Ltft> # 7 »/"7 W O fin

BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY

by

O t t o w e l l Blake Elliot

A .Thesis submitted i n p a r t i a l fulfilment

of the requirements f o r the degree o f

MASTER OF ARTS

i n the Department

Of

HISTORY

The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia

A p r i l , 1940
BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.

Chapter I. The T r e a t y o f

Versailles. Page

Chapter II. The French S e a r c h f o r

A l l i a n c e s , 1920-1925 * page 17.

Chapter I I I . France and t h e Making

o f Locarno. page 35.

Chapter IV. B r i a n d ' s Work and

influenoe, 1926-1932. Page 61,

Chapter V, France and t h e Years

of C r i s i s , 1929-1932. Page 98.

Chapter Vii B r i a n d and the S t r u g g l e f o r

Disarmament, 1921-1932. Page 115,

Chapter V I I . Epilogue. Page 153,

Bibliography, Pages i - L V I .
INTRODUCTION
 INTRODUCTION

From the c a t a s t r o p h e o f 1914-1918 France as one o f t h e

major A l l i e d Powers emerged v i c t o r i o u s . Her statesmen were

determined t h a t one o f the b a s i c f r u i t s o f v i c t o r y must be

the permanent guarantee o f n a t i o n a l seourity.

The n o n r r e a l i z a t i o n o f the Anglo-American Guarantee was

a serious blow t o the French s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e and was

fraught w i t h i l l i m i t a b l e consequences. This f i r s t breach i n

the system o f c o l l e c t i v e s e o u r i t y which the French people

were so anxious to see e s t a b l i s h e d on a f i r m b a s i s , resulted

temporarily i n the French r e v e r s i o n t o a p o l i c y o f f o r c e un-

der Poincare'* The f a i l u r e of t h i s method t o promote s e c u r i t y

led t o t h e emergence o f A r i s t i d e B r i a n d to a p o s i t i o n of

prominence on the French p o l i t i c a l s t a g e . The p o l i o y o f

rapprochement which he advocated l a r g e l y dominated the French

s e c u r i t y p i c t u r e from 1925 u n t i l h i s death i n 1932. Because

o f t h i s f a c t the name o f B r i a n d i s inevitably linked with

t h i s problem whioh i s so important i n the n a t i o n a l l i f e o f

Franoe.

An i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h i s study would not be complete w i t h -

out a word of thanks to P r o f e s s o r F r e d e r i c H. Spward f o r h i s

invaluable assistance c h e e r f u l l y extended a t a l l t i m e s . Ap-

p r e c i a t i o n must be a l s o be g i v e n to M i s s Anne M. Smith and

M i s s M. L. Lanning o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Lib-

r a r y S t a f f f o r t h e i r guidance i n the s e l e c t i o n o f m a t e r i a l s .
 CHAPTER I .

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

 BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY

CHAPTER I .

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

Tlie t r e a t y which marked the end o f the Great War of

1914-1918 was r a t i f i e d i n the b e a u t i f u l H a l l o f M i r r o r s a t

Versailles. I t was i n t h i s same p l a c e t h a t the a r t i c l e s o f

peace were s i g n e d by the F r e n c h and German p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s

a f t e r the War o f 1870. " I t i s a moot q u e s t i o n i f i n human

h i s t o r y t h e r e ever has been a s w i f t e r and more tremendous

1
reversal." E v e r y t h i n g i n the peace and i n the circumstanoes

surrounding i t emphasize t h i s r a p i d ohange and f o r France

t h i s was one o f the most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s . Each o f the

A l l i e d n a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d a t the Conference had certain

n a t i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s which d e s i r e d s a t i s f a c t i o n . The French

f e l t t h a t however important these needs might be the q u e s t i o n

which r e q u i r e d p r i o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n was their national security.

There were two approaches t o t h i s problem advocated by

groups o f comparative importance* M. H e n r i de J o u v e n e l , a

s t r o n g f i g u r e i n one group, urged that both the government

and people o f France g i v e t h e i r support t o the League and

work through i t f o r enduring peace and a l s o f o r the s a t i s -

f a c t i o n of t h e i r needs. There were o t h e r s i n France who

c a l l e d M. de tiouvenel and h i s f r i e n d s i d e a l i s t s and t h e o r i s t s

:1. Anon., The S i g n i n g o f the Peace, Manchester Guardian

Weekly, y o l . 1, J u l y 4, 1919, p. 2.

1
 2
and maintained t h a t s e c u r i t y f o r France l a y i n the complete

disarmament o f Germany coupled w i t h a heavy indemnity. Both

o f these s o l u t i o n s to the problem of s e c u r i t y were probably

put forward by t h e i r advocates i n a l l honesty o f purpose and

both, i n g r e a t e r or l e s s degree, i n f l u e n c e d the making o f the

treaty.

The T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s c o n t a i n s s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s d i r -
1

e c t l y concerned w i t h the problem of s e c u r i t y . President

Wilson's i d e a l was to e s t a b l i s h a League of n a t i o n s which

would i n t r o d u c e a s p i r i t of t r u s t and mutual understanding

between n a t i o n s , i t was n a t u r a l t h a t i n the months immed-

i a t e l y a f t e r the war when peoples throughout the world were

r e c e p t i v e t o such i d e a s t h a t the League o f Nations i d e a

should take h o l d . Wilson's power which was on the ascen-

dant at t h i s p e r i o d enabled him t o have the League o f iMations

Covenant p l a c e d at the b e g i n n i n g of the T r e a t y t e x t . Although

the A r t i c l e s o f the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s mentioned above have

an important b e a r i n g on the problem of s e c u r i t y the main

a r t i o l e around which the problem r e s o l v e s i s A r t i c l e 10 o f

the League Covenant. I t reads:

The members o f the League undertake to r e s p e c t
and preserve a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n the t e r -
r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l indepen-
dence of a l l members of the League. In case of any
such a g g r e s s i o n or i n case o f any t h r e a t or danger
o f such a g g r e s s i o n the C o u n c i l s h a l l a d v i s e upon the
means by which t h i s o b l i g a t i o n s h a l l be f u l f i l l e d .

1. Text o f the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s , A r t i c l e s 4 2 , 45, 44,

428, 429, 431, 432.
2i ibid., Article 10.
 3

P r e s i d e n t Yvilson maintained t h a t t h i s A r t i c l e was the Monroe

1

D o c t r i n e o f t h e world y e t h i s i n s i s t e n c e upon t h e i n s e r t i o n

of t h i s A r t i c l e i n t h e League o f N a t i o n s s e c t i o n alienated

the support o f many o f h i s f r i e n d s who, although opposing

the Peace T r e a t y , were i n favor.of the i d e a o f a League.

Robert L a n s i n g says o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n , "The P r e s i d e n t ' s un-

a l t e r a b l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n to have h i s form o f guarantee i n the

Covenants . .and h i s f i r m r e f u s a l t o modify i t , i n any sub-

s t a n t i a l way, r e s u l t e d i n t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f t h e opponents

of t h e League t o such an extent t h a t they were able t o p r e -

vent the T r e a t y from o b t a i n i n g t h e necessary consent o f two-

2

t h i r d s o f the Senators." T h i s r e f u s a l o f the Senate t o con-

s i d e r A r t i c l e 10 was a very s e r i o u s blow t o t h e p l a n o f s e -

c u r i t y which t h e French l e a d e r s were t r y i n g t o b u i l d up and

would mean t h a t France would probably be l e s s r e c e p t i v e to

o v e r t u r e s o f f r i e n d s h i p which t h e German statesmen might

make t o h e r . Europe had been a s s u r e d by P r e s i d e n t Wilson

w i t h a s i n c e r i t y which i t never o c c u r r e d t o t h e common man

t o doubt, that he was m o r a l l y and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y the p l e n i -

p o t e n t i a r y o f h i s country, and t h a t i n f u t u r e the French

might count without r e s e r v e upon t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Failure

to win support from the U n i t e d S t a t e s was a very s e r i o u s

blow t o proponents o f t h e League o f N a t i o n s who, not realizing

1. Stannard- Baker, Woodrow W i l s o n and World Settlement,
Double day-irage and Company, 1923, v o l . 1, p* 326.

2. L a n s i n g , Robert, The Peace N e g o t i a t i o n s , London,

Constable and Company, 1921, p. 112.
 4

the power o f the Senate to n u l l i f y t h e work o f a ^ r e s i d e n t

at w i l l , took i t f o r granted t h a t the United s t a t e s would

endorse the completed t r e a t y .

The Reparations problem loomed very l a r g e i n the French

security picture. When the Conference at P a r i s began i t s

study of the problem o f R e p a r a t i o n s , there were s e v e r a l

a t t i t u d e s a t once apparent. In the case of the A l l i e d (count-

r i e s i t was the g e n e r a l f e e l i n g t h a t Germany must be made to

pay f o r a l l the damage done to the destroyed p o r t i o n s o f

Prance and Belgium as w e l l as any a d d i t i o n a l payments which

the A l l i e s through the Peace Conference should see f i t to

impose. T h i s a d d i t i o n a l c l a u s e was contained i n A r t i c l e 19

which went much f a r t h e r i n scope than d i d A r t i c l e 8 o f the

Fourteen j o i n t s which merely provided t h a t a l l French ter-

r i t o r y should be f r e e d and t h e invaded p o r t i o n s r e s t o r e d .

That t h i s would be the extent o f the f i n a n c i a l demands on

Germany was the b e l i e f b e f o r e the end o f t h e War but a t the

.feace Conference t h i s view underwent a decided change. The

word "Reparations" was g i v e n the broadest interpretation;

E n g l i s h and French a l i k e put forward, what from the German

1

standpoint were c o n s i d e r e d i m p o s s i b l e demands. The Germans

urged t h a t a f i x e d sum be s e t , otherwise they d e c l a r e d t h a t

i t would be i m p o s s i b l e f o r them to o r g a n i z e t h e i r internal

f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s i n order to prevent f i n a n c i a l chaos. The

1* Bergmantjf C a r l , H i s t o r y of Reparation^ London,

E. Benn L i m i t e d , 1927, p. 3.
 5
1
Americans supported the Germans in. t h i s stand. However, as

Congress r e f u s e d r a t i f i c a t i o n of the T r e a t y , t h e i r objection

d i d not c a r r y as much weight as i t might have under other

circumstances * The French stand on t h i s i s s u e was the r e a l

stumbling-block. They f e l t t h a t f i x i n g a t o t a l sum might

have a s e r i o u s e f f e c t on t h e i r f i n a n c i a l s e c u r i t y i n the

future, i f a f i x e d sum was agreed upon at t h i s j u n c t u r e ,

improvement i n the German f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n would mean a

decided l o s s i n indemnity payments to France. The French

p r e f e r r e d to l e a v e the matter i n d e f i n i t e and were s u c c e s s f u l

i n having i t p l a c e d i n the hands of a R e p a r a t i o n s Commission.

"The f u t u r e / " s a i d Foch, "can only be assured i n any

l a s t i n g manner, by making the Rhine our m i l i t a r y frontier

2

and h o l d i n g i t w i t h A l l i e d f o r c e s . " Marshal Foch was very

insistent that i n order t o guarantee the s e c u r i t y o f France

i n the f u t u r e the Rhine must be c o n s i d e r e d as the boundary

between France and Germany. There were many people i n France

who were of a l i k e o p i n i o n . Some o f the arguments used by

the French i n support o f t h i s t h e s i s were the f a c t t h a t France

had a p o p u l a t i o n of approximately o n e - h a l f t h a t o f Germany,

and her b i r t h - r a t e was not i n c r e a s i n g at a n y t h i n g near the

r a t e o f her neighbor a c r o s s the Rhine. She was a l s o b e r e f t

i .
1. T a r d i e u , Andre , The T r u t h about the T r e a t y ,
7

I n d i a n a p o l i s , BobbSfMieErill, 1921.

2. Great B r i t a i n , n i s Majesty's S t a t i o n e r y . u f f i c e ,
Memorandum Communicated.by M a r s h a l Foch t o p r e s i d e n t
?7ilson, Mr. L l o y d Geropge, s i g n o r L*Orlando, at a
meeting on March 31, 1919, Gmd. 2169, p. 85.
 6

o f the R u s s i a n A l l i a n c e due t o the r e v o l u t i o n i n t h a t country,

which d e p r i v e d her o f an a l l y on the extreme f r o n t i e r o f Ger-

many. T h i r d l y , France d i d not have a n a t u r a l f r o n t i e r on the

East f a c i n g Germany. The Rhine would p r o v i d e t h i s . This

p o l i c y was not new w i t h Foch, i t had been developed and ad-

vanced i n 1916 a f t e r S i r Edward Gray had suggested t h a t the

A l l i e s should make known t h e i r war aims. In a d d i t i o n , M.

Doumergue submitted to the R u s s i a n Emperor a t e l e g r a m on

February 12, 1917 i i n which he s t a t e d e x p l i c i t y the d e s i r e

o f France t h a t " i n the f u t u r e the R i v e r Rhine might form a

1

permanent s t r a t e g i c f r o n t i e r a g a i n s t a German i n v a s i o n . "

L o u i s M a d e l i n , a French j o u r n a l i s t and author w r i t i n g i n '

"La Revue des Deux Mondes", compares the French p o s i t i o n t o

t h a t of an owner of a garden whioh had been p i l l a g e d f o r

many times over. Should he be s a t i s f i e d merely t o p l a c e a t

h i s gate, as M a d e l i n says "un c r i t e a u sur l e q u e l serait

2

e'crit: Defenser d ' e n t r e r ? " Foch d i d not t h i n k so and made

very determined e f f o r t s to ensure t h a t the statesmen a t the

Conference were conversant w i t h h i s views. He was so d e t e r -

mined on one o c c a s i o n t h a t Clemenceau had to remind him that

he was not d i c t a t i n g the peace but was merely a c t i n g as a
3
c o n s u l t a n t . The great Commander-in-Chief regarded Clemenceau

1. Temperley, H. W. V., ed., A H i s t o r y of the Peace Confer-

ence of P a r i s , London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press and
Hodder & Stoughton, 1920, v o l . 1, appendix I I .

2. M a d e l i n , L o u i s , Le Marechal Foch, P a r t . i l l . , Revue des

Deux Mondes, Tome 22, 1 Aout, 1924, p. 795*

3* Tabouis, Genevieve, The L i f e o f J u l e s Cambon, London,

Jonathan Cape, 1938, p. 352.
 7

as the b e t r a y e r o f h i s country. He h i m s e l f o u t s i d e and

L o u i s Barthou i n s i d e the Chamber o f Deputies kept up an i n -

cessant c r i t i c i s m of the " T i g e r ' s " e f f o r t s towards a s e t t l e -

1

ment on the e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r . Foch, at t h i s time was merely

endorsing the work of the Comite d E t u d e s , headed by

/ T
the

h i s t o r i a n , E r n e s t L a v i s s e , which had met i n 1917 to study

the Rhine f r o n t i e r q u e s t i o n and had conoluded t h a t the new

f r o n t i e r should be that o f 1814 w i t h c e r t a i n extensions i n

the Saar area to i n c l u d e the c o a l b a s i n . The m i l i t a r y bound-

a r y was by t h i s s o l u t i o n to be separated from the political

boundary and the t e r r i t o r y i n between was to be organized

i n t o a separate r e g i o n from which German f o r c e s were t o be

2

e n t i r e l y excluded* T a r d i e u vehemently denies t h a t h i s gov-

ernment a t any time ever contemplated the dismemberment o f

German u n i t y when he says t h a t " . . * a t no time d i d the Gov-

ernment, the Parliament or even the Press demand the des-

3
t r u c t i o n o f German u n i t y . " Yet i f these t h r e e elements d i d
not f a v o r the establishment o f a separate Rhineland, the
4

military certainly did. General Mangin, i n c o n t r o l of the

French zone was not a n t a g o n i s t i c t o the movement o f Dr.

1. L l o y d George, David, The T r u t h about the Peace T r e a t i e s ,

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , 1938, v o l . - ' l , p. 580.

2. Tabouis, op. c i t * , p. 352.

3. T a r d i e u , Andre', op. c i t . , p* 364*

4. E l l i n g t o n - W r i g h t , C. E., The Rhineland, Past and
F u t u r e , London, R a t i o n and Athenaeum, v o l . 35,
August 23, 1924, p* 635*
 8

Dorten, but England and the United S t a t e s were g r e a t l y op-

posed* Dr. Dorten complained t h a t England s e c r e t l y supported

the c e n t r a l government at B e r l i n i n i t s e f f o r t s to stamp out

the s e c e s s i o n movement. Allied s o l i d a r i t y behind the Separ^

a t i s t s would have meant the b u i l d i n g o f a r e a l b a r r i e r a g a i n s t

2

the i n f l u e n c e of P r u s s i a n i s m , Dr. Dorten maintained. How-

ever, L l o y d George i s c r e d i t e d w i t h f o r c i n g the r e c a l l of

G e n e r a l Mangin and w i t h h i s departure the s e c e s s i o n movement

l o s t f o r c e very r a p i d l y , i t i s v e r y probable t h a t the Rhine-

l a n d elements f e l t t h a t the forming o f a separate peace

would mean t h a t they would weather the storm w i t h e a s i e r

terms, but i t was the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

which B r i t a i n f e a r e d . Her o b j e c t was to r e s t o r e t r a d e

r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany i n the q u i c k e s t p o s s i b l e time. She

was not so v i t a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n France's problem of s e c u r -

ity; P r e s i d e n t Wilson and L l o y d George w.ere agreed as t o

the requirements o f French security.; They f e l t t h a t de-

m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f the Rhineland Zone i n a d d i t i o n t o an

Anglo-American promise t o come to France's a i d i n case of

3

a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t her were s u f f i c i e n t guarantees. Colonel

House appears t o have been f a v o r a b l e at f i r s t but Lansing,

1. ' Stannard-Baker-, op. c i t . , v o l . .2, p. 86 f f .

2. Dorten,.Hans, The Rhineland Movement, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 3

"flQ. 3, A p r i l , 1925, p* 399* ,

3. T a r d i e u , Andre , op. c i t * , p. 175 f f .

7
 9
1
White and B l i s s decidedly were not. However, P r e s i d e n t Wilson

d i s r e g a r d e d t h e i r o p i n i o n i n o r d e r to reach a d e f i n i t e d e c i s -
2

ion. Clemenceau f i n a l l y gave i n i n h i s u r g i n g f o r an inde-

pendent s t a t e on the l e f t bank, i n t h i s way a compromise

was reached to guarantee Frenoh s e c u r i t y * P r o v i s i o n s made

i n the T r e a t y c o v e r i n g t h i s problem a r e :
1. Germany i s f o r b i d d e n to m a i n t a i n or c o n s t r u c t
any f o r t i f i c a t i o n whether on the l e f t bank o f
the Rhine or on the r i g h t bank to the west of
a l i n e drawn 50 k i l o m e t r e s to the East o f the
Rhine.

2. i n the a r e a d e f i n e d above the maintenance and

the assembly of the armed f o r c e s , e i t h e r per-
manent or t e m p o r a r i l y , and m i l i t a r y manoeuvers
o f any k i n d , as w e l l as the upkeep o f a l l per-
manent u n i t s f o r m o b i l i z a t i o n , are In the same
way f o r b i d d e n .

3. i n ease Germany v i o l a t e s i n any manner what-

ever the p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 she
s h a l l be regarded as committing a h o s t i l e act
a g a i n s t the Powers s i g n a t o r y o f the present
T r e a t y and i s c a l c u l a t e d to d i s t u r b the peace
o f the world* 3

F i f t e e n years was s p e c i f i e d as the p e r i o d o f o c c u p a t i o n but

i n case at any time the guarantees a g a i n s t unprovoked

a g g r e s s i o n were thought to be i n s u f f i c i e n t , the evacuation

o f the occupying troops could be delayed f o r the p e r i o d

5
f e l t to be necessary. By these measures it.was hoped t h a t

1. The Intimate i-apers o f C o l o n e l House, Arranged as a

n a r r a t i v e by C h a r l e s Seymour, London, E r n e s t Benn,
L i m i t e d , 1926-28, p. 394.

2* Lansing, Robert, The Peace N e g o t i a t i o n s , A P e r s o n a l

N a r r a t i v e , New York, Houghlon, M i f f l i n , 1921, p. 124

3. T r e a t y Text, op. c i t . , A r t i c l e s 42, 43, 44.

4. Ibid., Article 49.
5. ibid., Article 429.
 10

the French had been p r o v i d e d w i t h ample s e c u r i t y .

V a r i o u s m i s g i v i n g s ..were f e l t i n some French quarters as

to the degree of r e l i a n c e t o be p l a c e d i n a T r i p a r t i t e

Guarantee. There were two f a c t o r s which s e r i o u s l y bothered

French statesmen, i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e i t was f e l t that

too g r e a t a time would elapse b e f o r e s u f f i c i e n t American

troops c o u l d a r r i v e i n France t o be an e f f e c t i v e fighting

f o r c e and i n the second, doubts were r a i s e d as to whether

the United S t a t e s Senate would support the guarantee i Fail-

ure t o r a t i f y the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s on the p a r t o f the

Senate brought the f e a r s of the F r e n c h to f u l l realization

and i n a d d i t i o n the Amerioan government r e f u s e d t o endorse

the T r i p a r t i t e Guarantee c l a i m i n g t h a t i t wanted no com-

1
m i t m e n t s i n Europe. The b a s i c t h e s i s of the French, "the
more powerful the guarantees of peace, the s m a l l e r w i l l be
2

the p r o b a b i l i t y you w i l l have to c a l l upon, them" had suf-

f e r e d a severe blow and they were g r e a t l y d i s h e a r t e n e d by

this set-back.

From o b s e r v a t i o n o f French p o l i c y i n r e s p e c t to the

Rhineland i t i s evident t h a t a powerful s e c t i o n of Frenoh

o p i n i o n was not averse to s e e i n g the d i s r u p t i o n o f German

unity, i t i s q u i t e understandable then t h a t the French

would be g r e a t l y averse t o any thought of p e r m i t t i n g

1. Lord Ridded, i n t i m a t e D i a r y o f the .Peace Conference

and A f t e r , 1918-1923, London, V i c t o r G o l l a n e z L t d . ,
1933, p. 55.

2. h a s k i n s , C. H., Franco-German F r o n t i e r , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,
v o l . 3, Wo.'2, December 15, 1924, p. 199.
 11

Austro-German u n i o n . One o f the most famous d o c t r i n e s advan-

ced by Wilson a t the Conference was t h a t o f the " s e l f - d e t e r - ,

mination of peoples." T h i s was used at f i r s t i n r e f e r e n c e

to t h e Balkan peoples, but i t had an unexpected r e a c t i o n when

i t was observed t h a t the Germanic peoples were a p p l y i n g i t

to. t h e s i t u a t i o n o f A u s t r i a . There were t h r e e suggestions

put forward as t o t h e f a t e o f t h a t country.

