted rights and
defenses in her own personal capacity. So it was that the GARCIAS filed a "Reply to
that ZONIA was SOLANO's sole and universal heir; that ZONIA could not legally be
considered as SOLANO's acknowledged natural child because of a legal impediment;
that the admission to probate of SOLANO's Will was merely conclusive as to its due
execution; that the supposed recognition under a notarial instrument of ZONIA as an
acknowledged natural child was fraudulent and a product of misrepresentation; that
ZONIA's recognition in the Will as an acknowledged natural child is subject to
nullification and that at most ZONIA is, like them, an adulterous child of SOLANO
with Trinidad Tuagnon.
During the trial, the GARCIAS presented evidence to prove their allegations not only in
their main complaint but also in their "Reply to Appearance and Supplemental Cause of
Action". ZONIA presented no objection to the presentation by the GARCIAS of their
oral and documentary evidence and even cross-examined their witnesses. ZONIA, for
her part, presented her own testimonial and documentary evidence, denied the
relationship of the GARCIAS' to SOLANO and presented the notarial recognition in her
favor as an acknowledged natural child by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon (Exhibit
"Q"). Thus, as raised by the parties in their own pleadings and pursuant to their
respective evidence during the trial, the litigation was converted into a contest between
the GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct status as heirs and their
respective rights as such. No error was committed by either the Trial Court or the
Appellate Court, therefore, in resolving the issue of ZONIA's status.
ZONIA additionally assails the jurisdiction of the Trial Court in declaring null and void
the institution of heir in SOLANO's will; in concluding that total intestacy resulted
therefrom; and distributing the shares of the parties in SOLANO's estate when said
estate was under the jurisdiction and control of the Probate Court in Special
Proceedings No. 842.
Normally, this would be the general rule. However, a peculiar situation is thrust upon us
here. It should be recalled that SOLANO himself instituted the petition for probate of
the Will during his lifetime. That proceeding was not one to settle the estate of a
deceased person that would be deemed terminated only upon the final distribution of the
residue of the hereditary estate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have while the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the
terminated except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO's death, continued to estate.
file pleadings therein. Secondly, upon motion of the GARCIAS, and over the objection
of ZONIA, the Trial Court ordered the impleading of the estate of SOLANO and As heretofore stated, the usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the properties
proceeded on that basis. In effect, therefore, the two cases were consolidated. The indicated in the Will is valid and should be respected.
records further disclose that the action for recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) and Spec.
Procs. No. 842 were pending before the same Branch of the Court and before the same
The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., 14 reiterating the ruling in Neri, et al. vs. Akutin,
presiding Judge. Thirdly, it is settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as
et al., 15 which held that where the institution of a universal heir is null and void due to
to its due execution.5 A probate decree is not concerned with the intrinsic validity or
pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate succession ensues, is not
legality of the provisions of the Will. 6 applicable herein because in the Nuguid case, only a one-sentence Will was involved
with no other provision except the institution of the sole and universal heir; there was
Thus, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to conclude that, upon the no specification of individual property; there were no specific legacies or bequests. It
facts, the GARCIAS and ZONIA were in the same category as illegitimate children; was upon that factual setting that this Court declared: têñ.£îhqwâ£
that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a "natural child" in a notarial document executed by
SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon on December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at the
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question 'a
time of her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce
complete nullity. Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies
having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not have the legal capacity to
'the institution of heir'. Considering, however, that the will before us
contract marriage at the time of ZONIA's conception, 7 that being compulsory heirs, the
solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and
GARCIAS were, in fact, pretended from SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that
nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null." (at p.
as a result of said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null
459)
and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code. têñ.£îhqwâ£
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or legacy so that Article 854 of
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
the Civil Code, supra, applies merely annulling the "institution of heir".
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of
the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar Lastly, it should be pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and the Appellate
as they are not inofficious. ... 8 Court was never questioned before either Court. ZONIA herself had gone, without
objection, to trial on the issues raised and as defined by the Trial Court. Neither had
ZONIA assigned lack of jurisdiction of the Trial Court as an error before the Appellate
As provided in the foregoing provision, the disposition in the Will giving the usufruct in
Court. She should now be held estopped to repudiate that jurisdiction to which she had
favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, is
voluntarily submitted, after she had received an unfavorable judgment, The leading case
a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the Civil Code, 9 and should be respected in so far
of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 16 on this point, declared: têñ.£îhqwâ£
as it is not inofficious. 10
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
So also did the Trial Court have jurisdiction in resolving the issue of the hereditary
relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
shares of the GARCIAS and ZONIA. However, contrary to the conclusions of the
repudiate or question the same jurisdiction. The question whether the
Courts below, holding that the entire Will is void and intestacy ensues, the pretention of court has jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of
the GARCIAS should annul the institution of ZONIA as heir only insofar as the the parties is not because the judgment or order of the court is valid
legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid subject to that
and conclusive as an adjudication but for the reason that such practice
limitation. 11 It is a plain that the intention of the testator was to favor ZONIA with
cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy. After
certain portions of his property, which, under the law, he had a right to dispose of by
voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision
Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half (1/2)
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of. 12 Since the legitime of
power of the court.
illegitimate children consists of one half (1/2) of the hereditary estate, 13 the GARCIAS
and ZONIA each have a right to participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3)
each. ZONIA's hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in that the hereditary
share in the estate of the decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T. Solano is hereby declared
to be (1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate, while that of private respondents,
Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia, shall each be (1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the
estate. The usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon shall be respected. The judgment is
affirmed in all other respects. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division),
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108)
ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its
Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners
herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent
Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII
(Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to
costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain
and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died
leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his
sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27)
with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of
debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of
the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house,
lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson
shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino,
widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko
Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased
me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and
here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to
his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura,
Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591
ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors
(respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased
and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio
Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition
for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6).
Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the
Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy
under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring
into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it
cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to
probate;
 (C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be
admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the
New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct
line," and does not apply to private respondents who are not
compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says
will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that
suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would
give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a
definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly
expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing
to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will
of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is
therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA
450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated
otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even
if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil
code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A.
Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner
(.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and
preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto
en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not
result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification
of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the
will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in
clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation
(Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the
whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his
brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily,
the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in
a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who
has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there
being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of
personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of
the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of
the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the
deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva,
110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan
Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138
SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not
available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v.
Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave
abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is
founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137
[1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent
Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to
rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid,
17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno
v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v.
Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a
complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court
said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case
will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense,
plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce
us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists
a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by
the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the
proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in
connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed
the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright.
Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court
should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21,
1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to
be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the
case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that
one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in
futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of
certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v.
Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the
Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari
may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate
relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985
and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. PABLO and BASILIO
SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as
required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance
of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of
Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26
centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and
decided in a single judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22,
1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881,
and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,
1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed
through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title
whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan - that is, two uncles german of Pedro
Sablan - appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things:
Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law
to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11,
12.)chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed
through a bill of exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question
partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case
application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two
uncles of Pedro Sablan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of
error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are
required by law to be reserved - a contention we regard as
indefensible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by
inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan,
likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by
inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having
been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his
brothers. These are admitted facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil
Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives;
and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third
degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired
without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded.
(Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of
land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration - that is, by inheritance
from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of
law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial
court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is
therefore in accordance with the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question
have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a
valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to
reserved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first
instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that
"Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the
Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which
the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents'
renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p.
49).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the
applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried
and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection
on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his
mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935
of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants
shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these
lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case
presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the
son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption
is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and
not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.)
All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied
with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his
property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what
he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the
hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose
of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code,
art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be
reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's
inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that
article 811 of the Civil Code says.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject
matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party
has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of
her son.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be
admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by
operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired
by operation of law - that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this
presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was
acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible - that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes
to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces
it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at
the trial:chanrobles virtual law library
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to
my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about
making delivery of them. (p. 91).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that
Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it
cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such
lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong
to her and must be delivered to her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action.
The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring
fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the
right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage
Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of
section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved
by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are.
Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted
from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be
reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who
are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are
entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the
property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry;
but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here
that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be
reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property
registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the
record).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the
applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the
effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has
prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required by
law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code,
which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the
Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that
from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently
of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the
country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July,
1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has
operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in
whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding
the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due
time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right
itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory
obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth
allegations.)chanrobles virtual law library
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which
the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has
prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the
first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be
registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in
the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the
allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate
subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief
disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place
here.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one
of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the
Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the
modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the
Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of
the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the
eight day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil
Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:chanrobles virtual law library
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a
seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the
first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the
deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a
valuable consideration."chanrobles virtual law library
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on
December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved
by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those
laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in
favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second
marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set
forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure
the right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who
contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the
right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same
in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive
circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances
in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section
that deals in general with property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to
the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle
of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to
that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the
supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and
978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are
applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists
and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are
found."chanrobles virtual law library
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July,
1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons
entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must
make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and
978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has
married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the
property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right
reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty,
under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of
what is validly alienated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the
Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the
applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and
guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision
of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read
thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved,
if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally
represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must
be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article
(relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article
199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:chanrobles virtual law library
1. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the
period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the
mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved,
has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by
noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the
Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the
right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the
reservation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court
the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may
demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person
obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."chanrobles
virtual law library
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case
of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be
instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the
inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has
elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they
are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."chanrobles virtual law
library
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by
prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement
thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if
the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons
entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription
against the exercise of such right of action cannot be
sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action
for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as
the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in
accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of
action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with reference to
instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the
property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case,
to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents
for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of
land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because
of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the
two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in
the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of,
and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete
ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will
have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct
title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first
two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple - that is,
the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct
expires, will come into full ownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation
of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title
belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the
person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in
whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem
to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court
of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22,
1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points - the usufruct and the
fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become
obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things:
that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys
for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)chanrobles virtual law library
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be
maintained - that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make
the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants
immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." ( Ibid.,
238.)chanrobles virtual law library
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by
operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him
exclusively - use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is
inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within
the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should
be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property
proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and
scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights
that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in
reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of
the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it
does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the
rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference
between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as
usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in
article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the
slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner
and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any
act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of
usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act
of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the
Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the
property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by
article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the former
from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it
from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or
of recovery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve
the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her
death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a
condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive."chanrobles virtual law library
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation
thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and
without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation
subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties
interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the
right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition
subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the
right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right
should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would
be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the
law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the
alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to
the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition,
because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist,
according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the
reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving
spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of
the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants
must make the reservation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,
" Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be
reserved," in these words:chanrobles virtual law library
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by
law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after
the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an
expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that
expectation to their heirs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things
according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon
the article of the Code referring to use and
usufruct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the
owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in
article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion
General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and
975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal
in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with
the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than
the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject
to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the
Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil
Code, VI, 270.)chanrobles virtual law library
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or
not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such
relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If
they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the
possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the
ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate
what he has and nothing more because no one can give what does not belong to him,
and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within
the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the
ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are
also within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve the right
has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be
reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the
usufruct have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. ( Morell, Estudios sobre
bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond
any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set
forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he
has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved,
and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover
it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although
a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under
a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved
has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can
do.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually,
constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no
title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the
hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them
will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in
the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of
aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is
reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of
even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be
null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30,
1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at
the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right
required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become
absolute should that person die."chanrobles virtual law library
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter
vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in
whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights
inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the
third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring
a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of
disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of
the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to
him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a
family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise
have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)chanrobles virtual law library
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the
condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot
attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be
reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of
land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her
is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the
Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be
reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in
alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an
incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple
is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the
institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish
of the predecessor in interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and
declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land
which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right
required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan
and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in
ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to
usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a
condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:chanrobles virtual law
library

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition
subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of
the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be
made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land
be recorded, as the law provides?chanrobles virtual law library

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the
vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)

If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he
has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a
condition subsequent annexed - that the alienation the purchaser may make will be
terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which
says:chanrobles virtual law library

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right
to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever
more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the
vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition
subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in
the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged - that is to say, the latter with the
consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate
the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry
that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to
be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is
reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law
would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the reservation the
provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in
his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
G.R. No. L-12957 March 24, 1961
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void
the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants
Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3)
ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00
as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge
or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang
in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the
ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter
thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of
appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession
thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and
counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as
the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been
registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana
on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
(1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff
spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance
prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the
same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the
reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the
death of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the
costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the
sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that
Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he
had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second
wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral
records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death — the date of
which does not clearly appear of record — were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366
to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to
Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral
proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in
the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother
administered the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs
A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco
died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother,
as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of
the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said
vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of
Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 — which was in their possession — the latter
refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record
No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the
surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their
name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and
thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141
(Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in
question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from
his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it
was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under
obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this
connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving
her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates
two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and
(2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934).
This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title
and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is
like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but
subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista
(Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the
alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was
still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the
former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property
subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to
a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within
the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit
conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the
present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang,
the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the
reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her
and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the
resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so
far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso,
because the vendees — the Esparcia spouses did — not appeal therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision — as above modified — is affirmed, with costs,

and without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have
against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon
Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the surname
Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino;
for Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes,
Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson,
guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging as
follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that
during the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion,
Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon;
that on becoming a widower he married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with
whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de
Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was
survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above
mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of March
1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan,
Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that
Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the
deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of
Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and
Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will
before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his
aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz
de Leon; that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should
be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino
III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the
complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay,
some personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891;
that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the
complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a
will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino;
that, as such heir, said daughter took possession of all the property left at the death of
her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property, described
in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son,
the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said
Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands
described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said
complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described
therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in
paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to
deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that without any justifiable
motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for
its value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the
lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn
at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of
fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in
addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the
fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they
pray it be declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the
plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned
in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes
Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the
property in question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value; and
that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000)
together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause
of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the
property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in
turn, inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no
allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the widow Severina Faz de Leon did
not remarry after the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right
claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following articles,
but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the provisions of
the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those
extraneous to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the
widow Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon
(property which originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the
hands of the defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common
ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of the posthumos
son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his mother
Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said
property having been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother
(Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case
because, when the defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded
to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz de
Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the character of
reservable property — there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with
the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the
law whereby said property may not passed into the possession of strangers are void,
inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino
is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is
no property reserved for the plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the
property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that
the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime; that in the
instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the legitime
of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property
could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her forced
heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain
of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor
of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to
succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother,
although the said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there would be
injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as violation of
section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal
protection. Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the
plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the
defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a
new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the
corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the
clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of
the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their complaint within the
period prescribed by the rules — undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not
alter nor change the facts constituting the cause of action, and that, as both parties were
agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in the demurrer, every question
reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the decision of the court — the
said judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by
absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay
the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the
complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on the
ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action.
However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby making an end to the
cause, instead of dismissing the same, because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the
controversy between the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer
would be the same which the defendants would allege in their answer — those dealing
with a mere question of law which the courts would have to decide — and that, the
demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist — they could do no less
— upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another
demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with
costs against the plaintiffs — in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case
that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary — as
in this case what has been done does not prejudice the parties — the appellate court will
now proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to the
legal provisions applicable to the question of law in controversy so that unnecessary
delay and greater expense may be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary
proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and
terms that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for
its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor,
the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is
applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine
whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the nature of
reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the provision of the Civil
Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino) who inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after
the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve
same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son
Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
 Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the
latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two
children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino
III (born after the death of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under
a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he left, one of whom, the
posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the aforementioned property
enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III
died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited
the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole
heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took
possession of all property left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included
in said inheritance is the property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of
the said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to her only
daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not
lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the
litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by
same (by operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de
Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his
brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father,
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of
the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives,
within the third degree, of the line from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property,
but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the
obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the
death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the nature of the line
from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said property in fact and by
operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) —
said property reverts to said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the
death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios (person for
whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant
from whom the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living,
within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a
fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of
his own property which is not reservable property and which constitutes his legitime,
according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within
the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby
converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his
legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios,
who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such property
came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives
of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees
can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one
alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship,
nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within
the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person
from whom the reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said
deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with article 811 of
the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion,
Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are
both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son,
Jose Florentino; that the same have the right to represent their aforementioned father,
Jose Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate
children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother;
and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their
legitimate father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other children of the
first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that
this decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at
the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II,
to wit, his three children of his first marriage — Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his
three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve
children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All
of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino
III, within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining
twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first
four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are
such by representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the
property which came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio
Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his
legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge
refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants,
absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely
inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes Florentino
survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property came and her
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II;
that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is
likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her
mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the
fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as
the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of
strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs
of the right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into
existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil
Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the
plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable
right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which exclusively belongs to the
defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the precept of article 813 of the same
Code which provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except
in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden,
condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the
usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in
determining whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son
of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of reservable
property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came,
without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and
when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of law
into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable
property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object
that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of person other than those comprehended within the
order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said
property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and condition of
reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio
III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the right of
usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return
it as such reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree,
among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the
ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not
form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes
his own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died
(reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own
property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress.
But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property received
from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the
other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is
unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the
right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to
the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by
operation of law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz
de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime pertaining
to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive
property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant
Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the order of
legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within
the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes
Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been
reduced and impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case
in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she
is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there being no lawful or just reason
which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives,
within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property in question. As these
relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find
any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they
should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter
Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the character,
previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina,
therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives within the third
degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has
been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by the aforementioned
Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by
her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced
heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her obligation to
reserve the property which she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the
character of reservable property, held before the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took
possession of the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of strangers.
But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is
no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the
other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within the third degree in
accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of
portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the
plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the
complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17,
1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh part should go to the
defendant Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision
appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property,
inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is
reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III
within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the
defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter,
together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-
sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of the quantity
claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one
thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings
as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.

From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme
Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and
consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.

Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the
legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is expressly
respected in this decision.

However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not
been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and
was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third
degree of the person from whom same came; that said property, upon passing into the
hands of the forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the
former; and that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an
exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her
relatives within the third degree of certain portions thereof.

Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the
delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no evidence
of any damage which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the
second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the principal part of the
G. R. No. L-11960
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna
in its Special Proceedings No. 4551.
The facts are simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during
his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom they named
Manuel Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing; he had two children named
Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated
in Special Proceedings No, 664 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he
bequeathed his properties among his children, Manuel, Candelaria and Fortunato, and
his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the probate proceedings, Fortunate was
adjudicated four parcels of land covered under Decree No. 25960 issued In Land
Registration Case No. 86 G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of this appeal.
Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will; and
not having any issue, the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother,
Benita Garing. She applied for and later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her
name, but subject to the condition that the properties were reservable in favor of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, in
accordance with the applicable provision of law, under a decree of the court dated
August 25, 1916, in Land Registration Case No. G. L. R. O. No. 10818.
On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four
legitimate children, the appellants herein, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all
surnamed Baldovino, Six years later, on October 6, 1940, Manuel Padura also died.
Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco,
Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15, 1952, appellants and
appellees took possession of the reservable properties. In a resolution, dated August 1,
1953, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings No. 4551, the
legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were
declared to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties
(the original reserveess Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura, having predeceased
the reservista). The instant petition, dated October 22, 1956, filed by appellants
Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned, such that one-half of the same be
adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they
inherit by right of representation from their respective parents, the original
reservees. To this petition, appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they should
all (the eleven reservees) be deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they
claim, each should have an equal share.
Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered judgment declaring all
the reservees (without distinction) "co-owners, pro-indiviso, equal shares of the parcels
of land" subject matter of the suit.
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal,
where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the
line of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the
half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved
properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole
blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of the property
under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of 1889)
the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share twice as large as
that of the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.
"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers
and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the
latter.(949)n
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per
capita or per stripes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of
the full blood, (951)"
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the
subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the appellants
is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of
the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant (reservista). To this end, the Code provides:
"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came. (811)"
It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in the law of
Castile. The President of the Spanish Code Commission, D. Manuel Alonso Martinez,
explained the motives for the formulation of the reserva troncal in the Civil Code of
1889 in his book "El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con las Legislaciones Forales"
(Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226-228, 233-235) in the following words:
"La base cuarta, á más de estar en pugna con la legislacion española, es una desviacion
del antiguo derecho romano y del moderno derecho europeo, perfectamente conformes
ambos con el tradicional sistema de Castilla. En qué se fundó, pues, la Comision para
semejante novedad? Que razones pudieron moverla á establecer la sucesion lineal,
separándose del cáuce secular?
"Lo diré en breves frases. Hay un case, no del todo raro, que subleva el sentimiento de
cuantos lo imaginan ó lo ven: el hijo mayor de un magnate sucede á su padre en la
mitad Integra de pingues mayorazgos, tocando á sus hermanos un lote modestisimo en
la division de la herencia paterna; aquel hijo se casa y fallece al poco tiempo dejando un
tierno vástago; la viuda, todavia jóven, contrae segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de
perder al hijo del primer matrimonio heredando toda su fortuna con exclusion de la
madre y los hermanos de su primer marido. No hay para qué decir que, si hay
descendientes del segundo matrimonio, á ellos se trasmite en su dia la hereticia. Por
donde resulta el irritante espectáculo de que los vástagos directos del magnate viven en
la estrechez y tal vez en la miseria, mientras gozan de su rico patrimonio personas
extrañas á su familia y que, por un órden natural, la son profundamente antipáticas. Esta
hipótesis se puede realizar y se realize, aunque por lo general en menor escala, entre
propietarios, banqueros é industriales. labradores y comerciantes, sin necesidad de
vinculaciones ni titulos nobiliarios.
"Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocupó vivamente de esto, considerando el
principio de familia como superior al del afecto presumible del difunto. A esta
impresion obedecia la propuesta del Sr. Garcia Goyena, para que á los ascendientes se
les diera su legitima tan sólo en usufructo: en idéntica razon se apoyaba el Sr. Franco
para pedir con insistencia se declarase que, si un ascendiente tenia hecha una donacion á
su descendiente, bien fuese al contraer matrinionio ó bien con cualquiera otro motivo, y
muriese el donatario sin sucesion, volvieran los bienes donados al donante, sin perjuicio
de la legitima que pudiera corresponderle en su calidad de ascendiente. La Comision no
se atrevió a ir tan allá como estos dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para eludir las consecuencias
que á las veces produce el principio de la proximidad del parentesco y que he puesto de
relieve poco há, proclamó, no sin vacilar, la doctrina de la sucesion lineal." (pp.226-
227)
"Y este fué el temperamento que, por indicacion mia, adoptó la Comision Codificadora,
norabrando una Sub-comision que redactara las bases é que habia de sujetarse esta
especie de reversion de los bienes inmuebles al tronco de donde procedan, lo mismo en
la sucesion testamentaria que en la intestada, sin perjuicio del derecho sacratisimo de
los padres al disfrute de la herencia de sus hijos malogrados prematuramente.
"Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres. Durán y Bás y Franco como defensores del
régimen f oral, y de los Sres. Manresa y Garcia Goyena en representacion de la
legislacion castellana, sometieron á la deliberacion de la Comision Codificadora la
proposicion siguiente:
'El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por
titulo lucrativo de_ otro ascendiente ó de un hermano, se halla obligado á reservar los
que hubiese adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes del difunto que
se hallaran comprendidos dentro del tercer grado y que lo sean por la parte de donde
proceden los bienes.'
"No voy á discutir ahora si esta fórmula es más ó ménos feliz, y si debe aprobarse tal
cual está redactada ó si há menester de enmienda ó adicion. Aplazo este examen para
cuando trate de la sucesion intestada, á la cual tiene mayor aplicacion. Por el momento
me limito á reconocer. primero: que con esta base desaparece el peligro de que bienes
poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente y á titulo gratuito á manos
extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y de muertes prematuras; segundo: que sin negar que
sea una novedad esta base del derecho de Castllla, tiene en rigor en su abono la
autoridad de los Códigos más niveladores y el ejemplo de las naciones más
democráticas de Europe, si no en la extension en que lo presenta la Comision
Codificadora, á lo ménos en el principio generador de la reforma." (pp.233-235)
The stated purpose o£ the reserva is accomplished once property has devolved to the
specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further
occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the
same degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective
share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of
intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has
resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should
pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the
descendant (prepositus) , excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree
(Florentine vs. Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los
Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
"Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
re1atives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never
be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one
alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios
who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x." (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) (see also Nieva and Alacala vs.
Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share
double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of
the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews
are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood
should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the
individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is
strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its
application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the
law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
"creándose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino más
bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepción mientras fuere
necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas
generales y fundamentals del Código en materia de sucesión, en aquellos extremos no
resueltos de un raodo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accián de la
reserva que se crea."
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of
the reserve viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980).
There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservista's lifetime,
the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the
right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their
reversionary right: and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in
the Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar,
Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is incompatible with the
mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise
clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not
dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona,
58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservist, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to
the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Torao 2,
p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) Had the nephews of
whole and half-blood succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would
undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood (Arts. 1008 and
1006, jam cit.) Why then should the latter receive equal shares simply because the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The
decedent (causante) the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is no cogent
reason why the hereditary portions should vary.
It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by
distinguished commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Román
(Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p. 1008) and Mucius Scaevola (Código Civil, Vol 14, p.
342). The reason given by these authors is that the reservatarios are called by law to
take the reservable property because they belong to the line of origin; and not because
of their relationship. But the argument, if logically pursued, would lead to the
conclusion that the property should pass to any and all the reservatarios, as a class, and
in equal shares, regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the thesis of Scaevola,
that later became known as the theory of reserva integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332
et seq.). But, as we have seen, the Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have
rejected that view, and consider that the reservable property should be succeeded by
the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules of intestacy. The
refutation of the trial court's position is found in the following, passage of Manresa's
Commentaries (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 346):
"A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el articulo 811 es un derecho propio que
nace de la mera calidad de pariente; no un derecho que se adquiere por sucesión.
Ciertamente, el derecho se concede a los parientes lineales dentro del tercer grado; pero
se les concede con motivo de la muerte de un descendiente y en la sucesión de este.
Ellos suceden por la procedencia especial de los bienes después de ser éstos disfrutados
por el ascendiente; pero suceden a titulo lucrativo y por causa de muerte y ministerio de
la ley, lo cual es dificil poderlo negar. Hasta podrlan estimarse esos parientes
legitimarios o herederos forzosos, como el mismo autor reconoce en otro lugar de su
obra. De modo que este argumento no es convincente."
All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a minimum
the alterations introduced by the reserva in the basic rules of succession mortis causa.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set aside, and
the reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood. Let the records be remanded to
the court below for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
So Ordered.
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS
CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V
and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the
complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al.
vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la
Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy
Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias
Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first
marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated
January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No.
399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la
Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second
marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio
Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the
Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as
owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without
any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-
indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la
Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share
of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering
the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de
la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line
except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A,
the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and
Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua,
also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a
distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the
respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but
which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a
reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval
troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as
administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of
petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line
from which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was
acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous
title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by
another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all
of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias
Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue;
his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion
de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third
degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios
Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the
petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva
troncal — whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his
father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court
said:
 It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property
in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito
Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the
legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from
Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot
in question is not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the
New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question
is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As
explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva,
44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or
be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing
any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property
gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino
commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any
prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in
question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose
Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true
that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816
which estates in express terms;
2. — Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la
Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor
de edad, todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental,
I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas
propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la
Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y
cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales
pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of
New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos
resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of
P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not
personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order
of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the
transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the
deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it
does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua,
to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change
the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the
lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the
respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition
based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the
supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that
the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents'
answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931
of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private
respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua
has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and
Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the testamentary
heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be
made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of
partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of
the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any
issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-
indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the property
was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within
the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are
the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399
which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was
filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners
herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de
la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to
recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared
owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering
Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new
Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion;
Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua,
1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F.
LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA
LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD
F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE
LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages
and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena
Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are
as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June
17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children:
four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named
Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned
in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his
deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole
heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to
herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a
credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a
1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason &
Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance
Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to
80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of
deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201,
48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry
of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of
deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in
TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No.
41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and
improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and
48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the
Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of
deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of
adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as
co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein
she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the
children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The
document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
A mis hijos :
 Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y
Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y
tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente
comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que
yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa;
proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda
Races. 1äwphï1.ñët
(Sgd.)
FILOMENA
ROCES
LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six
surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the
estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their
father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on
May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground
that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena
Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro
and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito
F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968
an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her
mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are
reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to
her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal
under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower
court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error
contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate
of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares
in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs.
Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by
estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs.
Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of
December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the
petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under
undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only
the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the
only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual
matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those
issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article
891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion
of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her
daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees
in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the
second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt
was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the
applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent
rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also
called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting
on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion
legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from
being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation
(which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to
discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which
situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented
agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship,
is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission,
restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan
Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article
891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que
este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un
hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por
ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del
tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by
another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant,
and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title
(inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or
legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another
ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation,
and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation)
from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or
sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th
Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia
Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the
death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his
maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of
article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from
whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2)
the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by
operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and
for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil.
1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31,
1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor,
72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos
secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por
el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide
personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado
en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs.
Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that
case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died
in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the
two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The
reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan,
the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name
but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law,
should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share
of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When
Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto
Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt
was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto
Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista
Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the
line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil.
480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang
and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs.
Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil.
322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186,
190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia
Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his
hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person
entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her
nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They
cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives
within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule
of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and
relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives
nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil.
186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant
obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to
the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership
of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480:
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de
retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,
meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of
the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46
Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His
expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become
absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require
that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs.
Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil.
944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property
is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo,
58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and
dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to
the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to
have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property.
(J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
 Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the
ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to
prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their
reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the
annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the
(reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds
to the natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the
reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may
not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios
existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the
descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes
in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in
the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree
of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey
the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third
degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second
degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is
already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of
the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable
properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable
property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That
testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of
ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of
another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's
lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said
property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an
inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery
to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest
(prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot
part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife
Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two
inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties
were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her
daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her
deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon
and the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes
Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de
Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father
Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be
disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by
this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of
Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of
the properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six
reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case
the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the
reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the
reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor
cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only
relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased
ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have
survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to
the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent
persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that
would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the
reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored
the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by
the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the
daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the
prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one
reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that
the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded
upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the
reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in
her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives
within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of
Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second
degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the
reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis
causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs.
Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the
non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of
the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree
relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the
absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death,
there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said
properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal
and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not
form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby
adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her
daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable
properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F.
Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective
heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and
JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the
following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and
the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's
grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-
Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who
had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and
great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the parties
is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an
integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate
sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by
her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children,
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D,
Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels
of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived
by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them
plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad
Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as
Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late
Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco,
the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate
children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single
and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the
seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio
Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property
subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the
Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate,
and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned
were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving
husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now
owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-
Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal
advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon
upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said
claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-
indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said
parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in
this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in
 question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the
one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio
Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4)
of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven
(7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals
collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko
Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the
rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and
have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and
in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they
hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other
than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this
Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties,
the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-
indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land
involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to
three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the
defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said
parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes
corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties
expressly waived all their claims against each other for damages
including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal
interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court renders judgment
adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-
64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby
ordered to make an accounting of all rents received by her on the
properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining the
legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in
the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the
lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate
line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of
the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and
should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the
line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be
controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to
a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with
Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case
of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving
the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the
descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and
the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved
properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews
of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews
of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva
troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line
from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property
has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from
this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the
relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree
there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit
the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that
upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino,
40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol.
20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor
of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when
there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right
of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to
him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation
cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are
within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does
not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on
the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the
third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also
Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers
and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of
the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of
representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share
for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise
operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since
Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened
by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its
application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish
the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries
(Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas
generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en
aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan
fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the
new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as
exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and
the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate
succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as
aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded
from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to
him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where
Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews
and nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters
of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per
stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also
and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that
immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus,
Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or
nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the
surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters
and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving
spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or
widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the
spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the
latter vis a vis the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to
the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from
the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries,
Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy
proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary where the final
decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over
property subject to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter's rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests
upon the assumption that the reservatario win succeed in, or inherit,
the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is
the reservable property part of the reservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be
deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable
property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee
in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is
no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for
the debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt
that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under
the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain
simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of
the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving
rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-
appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary
property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and
the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24750 May 16, 1980
DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and
GLICERIA ABRENICA, petitioners,
vs.
PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA MIRANO, JUANA MIRANO and
MARCIANO MIRANO, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Recto Law Office for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on April 12, 1965 1 in CA G.R. No. 23597-R, entitled "Primitive Mirano,
et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus, Doroteo Banawa, et al., Defendants-Appellants", the
dispositive part of which is: têñ.£îhqwâ£
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed,
with costs against defendants-appellants.
The judgment of the lower court which was affirmed reads as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the two parcels of land
described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
(b) Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the said
parcels of land to the plaintiffs;
(c) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Roman Biscocho, Paula
Biscocho and Maria Carmen Mendoza in favor of Doroteo Banawa
and Juliana Mendoza, dated April 4, 1940, as evidenced by Exhibit 'E'
and its registration in the registry of deeds of Batangas, to be null and
void;
(d) Declaring null and void the deed of donation, dated August 7,
1956, evidenced by Exhibit 'D' executed by the spouses Doroteo
Banawa and Juliana Mendoza in favor of the spouses Casiano
Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica as well as Tax Declarations No.
26818 in the names of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza, and No. 26845 in the names of the spouses Casiano
Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica, and the registration of the said deed
of donation in the registry of deeds of Batangas; and
(e) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages in
the amount of P 4,500 and attorney's fees in the amount of P500.00,
and the costs of this action.
SO ORDERED. 2
The spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza both died during the pendency of
this case in the Court of Appeals. They have been substituted by the petitioners Casiano
Amponin and his wife Gliceria Abrenica, legally adopted daughter of one of the
deceased petitioners and donee of the Carsuche property. 3
The petitioners filed on May 20, 1965, a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Said motion was denied on June 28, 1965. 4
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts are: têñ.£îhqwâ£
It appears that sometime in 1911, Maria Mirano a niece of appellant
Juliana Mendoza, and who was then about nine years old, was taken
in by the appellants-spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza,
in the latter's house in Mahabang Lodlod, Taal, Batangas. Appellants
spouses being childless, treated and reared her up like their own child.
They hired a private tutor to teach her the rudiments of reading,
writing and arithmetic. They supported her, gave her money, clothes
and even jewelry. Maria reciprocated their care and affection by
helping with the household chores.
A few years later, the spouses opened up a store for general
merchandise in barrio Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon, from which they
derived considerable income and which enabled them to acquire
several parcels of land.
On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died in Taal,
Batangas while still living with the spouses. At the time of her death
she left as her only nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs, namely
Primitiva Mirano, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and
Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are the children of a deceased
brother, Martin Mirano.
The parties do not dispute the Identity of the two parcels of land in
controversy, which are described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
1. A parcel of sugar land situated in the Barrio of
Iba, Taal, Batangas, with an area of 44,200 square
meters, more or less. Bounded on the North, by
Ravine; on the East, by the property of Leodovico
Garcia; on the South by the property of Gregorio
Amponin; and on the West, by the property of
Gregorio Maria Aniversario (now Doroteo
Banawa). Under Tax Declaration No. 25994 in the
name of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2,210.00.
2. A parcel of sugar land situated in the barrio of
Carsuche, Taal, Batangas, with an area of 54,093
square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North,
by the property of Agapito Aro and Alley; on the
East, by an Alley; on the South, by the properties of
Filomeno Diomampo, Gregorio de la Rosa and
Andres Moratilla; and on the West, by the property
of Agapito Aro. Under Tax Declaration No. 19786
in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at
P2,760.00.
For purposes of clearness and convenience, and since the respective
assertions and evidences adduced by the parties regarding the two
parcels of land are in sharp divergence, we shall refer to the first
parcel as the Iba Property and to the second parcel as the Carsuche
property and, moreover, we shall treat and discuss the two separately.
Parcel 1, or the Iba Property.
The parties agree that the Iba Property was originally owned by
Placido Punzalan from whom it was acquired on May 5, 1921.
Plaintiffs' evidence upon this point tends to show that the acquisition
of the said parcel of land was pursuant to a deed of sale contained in a
public instrument acknowledged before Notary Public Ramon A.
Cabrera on the date aforesaid, a photostatic copy of which was
introduced in evidence as Exhibit 'A', the same having been secured
from an original copy on file with the Division of Archives, Bureau of
Libraries. The deed of sale in question states that the Iba property
consisted formerly of two parcels of land and that they were sold for
the amount of P2,000.00 in favor of Maria Mirano. Defendant
Doroteo Banawa impliedly admitted the execution of this notarial
document when he declared that in the execution of the document
concerning the purchase of the Iba property from Punzalan the notary
public charged him P20.00 and another P5.00 for stamps in the name
of Maria Mirano since 1923 (Exhs. 'A-1' to 'A-7').
By contrast, defendants' claim of ownership over the Iba property is
predicated upon their assertion that the money used in buying said
land pertained to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
Defendants contend that since 1919 Placido Punzalan borrowed
money from defendant spouses on three different occasions for the
sums of P1,200.00, P1,800.00 and P1,080.00, respectively, each of
which was evidenced by Exhs. '1', '2', and '3', respectively. Upon the
failure of Placido Punzalan to discharge said obligations in 1921, he
agreed to sell the land aforementioned to the spouses for P 3,700.00,
but as the total value of the three loans was P4,080.00, Punzalan had
to reimburse to said spouses the difference of P380.00. The document
of sale stated the price to be only P2,000.00 in view of the fact that
Doroteo Banawa had only P25.00 with him when the deed was
prepared by the notary public, and the latter was charging P10.00 for
every one thousand pesos mentioned as the consideration of the
contract, Defendants likewise maintain that the sale was made to
appear in favor of Maria Mirano because said spouses being already
old, they want to leave something to Maria Mirano for her to lean
upon when they would have been gone. They, however, made Maria
understand that although the property was placed under her name,
they would continue to be the owners thereof, to administer and enjoy
the fruits of the same as long as they live, and that she would become
the owner of the land only after their death. Maria supposedly
expressed her conformity to and appreciation for the said
arrangement. Maria Mirano was 19 years old when the deed of sale
was executed.
Parcel 2, or the Carsuche Property.
There is no dispute between the parties that the Carsuche property
was acquired by way of purchase from its original owners, to wit:
Roman Biscocho, his sister Paula Biscocho, and sister-in-law Carmen
Mendoza. The sale took place sometime in December, 1935. There is,
however, a sharp conflict of evidence between the parties concerning
the form of the document evidencing the same and in whose favor the
sale was made at that time. The plaintiffs claim that the sale was
evidenced by a public instrument executed before and ratified by
Notary Public Vicente Ilagan of Taal, Batangas, and that the vendee
mentioned in the said document was Maria Mirano. The defendants,
on the other hand, assert that the sale was evidenced by a private
writing prepared in the handwriting of Roman Biscocho and that it
 was in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
Neither the public instrument allegedly ratified by Atty. Ilagan nor the
private writing supposedly prepared by Roman Biscocho was
presented before the lower court.
After laying the proper predicate for the presentation of secondary
evidence, the plaintiffs presented Atty. Vicente Ilagan and Roman
Biscocho to testify upon the execution of the aforesaid public
instrument in December, 1935. These two declared that sometime in
December, 1935, the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza,
Maria Mirano, Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Carmen
Mendoza, accompanied by Atty. Regino Aro, went to the office of
Atty. Ilagan in Taal, Batangas; that Atty. Aro, who was a classmate of
Atty. Ilagan in the law school, asked the latter's permission to use his
typewriter on which he prepared a document in English and which he
asked Atty. Ilagan to ratify; that Atty. Ilagan translated into Tagalog
the contents of the said document to the parties and. the witnesses,
after which they all signed the same; that the document involved the
sale of the Carsuche property in favor of Maria Mirano: that after
paying him P20.00 for his services which Atty. Ilagan would not
accept at first, Doroteo Banawa asked Atty. Ilagan in Tagalog
whether the document that he ratified was 'strong enough' (Matibay)
to safeguard the rights of Maria Mirano, to which Atty. Ilagan
answered in the affirmative.
Doroteo Banawa, on the other hand, stated that on being offered the
Carsuche property by the owners thereof, they agreed on the purchase
price of P3,700.00 of which a down payment of P1,200.00 was made
and, later, an additional sum of P100.00 was given to Roman
Biscocho, both payments being evidenced by a receipt dated
December 15, 1936 (Exh. '9'). A few days later, Roman Biscocho
prepared in his own handwriting a private document selling the
Carsuche property in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and
Juliana Mendoza for the sum of P4,000.00, the vendors having asked
for a P300.00 increase in price. Doroteo Banawa, thereafter brought
said private document to the municipal treasurer of Taal, Batangas, to
whom he expressed the desire to have the land declared in the name
of Maria Mirano so that the latter might attend to the payment of
taxes over the land whenever he was away. This wish of Doroteo
Banawa was done by his thumb-marking an affidavit, thus accounting
for the fact that said land appears in the name of Maria Mirano in the
tax declarations covering the same from 1934 to 1956. 5
The petitioners assign the following errors: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
LAW IN RULING THAT THE PLACING OF IBA PROPERTY IN
THE NAME OF THE LATE MARIA MIRANO WAS IN THE
NATURE OF A DONATION INTER-VIVOS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF
ARTICLE 632 OF THE OLD CIVIL CODE IS TOO LITERAL AND
IGNORES THE RATIONALE OF THE LEGAL PROVISION.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
LAW IN RULING THAT THE 'EXCEPTIVE' CLAUSE' OF
ARTICLE 1448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE IN THE
PRESENT CASE.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
LAW IN RULING THAT SECTION 5, RULE 100 OF THE OLD
RULES OF COURT DOES NOT APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE
BECAUSE MARIA MIRANO WAS NOT LEGALLY ADOPTED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
LAW IN RULING WITH RESPECT TO THE CARSUCHE
PROPERTY (LOT NO. 2) THAT THE DEED OF SALE
EXECUTED IN 1940 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS
DOROTEO BANAWA AND HIS WIFE JULIANA MENDOZA
AND WHICH WAS DULY REGISTERED DID NOT IMPAIR THE
PRETENDED SALE TO MARIA MIRANO. 6
The first, second, third and fourth errors assigned refer to the Iba property, parcel 1,
while the fifth error assigned refers to the Carsuche property, Lot 2. 7
As may be discerned from the assignment of errors, the basic issue is the ownership of
the two parcels of land in question. The plaintiffs appellees, respondents herein, assert
title to the lands as heirs of Maria Mirano. Defendants-appellants, petitioners herein,
claim ownership over them by virtue of purchase from the original owners.
Considering that in the case at bar the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not
contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by this Court of said findings is not
necessary. In Tolentino vs. de Jesus, et al., 8 this Court held: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and on this Court (Tamayo vs. Callejo, L-
25563, July 28, 1972, 46 SCRA 27; Nery, et al. vs. Lorenzo, et al., L-
23096 & L-23376, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 43 1; Villacrucis vs. CA,
L-29831, March 29, 1972, 44 SCRA 176; Dela Cruz, et al. vs. CA, L-
24000, Nov. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 68; Naga Dev. Corp. vs. CA, L-
28175, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 105, 115; Lacson & Basilio vs.
Pineda, et al., L-28523, July 16, 1971, 40 SCRA 35; Quiñ;ano, et al.
vs. CA, et al., L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 227; Reyes, et al. vs.
CA, et al., L-28466, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 138, 142; Gotamco
Hermanas vs. Shotwell, et al., L-22519, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA
112-117; Limjoco vs. CA, L-20656, Feb. 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 663-
669; De Garcia, et al. vs. CA, L-20264, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 130,
136-137; Simeon vs. Peñ;a, L-29049, Dec. 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 611),
unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellees [Roque vs.
Buan, L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648]; (6) the findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents [Garcia vs. CA, L-26490, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
622] ; and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence
on record [Salazar vs. Gutierrez, L-21727, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA
243].
The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions.
However, all the issues raised by the petitioners shall be passed upon individually.
The first error assigned reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that
the placing of the Iba Properly in the name of the late Maria Mirano
was in the nature of a donation inter-vivos.
The respondents 9 correctly pointed out that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court
of First Instance of Batangas categorically stated that the placing of the properties in the
name of Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation inter-vivos. In rejecting the
petitioners' contention that a donation mortis causa was executed, the Court of Appeals
said that, under the facts and circumstances narrated by the petitioners, the placing of
the Iba property in the name of Maria Mirano-if it was to be called a donation at all -
was not in the nature of a donation mortis causa, but rather it would be in the nature of a
donation inter-vivos, giving its reasons and citing the applicable law and decisions of
this Court on the matter. The Court of First Instance made the same hypothetical
conclusion. 10
The finding of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which was sustained by the Court
of Appeals is that what was donated by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza to Maria Mirano was the money used in the purchase of the lands in question.
This conclusion of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was supported by the
testimony of Macario B. Aro, a nephew of the deceased Doroteo Banawa, that the
money used by Maria Mirano in the purchase of the Iba and Carsuche properties was
given to her by, Doroteo Banawa. 11
If the money used by Maria Mirano in purchasing the properties was given to her by the
spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, or by either of them, then the money
had belonged to her. Maria Mirano purchased and paid for the said properties with her
money. As a matter or fact, the deed of sale, Exhibit "A", 12 recites as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Que en consideracion a la suma de Dos Mil Pesos moneda filipina
(P2,000.00) que me ha pagado Maria Mirano ... .
It is also contended by the petitioners that the deeds of sale executed by the owners of
the land in favor of Maria Mirano were simulated contracts intended to shortcut two
different transactions: (1) a sale in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza; and (2) a donation of lands by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano. 13
There are two kinds of simulated contracts, namely: the absolutely simulated contract
and the relatively simulated one. In both instances, however, their nullity is based on the
want of true consent of the parties. There is no intent to be bound or the true intent is
hidden or concealed. Such contracts are even generally regarded as fraudulent with
intent of injuring third persons. The purpose, therefore, of a simulated contract which
may be annulled is to conceal the parties' true intent, or to deceive or defraud third
persons.
From the record, there is no showing of deception or fraud, nor of concealment of intent
of the parties as to the sale of the Iba property by the vendors in favor of Maria Mirano.
The transactions which transpired were purely: (1) donations of money or things
representing or equivalent to money by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano which
could be made and accepted verbally; and (2) purchase of lands by Maria Mirano with
the use of that money or credits (pre-existing indebtedness in favor of the spouses) as
consideration thereof.
The petitioners' contention that "the contract of sale had been intended to be a contract
of sale between the vendors and the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza" has
no merit. The petitioners were present when the sales were made to Maria Mirano. They
were the ones who caused the titles to the properties to be placed in the name of Maria
Mirano because they wished "that after our death Maria Mirano could have something
for her maintenance. 14 Moreover, the testimony of Vicente Ilagan, the notary public
before whom the deed of sale was executed, to the effect that he was asked by Doroteo
Banawa in Tagalog "Kung matibay ang documenting ito para kay Maria" 15 and to
which query he answered, "Yes, Sir", 16 supports this conclusion. The conduct of the
spouses at the time of the execution of the contracts are inconsistent with those which
the petitioners, the late spouses and their successors-in interest, now assert. Their
intention to make Maria Mirano the owner of the said parcels of land was clearly shown
by their conduct at the time of the execution of the deeds of sale which influenced the
vendors to believe that Maria Mirano was indeed the vendee in their agreement. The
petitioners had full knowledge of the facts surrounding the execution of the document
of sale. They are equitably estopped 17 to deny that the transfer of the lands in question
in favor of Maria Mirano was the actual and true intent of the parties as embodied in the
documents of sale of the Iba and Carsuche properties. The documents are what they
purport to be — contracts of sale from the vendors to the vendee, Maria Mirano.
The petitioners submit that since there was transfer of title to the land in litigation to
Maria Mirano when the purchase price was in fact actually paid by the petitioners-
spouses, an implied trust was created. The present law on implied trust is Article 1448
of the New Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the
legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for
the purpose of having beneficial interest of the property. The former
is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However if the person
to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of
the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it
being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code of the Philippines became
effective on August 30, 1950. Hence Article 1448 of said Code is not applicable. 18
Moreover, there is no showing that Maria Mirano bought the lands in question in trust
for the petitioners.
The petitioners also claim that they have become owners of the properties by acquisitive
prescription under Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Ownership and other real rights in immovable property shall prescribe
by possession in good faith and under a just title for ten years as
between persons present and for twenty years as between absentees.
The above-cited provision speaks of two essential requirements: (1) possession for ten
(10) years as between persons present and twenty (20) years, for absentees; and (2) a
just title.
As regards the Iba property (Lot No. 1), petitioners have not presented any title, just or
otherwise, to support their claim. And Article 1954 of the Old Civil Code provides,
further, that a "just title must be proven; it never can be presumed."
Not having a just title, as required by Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code, the petitioners
cannot invoke prescription with respect to the Iba property.
The petitioners also assert ownership by acquisitive prescription over the Iba property
under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The pertinent portion of Section 41 of
the Code of Civil Procedure reads têñ.£îhqwâ£
Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the
owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly
continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise in
whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued,
shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and
complete title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights
secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by
prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or
by the person under or through whom he claims must have been
actual open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any
other right and adverse to all other claimants ...
It is a fact that while Maria Mirano was alive she possessed the property in question as
the owner thereof Hence, it is error for the petitioners to claim ownership over the Iba
property by acquisitive prescription under Article 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
their possession of the said property became adverse and exclusive only in July 1949
after Maria Mirano's death. From 1949 to the date of the filing in 1957 of the present
action by the respondents only eight years had elapsed.
The second error assigned is: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that
petitioners' interpretation of Article 632 of the Old Civil Code is too
literal and ignores the rationale of the legal provision.
Article 632 of the Old Civil Code provides: "Donations of personal property may be
made verbally or in writing. Verbal donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the
gift. In the absence of this requisite the donation shall produce no effect, unless made in
writing and accepted in the same form."
It is contended by the petitioners that oral donation of personal property requires
simultaneous delivery of the gift. As regards the Iba property, the consideration given
by Maria Mirano for the purchase of the said property from Placido Punzalan was the
pre- existing debts of the latter to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
The contention of the petitioners that there was no simultaneous delivery of the credits
to Maria Mirano is not meritorious. Delivery may be actual or constructive.
Actual delivery consists in the giving of actual possession to the vendee or his agent, as
for example, in manually transferring the possession of a thing from the vendor to the
vendee.
Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those acts which, although
not conferring physical possession of the thing, have been held by construction of law
equivalent to acts of real delivery, as for example, the giving of the key to the house, as
constructive delivery of the house from the vendor to the vendee.
In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of pre-existing obligations of
the vendor, Placido Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with the constructive
delivery thereof to Maria Mirano when the spouses consented to the execution of the
deed of sale of the Iba property in favor of Maria Mirano. The execution of the said
deed of sale constituted payment by the vendor, Placido Punzalan, of his outstanding
obligations due to the spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Consequently,
there was constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses
over the property in question to Maria Mirano.
It is no longer necessary to discuss the third error assigned because of the holding that
Article 1448 of the New Civil Code has no retroactive application to the instant case.
Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioners urge that the donor spouses are entitled
to the land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the
pertinent portion of which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature,
and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property
received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents
by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their
legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order established by
the Civil Code for intestate estates.
The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the
contemplation and spirit of this rule of reversion adoptive. However, the rule involved
specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule
of construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must
be taken to mean exactly what it says.
The fifth error assigned is: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling with
respect to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) that the deed of sale
executed in 1940 in favor of the petitioner Doroteo Banawa and his
wife Juliana Mendoza did not impair the pretended sale to Maria
Mirano.
The Court of Appeals found that there was a sale of the Carsuche property in 1935 in
favor of Maria Mirano and that such sale was embodied in a public instrument.
However, in 1940 the same land was sold to the petitioners. The sale was duly
registered. The petitioners immediately entered into the possession of the land as
owners.
The claim of the petitioners that they have acquired by acquisitive prescription the
Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) is meritorious.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Period of prescription as to real
estate — An action for recovery of title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest
therein, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues."
That the aforesaid Section 40 governs the instant case is clear from Article 1116 of the
New Civil Code which provides that "prescriptions already running before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code, shall be governed by the laws previously in force."
The prescriptive period commenced to run since 1940, the date the sale in favor of the
Banawas was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas. Hence the Code of
Civil Procedure governs.
The instant case, not having been filed within ten (10) years from the time the cause of
action accrued in 1940, prescribed under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure in
1950 because the same was filed only in 1957, seventeen (17) years later.
The possession of the Banawas over the Carsuche property ripened into full ownership
in 1950, ten (10) years after 1940, when the possession of the petitioner-spouses which
was actual, open, public and continuous, under a claims of title exclusive of any other
right and adverse to all other claim commenced. (Sec. 41, Code of Civil Procedure).
The sale in favor of the Banawas was registered in 1940 with the Register of Deeds of
Batangas. The actual and adverse possession of the petitioner-spouses was continued by
their present successors.
The alleged bad faith of the petitioners in that they knew that the land was previously
sold to Maria Mirano is of no consequence because Section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that there is prescription "in whatever way such occupancy may
have commenced." As held in one case "... guilty knowledge is of no moment for under
the law title by prescription may be acquired in whatever way possession may have
been commenced or continued and so long as the possessor had possessed the land
openly, publicly, continuously and under a claim of title for a period of over ten
years." 19