, 1* Become p a r t o f a Danubian c o n f e d e r a t i o n w i t h Czecho-

s l o v a k i a , Y u g o - S l a v i a and the Balkan n a t i o n s *

2. d o i n w i t h the German R e p u b l i c *

3. Remain an independent Republic.

m the f i r s t i n s t a n c e France was not a g a i n s t A u s t r i a n u n i o n

w i t h o t h e r Danubian c o u n t r i e s from the standpoint o f her

security* She f e l t t h a t i t would s h i f t some o f the German

i n f l u e n c e from C e n t r a l Europe to t h e eastward. Yet the I t a l -

i a n s f e a r e d t h a t i t might l e a d t o a r e v i v a l of t h e o l d A u s t r o -

hungarian Empire and the s m a l l ambitious Balkan n a t i o n s were

averse t o becoming l i n k e d up w i t h a decadent people so t h a t

1

e f f o r t s towards t h a t s o l u t i o n were dropped, uf the two r e -

maining s o l u t i o n s , the French f a v o r e d an independent A u s t r i a n

R e p u b l i c and when on March 4, 1919, the A u s t r i a n Assembly made

known i t s d e s i r e f o r u n i o n w i t h Germany t h e r e almost seemed

to be a s p i r i t o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n t o the i n e v i t a b l e , but as

time went on the f e e l i n g that i t was the p r e r o g a t i v e of the

v i c t o r s t o d i s r e g a r d the " s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f peoples" i f

1* Temperley, op. c i t . , v o l . 4, p. 470 f f .

 12
1
they so wished f o r t h e i r own s e c u r i t y a s s e r t e d i t s e l f . France

made a v e r y s e r i o u s b l u n d e r over t h i s q u e s t i o n o f A u s t r o -
2
German union. Her f e a r o f 60,000,000 Germans on her f r o n t i e r

was r e a l enough and she f e l t that t h e a d d i t i o n o f s e v e r a l

m i l l i o n s more A u s t r i a n s would make the German i n f l u e n o e too

strong. Y e t , openly f l o u t i n g t h e p r i n o i p a l o f s e l f - d e t e r ^

m i n a t i o n i n t h i s manner aroused i n these peoples a s p i r i t o f

resentment which L l o y d George i n a l e t t e r t o Clemenceau s a i d

3

would f i n d some means o f e x a c t i n g r e t r i b u t i o n . The t r e n d o f

French r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Germany o f H i t l e r seems t o bear out

this conclusion. I t was f e l t i n some q u a r t e r s t h a t A u s t r i a

might have s u c c e s s f u l l y used t h i s i n d e c i s i o n over her f u t u r e

to p r e s s f o r more f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s o f peace. Y e t her

government f a i l e d t o do so and l e t matters take t h e i r course.

C o l o n e l House comments t h a t A u s t r i a n s would not j o i n the

4

Germans i f the Conference intimated otherwise. The F r e n c h

f i n a l l y won i n t h e i r d e s i r e to prevent t h i s union and gained

one o f t h e i r e s s e n t i a l p o i n t s f o r s e c u r i t y . I n the T r e a t y o f

V e r s a i l l e s Germany promises t o " r e s p e c t s t r i c t l y the

1. Noble, G. B., Problems and Opinions a t j^aris, New York,

M a c m i l l a n and Uompany, 1935, p. 222.

2. Aubert, L o u i s F., France and the League, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l * 3, No. 4, J u l y , 1925, p. 637.

3. Great B r i t a i n , H i s M a j e s t y ' s S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e ,
L e t t e r from L l o y d George t o Glemenceau: Some
C o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r the .teace Conference b e f o r e
they f i n a l l y d r a f t t h e i r terms, Cmd* 2169, p. 76* .

4. Papers o f C o l o n e l House, v o l . 4, p* 335.

 13
1

independence o f A u s t r i a . "
With t h e l o s s o f her hoped-for f r o n t i e r on the Rhine,

France turned her a t t e n t i o n t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n progress

towards the e s t a b l i s h i n g o f the new. European states. Poland

was one o f her c h i e f o b j e c t s o f i n t e r e s t . French l e a d e r s

f e l t t h a t only t h e counter-balance o f a s t r o n g Poland would

i n some degree compensate her f o r t h e l o s s o f the Rhine fron-

tier. Conversely, Germany b e l i e v e d t h a t a s t r o n g Poland would

be a s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e t o her r e c o v e r y * F o r t h i s reason she

r a i s e d v i g o r o u s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e p a r t i t i o n o f upper Silesia

as w e l l as f o r t h e l o s s o f t h e n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s i n t h a t
2
a r e a . Poland was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r some f r i c t i o n on t h e Ger-
3
man f r o n t i e r and i n t h i s she was encouraged by F r a n c e . I t

i s v e r y p o s s i b l e t h a t her b i t t e r n e s s towards Germany i n some

4

measure poisoned her sense o f j u s t i c e * however, France was

t a k i n g a l l p o s s i b l e steps w i t h i n her power t o assure s e c u r i t y

for herself. Doubts began t o "enter the French n a t i o n a l mind

as t o the continued whole-hearted support o f her a l l i e s so

b e s i d e s t r u s t i n g t o the r e g u l a r machinery s e t up by the Con-

ference France was working i n o t h e r d i r e c t i o n s t o a l a r g e

degree i n d e p e n d e n t l y .

One o f the mainstays o f the s e c u r i t y o f France i n pre-war

1. T r e a t y Text, A r t i c l e 80.

2. I b i d . , A r t i c l e 88.

3. Lord R i d d e l l ' s D i a r y , p. 191.

4. L l o y d George, op. c i t . , v o l . 2, p. 990.

 14

y e a r s was her f r i e n d s h i p w i t h R u s s i a . In 1917 w i t h the out-

break of r e v o l u t i o n i n t h a t l a n d the o l d Regime was overthrown

and w i t h i t went, i n F r e n c h eyes, an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e i r

system o f a l l i a n c e s * A l s o , from the S o v i e t p o i n t o f view

went the o b l i g a t i o n to pay debts i n c u r r e d by the C z a r i s t gov-

ernment to France i n pre-war and war y e a r s . French opinion

f e l t t h a t the L e n i n i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s e t up i n R u s s i a a f t e r

the R e v o l u t i o n d i d not r e p r e s e n t the r e a l R u s s i a n people

and the French were n o t l i k e W i l s o n ^ t r o u b l e d w i t h i d e a l o g i o a l

;

qualms about " s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n " and the " r i g h t of p e o p l e s " .

There were two courses open.-to F r a n c e . One was t o adopt a

" s t a n d - o f f p o l i c y and allow the Russians t o develop t h e i r own

plans f o r salvation* T h i s was c a l l e d the "cordon sanitaire".

Its aim was t o b l o c k o f f a l l R u s s i a n c o n t a c t s w i t h the western

c o u n t r i e s so as t o s t a r v e the country i n t o abandoning Bolshe-

vism* I n the second case the French government favored a p o l -

icy o f i n t e r v e n t i o n , even a l t h o u g h t h i s d i d not f i n d f a v o r

w i t h the S o c i a l i s t and Labor p r e s s . I n t e r v e n t i o n was not to

be f o r conquest but r a t h e r i t was to take on the appearance

of a c r u s a d e — t o save the R u s s i a n people. Which o f these two

p o l i c i e s would b e s t a i d French s e c u r i t y ? In the case o f the

"cordon s a n i t a i r e " i t was f e l t t h a t i t would s t a r v e the wrong

people and abandoning R u s s i a i n t h a t way would be tantamount

to a complete l o s s as f a r as the v a s t R u s s i a n debts t o France

were concerned. To openly a t t a c k R u s s i a would o f f e n d some of

the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f the Conference so e v e n t u a l l y the

Supreme C o u n c i l decided t o throw i t s weight behind A d m i r a l

 15

Kolchak. However, t h i s White R u s s i a n l e a d e r l o s t out and as

a r e s u l t each n a t i o n was l e f t t o i t s own designs as f a r as

R u s s i a was concerned. Once an a l l y , R u s s i a was now f e a r e d by

France. However, her R u s s i a n p o l i c y was f a i r l y dormant until

she sent G e n e r a l Weygand t o r e o r g a n i z e the F o l i s h f o r c e s which

1

were b e i n g s e r i o u s l y beaten by the r e j u v e n a t e d S o v i e t armies.

The French f e a r e d the i d e a l o g y o f the R u s s i a n S o v i e t s , and

I t s p o s s i b l e i n f l u e n c e on French n a t i o n a l u n i t y more than

a t t a c k on t h e i r n a t i o n a l f r o n t i e r s by R u s s i a n f o r c e s . Also

they were alarmed l e s t R u s s i a should j o i n f o r c e s w i t h Germany

i n a common f r o n t ; Then her s e c u r i t y would indeed be ser-

i o u s l y menaced.

I n t h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter an e f f o r t has been made t o

a n a l y z e some of the f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n France's s e a r c h f o r

s e c u r i t y through the Peace o f V e r s a i l l e s . Twenty y e a r s a f t e r

the T r e a t y the world can s i t i n sober judgment and f i n d fault

w i t h many of i t s p r o v i s i o n s , i t d i d commit i n j u s t i c e s without

doubt, y e t i f i t had o b t a i n e d the support from the n a t i o n s

which formulated i t , as f a r as France i s concerned i t would

have guaranteed her s e c u r i t y s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The f a i l u r e o f

the United S t a t e s to r a t i f y the T r e a t y and the T r i p a r t i t e

Guarantee r e s u l t i n g i n England's r e f u s a l to stand by her pro-

mise, caused t h e F r e n c h t o f e e l that they were b e i n g deserted*

Speaking o f h i s country one French w r i t e r s a i d , "Son activite'

s o r i e n t v e r s l ' a r t s de l a p a i x , son e & p r i t ne n o u r i t aucune

r

1. Lord R i d d e l l ' s D i a r y , p. 227.

 16
1
idee de conquetei" Yet France f e l t that she was going to have

to p r e s e r v e t h a t peace alone. As her confidence i n her former

a l l i e s lessened France turned t o a new system o f a l l i a n c e s to

supplement the guarantees o f the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s . This

s e a r c h f o r a l l i e s i s the second phase o f t h e French search

for security.

1* Dumont-Wilden, L., La France e t Les A l l i a n c e s ,

Revue des Deux Mondes, Tome 21, 15 Mai, 1924, p. 272.
 CHAPTER I I .

THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR ALLIANCES 19£0-1925

 CHAPTER I I .

THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR ALLIANCES 1920-1925

"FourteBn P o i n t s , " s a i d Clemenoeau of Wilson's p l a n f o r

1

peaoe, "God A l m i g h t y o n l y had t e n * " Suoh was the s p i r i t w i t h

which some Frenoh p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s s e t about r e o r g a n i z i n g the

n a t i o n a l l i f e o f France f o r peace. V i c t o r y had been achieved

at great c o s t i n l i v e s and p r o p e r t y , not o n l y f o r France but

f o r o t h e r s as w e l l * H e r e i n l a y the cause f o r the note o f im-

p a t i e n c e i n Clemenceau's remark. For i n a l l post-war arrange-

ments France's w i l l was not o n l y t o be c o n s i d e r e d . Woodrow

Wilson's l e a d e r s h i p f o r peace through t h e League o f N a t i o n s

found such a c t i v e support i n so many c o u n t r i e s t h a t the French

a u t h o r i t i e s c o u l d not o v e r l o o k i t i n t h e i r c a l c u l a t i o n s . Yet

they would not put t h e i r whole f a i t h i n i t . Rather must they

t r y t o f i n d other safeguards should the League f a i l t o p r o v i d e

France w i t h the s e c u r i t y she must have.

What were these other safeguards? I n the f i r s t case

Franoe c o u l d r e a l l y disarm. T h i s might be a safeguard a g a i n s t

a f u t u r e war* Yet the Frenchman i s a m i l i t a r i s t i c pacifist.

He does not f e e l s a f e u n l e s s he has an army of s u f f i c i e n t

s i z e always on c a l l . However, t h i s p o i n t , as an argument

a g a i n s t d i s a r m i n g , i s v e r y weak i n comparison t o t h a t o f pop-

ulation. Franoe, whose p o p u l a t i o n was a t one time l a r g e r than

1. Anon., France and Germany, Round T a b l e , v o l . 21, tiune,

1931, p. 506.

17
 18
1
Germany's, had much l e s s i n 1921. In a d d i t i o n , the b i r t h - r a t e

i n Germany was much g r e a t e r than t h a t i n t r a n c e , i n the first

s i x months of 1921 i n France t h e r e were 72,000 b i r t h s whereas

2
f o r the same p e r i o d i n Germany t h e r e were 180,000. T h i s ,

coupled w i t h the f a c t t h a t during the Great War France lost

3
2,000,000 men made French l e a d e r s very s e n s i t i v e about the

problem o f s e c u r i t y and p r e c l u d e d any p o s s i b i l i t y of France

a c c e p t i n g the dictum t h a t by disarming h e r s e l f she c o u l d best

a t t a i n her o b j e c t — s e c u r i t y . The second a l t e r n a t i v e , n a t u r -

a l l y f o l l o w s t h e r e f o r e , t h a t France must m a i n t a i n a l a r g e

army and r e l y upon h e r s e l f f o r p r o t e c t i o n . As she had the

l a r g e s t army i n Europe under arms two years a f t e r the war

ended one might ask why she d i d not f e e l secure? Her leaders

knew t h a t she c o u l d no longer c o n s i d e r h e r s e l f as the s o l e

a r b i t e r i n European matters, because j u s t as she waged long

and b i t t e r wars under the banner o f L o u i s XIV* to maintain

the balance of power i n t h a t p e r i o d o f her h i s t o r y , she knew,

o t h e r s would be j u s t as i n s i s t e n t t h a t i t be maintained after

1. Toynbee, A. J . , Survey of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , London,

The R o y a l I n s t i t u t e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1927, p.131.
P r o f e s s o r Toynbee s t a t e s t h a t a t t h i s time France had
a p o p u l a t i o n of 39,604,992.

Anon., F r e n c h P r e p a r a t i o n s f o r Genoa, Current H i s t o r y ,

v o l . 16, No. 1, A p r i l , 19.22, p. 171.
The w r i t e r o f t h i s a r t i c l e s e t s the p o p u l a t i o n o f Ger-
many at 64,000,000. He says Franoe has 37,000,000 which
i s at v a r i a n c e w i t h the f i g u r e of P r o f e s s o r Toynbee.

2. Anon., The Malady of Europe, Round T a l l e , v o l . 12,

September, 1922, p; 751.

3. Toynbee, A. J . , op. c i t . , 1927, p. 131*

 19

the Great War. i n a d d i t i o n French statesmen knew t h a t i f

France i n s i s t e d upon m a i n t a i n i n g a l a r g e army, c o m p e t i t i v e

b u i l d i n g might ensue which would make her task t h a t much c o s t -

lier i n order t o m a i n t a i n a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y l a r g e r f o r o e .

The t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e would be f o r France t o r e l y upon

the League o f N a t i o n s to p r o v i d e her w i t h adequate p r o t e c t i o n .

In the f i r s t enthusiasm o f success the great mass o f French

people were whole-heartedly behind t h i s a l t o g e t h e r n o v e l and

thoroughly p r o m i s i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n . The T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s

marked the end of the Great War and the Covenant o f the League

of N a t i o n s was p a r t of the T r e a t y , t h e r e f o r e the Frenoh people

expected t h a t the s i g n a t u r e s of t h e former C e n t r a l Powers t o

the V e r s a i l l e s Pact would mark t h e i r acceptance o f the " s t a t u s

quo" as e s t a b l i s h e d by the T r e a t y . T h i s was v e r y necessary,

the French c o n s i d e r e d , before they c o u l d f e e l that security

Was assured. Yet i n German eyes t h i s a t t i t u d e o f t h e French

c o u l d o n l y mean t h a t the Germans were to be p l a c e d i n a p o s i -

t i o n of permanent i n f e r i o r i t y i n Europe.

In a d d i t i o n t o German o p p o s i t i o n t o the i d e a o f the p e r -

manence o f the V e r s a i l l e s P a c t , o t h e r f a c t o r s soon became

apparent which caused the French to decide t h a t they could not

p l a c e a l l t h e i r hope o f s e c u r i t y i n the League of Nations

organization* They deoided to r e v i s e the pre-war system o f

•developing a l l i a n c e s . The first of these f a c t o r s was the fail-

ure of the u n i t e d S t a t e s to r a t i f y the T r i p a r t i t e T r e a t y o f

Guarantee. As Robert de J o u v e n e l , a R a d i c a l j o u r n a l i s t wrote,

" P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n came to Europe t o r e p r e s e n t a p r i n c i p l e which

 20

lie brought i n the name o f a s u p e r i o r m o r a l i t y . The Frenoh

soon l e a r n e d i t was o n l y i n the name o f h i s country t h a t he

1
came*" F r e n c h enthusiasm f o r the f u t u r e r e c e i v e d a severe

shock; The second f a c t o r which caused the French to stop and

c o n s i d e r was the r a p i d l y changing B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e . British

i n t e r e s t on the c o n t i n e n t was not concerned w i t h French sec-

u r i t y , r a t h e r was i t i n the resumption o f normal economic r e -

2

l a t i o n s , p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h Germany; The German market was

thought to be e s s e n t i a l t o B r i t i s h commerce and i f Germany was

to be h e l d i n economic s u b j e c t i o n through Reparations i t would

mean that the buying power o f the Germans would be seriously

affected, hence the B r i t i s h and French a t t i t u d e s were at

complete v a r i a n c e . Britain felt the best method t o g a i n Rep-

a r a t i o n s was the r e s t o r a t i o n o f t r a d e wlith Germany. The French

thought t h a t payments should come from Germany without assist-

ance from the o u t s i d e . The a t t i t u d e o f the B r i t i s h on w o r l d

problems was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y wider i n scope, that o f the

French remained fundamentally narrow and continental;

As the F r e n c h l e a d e r s p e r c e i v e d that t h e i r former allies

were not going t o f u l f i l l t h e i r promises i n r e s p e c t t o guaran-

t e e s and a l s o t h a t the gap between the French and B r i t i s h view

on c o n t i n e n t a l problems was growing wider without any apparent

1. Jouvenel, Robert de, A French Debate on the League o f

N a t i o n s , L i v i n g Age, v o l . 321, May 1924, p. 931.
T r a n s l a t e d from La Grande Revue, P a r i s monthly.

2. Toynbee, A r n o l d , The World .after the Peace Conference,

Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press,. 1925, p. 4 9 - f f *
 31

hope o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n they turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n towards

the f o r m a t i o n o f A l l i a n c e s .

i n the e a r l y summer o f 1920 m i l i t a r y c o n v e r s a t i o n s were

begun between Belgium and France. These c o n v e r s a t i o n s r e -

s u l t e d i n the s i g n a t u r e o f an agreement on the seventh o f Sep-

tember o f t h e same y e a r . T h i s m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e was l e g a l i n

1

view o f t h e v i o l a t i o n o f the n e u t r a l i t y t r e a t y o f 1839. I t

was f i r s t thought t h a t A r t i c l e 8 o f the Covenant o f the League

which says t h a t "Every t r e a t y o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagement

entered i n t o h e r e a f t e r by any member o f t h e League s h a l l be

2

f o r t h w i t h r e g i s t e r e d w i t h the S e c r e t a r i a t " would d e s t r o y the

e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h i s m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , however n o t i f i c a t i o n

t h a t i t was p u r e l y a d e f e n s i v e agreement was sent t o the Sec-

r e t a r y - G e n e r a l but i t s c l a u s e s were not d i s c l o s e d . T h i s de-

p a r t u r e from her h i s t o r i c p o l i c y was a very r a d i c a l step f o r

the B e l g i a n government t o take and i s testimony t o the power

and p r e s t i g e o f post-war France. The B e l g i a n government r e -

garded t h e widening breach between Great B r i t a i n and France

w i t h concern f o r the c o o p e r a t i o n and f r i e n d s h i p o f these two

Powers was e s s e n t i a l t o her s e c u r i t y . Y e t , on the other hand,

the commercial i n t e r e s t s o f the B e l g i a n s were l a r g e l y bound up

w i t h Germany and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s f e a r e d that i f a s e r i o u s breach

d i d take p l a c e between France and Great B r i t a i n t h i s m i l i t a r y

1, B r i t i s h F o r e i g n O f f i c e H i s t o r i c a l S e c t i o n Handbook, B e l -
gium, Appendix,, by Hymans, E - , La Belgique et L Oeuvre f

de*M. Leon DeLacroix, P a r i s , Le C o r r e s p o n d a n t /

Tome 281, 10 Decembre, 1920, p. 769.
1 1

2. Covenant o f t h e League o f N a t i o n s , A r t i c l e 8.
 22

a l l i a n c e w i t h France, i n a d d i t i o n to her g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n
1

would d r i v e her too much i n t o dependence upon t h a t c o u n t r y .

However, the a l l i a n c e h e l d and the f i r s t l i n k i n the F r e n c h

s e c u r i t y c h a i n had been f o r g e d .

The fundamental f a c t o r i n the French p l a n o f s e c u r i t y was,

the more p o w e r f u l the guarantees o f peace, the s m a l l e r w i l l

be the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of war. A l t h o u g h many F r e n c h political

l e a d e r s and w r i t e r s f e l t that France should have had complete

2

c o n t r o l over the Rhineland and the Saar she was forced to

accept the c o n d i t i o n s of the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s and share

c o n t r o l o f the Rhineland w i t h Great B r i t a i n and Belgium and

to use the mines of the Saar o n l y f o r a s t i p u l a t e d p e r i o d t o

take t h e p l a c e of those destroyed i n the Great War w i t h i n her

own national frontiers. The French hoped t h a t A l l i e d oecUpa-

t i o n a t o g e t h e r w i t h the support o f the League of Nations would

g i v e her her wonted s e c u r i t y i n the west.

By the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s , the foundations o f the o l d

p o l i t i c a l and economic o r d e r i n E a s t e r n Europe had been b u r s t

asunder. Whereas the t h r e e g r e a t empires, the German, the

R u s s i a n and the A u s t r i a n f o r m e r l y dominated the political

scene, now s m a l l e r , more r a c i a l l y i n t a c t groups which had

1. The B e l g i a n Cabinet which signed the A l l i a n c e was voted

out s h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s but the A l l i a n c e was not
s e r i o u s l y menaced u n t i l l$/£ir.

2. Degouy, l e c o n t r e - a m i r a l , Dans La Sarre, Revue des Deux

Mondes, Tome 18, 15 Novembre, 1923, p. 430*
T h i s n a v a l man says complete c o n t r o l of the Saar i s
a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l t o the s e c u r i t y of France.
 23

broken away from the l a r g e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s were c a r r y i n g on

independently. France, keenly conscious of the f a i l u r e o f the

United S t a t e s and ureat B r i t a i n to guarantee her s e c u r i t y i n

the west as P r e s i d e n t Wilson and L l o y d George had promised,

saw i n these s m a l l e r groups, an o p p o r t u n i t y , p a r t i a l l y a t least,

to make up f o r t h i s f a i l u r e ; The h e l p given to the P o l e s i n

the war w i t h R u s s i a , g i v e n independently by Prance a f t e r L l o y d

1

George had r e f u s e d t o cooperate, l e d i n February, 1921, t o the

s i g n i n g o f the F r a n c o - P o l i s h A l l i a n c e ; M. Dmowski, one of

Poland's g r e a t e s t statesmen, c o n s i d e r e d t h i s pact t o be an

i n t e g r a l p a r t "d'un nouveau systeme d ' e q u i l i b r e p o l i t i q u e en

2 . -

Europe." T h i s i s not e x a c t l y what France was t r y i n g to e s t -

ablish. She was t r y i n g to guarantee h e r s e l f s e c u r i t y through

an a l l i a n c e w i t h Poland against a very r e a l fear of aggression

by Germany i n the ."east and a g a i n s t R u s s i a i n the n o r t h ; This

F r a n c o - P o l i s h A l l i a n c e might have dominated the p o l i t i c a l sit-

u a t i o n s i n Europe f o r the f o l l o w i n g years exoept f o r the fact

t h a t the P o l i s h l e a d e r s r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e i r own s e c u r i t y might

be f u r t h e r enhanced by a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n o f t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s
3

w i t h Germany over the Upper S i l e s i a n q u e s t i o n . T h i s was done

and thus Poland was not f o r c e d t o come e n t i r e l y i n t o the French

o r b i t , however a commercial agreement was undertaken between

1. P a t t e r s o n , E r i c J . , Poland, London, Arrowsmith, 1934, p. 72.

2. Gaston, V i c t o r , La P o l i t i g u e e x t e r i e u r e de l a Pologne,
P a r i s , Revue Bleue.( P o l i t i q u e et L i t t e r a i r e j , No. 23,
1 Decembrej 1923, p. 825.

3. Toynbee, A. J . , op. c i t . , 1920-1923, p; 269.

 24

Franoe and Poland by which they agreed to open up the markets

o f the two c o u n t r i e s a t a lower t a r i f f and by a French l o a n

1

to Poland o f 400,000,000 f r a n c s .

i n d i s c u s s i n g France's s e a r c h f o r a l l i a n c e s i t i s now

necessary t o t u r n back a g a i n t o the "west and t o t r a c e the

developments i n Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s . A t the c l o s e o f hos-

t i l i t i e s , England and the U n i t e d S t a t e s took immediate steps

t o disband t h e i r armies. France d i d n o t . Thus i n the new

European system o f A l l i a n c e s which France was working out so

a s s i d u o u s l y B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y power had become o n l y a secondary

f a c t o r u n t i l such a time as i t c o u l d be brought i n t o l i n e w i t h

the p o l i c y o f Franoe and her two a l l i e s , Belgium and Poland.

W r i t i n g t o Clemenceau at the time o f the Peace Conference o f

1919, Poincare''states, "the p r e c i o u s a s s i s t a n c e which our

f r i e n d s w i l l g i v e us i n the event o f a German a g g r e s s i o n ,

can u n f o r t u n a t e l y , never be i n s t a n t a n e o u s , l t cannot be a

2

substitute f o r occupation." In s p i t e o f the French determin-

a t i o n t o occupy the Ruhr and even a l t h o u g h the u n i t e d S t a t e s

r e f u s e d t o r a t i f y the T r i p a r t i t e T r e a t y o f Guarantee, i t was

hoped t h a t some way would be found to prevent the breakdown

o f the A n g l o - F r e n c h r e l a t i o n s h i p which had been such a potent

f a c t o r i n European a f f a i r s . With t h i s o b j e c t i n view the

French ambassador to Great B r i t a i n , the Count de S a i n t - A u l a i r e

plaoed b e f o r e the Marquis o f Curzon t e n t a t i v e p r o p o s a l s t h a t

1. ibid., 1924, p. 441, f o o t - n o t e 1.

2. Cmd. 2169, p. 100.

 85
1
conversations should be begun towards t h a t end. He f e l t that

advantage t o Europe g e n e r a l l y and England s p e c i f i c a l l y would

be four-fold:

li France would be able t o reduce her l a n d armaments, thus

e n a b l i n g Great B r i t a i n to do l i k e w i s e .

2. France would consent to immediate entry of Germany i n t o

the League of N a t i o n s i

3. An Anglo-French A l l i a n c e would have a s t e a d y i n g effect

on the continent,, and more s p e c i f i c a l l y on Germany h e r s e l f .

4* i t would enable France t o work w i t h Great Britain and

Germany t o help K u s s i a r e b u i l d the s h a t t e r e d f a b r i c of

2
her s t a t e .

Somewhat the same thoughts were s t a t e d by B r i a n d later

i n the same month of December d u r i n g a v i s i t to Mr. Lloyd

George but no o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h stand was taken u n t i l the lat-

t e r statesman p l a c e d some concrete p r o p o s a l s b e f o r e Briand

d u r i n g the economic conference o f some o f the western n a t i o n s

3

h e l d at Cannes. He r e c o g n i z e d the French need f o r s e c u r i t y

but s t r e s s e d the B r i t i s h d i s l i k e o f any c o n t i n e n t a l commit-

ments. B r i a n d i n h i s r e p l y s t a t e d t h a t i n the o p i n i o n of the

French government "some mutual guarantee of m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y

and demonstration of the c l o s e p o l i t i c a l understanding existing

1. I b i d . , No. 32, The Marquis of Curzon t o Lord Harding,

December 5, 1921, p. 108.

2. Cmd. 2169, p. 110.

3. i b i d . , No. 33, Notes o f a c o n v e r s a t i o n between Mr. L l o y d

George and M. B r i a n d at 10 Downing S t r e e t , December
21, 1921, p. 112. '
 26

between them would be o f c a p i t a l importance f o r the p a c i f i c

1
settlement of European,,questions. Here we see the divergent

B r i t i s h and French views on the problem o f s e c u r i t y . I t was

i n an e f f o r t to overcome t h i s c o n f l i c t o f aims t h a t these two

statesmen were c a r r y i n g on t h e i r c o n v e r s a t i o n s ; This differ-

ence can best be understood by examining A r t i c l e 1 of the B r i -

t i s h and French d r a f t s of a proposed Anglo-French t r e a t y .

British

i n the event o f a d i r e c t and unprovoked a g g r e s s i o n

a g a i n s t the s o i l o f France by Germany, Great B r i t a i n will

immediately p l a c e h e r s e l f a t t h e s i d e of France w i t h her

n a v a l , m i l i t a r y and a i r f o r c e s .
3
French

I n the event o f unprovoked a g g r e s s i o n by Germany a g a i n s t

France, Great B r i t a i n w i l l p l a c e h e r s e l f immediately at t h e

s i d e o f France w i t h her n a v a l , m i l i t a r y and a i r f o r c e s .

R e c i p r o c a l l y i n the case o f an unprovoked a g g r e s s i o n by

Germany a g a i n s t ^ r e a t B r i t a i n , France w i l l p l a c e h e r s e l f im-

m e d i a t e l y at the s i d e o f Great B r i t a i n w i t h her m i l i t a r y , \

n a v a l and a i r f o r c e s .

1. Gmdi 2169, No. 35, Statement o f the views o f the Frenoh

4
government on A n g l o - F r e n c h R e l a t i o n s sent t o Mr. L l o y d
George by M. B r i a n d on January 8, 1922, p. 123.

2. i b i d . , No. 38, B r i t i s h D r a f t o f T r e a t y between the Govern-

ment o f the B r i t i s h limpire and the drench R e p u b l i c ,
handed by Mr. L l o y d George to M. B r i a n d , January 12,
1922, p. 127.

3. i b i d . , No. 39, French D r a f t o f Proposed Anglo-French T r e a t y

V communicated to the marquis o f Curzon o f K e d l e s t o n by
the French Ambassador, January 22, 1922j, p. 128.
 27

I t w i l l be seen i n the above two e x t r a c t s t h a t the B r i -

t i s h guarantee i s u n i l a t e r a l i n c h a r a c t e r , because i t contem-

plated, a guarantee a g a i n s t German a g g r e s s i o n g i v e n to France

by Great B r i t a i n without r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n by France to

Great B r i t a i n . As soon as the F r e n c h Chamber got word o f the

contents o f the proposed pact B r i a n d was r e c a l l e d t o jr'aris

by P r e s i d e n t M i l l e r a n d where b i t t e r h o s t i l i t y caused him t o

summarily resign. The French wanted the B r i t i s h guarantee

very b a d l y but so great was t h e i r p r i d e a f t e r the war that

they wanted the world t o t h i n k t h a t they were ready to accept

i t but were not a c t u a l l y p r e s s i n g f o r i t * Poincare',who suc-

ceeded B r i a n d ^ c a r r i e d on n e g o t i a t i o n s but the B r i t i s h govern-

ment had s t i l l no d e s i r e to make the Pact r e c i p r o c a l . The

French were determined that i t should be undertaken on a b a s i s

of absolute e q u a l i t y . Mo u n d e r s t a n d i n g could be a r r i v e d at

f o r another reason as w e l l * R e f e r r i n g a g a i n to the statement

o f the above two A r t i c l e s i t w i l l be n o t i c e d t h a t the word

" d i r e c t " i s used i n the B r i t i s h and omitted i n the French

draft. T h i s was another s e r i o u s p o i n t of c o n t e n t i o n .

The q u e s t i o n . o f Poland i s brought i n t o the ^problem; here.

France had an a l l i a n c e with Poland which i n c l u d e d a m i l i t a r y

convention and she was thereby o b l i g a t e d t o go t o the a i d o f

Poland i f t h a t country should be a t t a c k e d by Germany. Now, in

the immediate post-war y e a r s B r i t a i n regarded Poland as an

a r t i f i c i a l c r e a t i o n , a protege^of France and above a l l as a

t h r e a t to the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n the B a l t i c . In a d d i t i o n ,

Poland's f r o n t i e r s were not n a t u r a l g e o g r a p h i c a l l y and t h e r e f o r e

 28

were d i f f i c u l t t o defend. For these reasons the B r i t i s h felt

that i f they should r a t i f y the French d r a f t i t would o b l i g a t e

them t o go t o the defense o f t h e P o l e s while f i g h t i n g w i t h

France. This,..of course, was not w i t h i n B r i t i s h comprehension

at t h i s p e r i o d , although i n l a t e r years the a t t i t u d e o f the

B r i t i s h changed r a d i c a l l y , due t o t h e p r e s s u r e o f events.

Poincare''concluded t h e a b o r t i v e c o n v e r s a t i o n s i n h i s l e t t e r to

the Marquis o f Crewe when he wrote t h a t i f i n the f u t u r e any

f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s should be undertaken i n r e s p e c t to a Pact

i t must be b i l a t e r a l ; must be accompanied by e f f e c t i v e recipro-

c a l m i l i t a r y guarantees and t h a t i t must have a p r a c t i c a l value

1

f o r both countries.

i n summarizing the Anglo-French phase o f the French search

f o r a l l i a n c e s what was the b a s i s o f the d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n

i n t h i s problem of security? I t i s the d i f f e r e n c e o f a t t i t u d e

on the p a r t o f a Frenchman and Englishman on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

of " a g g r e s s i o n " . I n France, a guarantee such as t h a t d i s c u s s e d

above, would be regarded as a b i n d i n g commitment on t h e p a r t o f

England t o a s s i s t France a g a i n s t Germany whatever might be the

circumstances o f the q u a r r e l o r the c o n d i t i o n s which l e d up

to i t , so l o n g as Germany was f o r m a l l y the a g g r e s s o r . I n Eng-

land i t was taken f o r granted t h a t when the time came f o r a

d e c i s i o n on the p a r t o f the B r i t i s h government and people that

they would be f r e e t o decide f o r themselves on the m e r i t s o f

the case as to who was i n r e a l i t y t h e aggressor. Great Britain

1. Cmd. 2169, No. 55, E n c l o s u r e I * , M. P o i n c a r e t o t h e Marquis

of Crewe, August 20, 1923, p. 173.
 29

had t6a dominions i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth t o con-

s i d e r and i n these e a r l y post-war years they were showing d i v -

ergencies o f i n t e r e s t , French narrowness and the world view-

p o i n t o f the B r i t i s h c o u l d not be r e c o n c i l e d at t h i s period.

A f t e r t h e i r f a i l u r e i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Great Brit-

a i n , French statesmen turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f u r t h e r a n c e

of t h e i r p o l i c y o f b u i l d i n g up a l l i a n c e s on the European con-

tinent i France had a l r e a d y n e g o t i a t e d t r e a t i e s w i t h Belgium

and Poland and she now turned towards t h e e a s t . French l e a d e r s

had been watching w i t h i n t e r e s t t h e course o f c o n v e r s a t i o n s

b e i n g c a r r i e d on by her a l l y , P o l a n d w i t h Rumania and a l s o

;

by Rumania w i t h J u g o - S l o v i a and C z e c h o - S l o v a k i a . By the t h i r d

o f March,1921, Poland had a l r e a d y concluded an agreement w i t h

Rumania. Both o f these c o u n t r i e s f e a r e d R u s s i a and were an-

x i o u s f o r each o t h e r ' s support. The L i t t l e Entente structure

1

was completed by the Rumanian-Jugo-Slav t r e a t y on June 7, 1921,

and although these A l l i a n c e s had been entered i n t o by t h e

Balkan and E a s t e r n European countries primarily for t h e i r

i n t e r e s t s , yet those i n t e r e s t s were c l o s e l y connected w i t h those

o f France by t h e f a c t that they r e s t e d on the common b a s i s o f

2

the F o u r European Peace T r e a t i e s . The French motive i n desir-

i n g d e f i n i t e understandings w i t h Rumania, J u g o - S l a v i a and

Czecho-Slovakia has a d i f f e r e n t f o u n d a t i o n than t h a t which

prompted her t o make t h e B e l g i a n and P o l i s h A l l i a n c e s . With

1. Temperley, H. W. V., op. c i t . , v o l . 4, 1921, p* 519.

2. Toynbee, A. J"., op. c i t . , 1926, p. 144 f f .

 30

them I t was merely a d e s i r e on the p a r t o f France to cement

t h e i r common i n t e r e s t i n keeping a check on Germany. But w i t h

the new s t a t e s i n South-eastern Europe i t was l a r g e l y their

common i n t e r e s t t o p r e s e r v e the " s t a t u s quo" through the sep-

a r a t e peace t r e a t i e s made hy them w i t h t h e C e n t r a l Powers.

B r o a d l y speaking, i f Prance c o u l d come t o some understanding

w i t h these s m a l l e r n a t i o n s I t would he d e f i n i t e l y t o a i d Ru-

mania a g a i n s t R u s s i a , Czeoho-Slovakia a g a i n s t Hungary and Jugo-

s l a v i a against I t a l y . I t would mean heavy commitments f o r

France, but she was the r i c h e s t and most powerful n a t i o n on

the European c o n t i n e n t .

The p o l i c y o f a t t a i n i n g s e o u r i t y through a l l i a n c e s was

b e i n g pursued w h i l e France a c t i v e l y engaged i n t h e Ruhr occu-

pation; However, t h i s episode i n French post-war history i s

more concerned w i t h t h e f i n a n c i a l s i d e o f French p o l i c y than

with security; The o f f i c i a l F r e n c h government stand on t h i s

q u e s t i o n was conveyed t o t h e E n g l i s h government by t h e Count

de S a i n t A u l a i r e when he s t a t e d t h a t t h e i n v a s i o n was under-

taken f o r economic purposes only and had no c o n n e c t i o n w i t h

1

the q u e s t i o n o f s e o u r i t y . C r i t i c i s m which r e s u l t e d from this

a c t i o n was very b i t t e r and i n s p i t e o f the F r e n c h d i s c l a i m e r

r e g a r d i n g s e c u r i t y , t h i s a c t i o n was bound t o a f f e c t French

n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n the a t t i t u d e s i t engendered i n other

peoples. W i t h i n Germany sentiment can best be d e s c r i b e d by

quoting the. words o f a young m a r r i e d woman who s a i d : "When

1. Cmd. 3169, i\io. 51, The Marquis Curzon o f K e d l e s t o n t o the

Marquis o f Crewe, P a r i s , ( E x t r a c t ) , J u l y 10, 1923, p. 171.
 31

I m a r r i e d 1 hoped I would have no c h i l d r e n . We were r u i n e d

by the i n f l a t i o n , we were l i v i n g from hand to mouth.;.but

now I want sons so t h a t I may b r i n g them up and d e d i c a t e them

: 1
to the t a s k o f avenging the F a t h e r l a n d . " An American w r i t e r ,

N i c h o l a s R o o s e v e l t , m a i n t a i n s that the Ruhr o c c u p a t i o n y i e l d e d

a net p r o f i t o f n e a r l y 4,000,000,000 paper f r a n c s and t h a t as

2
a d i p l o m a t i c weapon i t was a success,but a Frenchman, George

L e s c h a r t i e r says t h a t "the r e s u l t s o f t h i s adventure;..proved

d i s a s t r o u s i n every way, materially, financially, politically

and even m o r a l l y , f o r i t d e a l t a severe blow to French p r e s t i g e

3
abroad. Y e t t h a t the French Chamber o f Deputies was thor-

oughly behind the p o l i c y o f the Premier, Poincare^ i s shown

by the f a c t t h a t the vote taken a f t e r the S o c i a l i s t deputy

M. Leon Blum censured the government, was 478 t o 86 i n f a v o r

4

o f the p o l i c y of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Thus the f i r s t puhitivie

e f f o r t undertaken j o i n t l y by the two a l l i e s , Franoe and B e l -

gium was begun, i n s p i t e o f o f f i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n s to the con-

t r a r y , the Frenchman's sense o f s e c u r i t y was reduced.

1. Anon., The Regeneration o f Germany, Q u a r t e r l y Review,

No. 484, A p r i l 25, 1925, p. 231.

2. R o o s e v e l t , N i c h o l a s , The Ruhr Occupation, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s

(New Y o r k ] , v o l . 4, No. 1, October 25, 1925, p. 112*

3* L e s c h a r t i e r , Georges, French P o l i c y and Disarmament, i n t e r -

n a t i o n a l problems and R e l a t i o n s , Academy o f p o l i t i c a l
S c i e n c e , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1927, p. 36.

4. Anon., The French i n v a s i o n o f the Ruhr, Current H i s t o r y ,

v o l . XVII., Ho* 5, February, 1923, p. 711.
 32

I t i s necessary t o mention a t t h i s juncture t h e use by

France o f a new t o o l i n b u i l d i n g her s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e v i z .

money. Her o b j e c t was to hold the f r i e n d s h i p of her allies

by every p o s s i b l e method and her strong f i n a n c i a l condition

made I t p o s s i b l e f o r her t o use money as a l e v e r . On December

17, 1923, the French Senate r a t i f i e d the o f f e r o f c r e d i t s to

Poland, Y u g o - S l a v i a and Rumania t o be used f o r the purchase

1

of war m a t e r i a l s i n Prance. I t was at once a convenient way

o f g e t t i n g r i d o f her o l d war s u p p l i e s and arming her allies.

One o f the reasons why Poland, i u g o - S l a v i a and Rumania found

it so d i f f i c u l t t o r a i s e funds f o r c o n s t r u c t i v e purposes was

the l a r g e amount of t h e i r indebtedness t o Prance and when

they d i d want money f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n they were u s u a l l y f o r c e d

to go t o London and New York as Prance was not i n t e r e s t e d when

2

she c o u l d not put her money to p o l i t i c a l use. Prance drove a

hard b a r g a i n at t h i s p e r i o d and a t the b a s i s o f a l l her schemes

was her g r e a t object—security.

On March 24, 1924, a Franco-Czecho-Slovak t r e a t y was rat-

ified. Gzecho-Slovakia was s i t u a t e d on Germany's southern

border and the c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s t r e a t y meant that France

had a l l i e s now on the west, n o r t h and South borders* The

Frenoh c o u l d r i g h t l y f e e l t h a t t h e y were making p r o g r e s s i n

t h e i r p o l i c y o f keeping Germany weak. For France the key

1. Toynbee, A. J *, op. c i t * , 1924, p. 444, f o o t note No. 1.

2. E i n z i g , P a u l , Finance and P o l i t i c s , London, Macmillan.

1932, p. 47 f f .
 33
1

p o i n t o f t h i s T r e a t y i s A r t i c l e 1 which s t a t e s ^
"The governments o f the French R e p u b l i c and the Czecho-

s l o v a k R e p u b l i c undertake t o c o n c e r t t h e i r a c t i o n i n a l l

matters o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y which may t h r e a t e n t h e i r s e c u r i t y or

which may tend t o subvert the s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d by t h e T r e a t i e s

of Peace o f which both p a r t i e s are s i g n a t o r i e s . " T h i s was a

purely consultative pact. A c c u s a t i o n s were made t h a t t h e r e

2

were s e c r e t m i l i t a r y c l a u s e s t o t h e Pact but t h i s was denied

by Dr. Benes. T h i s t r e a t y added another n a t i o n t o t h e b u l -

wark a g a i n s t r e v i s i o n o f the V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y . French states-r

men were encouraged i n t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t the s e c u r i t y o f France

was s t e a d i l y increasing;

The Frenoh were p l e a s e d w i t h t h e i r success i n t h e pur-

suance o f t h e i r p o l i c y o f b u i l d i n g up a l l i a n c e s a g a i n s t Ger-

many, but Romain Roland, one o f t h e g r e a t e s t o f French p a c i -

f i s t s s a i d o f t h i s p o l i c y o f France "...the boundaries esta-

b l i s h e d by the t r e a t i e s o f 1919 cannot from the p o i n t o f view

of t w o - t h i r d s o f Europe be maintained. Our French informants

stop t h e i r ears t o the agonized c r i e s o f the vanquished coun-

t r i e s , Germany i s s t a r v e d and w i l l not be able to bear this

4
repression."

1; Anon., France and Germany, Round T a b l e , v o l . 13, March,

1923, p. 237.

2. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1924, p. 446.

3. i b i d . , p i 441.

4. Koland, Romain, Broaden Europe o r D i e , New York, N a t i o n ,

v o l . 132, No. 3433, A p r i l 22, 1931, p; 443.
 34

T h e French c l a i m t o be r e a l i s t s , so much so t h a t they d i d

not p l a c e a l l t h e i r trust i n the League but p r e f e r r e d t o b u i l d

a second l i n e o f defense i n t h e i r A l l i a n c e s . .By tne time five

y e a r s had passed s i n c e the Treaty o f V e r s a i l l e s France had

done much t o i n c r e a s e German b i t t e r n e s s , and y e t a t t h e same

time had i n c r e a s e d her own s e c u r i t y through her own e f f o r t s .

Yet a movement began t o take shape f o r a broader inter-

p r e t a t i o n o f the word s e c u r i t y ; France was whole-heartedly

behind i t ; But she always knew t h a t whatever the outcome

she always had a d e v e l o p i n g system o f a l l i a n c e s which was

g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s i n g her n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .
 CHAPTER I I I .

FRANCE AND THE MAKING OF LOCARNO

 CHAPTER I I I .

FRANCE AND THE MAKING OF LOCARNO

Even w h i l e F r e n c h statesmen were busy weaving other count

r i e s i n t o t h e i r s e c u r i t y p a t t e r n f o r France, t h e y always pro-

f e s s e d r e a d i n e s s to d i s c u s s broader guarantees o f peace which

would embrace c o n t i n e n t a l Europe as w e l l . The more n a t i o n s

prepared t o guarantee French s e c u r i t y the b e t t e r France was

pleased* The f i r s t o f these d i s c u s s i o n s led up t o the attemp-

ted T r e a t y o f Mutual A s s i s t a n c e . A l t h o u g h not accepted by

many o f the Powers t h i s t r e a t y and t h e Geneva P r o t o c o l which

f o l l o w e d i t l a i d the f o u n d a t i o n s f o r the Locarno Peace Pact

and because o f t h a t must be i n c l u d e d i n t h i s study.