The trial court found that the two parcels of land in question with a combined area of a
little less than ten (10) hectares had an average annual net yield of P 500.00. A total
amount of P 4,500.00 as actual damages was awarded in as much as Maria Mirano had
been dead for nine (9) years when the decision of the trial court was rendered. An
adjustment should be made in view of the finding of this Court that the Carsuche
property, Lot 2, belongs to the petitioners.

The Iba property, Lot 1, is about 45% of the combined area of the two lands in question.
Forty-five percent (45 %) of the annual net income of P500.00 is equivalent to P225.00.
Maria Mirano has been dead for about thirty-one (31) years now. During all this period,
the petitioners have been in possession of the Iba property and receiving the products
thereof. They should pay as actual damages the total amount of P6,975.00 representing
the net income for the period of thirty-one (31) years on the basis of P225.00 a year.

The respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to the Iba
property (Lot No. 1) but reversed as to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) which was
acquired by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza who could validly
donate the said property to Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica The petitioners are
ordered to pay the private respondents the total amount of Six Thousand Nine Hundred
Seventy-Five Pesos (P6,975.00) as actual damages and the amount of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) as attorney's fees, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila
leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she
executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof
in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn
affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and
every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her
witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was
possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure
or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of
fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had
neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all
her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene
A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the
testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked
ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate
children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the
will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before
the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955
after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the
probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as
required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the
will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or
influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor
had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the
oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959,
the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who
took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on
November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in
favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be
vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal
heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the
judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested
leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of
the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner
and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies
the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of
succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the
will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors
which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has
oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will
in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in
passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who
should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor
of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The
Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party
has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand,
in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
 According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party has
been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor
(Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in
this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest
required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No.
L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of
the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that
the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no
interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any
claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has
also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any
claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while
she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already
disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1äwphï1.ñët
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right
only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is
true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it
be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister
of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of
her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child
has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed
in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother
who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be
called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie,
but the law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality
of the facts and upon the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product
of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is
ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law.
Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting
parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives
of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the
adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of
the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate
children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes
certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The
relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and
does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not
extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited
to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine
Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See
also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313;
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as
legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted
to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only
because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure
and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it
contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of
record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental
witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she
executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix
signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at
the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary
public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as
such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the
witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the
testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first
one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it
to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the
best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the
witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed
the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally
said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time
and place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will
was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied
by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with
Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that
there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of
isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their
supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence
of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of
the will on May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to
support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the
weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really
wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect
and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the
oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in
Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on
different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the
foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband
Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she
lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old
and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for
several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental
witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full
consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration.
The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather
than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the
will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here
was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by
the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among
which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements
of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding
its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions
therein contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or
fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not
impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the
will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be
punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public
morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a
will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was
in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the
new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such
proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has
no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can
not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
(Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a
quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be
set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to
defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding.
As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in
favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that
the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of
the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA
MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO
CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ
CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners.
Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners.
De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto Cruz.
Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will
and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria,
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the
petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed
and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and
Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own
legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia
died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same
court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the
blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a
petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin
of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been
adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents
mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate,
the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959,
couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by
the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby
granted."
In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it of
the several adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion of
the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the National
Bureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the
genuineness of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results,
managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-document
examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The
petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption
papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners likewise located
former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption,
and obtained written depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the
pertinent adoption proceedings.
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the
petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of
the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late
Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent
Benita Cruz-Meñez who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother
Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of
alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to
properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides
subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued
an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the
deceased which were not disposed of in the will.
The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby an
opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from
both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and
October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention
to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.
The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of
the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria,
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and
nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the
other side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez,
Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the
deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal
adoption. At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will — immaculate in its
extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.
The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie
which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with the
decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the
validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the
institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as
testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in
article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitime of said heirs.
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are not
compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-
wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if
any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can
take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate
should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution
of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of
whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists
proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of such cause.
Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention
of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of the
deceased which recite:
III
Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang
aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados)
na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may
apelyidong Cruz.
xxx xxx xxx
Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang
aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:
A.—Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina
Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong
Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en
partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang
kalahati (½) ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales
ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion
Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at
itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati
(½) ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo,
Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria,
at ang kalahati (½) ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon,
Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria.
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the
late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half
of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The
petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she
would not have instituted the respondents at all — the basis of the institution being
solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the
adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate
wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the
rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece from registering their
claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling
reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under
the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in
instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was
aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of
her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed
compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes
should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even
this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind
of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the
decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such
institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain
implications.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit
injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any
of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate,2 as was
done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be
avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the
language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.3 A probate court has found, by
final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary
capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.4

And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commanded assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of
her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, a collateral attack.5
still such institution must stand.
To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent
false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such orders complained of served merely to clarify the first — an act which the court could
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes and
that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause orders so as to make them conformable to law and justices.6 That the court a quo has
for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated
institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her by the Rules of Court.7
legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at
best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on
succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the
abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent
would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was
not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of
her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the
latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible
inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law
enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land
which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were
we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the
petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by
intestacy — a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and
REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO
LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA
LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992
ROLDOFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the
ESTATE OF EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO,
ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE
GUINTO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders 1 dated September 20, 1976, January
7, 1977 and January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch, IV respectively, cancelling the notice of lis pendens filed by Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al. with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976 filed by Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al., and holding in abeyance the resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a
"Testamento" 2 which contains among its provisions, the following:
DECIMA — Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion
consistente en una tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14) avas partes
proindivisas de la Hda. Minuluan, que he adquirido mediante permuta
de mi hermano Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, se adjudique, como por el
presente se adjudica, a mi sobrina Eustaquia Lizares;
ENTENDIENDOSE, sin embargo, que en el caso de que mi citada
sobrina Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera o sin descendientes
legitimos, mi referida participacion en la Hda. Minuluan se
adjudicara a mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares que me sobrevivan.
UNDECIMA — Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de todas
mis propiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones, derechos e
intereses (no dispuestos mas arriba) an las Haciendas "Minuluan"
(Lotes Nos. 439, 403, 1273, 1274, 1278, 1279 y 1280 del Catastro de
Talisay, Negros Occidental), y "Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550,
552, 553 y 1287-C del Catastrado de Talisay, Negros Occidental),
situadas en el Municipio de Talisay, Provincia de Negros Occidental,
I.F., el resto de mis acciones en la Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de la Financing Corporation of the
Philippines (unas 53,636 acciones), registradas a mi nombre y no
heredadas de mi difunta madre Dña. Enrica A. Vda. de Lizares, mis
acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., Negros
Navigation Co. y otras Compañas Mineras, y todos los demas bienes
no mencionados en este testamento y que me pertenezcan en la fecha
de mi muerte, se adjudiquen, como por el presente adjudico, a mi
sobrina Srta. Eusaquia Lizares, hija de mi difunto hermano Don
Simplicio Lizares cuidados que mi citada sobrina me ha prestado y
signe prestandome hasta ahora. Ordeno, sin embargo, a mi referida
sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se haga cargo de pagar todas
las obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre las propriedades
adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi citada sobrina que ella
mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada año en sufragio de mi
alma, y misas ordinarias en sufragio de las almas de mi difunto Padre
y de mi difunta Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 de Deciembre de cada año,
respectivamente, y mande celebrar todos los años la fiesta de San Jose
en Talisay como lo hago hasta ahora. En el caso de que mi citada
sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, falleciere sin dejar descendientes
legitimos, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una
sexta parte (1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang, con su correspondiente cuota
de azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas y hermano
antes mencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied)
On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving said
"testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares.3 On February
6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of the testate estate of Maria
Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452. 4
The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been made, in
due course, the probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and appointing
Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. 5
On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6 which was granted by the
probate court in an order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously, said court declared the
heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the
only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the
properties repectively assigned to each and every one of them, and ordered the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental and Bacolod City to effect the corresponding transfer of
the real properties to said heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends in
different corporations, companies and partnerships in the name of Maria Lizares to the
heirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares. 7
Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order
that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be
adjudicated to her. 8 The Court granted the motion and correspondingly reopened the
testate proceedings. It adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving
fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or personal
properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last
will and testament. 9
On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. de
Panlilio, Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes
Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of partition and subdivision,
thereby terminating their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of plan
SWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005; T-65006, T-65007, and T-65008. 10
A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without any
descendant. 11 In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint
administrators of Eustquia's intestate estate.
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the
will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa
Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in
Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once again the testate estate proceedings of
Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute administrator be appointed;
that the order dated January 8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended by declaring them as
heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of which form
an aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, after
such amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective certificates of
title, the order of probate and a "declaration" that movants are the heirs of said
properties, and correspondingly issue new certificates of title in their names. 12
Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely: Socorro L.
Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo, and Aurora Lizares
Wagner opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged that the court had no more
jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of
closure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions sought to be
enforced are null and void.13
On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate
proceedings and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is a proceeding in
rem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole world. It observed that inspite of
the fact that the movants knew that the court had jurisdiction over them, they did not
take part in the proceedings nor did they appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the
court concluded, even if the said order was erroneous, and since the error was not
jurisdictional, the same could have been corrected only by a regular appeal. The period
for filing a motion for reconsideration having expired, the court opined that the movants
could have sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but
unfortunately for the movants, the period for filing such remedy had also elapsed. 14
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. It
was denied on June 17, 1974. 15 Hence, on October 14, 1974, the said movants filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joining
administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 11639 with the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch IV. 16 On the same date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14,
Section 24 of Rules of Court
by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. 17
As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia
Lizares, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint administrators for brevity), filed
a motion to dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the case; the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, and the complaint
stated no cause of action. 18 This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs.
On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens on the contentions that there existed exceptional circumstances
which justified the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and that no prejudice would
be caused to the plaintiffs. 19 The latter opposed said motion. The defendants having
filed a reply thereto, the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder reiterating their arguments in their
opposition to the motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 20
On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion for
cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 21 The court simultaneously held in abeyance the
resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint.
The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.
11639. 22 Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative
defenses. 23 Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. vigorously opposed said motion. 24
On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying for the
reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976. 25 The joint administrators
having filed an opposition thereto, 26 on January 7, 1977 the lower court denied the
aforesaid motion for reconsideration. 27 It held that while a notice of lis pendens would
serve as notice to strangers that a particular property was under litigation, its annotation
upon the certificates of title to the properties involved was not necessary because such
properties, being in custodia legis, could not just be alienated without the approval of
the court. Moreover, the court added, a notice of lis pendens would prejudice any effort
of the estate to secure crop loans which were necessary for the viable cultivation and
production of sugar to which the properties were planted.
Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in this Court
a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. Docketed as
G.R No. L-45425, the petition contends that the grounds of lis pendens, namely, that the
properties are in custodia legis and the lending institutions would not grant crop loans to
the estate, are not the legal grounds provided for under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that since on
September 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss, it
was also proper to suspend the resolution of the affirmative defenses interposed by the
defendants until after trial on the merits of the case. Accordingly, the court set the date
of pre-trial for March 24, 1977. 28
On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-45965. Petitioners contend that the lower
court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it involves the interpretation of
the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the adjudication of her properties.
They assert that the matter had been settled in Special Proceedings No. become final
and unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had become
final and unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and
therefore, the cause of action in the latter case was barred by the principle of res
judicata. They aver that the claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria
Lizares, over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had
inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of
Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a
fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said provisions of the
will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil code, they constitute an invalid
fideicommissary substitution of heirs.
On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the lower
court from further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 11639. 29 After both G.R.
Nos. L-45425 and L-45965 had been given due course and submitted for decision, on
January 20, 1986, the two cases were consolidated.
The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated. 30 The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. 31 The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will. 32
Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance
to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.
Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza, 33 and Torres v. Encarnacion, 34 the
Court said:
. . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the entire
estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision, within
the estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one
in which this power and function of the court can be exercised and
performed without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo
the incovenience and litigate an entirely different action.
Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the
jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of the
properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v. Gerona, 35 and Benedicto v.
Javellana, 36 this Court said:
. . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the
authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir,
legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may
make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special
proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having
jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of
the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called
upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the
interested parties. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the
power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled . . .. 37 A
project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the heredity estate which
the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate
and determines the persons entitled thereto. 38
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of
Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January 8, 1971, a project
of partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint for
reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and assigned exclusively to
Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance with said project of partition
which was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio,
Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza
and Eustaquia Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on
November 28, 1972, whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots
Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts taken
altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by
the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of
it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good
conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and
repudiate what does not suit him. 39 Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a
partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected through improper
means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on
said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the
court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. 40 The question of
private respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the partition
and became a closed matter.
The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint, Civil Case
No. 11639, that Eustaquia had been in possession of the questioned lots since March 2,
1971 up to the time of her death indicates that the distribution pursuant to the decree of
partition has already been carried out. Moreover, it cannot be denied that when Celsa L.
Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of
Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings
was already final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty (30) days having
elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them.
Therefore, they cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of the properties
left by will of Maria Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of
the very same properties subject of such partition.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land
of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by
opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the
court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the
validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. 41
It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of public
policy, that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object
of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." 42 The only
instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to
secure relief is the opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary
period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for
another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and
reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. 43
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that, when a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate. 44
All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order approving
the distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in said will has
become final and unappealable; the probate court that rendered judgment had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; the judgment or orders had
been rendered on the merits; the special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Maria Lizares was a proceeding in rem that was directed against the whole world
including Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., so that it can be said that there is a similarity
of parties in Special Proceedings No. 8452 and Civil Case No. 11639, the judicial
administrators of Eustaquia being privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.; there is SO ORDERED.
identity of subject matter involved in both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria
Lizares; there is identity of causes of action because in the first action there was a
declaration of the probate court in its order dated April 6, 1974 that although the
testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will,
the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not been
satisfied. 45

Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No. 11639, the
contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are conditional substitute heirs
of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares 46 is not meritorious. While the
allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last
will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the
Civil Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear
obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may
said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.

It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if
such heir should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no
fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or
simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the
first heir dies before the testator. 47 In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived
the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria
Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under
the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia
by operation of the law of intestacy.

With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties involved,
there is no merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., that the lower
court acted contrary to law and/or gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the notice
of lis pendens. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice, being a mere incident in
an action, may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction over it at any given
time. 48 Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled "after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it
to be recorded." 49 In this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on
the principal reason that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the
supervision of the court and the said properties are under custodia legis. Therefore, such
notice was not necessary to protect the rights of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More
so in this case where it turned out that their claim to the properties left by Eustaquia is
without any legal basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in L-45425 is hereby DENIED but
the petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus in L-45965 is GRANTED.
The temporary restraining order of April 26, 1977 which was issued by the Court in L-
45965 is made PERMANENT. Costs against the petitioners in L-45425.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982 por accion ................................................................................8,347.00

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs. de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90

Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust

ABAD SANTOS, J.: Co..............................................................................................

2,350.73
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose
Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle TOTAL..............................................................
Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
P512,976.97
companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
MENOS:
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris,
while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator
provided for substitutions. Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was
appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the
estate as follows:
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO...........................................
P507,976.97
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas
menores de edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818,
Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion
vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con
sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa
de la finca Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los
legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion
del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del
apellido Ramirez,

Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —

de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00 a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da.
Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General
 Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u
fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de
Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la
nombrada Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v
fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan
Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la
mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis
Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente
ordinadas, las usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo
propietarios, podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes
objeto delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los titulares
fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow
'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall
go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of
the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3)
with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda)
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the
first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct
over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien,
violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed
partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the
widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this
property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its
order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this
Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in
full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's
legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which
he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The
court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno
dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not
entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions
even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so
that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art.
857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or
common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.)
According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really
only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The
others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to
substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should
die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to
accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it
refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the
fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to
preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the
legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a
favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar
reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The
appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow
Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled above, the
widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with
Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the
testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying
before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal
or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra.
Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in
their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to
Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has
decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there
can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need
not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present
Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the
substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a
child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are
one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee
admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution
when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement
of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of
Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition
of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that
the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens
to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent
the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of
a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor
of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-13876 February 28, 1962
CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.
Felix V. Vergara for defendant-appellant.
B. Martinez for plaintiffs-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco
Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located a Plaridel
St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and the
improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged
that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion
Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will
of Dña. Leona Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and
approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding No. 453;
that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendant
refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action.
Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and
not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, she
was not entitled to demand partition thereof.
After trial upon the issue thus posed, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
1. Declaring that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with the defendant of
the house and lot described in the complaint to the extent of each of an
undivided 1/2 portion thereof; .
2. Ordering the aforesaid co-owners to execute an agreement of partition of the
said property within 30 days from receipt of this judgment unless it be shown
that the division thereof may render it unserviceable, in which case the
provisions of Art. 498 of the New Civil Code may be applied; .1äwphï1.ñët
3. That in the event the said parties shall fail to do so, this Court will appoint
the corresponding commissioners to make the partition in accordance with law;
and .
4. Without special pronouncement as to costs." .
From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.
It is admitted that Dña. Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was the
owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 she
executed her last will which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of
the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 3605-
R. At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were her brothers
Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and
her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
Clause IX of her last will reads as follows: .
NOVENO. — Ordeno que se de a mi nieta por parte de mi hermana mia y que
al mismo tiempo vive en mi casa, y, por tanto, bajo mi proteccion, y es la
CONSOLACION FLORENTINO: —
(A). La mitad de mi casa de materials fuertes con techo de hierro galvanizado,
incluyendo la mitad de su solar, ubicado en la Poblacion de Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
Calle Plaridel, actualmente arrendada por los hermanos Fortunato, Teofilo y
Pedro del appellido Kairuz. Pero si falleciere antes o despues que yo mi citada
nieta, esta propiedad se dara por partes iguales entre mis tres hermanos
Evaristo, Manuel y Dionisio, o a sus herederos forzosos en el caso de que
alguno de ellas murieie antes ... (Exhibit F.)
The issue to be decided is whether the testamentary disposition above-quoted provided
for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria. This issue is, we
believe, controlled by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code in force in the
Philippines prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code, in view of the fact that the
testatrix died on January 13, 1948. They are the following: .
Art. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir
or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should
not wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it is to apply,
shall include the three mentioned in the next preceeding paragraph, unless the
testator has otherwise provided:
Art. 781. Fidei-commissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is charged
to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of the inheritance
shall be valid and effective, provided they do not go beyond the second degree,
or that they are made in favor of persons living at the time of the death of the
testator." .
Art. 785. The following shall be inoperative: .
 1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving them this name 1.o Un primer heredero llamado al goce de los bienes preferentemente.
or by imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation of delivering the
property to a second heir." .... 2.o Obligacion claramente impuesta al mismo de conservar y transmitir a un
tercero el todo o parte del caudal.
In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the testator may not only
designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his death, but also provide for substitutes 3.o Un segundo heredero.
in the event that said heirs do not accept or are in no position to accept the inheritance
or legacies, or die ahead of him. A estos requisitos anade la sentencia de 18 de Noviembre de 1918, otro mas, el
del que el fideicomisario tenga derecho a los bienes de la herencia desde el
The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person with the obligation, momento de la muerte del testador, puesto que ha de suceder a este y no al
on the part of the latter, to deliver the same to another person, totally or partially, upon fiduciario.
the occurrence of a particular event (6 Manresa, p. 1112).
Por tanto, cuando el causante se limita a instituir dos herederos, y por
It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a fallecimiento de ambos o de cualquiera de ellos, asigna la parte del fallecido o
substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that upon the death of fallecidos, a los herederos legitimos o a otras personas, solo existe una
Consolacion Florentino — whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix — the sustitucion vulgar, porque falta el requisito de haberse impuesto a los primeros
property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts herederos la obligacion de conservar y transmitir los bienes, y el articulo 789,
to the testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, en su parrafo primero, evige que la sustitucion sea expresa, ya dandole el
should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what testador el nombre de sustitucion fideicomisaria, ya imponiendo al sustituido la
is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that Consolacion obligacion terminante de conservar y transmitir los bienes a un segundo
Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of heredero.
the property, but if it provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired
nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the
undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As Manresa says, if the
substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary
fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the property bequeathed by will, but mere
kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime,
usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to deliver said property to the
shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude ownership over the property, upon the death
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it
of the testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another person, and the person cannot be
merely provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that
other than the fideicomisario (6 Manresa p. 145).
of the testatrix — her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be

In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased
clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part
Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion
of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular
Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death
event. For this reason, Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary
of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.
substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly ("de una manera expresa")
either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation
("obligacion terminante") to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir. In this IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.
connection Manresa says: .

Para que la sustitucion sea fideicomisaria, es preciso segun el art. 781, que se
ordeno o encargue al primer heredero, cuando sea tal, que conserve y transmita
a una tercera persona o entidad el todo a parte de la herencia. O lo que es lo
mismo, la sustitucion fideicomisaria, como declaran las resoluciones de 25 de
Junio de 1895, 10 de Febrero de 1899 y 19 de Julio de 1909, exige tres
requisitos: .
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. L-23662 October 12, 1967
MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
Jose D. Villena for petitioners.
Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-R) affirming that of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, in Special Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to
probate the alleged last will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the
opposition to the probate.
It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now
respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the
purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and
annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of
the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez,
Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and
Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed
oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery,
vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of
the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the
testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were
finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954, in
cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of June 20,
1958, found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on
the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the
properties is opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial,
insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved;
whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in
estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to
raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."
On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as
administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was
done on February 9, 1960.
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the
execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of
the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930
testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869
of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the
will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate,
had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable
independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of
oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943
and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself,
and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Oppositors then appealed to this Court.
In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main issues: (a) whether or
not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become
final for lack of appeal; (b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27,
1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become
final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly
revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March
26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to
probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of
estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree
finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the
proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether
its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil.
676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such,
the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions
of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or
judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other
grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a
multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since
Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be
taken in special proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed
on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no
longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus,
the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor
of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of
whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate,
or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is
no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation
invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from
subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original
intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would
not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249,
that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being
primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to
respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within
legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the
same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised
Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext
of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still
appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals
correctly so ruled.
The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the
Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) . . . .
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or
any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise
shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the
alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason
of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid,
unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the
right of repurchase;
xxx xxx xxx
It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of the quoted
provision is a presumed change of intention on the part of the testator. As pointed out
by Manresa in his Commentaries on Article 869 of the Civil Code (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p.
743) —
Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este, despues de
legar, se desprende de la cosa por titulo lucrativo u oneroso, hace desaparecer
su derecho sobra ella, dando lugar a la presuncion de que ha cambiado de
voluntad, y no quiere que el legado se cumpla. Mas para que pueda presumirse
esa voluntad, es necesario que medien actos del testador que la indiquen. Si la
perdida del derecho sobre la cosa ha sido independiente de la voluntad del
testador, el legado podraquedar sin efecto, mas no en virtud del numero 2 del
articulo 869, que exige siempre actos voluntarios de enajenacion por parte del
mismo testador.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure
from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered
doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were
executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the
Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by
this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620,
promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent
Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether
in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in
advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or
departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts
below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would
not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the
findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944
deeds of sale were also that
 it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship,
which was the only cause for the execution of Exhs. A and B (the 1943 and
1944 conveyances). (Decision, L-5618 and L-5620).

If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the
transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances.
Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on
her part to abandon the original legacy.

True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated
property "even if it be by reason of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the
legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325)
the "nullity of the contract" can not be taken in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could
not be maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation were avoided
because the testator was mentally deranged at the time, the revocatory effect ordained
by the article should still ensue. And the same thing could be said if the alienation
(posterior to the will) were avoided on account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an
alienation through undue influence in no way differs from one made through violence
or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his real intent,3 and it can
not be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the
anterior bequest.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-14474. October 31, 1960.]
ONESIMA D. BELEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, Oppositors-Appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order, dated May 23, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceedings No. 9226, denying appellant’s petition therein as hereafter
discussed.
Briefly, the facts and circumstances that brought about this present appeal may be
narrated as follows:.
Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944, the pertinent provisions of
which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"9.o — En caso de muerte de alguno o de todos los legatarios nom brados por mi, seran
beneficiarios o sea pasaran los legados a favor solamente de los descendientes y
ascendientes legitimos, pero no a los viudos conyuges.
10.o — Transcurridos diez o quince años despues de mi muerte todas mis propiedades,
muebles o inmuebles, derechos y acciones, cuando asi convenga a los legatarios y los
precios sean ventajosos, pueden proceder a la venta de todos dando preferencia a los
legatarios y de su importe total se deduciran mil pesos (P1,000) para los cuatro hijos de
mi difunto hermano Fabian, todos los gastos y reservando una cantidad suficiente y bien
calculada para sufragar los gastos para otros diez años para las mandas y misas. El resto
se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus descendientes
legitimos:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A Isabel M. de Santiago — cincuenta por ciento (50%)
Los hijos de Domingo Legarda — treinta por ciento (30%)
Filomena Diaz — diez por ciento (10%)
Nestor M. Santiago — diez por ciento (10%)."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died; and the aforesaid codicil, together with the
will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 894 of the same Court of First
Instance of Manila. The proceedings for the administration of the estate of Benigno
Diaz were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of
the appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros
Belen de Olaguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen,
single.
On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings No. 9226,
contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the
codicil should now be divided (equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de
Olaguera, as the surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other
words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera. The court, in
its order of May 23, 1958, denied, as we initially pointed out, Onesima’s petition. More
specifically, the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After due consideration of the petition filed by Onesima D. Belen on March 19, 1958,
wherein it is prayed that the trustee Bank of the Philippine Islands be directed to deliver
to her ‘one-half of whatever share is due to the deceased Filomena Diaz as legatee in the
will and codicil of the deceased testator Benigno Diaz y Heredia, subject of trusteeship
in these proceedings,’ this Court finds that said petition should be, as it is hereby,
denied in view of the resolution of September 28, 1959, in which resolution the
following was declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of the proceeds of the sale of the
properties covered in paragraph 10 of the codicil aforementioned does not and should
not form part of her estate; pertains to her legitimate descendants; and
‘That the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz should be distributed not only between her
children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera and Onesima D. Belen, but also among her other
legitimate descendants, if any, for descendientes include not only children but also
grandchildren, etc., and in this connection, it is not amiss to observe that one may be a
descendant and yet not be an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a
descendant."cralaw virtua1aw library
From this order Onesima D. Belen has appealed to this Court, insisting that (1) the
Court below was in error in holding that its former resolution of September 16, 1955
had been affirmed by our decision of February 28, 1958 in the case of Arguelles v.
Belen de Olaguera, G. R. No. L-10164 Feb. 28, 1958; and (2) that the term "sus
descendientes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean
descendants nearest in degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz. In the present case,
they are her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding the seven
grandchildren of said legatee.
As to her first point, the appellant is correct in her view that the trial court’s
interpretation of clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz has not been
affirmed in our previous decision (G. R. No. L-10164). Perusal of that judgment will
show that this Court left the issue open at the time, contenting itself with pointing out
that the then appellant Administrator of the estate of Filomena Diaz was not the proper
party to raise the particular issue.
As to the actual meaning of the provision —

"El resto se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus descendientes
legitimos",
it is undeniable that by this clause the testator ordained a simple substitution
(sustitucion vulgar) with a plurality of substitutes for each legatee. This form of
substitution is authorized by the first part of Article 860 of the Civil Code (Art. 778 of
the Code of 1889):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Two or more persons may be substituted for one; and one person for two or more
heirs."cralaw virtua1aw library
The issue is now squarely before us: do the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer
conjointly to all living descendants (children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a
class; or do they refer to the descendants nearest in degree?
Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives
nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore divided
equally between her and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the
latter’s sons and daughters, grandchildren of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As
authority in support of her thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (reproducing ne varietur Article 751 of the Code of
1889):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator’s relatives shall be
understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree."cralaw virtua1aw library
The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application to the
case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such
an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in
order to benefit the relatives closest to him, because, as Manresa observes, —
"la razon y la logica hacen fundadamente suponer que, el procurar este favorecer a sus
parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a su intencion el que gozasen sus bienes aquellas
personas mas ligadas al mismo (testador) por los vinculos de la sangre y de la familia"
(6 Manrese, Comm., 7th Ed., p. 72).
But the ratio legis (that among a testator’s relatives the closest are dearest) obviously
does not apply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and
not of the testator. There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator
intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and
provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer
the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them
in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by analogy? There are various reasons
against this. The most important one is that under this article, as recognized by the
principal commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest exclude all the farther relatives
and the right of representation does not operate. Castan, in his monograph "El derecho
de representacion y mecanismos juridicos afines en la sucesion testamentaria" (Reus,
1942), says on this question (pp. 13, 14, 15):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"En el subgrupo iberico de Europa y América predomina, aunque haya excepciones,
como ya hemos visto, al criterio de que la representacion, cuando menos en principio,
no tiena cabida en la sucesion testamentaria. Asi, por ejemplo, lo establece la doctrina
cientifica en Portugal y en la Argentina y lo ha sancionado la jurisprudencia en Cuba.
En igual sentido, en la doctrina española es opinion general que el derecho de
representacion, dentro del Codigo civil, no tiene lugar mas que en la sucesion intestada,
y en la testamentaria en la parte referente a las legitimas. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA juzga
que la representacion, atraida por la herencia legitima, es repelida por la testada, y
apunta, como razon de ello, la de que ‘la primera descansa en la ley de la sangre, en el
parentesco con su consiguiente atributo da linea y grado, elementos propios c
indispensables para la representacion, en tanto que la segunda se basa exclusivamente
en la voluntad del testador, elemento diverso, en el orden legal, al de la naturaleza o de
la sangre’. Y el maestro DE DIEGO, con orientacion analoga, piensa que ‘como el
titulo de la sucesion testada es de origen voluntario y caracter personalisimo, es
evidente que no hay terminos habiles para el derecho de representacion: los
llamamientos son individuales y la premoriencia del instituido, como su incapacidad,
aniquilan la institucion’.
In the second place, the history of Article 751 (of the 1889 Code) shows that the right of
representation was deliberately suppressed. Says Castan (op. cit.,
24):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"En nuestra Patria opino GARCIA GOYENA que debia tener lugar el derecho de
representacion aun cuando el testador llame a los parientes mas cercanos", pues ‘en lo
que no se contraria abiertamente la voluntad del testador, debe observarse el orden de la
sucesion legitima, al que se presume que en todo lo demas quiso atemperarse’. Por ello,
el art. 562 Proyecto de 1851 quédo redactado asi: "La disposicion hecha simple y
generalmente a favor de los parientes del testador, se entiende hecha en favor de los mas
proximos en grado; pero habra lugar al derecho de representacion con todos sus efectos,
con arreglo al titulo siguiente’.
Con poco acierto, a nuestro juicio, los autores del vigente Codigo han suprimido esta
ultima salvedad del Proyecto del 51, y con ello han instaurado una norma rigida,
distanciada de lo que exige la equidad y de lo que suelen establecer los Codigos
extranjeros. Los commentaristas convienen en que la supresion ha sido intencionada, y
por consiguiente el proposito del legislador es que en esta clase de llamamientos no se
da el derecho de representacion. Dice Manresa que el art. 751 ‘tiene por favorecidos con
tal institucion, no a los parientes de mejor derecho, sino a los mas proximos en grado y,
por lo tanto, los de primer grado excluiran a los de segundo y asi sucesivamente, toda
ves que la proximidad del parentesco se aprecia en esta forma con arreglo al art. 915’.
La misma interpretacion dan al articulo de referencia NAVARRO AMANDI, MUCIUS
SCAEVOLA, SANCHEZ ROMAN y VALVERDE."cralaw virtua1aw library
The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filomena Diaz the "nearest
relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited to her children, or
anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the
intention of the testator who, in the selfsame clause 10 of his codicil (ante), speaks of
"cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de Domingo Legarda," as
well as of "descendientes legitimos" of the other legatees, to us indicating clearly that
he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms. Observe
that, in referring to the substitutes of Filomena Diaz, Nestor Santiago and Isabel M. de
Santiago, the testator, does not even use the description "sus hijos o descendientes," but
only "descendientes."
It is suggested that "descendientes legitimos" could mean the nearest descendant but
with right of representation in favor of the more distant relatives. Unquestionably, the
testator was at liberty to provide a series of successive substitutions in the order of
proximity of relationship to the original legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain
that the more distant descendants should enjoy the right of representation as in intestate
succession. But to arrive at such conclusion, we must declare that the testator
had:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion among co-heirs and co-legatees,
as established for testamentary successions by Articles 1016 (old Art. 982) and 1019,
and intended to replace such accretion with representation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a testamentary
succession, it shall be necessary:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance, or to the same portion
thereof, pro indiviso; and(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator
or renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it.
x x x conveyance to ‘descendants’ or ‘issue’, children take concurrently with their parents.
ART. 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by the right of accretion take it in the
same proportion that they inherit."cralaw virtua1aw library
(b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced from Article 765 of the Code
of 1889) ‘providing that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts",
which would not obtain if the right of representation were to apply;
(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that vacancies in the free part
should be filled according to the rules of accretion or substitution (not representation);
and in default of these two, ultimately inherited by the testator’s own heirs
intestate:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not take
place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated,
shall pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the same charges
and obligations."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no doubt that, the testator’s intention being the cardinal rule of succession in
the absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have rendered inoperative all the
articles mentioned, if he had so desired. But without any other supporting
circumstances, we deem it extremely conjectural to hold that by the simple expression
"o a sus descendientes legitimos," the testator Benigno Diaz did intend to circumvent all
the legal provisions heretofore quoted. It was incumbent upon appellant to prove such
intention on the part of the testator; yet she has not done so.
It is interesting to note that even under the Anglo-Saxon doctrine, the courts are divided
on the question whether a bequest to "relatives" or "issue," made in general terms, gives
rise to a succession per capita or per stirpes. In Wyeth, Et Al., v. Crane, 174 N.E. 871,
the Supreme Court of Illinois said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The meaning of the word ‘descendants’, when used in a will or deed to designate a
class to take property passing by the will or deed, has been frequently considered and
decided by the courts of England and the United States. The established rule in England
from an early date was that the word ‘descendants’ or the word ‘issue’, unexplained by
anything in the context of the instrument, means all persons descending lineally from
another, to the remotest degree, and includes persons so descended, even though their
parents are living, and that such descendants take per capita and not per stirpes."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"The courts of this country are divided on the question of whether in case of a gift or
The so-called English rule has been adhered to in New York, New Jersey, and
Tennessee. . . . On the other hand, the courts of Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island
and South Carolina have held that, in case of a gift or conveyance to descendants or
issue, unexplained by anything in the context of the instrument, children do not take
concurrently with their parents."cralaw virtua1aw library
We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule
to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of
legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article
846. So that the original legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her
surviving children and grandchildren.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the Appellant.
G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971
GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.
Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.
From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21, 1965,
Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de
la Cruz, alleging, among others, that on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs,
including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of which
was attached to the complaint) over a certain portion of land with an area of around
20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the
defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the latter would
undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter
of the agreement, all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds
of the sale of the aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff,
by the co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant refused to
perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid lots. The
plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his obligation under the
extrajudicial partition agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and
costs.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that
the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and
was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he
had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale
were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The answer
contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise
sold her share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition agreement
being void insofar as the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the
proceeds as his share by way of reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be
dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition agreement be declared void with respect to the
plaintiff; and, on his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of
P2,500.00.
On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965,
declaring the plaintiff in default for not having answered the counterclaim.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of
facts:
1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the "Extra-
Judicial Partition Agreement" dated August 24, 1963, which was
marked as Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff, and Exhibit "I" for the
defendant, which partition agreement was marked as Annex "A" in
the complaint;
2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-
mentioned Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the distribution
of the in question for the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz; however the
parties further agree that several lots in the said land have been sold
by some of the co-heirs, and there are houses several houses
constructed therein and residents therein;
3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed
Administrator and In-charge of the development and subdivision of
the land in question, as provided for in the aforementioned
extrajudicial partition agreement;
4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd
paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have been sold by the
defendant herein; and parties further agree that there are no properly
constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;
5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the
deceased Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and
predecessor in interest of the land which was the subject matter of the
extra-judicial partition agreement;
6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz;
7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October
16, 1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as
Exhibit "2" for tap defendant; and
 8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the
niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la
Cruz died on September 22, 1935, as evidenced by Exhibit "3" for the
defendant.
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant, being a
party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the
right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must
abide by the terms of the agreement. The court ordered the defendant "to perform his
obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as described on page 2 of
the Extrajudicial Partition Agreement" (meaning, apparently, that the defendant should
develop the subdivision because said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this
purpose), and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of
P500.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's
counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was denied.
Hence, this appeal.
The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to the
following:
1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition
agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and,
consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
defendant-appellant.
2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is
estopped from questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the
agreement enforced.
3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual
damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting
the relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.
1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that the
owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia
de la Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant-appellant is a
nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de la
Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz; that
plaintiff-appellee's mother died on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing Pelagia de la
Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and
distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a heir of the
decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece
of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.
ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation
when it properly takes place. ... .
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Iturralde,
5 Phil., 176 (1905), said,
... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a
nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the
collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons
and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the
case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his
deceased uncle.
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her
nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-
appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the
extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is
concerned? They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express
purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the
stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating
therein in representation of her deceased mother. The pertinent portion of the
agreement is herein quoted, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, we ... and Diego de los Santos, married to
Anastasia de la Cruz; Mariano delos Santos married to Andrea
Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo
delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos,
married to Narciso Ramota; all in representation of our mother,
 MARCIANA DELA CRUZ, ..., do hereby by these presents,
mutually, voluntarily and amicably agree among ourselves to
equitably divide the property left by the deceased PELAGIA DELA
CRUZ, and adjudicate unto ourselves definite and independent
portions of the estate in the following manner ... .
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were
laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such a heir, the partition is void with
respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir,
but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased
owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really
and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to
succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49).
A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its
terms enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant.
Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which
are prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric
Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 5221). In Ramiro vs.
Graño, et al., 54 Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:
No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct the party
sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake.
And which there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is
that the acts and declarations of a party based upon an innocent
mistake as to his legal rights will not estop him to assert the same,
especially where every fact known to the party sought to be estopped
is equally well known to the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J.,
1125, 1126.)
And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963
(7 SCRA 367), this Court said:
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to
raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the
widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the
inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her
deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those
inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants
require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of
the facts and be apprised of his rights at the time he performs the act
constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no
estoppel. ... .
3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be sustained in
view of the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore, actual or compensatory
damages must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil Code). Here, no proof of such
damages was presented inasmuch as the case was decided on a stipulation of facts and
no evidence was adduced before the trial court.
We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged that plaintiff-
appelee sold her share to a certain person for the price of P10,000.00, and claims that he
is entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds by right of reversion. It will be noted that
plaintiff-appellee had been declared in default on defendant-appellant's counterclaim;
but the latter did not present any evidence to prove the material allegation therein —
more specifically, the alleged sale of the former's share for the sum of P10,000.00. That
no such evidence had been adduced is understandable, for the parties expressly
submitted the case for the resolution of the court upon their stipulation of facts which,
unfortunately, did not make any mention of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant
made any offer or move to introduce the necessary evidence to that effect for the
consideration and evaluation by the trial court.
Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's having been
declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all the allegations in his
counterclaim, so that the court a quo should have granted the relief prayed for by him.
We find no merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
SECTION 1. Judgment by default.—if the defendant fails to answer
within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion
of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in
default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's
evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the
complaint and the facts proven may warrant. This provision applies
where no answer is made to a counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party
complaint within the period provided in this rule.
The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this Court said:
Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment by
default against a defendant who has neither appeared nor filed his
 answer does not imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard
and of presenting evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission
by the defendant of the facts and causes of action of the plaintiff,
because the codal section requires the latter to adduce his evidence in
support of his allegations as an indispensable condition before final
judgment could be given in his favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an
admission by the defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find
support in the law or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for.
... .

Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the parties that said
plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by virtue of the
extrajudicial partition agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:

(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m. as

described in the Technical Description to be adjudicated to Diego
delos Santos, married to Anastacia dela Cruz; Mariano delos Santos,
married to Regina Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea
Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo
delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos,
married to Narciso Ramota, in co-ownership, share and share alike.

Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his contention that the
lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim and, consequently, in not
sentencing appellee to turn over to him his corresponding share of said portion received
by appellee under the void partition. Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly
received and took possession of the property of a deceased person without any right, by
virtue of a null and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the
inheritance (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., supra). Of course, if such share has already
been disposed of by appellee to a bona fide purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the
unproven allegations of the counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any
specific amount to defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of
such sale for the reason that, as already stated above, this aspect of the counterclaim has
not been touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has it been supported by evidence
which appellant should have presented in the lower court but did not.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is

hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from any ability to
and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim, appellee is hereby
sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding share of the property she has
received under the extrajudicial partition hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not
already been disposed of as alleged. Costs in both instance against plaintiff-appellee.
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of
FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.
RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987
declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their
respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to
grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the
case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term
"relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children?
Invited to discuss as amici curiae during the hearing were the following: Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former
Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana
were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of
their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow
of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo
Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero
and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in
1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)
Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this — who are the legal heirs of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren
(the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether
petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code
(Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the
Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants
illegitimate children certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New
Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never
before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely
entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under
Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again,
We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new
Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code
provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have
conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of
their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time
does not exist.
Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding
articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate.
 Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by
right of representation and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions. (933)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive
descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall
succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation.
(940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles
to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their
deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children,
which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of
these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that
the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions
are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may
be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is
entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to
the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the
provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate
children ... are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment."
(7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196).
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on
Articles 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New
Civil Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine
adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil.,
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by
former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which
identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the
legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is
already abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be
made to apply to the instant case.
Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain
substantial changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with
respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said
substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil
Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters
which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may
have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in
conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised
where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If
the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is
legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides
that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason
of the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the
matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable
to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of
giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the
intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of
reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant
case.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes
which also find support from other civilists. We quote:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article
 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the
Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in
subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary
portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the
intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible
and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue
enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992
must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with
an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on
the Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-
41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196, Rollo)
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person
spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11,
Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this
case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of
Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in
holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not
defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory
interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive
scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por
los vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los
descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz
o tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p.
377, Rollo)
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of
interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a
more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003
and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as
already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates.
which goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not
erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place
legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even
the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation
between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done
away with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and
'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children
have only those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them
by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol.
III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least
amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law
literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-19382. August 31, 1965.]

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF

MELOIDA FARRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-

appellant, vs. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO,
CATALINA FERRARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO
FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J p:

This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law,

from a resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein,
Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of
Melodia Ferraris, Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Third Branch, as well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a
motion to reconsider said resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she
transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there
continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the
petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her
whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the
last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one third (1/3)
share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and
which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant,
ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely,
Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt, and half- sister of decedent's father, The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the
Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral
Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother relatives, to wit: an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her?
of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the
classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?
estate of said Melodia Ferraris. The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only
The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the
contending parties to said Melodia Ferraris: same decedent, reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees)
than the latter since nieces and nephew succeed by right of representation, while
petitioner- appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other
collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters, or children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present
appeal that she is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors-
appellees, three degrees removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of
the New Civil Code no right or representation could take place when the nieces and
nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar,
but rather the former succeed in their own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased, she is as far
distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line
to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to
the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966).
Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers
or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975:
"ART. 975.When children of one or more brothers or
sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts
and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from
articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that
provided as follows:
"ART. 1001.Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half."
"ART. 1004.Should the only survivors be, brothers and
sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares."
"ART. 1005.Should brothers and sisters survive together
with nephews and nieces who are the children of the decedent's
brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per
capita, and the latter per stirpes."
"ART. 1009.Should there be neither brothers nor sisters,
nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate."
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in
force (R. A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as
follows:
"ART. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of
nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole
blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree
of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased."
"ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters,
nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of the whole blood."
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while
other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil
Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and
nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred
position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009
of the present Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of
preference. Which is true as to "other collaterals", since preference among them is
according to their proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962,
paragraph 1.
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place."
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other
collaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his
commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol. II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had
unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly states:
"Other Collaterals.— The last of the relatives of the
decedent to succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals other
than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are,
however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this,
we can safely say, there is hardly any affection to merit the
succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, persons beyond
the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for
successional purposes.
 "Article 1009 does not state any order of preference.
However, this article should be understood in connection with the
general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals
of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood
relationship." (Italics supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and
nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby
affirmed. No costs.
||| (De Bacayo v. De Borromeo, G.R. No. L-19382, [August 31, 1965], 122 PHIL 319-
325)
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco,
RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L.
CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and
CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years.
His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941
decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in
that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his
half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio
(3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half
brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother
Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the
widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had
begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo
Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26,
1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That
project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel
contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an
institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented
Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead
when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity
with the will because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not
physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su
testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a
los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la
declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It
held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not
in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that
"tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the
testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be
regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o
morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See
Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as
prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the
estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in
tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants
entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the
legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs
of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed
that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R.
Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the
appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of
judgment were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October
24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of
two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise
agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case"
(Exh. D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and
physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and
noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest
the controvery over the Yangco's estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate
estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil
Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should
be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res
judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon
in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the
project of partition for the testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January
23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves
real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before
it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that
Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3)
that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches.
In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had
been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata
and laches. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of
apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to
recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court
found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados
Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The
basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged
natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis
Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were
his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos,
Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos
herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and
Florencio Gonzales Diez
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as
Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on
appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the
presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and
over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that
Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he
had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as
reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the
probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or
official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed
to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and
Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z],
[bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and
since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child,
we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the
supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's
estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen
derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to
haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all
successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16
Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...
Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas
Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's
estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that
"an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon
by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of
resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or
legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father
or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default
of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by
their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side,
who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.

Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate
relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996,
April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).

Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two
acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were
held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).

By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil.
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).

The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate
brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).

WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL
BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC., respondents.
Porfirio C. David for petitioner.
Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
43476-R, promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner:
(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson
and heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share
in the estate of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;
(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the
properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of
defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewen
(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant
Maria Cailles in so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are
affected;
(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this
decision, of the properties subject of this litigation, between defendant
Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share
alike;
(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within
30 days from the finality of this decision, to render an accounting of
the fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff
Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share thereof with interest of 6%
per annum;
(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and
severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees;
(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and
(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1
From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942
was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero
Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero
Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the
late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and
accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared
one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the
estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles,
(2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of
all the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession
thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein
with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive
ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child
who cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private
respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a
valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor.
These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc.
sometime in September 1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private
respondent insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit.
From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as
already stated, reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby dismissing petitioner's
complaint, reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for
review was filed of the following assignment of errors:
I
 RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA
REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY
REPRESENTATION.
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive
properties of the private respondents.
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed
separately, as each has its own distinct factual setting. The first was
bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'),
which describes it as follows:
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho
Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos
siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de
Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de Maria
Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via
ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle
Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes
starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso
Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the
property and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for unexplained
reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because of
this, plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking
that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some
proprietary right over the same.
The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles
in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes the property as
follows:
. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de
la sal, que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y
Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de
Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con
los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por
Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una
extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty
tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter
when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence
in Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes administered the property and like in
the first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own name.
Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff
filed the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same
allegedly represents the share of his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the
plaintiff principally because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently
show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are
the same as the properties sought by the plaintiff.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge
misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in
question.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that
the land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in Las Pinas
Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living
at the time, including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la
via ferrea del Railroad Co.')
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed,
the description fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this
property is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the
M.R.R. Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the
property described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and
the same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since
several decades have already passed between the deed and the
declaration and 'during that period, many changes of abode would
likely have occurred.
 Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in
Desposorio St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this property
from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to
doubt that this property is the same, if not Identical to the property in
Desposorio St. which is now being sought after by the plaintiff.
With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from
Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar
boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after
declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes
thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.)2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting
that since the present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may
be raised. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that
findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this
Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both
appellant and appellee. 3 None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at
bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following
findings:
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of
Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of
Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased
Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in
1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to
the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged
birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to
Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper
evaluation of this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the
same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of
the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does
not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate
is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was
born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol.
Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable
evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth
certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time
and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that
plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite
in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in
question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review
in the absence of a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial
evidence, or that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making
the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of
Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate
left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.
(Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this
petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON,
CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO
CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying
the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro
Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage,
Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda
and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a)
that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels
which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta
Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most
of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that
administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending;
and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and
not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently,
oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a
project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate.
Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the
conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided
as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed
that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's
inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and
ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the
surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and
the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon.
This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal
properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of
law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether
the order of the lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone
assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided
when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore,
appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the
Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled."
The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of
the New Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow
or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... .
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites
Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the
extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate
succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control,
regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession
involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory
construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession;
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being
the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of
his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art.
888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the
intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get
when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child
and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the
pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least,
his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the
Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or
intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that
under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share
the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:
One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the
spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the
other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or
descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be
understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a)
Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one
"child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of
judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas
in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get
1/2 in intestate.
A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the
singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or
widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that
of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that
"child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because
"children" will not include "child" in the following articles:
ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and
descendants ... .
ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half of the hereditary estate ... .
ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-
fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be
inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only
legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear,
because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of
"children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning
should be given to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate
succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and
the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child
gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower
"gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the
law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her
only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or
widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the
widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate
just one general rule applicable to both situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are not
called upon to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound
to enforce.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977 Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on
April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her.
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza
vs. and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died
CARTENA, defendant-appellant. leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese
(Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.

Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the
only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter
which is purely a legal question.

The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:

Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859

(Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely:
Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio
Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband
Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso
(Exhibit "E"). Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa
Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died
sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the
plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died
on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio
Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are
her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong,
Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land
which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted
with 38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m.
Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas;
on the S. by Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso
Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra
Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of
defendant Geronimo Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San
Pablo, planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455
sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa
Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on
the W. by Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year
1948 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San
Pablo, planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area
of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto
Glorioso and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the
S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the
W. by Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year
1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed
at P2,720.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San
Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of
Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by
Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax
No. 17653 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now
Tax No. 21452, assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza;
and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria,
Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990
sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E.
by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by
Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia
Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and
Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura
Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela
Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs
approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they
were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the
expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having
agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again
sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts,
accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the
properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of
the same to the defendants.
( rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
After trial, the court
R
e WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
c who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24)
o share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio
r Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are
d represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino
Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959
o the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24)
n share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with
legal interest from the time this decision shall have become final.
A
p
With costs against the defendants.
p
e
a SO ORDERED.
l
, City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
p
p
.
 )

J
O decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute
From the aforesaid
S
defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other
E Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to
defendant, Engracio
the parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under Letters D and E in
G
the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-
.
half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A,
B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his
possession. 2 B
A
U
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006
T
and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-
I
appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable
S
provisions. He asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court,
T defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood
plaintiffs requested
of Maura Bagsic,Adied on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952,
Felipa succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New
J
Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the
u shares," and he concludes with the rule that the
full blood, they shall inherit in equal
relatives nearest in degree excludesd the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
g
e claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees
not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the
parties as clearlyRshown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic
e
died on May 9. 1945. 3

c
o
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the
r
trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question
d
involving the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the
appellate court certified this case to Us.
o
n
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are
applicable to theAadmitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:
p
p Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile
e deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation,
a if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
l they shall inherit in equal portions."
,
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
p together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall
. be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
 Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall
succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid
down for brothers and sisters of the full blood.

In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,

Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without
an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and
the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with
the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August
31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by
right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of
the deceased."

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the
nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to
whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of
whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The
only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to
Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole
niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such
distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been
recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402,
June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610).

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa
Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood
citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous
factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here
before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura
Bagsic.

We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA
FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE
VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmeña and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a
resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris,
Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as
well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to reconsider said
resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to
be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession
and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or
spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris,
who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest
intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending
parties to said Melodia Ferraris:
Note: Picture
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a
deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt
and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former
be excluded by the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is
three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded
by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance
with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is
of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees
removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right
of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not
concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their
own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both
kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor
and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her
contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided
expressly by Article 975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:
 ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.
ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers
or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to
the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles
952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers
or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to
the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the
other collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the
present Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference.
Which is true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to
their proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes
place.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of
equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009
(Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote),
Tolentino expressly states:
Other collaterals. — The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within
the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to
merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond
the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional
purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article
should be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest
relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal
parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction
of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship.
(Emphasis supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No
costs.
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-
CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D.
ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
1
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda
D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas D. Neri
(Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia), and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria)
seek to reverse and set aside the April 27, 2010 Decision2 and October 18, 2010
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN which
annulled the October 25, 2004 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo
City, Davao del Norte and instead, entered a new one dismissing petitioners’ complaint
for annulment of sale, damages and attorney’s feesagainst herein respondents heirs of
spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from
her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five
(5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia,
Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and
Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555
square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285 , (P-14608) P-51536 and P-20551 (P-8348)7 issued
on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his
personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas,
together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves
the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses Hadji
Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of ₱ 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the
said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been
sold within the prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia
and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their
legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took
place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents.
They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusionfrom the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of
prescription and laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others, the
annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It
ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still
void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that
Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and
Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by spouses Uy,
who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that co-
ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010
Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia and
Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject
properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit
the annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and
thatEutropia and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years
fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. It,
however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes from their
co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent saleas valid
and binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they
have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they consider necessary or
fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to
have ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it upon reaching the age of
majority.Italso found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of
time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT Rosa 1/16
OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES
OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING Douglas 1/16
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH
participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that
RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING
then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
was not valid and binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.

III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

The Ruling of the Court

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x

The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of
Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique,
respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant
to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
xxx
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and
Enrique acquired their respective inheritances,9 entitling them to their pro indiviso
shares in her whole estate, as follows:
Enrique 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)
Eutropia 1/16
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section;
but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated
in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was
null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the
nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule
"no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect
the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to
challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution…
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the
subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in
favor of the respondents isvalid but only with respect to their proportionate shares
therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the
properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death11 and that, as owners thereof,
they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate.12

Victoria 1/16 With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the
Napoleon 1/16 settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the
transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was
Alicia 1/16 merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of
their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Visminda 1/16
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of
the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval
of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the
duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the
child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of guardians
under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good
reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of
fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation,
or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property
and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children
without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of
majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil
Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by
the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to
some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not
be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a
ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the
party so making the ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the
person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects
from the moment it was constituted,17 as it has a retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation18 before the RTC
dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri
concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the other
plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7,
1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and
therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this
case are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have any
intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family
and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement of the estate
and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution
and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to
spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence
showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not
binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia,
Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor
of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the
buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally
transfer."20 On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be 3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D.
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERS of the 3/16 portions of the subject
of the co-ownership. homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-
2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of
the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their 4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri,
respective 1/16 shares. They were deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-
Victoria and Douglas under an implied constructive trust for the latter’s benefit, Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid
conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee amount of ₱ 15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the
of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes." As time of payment until finality of this decision and 12% per annum thereafter
such, it is only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their shares equivalent to until fully paid.
₱ 5,000.0021 each or a total of ₱ 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.
No pronouncement as to costs.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has
not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
SO ORDERED.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section
1 Rule 74 of the Rules of

Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to
petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful
participation in the subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense for the declaration of
the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the
Civil Code.

However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the
time the cause of action accrues,22 which is from the time of actual notice in case of
unregistered deed.23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have
knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father,
Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997
was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision and
October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:

1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion

Neri NULL and VOID;

2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji
Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of the late
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA,
ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY
PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S.
ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Nos. 54492-R and 54493-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Albay allowing the probate of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in Special Proceedings No.
699 and dismissing the complaint in Civil Case 3068 after declaring the two deeds of
sale executed by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The respondent court 1 denied the
probate of the will, declared null and void the two sales subject of the complaint and
ordered the defendants, petitioners herein, to pay damages to the plaintiffs, now the
private respondents, the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to render an
accounting of the properties in their possession and to reimburse the latter the net gain
in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties from the date of the firing of
the complaint up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
attorney's fees and costs.
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated actions are the
following.
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doñ;a Florentina Rella, both of
Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo
Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua
de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present and existing properties of the spouses
Don Jesus and Doñ;a Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the
essential features of which are stated in private respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to
wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the properties of
the Alsua spouses, which inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them
signed by the spouses and all the above named heirs in the left margin
of every page (parafo primers).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties
described in the inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties with the
exception of five parcels of land Identified with the figures of 1 to 5
and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery stock which are paraphernal
properties of the late Doñ;a Tinay (segundo parafo).
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine
children but five of them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y
cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil
Code (old) to avoid Possible misunderstanding among their children
concerning the inheritance they are entitled to in the event of death of
one of them they have decided to effectuate an extrajudicial partition
of all the properties described in Annex "A" thereto under the
following terms and conditions: (Parafo quinto):
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 1-12 of
said inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,720,364 sq. meters, with
a book or appraised value of P69,740.00.
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 12-20 of
said inventory or, 26 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,679,262 sq. meters, with
a book or appraised value of P55,940.00.
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 20-33 of
said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of 6,639,810 sq. meters, with
a book or appraised value of P89,300.00.
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 33-47 of
said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,630,715 sq. meters, with
a book or appraised value of P58,830.00. têñ.£îhqwâ£
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and
admit that the totality of the properties allotted and adjudicated to the
heirs as described in the preceding paragraph, constitute one half of
the properties described in Annex "A", including any amount of cash
deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties
assigned to them as their hereditary portion represent one-half not
only of the conjugal properties but includes the paraphernal properties
— waiving now and forever any complaint or claim they have or they
may have concerning the amount, value, extension and location of the
properties that are allotted to each and everyone. They also waive any
claim they have or they may have over the remaining portion of the
properties, which spouses reserved for themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone of
the heirs acknowledge that the properties which are left in the
possession of the surviving spouse, including any amount in cash, are
even less than the one- half that should correspond in absolute
ownership as his legitimate participation in the conjugal properties. In
consequence they waive any claim that they have or may have over
said portion of said properties or any amount in cash during the
lifetime of the surviving spouse, including any right or claim they
have or they may have over the paraphernal properties of Doñ;a Tinay
in the event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them, the
surviving spouse waives any claim he or she may have over the
properties assigned or adjudicated to the heirs under and by virtue of
this deed. The properties which were reserved for them (the spouses)
should be considered as his or her legitimate participation in the
conjugal properties and the fair compensation of his or her usufruct
on the properties that the surviving spouse reserved for himself or
herself which shag be distributed in equal shares among the heirs
upon his or her death unless said properties of some of them have
been disposed of during the lifetime of the surviving spouse.
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy of the
provision contained herein shall be under obligation to pay to the
other heirs, in the concept of damages and prejudice, the sum of
P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees.
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein
heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties assigned
or adjudicated to each and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as
his share or participation in the estate or as his inheritance left by the
deceased and each heir shall become the absolute owner of the
properties adjudicated to him under this deed.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doñ;a Florentina, also known as Doñ;a Tinay
separately executed their respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the
provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial
partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the
institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of the
conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime among their four
living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in the
event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half thereof would
belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the four
children. The holographic will of Doñ;a Tinay written in Spanish reads, as
translated: têñ.£îhqwâ£
TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to
Don Jesus Alsua, resident of and with postal address in the
Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines, being in the
full possession of my mental and physical faculties freely and
spontaneously execute this my last will and testament in my
handwriting and signed by me and expressed in the Spanish language
which I speak, write and understand, this 5th day of January, 1955 in
the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which I ordain
and provide:
First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband
Don Jesus Alsua and begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of
whom are still living and they are Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua,
Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. The other five (5) died during
their minority, single and without children.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and
during our conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts and industry,
we were able to acquire conjugal properties consisting of abaca
(abales) and cacao lands and urban lands registered in the office of the
Registry of Property of the Province of Albay and in the City of
Manila.
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the following-
my spouse Don Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and
personal, and the other half, to my children Francisco Alsua, married
to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde
Samson, and Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje, in equal
parts. It is to be understood, however, that the other half that
corresponds as legitime to my above named children have already
been given to them, pursuant to a document dated November 25, 1949
and ratified on the same day, month and year before Notary Public U
Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. 11; Series of 1949) A
enjoining each and everyone of them to respect and faithfully comply
with each and every clause contained in the said document. (Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)

Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic will
this testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above will
above named children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the of his wife.
same proportion that is, one-half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the other
half to my children in equal parts. On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay filed before the Court of
First Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their respective
Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua holographic wins which were docketed as Special Proceedings No. 484 (Jesus Alsua,
without having to post any bond. Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No. 485 (Doñ;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua,
Petitioner).
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting this
testament on this 5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay executed their mutual and
Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines. têñ.£îhqw⣠reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins.
Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the
( properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed to
S and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November
G25, 1949, but that they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a
DTinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the
. above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto
) each other their participation therein as well as in all properties which might be acquired
subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the surviving spouse,
F whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would be divided
Lequally among the four children. It was also declared in both codicils that upon the
Odeath of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was designated mutually and
Rreciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the properties reserved for
Ethemselves.
N
TThe codicil executed by Doñ;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as
I translated: têñ.£îhqwâ£
N
A
CODICIL
R
. This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That
my spouse and I have agreed to divide the properties which we have
D acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would correspond to me covers all
E the properties that I have partitioned among my children in the
Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 before Notary
A Public Segundo G. Flores, Jr. (Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No.
L 11; Series of 1949) (and) even as the properties which by reason of
S this testament I leave to my husband as his share and the other half
that corresponds to my husband constitutes an the properties that up
to now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban lands N
situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of Albay and in the A
City of Manila, with the exception of that portion that I bequeath to
my husband as his inheritance and his legitimate. R
A
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don L
Jesus Alsua and my children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando L
Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I leave to my aforecited children all the A
properties described in the above mentioned Document of Partition
dated November 25, 1949 which correspond to each one of them and D
in the profits (fruits) expressed in the same, and in the event that the E
properties granted to one or any of my children should exceed in
quantity or value those corresponding to another or others, I hereby A
declare that it is my will that the same be divided among my children L
as their inheritance from the free portion of my property. S
U
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws A
inheritance the part of the free portion of my property which have not
been allocated in favor of my children in the Document of Partition (joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property
of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a
properties which we shall acquire after the execution of this separate but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above
document. codicil of his wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus
and Doñ;a Tinay both filed their respective supplemental petitions for the probate of
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby their respective codicils in the probate proceedings earlier filed. On February 19, 1957,
declare that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that pertain their respective holographic wins and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.
to me or would pertain to me, which have not been disposed of
pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among my above- Upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to
mentioned heirs after my death. Ligao, Albay, Philippines, August serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959. Letters
14,1956. têñ.£îhqw⣠testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he took his oath of office and
performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
(
S Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic
Gwill in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he
Dinstructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with their corresponding
. descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft a new
) will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November 14,
1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don
F Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had three essential features: (a) it expressly
Lcancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will of
OJanuary 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for the collation of
Rall his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura de
EParticion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the
Npartition of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as
Tlegatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and
I
whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given
to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Doñ;a Tinay had
been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for approval
a deed of partition executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and which essentially
confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the holographic will and codicil of
Doñ;a Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved the partition of 1959 and on January
6, 1961 declared the termination of the proceedings on the estate of Doñ;a Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the
will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don
Jesus Alsua before the Court of First Instance of Albay and was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando,
thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus
was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b)
that the will was executed under duress or influence of fear or threats; or it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the main
beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the
testator was secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not executed according to the
formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate
contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon by him, his deceased
spouse, Doñ;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando thru
his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened Don Jesus' own probated
holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively, essentially confirming and
implementing the said partition of 1949 which had already been partially executed by
all the signatories thereto in the partition of the estate of Doñ;a Tinay in December,
1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated November 14,
1959, the Probate Court appointed her Administratrix of the estate of her late father,
Don Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the Probate Court an inventory of the properties of
the estate which, according to the oppositors therein (the private respondents now) did
not include some properties appearing in the agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the
inventory attached thereto as Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion" of
December 19, 1959 as belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus. According to the
oppositors, these properties consist of thirty- three (33) premium agricultural lots with a
total land area of 1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a
total assessed value of P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of P238,000.00 at
only P2,000.00 per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots Ideally located in the
business section of Legazpi City including the lot and the building presently occupied
by the well-known "Mayon Hotel" with an assessed value of approximately
P117,260.00 or a probable market value at the time of P469,040.00. It appearing from
the new will that these properties were bequeathed to Pablo Alsua and Francisco Alsua-
Betts, specifically, 3 parcels of the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to
Francisco, the oppositors also raised in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the
inventory of the estate of their late father. In answer, Francisco claimed ownership over
the same, alleging that she bought the properties from their father and presenting the
two Deeds of Sale now being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show
the sale of the 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco by their father for the price of
P70,000.00 and the other dated November 26, 1962 evidencing the sale of the four
urban lots for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the oppositors filed
Civil Case No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two deeds of sale, with
damages, which upon agreement of the parties was then jointly heard and tried with
Special Proceedings No. 699 for probate of the Last Will and Testament of Don Jesus
executed on November 14, 1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First Instance of
Albay promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973, the dispositive portion of which
states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered, to wit:
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and
ALLOWS the Will executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on
November 14, 1959, which had been marked as Exhibit A, consisting
of nine (9) pages, and orders that the same be made the basis for
division and distribution of the estate of said testator;
2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint and
holds that the sale on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale on
November 26, 1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and valid sales and
accordingly conveyed title to the VENDEE thereof. The Plaintiffs in
Civil Case 3068. are ordered jointly and severally to pay to the
defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as damages and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for attorney's fees
or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to pay
the costs.
On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the
appealed decision in a judgment rendered on April 4, 1977, the dispositive portion of
which states, as translated, thus —têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself
constrained to set aside as it hereby sets aside the decision appealed
from in the following manner: (1) in Special Proceedings 699, the
probate of the will, Exh. A, is hereby denied; (2) in Civil Case No.
3068, Exhs. U and W and the titles issued on the basis thereof are
 hereby declared null and void, ordering the appellees Francisco Alsua
and Joseph Betts to pay to the plaintiffs in the concept of fixed
damages, the sum of P5,000.00 and to render an accounting of
properties in their possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs the net
gain, in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties subject
of litigation in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of this
complaint, up to the complete restoration of the properties pertaining
to (plaintiffs) pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code,
paragraph 11, ordering them in addition to pay to the plaintiffs and
oppositors the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs.
Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four assigned
errors, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the findings
of the probate court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that private
respondents, oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to
question the competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.
II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that
testator Don Jesus Alsua cannot revoke his previous will.
III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures resulting in a gross
misapprehension of facts.
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of
August 26, 1961 (Exh. U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold that the same is
of no moment. The controversy as to the competency or incompetency of Don Jesus
Alsua to execute his will cannot be determined by acts of the herein private respondents
as oppositors to the will in formally agreeing in writing jointly with the petitioner
Francisca Alsua de Betts that their father, Don Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the court
executor of the will of their mother in Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of
Doñ;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court not to require
Don Jesus Alsua to file any accounting as executor in the proceedings, which petitioners
claim and was upheld by the trial court as constituting estoppel on the part of the private
respondents from questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling laid down in
the case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs.
Remedios Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an eminent and
recognized authority on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of Appeals, and We
quote: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the
application therein of the rile of estoppel, when it win block the
ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over
and above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see that
testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed
conformably to law.
The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's Will,
300 N.Y.S., 502: têñ.£îhqwâ£
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to
establish the existence of the right of any living
person, but to determine whether or not the
decedent has performed the acts specified by the
pertinent statutes, which are the essential
prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of
devolution of his property on death. There is no
legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a
proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the
departed, and he may and frequently does receive
no personal benefit from the performance of the act.
One of the most fundamental conceptions of
probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to
effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with the
public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a
deceased person (Matter of Watson's Wilt 262 N.Y.,
284, 294, 186, N.E., 787; Matter of Marriman's
Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208, N.Y.S., 672;
Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div., 733, 216 N.Y.S.,
126, Henderson, S., Matter of Draske's Estate, 160
Misc. 587, 593, 290, N.Y.S., 581). To that end, the
court is, in effect, an additional party to every
litigation affecting the disposal of the assets of the
deceased. Matter of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164
Misc. 295, 298, N.Y.S., 219.'
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court erred in not
allowing the probate of the last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim
that the disallowance was based on speculations, surmises or conjectures, disregarding
the facts as found by the trial court. The Civil Court is very clear and explicit in
providing the cases where a will may be disallowed under Article 839 which provides
as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of
making a wilt at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence
of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,
on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.
The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the respondent
court itself when it accepted the findings of the trial court on the due execution of the
questioned will and testament of Don Jesus, declaring: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... and going back to the previous question, whether the questioned
will and testament of November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in
accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil Code, this Tribunal
from the very beginning accepts the findings of the inferior court
concerning the question, têñ.£îhqwâ£
On October 2, 1959, Doñ;a Florentina died at
Ligao, Albay. About 2 weeks after said death of his
wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a new will,
thereby revoking and cancelling his previous
holographic will which he made on January 5, 1955
and also its codicil dated August 14, 1956. In the
presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban
P. Ramirez, he crossed out in ink each and every
page of said page he wrote on each page the word
"cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon (Exh
V-5, V-6, consecutively up to and including Exh.
V-14). He then instructed Ramirez to make a list of
all s properties with their corresponding
descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer,
Don Gregorio Imperial, Sr. and the latter came
accompanied by his son, Atty. Jorge S, Imperial,
who, incidentally, is now a judge of the Court of
First Instance of Naga City, Camarines Sur. Don
Jesus informed his lawyers that he wanted to make
a new will, and accordingly gave more detailed
instructions as to how he wanted to divide his
properties among his four children. He handed to
them a list and on the left he indicated the name of
the child to whom the listed properties shall pertain.
Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the instructions
of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his
major language, as in fact his conversations with
Don Gregorio are always in Spanish. A few days
before November 14, 1959, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial
showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft of the will
and after reading it Don Jesus said that it was as
directed by him, and after making a few minor
corrections, he instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to
put the win in final form. He further told Atty, Jorge
Imperial that the signing of the will should be at his
home in Ligao, in the morning of November 14,
1959, and that the witnesses should be Mr. Ramon
Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr.
Jose Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and
Mr. Jose Gaya who is a sort of employee of Don
Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don
Gregorio and Atty. Jorge S. Imperial, riding in a
sedan, stopped at the Legaspi residence of Mr.
Ramon Balana, and informed the latter that Don
Jesus was requesting him to be one of the attesting
witnesses to his will. Mr. Balana, having a very
high regard for Don Jesus, considered it an honor to
be so asked, and gladly went with the Imperials.
They arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao;
Albay, almost ten o'clock of that morning, and they
were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter
requested them to be seated at the usual receiving
room on the ground floor while he announced their
arrival to Don Jesus who was on the second floor.
Soon Don Jesus came down, carrying with him the
will to be signed placed inside a cartolina folder. He
greeted Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty.
Imperial and immediately joined them in
conversation. Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose
Madarieta, whose residence is just across the road
from the house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was
already informed by Don Jesus himself about the
fact of signing the will that morning, and so, on
being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials had
already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the
residence of Don Jesus, without much delay. With
the coming of Madarieta and the coming back of
Gaya, there were now six people gathered in the
living room, namely: Don Jesus Alsua, Don
Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr.
Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr. Jose
Gaya. All the witnesses who testified for the
petitioner declared that Don Jesus was in bright and
lively conversation which ran from problems of
farming and the merits of French-made wines. At 1
1:00 o'clock, Don Gregorio made a remark that it is
about time to do what they were there for, and this
was followed by a more or less statement from
Jesus, who said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
'Preisamente es por lo que he
Hamado a ustedes que esten
presentes para ser testigos de rni
ultimo voluntad y testamento que
ha sido preparado por el abogado
Sr. Gregorio Imperial segun mis
instrucciones cuyo documento
tengo aqui conmigo y encuentro
que, despues de lo he leido, esta
satisfactoriamente hecho segun
mis instrucciones, Como saben
ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos
todos egos.' (pp. 43-44, t.s.n.,
hearing of December 7, 1967,
Sarte.
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the
big round table on another part of the same sala for
convenience in signing because there were chairs all
around this table. The will which consisted of nine
pages, with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid on
the round table and the signing began, with Atty.
Jorge S. Imperial assisting each person signing by
indicating the proper place where the signature shall
be written. Don Jesus, as testator, signed first. After
signing the original and the two other sets, the three
sets were then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who
signed as attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr.
Jose Madarieta signed next as another attesting
witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished signing
all the three sets, the same were passed to Mr. Jose
Gaya who also signed as the third attesting witness.
On each of the three sets, Don Jesus signed ten
times, — one on the margin of each of the nine
pages, and at the end of the instrument proper. Each
of the three attesting witnesses (Balana, Madarieta
and Gaya) signed eleven times on each set, — one
on the margin of each of the nine pages, one at the
end of the instrument proper and one below the
attestation clause. The original will was marked as
Exh. A (or set A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K)
and the triplicate of Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr.
Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were Identified by Mr.
Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge)
imperial. It was also clearly established that when
Don Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr.
Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and
witnessed said signing, and that when each of these
three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and the two
other attesting witnesses were present and
Witnessing said Signing. The signing by the testator
and the attesting witnesses having been completed,
Atty. Jorge S. Imperial as Notary Public with
commission for the entire province of Albay,
notarized the wilt and sealed it with his notarial seat
which seal he brought along that morning. After all
the three sets were notarized, they were all given
back to Don Jesus who placed them inside the same
folder. At that moment, it was already about 12:30
P.M. and Don Jesus invited all of them to lunch,
which invitation was gladly accepted by all of then-
L (pp. 474-480, Joint Record on Appeal in CA-G.R.
No. 54492-R)
which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to
conclude that the same had not complied with the requirements of
Arts. 804- 806 of the New Civil Code. ... (CA Decision, pp. 13-16, as
translated).
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings of the
lower court declaring the contested will as having been executed with all the formal
requirements of a valid will, are supported by the evidence. This finding is conclusive
upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter, review or revise the same. Hence, there is no
further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the lower court and the respondent
appellate court have declared that these are the facts and such facts are fully borne and
supported by the records. We find no error in the conclusion arrived at that the
contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. We rule that the questioned
last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal requirements
of the law.
Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain details
which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of
life." First was the fact that the spouses Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay together with their
four children Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had executed the Extrajudicial
Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which divided the conjugal properties of the
spouses between the spouses themselves and the children under the terms and
conditions and dispositions herein before stated and to implement its provisions, Don
Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay subsequently executed separately their respective holographic
wigs both dated January 5, 1955 and codicils dated August 14, 1956 with the same
terms and conditions as reproduced herein earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils
having been probated thereafter and upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay, Don Jesus was
appointed executor of the will and in due time the partition of the properties or estate of
Doñ;a Tinay was approved by the probate court on July 6, 1960.
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 was
an enforceable contract which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the surviving spouse,
barring him from violating said partition agreement, barring him from revoking his
holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956, and further
barring him from executing his new will and testament of November 14, 1959, now the
subject of the probate proceedings elevated to this Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the Extrajudicial
Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056 in relation to Article
1271 of the old Civil Code which are applicable hereto. These Articles provide as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from
the commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division
inter vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the
subject- matter of contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of the law
may be deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is
restricted only to one who has made a prior will or testament. In other words, Article
1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope as to include in the exception
any person whether he has made a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old and new
Civil Code, a person who executes a will is permitted at the same time or a little
thereafter or even before as long as he mentions this fact in the will, to partition his
properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The court
further added that jurisprudence is to the effect that the partition presupposes the
execution of the will that it ratifies or effectuates, citing the case of Legasto vs.
Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court held the opinion that the extrajudicial
partition of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the holographic will executed by Don
Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the codicil of August 14, 1956.
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto vs.
Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior will
before the testator can partition his properties among his heirs, and We quote the
pertinent portions of the decision: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the
partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces,
the defendants and appellants herein, was valid and enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903,
laid down the following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to
mean that a person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property
referred to in the section wherein said article is found, without the
authority of a testament containing an expression of his last will, or
the authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be
tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized,
nor included in the chapter referring to testaments, and especially, to
the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal
consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their
lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole or a part of
their property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271
makes reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts
may be entered into with respect to future inheritances except those
the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in
accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise
leads to the conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the
basis of a testamentary or legal succession and should be made in
conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the order of the
heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of the two provisions could
be given a wider meaning or scope than that they simply provide for
the division of the estate during the lifetime of the owner, which,
otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in
order to carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons
interested.
Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and
its division; and the provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator
to dispose of his property by acts inter vivos or by last will, must be
understood in accordance with this distinction. The Idea is to divide
the estate among the heirs designated by the testator. This designation
constitutes the disposition of the properties to take effect after his
death, and said act must necessarily appear in the testament because it
is the expression of the testator's last will and must be surrounded by
appropriate formalities. Then comes the second part, to wit, the
division in conformity with that disposition, and the testator may
make this division in the same will or in another will, or by an act
inter vivos. With these words, the law, in article 1056 as well as in
article 1057, which we shall hereafter examine, makes allusion to the
forms or manner of making the partition and not to the effects thereof,
which means that, for purposes of partition the formal solemnities
which must accompany every testament or last will are not necessary.
Neither is it necessary to observe the special for. realities required in
case of donations, because it is not a matter of disposing gratuitously
of properties, but of dividing those which already have been legally
disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned
and authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator
may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first
make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could
not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the
law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of
his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has
devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter
vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word
"testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who
freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will
to take effect after his death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the extrajudicial
partition of November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code was expressly
prohibited as against public policy had been validly ratified by the holographic will of
Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956. Such a
holding of the appellate court that a person who executes a will is permitted to partition
his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even
before executing his will as long as he mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted
under the ruling of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa as
quoted above. We rule, therefore, that the respondent court erred in denying probate to
the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being
a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions
thereof and hence could not revoke his participation therein by the simple expedience of
making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-
called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a
valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only be
given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the
parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949,
contained specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that there
was substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos under the old Civil
Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could have been no valid donation to the
children of the other half reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay
which, as stated in the deed, was to be divided equally among the children for the
simple reason that the property or properties were not specifically described in the
public instrument, an essential requirement under Article 633 which provides as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be
made by public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described and in the amount of the encumbrances to be
assumed by the donee expressed.
 The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate
public writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic
notice thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be
noted in both instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses which
may be disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would like in regards to
his or her share in such portion, unencumbered by the provision enjoining the last
surviving spouse to give equally to the children what belongs or-would pertain to him or
her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and Doñ;a Tinay, in the Deed of 1949,
made to their children valid donations of only one-half of their combined properties
which must be charged against their legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless
inofficious; the other half remained entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with
regards to their respective shares.
Upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion was
distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated January 25, 1955 and her
codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the distribution of her
properties was subject to her holographic win and codicil, independently of the
holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on the same date. This is
fundamental because otherwise, to consider both wills and codicils jointly would be to
circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly
because upon the death of Doñ;a Tinay, only her estate was being settled, and not that
of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Doñ;a
Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that Doñ;a Tinay expressly or impliedly
instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her free portion of her share in
the conjugal assets. In her holographic will, mention of her children as heirs was made
in the fourth clause but it only provided that, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de
otorgado este mi testamento seran las mismas repartados entre mi
esposo o hijos arriba mencionada en el parrafo tercero su la misma
proporcion o sea: la mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra mitad (1/2)
para mis hijos en partes iguales.
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that "Should I
acquire new properties after the execution of this testament, the same shall be
partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the children mentioned in
above par. 3 in the same proportion, that is, one- half (1/2) to my spouse; and the other
half to my children in equal parts." From the above-quoted provision, the children
would only inherit together with Don Jesus whatever new properties Doñ;a Tinay would
acquire after the execution of her will.
Likewise, the codicil of Doñ;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to her share in
the free portion of the conjugal assets, and We quote that part of the
codicil: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia que
se sacara de ni cuenta de libre disposicion todos aquellos bienes de los
que no he dispuesto aun en favor de mis hijos en la escritura de
reparticion precitada y que excedieran de la mitad de gananciales que
le corresponds tal como arriba declare, incluyendo todos aquenos
bienes que se adquiriesen por nosotros despues de otorgado por mi
este testamento.
Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo sobreviviera a mi esposo
declaro que es mi voluntad que todas las propiedades de todo genero
que me pertenecen y me pudieran pertenecer, no dispuestas aun en la
reparticion, se dividan por igual entre mis herederos mencionados
despues de mi muerte.
Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his
inheritance the part of the free portion of my property which have not
been allocated in favor of my children in the Document of Partition
aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property
of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all those
properties which we shall acquire after the execution of this
document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby
declare that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that
pertains to me or would pertain to me, which have not been disposed
of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among my
above-mentioned heirs after my death.
The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining estate of
Doñ;a Tinay in the event that she should be the surviving spouse. To stress the point,
Doñ;a Tinay did not oblige her husband to give equally to the children, upon his death,
all such properties she was bequeathing him.
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed on
November 14, 1959 in view of Our holding that Doñ;a Tinay's wig and codicil did not
stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow the properties equally to the children, it follows that
all the properties of Doñ;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under her holographic win
and codicil became part of Don Jesus' estate unburdened by any condition obligation or
proviso.
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of November
25, 1949 and had in fact conformed to said Partition by making a holographic will and
codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of Doñ;a Tinay, which respondent
court sustained. We rule, however, that Don Jesus was not forever bound thereby for his
previous holographic will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his discretion.
Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A win may be revoked by the testator at any
time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void." There can be no
restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and
codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in
the case at bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the
first place, probate only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the
dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the succession are transmitted only
from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine,
Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his property before his death to
whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced,
which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole
Alsua estate is being contested.
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir instituted to the
remaining estate of Doñ;a Tinay in her holographic will and codicil resulting in all such
properties becoming the properties of Don Jesus alone, and after clearly pointing out
that Don Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous holographic will and codicil, by making
another win expressly cancelling and revoking the former, the next issue for the Court's
resolution is the validity of the provisions of the contested will. Though the law and
jurisprudence are clear that only questions about the extrinsic validity of the will may be
entertained by the probate court, the Court had, on more than one occasion, passed upon
the intrinsic validity of a will even before it had been authenticated. Thus We declared
in Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will
should be allowed to probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
intrinsic validity of the wilt Normally this comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. ...
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt nothing will
be gained. On the contrary, this litigation win be protracted and for
ought that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will probability exists that the case win come up once
again before us on the issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
wilt Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These
are the practical considerations that induce us to a behalf that we
might as well meet head-on the time of the validity of the provisions
of the will in question. ...
The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 contained an
express revocation of his holographic wig of January 5, 1955 and the codicil of August
14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of his properties donated to his children in the
Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of his estate; the
institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a
statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in the
future, before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as
executrix without bond.
Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the properties distributed
to the children under the Deed of 1949 and those distributed under the contested will of
Don Jesus does not show that the former had in fact been included in the latter. This
being so, it must be presumed that the intention of Don Jesus in his last win was not to
revoke the donations already made in the Deed of 1949 but only to redistribute his
remaining estate, or that portion of the conjugal assets totally left to his free disposal
and that which he received as his inheritance from Doñ;a Tinay. The legitimes of the
forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or
intimated otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in the contested will belonged
wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be diamond of by him to whomsoever
he may choose.
If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as in
fact he was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of
Don Jesus in doing so. We have clearly laid down this rule in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73
Phil. 635, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its
own Idea of a just distribution of the property in the face of a different
mode of disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix in the latter
will. ...
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will
in order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable division of
the estate of a deceased person. The only functions of the courts in
these cases is to carry out the intention of the deceased as manifested
in the wig. Once that intention has been determined through a careful
reading of the will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not
been violated, it is beyond the place of judicial cognizance to inquire
into the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequeast. The court
should not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of the
testatrix, first, because as already stated, nothing in the law restrained
her from disposing of her property in any manner she desired, and
 secondly, because there are no adequate means of ascertaining the
inward process of her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own
attitude toward those who expected her bounty. ...
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which allegedly
benefited and favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the other heirs who would have
been entitled to an equal share under the extrajudicial partition of 1949, faced two
alternatives-one, to consider Don Jesus as a man of culture and honor and would not
snow himself to violate the previous agreement, and the other as one whose mental
faculties or his possession of the same had been diminished considering that when the
will was executed, he was already 84 years of age and in view of his weakness and
advanced age, the actual administration of his properties had been left to his assistant
Madarieta who, for his part received instructions from Francisco and her husband,
Joseph Betts. According to the court, the better explanation is the latter, which is not
legally tenable. Under Article 799 of the New Civil Code which provides as
follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be
in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or
other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the
will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act,
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win. Mere
weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age-does not
render a person incapable of making a will. têñ.£îhqwâ£
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that
degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or Idiocy,
there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and
while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or
partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a
person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person
may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to
whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held
that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person
shall actually be insane or of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14
Phil. 163).
The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will, it is
essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution, and under
Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind in the absence of
proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the acceptance by the respondent court of the
findings of fact of the trial court on the due execution of the last win and testament of
Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the will was not
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. But more than that, gleaned
from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described behavior of Don Jesus
is not that of a mentally incapacitated person nor one suffering from "senile dementia"
as claimed by private respondents. From these accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was
Don Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he wanted to
divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his properties should
pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his lawyer w-as even
corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will at his house in Ligao,
"Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the conversation which ran
from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the
will by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don
Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or gathering, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten presentes
para ser testigos de mi ultima voluntad y testamento que ha sido
preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial segun mis
instrucciones cuyo documents tengo aqui con migo y encuentro que,
despues de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.
Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun implications
thereof.
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other details which,
in the words of the decision "are a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary
course of things and of fife" such as the fact that Don Jesus had sought the probate of
his will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956 during his lifetime but
insofar as the will of November 14, 1959 is concerned, he had no intention of seeking
the probate thereof during his lifetime, the alleged redundant and unnecessary
proceedings undertaken by Don Jesus in the properties under question to petitioner
Franciso Alsua-Betts when the same properties had already been bequeathed to her in
the will of November 14, 1959 and that "nothing, absolutely nothing, could be made the
basis for finding that Don Jesus Alsua had regarded his other children with less favor,
and that he was more sympathetic to Francisca so as to or forget the former depriving
them of benefits already given to them and rewarding the latter with disproportionate
advantages or benefits, to such an extreme as to violate his previous disposition
consecrated in the previous extrajudicial partition, Exh. 8."
We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found difficult to
reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life are mere conjectures, surmises
or speculations which, however, do not warrant or justify disallowance of the probate of
the win of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not cause his will to be probated
during his lifetime while his previous holographic win and codicil were duly probated
when he was still alive is a mere speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of
Don Jesus as the testator. The law does not require that a will be probated during the
lifetime of the testator and for not doing so there cannot arise any favorable or
unfavorable consequence therefrom. The parties cannot correctly guess or surmise the
motives of the testator and neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or
conjecture is no valid and legal ground to reject allowance or disallowance of the wig.
The same thing can be said as to whatever reason Don Jesus had for selling the
properties to his daughter Francisca when he had already assigned the same properties
to her in his will. While We can speculate that Don Jesus desired to have possession of
the properties transferred to Francisca after the sale instead of waiting for his death may
be a reasonable explanation or speculation for the act of the testator and yet there is no
certainty that such was actually the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the
respondents may offer or as difficult to accept which respondent court believes. A
conjecture is always a conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for annulment of
the two Deeds of Sale executed by and between Don Jesus and petitioner Francisco is
their validity or nullity. Private respondents mainly contend that the sales were fictitious
or simulated, there having been no actual consideration paid. They further insist that the
issue raised is a question of fact and, therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari proceeding
before the Supreme Court. On the other hand, petitioners herein maintain that it was
error for the respondent court to set aside on appeal the factual findings of the trial court
that the two sales were valid.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings
of fact being conclusive; and this same principle applies even if the Court of Appeals
was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a
consequent reversal of its findings of fact. But what should not be ignored by lawyers
and litigants alike is the more basic principle that the "findings of fact" described as
"final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which are based upon
substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare
the absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. These
are exceptions to the general rule, where We have reviewed and revised the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that findings of fact by
the Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257);
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna vs.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2927);
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs. Sosing, L-4875,
Nov. 27, 1953);
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April 30,
1957); and
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee
(Evangelists vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139, April 23, 1958; Ramos vs. Pepsi
Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289).
In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's conclusion as to
the nullity of the contested sales was not supported by the evidence on record and
adduced during the trial.
Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit U, a deed
of sale over agricultural lands executed on August 26, 1961 by Don Jesus in favor of
Francisca for the consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00), which
document bears the signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as a forgery, and the signature
of Pablo Alsua as an instrumental witness, again not assailed as a forgery nor alleged as
done thru fraud, force or threat. (2) Exhibit "W", a deed of sale over urban lots executed
on November 16, 1962 for the consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00),
which document also bears the signature of Don Jesus, also admittedly not a forgery. (3)
Exhibit "F", a document dated August 26, 1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo
Alsua as witness, acknowledging receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No. 0252
in the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of
agricultural land to Francisco under the same date; again, Pablo did not deny the
genuineness of his signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the Philippine Islands Check
No. D-6979 dated November 26, 1962, in the amount of P32,644.71, drawn and signed
by Francesca, payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X-1", a second Bank of Philippine
Islands Check (No. D-6980) also dated November 26, 1962 in the amount of
?47,355.29, drawn by Francisco and payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-5
", endorsements on the back of the last two checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures
thereon were not assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in the annulment case), a Bureau of Internal
Revenue Receipt (No. 2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a notation
acknowledging the receipt of BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from
Don Jesus Alsua in payment of Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus
interest. We are convinced and satisfied from this array of documentary evidence that in
fact, Don Jesus sold the subject properties to his daughter, Francisca for the total
consideration of P150,000.00.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for being
without cause or consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground upon which the
respondent court upheld said claim on the basis that there was no need for funds in Don
Jesus' old age aside from the speculation that there was nothing in the evidence that
showed what motivated Don Jesus to change his mind as to favor Francesca and
discriminate against the other children. The two contracts of same executed by Don
Jesus in favor of Francesca are evidenced by Exhibits "U" and "W", the genuineness of
which were not at all assailed at any time during this long drawn-out litigation of 15
years standing. That the consideration stated in the contracts were paid is also
sufficiently proved as the receipts thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the
private respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny the payment
of the consideration And even of he now allege that in fact no transfer of money was
involved, We find his allegation belied by Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which show that
the checks of Francisco made payable to Don Jesus. were in fact given to Don Jesus as
he endorsed them on the back thereof, and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the
annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus actually used Exhibit "XI " to complete
payment on the estate and inheritance tax on the estate of his wife to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.

Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the
inadequacy of the given price. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract
unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or
undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated price as
so inadequate to shock the court's conscience, considering that the price paid was much
higher than the assessed value of the subject properties and considering that the sales
were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into
account.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is

hereby set aside. The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special
Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with costs against
respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36083 September 5, 1975
Spouses RAMON DOROMAL, SR., and ROSARIO SALAS, and Spouses
RAMON DOROMAL, JR., and GAUDELIA VEGA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENA JAVELLANA, respondents.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Parlade and Associates and Marvin J. Mirasol for petitioners.
Arturo H. Villanueva, Jr. for private respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
47945-R entitled Filomena Javellana vs. Spouses Ramon Doromal, Sr., et al. which
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo that had in turn dismissed
herein private respondent Filomena Javellana's action for redemption of a certain
property sold by her co-owners to herein petitioners for having been made out of time.
The factual background found by the Court of Appeals and which is binding on this
Court, the same not being assailed by petitioners as being capricious, is as follows:
IT RESULTING: That the facts are quite simple; Lot 3504 of the
cadastral survey of Iloilo, situated in the poblacion of La Paz, one of
its districts, with an area of a little more than 2-½ hectares was
originally decreed in the name of the late Justice Antonio Horilleno,
in 1916, under Original Certificate of Title No. 1314, Exh. A; but
before he died, on a date not particularized in the record, he executed
a last will and testament attesting to the fact that it was a co-
ownership between himself and his brothers and sisters, Exh. C; so
that the truth was that the owners or better stated, the co-owners were;
beside Justice Horilleno,
"Luis, Soledad, Fe, Rosita, Carlos and Esperanza,"
all surnamed Horilleno, and since Esperanza had already died, she
was succeeded by her only daughter and heir herein plaintiff.
Filomena Javellana, in the proportion of 1/7 undivided ownership
each; now then, even though their right had not as yet been annotated
in the title, the co-owners led by Carlos, and as to deceased Justice
Antonio Horilleno, his daughter Mary, sometime since early 1967,
had wanted to sell their shares, or if possible if Filomena Javellana
were agreeable, to sell the entire property, and they hired an
acquaintance Cresencia Harder, to look for buyers, and the latter came
to interest defendants, the father and son, named Ramon Doromal, Sr.
and Jr., and in preparation for the execution of the sale, since the
brothers and sisters Horilleno were scattered in various parts of the
country, Carlos in Ilocos Sur, Mary in Baguio, Soledad and Fe, in
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Rosita in Basilan City, they all executed
various powers of attorney in favor of their niece, Mary H. Jimenez
Exh. 1-8, they also caused preparation of a power of attorney of
identical tenor for signature by plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, Exh. M,
and sent it with a letter of Carlos, Exh. 7 dated 18 January, 1968 unto
her thru Mrs. Harder, and here, Carlos informed her that the price was
P4.00 a square meter, — although it now turns out according to Exh.
3 that as early as 22 October, 1967, Carlos had received in check as
earnest money from defendant Ramon Doromal, Jr., the sum of
P5,000.00 and the price therein agreed upon was five (P5.00) pesos a
square meter as indeed in another letter also of Carlos to Plaintiff in 5
November, 1967, Exh. 6, he had told her that the Doromals had given
the earnest money of P5,000.00 at P5.00 a square meter, — at any
rate, plaintiff not being agreeable, did not sign the power of attorney,
and the rest of the co-owners went ahead with their sale of their 6/7,
Carlos first seeing to it that the deed of sale by their common attorney
in fact, Mary H. Jimenez be signed and ratified as it was signed and
ratified in Candon, Ilocos Sur, on 15 January, 1968, Exh. 2, then
brought to Iloilo by Carlos in the same month, and because the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo refused to register right away, since the
original registered owner, Justice Antonio Horilleno was already
dead, Carlos had to ask as he did, hire Atty. Teotimo Arandela to file
a petition within the cadastral case, on 26 February, 1968, for the
purpose, Exh. C, after which Carlos returned to Luzon, and after
compliance with the requisites of publication, hearing and notice, the
petition was approved, and we now see that on 29 April, 1968, Carlos
already back in Iloilo went to the Register of Deeds and caused the
registration of the order of the cadastral court approving the issuance
of a new title in the name of the co-owners, as well as of the deed of
sale to the Doromals, as a result of which on that same date, a new
title was issued TCT No. 23152, in the name of the Horillenos to 6/7
and plaintiff Filomena Javellana to 1/7, Exh. D, only to be cancelled
on the same day under TCT No. 23153, Exh. 2, already in the names
of the vendees Doromals for 6/7 and to herein plaintiff, Filomena
Javellana, 1/7, and the next day 30 April, 1968, the Doromals paid
unto Carlos by check, the sum of P97,000.00 Exh. 1, of Chartered
Bank which was later substituted by check of Phil. National Bank,
because there was no Chartered Bank Branch in Ilocos Sur, but
besides this amount paid in check, the Doromals according to their
evidence still paid an additional amount in cash of P18,250.00 since
the agreed price was P5.00 a square meter; and thus was
 consummated the transaction, but it is here where complications set
in,