I n the month o f J u l y , 1922 n e g o t i a t i o n s between France

and Great B r i t a i n towards an Anglo-French guarantee finally

lapsed; The d i f f e r e n c e s between the French and B r i t i s h atti-

tudes were s h a r p l y brought o u t . The French f e l t t h a t their

armies saved B r i t a i n I n the f i r s t months o f the Great War and

t h e r e f o r e a guarantee o f some s o r t was an o b l i g a t i o n on the

p a r t of the B r i t i s h . The B r i t i s h t r u s t e d to t h e i r insular

position for security. "Englishmen," says M. Andre''Cheradame,

"have never been a b l e t o get the French p o i n t o f view. They

1

are m u t u a l l y i n d i s p e n s a b l e , y e t incomprehensible." What was

needed was a new approach t o the problem. T h i s was provided

i n the D r a f t T r e a t y of Mutual A s s i s t a n c e begun under the

1. M. Andre Cheradame c i t e d by Wickham Steed, The P o s i t i o n

7

o f France, London, J o u r n a l o f t h e . B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 2, March 20, 1923, p. 65.

35
 36

a u s p i c e s o f the League o f N a t i o n s .

During the d e l i b e r a t i o n s of the Second Assembly o f the

League the c o n c l u s i o n was a r r i v e d at that s e c u r i t y could be

a t t a i n e d through the r e d u c t i o n o f armaments * France had never

h e l d t o t h i s theory, r a t h e r d i d she i n s i s t that guarantees

must precede disarmament. However, i n accordance w i t h i t s

1

new theory the Assembly s e t up a Temporary Mixed Commission

which was t o b r i n g i n a r e p o r t as t o how this reduction could

be c a r r i e d out; Lord Esher brought forward a new proposal

t h a t r e d u c t i o n be c a r r i e d nut, not by a t r e a t y , but by devel-

oping a n u m e r i c a l f a c t o r as a common measure and reducing

proportionately. H i s p l a n was t o take a u n i t of 30,000 men

as a b a s i s upon which to develop the s i z e o f the armed forces

o f European c o u n t r i e s . T h i s would g i v e France an army of

180,000 men which he deemed s u f f i c i e n t f o r her protection.

N a t u r a l l y the p l a n d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e , as i t d i d not include

a l l the n a t i o n s and the problem o f s e c u r i t y was not dealt

w i t h d i r e c t l y as i t was thought t h a t i t would f o l l o w out of

the Esher p l a n . T h a t was not good enough f o r the French.

There must be something more c o n c r e t e and possessing a clearer

definition. The members of the Temporary Mixed Commission

agreed t h a t b e f o r e a s t a t e c o u l d reduce i t s armaments i t must

have some form o f guarantee to assure i t o f s e c u r i t y * This

1. Toynbee, A. J.', Survey, 1924, p. 18.

2. Maurice, F. B., Lord Esher's P r o p o s a l s f o r the L i m i t a t i o n

of Armaments, J o u r n a l , o f the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e of
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, J u l y , 1922, p. 101.
 37

was the o r i g i n a l French t h e s i s which formed the b a s i s f o r the

a b o r t i v e Anglo-French conversations*

w i t h the c r i t i c i s m o f Lord Esher's p l a n i n mind the T h i r d

Assembly o f t h e League charged the Temporary Mixed Commission

1

w i t h a new t a s k contained i n R e s o l u t i o n XIV. A r t i c l e s 1 and

2 o f t h i s r e s o l u t i o n s e r v e to show the l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g along

which men were t h i n k i n g at t h i s time.

A r t i c l e 1. no scheme f o r the r e d u c t i o n o f armaments w i t h i n

the meaning o f A r t i c l e 8 o f the Covenant can be fully

successful unless i t i s general.

A r t i c l e 2. I n the present s t a t e o f the world many Govern-

ments would be unable to accept the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r

a s e r i o u s r e d u c t i o n of armaments u n l e s s they r e c e i v e d i n

exchange a s a t i s f a c t o r y guarantee of the s a f e t y of t h e i r

country.
2
I n 1914, t h e r e were 3,740,000 men i n Europe under arms.
3
i n 1923 t h e r e were 3,600,000. A c c o r d i n g to A r t i c l e 160 of

the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s Germany was allowed 100,000 men under

arms. The former A l l i e s must be m a i n t a i n i n g l a r g e establishments

1* Records of the T h i r d Assembly, v o l . 1, p. 287 f f . , c i t e d

by K e l l o r , Frances and Hat-vany, A n t o n i a , S e c u r i t y A g a i n s t
War, New York, Macmillan, 1924, v o l . 2, p. 699.

Toynbee, A. J . , op. c i t . , 1924, p. 21, Substance o f R e s o l -

u t i o n XIV. was put forward by the French as a compromise
and was accepted by the Assembly f o r the same reason.

2. Maurice, F . 3., op. c i t . , p. 105.

3. Maurice, F. B*, The D r a f t T r e a t y of Mutual A s s i s t a n c e ,

J o u r n a l of the B r i t i s h i n s t i t u t e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s ,
v o l . 3, March 1924, p. 47.
 38

to account f o r t h e b a l a n c e . Yet i n s p i t e o f t h i s f i g u r e stip-

u l a t e d i n t h e T r e a t y the-.French maintained t h a t the Germans

were spending t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f 591,656,273 French f r a n c s on

1
t h e i r army and i t s equipment to t h e i r 372,186,410 f r a n c s . A l -
2
though Stresemann denied t h i s t h e French never doubted i t s

truth. Hence the importance t o them o f t h e above mentioned

a r t i c l e s o f R e s o l u t i o n XIV. The French were f a v o r a b l e t o a

g e n e r a l agreement but i t must be a c c o r d i n g t o a "pre-arranged
3
plan." The F r e n c h must know the consequences o f each s t e p .

Lord Robert C e c i l and C o l o n e l Requin, a former o f f i c e r on the

s t a f f o f Foch each prepared a d r a f t o f a proposed t r e a t y . That

o f L o r d C e c i l was g e n e r a l i n t y p e , p l a c i n g i n the hands o f t h e

League the power t o make supplementary agreements where the

s i t u a t i o n warranted i t . That o f C o l o n e l Requin was based on

the premise that i t i s i n e v i t a b l e i n European politics for

n a t i o n s to d r i f t i n t o a scheme o f a l l i a n c e s and t h a t therefore

any t r e a t y must be a g e n e r a l one, w i t h supplementary treaties

to be c r e a t e d by i n d i v i d u a l members u n d e P t h e g e n e r a l t r e a t y ,

f o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n of s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Lord C e c i l went

f u r t h e r than C o l o n e l Requin i n t h a t he made p r o v i s i o n f o r the

naming o f an a g g r e s s o r . T h i s was t o be decided w i t h i n f o u r

1. Anon., Depenses m i l i t a r r e s de l'Allemagne e t de l a France,

L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 429, 8 Mai, 1926, p . 647.

2. Stresemann, Gustave, H i s d i a r i e s , l e t t e r s and papers,

e d i t e d and t r a n s l a t e d by E r i c Sutton, Macmillan,
London, 1935, v o l . 2, p . 12.

3; A r t i c l e 3 o f R e s o l u t i o n XIV.
 39
1
days a f t e r an a t t a c k was made* But the b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e be-

tween the two drafts lay i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e to p a r t i a l alliances.

Lord Robert C e c i l h e l d t h a t they should o n l y be undertaken a f t e r

permission o f t h r e e - f o u r t h s o f the C o u n c i l was obtained but

C o l o n e l Re'quin f e l t t h a t r e g i s t e r i n g t r e a t i e s a l r e a d y made

w i t h the C o u n c i l was sufficient. Here a g a i n w i l l be seen the

philosophy t h a t permeated French p o l i c y at t h i s period—to

work through and w i t h the League f o r s e c u r i t y , but a t the same

time m a i n t a i n the a l l i a n c e s a l r e a d y made and preserve the

r i g h t f o r making new ones. Out o f these two efforts a Draft

2
T r e a t y of Mutual A s s i s t a n c e was drawn up which was l a i d by the
Temporary Commission before the Assembly d u r i n g i t s F o u r t h
3

Session i n September, 1923.

Although the D r a f t T r e a t y o f Mutual A s s i s t a n c e discussed

above was never adopted owing l a r g e l y t o the o p p o s i t i o n o f the

B r i t i s h Commonwealth i t found f a v o r i n French eyes because i t

provided f o r those f a c t o r s which were p o i n t s at i s s u e i n the

Anglo-French n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e i t took i n

the e a s t e r n sphere of Europe as w e l l as the western, i t in-

v o l v e d much broader r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r Great B r i t a i n than

the b i l a t e r a l pact d i s c u s s e d d u r i n g the Anglo-French n e g o t i a t i o n s

1; Much j u s t i f i a b l e c r i t i c i s m i s made o f t h i s i d e a as 20
years a f t e r the Great War ended t h e r e i s s t i l l much
doubt as t o who was the a c t u a l aggressor.

2; Anon., A P r a c t i c a l P l a n f o r Disarmament, I n t e r n a t i o n a l
C o n c i l i a t i o n , Carnegie Endowment o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace,
No. 201, August, 1924, Appendix, p. 360.

3. Toynbee, opu c i t . , 1924, p. 22.

 40

o f 1921-1922i The second f a c t o r was t h a t i t allowed t h e form-

a t i o n o f s p e c i a l groups o f a l l i a n c e s under the s u p e r v i s i o n o f

the League. France and some of the s m a l l e r C e n t r a l European

s t a t e s were a l r e a d y p a r t y t o s e v e r a l o f these a l l i a n c e s . Great

B r i t a i n was s u s p i c i o u s o f them and the Dominions were openly

hostile. I n the t h i r d i n s t a n c e i t p e r m i t t e d those n a t i o n s

p a r t y t o these a l l i a n c e s t o arrange for m i l i t a r y cooperation

i n advance although i n t h i s A r t i c l e (No. 8) p r o v i s i o n was made

t h a t the League o f Nations must be informed a t once o f t h e

agreements undertaken. The D r a f t T r e a t y o f Mutual A s s i s t a n c e

was an attempt t o combine t h e two p r i n c i p l e s o f g e n e r a l agree-

ment and s p e c i a l a l l i a n c e o r more b r o a d l y speaking,combining

of t h e i d e a o f a g e n e r a l agreement among a l l s t a t e s w i t h that

o f p a r t i a l a l l i a n c e s among s o m e — a l l under the c o n t r o l o f the

League o f N a t i o n s . French hopes o f a guarantee through this

D r a f t T r e a t y o f Mutual A s s i s t a n c e were d i s s i p a t e d .

The r e f u s a l o f some rowers t o s a n c t i o n t h i s t r e a t y had

a d e f i n i t e r e a c t i o n on p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n F r a n c e . One French

commentator, w r i t i n g i n the French magazine, Correspondant,

speaks s a r c a s t i c a l l y on the a c t i o n o f the League Assembly i n

not e n d o r s i n g the D r a f t T r e a t y a t once when he says, " C r a i g -

nant de s'engager t r o p a fond, e l l e se contenta de l'envoyer

pour a v i s aux gouvernements interesse's," w h i l e o f England's

stand he remarks, " L ' A n g l e t e r r e , . . .dont l a c o l l a b o r a t i o n e'tait

i n d i s p e n s a b l e s i l ' o n ne v o u l a i t pas r e s t e r dans l a domain de

reve, a v a i t p r i s une t e l l e a t t i t u d e qu'on se demandait serieu-

sement comment reprendre l a q u e s t i o n sans r i s q u e r de

 41

compromettre deflnitimment l e p r e s t i g e de l a S o c i e t e . "

While the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the D r a f t T r e a t y o f Mutual

A s s i s t a n c e were i n p r o g r e s s French p a r t i c i p a n t s were embued

w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t i c s p i r i t o f Poincare'' and h i s group. As

a r e s u l t i t was necessary f o r the framers o f the D r a f t T r e a t y

to p r o v i d e i n t h e i r d r a f t f o r the maintenance o f the system

of a l l i a n c e s which Prance had b u i l t up i f they wanted to pro-

duce a t r e a t y at a l l . With the f a i l u r e o f t h i s t r e a t y t o win

the acceptance o f so many n a t i o n s the -French people, as indi-

v i d u a l s , began t o take stock and came to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t

perhaps they were t r y i n g t o get s e c u r i t y by the wrong method.

Thus i n the l a t t e r p a r t o f 1923 and the e a r l y p a r t o f 1924

we see a new s p i r i t abroad i n P r a n c e — o n e which reasoned that

i f France hoped t o a t t a i n s e c u r i t y through o s t r a c i z i n g h e r s e l f

from the r e s t o f the world she was making a s e r i o u s mistake.

From a n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n almost s o l i d l y behind the Kuhr p o l i c y

of M. Poincare'', t h e r e has developed a c o n f l i c t o f o p i n i o n

remarkable i n i t s c o n t r a s t s . The o l d i d e a o f a l o c a l settle-

ment o f the Franco-German problem i s put forward by M. P a u l

Reynaud when he says t h a t i t would be s h i r k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

to r e f e r t h i s g r e a t problem to the League, but M. Robert de

Jouvenel takes a stand f a s t growing In p o p u l a r i t y , the exact

o p p o s i t e from t h a t o f M. Reynaud. He says t h a t the Quai d'Orsay

has not s e t t l e d anything between France and Germany y e t and

the s e c u r i t y o f Europe depends on i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n , so how

1. Anon., La Probleme De La Securite', Le Correspondant,

Tome 301, 25 Novembre, 1925, p* 493.
 42

c o u l d Prance and Germany s e t t l e the peace of Europe between

1
themselves? The changing o f f i c i a l a t t i t u d e i s shown i n the

words o f Edouard H e r r i o t , the new premier, when he said,

"To wish f o r the d e s t r u c t i o n o f Germany i s s t u p i d from both

the moral and p o l i t i c a l p o i n t o f view...because o f t h e i r weak-

nesses these German democrats ought to have been a i d e d , even

d i r e c t e d by us."

T h i s was the s p i r i t which prompted H e r r i o t i n the conver-

3

s a t i o n s a t the London Gonferenoe on Reparations to respond to

t h e f r i e n d l y o v e r t u r e s put forward by Ramsay McDonald, the new

Labor Prime M i n i s t e r o f Great B r i t a i n . The B r i t i s h always

had s t a r t e d from the b a s i s o f a r b i t r a t i o n and disarmament i n

the formulae f o r world peace b e l i e v i n g t h a t s e c u r i t y would take

care o f i t s e l f . The French, a l t h o u g h s t i l l i n s i s t i n g on con-

c r e t e guarantees, were w i l l i n g t o s e a r c h f o r an agreement based

more on moral guarantees than on d e f i n i t e m i l i t a r y commitments

j

to cooperate i n the d e f i n i n g o f an aggressor and thus remedy

one of the major f a u l t s i n the T r e a t y of Mutual A s s i s t a n c e ,

and to draw up a procedure t o be f o l l o w e d i n the case that

a c t i o n a g a i n s t an aggressor should become necessary* The

crux o f M. H e r r i o t ' s stand was i n h i s speech when he r e f e r r e d

d i r e c t l y to the problem of s e c u r i t y . " A r b i t r a t i o n , " he says,

1; Reynaud, P a u l , and Jouvenel, Robert de, A French Debate on
the League o f iMations, L i v i n g Age, v o l . 321, May 17, 1924,
p. 931. I T r a n s l a t e d from La Grande Revue;)

2. H e r r i o t , Edouard, The Program of L i b e r a l France, F o r e i g n

A f f a i r s , v o l . 2, Wo. 4, June 15, 1924, p* 560.

3. J u l y 15, 1924, Toynbee, op; c i t . , 1924, p. 370.

 43

i s e s s e n t i a l but i t i s not sufficient, i t i s a means but

not an end. i t does not e n t i r e l y f u l f i l l the intentions of

A r t i c l e 8 o f the Covenant, which...are s e c u r i t y and disarma-

ment .. . A r b i t r a t i o n must not be a snare f o r t r u s t f u l nations...

we Frenchmen b e l i e v e that a n a t i o n which a c c e p t s a r b i t r a t i o n . . .

1

be i t great or s m a l l has a r i g h t to security." In accordance

w i t h these sentiments h e r r i o t and MacDonald presented a joint

statement to the F i f t h Assembly which was adopted by i t on

2

September 6, 1924. i n view of the f a i l u r e of Anglo-French

negotiations up to t h i s p o i n t on the q u e s t i o n o f a guarantee

and the d i f f e r e n c e o f the view-point already d i s c l o s e d i n the

F i f t h Assembly, i t i s of utmost i n t e r e s t to note the t e x t of

3
t h i s j o i n t note.
1; The T h i r d Committee i s r e q u e s t e d t o c o n s i d e r the
m a t e r i a l d e a l i n g w i t h s e c u r i t y and the r e d u c t i o n of
' armaments, p a r t i c u l a r l y the o p e r a t i o n s o f the Govern-
ments i n the D r a f t T r e a t y of Mutual A s s i s t a n c e con-
t a i n e d i n the Covenant o f the League i n r e l a t i o n to
the guarantees of s e c u r i t y which a r e s o r t to a r b i -
t r a t i o n and a r e d u c t i o n o f armaments may r e q u i r e .
2. The F i r s t Committee i s r e q u e s t e d :
a. to c o n s i d e r i n view o f p o s s i b l e amendments, the
a r t i c l e s i n the Covenant r e l a t i n g to the settlement
of disputes;

b; to examine w i t h i n what l i m i t s the terms of

A r t i c l e 36, paragraph 2, o f the s t a t u t e of establish-?
i n g the Permanent Court of I n t e r n a t i o n a l J u s t i c e
might be rendered more p r e c i s e and thereby f a c i l -
i t a t e the more g e n e r a l acceptance o f the c l a u s e

1; Toynbee, op; c i t . , 1924, p. 42.

2. i b i d . , p. 45.

3. Assembly Document, A 135, 1924, c i t e d by Toynbee,

op. c i t . , pp. 45-46.
 44

and thus s t r e n g t h e n t h e s o l i d a r i t y and t h e s e c u r i t y

of t h e n a t i o n s o f t h e world by s e t t l i n g by p a c i f i c
means a l l the d i s p u t e s whieh may a r i s e between s t a t e s .

I t can be seen i n the above t h r e e e x t r a c t s from t h i s A n g l o -

F r e n c h note t h a t b o t h England and France were anxious t o r e a c h

some b a s i s o f understanding* F a r t i o u l a r l y i n t h e case o f

France as her s a c r i f i c e would l i k e l y be much t h e g r e a t e r i f

some s o l u t i o n were agreed upon;

1

In t h i s study o f the Geneva P r o t o c o l i n as f a r as i t

e f f e c t s French s e c u r i t y i t now remains t o examine those A r t i c l e s

from t h e document which had a d i r e c t b e a r i n g on ,and contri-

buted something to, the s e c u r i t y o f -crance. "Nous sommes pao-

i f i q u e s e t nous en avons f o u r n i l a preuve en donnant n o t r e

adhesion e n t i e r e a l a c l a u s e de 1 ' a r b i t r a g e o b l i g a t o i r e , nous

sommes meme p r e t s a une c e r t a i n e r e d u c t i o n de notre e t a t m i l -

i t a i r e , mais sentement en echange de g a r a n t i e s concretes et

precises." A r t i c l e s 1, 7, 10, 16, 18 and 19 o f t h e P r o t o c o l

d e a l t w i t h t h e problem o f compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , A r t i c l e 10

c l e a r l y d e f i n i n g the word, a g g r e s s o r . The Prench were very

p l e a s e d w i t h that y e t they were c r i t i c a l o f A r t i c l e 15 which,

i n speaking o f punishment o f the aggressor says i n p a r t that

n e i t h e r the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y nor t h e p o l i t i c a l indepen-

dence o f an aggressor s t a t e s h a l l be a f f e c t e d i n the event o f

1. T e x t . o f t h e Geneva P r o t o c o l , I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n ,
1924, p. 531.

2. Anon., Le P r o t o c o l e de Genevie et l a Reduction des

•" Armements, Kevue des Deux Mondes, Tome 28, J a n v i e r ,
1925, p. 41.
 45
a p p l i c a t i o n o f any o f the c l a u s e s o f the P r o t o c o l , i n the

old days, argued the French, the v i c t o r had hope o f compensat-

ion but today i t i s b e t t e r t o l o s e on the enemy's t e r r i t o r y

than t o win a b a t t l e fought on one's own. That t h i s i s a l o g -

i c a l view i s evidenced by the post-war experience o f France.

The French ask, what b a s i s have we f o r assuming t h a t a l l ag-

gression i s impossible? What would happen t o France i f she

disarmed as i s p r o v i d e d f o r under A r t i c l e 17 and then Germany

and R u s s i a were suddenly t o s p r i n g upon her when she became

i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r n a l problems? France was not convinced that

t h i s c o u l d not happen as i t was o n l y two years p r e v i o u s that

x
Germany and R u s s i a had come t o an understanding i n The T r e a t y

of R a p a l l o . i t was t h i s n a t u r a l g r a v i t a t i o n o f these two

Powers towards some understanding t h a t France f e a r e d .

On t u r n i n g to the problem o f the Rhine we see a f a i r l y

s a t i s f i e d France i n as f a r as t h e Rhineland i s concerned. So

l o n g as the French and B e l g i a n f o r c e s were i n the Ruhr and

the A l l i e d f o r c e s i n the Occupied Zone the p r i n c i p a l p a r t s o f

the enemy's a r s e n a l were i n French or A l l i e d hands, however,

the w a r - l i k e s p i r i t of the Germans made the t r e n c h f e e l t h a t

no Power, as p r o v i d e d f o r under the P r o t o c o l , oould be on the

spot w i t h s u f f i c i e n t speed to keep the German armies from

v i o l a t i n g French s o i l i n case o f sudden a t t a c k . Again A r t i c l e

11 s t a t e s t h a t i n time of war the s i g n a t o r i e s o f the P r o t o c o l ,

w i l l a l l promise to cooperate t o the utmost i n the a p p l i c a t i o n

1. A p r i l 16, 1932
 46

o f s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t an a g g r e s s o r . But what becomes o f t h a t

country whose w e l l - b e i n g depends on i t s exports when i t can

get no market? In a d d i t i o n , the French say t h a t both England

and Japan show a d e f i n i t e a v e r s i o n to a c t i n g i n common i n t h i s

way. £oth these c o u n t r i e s are p r i m a r i l y m e r c a n t i l e .

¥/hy i s i t necessary t o mention the l o n g l i s t of f a u l t s

which the French found i n the P r o t o c o l ? The answer i s simple.
To show the extent to which the French were ready to cooperate.
P r o f e s s o r Noel-Baker asked twelve y e a r s a f t e r the Geneva Pro-
t o c o l whether these p l a n s f o r peace undertaken year a f t e r year
1

were a l l cant? S u r e l y i t was not cant t h a t prompted M. B r i a n d

to say, as he stood b e f o r e the League Assembly, "I am here on

b e h a l f o f the D e l e g a t i o n and w i t h the f u l l assent o f my Govern-

ment to say, i n response to the a p p e a l o f your Committees,

•France adheres t o the P r o t o c o l ; France i s prepared to s i g n
2
it."* France, whose borders were f a r l e s s secure than those

of Great B r i t a i n , whose o b l i g a t i o n s were f a r g r e a t e r t h a n any

o f the overseas Dominions.signed t h i s Pact which none of the

3

B r i t i s h Dominions were prepared t o do. T h i s a t t i t u d e of the

B r i t i s h government i s commented on very b i t t e r l y by one French

1. Noel-baker, P h i l i p , The P r i v a t e Manufacture of Armaments,

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , 1936, v o l . 1, p. 518.

2. Noel-Baker, P h i l i p , The P r e s e n t J u d i c i a l S t a t u s of the

B r i t i s h Dominions i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, London,
Longmans, Green, 1929, p. 59.