On 10 June, 1968, there came to the residence of the Doromals in Dumangas, Iloilo, Mr. & Mrs. Ramon Doromal, Sr.
plaintiff's lawyer, Atty. Arturo H. Villanueva, bringing with him her letter of that date, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Doromal, Jr.
reading,
"Dumangas Iloilo
"
P Dear Mr. and Mrs. Doromal:
.
O
The bearer of this letter is my nephew, Atty. Arturo
.
H. Villanueva, Jr., of this City. Through him, I am
making a formal offer to repurchase or redeem from
B
you the 6/7 undivided share in Lot No. 3504, of the
o Iloilo Cadastre, which you bought from my
x erstwhile co-owners, the Horillenos, for the sum of
P30,000.00, Atty. Villanueva has with him the sum
1
of P30,000.00 in cash, which he will deliver to you
8
as soon as you execute the contract of sale in my
9
favor.
,

BThank you very much for whatever favorable consideration you can
a give this request.
c
o V
l e
o r
d y

C t
i r
t u
y l
y
J
u y
n o
e u
r
1 s
0 ,
,

1
9
 G "Plaintiff was informed of the intended sale of the
N 6/7 share belonging to the Horillenos."
E
Dand that,
)
"The plaintiff have every reason to be grateful to Atty. Carlos
M
Horilleno because in the petition for declaration of heirs of her late
r
uncle Antonio Horilleno in whose name only the Original Certificate
s
of Title covering the Lot in question was issued, her uncle Atty.
.
Carlos Horilleno included her as one of the heirs of said Antonio
Horilleno. Instead, she filed this case to redeem the 6/7 share sold to
F
the Doromals for the simple reason that the consideration in the deed
I
of sale is the sum of P30,000.00 only instead of P115,250.00
L
approximately which was actually paid by the defendants to her co-
O
owners, thus she wants to enrich herself at the expense of her own
M
blood relatives who are her aunts, uncles and cousins. The
Econsideration of P30,000.00 only was placed in the deed of sale to
Nminimize the payment of the registration fees, stamps, and sales tax.
A
pp. 77-78, R.A.,
J
Aand dismiss and further condemned plaintiff to pay attorney's fees,
Vand moral and exemplary damages as set forth in few pages back, it is
Ebecause of this that plaintiff has come here and contends, that Lower
LCourt erred:
L
A"I. ... in denying plaintiff-appellant, as a co-owner of Lot No. 3504, of
Nthe Iloilo Cadastre, the right of legal redemption under Art. 1620, of
Athe Civil Code:
"
"II. ... as a consequence of the above error, in refusing to order the
p. 26, Exh. "J", Manual of Exhibits. defendants-appellees, the vendees of a portion of the aforesaid Lot
No. 3504 which they bought from the co-owners of the plaintiff-
and then and there said lawyer manifested to the Doromals that he had appellant, to reconvey the portion they purchased to the herein
the P30,000.00 with him in cash, and tendered it to them, for the plaintiff-appellant..
exercise of the legal redemption, the Doromals were aghast, and
refused. and the very next day as has been said. 11 June, 1968, "III. ... in admitting extrinsic evidence in the determination of the
plaintiff filed this case, and in the trial, thru oral and documentary consideration of the sale, instead of simply adhering to the purchase
proofs sought to show that as co-owner, she had the right to redeem at price of P30,000.00, set forth in the pertinent Deed of Sale executed
the price stated in the deed of sale, Exh. 2, namely P30,000.00 of the by the vendors and owners of the plaintiff-appellant in favor of the
but defendants in answer, and in their evidence, oral and documentary defendants-appellees.
sought to show that plaintiff had no more right to redeem and that if
ever she should have, that it should be at the true and real price by "IV. ... in dismissing the complaint filed in this case." pp. 1-3,
them paid, namely, the total sum of P115,250.00, and trial judge, after Appellant's Brief,.
hearing the evidence, believed defendants, that plaintiff had no more
right, to redeem, because,
 which can be reduced to the simple question of whether or not on tile
basis of the evidence and the law, the judgment appealed from should
be maintained; (Pp. 16-22, Record.) .
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held that
although respondent Javellana was informed of her co-owners' proposal to sell the land
in question to petitioners she was, however, "never notified ... least of all, in writing", of
the actual execution and registration of the corresponding deed of sale, hence, said
respondent's right to redeem had not yet expired at the time she made her offer for that
purpose thru her letter of June 10, 1968 delivered to petitioners on even date. The
intermediate court further held that the redemption price to be paid by respondent
should be that stated in the deed of sale which is P30,000 notwithstanding that the
preponderance of the evidence proves that the actual price paid by petitioners was
P115,250. Thus, in their brief, petitioners assign the following alleged errors:
I observed, it was Carlos Horilleno alone who signed them, and as of January 18, 1968,
IT IS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THAT
THE NOTICE IN WRITING OF THE SALE CONTEMPLATED IN
ARTICLE 1623 OF THE CIVIL CODE REFERS TO A NOTICE IN
WRITING AFTER THE EXECUTION AND REGISTRATION OF
THE INSTRUMENT OF SALE, HENCE, OF THE DOCUMENT OF
SALE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE INSCRIPTION OF THE SALE IN THE REGISTRY OF
PROPERTY TAKES EFFECT AS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS
INCLUDING CLAIMS OF POSSIBLE REDEMPTIONERS.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS
THE RIGHT TO REDEEM, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE REDEMPTION PRICE SHOULD BE
THAT STATED IN THE DEED OF SALE. (Pp. 1-2, Brief for
Petitioner, page 74-Rec.)
We cannot agree with petitioners.
Petitioners do not question respondent's right to redeem, she being admittedly a 1/7 co-
owner of the property in dispute. The thrust of their first assignment of error is that for
purposes of Article 1623 of the Civil Code which provides that:
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners.
the letters sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent and dated January 18, 1968, Exhibit 7,
and November 5, 1967, Exhibit 6, constituted the required notice in writing from which
the 30-day period fixed in said provision should be computed. But to start with, there is
no showing that said letters were in fact received by respondent and when they were
actually received. Besides, petitioners do not pinpoint which of these two letters, their
dates being more than two months apart, is the required notice. In any event, as found
by the appellate court, neither of said letters referred to a consummated sale. As may be
powers of attorney from the various co-owners were still to be secured. Indeed, the later
letter of January 18, 1968 mentioned that the price was P4.00 per square meter whereas
in the earlier letter of November 5, 1967 it was P5.00, as in fact, on that basis, as early
as October 27, 1967, Carlos had already received P5,000 from petitioners supposedly as
earnest money, of which, however, mention was made by him to his niece only in the
later letter of January 18, 1968, the explanation being that "at later negotiation it was
increased to P5.00 per square meter." (p. 4 of petitioners' brief as appellees in the Court
of Appeals quoting from the decision of the trial court.) In other words, while the letters
relied upon by petitioners could convey the idea that more or less some kind of
consensus had been arrived at among the other co-owners to sell the property in dispute
to petitioners, it cannot be said definitely that such a sale had even been actually
perfected. The fact alone that in the later letter of January 18, 1968 the price indicated
was P4.00 per square meter while in that of November 5, 1967, what was stated was
P5.00 per square meter negatives the possibility that a "price definite" had already been
agreed upon. While P5,000 might have indeed been paid to Carlos in October, 1967,
there is nothing to show that the same was in the concept of the earnest money
contemplated in Article 1482 of the Civil Code, invoked by petitioner, as signifying
perfection of the sale. Viewed in the backdrop of the factual milieu thereof extant in the
record, We are more inclined to believe that the said P5,000 were paid in the concept of
earnest money as the term was understood under the Old Civil Code, that is, as a
guarantee that the buyer would not back out, considering that it is not clear that there
was already a definite agreement as to the price then and that petitioners were decided
to buy 6/7 only of the property should respondent Javellana refuse to agree to part with
her 1/7 share.
In the light of these considerations, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the letters aforementioned sufficed to comply with the requirement of
notice of a sale by co-owners under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. We are of the
considered opinion and so hold that for purposes of the co-owner's right of redemption
granted by Article 1620 of the Civil Code, the notice in writing which Article 1623
requires to be made to the other co-owners and from receipt of which the 30-day period
to redeem should be counted is a notice not only of a perfected sale but of the actual
execution and delivery of the deed of sale. This is implied from the latter portion of
Article 1623 which requires that before a register of deeds can record a sale by a co-
owner, there must be presented to him, an affidavit to the effect that the notice of the
sale had been sent in writing to the other co-owners. A sale may not be presented to the
register of deeds for registration unless it be in the form of a duly executed public
instrument. Moreover, the law prefers that all the terms and conditions of the sale
should be definite and in writing. As aptly observed by Justice Gatmaitan in the
decision under review, Article 1619 of the Civil Code bestows unto a co-owner the right
to redeem and "to be subrogated under the same terms and conditions stipulated in the
contract", and to avoid any controversy as to the terms and conditions under which the
right to redeem may be exercised, it is best that the period therefor should not be
deemed to have commenced unless the notice of the disposition is made after the formal
deed of disposal has been duly executed. And it being beyond dispute that respondent
herein has never been notified in writing of the execution of the deed of sale by which
petitioners acquired the subject property, it necessarily follows that her tender to redeem
the same made on June 10, 1968 was well within the period prescribed by law. Indeed,
it is immaterial when she might have actually come to know about said deed, it
appearing she has never been shown a copy thereof through a written communication
by either any of the petitioners-purchasers or any of her co-owners-vendees. (Cornejo et
al. vs. CA et al., 16 SCRA 775.)
The only other pivotal issue raised by petitioners relates to the price which respondent
offered for the redemption in question. In this connection, from the decision of the
Court of Appeals, We gather that there is "decisive preponderance of evidence"
establishing "that the price paid by defendants was not that stated in the document,
Exhibit 2, of P30,000 but much more, at least P97,000, according to the check, Exhibit
1, if not a total of P115,250.00 because another amount in cash of P18,250 was paid
afterwards."
It is, therefore, the contention of petitioners here that considering said finding of fact of
the intermediate court, it erred in holding nevertheless that "the redemption price should
be that stated in the deed of sale."
Again, petitioners' contention cannot be sustained. As stated in the decision under
review, the trial court found that "the consideration of P30,000 only was placed in the
deed of sale to minimize the payment of the registration fees, stamps and sales tax."
With this undisputed fact in mind, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to sanction
petitioners' pragmatic but immoral posture. Being patently violative of public policy
and injurious to public interest, the seemingly wide practice of understating
considerations of transactions for the purpose of evading taxes and fees due to the
government must be condemned and all parties guilty thereof must be made to suffer
the consequences of their ill-advised agreement to defraud the state. Verily, the trial
court fell short of its devotion and loyalty to the Republic in officially giving its stamp
of approval to the stand of petitioners and even berating respondent Javellana as
wanting to enrich herself "at the expense of her own blood relatives who are her aunts,
uncles and cousins." On the contrary, said "blood relatives" should have been sternly
told, as We here hold, that they are in pari-delicto with petitioners in committing tax
evasion and should not receive any consideration from any court in respect to the
money paid for the sale in dispute. Their situation is similar to that of parties to an
illegal contract.1
Of course, the Court of Appeals was also eminently correct in its considerations
supporting the conclusion that the redemption in controversy should be only for the
price stipulated in the deed, regardless of what might have been actually paid by
petitioners that style inimitable and all his own, Justice Gatmaitan states those
considerations thus:
CONSIDERING: As to this that the evidence has established with
decisive preponderance that the price paid by defendants was not that
stated in the document, Exh. 2 of P30,000.00 but much more, at least
P97,000.00 according to the check, Exh. 1 if not a total of
P115,250.00 because another amount in cash of P18,250.00 was paid
afterwards, perhaps it would be neither correct nor just that plaintiff
should be permitted to redeem at only P30,000.00, that at first glance
would practically enrich her by the difference, on the other hand, after
some reflection, this Court can not but have to bear in mind certain
definite points.
1st — According to Art. 1619
"Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms
and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who
acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title." pp.
471-472, New Civil Code,
and note that redemptioner right is to be subrogated
"upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract."
and here, the stipulation in the public evidence of the contract, made
public by both vendors and vendees is that the price was P30,000.00;
2nd — According to Art. 1620,
"A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the share of all the
other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation
is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. p. 472, New
Civil Code, .
from which it is seen that if the price paid is 'grossly excessive'
redemptioner is required to pay only a reasonable one; not that
actually paid by the vendee, going to show that the law seeks to
protect redemptioner and converts his position into one not that of a
contractually but of a legally subrogated creditor as to the right of
redemption, if the price is not 'grossly excessive', what the law had
intended redemptioner to pay can be read in Art. 1623.
The right of a legal pre-emption or redemption shall
not be exercised except within thirty (30) days from
the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof of all
possible redemptioners.' p. 473, New Civil Code,
if that be so that affidavit must have been intended by the lawmakers
for a definite purpose, to argue that this affidavit has no purpose is to
go against all canons of statutory construction, no law mandatory in
character and worse, prohibitive should be understood to have no
purpose at all, that would be an absurdity, that purpose could not but
have been to give a clear and unmistakable guide to redemptioner, on
how much he should pay and when he should redeem; from this must
follow that that notice must have been intended to state the truth and
if vendor and vendee should have instead, decided to state an untruth
therein, it is they who should bear the consequences of having thereby
misled the redemptioner who had the right to rely and act thereon and
on nothing else; stated otherwise, all the elements of equitable
estoppel are here since the requirement of the law is to submit the
affidavit of notice to all possible redemptioners, that affidavit to be a
condition precedent to registration of the sale therefore, the law must
have intended that it be by the parties understood that they were there
asking a solemn representation to all possible redemptioners, who
upon faith of that are thus induced to act, and here worse for the
parties to the sale, they sought to avoid compliance with the law and
certainly refusal to comply cannot be rewarded with exception and
acceptance of the plea that they cannot be now estopped by their own
representation, and this Court notes that in the trial and to this appeal,
plaintiff earnestly insisted and insists on their estoppel;
have been impossible for vendors and vendees to have inserted in the
affidavit that the price was truly P97,000.00 plus P18,250.00 or a total
of P115,250.00; in other words, if defendants had only complied with
the law, they would have been obligated to accept the redemption
money of only P30,000.00;
4th — If it be argued that foregoing solution would mean unjust
enrichment for plaintiff, it need only be remembered that plaintiff's
right is not contractual, but a mere legal one, the exercise of a right
granted by the law, and the law is definite that she can subrogate
herself in place of the buyer,
"upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract,"
in the words of Art. 1619, and here the price
"stipulated in the contract"
was P30,000.00, in other words, if this be possible enrichment on the
part of Filomena, it was not unjust but just enrichment because
permitted by the law; if it still be argued that plaintiff would thus be
enabled to abuse her right, the answer simply is that what she is
seeking to enforce is not an abuse but a mere exercise of a right; if it
be stated that just the same, the effect of sustaining plaintiff would be
to promote not justice but injustice, the answer again simply is that
this solution is not unjust because it only binds the parties to make
good their solemn representation to possible redemptioners on the
price of the sale, to what they had solemnly averred in a public
document required by the law to be the only basis for that exercise of
redemption; (Pp. 24-27, Record.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners..

3rd — If therefore, here vendors had only attempted to comply with

the law, they would have been obligated to send a copy of the deed of
sale unto Filomena Javellana and from that copy, Filomena would
have been notified that she should if she had wanted to redeem,
offered no more, no less, that P30,000.00, within 30 days, it would
 [ GR No. 72873, May 28, 1987 ]
CARLOS ALONZO v. IAC +
DECISION
234 Phil. 267
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture,
whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is
unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not
equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of
justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme
of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry
of Deeds of Tarlac.[1]
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share to
the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale.[2] One year later,
on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees,
in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P440.00.[3]
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two?fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their
son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed
area.[4]
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the
area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that
he was an American citizen.[5] On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-
heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her
brother.[6]
The trial court* also dismisses this complaint, now on the ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and
1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the
sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.[7]
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The
other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only
604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners.[8] Eustaquia herself,
who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later
claimed redemption.[9] Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close
friends and neighbors whose children went to school together.[10]
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they
thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was
impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection
thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was
done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and
application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners
and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
follows:
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor."
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court* declared that the notice required by
the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals[11] applied by the
trial court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article
1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing
the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would
satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the
redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he
declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running."
In the earlier decision of Butte v. Uy,[12] the Court, speaking through the same learned
jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the
vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co?owners excludes that of the adjoining owners."
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately
selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed
exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would
not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard
cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that
there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied
and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of
such deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less
expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and
the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as
it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."[13] While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the
power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While
we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right
to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that
killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's will.
"The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the
statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but
not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within
the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers."[14]
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is
properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to
obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked
not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed
by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the
second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade,
assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of
redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would
such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was
not in writing, would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had
expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense
that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964.
By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the
law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners
are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were
actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that
such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in
1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the
sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This
could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the
co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when
Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished
because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
"While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an
alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he
bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and
the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party
neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the
facts."[15]
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo,
who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build
thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet,
given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to
ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one
of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict
letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be
clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Butte doctrines.
What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint
for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These
are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due."[16] That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 79958 October 28, 1988
EMILIANA BAUTISTA, as Heir of the late MANUEL BAUTISTA and
EVANGELINE BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUSTICES CAROLINA C. GRINO-AQUINO, MANUEL T. REYES, AND
JAIME M. LANTIN in their capacity as Justices of the Special First Division of
the Court of Appeals, HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City, MANOLITO
BAUTISTA, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN, BETTY N. BAUTISTA alias BEATRIZ
BAUTISTA, NELIA N. BAUTISTA, GLORIA N. BAUTISTA, CLARITA N.
BAUTISTA and ROSALINA BAUTISTA, respondents.
Roberto M. Mendoza for petitioners.
Florante R. Mendoza for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Can the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of
the estate of the deceased wife? This is the singular issue in this petition.
In Civil Case No. 4033-P, petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal to declare the deed of extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer
Certificates Title Nos. 14182, 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City
and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and void.
On January 6,1976, the parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts dated
December 15, 1975:
1. That both parties admit that the land in question was registered in the name of
petitioner Manuel Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter inherited this land from
his father, Mariano Bautista;
2. Both petitioners and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were signatories to the deed,
and the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that
document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial
Partition;
3. Both parties admit that upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
T.C.T. No. 2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182 was issued;
4. The parties admit that the private respondents, with the exception of Manolito
Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that
property;
5. Upon registration of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista;
6. On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other
private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T. C.T. Nos. T-1 5665,
T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T-15671, were issued to private
respondents;
7. Parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife Emiliana
Tamayo;
8. Parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a
child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949;
9. That the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of
property on December 22,1966, among the heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first
wife of Manuel Bautista;
10. Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property;
11. On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned
signature of Manuel Bautista;
12. That the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic. (Pp. 37-38,
rollo; pp. 2-3 of decision of respondent court)
In a decision of January 14, 1983, the trial court dismissed the complaint with costs
against plaintiffs. On appeal, a decision was rendered in due course by the Court of
Appeals on August 3, 1987, affirming the decision of the trial court. 1
Petitioner now seeks a review of said decision alleging the following errors committed
by the respondent court-
A. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ARE
MANIFESTLY ABSURD AND MISTAKEN;
B. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AUTHORIZED THE EXTRA-
JUDICIAL PARTITION OF FUTURE INHERITANCE IN CLEAR
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1347 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE:
 C. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AUTHORIZED THE PRETERITION
OF PETITIONER EVANGELINE BAUTISTA IN VIOLATION OF
THE LAW ON SUCCESSIO. (P. 7, petition for review; p. 8, rollo)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that the
signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is
authentic, as examined by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding.
Nevertheless, even granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned
Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on
admitted and proven facts renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial
partition was supposed to be a partition without court intervention of the estate of the
late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista, constituting the subject property. In
the same document Manuel Bautista appears to have waived his right or share in the
property in favor of private respondents.
However, the property subject matter of said extrajudicial partition does not belong to
the estate of Juliana Nojadera. It is the exclusive property of Manuel Bautista who
inherited the same from his father Mariano Bautista, which was registered in his name
under T.C.T. No. 2210.
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate
applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no
creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent
certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an
extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased
would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of
law. Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can
be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition
obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline
Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second
marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and
ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not
surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents
knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court
finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be
rescinded. 2
The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition and issuance
of the title in their names, private respondents except Manolito Bautista in turn executed
a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of the latter in whose name the title was
also issued. And yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was executed this time by
Manolito Bautista selling back the same property to private respondents in whose names
the respective titles were thus subsequently issued. This series of transactions between
and among private respondents is an indication of a clever scheme to place the property
beyond the reach of those lawfully entitled thereto.
Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the property
during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is
prohibited by law. 3
As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging
exclusively to petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all
subsequent transactions involving the same property between and among the private
respondents are also null and void.
Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to sue their co-
owners for partition of the property is imprescriptible. 4 And even assuming that the
present action may prescribe as ruled by the respondent court, petitioners Emiliana
Bautista and Evangeline Bautista who are not parties to the said instrument asserted that
they discovered the same only soon before they filed the complaint in court. Certainly
the action has not prescribed.
WHEREFORE, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision
dated August 3, 1987, of respondent Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 03631 and
the Resolution of September 11, 1987, in the same case, are hereby reversed and set
aside; and a new one is rendered declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated
December 22, 1966, as null and void ab initio, nullifying and cancelling T.C.T. Nos. T-
14182, T-14186, T-15665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T-15670, T-15671,
and Tax Declaration No. 5147, restoring and reviving T.C.T. No. 2210, in the name of
Manuel Bautista, with costs against private respondents. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished to the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City for implementation.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972
JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND
ALEJANDRO LOPEZ respondents .
Filemon Cajator for petitioner.
Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Alejandro Lopez.
MAKASIAR, J.:p
It appears from the records that Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua, Pampanga was
married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children.
On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole
heir and executor (pp. 20-21, rec.).
In a Resolution dated October 26, 1953 in Sp. Proc. No. 894 entitled "En el Asunto de
la Adopcion de la Menor Juanita Lopez y Limson" (pp. 92-94, 103, rec.), herein
petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was declared
legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After
adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not
execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the aforementioned
will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco,
was appointed executor without bond by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
(Annexes "A" and "B", pp. 18-23, rec.). Accordingly, Alejandro took his oath of office
as executor (Annex "C", p. 24, rec.).
Nevertheless, in a project of partition dated March 19, 1960 executed by both Alejandro
Lopez and Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was
recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 (Jacinta's paraphernal property), described and
embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 13092, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga
— Lot 3368 with an area of 68,141 square meters and Lot 3441 with an area of 163,231
square meters, then assessed respectively at P3,070.00 and P5,800.00 (Annex "D", pp.
27-36, rec.) — were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share free from all liens,
encumbrances and charges, with the executor Alejandro Lopez, binding himself to free
the said two parcels from such liens, encumbrances and charges. The rest of the estate
of the deceased consisting of 28 other parcels of lands with a total assessed valuation of
P69,020.00 and a combined area of 743,924.67 square meters, as well as personal
properties including a 1953 Buick car valued at P2,500.00 were allotted to Don
Alejandro who assumed all the mortgage liens on the estate (Annex "D", pp. 25-37,
rec.).
In an order dated April 23, 1960, the lower court approved the said project of partition
and directed that the records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the
estate and inheritance taxes (Annex "E", p. 38, rec.). Upon ex-parte petition of the
adjudicatees Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez-Guilas dated August 25, 1961 (Annex
"F", pp. 39-40, rec.), the lower court in an order dated August 28, 1961, approved the
correction of clerical errors appearing in the project of partition (Annex "G", p. 41,
rec.).
On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary
action to set aside and annul the project of partition, which case was docketed as Civil
Case 2539 entitled "Juanita Lopez-Guilas vs. Alejandro Lopez" in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further
that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and
to deliver immediately to Juanita lots nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre,
which were allocated to her under the project of partition (p. 132, rec.).
Meanwhile, in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition dated July 20,
1964 praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of
said lots nos. 3368 and 3441 as well as the 1,216 caverns of palay that he collected from
the ten (10) tenants or lessees of the said two lots (Annex "H", pp. 42-44, rec.).
In his opposition dated August 5, 1964 to the said petition, Alejandro Lopez claims that,
by virtue of the order dated April 23, 1960 which approved the project of partition
submitted by both Alejandro and Juanita and directed that the records of the case be
archived upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes, and the order of December
15, 1960 which "ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate
proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a
consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is
guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years
after such closure of the estate, when she could have filed a petition for relief of
judgment within sixty (60) days from December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old
Rules of Court (Annex "I") citing A. Austria vs. Heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, L-100808,
Sept. 18, 1956 (pp. 45-48, rec.).
In her reply dated November 17, 1965 to said opposition, Juanita contends that the
actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of
the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the termination
of the probate proceedings (citing Intestate estate of the deceased Mercedes Cano,
Timbol vs. Cano, 59 O.G. No. 30, pp. 46-73, April 29, 1961, where it was ruled that
"the probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the taxes, and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled
to receive the same"); that the executor Alejandro is estopped from opposing her
petition because he was the one who prepared, filed and secured court approval of, the
aforesaid project of partition, which she seeks to be implemented; that she is not guilty
of laches, because when she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for he delivery of her
share allocated to her under the project of partition, less than 3 years had elapsed from
August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approved, which is within
the 5-year period for the execution of judgment by motion (Annex "J", pp. 49-52, rec.).
In its order dated October 2, 1964, the lower court after a "pre-trial" stated that because
the civil action for the annulment of the project of partition was filed on April 13, 1964,
before the filing on July 2, 1964 of the petition for delivery of the shares of Juanita
Lopez, "the parties have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said petition
for the delivery of shares until; after the civil action aforementioned has been finally
settled and decided", and forthwith set the civil action for annulment for trial on
November 25, and December 2, 1964 (Annex "K", pp. 53-54, rec.).
On June 11, 1965, Juanita filed an amended complaint in Civil Case 2539 (pp. 78-110,
rec.), where she acknowledges the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
insofar as the allocation in her favor of the Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of
which she is seeking (pp. 106-107, rec.).
In her motion dated November 17, 1965, Juanita sought the setting aside of the order
dated October 2, 1964 on the ground that while the said order considered her action for
annulment of the project of partition as a prejudicial question, her filing an amended
complaint on June 11, 1965 in civil case No. 2539 wherein she admitted the partial
legality and validity of the project of partition with respect to the adjudication to her of
the two lots as her share, rendered said civil case No. 2539 no longer a prejudicial
question to her petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery of her share (Annex "L", pp.
55-59, rec.).
Alejandro filed his opposition dated December 1, 1965 to the aforesaid motion of
Juanita to set aside the order dated October 2, 1964 (Annex "M", pp. 60-61, rec.), to
which Juanita filed her rejoinder dated December 6, 1965 wherein she stated among
others that pursuant to the project of partition, executor Alejandro secured the
cancellation of OCT. No. 13093 covering the two parcels of land adjudicated to her
under the project of partition and the issuance in his exclusive name on August 4, 1961
TCT No. 26638-R covering the said Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre
(Annex "N", pp. 62-71, rec.).
In an order dated April 27, 1966, the lower court denied Juanita's motion to set aside the
order of October 2, 1964 on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend
resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for
annulment of the project of partition has been finally settled and decided (Annex "O", p.
72, rec.).
Juanita filed a motion dated May 9, 1966 for the reconsideration of the order dated
April 27, 1966 (Annex "P" pp. 73-77, rec.), to which Alejandro filed an opposition
dated June 8, 1966 (Annex "Q", pp. 112-113, rec.).
Subsequently, Alejandro filed a motion dated July 25, 1966 praying that the palay
deposited with Fericsons and Ideal Rice Mill by the ten (10) tenants of the two parcels
in question be delivered to him (Annex "R", pp. 114-116, rec.),to which Juanita filed an
opposition dated July 26, 1966 (Annex "S", pp. 117-121, rec.). In an order dated
September 8, 1966, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the order
dated April 27, 1966, and directed Fericsons Inc. and the Ideal Rice Mills to deliver to
Alejandro or his representative the 229 cavans and 46 kilos and 325 and 1/2 cavans and
23 kilos of palay respectively deposited with the said rice mills upon the filing by
Alejandro of a bond in the amount of P12,000.00 duly approved by the court (Annex
"T", pp. 122-127, rec.). Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
The position of petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas should be sustained and the writs
prayed for granted.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone
does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-
15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong vs. Tecson, 89 Phil., pp. 28-30). As long as the order
of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing
an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed
(Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate
or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of
the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil., 730, 741-742; Timbol vs.
Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures
for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession",
re-states the aforecited doctrines.
The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not control the present
controversy; because the motion filed therein for the removal of the administratrix and
the appointment of a new administrator in her place was rejected by the court on the
ground of laches as it was filed after the lapse of about 38 years from October 5, 1910 (2) to deliver and/or pay to herein, petitioner all the rents, crops or
when the court issued an order settling and deciding the issues raised by the motion (L- income collected by him from said lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 from
10018, September 19, 1956, 99 Phil., 1069-1070). In the case at bar, the motion filed by April 23, 1960 until the possession of the two aforementioned lots is
petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more actually delivered to her, or their value based on the current market
than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve price; and
and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of partition was
approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project of (3) to pay the costs.
partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15,
1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the probate case did not legally
terminate the testate proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has not
been delivered to her.

While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of the parties
suspended resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the decision
in the civil action for the annulment of the project of partition (Civil Case 2539) she
filed on April 10, 1964; the said order lost its validity and efficacy when the herein
petitioner filed on June 11, 1965 an amended complaint in said Civil Case 2539 wherein
she recognized the partial legality and validity of the said project of partition insofar as
the allocation in her favor of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 in the delivery of which she has
been insisting all along (pp. 106-107, rec.).

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Granting the writs prayed for;

2. Setting aside the orders of the respondent court dated October 2, 1964 and April 27,
1966, as null and void; and, without prejudice to the continuance of Civil Case No.
2539, which, by reason of this decision, involves no longer Lots 3368 and 3441 of the
Bacolor Cadastre, .

3. Directing.

(a) the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT No. 26638-R

covering the aforesaid lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor
Cadastre and to issue anew Transfer Certificate of Title covering the
said two lots in the name of herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas;
and

(b) the respondent Alejandro Lopez

(1) to deliver to herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas the possession

of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441;
[G.R. No. L-612. April 3, 1948.]
JOSEFA AGUSTINES, ENCARNACION AGUSTINES, JOSE AGUSTINES,
LOURDES AGUSTINES, ESTELA AGUSTINES, and ABELARDO
AGUSTINES, Petitioners, v. THE JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BULACAN, SEVERO VALENZUELA, and THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
A nine-hectare land in Marilao, Bulacan, is the subject of a three-cornered dispute
between Severo Valenzuela on one side and the relatives of his deceased wife Generosa
Agustines on the other, with the Archbishop of Manila as intervenor.
The main facts are unquestioned:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In August, 1934, Generosa Agustines died leaving a will which was subsequently
submitted for probate in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in special proceedings
No. 4944. Having no children, she named her surviving husband Severo Valenzuela the
universal heir, but she specified some bequests. There was opposition to the approval of
the will; however, after some negotiations, the sister (Josefa) and the nephews and
nieces of the decedent (the other petitioners in this special civil action) executed on
February 8, 1935, an extrajudicial partition with the respondent Severo Valenzuela,
expressing conformity with the probate of the testament and dividing the properties of
the deceased. They promised specifically to respect the wishes of the testatrix, one of
which was this:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sexto — Encargo a mi marido que, despues de que heya percibido todos los bienes
recayentes en mi herencia done . . . a la.
x x x frustrate their civil action No. 158, the petitioners herein submitted motions for
Iglesia Catolica de Polo otra porcion que no exceda de nueve hectareas, a discrecion
tambien de mi marido, del mismo terreno palayero e inculto, en el sitio de Quiririt, para
que su producto se invierta en misas en sufragio de mi alma."cralaw virtua1aw library
Giving effect to the above direction, the extrajudicial partition stipulated that, "Quinta
base. Que el solicitante de este expediente Sr. Severo Valenzuela, instituido heredero
universal en el testamento obrante en autos y marcado como Exhibit "A," por su parte
renuncia a favor de los opositores, todo derecho que tenga o pudiera tener en la parcela
de terreno, descrito y deslindado en el inventario de los bienes propios de la finada y
designado con el numero cuatro (4) de dicho inventario, con excepcion de, y despues de
descontar aquella porcion de nueve (9) hectareas, cuyo producto, la finada ha destinado,
para misas en sufragio de su alma, a discrecion de su esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela, por
disposicion testamentaria y otras tres hectareas mas, de esta misma parcela de terreno
que se adjudican y seran para el Sr. Severo Valenzuela. Entendiendose, que en la
segregacion de estos 12 hectareas, 9 de los cuales cuyo producto se destina en sufragio
del alma de la finada y los otros tres hectareas que perteneceran al Sr. Severo
Valenzuela deben colindarse con, estar muy contiguos, a la pesquera designada y
descrita en el inventario de los bienes propios de la finada, e indicadas con el numero
tres (3)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Other items of the estate were apportioned among the signers of the deed of partition,
which, submitted for approval, was confirmed by the probate court on October 31,
1936, in an order directing the administrator to deliver the respective shares to the heirs
or legatees after paying the corresponding inheritance taxes. No appeal was ever taken
from such order.
Years passed. Severo Valenzuela failed to transmit the lot or part thereof to the parish
church of Polo or to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Wherefore, in May,
1944, the Agustines connections, petitioners herein, filed a complaint against Severo
Valenzuela (civil case No. 158) seeking the return to them of that nine-hectare lot in
Quiririt, alleging his breach of trust, plus renunciation on the part of the church of Polo
that had reportedly neglected to demand compliance with the beneficial legacy.
Advised of this move, the surviving husband Severo Valenzuela hastened to submit in
September, 1944, in the testamentary proceeding No. 4944, a motion in which he
represented that under the will he had discretion to determine the area of land to be
conveyed to the Polo church and that, exercising such discretion, he elected to assign
that tract actually cultivated by the tenant named Benito Salazar in Quiririt (admittedly
one hectare more or less). He asked that this assignment be declared full compliance
with the testamentary directions. The other parties to the testamentary proceeding were
not given notice of this petition. It was approved on December 2, 1944.
After the liberation and after they had become aware of Valenzuela’s act that tended to
reconsideration, the main theme of which was that the said last order amended the
decree of distribution of October 31, 1936, which had become final long ago. All was to
no avail. Hence they started this special civil action to annul the order of December 2,
1944, on the concrete proposition that the court had no jurisdiction to issue it, the order
of October 31, 1936, having become final and executory eight years before. They
contend, first, that under the will, and in accordance with the partition approved by the
court in 1936, the Polo church was entitled to nine hectares in the Quiririt farm of
Generosa. They argue next that when that church repudiated the nine-hectare lot, it
again became a part of the whole Quiririt property which, under the partition, had been
adjudicated to them.
On the other hand, Severo Valenzuela’s position is that the whole nine-hectare realty
was awarded to him, subject to his obligation to donate to the Polo church such portion
thereof as he may designate in his discretion.
The intervenor, the Archbishop of Manila, representing the Polo church, shares the
petitioner’s opinion that a nine-hectare lot had been granted to said church. He
maintains, however, that no voluntary renunciation of the legacy ever took place.
The questions at issue are these:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) What was the share of the church of Polo under the will and the extrajudicial
partition?
(b) If it was a nine-hectare piece, is the order of December 2, 1944 in special proceeding
No. 4944 valid?
(c) If invalid, is certiorari the proper remedy?
I. It will be recalled that the will of Generosa Agustines contained a provision directing
her husband to donate a portion of her Quiririt farm not exceeding nine hectares to the
Polo church.
It will also be recalled that the extrajudicial partition, containing the promise of all
parties to respect all her testamentary directions, provided that all the land in Quiririt
belonging to Generosa would be adjudicated to the herein petitioners excepting "con
excepcion de, y despues de descontar aquella porcion de nueve (9) hectareas, cuyo
producto, la finada ha destinado, para misas en sufragio de su alma, a discrecion de su
esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela, por disposicion testamentaria y otros tres hectareas mas,
de esta misma parcela de terreno que se adjudican y seran para el Sr. Severo
Valenzuela. Entendiendose, que en la segregacion de estos 12 hectareas, 9 de los cuales
cuyo producto se destina en sufragio del alma de la finada y los otros tres hectareas que
perteneceran al Sr. Severo Valenzuela deben colindarse con, estar muy contiguos, a la
pesquera designada y descrita en el inventario de los bienes propios de la finada, e
indicadas con el numero tres (3)."
After examining and analyzing the circumstances of this litigation, we reach the
conclusion that, as contended by petitioners and the intervenor, the extrajudicial
partition definitely allotted a nine-hectare parcel to the Polo church. Supposing, that
under the will Valenzuela’s discretion included the determination of the area to be
transferred — and not merely the selection of the site where the nine- hectare portion is
to be segregated — still it seems clear that in the partition he elected or agreed that a
nine-hectare portion shall be conveyed to the Polo church for masses.
While it is true, as pointed out by Valenzuela’s counsel, that in the paragraph
hereinabove quoted from the extrajudicial partition the phrase "a discrecion de su
esposo" appears, still it must be admitted that it could not have implied a future choice
by such husband, because immediately thereafter the document speaks of nine hectares,
"cuyo producto se destina en sufragio del alma de la finada" without any discretionary
reservations. It is obvious that "a discrecion de su esposo" meant "segun discrecion que
hoy ejercita su esposo." It might also have referred to the particular location of the
parcel to be separated.
It is markworthy that, in addition to the nine-hectare portion, the deed mentions another
parcel of three hectares exclusively given to Valenzuela. If the parties had not
contemplated a nine-hectare donation to the Polo church, but empowered Valenzuela to
fix the area subsequently, they would have assigned to him 12 hectares, with the
provision that he will separate therefrom such portion as he may desire to convey to the
parish of Polo. They did not say so. Instead they clearly stipulated that nine hectares
were destined for "misas" (to the Church), and that three hectares would be reserved for
him.
It is quite probable that if Generosa’s kin had known, in the course of bargaining, that
Valenzuela would not deliver all the nine hectares to the Polo church but would retain
eight hectares thereof, they would not have ceded to him an additional lot of three
hectares.
Proof positive that he had no choice as to the number of hectares is the fact that for
eight years he never exercised it, keeping for himself in breach of trust the fruits of all
the land. He might have ideas repugnant to the religious beliefs of his wife in regard to
the celebration of masses for the dead. But as a man of honor, as the surviving partner,
he had no excuse to set his own notions against those of his departed spouse, especially
on a subject that concerned the disposition of her own properties. The will of the
testatrix is law 1 . And his action in fixing one hectare, when his wife bequeathed a
portion not exceeding nine hectares is surely such abuse of discretion (if he had any)
that will not easily commend itself to judicial approbation.
To make ourselves clear, we must state at the risk of repetition that although under the
provisions of the will Severo Valenzuela might have elected to transfer to the Polo
church a portion less than nine hectares, however, in the deed of partition he agreed —
exercising his discretion — to assign nine hectares for masses (to the Polo church). It
must be emphasized that in the distribution of the decedent’s assets, we must face the
deed of partition which bears the court’s fiat. The last will becomes secondary in value.
Important to bear this distinction in mind, because both in Valenzuela’s motion and in
the court’s order approving the assignment of one hectare, only the will was quoted, and
not the extrajudicial partition. Valenzuela’s motion invoking the will exclusively
induced the court into error.
A third reason to hold that the document of partition deeded nine hectares to the Polo
church is the fact that the court and the parties considered it a final settlement of all the
rights of all concerned, the court approving it in toto and ordering the administrator to
deliver to the beneficiaries their respective portions or legacies. The court’s order even
wrote finish to the expediente. And the parties, including Severo Valenzuela regarded it
as final for eight years, until he found it necessary, for his own interests, to make
another move indirectly amending the final settlement of October, 1936. Now then, if
that partition avowedly settled the estate and accomplished its distribution, the
implication is unavoidable that it left nothing to future judicial action or determination.
Consequently it did not contemplate any subsequent fixing by Valenzuela, and approval
by the court, of the portion to be transmitted to the Church of Polo. The parties deemed
it final — because the rights of all beneficiaries were therein defined with certainty.
Therefore, the attempt by the surviving husband to modify it eight years thereafter was
completely beyond the pale of the law.

This should be the logical place to discuss the effects of the nondelivery of the landed
legacy for so many years. But in the interest of orderly procedure that matter should be
left open to debate and decision in Civil Case No. 158 of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.

II. Having found in the preceding exposition that under the partition the Polo church (or
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila) was entitled to a nine-hectare lot, the
conclusion becomes inevitable that the order of December 2, 1944, attempted to modify
the final order of October, 1936. Which of course may not be done in this jurisdiction.

III. And certiorari may be interposed and granted under the circumstances, the order of
December 2, 1944, being an absolute nullity. 2

Wherefore, the order of the Bulacan court of December 2, 1944 is declared null and
void and of no effect whatsoever.

Petition granted with costs against respondent Severo Valenzuela.

G.R. No. 183053 June 16, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA
AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
1
Unlike Pope Alexander VI who, faced with the impasse between Spain and Portugal,
deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New
World by issuing the Inter Caetera,2 we are confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too
familiar tale of another family imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.3
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,4 reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.5
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death,
Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including
herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three
children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed
Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled.
Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay
Tañedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere
baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged
natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was
likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was
annulled.6 Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived
with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and
paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights
over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition and allowed
Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating
her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27,
1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.71avvphi1
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedent’s] death, [she] was a resident of the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an estate of real and personal
properties, with a probable gross value of ₱29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and
residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years
old, surviving spouse and a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old,
legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39
years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-
Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far as
[respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at the time of her death.8
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico
filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and
he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition
was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio III
and Nenita S. Tañedo; that he is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate of
Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one who managed
their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition
was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are
in the hands of usurpers is untrue.9
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably,
Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son,
Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf, in the event he would
be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to Intervene
considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-
Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent
to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III
averred his own qualifications that: "[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and
banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the
activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979 in
memory of her grandmother’s father; the significant work experiences outside the
family group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor
[Federico] after his graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E.
Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x."10
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties’ witnesses were heard and evidence on their
respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9,
2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristina’s
intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed administrator
of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the
execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and
charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time
when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in
his favor.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9,
2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court
to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel
Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of
a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.12
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals by
certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER
SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992
OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS
REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER
ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM
BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENT’S ESTATE.13
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial and
documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the estate of the decedent
and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed
administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondent’s immediate]
family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not
for this court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum to dwell upon.
What matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of
such unfortunate and bitter estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes
of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her
own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who
nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is accorded preference
as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such
preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner and instead
nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, absent any
valid and justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly
ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to give effect to
the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate,
the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the
estate and its claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator should be one who
is prepared, academically and by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of the
position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the
court that when it comes to management of real estate and the processing and payment
of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established track record as a manager has a
decided edge and therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of the
estate.14
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate child of
Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the
latter’s legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio
III, who was merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the
latter’s appointment as administrator of the decedent’s estate, cannot be appointed as
the administrator of the decedent’s estate for the following reasons:15
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e.,
Federico’s appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the surviving
spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before his appointment
as administrator of Cristina’s estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III
inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring
(Emilio III) of decedent’s son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the
"next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and
entitled to share in the distribution of Cristina’s estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 99216 of the Civil Code bars
the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from
inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the
administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTC’s finding, respondent is as much competent as Emilio
III to administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses none of the
disqualifications specified in Section 1,17 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is
better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in the
administration of the decedent’s undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over
several undisputed facts and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give
preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and
effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain
bar rule,18 is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the
actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III,
on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during
the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with
that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership,
albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not
simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from
the administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s
interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein
of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, [Federico],
being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership."
Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning – Emilio III’s
nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of
Federico’s death – wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment
of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts
and circumstances of each case.19 Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.20 In the main, the attendant
facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by
both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,21 we upheld the appointment by the trial court of
a co-administration between the decedent’s son and the decedent’s brother, who was
likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate. In the same vein, we declared in Delgado
Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian22 that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the
estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand
that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a
situation which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs,
including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo, but
who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel,
Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs,
and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of
their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil
Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a
decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the
contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by
the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and
trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent’s husband, the
original oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law
concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with
the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within
the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but
with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the
illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible
and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a
choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said
article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord
with an enlightened attitude vis-à-vis illegitimate children.23
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded… on the presumed will of the deceased… Love, it is
said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first
calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring
those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased
would have done so had he manifested his last will… Lastly, in default of anyone called
to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance
with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or educational
institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.24
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate
succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish
between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband,
Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate
grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case,
painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in
Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from
making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the
parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will
administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata25 on the same issue remains good law:

[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of
the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. – x x x. If there is a controversy

before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration
over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner
Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each
of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by
the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further
directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA
PARREÑO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the April 30,
2009 Decision1 and July 21, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreño
v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and
Diosdado Salinas (Manungas). The CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order
dated November 4, 20023 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City,
Davao del Norte, in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas, Diosdado Manungas, petitioner,
wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of respondent Florencia Avila Parreño
(Parreño) as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas and appointed
petitioner Diosdado Salinas Manungas (Diosdado) in her stead.
The Facts
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children.
Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino
Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive
mother.4 Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980
in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the
administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of
Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she
acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino Manungas.5 Meanwhile, Avila’s widow
executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on October 29, 1980, renouncing her
rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia Manungas.
Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings
of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon
Manungas, the surviving heirs.6
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreño, the niece
of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her
incompetent aunt.7
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against
the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and
damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer, the
spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
However, the answer was filed beyond the reglementary period and was not considered
by the MTC. Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia
Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to
Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to the RTC of
Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC.8 On appeal to this
Court, defendants’ petition was denied for having been filed out of time in a Resolution
which became final on April 20, 1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his
favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he, being an
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas.10 The
petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging that
Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that
he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a
creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a debtor of the estate
having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a Decision
issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an
Order appointing Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreño is hereby appointed as
Special Administrator of the property of the late Engracia N. Vda. de Manungas. The
Special Administrator is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P200,000.00
pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.11
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction.12 In his motion, Diosdado argued that Parreño’s
appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her
being the judicial guardian of the latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia
Manungas’ death, concluding that her appointment as special administrator was without
basis. He added that Parreño was not fit to become a special administrator having
already been fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia
Manungas’ property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that Parreño is a
mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he is the illegitimate son
of Florentino Manungas.
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the
revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of
Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.13
Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued its
assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead. The CA further reinstated
Parreño as the special administrator of the estate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
November 4, 2002 setting aside the appointment of Florencia Parreño as special
administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas, and denying the
property bond posted by Florencia Parreño [is] hereby declared NULL and VOID and
SET ASIDE as having been issued by Public Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del Norte with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.14
Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 15,
200915 which the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.
The Issues
Diosdado raises the following issues:
The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available.16
The Court a Quo in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration grossly violated
the rule that once a decision or order is final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable.17
The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment of
petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment
of Florencia Parreño as special administrator.18
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to oppositors’ petition that is
flawed.19
The Court’s Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order
The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether the RTC
Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari cannot be the
substitute for a lost appeal, Parreño should have appealed the RTC Order dated
November 4, 2002 to the CA through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Diosdado contends that the Order dated November 4, 2002
became final and executory, Parreño having failed to file the petition within the
reglementary period; thus, the Order cannot be the subject of review even by this Court.
However, Diosdado’s position assumes that the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is
a final order instead of an interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,20 the Court stated what an interlocutory order is:
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is "interlocutory", e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as
above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only
as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in
the case.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory
or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a
testate or intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,21 the Court succinctly held, "The
appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court."
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002 is clearly
an interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the subject of an appeal under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The proper remedy is the filing of a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the petition well within the
prescribed period under this rule.
There was no necessity to file a motion for reconsideration
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is
required before a decision may be appealed through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. Under the rule, there must be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioner argues that respondent’s failure to move for the
reconsideration of the Order dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such
general rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos Reyes v. Flores:22
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and
mandamus are available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration. The writ of
certiorari does not lie where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of
the error. x x x However, there are several exceptions where a petition for certiorari will
lie without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
xxxx
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination of the issues
raised by respondents in appealing the Order dated November 4, 2002, reveals that the
issues are only questions of law. Ergo, there is no need for a motion for reconsideration.
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari despite the
existence of an appeal or other appropriate remedy in several instances, including when
the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order.23
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the November 4, 2002
Order of the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both petitioner and
oppositors, this Court finds merit in the contention of petitioner. In the case of Gonzales
vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral relatives to his
estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas inherits the
latter’s property by operation of law;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing Florencia Parreño as
special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas is ordered set
aside.
Such reasoning is a non sequitur.
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean
that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the
discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,24 it
was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain
persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the
statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed
as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or
court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must
be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. (Emphasis
supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased
parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory
requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal
of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as
would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the
discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and
legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of
the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of
equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the
role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is
appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator
shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed,
and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell
only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator
shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the
court.1avvphi1
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent
and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual
distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose
the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may
use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to
appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased.
To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order,
acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special
administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño
as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention that
he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record
shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in
preserving the latter’s estate. On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial
guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is
interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing
so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s estate. Hence,
the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as
special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower
court exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas.
It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject
of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to
the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.27 With the termination of
the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate
heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not
entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of
the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to
appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the trial court,
reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as the special administrator
of Engracia Manungas’ estate, the May 15, 2002 Order is necessarily reinstated and
Parreño’s appointment as special administrator is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CA’s April 30, 2009 Decision and
July 21, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN declaring as null and void the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED.
Consequently, the Order dated May 15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby REINSTATED and
Florencia Avila Parreño is REINSTATED as the special administrator of the estate of
Engracia Manungas.
SO ORDERED.