3. Dumont-Wilden, L., Le P r o t o c o l e de Geneve et La Question

de La Se'curite', Revue Bleue, No. 7, 7 Mars, 1925,
' p. 171.
 47

w r i t e r who says i n p a r t t h a t t h i s h e s i t a t i n g p o s i t i o n o f B r i -

t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f E n g l i s h diplomacy in

post-war years has shown up v e r y c l e a r l y i n t h i s a f f a i r of the

1

Geneva p r o t o c o l . The government at London imagines that to

get peace a l l i t has to do i s t o wish f o r i t . he adds t h a t

i n order t o get peace i n the new Europe i t i s necessary t o

have the adhesion o f the B r i t i s h n a t i o n s who are r e p r e s e n t e d

at Geneva.

Two great e f f o r t s towards making another major war in

Europe i m p o s s i b l e have f a i l e d * By both o f these efforts

France hoped to g a i n a guarantee sufficient to assure her se-

curity* x'et t h i s i n a b i l i t y t o f i n d agreement d i d not c l o s e

the heart o f t h e s i n c e r e Frenchman towards the p u r s u i t o f f u r -

2

t h e r means and when on February 9, 1925, the Germans put for-

ward suggestions f o r a s e c u r i t y p a c t , t h e i r note was given a

great r e c e p t i o n by the -t'reneh people who f e l t that t h i s novel

departure might b r i n g f o r t h r e a l r e s u l t s . From the German

view-point i t was felt t h a t i f the French p o l i c y o f c o n t i n u i n g

the f o r m a t i o n o f A l l i a n c e s was to go on i t would inevitably

l e a d t o the complete e n c i r c l e m e n t of Germany and prevent her

l i b e r a t i o n from her bonds of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s *

What made these very p r o g r e s s i v e agreements of Locarno

possible? I n order to answer t h i s i t i s necessary to s e a r c h

1. I b i d . , p. 172.

2. Stresemann, Gustav, op. c i t . , Memorandum handed i n P a r i s

by C o u n s e l l o r o f L e g a t i o n , F o r s t e r to the French Premier
M. H e r r i o t on b e h a l f of the Ambassador rierr von Hoesch,
v o l . 1, p. 457.
 !

48

Into the immediate background o f the peace P a c t s , i n the

first i n s t a n c e we f i n d German statesmen f a c i n g a great d e c i s i o n .

I n t e r n a l l y a c r i s i s was reaching serious proportions. The

G-overnment had two a l t e r n a t i v e s to face. They c o u l d g i v e way

to the- demands o f the 'German N a t i o n a l i s t s and i n s i s t that before

any d i s c u s s i o n s began the war guilt c l a u s e i n the T r e a t y of

V e r s a i l l e s must be withdrawn, or they c o u l d make entry i n t o the

League the primary o b j e c t on the best p o s s i b l e terms. This

was the p o l i c y of Stresemann, the l e a d e r o f the S o c i a l Demo-

c r a t i c party,who used every means i n h i s power to f u r t h e r Ger-

many s progress
r
towards League membership. But he d i d i n s i s t

that entry i n t o the League depended upon the r e c o g n i t i o n of

h i s country's s t a t u s as a Great .rower. T h i s would e n t a i l a

permanent seat on the League C o u n c i l , i n a l e t t e r w r i t t e n on

the s i x t h o f September, 1924, t o the C h a n c e l l o r , Dr. Marx,

Stresemann w r i t e s , "An e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n . . . i s the acknow-

ledgement of our e q u a l i t y by the other Powers...If these con-

1

d i t i o n s are given, then Germany i s ready."

The French people by 1925 had come to the p l a c e where

they were beginning to f e e l that a Franco-German understanding

was necessary. England and France overcame t h e i r c e n t u r i e s -

o l d antagonism i n 1904 due to t h e i r common f e a r of Germany's

r i s i n g power. France and Germany'in 1925 a l s o had a common

fear—war. The French people urged the ending of.Poincare's

1. i b i d . , L e t t e r to C h a n c e l l o r Marx; Sigmaringen, September

6, 1924, v o l . 1, p. 442.
 49

policy. "La t e t e "a t e t e f r a n c o — a l l e m a n d conduit "a une c a t a s -

1
trophe.' r
Germany would become an implacable enemy i f t h i s

p o l i c y was not brought t o an end, m a d d i t i o n , the f i n a n c e s

of France were not i n a very sound s t a t e at t h i s time, .tier

l a r g e m i l i t a r y expenses were a heavy burden and she had im-

mense i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l l i a b i l i t i e s t o meet i n 1925 as

well. M. de Mouy, one of the T r e a s u r y o f f i c i a l s d e s c r i b e d

2

the s i t u a t i o n as desperate. I t was hoped t h a t Locarno would

relieve i t . France a l s o hoped t h a t an agreement might be made

because she expected t h a t the next war would probably s t a r t

i n the E a s t and she wanted to be sure t h a t the West would r e - T

main a t peace; Yet even as these steps v/ere being taken t o

f i n d grounds f o r d i s c u s s i o n France was c o n t i n u i n g the p o l i c y

used so s u c c e s s f u l l y t h r e e hundred y e a r s b e f o r e by R i c h e l i e u

and to be used again i n post-Lacarno y e a r s by B a r t h o u — t h a t

of making i s s u e of the d i v i s i o n of her neighbors i n the E a s t ;

I t was approximately a t t h i s time t h a t the case o f the spy,

3

Margot Nadau was brought to l i g h t i n Warsaw. A beautiful

woman w i t h a German passport was d e t e c t e d i n her n e f a r i o u s

a c t i v i t i e s i n Poland, which country was an a l l y of F r a n c e .

Such exposures as these made the French o f f i c i a l s worry but

1. Anon., La S e c u r i t e ' G o n t i n e n t a l e , L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,
No. 363, 31 J a n v i e r , 1925, p. 134.

2. Bonnet, Georges, Les echeances de 1925, L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 374, 18 A v r i l , 1925, p. 514.

Anon., L'Annee de Locarno, No. 410, 26 Decembre, 1925, p. 1723

3; Anon., Une emule de Mata-Hari, L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No.

363, 31 J a n v i e r , 1925, p. 137.
 50

s t i l l t h a t n a t i o n urged a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The average French-

man b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t Germany would r e g a i n

her independent s t a t u s sooner or l a t e r and t h a t u n l e s s i t was

regained through p e a c e f u l methods, French s e c u r i t y would never

1

be a c e r t a i n t y . The best way o f summarizing the French view-

p o i n t i n r e s p e c t to t h i s new e f f o r t towards s e c u r i t y would be

to note the words o f Henri de J o u v e n e l who d e s c r i b e d Franco-

German r e c o n c i l i a t i o n through Locarno as " l e moyen de l ' e n -

t r e e europeenne"aahd adds "C'est pour c e l a que nous l a sou-
2
haitohs."

B r i a n d ' s r e p l y t o the German note o f February 9 mentioned

above l a i d down s e v e r a l c o n d i t i o n s which would govern the en-

try o f Germany i n t o the League. I t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t some o f

these f a o t o r s be mentioned In t h i s study as they a s s i s t i n

3

the o r i e n t a t i o n o f France's stand a t Locarno. In the f i r s t

i n s t a n c e , Germany must assume the o b l i g a t i o n s as l a i d down

i n the Covenant. Here t h e r e i s a p o i n t o f c r i t i c i s m which

must be made a g a i n s t France i n r e s p e c t to her d e s i r e to get

Germany to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of League membership.

Why was France so impatient at t h i s time t o see Germany i n

the League i f not t o make i t complementary to the French

a l l i a n c e w i t h Poland? As a member o f the League i t was prac-

tically i m p o s s i b l e f o r her to v i o l a t e the f r o n t i e r s o f Poland

1. Anon., The Locarno T r e a t i e s , Round T a b l e , v o l . 16, December,

1925, p. 1.

2. J o u v e n e l , Henri de, Pas d'entente franco-allemande sans

l'Europe, L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No..452, 9 Octofeee, 1926,
p. 139.

3. Cmd. 2435, c i t e d i n Toynbee, 1925, v o l . 2, p. 38.

 51

and thus her m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h t h a t s t a t e would not I n -

v o l v e her i n any major i n c i d e n t s . T h i s was a double form of

s e c u r i t y f o r France y e t i t was not l i k e l y t o arouse any feel-

i n g but s u s p i c i o n i n Germany. B r i a n d s second p o i n t was

1
that

the s e a r c h f o r guarantees of s e c u r i t y cannot be c o n s i d e r e d

to i n v o l v e any m o d i f i c a t i o n of the Peace T r e a t i e s . The French

motive i n l a y i n g down a s t i p u l a t i o n o f t h i s nature i s a t once

apparent when i t i s r e a l i z e d that s e c u r i t y f o r France i n

F r e n c h eyes meant the I m m o b i l i z a t i o n o f Germany behind the

German f r o n t i e r as l a i d down i n the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s .

The French a l s o knew t h a t from the German p o i n t o f view se-

c u r i t y f o r themselves rested i n t h e i r recovery of t h e i r lib-

1

e r t y o f movement. T h i s the French were determined to prevent

without first s e c u r i n g adequate s a f e g u a r d s . In l i n e w i t h t h i s

l a s t c o n d i t i o n France would be f a v o r a b l e t o a Rhineland Pact

which would i n c l u d e Belgium. T h i s Pact should be guaranteed

by a l l s i g n a t o r i e s t o the Pact who should take a c t i o n i f one

o f them should attempt hostilities; The C o u n c i l should de-

c i d e as t o what form the c o e r c i v e a c t i o n should f o l l o w . Ger-

many put forward the p r o p o s a l i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h these pro-

posed agreements t h a t other a r b i t r a t i o n t r e a t i e s c o u l d be

undertaken i n a d d i t i o n t o the r e g u l a r p a c t s and t h a t other

Bowers who were s i g n a t o r i e s o f the V e r s a i l l e s Pact and the

proposed R h i n e l a n d Pact could become the guarantors of these

I. Anon*, E n t r e l e t r a i t e ' d e V e r s a i l l e s et l e pacte,

L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No-. 399, 10 Octobre, 1925,
p. 1338.
 52
P a c t s i f they so wished. France agreed. Why? Simply because

t h i s system o f agreements was i n complete a c c o r d w i t h her sys-

tem o f a l l i a n c e s . She a l r e a d y had a l l i a n c e s w i t h Poland, Rum-

a n i a and C z e c h o - S l o v a k i a and she wanted t o keep h e r s e l f f r e e

to guarantee any a r b i t r a l agreements i n t o which any o f her

e a s t e r n a l l i e s might e n t e r . T h i s would f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e her

1
security. However, B r i a n d was determined t h a t the Germans

s h o u l d be c a r e f u l as t o what i n t e r p r e t a t i o n they might put on

these F r e n c h c o n c e s s i o n s . They must understand that the con-

d i t i o n s l a i d down i n the V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y must be e n f o r c e d .

I t was t h i s phase of the B r i a n d system which the German people

found so hard t o understand. Why should he s t r i v e with

s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d r e a l i s m t o promote Franco-German understand-

i n g and y e t a t the same time be b u i l d i n g a system o f e n c i r c -

l i n g a l l i a n c e s around Germany? F o r B r i a n d the answer was

simplicity i t s e l f — t h e s e c u r i t y of h i s country.

While c o n v e r s a t i o n s were s t i l l i n an e a r l y stage i t was

questioned i n England as t o whether the E n g l i s h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

o f t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s under Locarno was the same as that o f
2
Briand. He thought t h a t d i s p u t e s between Germany and her

neighbors c o u l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y come under the Locarno Pact

and any d e c i s i o n rendered by whatever authorized authority

under the Pact would a u t o m a t i c a l l y be guaranteed by Great

1. B u e l l , R. L., Poland, Key t o Europe, Mew York,

A. A. Knopf, 1939, p. 312.

2. Swanwick, H. M., The S e o u r i t y P a c t , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s

( B r i t i s h ) , v o l . 7, No. 1, J u l y , 1925, p, 5.
 53

Britain. England had never a t any p e r i o d p r i o r t o t h i s under-

taken to guarantee a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r eastward than the Rhine,

2

and she d i d not contemplate any such t h i n g at t h i s time.

B r i a n d was t a k i n g too much f o r g r a n t e d . The E n g l i s h were v e r y

c a u t i o u s i n t h e i r e a r l y post-war commitments and they had

never been l e g a l l y committed by a n y t h i n g other than t h e guar-

antee o f the t e r r i t o r i a l " s t a t u s quo" as d e f i n e d i n t h e T r e a t y

of V e r s a i l l e s t o p r o t e c t t h e Franco-German and German-Belgian

f r o n t i e r s and t o enforce A r t i c l e s 42 and 43 which concern the

d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone a l o n g the Rhine.

In s p i t e o f t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s s u f f i c i e n t unanimity o f

view-point had been achieved t o enable the governments t o come

to t h r e e b a s i o c o n c l u s i o n s which would form t h e ground-work

3

for t h e new P a c t . These i l l u s t r a t e what B r i a n d c o n s i d e r e d t o

be e s s e n t i a l t o French s e c u r i t y . In the f i r s t case t h e p r o -

posed P a c t was to have no c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the T r e a t y o f V e r -

sailles o t h e r than t h a t t h e French government r e c o g n i z e d t h a t

the T r e a t y c o u l d be m o d i f i e d and a l s o Franoe guaranteed t o

observe t h i s c l a u s e o f t h e T r e a t y . Germany w h i l e i n t h e p r o -

cess o f e n t e r i n g t h e League can c l a i m no s p e c i a l s t a t u s , t h a t

is she w i l l have no power, but must r e l y upon t h e o t h e r members

to t r e a t her w i t h j u s t i c e . I n the t h i r d i n s t a n c e Franoe

1. Gmd. 2435, p. 11, c i t e d i n Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1925, p. 34.

2. Anon*, The Locarno T r e a t i e s , Round T a b l e , v o l , 16,

December, 1925, p. 1.

3. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1925, p. 42.

Stresemann, pp. c i t * , v o l ; 2, p. 156.

 54

i n s i s t e d t h a t a l l i s s u e s whioh might become c o n t e n t i o u s must

be s e t t l e d by p e a c e f u l methods. The word aggressor was

automatically defined, i t would r e f e r to t h a t n a t i o n which

took up arms and crossed the f r o n t i e r o f a neighbor, i n the

case o f the .Rhine area-^-the d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone. This refer-

ence to the d e f i n i t i o n o f an aggressor was the outcome o f

Anglo-irench conversations i n which Great B r i t a i n insisted

t h a t she r e t a i n the r i g h t to decide f o r h e r s e l f the differ-

ence between a d o u b t f u l and flagrant v i o l a t i o n of a f r o n t i e r ,

i n the d o u b t f u l case she would r e f e r the s i t u a t i o n to the

League w h i l e i n the f l a g r a n t case she would d e c l a r e war with-

out c o n s u l t a t i o n . A weakness i n the Pact ( T r e a t y o f Mutual

Guarantee) i s found i n t h i s l a s t above-mentioned p o i n t i n

t h a t i n the case o f a s i t u a t i o n d e v e l o p i n g which might i n -

v o l v e s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s England's formula might prove o f lit-

t l e value yet/ the f a c t t h a t B r i a n d accepted i t shows that he

was anxious to cooperate to the u t t e r m o s t . A t t h i s time he

was embued w i t h the s p i r i t o f peace which c a r r i e d him through

t h i s whole p e r i o d o f n e g o t i a t i o n s , uf t h i s e l u s i v e s p i r i t he

said, " i l f a u t a v o i r l a chose dans l a coeur, i l f a i t saisir

toutes occasions, t o u t e s p o s s i b i l i t i e s de l a s e r v i r et de
1 '
l a s e r v i r constamment."
A meeting o f j u r i s t i c experts was h e l d i n London on

1. D i s c o u r s prononce' a l a Ghambre des deputes par M. B r i a n d ,

pre'sident du o o n s e i l , 26 E e v r i e r , 1926,
c i t e d i n L*Europe Nouvelle, No. 422, 2G Mars, 1926,
p. 371.
 55

September 1, 1925, whose o b j e c t was t o put i n t o exact legal

terminology any c o n t r o v e r s i a l problem s t i l l o u t s t a n d i n g . The

German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Dr. GauSj took an a c t i v e part i n the

1
proceedings. I t h a r d l y seems p o s s i b l e t h a t Dr. Gaus could

have r e p o r t e d t o Stresemann t h a t t h e ithineland Pact was t h e

o n l y t o p i c d i s c u s s e d by the j u r i s t s , y e t when j u s t p r i o r to

the summoning o f the f i r s t meeting o f the o f f i c i a l delegates

at Locarno the A l l i e s announced t h e i n c l u s i o n o f Poland and

Czecho-Slovakia as p a r t i c i p a n t s there was a n a t u r a l and j u s -

t i f i e d p r o t e s t from Germany. B r i a n d had overstepped the mark.

As more than one c r i t i c d e s c r i b e d i t , B r i a n d was j u s t a b i t

too c l e v e r ; of course, the c o n f l i c t centered around the

q u e s t i o n o f a guarantee o f t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r s . Germany

r e f u s e d t o c o n s i d e r the P o l i s h C o r r i d o r as l o s t f o r e v e r . Yet

Poland and Czecho-Slovakia as a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the ne-

g o t i a t i o n s would be a d e f i n i t e f a c t o r i n Briand*s s e c u r i t y

plans. The Germans had hoped t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f the e a s t e r n

f r o n t i e r s would not be i n c l u d e d i n t h e same d i s c u s s i o n s as the

Rhineland Pact but the P o l i s h government i n s i s t e d t h a t i t

should; The only s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem was t h a t Germany

2 3
and Poland and Germany and Czecho-Slovakia should make

1. Stresemann*s d i a r i e s , l e t t e r s and papers, v o l . 2, p. 157.

L o u t r e , C a m i l l e , La Reunion des j u r i s t e s a Londres,

L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No* 394, 5 Septembre, 1925, p. 1173.
T h i s French w r i t e r says t h a t the R i g h t i s t s h o l d t h a t
he was not g i v e n power t o a c t .

2. Cmd. No. 2525 Annex D. Initialled October 16, 1925.

3. I b i d . , Annex F. Initialled October 16, 1925.

 56

separate agreements and t h a t these agreements should be covered

by any guarantee s p e c i f i e d i n t h e Locarno P a c t . A serious d i f -

f i c u l t y arose over A r t i c l e 15 o f t h e Covenant i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n .

In t h e case o f a f a i l u r e of the C o u n c i l t o r e a c h a unanimous

d e c i s i o n any member o f the C o u n c i l was a t l i b e r t y t o take

whatever a c t i o n t h a t member f e l t to be i n keeping w i t h r i g h t

1
and j u s t i o e . Poland and C z e c h o - S l o v a k i a were determined t h a t

they would not be l e f t t o t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s i n such a ease

and Prance supported them. B i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s were n e g o t i a t e d

2 3
between France and Poland and France and Czecho-Slovakia where

i n the case o f f a i l u r e by t h e C o u n c i l t o r e a c h a d e c i s i o n they

would come t o each others support i f unprovoked a g g r e s s i o n

a g a i n s t e i t h e r o f them s h o u l d take p l a c e . T h i s was understood

by a l l s i g n a t o r i e s t o mean t h a t France's response t o a g g r e s s i v e

a c t i o n a g a i n s t Poland or Czecho-Slovakia would be to a l i g n

h e r s e l f a u t o m a t i c a l l y on t h e s i d e o f t h e invaded n a t i o n . This

gave a c l a r i t y t o France's stand and although there was r e s e n t -

ment on the p a r t o f t h e extreme German n a t i o n a l i s t s o f the Dr.

Hugenberg group, Stresemann agreed* The German People's P a r t y

endorsed t h e stand o f .'Dr.' Stresemann t h a t almost any s a c r i f i c e

was warranted i f i t could speed Germany's e n t r y i n t o the

4
League o f N a t i o n s .

1. A r t i c l e 15, Paragraph 7.

2. Cmd. 2525 Annex F. p. 56, i n i t i a l l e d , October 16, 1925.

3. Cmd. 2525 Annex E . p* 44, i n i t i a l l e d , Uctober 16, 1925.

4. Stresemann, op. c i t . , v o l . 2, p. 172*

 57

The agreements which en t o t o form the Locarno Pacts were

accepted by the d i f f e r e n t governments and were signed on the

first of December i n London and were p l a c e d i n the archives

1

at Geneva on the f o u r t e e n t h of, the same month. The first of

the f a c t o r s p r e v e n t i n g the p u t t i n g i n t o f o r c e o f these Peace

P a c t s was now removed, a l l t h a t remained was f o r Germany to

enter t h e League and take her p l a c e as a member of the C o u n c i l .

A l l n a t i o n s had been agreed from the commencement of negot-

i a t i o n s t h a t the u l t i m a t e g o a l was to see Germany at the Coun-

c i l t a b l e , but t h e r e were c e r t a i n Powers which put forward

t h e i r c l a i m s to a permanent seat at t h i s t i m e . Poland, Spain,

B r a z i l and China f e l t t h a t the time was r i p e to throw t h e i r

hats i n t o the r i n g . A l l had i n t h e i r own opinions, just rea-

sons f o r t h i s demand. I t would be i r r e l e v a n t at t h i s time to

d i s c u s s the claims o f each of these n a t i o n s f o r our interest

i s o n l y to analyze the p o s i t i o n taken by France*

P u b l i c o p i n i o n i n France and Lngiand showed a wide d i v e r -

gence on the C o u n c i l Issue. B r i a n d favored an i n c r e a s e i n the

C o u n c i l by the a d d i t i o n o f Poland. T h i s would provide a coun-

ter-weight a g a i n s t the newly-acquired power o f Germany. This

stand was endorsed by p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n France and Poland and

a l s o by the" B r i t i s h F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , S i r A u s t i n Chamberlain.

Yet i n England both parliament and people were d e f i n i t e l y

a g a i n s t an. enlargement of the C o u n c i l at t h i s time f o r two

reasons, i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e i t would make the C o u n c i l more

1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1925, v o l . 2, p. 61*

 58

cumbersome and remove the f l e x i b i l i t y which the s m a l l e r group

would have* Secondly, i t had a l l the appearance o f a d i r e o t

a f f r o n t t o Germany* How was the problem o f French s e c u r i t y

i n v o l v e d i n t h i s question o f i n c r e a s e o f the C o u n c i l ? To ans-

wer t h i s q u e s t i o n we must r e c a l l t h a t the French people, quite

j u s t i f i a b l y i n t h e i r o p i n i o n , looked upon the League as an

o r g a n i z a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d e s p e c i a l l y f o r t h e i r support. As a

r e s u l t , they felt i t q u i t e i n order t h a t t h e i r government

should g i v e support to P o l i s h i n t e r e s t s . France was t o r n be-

tween two fears; F i r s t , R u s s i a , f o r whom Franoe s t i l l had a

very r e a l antagonism, made advances to Poland which r e s u l t e d

in a rumor o f a commercial t r e a t y and f a r more important, a

f e e l i n g i n France t h a t a new rapprochement was i n the offing

between Germany and R u s s i a as a r e s u l t o f the commercial t r e a -

1
ty n e g o t i a t e d by M. C h i o h e r i n i n B e r l i n on October 12, 1925.

The Frenoh had no r i g h t t o q u e s t i o n the s i n c e r i t y o f Germany's

2

i n t e n t i o n to f u l f i l l the c o n d i t i o n s o f League membership. Re-

g a r d l e s s of t h i s f a c t , B r i a n d was unconsciously i n f l u e n c e d by

p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n h i s e f f o r t s t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the con-

t r o v e r s y c e n t e r i n g around the q u e s t i o n of Germany's admission

to the C o u n c i l ;

The s p e c i a l s e s s i o n o f the League Assembly ended on March

1. I b i d . , v o l . 2, p. 65. T h i s t r e a t y , following only three

years a f t e r the T r e a t y o f R a p a l l o , d i s t u r b e d the
French.

2. Anon., ( e d i t o r i a l ) , New Statesman, v o l . 27, No. 678,

A p r i l 24, 1926, p. 33.
 59
1
17 without f u l f i l l i n g i t s o b l i g a t i o n t o Germany. B r i a n d had

again over-reached himself; S i r A u s t i n Chamberlain was e q u a l l y

at f a u l t , y e t he took h i s l e a d from B r i a n d , who had a g r e a t e r

2
understanding o f the European s i t u a t i o n . A l t h o u g h Germany

was admitted t o membership i n the F a l l o f 1926, y e t i f M. B r i a n d

and t h e B r i t i s h F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y had had t h e t r u e Locarno •

s p i r i t , Locarno c o u l d have become a r e a l i t y s e v e r a l months

3
before. During t h e p e r i o d which elapsed a f t e r the f i a s c o i n

March over the q u e s t i o n o f e n l a r g i n g the C o u n c i l and t h e accep-

tance o f Germany i n t h e F a l l , seeds o f doubt were p l a n t e d ,

Russia r a i n e d a v e r i t a b l e barrage o f abuse a g a i n s t the League,

4

a Treaty o f F r i e n d s h i p between Germany and R u s s i a was signed

and most s e r i o u s o f a l l , t h e wisdom and s i n c e r i t y o f S i r A u s t i n

Chamberlain and B r i a n d was c h a l l e n g e d , unce awakened, p a r -

t i c u l a r l y i n t h e mind of t h e oppressed Germans, t h i s doubt was

hard t o e r a d i c a t e , i f Stresemann c o u l d have addressed h i s

people he might w i t h j u s t i f i c a t i o n have s a i d , "In s p i t e o f

a l l t h i s our best p o l i c y i s s t i l l to get i n t h e League. We

w i l l b y y t h i s g a i n concessions which w i l l make us s t r o n g e r ;

When we a r e s t r o n g enough we w i l l throw o f f a l l pretence and

take our r i g h t f u l p l a c e . We w i l l not have t o b a r g a i n then."

1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1926, p. 52.

2. Huddleston, s i s l e y , B r i a n d i s s i m o , New Statesman, v o l . 26,

March 20, 1926, p.. 702.

3. H a r r i s , J±. Wilson, The breakdown: at Geneva, Contemporary

Review, v o l . 129, A p r i l , 1926, p. 416.

4. A p r i l 24, 1926, Toynbee, 1926, p. 151.

 60

That he d i d not i s g r e a t l y t o h i s c r e d i t , but the n a t i o n -

a l i s t s i n Germany were b u s i l y a t work a l o n g t h i s v e r y l i n e , ,

i t was hoped that Locarno would mean the end o f t h e

Great War. i t was hoped t h a t i t would mean t h e emergence o f

Germany from p o l i t i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l i s o l a t i o n , i t was

hoped t h a t i t would dry up what Lord Baldwin i n 1925 c a l l e d

1

the "quaking bog" o f European u n c e r t a i n t y . Yet i t d i d none

o f these t h i n g s . To know why we can best t u r n t o a remark

made by B r i a n d who s a i d , "Locarno gave us a l l t h e s e c u r i t y

we need, but the French armies must be kept on the Rhine t o

assure payments o f Reparations and the f u l f i l l m e n t o f L i s -

2
armament c o n d i t i o n s . "

1. Steed, Wickham, Locarno and B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s , J o u r n a l

o f the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 4,
November, 1925, p. 286.

2; Anon., France and America Renew a T r e a t y , New York,

Outlook, v o l . 148, February 15, 1928, p. 258.
 CHAPTER IV.

BRIAND'S WORK AND INFLUENCE 1926-1952

 CHAPTER IV.

BRIAND*S WORK AND INFLUENCE 1926-1952

I t has been s t a t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s study t h a t the French

were w i l l i n g t o extend every form o f a s s i s t a n c e w i t h i n t h e i r

power t o the League o f Nations t o a s s u r e the peace o f the

world* In r e t u r n France expected the League t o p r o v i d e her

w i t h adequate n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , l e t u n t i l the time should

come when she c o u l d t r u s t e n t i r e l y t o the League as t h e sole

means f o r her p r o t e c t i o n she must continue her system o f form-

ing alliances. T h i s was the p o l i c y of B r i a n d .

During the summer of 1926 when a s o l u t i o n was being

sought f o r the problem which had a r i s e n over Germany's e n t r y

i n t o the C o u n c i l o f the League, B r i a n d turned h i s a t t e n t i o n

to the completion of h i s system o f A l l i a n c e s a l r e a d y w e l l be-

gun i n the p e r i o d p r i o r to Locarno. When observers examined

the C e n t r a l European scene d u r i n g t h i s " b r e a t h i n g space" from

the t e n s i o n of the Locarno conferences they noted s e v e r a l very

important factors, i n the f i r s t instance Czecho-Slovakia,

J u g o - S l a v i a , and Rumania were busy u n i f y i n g t h e i r relationships

w i t h each o t h e r by renewing t r e a t i e s of f r i e n d s h i p and also

w i t h a l l i a n c e s i n v o l v i n g m i l i t a r y commitments. A t the same

time these s m a l l e r Powers were c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r e f f o r t s i n

order t o present a u n i f i e d f r o n t on questions o f territorial

adjustments advanced by Germany and her former allies. The

second o b s e r v a t i o n was the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the L i t t l e Entente

Powers were c l o s e l y watching t o observe the extent to which

61
 62

the Great Powers c a r r i e d out t h e i r Locarno commitments.

Owing t o h i s f a i l u r e — o r r e f u s a l — t o understand t h e com-

p l e x i t i e s o f French f inane e B r i a n d was f o r c e d from t h e Prem-

y

i e r s h i p s h o r t l y a f t e r Locarno. H i s s u c c e s s o r , M. Poincare',

c a r r i e d on Briand's p o l i c y owing t o the f a c t t h a t i t had the

popular support a t the moment. He r e t a i n e d B r i a n d as F o r e i g n

Minister. Thus began Briand's l o n g term as M i n i s t e r o f For-

e i g n A f f a i r s during which h i s p o l i c i e s d i d much to shape t h e

course o f events i n Europe*

B r i a n d f e l t t h a t a f i r m system o f a l l i a n c e s w i t h t h e

L i t t l e Entente Powers was v i t a l l y necessary to the s e o u r i t y

o f France, inasmuch as t h e French g e o g r a p h i c a l s i t u a t i o n made

them i n t e g r a l f a c t o r s i n the French o b j e c t i v e , the p r e s e r -

v a t i o n o f the " s t a t u s quo". I n accordance w i t h t h i s plan

B r i a n d announced t h e Franco-Rumanian T r e a t y i n P a r i s on dune

1
10, 1926. T h i s t r e a t y was made when t h e Locarno s p i r i t was

at i t s height; I t omits any p r o v i s i o n s which are o b v i o u s l y

d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a t h i r d power and i n a d d i t i o n c o n t a i n s a
1

supplement which l a y s down a procedure f o r the p e a c e f u l s e t -

tlement o f d i s p u t e s between the two c o u n t r i e s . This treaty

compares very f a v o r a b l y w i t h the t r e a t y a l r e a d y negotiated

w i t h Czecho-Slovakia which was entered i n t o during a p e r i o d

when l i t t l e sympathy was extended t o the defeated powers, in

a d d i t i o n t o the Franco-Rumanian T r e a t y , an agreement was

n e g o t i a t e d between France and J u g o - S l a v i a at t h i s time although

1. Toynbee, A. J . , Survey o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1926,

p. 156,
 63

i t was not made known f o r f e a r of a r o u s i n g h o s t i l i t y i n I t a l y ,

Comment should be made at t h i s j u n c t u r e on the g e n e r a l

European s i t u a t i o n as i t presented i t s e l f a f t e r the drawing

up o f these t r e a t i e s . France now had e s t a b l i s h e d a net-work

of a l l i a n c e s which i n c l u d e d J u g o - S l a v i a , Czecho-Slovakia,

Rumania and Poland. Poland a l r e a d y had t r e a t i e s w i t h these

other s m a l l e r powers. Thus B r i a n d * s s e c u r i t y p i c t u r e should

have been complete. Yet i t was not. A l r e a d y a new menace

had presented i t s e l f i n the form o f the a s p i r a t i o n o f I t a l i a n

Fascism f o r expansion i n t o the south-east of Europe*

The fundamental c o n f l i c t between France and I t a l y i n

post-Locarno y e a r s l a y i n the f a c t t h a t M u s s o l i n i wanted to

share e q u a l l y w i t h France i n the p a c i f i c a t i o n of Europe, where

as France hoped t o keep I t a l y i n a p o s i t i o n of permanent I n -

feriority; T h i s antagonism i n . t h e south-east had i t s counter-

p a r t i n the Mediterranean where n a v a l r i v a l r y l e d t o animosity

2

between the two n a t i o n s ; I t was not l o n g b e f o r e France was

f o r c e d to r e c o g n i z e the t r u t h o f Count Bethlen's statement to

the. F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Committee o f the Hungarian Chamber when

he s a i d that the development o f the s i t u a t i o n i n C e n t r a l

Europe no longer depends on France alone but a l s o on the i n -

3
f l u e n c e o f v a r i o u s other s t a t e s . The i m p l i c a t i o n was not l o s t

1. Anon., Italp-French R e l a t i o n s , Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 17, No. 24, December 16, 1927, p. 465;

2* T h i s stand was taken by France at the Washington Naval Con

f e r e n c e , 1922, and h e l d throughout e f f o r t s at n a v a l
disarmament;

3. Anon., Traite'' franco-yougoslay, L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 513

10 Decembre, 1927, p. 1645;
 64

on t h e F r e n c h y e t B r i a n d f e l t t h a t a p a c i f i c approach t o the

I t a l i a n problem was the w i s e s t p o l i c y . Consequently when the

I t a l i a n d i c t a t o r launched a p o l i c y o f treaty-making i n the

Balkan a r e a , the French stood q u i e t l y but ever w a t c h f u l l y on

guard; France was brought d i r e c t l y i n t o the p i c t u r e when

I t a l i a n o v e r t u r e s t o J u g o - S l a v i a f a i l e d owing t o the f e a r s

of t h a t country that M u s s o l i n i had some unrevealed p l a n s r e -

garding A l b a n i a . J u g o - S l a v i a asked f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the

Franco-Jugo-Slav F a c t mentioned above; T h i s was accomplished

1

November 11, 1927; B r i a n d would have p r e f e r r e d t o delay pub-

l i c a t i o n o f t h i s agreement owing t o h i s f e a r t h a t the I t a l i a n

d i c t a t o r would view the T r e a t y i n much the same l i g h t as d i d

both the L e f t and Right p r e s s i n F r a n o e — a s a d i r e c t a t t a c k
2
on I t a l y . I t i s o f i n t e r e s t t o note t h a t o p i n i o n i n France
which i n the l a s t nine years had endorsed the t r e a t i e s w i t h

Poland, Rumania and C z e c h o - S l o v a k i a without s e r i o u s comment,

r e a c t e d v i g o r o u s l y t o the t r e a t y w i t h J u g o - S l a v i a . These

t r e a t i e s were d i r e c t e d towards d e f e a t e d powers. Y e t i t was

f e l t t h a t the above-mentioned pact was d i r e o t e d a g a i n s t a

former a l l y which was a r i s i n g power i n Europe as w e l l and

B r i a n d was thought t o be " i n v o l v i n g France i n an u n d e r t a k i n g ,

3
the danger o f which was as r e a l as i t was unnecessary."

1. Loc. c i t .

2; Anon., France's Network o f A l l i a n c e s , Manchester Guard-

ian Weekly, v o l . 17, No. 19, November 11, 1927,
• p. 364.

3. I b i d . , p.. 364.
 65

A l t h o u g h Premier Mussolini, maintained that t h i s t r e a t y was

merely a p a r t o f B r i a n d * s | o l i c y of b u i l d i n g a l l i a n c e s , the

enthusiasm w i t h which i t was r e c e i v e d i n Belgrade convinced

observers t h a t there i t was looked upon as a

counter-balance
1
to the i n c r e a s i n g intimacy between I t a l y and A l b a n i a . The
2

T r e a t y of T i r a n a signed e l e v e n days l a t e r by these two states

was a d i r e c t answer to J u g o - S l a v i a and an i n d i r e c t one to

Briand. The former A l l i e s of 1'rance, Great B r i t a i n and the

United S t a t e s had l e f t France w i t h an e s t a t e which she was

f i n d i n g i t hard to m a i n t a i n i n f a c e of r i s i n g o p p o s i t i o n , not

the l e a s t o f which was the new t h r e a t from I t a l y . For France,

J u g o - S l a v i a was a b u f f e r s t a t e a g a i n s t I t a l i a n expansion.

One o f the b a s i c problems i n the I t a l o - F r e n o h d i f f e r e n c e s

was t h a t I t a l y demanded e v e r y t h i n g from France and had nothing

but the o f f e r o f f r i e n d s h i p to g i v e i n r e t u r n . Briand could

not see wherein France could b e n e f i t i n a p r a c t i c a l sense.

He hoped t h a t the Yugo-Slav Fact would be f o l l o w e d by I t a l i a n

r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h t h a t s t a t e . The T r e a t y o f T i r a n a was h i s
3
answer. He was convinced by t h i s a c t i o n t h a t the Italian

aim was to c o n s t r u c t a system of a l l i a n c e s to counter-balance

1. Anon. I e d i t o r i a l ) , Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 16,

no* 23, June 10, 1927, p. 444.

2. Anon., T r a i t e ' ' d ' a l l i a n c e d e f e n s i v e entre l ' l t a l i e et

5

I ' A l b a n i e , signe' a T i r a n a , l e 22 Novembre, 1927, L'Eur-

ope N o u v e l l e , No. 513, 10 De'cembre, 1927j p. 1647.

3. Anon., Le t r a i t e ' f r a n e o - y o u g o s l a v , L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 509, 12 Novembre,.1927, p. 1494.
 66
1
that o f the Frenchi

A l t h o u g h both systems o f a l l i a n c e s aimed a t t h e p r e s e r -

v a t i o n o f peace y e t t h e t e n s i o n whioh developed caused r e -

l a t i o n s t o become so s t r a i n e d t h a t other European n a t i o n s be-

gan t o f e a r t h a t post-Locarno s e c u r i t y was menaced and t h a t

the danger might spread t o other areas through the envolve-?

ments o f these r e s p e c t i v e n a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r alliances.

B r i a n d sensed t h i s growing f e a r and e i g h t days a f t e r t h e

T r e a t y o f T i r a n a he t e m p o r a r i l y r e l i e v e d F r a n c o - I t a l i a n t e n -

s i o n by d e c l a r i n g t h a t he was always ready to undertake dis-

c u s s i o n s w i t h I t a l y a t any time and t h a t he had t h e support

o f t h e whole C a b i n e t i n t h i s a s s e r t i o n . The f i r s t r e s u l t o f

t h i s statement was an agreement made by the I t a l i a n ambassa-

dor i n P a r i s w i t h France towards t h e c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e

s t a t u s o f n a t i o n a l s o f e i t h e r c o u n t r y resident i n the o t h e r .

The I t a l i a n d i o t a t o r responded t o these overtures o f Briand

i n h i s statement t o the I t a l i a n Senate t h a t e f f o r t s towards

an understanding w i t h France which would e l i m i n a t e oauses o f

2

f r i c t i o n would be undertaken i n t h e near f u t u r e . This effort

o f B r i a n d might be regarded as a r e t u r n t o the pure Locarno

spirit. What success t h i s attempted rapproohement would have

was questioned i n I t a l i a n q u a r t e r s i n Great B r i t a i n — w h e r e

i t was f e l t t h a t because o f I t a l y ' s i n a b i l i t y t o o f f e r France

1. Gerando, F* de, Les Balkans Apres Le Pacte de T i r a n a ,

Revue P o l i t i q u e and P a r l e m e n t a i r e , Tome 130, 10 Mars,
1927, p. 422.

2. Speech made a t Rome, December 15, 1927.

 67

much t o complete a b a r g a i n i t was p r o b l e m a t i c a l whether any

1

l a s t i n g settlement c o u l d be achieved. I t a l y ' s demands were

two-fold, i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e she demanded t h a t France

grant her complete e q u a l i t y w i t h h e r s e l f i n the work o f con-

s o l i d a t i n g s o u t h - e a s t e r n Europe on the T r e a t y b a s i s * This

the French f e l t i n the i n t e r e s t s o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ,

they c o u l d not do; In the second case the I t a l i a n s insis-

ted t h a t they be g i v e n n a v a l e q u a l i t y w i t h France. Here

a g a i n , i n the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , the French

f e l t t h a t they c o u l d not comply. However, as a d i r e c t r e -

s u l t o f the l e s s e n i n g o f t e n s i o n between France and I t a l y the

announcement o f the I t a l i a n d i c t a t o r t h a t the'^Eour Great Eur-

opean Feace T r e a t i e s were not beyond the p a l e as f a r as r e -

v i s i o n was concerned d i d not arouse b i t t e r p r o t e s t i n France.

It c o u l d be looked upon as a d e l i b e r a t e p l a y to the dissat-

i s f i e d rowers i n s o u t h - e a s t e r n Europe, i n his observation

of the s i t u a t i o n , Herr von Hheinbaben, a former under-sec-

r e t a r y i n the German m i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s wrote i n

A p r i l of 1927, that: "Ruled as she i s today by a n a t i o n a l i s t

government,Italy i s more than u s u a l l y i n c l i n e d t o expansion,

and from an e x p a n s i o n i s t p o l i c y she i s p r i n c i p a l l y r e s t r a i n e d

"2
by the a t t i t u d e o f F r a n c e . " I t a l o - F r e n c h r e l a t i o n s d i d

1. Anon., Italo-German R e l a t i o n s , Manchester Guardian

Weekly, v o l . 17, Mo. 24, December 16, 1927, p. 465*

2. J o u v e n e l , Henri de, France and I t a l y , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 5, JMo. 4, J u l y 27, 1927, p. 546, c i t i n g
statements o f h e r r von Rheinbaben from the T a g l i s c h e
Rundschau, A p r i l 27, 1927.
 68
Improve however, and t h i s enabled B r i a n d to focus h i s a t t e n -

t i o n on the Rhineland problem.

The i d e a o f a r e a l entente was one o f the a s p i r a t i o n s o f

b o t h B r i a n d and Stresemann when they met a t T h o i r y to t r y and

move n e a r e r to a settlement o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s

through p e r s o n a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s , i n order t h a t a d e f i n i t e

b a s i s f o r s e c u r i t y oould be achieved B r i a n d f e l t t h a t the

f i r m e s t a b l i s h m e n t of R e p u b l i c a n sentiment throughout Germany

was n e c e s s a r y . T h i s would prevent any i d e o l o g i c a l c l a s h be-

tween the two c o u n t r i e s and h e l p t o curb the power of the r e -

a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s i n Germany. Secondly, France wanted Ger-

many t o show some r e a l w i l l i n g n e s s to make good the d e s t r u c t -

i o n wrought on French s o i l , and l a s t l y , t o grant a more c o r -

d i a l r e c e p t i o n t o Poland and her L i t t l e Entente A l l i e s as po-

l i t i c a l entities. France b e l i e v e d that these s m a l l e r Powers

would grow as p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s i n s p i t e o f the o p i n i o n o f

1
economists to the c o n t r a r y . German commentators questioned

the s i n c e r i t y o f the French f o r they asked why d i d they f o r c e

the post-war German government t o assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r

the war when they had a l r e a d y l a i d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y at the door
2
of the K a i s e r , i n 1815 the A l l i e s d i d not p l a c e a heavy i n -

demnity on the French people. They were merely r e q u i r e d t o pay

a comparatively s m a l l sum and to support an army of occupa-

tion. C a s t l e r e a g h h i m s e l f had made the a s s e r t i o n t h a t no

1* Sanchez, A. Mt de, F u r t h e r Economic Consequences o f

the Peace, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, No. 1, September
15, 1922, p. 158.
2i Kautsky, K a r l , Germany S i n c e the War, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,
v o l . 1, Mo. 2, December 15, 1922,~~p. 101.
 69

peace c o u l d be wise t h a t envolved the r u i n of one o f the

c o u n t r i e s concerned i n the making of the t r e a t y . To a l a r g e

extent they blamed Napoleon f o r the unrest and l e t r e s p o n s i -

b i l i t y rest there. In a d d i t i o n , i n 1918 the German people

r e p u d i a t e d the K a i s e r , n e c e s s i t a t i n g h i s f l i g h t tp H o l l a n d f o r
1
safety* Stresemann f e l t h i m s e l f f a c e d with a s i t u a t i o n how-
2
ever, the r e a l i t i e s o f which were o n l y too apparent. The

German F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r c a l l e d f o r the e v a c u a t i o n of the

3

Rhineland. b r i a n d o f f e r e d the second and t h i r d zones. French

t r o o p s from those zones were to be t r a n s f e r r e d i n t o the ter-

r i t o r y s t i l l under French o c c u p a t i o n , however, at t h i s time

the i n f l u e n c e o f M. P o i n c a r e had t o be c o n s i d e r e d and he was

a b l e to i n t e r p r e t A r t i c l e 431 of the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s

( I f b e f o r e the e x p i r a t i o n o f f i f t e e n y e a r s Germany complies

w i t h a l l the undertakings r e s u l t i n g from the present t r e a t y ,

the occupying f o r c e s w i l l be withdrawn immediately) so as t o

j u s t i f y continued o c c u p a t i o n by l i n k i n g up evacuation w i t h

Reparations* P a r t o f the compensation f o r e v a c u a t i o n d i s -

cussed at Thoiry was to have been 250-300 m i l l i o n s o f g o l d

4
marks s p e c i f i c a l l y earmarked f o r the Saar mines. At that

1. Loc. c i t .

2. Stern-Rubarth, Edgar, Three Men T r i e d , London, Duckworth,

1939. An e x c e l l e n t c h a r a c t e r study of Stresemann i s
g i v e n i n t h i s volume.

3. Toynbee, op* cit., 1929, p. 110.

4. F i g u r e s t a t e d i n the F r a n k f u r t e r Z e i t u n g , February 22,

1926, c i t e d by Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1927, p. 110.
 70

time t h i s sum would have been o f i n v a l u a b l e a s s i s t a n c e because

o f the p r e c a r i o u s f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n Prance, but M. P o i n -

c a r e h a d succeeded
x
i n r e s t o r i n g c o n f i d e n c e through r e - e s t a -

b l i s h i n g the soundness of the f r a n c and t h i s enabled the

French t o d i s r e g a r d t h i s f a c t o r as a c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the

question of evacuation. The o c c u p a t i o n of the Rhineland

might be regarded as a monument to d i p l o m a t i c s t u p i d i t y .

During the p e r i o d 1926-1928 the French and B r i t i s h could come

t o no understanding on a common p o l i e y . ..Dr:* Stresemann,

1

f e e l i n g t h a t the B r i t i s h were sympathetic to the i d e a o f evac-

u a t i o n , t r i e d t o get the E n g l i s h to b r i n g p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t

France which S i r A u s t i n Chamberlain would not do. At this

p e r i o d the E n g l i s h R h i n e l a n d p o l i c y seemed t o be merely t o

f e e b l y endorse t h a t of the French, w h i l e w i t h i n Germany S t r e s -

emann was t r y i n g t o hold the support o f the people i n f a v o r

of h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n p o l i c y . F r e n c h propaganda maintained

that t h e r e was s t i l l no s e c u r i t y i n Europe, i t was unques-

t i o n a b l y r i g h t , but i t f a i l e d t o r e a l i z e t h a t the reason f o r

2

I t l a y at home. It i s difficult t o estimate t o what extent

B r i a n d was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s u n f o r t u n a t e t u r n which French

p o l i c y had taken f o l l o w i n g Locarno. Poincare''had h i m s e l f

,1. Glasgow, George, The Gloom o f 1928, Contemporary Review,

vol.-135, January 1929 , p. 101.
Statement made by Mr. S t a n l e y Baldwin, November 9,
1928, at banquet of the Lord Mayor o f London.

2* Rober-Raynaud, M., La France en S a r r e , L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 507, 29 Octobre, 1927, p. 1455. '
The French t h e s i s i s supported by t h i s w r i t e r through-
out t h i s a r t i c l e .
 71

shown h i s support o f the p o l i c y o f B r i a n d throughout the

Locarno conferences, yet he never f u l l y persuaded himself that

h i s p o l i c y o f i n t i m i d a t i o n i n the Ruhr was wrong, even a f t e r

}h><L.\\y&r;fiyjtx stand f o r c e d h i s withdrawal o f the French

f o r c e s from that area, 'i'o B r i a n d a f t e r Locarno, h i s occupancy

of the Quai d'Orsay became somewhat o f a r e l i g i o n w i t h him^

yet i n t h i s l e s s e r post he was f o r c e d to f a l l i n l i n e w i t h the

wishes o f r o i n c a r e i n order t o r e t a i n h i s o f f i c e .
/
During t h i s

p e r i o d scant p r o g r e s s was made towards e v a c u a t i o n of the Rhine-

land and as a r e s u l t France was no nearer permanent security*

T u r n i n g to survey the course o f Franco-Russian r e l a t i o n s

we f i n d they have f o l l o w e d j u s t as t o r t u o u s a r o u t e as the

Franco-German n e g o t i a t i o n s over the R h i n e l a n d . Angered by the

withdrawal of R u s s i a from the A l l i e d s i d e and piqued by the

defeat o f the White Russians i n South R u s s i a whom they had

p u b l i c l y supported, the French found i t easy t o e r e c t a w a l l

between themselves and the new and unknown s t a t e of S o v i e t Rus-

sia. T h e i r support o f Poland d u r i n g the R u s s o - F o l i s h war d i d

not s o f t e n the h e a r t s o f the Russians towards France and the

S o v i e t r e f u s a l t o honor the debts c o n t r a c t e d by I m p e r i a l Rus-

s i a u n i t e d the French people behind t h e i r Government's a n t i -

Russian p o l i c y . Much has been w r i t t e n about the v e n a l i t y of

the French p r e s s , and t h e r e i s s m a l l doubt t h a t p r i o r t o the

Great War t h i s c r i t i c i s m was deserved. C e r t a i n s e c t i o n s of

the F r e n c h p r e s s were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the c o n t r a c t i o n o f these

very debts which they r a n t e d on so b i t t e r l y a f t e r the war was

over, i n r e t u r n f o r money c o n s i d e r a t i o n s the French newspapers

 72

persuaded the peasants and i n d u s t r i a l workers t o l o a n t h e i r

savings t o ' t h e R u s s i a n government. Poincare'was i n v o l v e d as

w e l l i n t h i s manoeuv<r.:ling;» i t i s estimated t h a t one thousand

m i l l i o n pounds s t e r l i n g o f the s a v i n g s of s m a l l h o l d e r s went

1

to R u s s i a i n t h i s way; The S o v i e t a u t h o r i t i e s were l o a t h to

acknowledge t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r payment, however on

October 28, 1924, the French government f o r m a l l y r e c o g n i z e d

the S o v i e t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as the l e g a l government of R u s s i a ;

The French l e a d e r s were t r y i n g to a d j u s t the new Russia to

t h e i r post-war s e c u r i t y system and as w e l l were anxious to

share i n the R u s s i a n markets which had been opened to Germany

by the T r e a t y of Rappallo n e g o t i a t e d d u r i n g the Conference
2
of Cannes.

The p e r i o d o f the Franco-Russian effort to r e - e s t a b l i s h

normal d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as commercial, runs fairly

p a r a l l e l to the improvement o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany p r i o r

to and immediately f o l l o w i n g the Locarno P a c t . The Russians

felt t h a t e s t a b l i s h i n g the Frenoh c o n n e c t i o n would a i d them

3

In s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r own particular institutions. They need-

ed, above a l l , cash and c r e d i t s . But b e f o r e any agreement c o u l d

be made t h e French government i n s i s t e d t h a t some understanding

1. Anon., The Hrench P r e s s and R u s s i a , The N a t i o n and Athenaeum,

v o l . 34, No. 19, February 9, 1924, p. 659;

2. Anon., F r a n c o - S o v i e t Trade, F o r e i g n P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n In-

f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , v o l . 6, No. 19, November 26, 1930,
p. 371.

3. Rakovsky, C h r i s t i a n , The F o r e i g n P o l i c y o f S o v i e t R u s s i a ,
F o r e i g n AfsEairs, v o l . 4, No 4, J u l y , 1926, p. 574.
 73

be a r r i v e d at c o n c e r n i n g the debts o f the I m p e r i a l Regime.

Many conferences were h e l d , the course of which does not e n t e r

i n t o the f i e l d of t h i s study, but the two p a r t i e s were unable

to come to any d e c i s i o n . Any payments which R u s s i a c o u l d under-

take must o f n e c e s s i t y be extended over a l o n g p e r i o d of time

and the French were adamant t h a t the payments should be larger

and cover a s h o r t e r p e r i o d .

During the R u s s o - P o l i s h War the R u s s i a n l e a d e r , T r o t s k y

vouchsafed the f a c t t h a t the S o v i e t was about to launch a

grandiose scheme which would envolve the conquest o f Germany

1

and France a f t e r the s u p p r e s s i o n o f Poland. I t was not l o n g ,

however, b e f o r e these dreamers began to a p p r e c i a t e the scope

of t h e i r problem and they turned to the use of s u b v e r s i v e

methods* The T h i r d i n t e r n a t i o n a l which had been formed a year

p r i o r t o the p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h i s p l a n was the agency

2

used. I t was t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n which the French f e a r e d . France

had, s i n c e the establishment of t h e T h i r d R e p u b l i c been a r e -

fuge f o r e x i l e s o f many n a t i o n a l i t i e s and t h i s made her task

of c o u n t e r a c t i n g the work o f t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n very difficult.

In s p i t e o f the f a c t t h a t t h e r e grew up i n France a l a r g e

group which f e l t that the T h i r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l was actually a

menace t o the s e c u r i t y of the country, h e r r i o t , Poincare'and

1. Chernov, V i c t o r , B o l s h e v i k Romance and R e a l i t y , F o r e i g n

A f f a i r s , v o l . 5, No. 2, January, 1927, p. 307.

2* Anon., La i i i I n t e r n a t i o n a l e contre l a France, son

e

arme'e et ses c o l o n i e s , Le Correspondant, Tome 299,

10 Mai, 1925, p. 321*
 74

others r e f u s e d to sever d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h R u s s i a as
1
d i d the E n g l i s h government. They f e l t t h a t s h u t t i n g t h e i r eyes

to an ©xi'st:emt, danger d i d not remove t h a t danger. Briand,

a l s o was i n f a v o r o f the c o n t i n u a t i o n of d i p l o m a t i c relations.

" I t i s by c h a r i t y , p a t i e n c e and t o l e r a n c e t h a t we can be of

2

s e r v i c e to R u s s i a , " H e r r i o t s a i d about the time France entered

i n t o f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s with t h a t country, and B r i a n d carried

on t h a t p o l i c y i n s p i t e of R u s s i a ' s r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t behavior -

d u r i n g the p e r i o d of the Locarno n e g o t i a t i o n s . She looked upon

the whole League system as an i n n o c e n t - l o o k i n g organization

b u i l t up by B r i t a i n and France to strengthen t h e i r grasp on

3

their " i l l gotten gains". In accordance w i t h t h i s b e l i e f she

t r i e d to detach Poland from her a l l i a n c e w i t h France at the

time of the d i f f i c u l t y over the C o u n c i l s e a t . French s t a t e s -

men, anxious about the s e c u r i t y o f t h e i r country, might w e l l

have been p l e a s e d when Poland c u r t l y informed Russia that

economic d i s c u s s i o n s were q u i t e i n order but t h a t s e c u r i t y

.4

i s s u e s should be l e f t to Locarno.

During the three years immediately f o l l o w i n g Locarno

the i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between R u s s i a and the western

1. Over the Z i n o v i e f f L e t t e r p a r t i a l l y ; Text i n Toynbee, op.
c i t . , 1924, Appendix, p. 493.

2. H e r r i o t , Edouard, The Program o f L i b e r a l France, Foreign

A f f a i r s , v o l . 2, No. 4, June 15, 1924.

3; Machray, Robert, The Red R e a c t i o n to Locarno, F o r t n i g h t l y

Review, v o l . 119, January 1, 1926, p. 158.

4; European Economic and P o l i t i c a l Survey [ i s s u e d by the

Reference S e r v i c e on I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , P a r i s j ,
No. 18, May 31, 1926, p. 14.
 75

democracies were s t i l l t o o potent a f o r c e to make f o r c l o s e

cooperation. No success was achieved between France and Rus-
sia towards settlement o f t h e i r debt problem and from the s e -
ourity angle R u s s i a s t i l l remained an enigma. On August 27,
1

1928, R u s s i a r e c e i v e d an i n v i t a t i o n from the u n i t e d S t a t e s

through France to adhere to the B r i a n d - K e l l o g g r a c t . The

French f e a r o f Germany, the g r a d u a l s t a b i l i z i n g of R u s s i a i n -

t e r n a l l y and the waning French f e a r o f t h a t country made France

the i d e a l country through which t o transmit such an i n v i t a t i o n .

R u s s i a had come w i t h i n the range of French statesmen guarding

security.

I n l o o k i n g at t h e European scene i n 1928 w i t h the o b j e c t

of g e t t i n g a panoramic p i c t u r e we see a c o n t i n e n t beset with

alliances and c o u n t e r - d a l l i a n c e s . Under the cover o f t h e League

the western n a t i o n s have e s t a b l i s h e d fundamentally the same

system as was i n use i n pre-war Europe. I n some groups the

p a r t n e r s are d i f f e r e n t * Not the l e a s t r e s p o n s i b l e o f p o s t -

War statesmen f o r t h i s s i t u a t i o n was B r i a n d . Locarno was a

great step forward f o r peace, y e t by 1928 c o n s i d e r a b l e o f the

enthusiasm o f 1925 had disappeared and a new note o f c y n i c i s m

seemed t o be c r e e p i n g i n . B r i a n d envisaged a Europe a t peace

through t h e League o f N a t i o n s , but he was not b i g enough t o

p l a c e h i s whole t r u s t i n that organization. That he genuinely

sought peace i s never questioned, but o n l y h i s method i s open

to censure, h i s r e a c t i o n s d u r i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s o f the r a c t

1. The United S t a t e s was not i n d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with

R u s s i a a t t h i s time.
 76

whioh bears h i s name p a r t i a l l y i l l u s t r a t e t h i s weakness. An-

x i o u s to improve Franco^American r e l a t i o n s which had become

somewhat s t r a i n e d owing to the r e f u s a l o f the French govern-

ment t o take p a r t i n a new maritime conference, Briand said:

France wishes to l i v e i n an atmosphere of confidence

and peace and the evidence of t h i s i s her s i g n a t u r e
o f the agreements t e n d i n g to h o l d at bay the t h r e a t
of c o n f l i c t . . . F o r those whose l i v e s are devoted to
s e c u r i n g t h i s l i v i n g r e a l i t y o f a p o l i c y o f peace the
u n i t e d S t a t e s and France a l r e a d y appear before the
world as m o r a l l y i n f u l l agreement.;.France would be
w i l l i n g t o s u b s c r i b e p u b l i c l y w i t h the United s t a t e s
to any mutual agreement to outlaw war...as between
these two c o u n t r i e s . 1

What was behind Briand's p r o p o s a l ? H i s d e s i r e was to conclude

a b i l a t e r a l agreement between France and the u n i t e d S t a t e s

which would e l i m i n a t e war between these two countries only.

By thus l i m i t i n g the p r o p o s a l i t would not commit France to

any such p o l i c y on the European c o n t i n e n t thus l e a v i n g the

way open f o r her to take d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n i n case o f aggression

by Germany. T h u s B r i a n d would p r e s e r v e the i n s t i t u t i o n of war

as the means o f a s s u r i n g the triumph o f h i s post-war p o l i c y

i n Europe and at the same time p r o t e c t France by making the

p a c i f i c settlement of a l l d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h the u n i t e d S t a t e s

mandatory. Mr. K e l l o g g was not deceived by t h i s lin.e o f approach

on the p a r t of B r i a n d . A t r e a t y o f t h i s k i n d between the two

c o u n t r i e s only would t i e the American hands i n r e s p e c t t o

France and might even envolve the u n i t e d S t a t e s i n a war of

which France was a part. The a t t i t u d e of Mr. K e l l o g g was shown

1. F o r e i g n P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i e e ; Text of
L e t t e r , v o l . 3, No. 7, June.8, 1927, p. 87*
 77

i n h i s r e p l y t o B r i a n d through the French ambassador at Wash-

1
ington. He was very f a v o r a b l e to a d e c l a r a t i o n of peace but

he d e c l a r e d that i t should be a g e n e r a l one. He argued t h a t

s i n c e the aim o f both France and the u n i t e d S t a t e s i s t o

a b o l i s h war, why limit it, l e t a l l the Great Fowers be included.

B r i a n d ' s p r o p o s a l was being s t r e t c h e d f a r beyond h i s o r i g i n a l

idea. He began to r e a l i z e from the p o i n t o f French s e c u r i t y

the s i t u a t i o n was becoming c o m p l i c a t e d . T h i s broadening o f

the scope o f the p r o p o s a l by the American statesman caused _

much d i s q u i e t i n France where i t was f e l t t h a t the complete

r e n u n c i a t i o n o f war would t i e French hands i n case Germany

should r e p u d i a t e the V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y . A l s o i t would n u l l i f y

the value o f the s a n c t i o n s c r e a t e d by t h e Covenant and by the

Locarno t r e a t i e s i n which France p l a c e d so great a f a i t h , in

accordance w i t h t h i s sentiment B r i a n d t r i e d to s o l v e the p r o -

blem by s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t r o d u c i n g the q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f a war

o f a g g r e s s i o n which he maintained would cover the French ob-

j e c t i o n s to t h e phrase "war as an instrument o f n a t i o n a l p o l i c y "

which was too broad from a French p o i n t o f view. Thus the

b a s i c cause o f disagreement, i t w i l l be seen, was t h a t Mr. Kel-

logg wanted t o outlaw war on any grounds w h i l e B r i a n d main-

3
t a i n e d t h a t d e f e n s i v e wars should be permitted* . French p u b l i c

1. The S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e at Washington to the French Ambass-

ador ( C l a u d e l ) , December 28, 1927, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Con-
c i l i a t i o n , No. 243 Documents, 1928, p. 465.

2. 'i'he F r e n c h Ambassador ( C l a u d e l ) t o the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e ,

Washington, January 5, 1928, i n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , ,
No. 243 Documents, 1928, p. 466.

3. M i l l e r , David Hunter, The Pact o f r a r i s , New York, G.

Putnam's Sons, 1928, p. 38.
 78

o p i n i o n at t h i s time was c o n j e c t u r i n g as t o whether t h e Amer-

i c a n S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e wasunot j u s t t r y i n g to g i v e s a t i s -
1

faction "aux a s p i r a t i o n s du mysticisme p a c i f i s t e " without

enough a t t e n t i o n to the r e a l i t i e s of the post-war situation

i n Europe. I t i s of v i t a l i n t e r e s t to observers that Briand

had brought on a s i t u a t i o n through h i s l e t t e r to the Ameri-

can people from which he now might have t o r e t r e a t , i n order

to a v o i d t h i s B r i a n d d i s p a t c h e d a new note i n which he laid

2

down c o n d i t i o n s f o r which the commentator, " P e r t i n a x " felt

the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r should be c o n g r a t u l a t e d as they would

l i k e l y put an end t o the d i s c u s s i o n s and i f by chance they

should be accepted, they would d e p r i v e the proposed t r e a t y

3

o f any v a l u e or s i g n i f i c a n c e i

The expected s t a g n a t i o n i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s d i d not

occur as Mr. Kellogg disregarded the l a t e s t o b j e c t i o n s of

4

B r i a n d and r e - s t a t e d the American t h e s i s i n a new note dis-

patched to the Governments o f Great B r i t a i n , Germany, I t a l y ,

and Japan. T h i s was f o l l o w e d almost immediately by a new

D1;r a f Anon.,
t T r e a t yLa thought
Reponse byde the
M. F
B r ieanncdh ato Mr. K e l l o g g ,t hL»Europe
safeguard eir
wouvelle, No. 530, 7 A v r i l , 1928, p. 450.

2. A t t h i s time a p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r on The Conservative

Echo de r a r i s .

3. Anon., War Outlawry p r o p o s a l , Manchester Guardian Weekly

v o l . 18, No. 15, A p r i l 13, 1928, p. 284.

4. International Conciliation No. 243, p. 478,

A p r i l 13, 1928.
 79
1
country's s e c u r i t y . With, these two texts before them, i t was

hoped t h a t the Great .rowers c o u l d see both s i d e s o f the pro-

blem and t h a t some common ground c o u l d be reached. As one

French w r i t e r s a i d , " C r i s t a l i i s e e s dans des t e x t e s rendus

p u b l i c s , l e s o p p o s i t i o n s de p o i n t s de vue vont s ' a f f i r m e r en-

core d'avantage et l a c o n c i l i a t i o n des deus theses n'en s e r a

2

sans doute pas rendue plus f a c i l e . " Franoe was v i t a l l y con-

cerned t h a t the proposed pact should cover t h e League Covenant

( A r t i c l e 1, French d r a f t o f A p r i l 20], i n order t h a t she could

p r o t e c t her c o n t i n e n t a l a l l i a n c e system p a r t i c u l a r l y her en-

volvements w i t h her a l l y , Poland, which country had a l r e a d y

caused c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t y a t Locarno, and a l s o over the

q u e s t i o n o f the e n l a r g i n g o f the League C o u n c i l ;

P u b l i c o p i n i o n i n France seemed t o f a v o r the American

d r a f t o f A p r i l 13, whioh had been dispatched by Mr. K e l l o g g

to t h e Powers, i t was f e a r e d t h a t f u r t h e r French o b j e c t i o n s

3

would put France Inc. a very bad l i g h t . However, the American

S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e dispatched a new d r a f t t o the Powers pre-

v i o u s l y mentioned and i n a d d i t i o n , Czecho-Slovakia

i
and Poland.

I t was accepted by a l l c o u n t r i e s named. In a d d i t i o n a l l other

c o u n t r i e s having c o n s t i t u t i o n a l governments were i n v i t e d t o

1. I b i d . , p. 481. i t was thought t h a t M. P o i n c a r e was behind

much o f these n e g o t i a t i o n s , as M. B r i a n d was i l l a t the
time. Bound T a b l e , The Outlawry o f War, v o l . 18,
June 1928, p. 455.

2. Anon., Le p r o j e c t K e l l o g g , L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 532,

21 A v r i l , 1928,. p. 55.

3. Huddleston, S i s l e y , European A l l i a n c e s , New Statesman,

v o l ; 31, No. 782, A p r i l 21, 1928, p. 38.
 80
1
adhere.

What was the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the B r i a n d - K e l l o g g Pact i n -

s o f a r as French s e c u r i t y was concerned? i t has been s t a t e d

e a r l i e r i n t h i s study t h a t the new element o f c y n i c i s m was

c r e e p i n g i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s d u r i n g the p e r i o d pre-

ceding t h i s r a c t . l o a c e r t a i n extent t h i s was t e m p o r a r i l y /

arrested; T h i s was important f o r prance because i t meant

that the a c c u s a t i o n that she might not r e a l l y d e s i r e peace a t

a l l would be s t i l l e d , she had shown her d e s i r e and willing-

ness t o cooperate; France had p a r t i c u l a r l y t o f a c e t h i s cri-

t i c i s m from the u n i t e d S t a t e s and B r i a n d hoped t h a t f o r a

w h i l e at l e a s t t h i s would be s i l e n c e d . l e t at the time of

the s i g n i n g of t h i s r a r i s r e a c e F a c t , France was s t a g i n g the

2

g r e a t e s t m i l i t a r y manoeuvres i n her h i s t o r y . From the view-

p o i n t o f the o u t s i d e o b s e r v e r t h i s appeared inconsistent,

but f o r the r e a l i s t , B r i a n d , i t was good b u s i n e s s , i t showed

the German people t h a t France was s t i l l a supporter o f the

peace e f f o r t s yet was not prepared t o brook any t r i f l i n g over

the Reparations q u e s t i o n . By the briand-jxellogg r a c t the

3
r i g h t o f a n a t i o n t o s e l f - d e f e n s e was r e t a i n e d . T h i s

1; M i l l e r , David hunter, op. c i t . , Addendum, p. 149.

2. nuddleston, S i s l e y , An A c t of F i t h , New Statesman,

a

v o l ; 31, No. 801, September:.!, 1928, p. 628.

3. A r t i c l e s 1 and 2 of the t e x t o f the B r i a n d - K e l l o g g t r e a t y .

A l t h o u g h not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s
understood, i f Germany should take a c t i o n , the con-
d i t i o n s governing an aggressor come i n t o p l a y .

S i e b u r g , F r i e d r i c h , B r i a n d , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 10,
No. 4, J u l y 19 32, p; 586.
 81
p a r t i c u l a r l y p l e a s e d France as t h e French were l e f t the power

to p r o t e c t themselves i n case of a t t a c k by Germany. The

t r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s , (Covenant) and the T r e a t i e s o f Locarno

were not a f f e c t e d by the new Fact. Any breach of the B r i a n d -

K e l l o g g F a c t would mean a simultaneous breach of the Covenant

1
of t h e League of N a t i o n s , i n the world at l a r g e the new Fact

was r e c e i v e d w i t h v a r y i n g degrees of enthusiasm. The r e -

a c t i o n a r y and r a d i c a l press was l a r g e l y condemnatory or

2 3
a p a t h e t i c but the more moderate organs felt that t h i s Pact
was a step i n advance and t h a t i t would a s s i s t the cause

which every n a t i o n maintained was the g o a l of i t s i n t e r n a t -

i o n a l p o l i c y — p e a c e f u l cooperation. T h i s thought was very

ably expressed by an American critic, George W. WIckersham,

when he wrote t h a t i f people r e a l i z e t h e f u l l scope o f the

.tact "they w i l l v i s i t w i t h p o l i t i c a l infamy those who would

deride t h e i r f a i t h and v i o l a t e t h e i r honour by making a mock-

4
ery of i t s r e a l import."

B r i a n d ' s r e c o r d i n i t a l o - F r e n c h r e l a t i o n s In the p o s t -

war y e a r s has shown moderation and r e s t r a i n t . Rather than

conclude an e x c l u s i v e pact w i t h J u g o - S l a v i a he urged the

1. M i l l e r , David Hunter, op. c i t . , p. 131.

2. Cocks, F. Seymour, The American Dove and the B r i t i s h Lamb,

London, The S o c i a l i s t Review, New S e r i e s , No. 24,
June, 1928, p. 8.

3. Dumont-Wilden, L., La R a t i f i c a t i o n du Pacte B r i a n d - K e l l o g g

Revue Bleue, No. 3, 2 F e v r i e r , 1928.

4i Wiekersham, G. W., The Pact o f P a r i s ; A Gesture o r a P l e d g

F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l ; 7, No. 3, A p r i l 1929, p. 356.
 82

i n c l u s i o n - o f I t a l y and even r e f r a i n e d from s i g n i n g t h a t Pact

u n t i l l a t e r so t h a t the I t a l i a n d i c t a t o r could be the first

1

to append h i s s i g n a t u r e . However, Signor M u s s o l i n i refused

to adhere and the Franco-Jugo-Slav T r e a t y was r a t i f i e d Nov-

ember 11, 1927. i t appeared from t h i s that I t a l y was deter-

mined to enter upon a path d i v e r g e n t from that of France.

To the French, t h e i r own l a y on the road to peace, and there-

f o r e t h a t o f I t a l y could only l e a d to war. This feeling was

confirmed immediately a f t e r the r e f u s a l of M u s s o l i n i to enter

i n t o a t r e a t y with France and J u g o - S l a v i a when I t a l i a n en-

g i n e e r s began to c o n s t r u c t m i l i t a r y roads a l l converging on

2 '

the French f r o n t i e r , i n a d d i t i o n , d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f approx-

imately one year while B r i a n d was waiting for Mussolini's

answer to h i s o v e r t u r e s f o r peace, the I t a l i a n d i c t a t o r con-

3

eluded a t r e a t y of c o n c i l i a t i o n and n e u t r a l i t y with Spain.

The French regarded t h i s as a d i r e c t a f f r o n t to dugo-Slavla

and as the f i r s t move towards encirclement of France. Fascist

I t a l y was becoming a p o t e n t i a l menace to French s e c u r i t y .

Both France and I t a l y i n common w i t h other European

c o u n t r i e s adhered t o the B r i a n d - l v e l l o g g F a c t to outlaw war. N

During the months which f o l l o w e d i t became apparent t h a t

1. S f o r z a , Comte C a r l o , I t a l i e et France, Revue de F a r i s ,
Tome 4, 15 J u i l l e t , 1930, p. 721.
2. Aubert, L o u i s , France and I t a l y , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,
v o l . 9, No. 2, January 1931, p. 237.

3. August 7, 1926. F o r e i g n P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n Information

S e r v i c e , v o l . 3, No. 1, March 16, 1927, p. 1.
 83

n e i t h e r country was prepared t o take i t too s e r i o u s l y until

a f t e r they had achieved t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e aims. The e n t r y o f

Germany i n t o t h e League and t h e growing power o f I t a l y caused

a l o o s e n i n g o f the bonds between France and the L i t t l e Entente

states. Where onoe these n a t i o n s would have jumped a t the

crack o f t h e French whip now a g r a v i t a t i o n of Czecho-Slovakia

1

towards Germany and Rumania towards I t a l y took p l a c e . How-

ever, B r i a n d p e r s i s t e d i n h i s e f f o r t s towards a peaceful set-

tlement o f d i f f e r e n c e s , i n s p i t e o f the d i s p a t c h o f M. Beau-

marehais, one o f the most s u c c e s s f u l French c o l o n i a l admin-

i s t r a t o r s , t o Rome, no settlement was reached. The e f f o r t s

of French statesmen were t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent thwarted

by t h e p r e s s and people o f both c o u n t r i e s which i n d u l g e d i n

a campaign o f mutual r e c r i m i n a t i o n which went to absurd

lengthsi A c c u s a t i o n s by t h e F r e n c h that t h e I t a l i a n s were

savages and t h e f r i e n d s h i p o f French Cabinet m i n i s t e r s f o r

a n t i - F a s c i s t emigres d i d n o t h i n g t o f u r t h e r the e f f o r t s t o -
2

wards c o n c i l i a t i o n . When i t became apparent t h a t no progress

c o u l d be made towards s e t t l e m e n t o f d i f f e r e n c e s on t h e con-

t i n e n t , the sphere o f i n t e r e s t s h i f t e d to the Mediterranean

where t h e problem o f n a v a l p a r i t y was r a p i d l y coming t o the

fore i n italo-French r e l a t i o n s . T h i s w i l l be d e a l t w i t h l a t e r

in this study.

1. Huddleston, S i s l e y , A D i p l o m a t i c S h i f t i n g , New Statesman,

v o l . 31, No. 788, June 2, 1928, p. 249.

2. Newman, E . W. P., F r a n c o - I t a l i a n R e l a t i o n s , Contemporary

Review, v o l . 138, August 1930, p. 155.
 84

An aot of f a i t h must never be made to look r i d i c u l o u s .

In the Pact of P a r i s the Great Powers solemnly renounced war

as an Instrument o f n a t i o n a l p o l i c y , The continued occupation

of the Rhineland looked f o o l i s h a f t e r Locarno, i t s continu-

a t i o n a f t e r the pact of P a r i s would almost appear o f f e n s i v e .

Por years the o c c u p a t i o n o f the Rhineland had been e x p l a i n e d

by the French on the ground o f s e c u r i t y . No f u r t h e r reason

had been vouchsafed even although the T r e a t y o f " V e r s a i l l e s

c a l l e d f o r the complete f u l f i l l i n g of a l l conditions l a i d

1

down there b e f o r e evacuation would be c o n s i d e r e d . Almost at

the moment o f the s i g n i n g of the B r i a n d - K e l l o g g Pact B r i a n d

was p r e s e n t i n g new demands to Stresemann; The financial sit-

u a t i o n must be a d j u s t e d . German p u b l i c o p i n i o n r e c e i v e d a

severe shock. The Germans might w e l l have asked "Why should

our every e f f o r t towards s i n c e r e c o o p e r a t i o n be regarded as

new evidence of h y p o c r i s y ? Why should not the same judgment

be meted out t o France, to B r i t a i n and even the United S t a t e s

of America?" For Stresemann, Briand's a t t i t u d e was a severe

blow, f o r he o n l y too w e l l r e a l i z e d the c r i t i c i s m h i s p o l i c y

of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was -going to have t o contend w i t h from h i s

n a t i o n a l i s t opponents. Yet i t i s not hard to f i n d a l o g i c a l

reason f o r t h i s s t i f f e n i n g of the a t t i t u d e o f the French For-

eign M i n i s t e r . He was no l o n g e r s o l e l y i n c o n t r o l o f the

f o r e i g n p o l i c y of France. Poincare'', the man who had saved

1. Article 431.
 85
1
the f r a n c i n 1926 was making h i s presence f e l t i n t h e inters
2
national f i e l d . B r i a n d who by the end o f 1930 had served

i n twenty-four C a b i n e t s and had been prime m i n i s t e r many times

as well,was b e g i n n i n g to l o o k upon h i m s e l f as an institution,

as a man above p o l i t i c s , as the f a t h e r o f B r i a n d i s m — t h e

accepted f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f France. In o r d e r to r e t a i n h i s

p l a c e i n the Quai d*0>rsay he would make h i m s e l f amenable t o

the o p i n i o n s of the premier of t h e time, hence t o a c e r t a i n

extent i t was a d i f f e r e n t B r i a n d which Stresemann had to

reckon w i t h i n h i s s t r u g g l e f o r the e v a c u a t i o n of the Rhine-

l a n d d u r i n g the p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the

B r i a n d - J i e l l o g g Pact*

The q u e s t i o n of e v a c u a t i o n was o f f i c i a l l y r a i s e d by P r e s -

i d e n t von Hindenburg to be f o l l o w e d s h o r t l y afterwards by

Stresemann. The l a t t e r maintained t h a t the p r i n c i p a l ob-

s t a c l e to improving Franco-German r e l a t i o n s was the presence

3
of A l l i e d troops i n the Rhineland.
I t was a French s e m i - o f f i c i a l newspaper which s a i d ,
r e f e r r i n g to the P r e s i d e n t ' s speech, t h a t the world
had become acuustomed t o the r h e t o r i c a l e f f o r t s o f
German p o l i c y , and t h e r e f o r e expressed the b e l i e f
that German demands should not be taken too s e r -
i o u s l y . French p u b l i c o p i n i o n would be g r a v e l y mis-
taken i f i t accepted t h i s p o i n t of view.*

1. Sanchez, J . A. M. de, A Year o f M. Poincare', F o r e i g n

A f f a i r s , v o l . 6, No. 1, October 1927, p. 41.

2. Huddleston, S i s l e y , The Group System, New Statesman,

v o l . 36, No. 922, December 27, 1930, p. 353.

3. toynbee, op. c i t . , 1929, p. 170.

4. Address t o the German R e i c h s t a g , January 30, 1928, ?Qieeler-

Bennett, J . Y/. ed., Documents o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s ,
1928, p. 33.
 86

B r i a n d r e p l i e d on February 2, 1929, i n a statement to the Sen-

ate i n which he summarized the stand o f France. Germany must

consent to p l a c i n g the Hhineland under p e r p e t u a l s u p e r v i s i o n

o f the League of N a t i o n s . Dr. Stresemann's p r o p o s a l t h a t sup-

e r v i s i o n should continue only u n t i l 1935 B r i a n d s a i d was i n -

adequate; In a d d i t i o n , Germany must make p o s i t i v e financial

1
proposals. He maintained t h a t Germany must pay cash down a t

once; He
advocated t h a t German r a i l w a y bonds be brought i n
2
under the Dawes scheme. The F r e n c h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r had l o s t
ts

a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f h i s i d e a l i s m . For him t h i s was

p u r e l y a matter o f b u s i n e s s . J u s t as i n the Fact o f P a r i s o f

1928, when the American S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e took B r i a n d s f

pro-

t e s t a t i o n s of peace too l i t e r a l l y and proposed a world pact

i n s t e a d o f one r e s t r i c t e d to t h e i r two n a t i o n s o n l y , now :he .

was e x p e r i e n c i n g the same qualms. E q u a l i t y between France

and Germany had been r e c o g n i z e d i n the Locarno Pacts and i n

the B r i a n d - K e l l o g g Pact y e t B r i a n d wished t o m a i n t a i n some

means o f supremacy over Germany through the Rhineland either

by m i l i t a r y or f i n a n c i a l means. Perhaps B r i a n d d i d not be-

l i e v e so much i n the worth o f Locarno as he p r o t e s t e d or pos-

s i b l y h i s quest f o r s e c u r i t y was so much of a phobia to him

that i t warped h i s sense o f j u s t i c e . Evidence of t h i s was

g i v e n d u r i n g the n i n t h s e s s i o n o f the League Assembly when

1. Anon., M. B r i a n d * s Terms t o Germany, Manchester Guardian

Weekly, v o l . 8, No. 6, February 10, 1928, p. 104.

2. Loc. c i t .
 87

he s t a t e d t h a t he doubted whether Germany had really disarmed.

"Who would oare to m a i n t a i n , " he asks, "that a great country,
so p o w e r f u l l y equipped f o r peace, t h a t i s t o say, for industr-
i a l development, would be at a l o s s t o supply an army w i t h war
1

materials?" I t must be admitted t h a t B r i a n d had some grounds

f o r t h i s statement f o r i t was approximately at t h i s time t h a t

the German trade u n i o n l e a d e r , B u l l e r j a h n , was sentenced to

p r i s o n by a m i l i t a r y t r i b u n a l on a charge o f t r e a s o n for re-

v e a l i n g to the A l l i e d Commission o f C o n t r o l t h a t machine-guns

•2 •

were being manufactured i l l e g a l l y i n German f o u n d r i e s . In any

case, h i s address seemed to d i s p e l the hope that the German

p l e a f o r evacuation would be t r e a t e d s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y by the

French government. Lord Cushendun, who was taking S i r Austin

Chamberlain's p l a c e at t h i s s e s s i o n seemed to take up a stand

by the side of Briand. One F r e n c h correspondent wrote, "Lord

Cushendun, en d e f i n e s s a n t l a p o s i t i o n B r i t a n n i q u e est venu con-

3
f i r m e r puisamment l a p o s i t i o n f r a n c a i s e . "
No progress seemed p o s s i b l e by d i r e o t n e g o t i a t i o n between
4
B r i a n d and Dr. M u l l e r but i n a p r i v a t e d i s c u s s i o n between

1. Documents o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1928, p* 43, Verbatim

r e c o r d s o f the speech by M. B r i a n d i n the Assembly,
September 10, 1928.
2. Noel-Baker, P h i l i p , P r i v a t e Manufacture o f Armaments, v o l ,
1, p. 373. B u l l e r j a h n was accused by P a u l von Gontard,
C h i e f Engineer of Deutsche Waffen und M u n i t i o n s F a b r i k ,
who b e f o r e the war.by h i s machinations had done much to
cause the r a c e i n machine-gun manufacture between France
and Germany*
3. Anon., Ne'gociation rhenane, L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 553,
15 Septembre, 1928, p. 1239.
4. Dr. Stresemann*s f a t a l i l l n e s s was the cause o f h i s absence.
 88

the delegates of France, Germany, Great B r i t a i n , I t a l y and

Japan a b a s i s f o r f u t u r e e f f o r t s was agreed upon* Three con-

d i t i o n s were l a i d down.

I*. The opening of n e g o t i a t i o n s at the request o f the German

C h a n c e l l o r on the a n t i c i p a t e d evacuation o f the Rhineland.

2. The need f o r the settlement of the problem of Reparations

and the naming f o r t h i s purpose o f a committee by the

s i x governments.

3. The acceptance o f the p r i n c i p l e o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a

Committee on V e r i f i c a t i o n and C o n c i l i a t i o n . (The f u n c t i o n

and d u r a t i o n o f t h i s committee was to be s e t t l e d by com-

1

mon agreement later*j

C h a n c e l l o r M u l l e r ' s agreement t o these c o n d i t i o n s was regar-

ded w i t h mixed f e e l i n g s i n Germany. Br. Marx, a former Chan-

c e l l o r , d e c l a r e d t h a t Dr. M u l l e r had succeeded i n g e t t i n g no

b e t t e r terms than any other p a r t y might have done. He re-

2
g r e t t e d t h a t Stresemann had not been the n e g o t i a t o r . Yet
i t i s p o i n t e d out i n L'Europe N o u v e l l e , t h a t Dr. Stresemann
had agreed to the t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s p r i o r to t h e i r acceptance
3
by Dr. Marx. In 1926 when a n a t i o n a l i s t government had been

i n power i n Germany Briand had h e l d out the hand o f f r i e n d s h i p

1. Anon.j Le R h i n vu de Geneve, L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 554,

22 Septembre, 1928, p* 1271. C l a u s e 3 had been advoc-
ated by B r i a n d i n February 1928, before the Frenoh Senate.

2. Anon., French Uneasiness at German C r i t i c i s m , Manchester

Guardian Weekly, v o l . 19, No. 2, September 24, 1928, p.224.

3. Anon., Le R h i n vu de Geneve, op* c i t . , by telephonic

communication* p. 1271.
 89

and had been f a v o r a b l e t o e v a c u a t i o n , but a t t h i s time, i n

s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e was a s o c i a l i s t administration

t h e r e , he appeared to r e b u f f t h e i r e f f o r t s . Why? Because

the Locarno s p i r i t , even i n B r i a n d , was/wearing o f f under t h e

pressure o f i n t e r n a l p u b l i o o p i n i o n i n France which evinced

g r e a t uneasiness due t o the v i o l e n t r e a c t i o n i n Germany t o

the agreement o u t l i n e d above*

I t c o u l d be s a i d o f B r i a n d t h a t he was p l a y i n g a game o f

p o l i t i c a l poker* Because o f the b i t t e r f e e l i n g i n Germany,

he was i n a s t a t e o f great uneasiness, but t h e speeoh o f S i r

A u s t i n Chamberlain i n t h e House o f Commons caused h i s s p i r i t s

to r e v i v e * The B r i t i s h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s t a t e d t h a t "the
1 •

c o n c e s s i o n p r o v i d e d f o r i n A r t i o l e 431 o f t h e Text o f the

T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s c o u l d only take e f f e c t when Germany had

completely executed and discharged t h e whole o f her Repar-

2

ations o b l i g a t i o n . T h i s a s s e r t i o n was r e c e i v e d i n P a r i s w i t h

great e l a t i o n because no French a u t h o r i t y had ever put suoh

a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on A r t i c l e 431 b e f o r e . German o f f i c *
i
i a l o p i n i o n was shocked and t h e n a t i o n a l i s t elements grew

more: c r i t i c a l than ever* 1

I t seemed t h a t the o l d entente be-

tween /France and B r i t a i n was being r e v i t a l i z e d and t h a t the

new s p i r i t o f Locarno was f a s t b e i n g f o r g o t t e n *

1. A r t i c l e - 4 3 1 (Text o f the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s ) — P r o v i d e d
f o r t h e withdrawal o f A l l i e d troops p r i o r t o 1935 i f
Germany f u l f i l l e d a l l her o b l i g a t i o n s .
2. Anon., T r e a t y Pledges on E v a c u a t i o n , Manchester Guardian
Weekly, v o l * 19, No* 23, December 7, 1928, p. 445.
 90

The two main p o i n t s a t i s s u e between Germany on t h e one

hand and the A l l i e s on the o t h e r were t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e

impending R e p a r a t i o n agreement t o t h e contemplated agreement

f o r R h i n e l a n d e v a c u a t i o n and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Rhine-

l a n d e v a c u a t i o n and t h e Jj'renoh d e s i r e f o r a Committee o f Ver-

i f i c a t i o n and C o n c i l i a t i o n . No p r o g r e s s was p o s s i b l e t o -

wards e v a c u a t i o n u n t i l some u n d e r s t a n d i n g had been a r r i v e d a t

on t h e f i n a n c i a l q u e s t i o n and f o r t h i s purpose an Expert Com-

m i t t e e on R e p a r a t i o n s was a p p o i n t e d which began work on i'eb-

1

r u a r y 11, 1929. An attempt had been made towards an under-

s t a n d i n g on t h e q u e s t i o n o f a Committee o f V e r i f i c a t i o n and

C o n c i l i a t i o n a t the f i f t y - t h i r d s e s s i o n o f t h e League C o u n c i l
2

h e l d a t Lugano, b u t t h i s had f a i l e d owing t o t h e r e f u s a l o f

Dr. Stresemann t o c o n s i d e r under any circumstances the ex-

t e n s i o n o f c o n t r o l o f the Rhineland beyond the t r e a t y limit

3

p r e s c r i b e d i n A r t i c l e 431. h i s stand was taken i n accordance

w i t h h i s speech made t o the R e i c h s t a g t h e p r e v i o u s November

i n whioh he s t a t e d t h a t t h e moral and l e g a l r i g h t o f Germany

i ^
t o t h e e v a c u a t i o n eould not be questioned; so he r e f u s e d t o
4
compromise h i s p o s i t i o n .
The r e p o r t o f the Expert Committee on R e p a r a t i o n s , c a l l e d

1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1929, p. 177.

2. Loo. c i t .

3. Anon., The league and Rhineland, Manchester Guardian

Weekly, v o l , 19, No. 25, December 21, 1928, p, 490.

4. Documents o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , November 19, 1928,

p. 49. i
 91
1
the ioung P l a n was i s s u e d on June 7, 1929. O b j e c t i o n t o i t

was r a i s e d by some s e c t i o n s o f French o p i n i o n . In France the

idea s t i l l found much support t h a t war debts had been i n c u r -

red i n a common cause and t h e r e f o r e the United S t a t e s should

o v e r l o o k the French o b l i g a t i o n on t h a t s c o r e . The Young F l a n

was not based on t h a t premise. Only i f some p l a n i s r a t i f i e d

for t h e settlement o f t h e Reparations i s s u e could p o s i t i v e

steps be taken towards e v a c u a t i o n . O f f i c i a l French o p i n i o n

led by Poincare' was determined t h a t France should accept the

Young P l a n f o r t o r e f u s e i t would cause " u n e c r i s e economique

avectoutes ses consequences s o c i a l e s . " An agreement was

reached between Poincare', Briand and Stresemann t h a t a spec-

ial conference should be c a l l e d by the powers f o r the r a t i -

f i c a t i o n o f the Young F l a n and a l s o t o arrange f o r evacuation

3

of the R h i n e l a n d . i t wasopenedat t h e Hague on August 6, 1929.

i t was a t t h i s conference t h a t Briand brought up the

q u e s t i o n o f the Committee f o r C o n c i l i a t i o n and C o n t r o l . For

him i t was a q u e s t i o n o f p r e s t i g e t h a t some form o f commission

i

be e s t a b l i s h e d , k. Wladimir d'Omesson, an i n f l u e n t i a l French

w r i t e r o u t l i n e d ^ at t h a t time what would be p r a c t i c a l type o f

commission. ! f
E l l e ne c o n s t i t n e r a i t qu'une simple mesure de

p r e c a u t i o n et n ' a g i r a i t qu'en cas de d a n g e r europeen*' Elle

r e s t e ' r a i t en harmone'e avec l ' a r t i c l e 213 du t r a i t e de 7

1* Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1929, p. 179.

2. Dumont-Wilden, L., Le Reglement de l a P a i x , Revue Bleue,

No; 11, 1 J u i n , 1929, p. 340.

3. Toynbee, op. c i t i , p. 180.

 1
paix." He envisaged the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Committee o n l y

i n e x c e p t i o n a l cases. T h i s d e s i r e f o r a Uommittee on the

p a r t of B r i a n d was not so much as a measure f o r s e c u r i t y as

t o enable him to r e t u r n to P a r i s w i t h something d e f i n i t e to

show to the Chamber of Deputies; Por i f he should return

and merely d e c l a r e t h a t the Rhineland was t o be evacuated,

even although h i s a c t i o n was c o r r e c t , he probably would be

r e l i e v e d of h i s post; i t would be t o o r a d i c a l an a c t i o n f o r

the Chamber. T h i s would be i n keeping w i t h the t r a d i t i o n of

the French system. The Deputies never take much i n t e r e s t i n

f o r e i g n a f f a i r s u n t i l some m i n i s t e r does something i n a pre-

2

c i p i t a t e manner—he i s u s u a l l y e j e c t e d at once; Briand had

to have some card which would c a r r y him through the p l a y .

A commission would be a b l e to see t h a t d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n was

enforced. By t h i s p r o p o s a l he i m p l i e d t h a t as soon as the

withdrawal of A l l i e d troops had taken p l a c e , A r t i c l e s 42, 43

3 -

and 44 of the t e x t of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s would be bro-

ken by the Germans and they would proceed t o r e b u i l d their

fortifications; "We w i l l withdraw our t r o o p s , " B r i a n d might

have s a i d , "but i n r e t u r n we ?/ant a permanent committee of

control." "We w i l l agree to a temporary committee," Dr;

Stresemann might have r e p l i e d , "but a c c o r d i n g to the Treaty

1. Ormesson, 7/ladimir d* , L'Evacuation de l a Rhenanie, Revue

de P a r i s , Tome 4,.11 Aout, 1929, p* 492*

2* S e i g f r i e d , Andre', France, A Study i n N a t i o n a l i t y , Y a l e

U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1 9 3 0 , p. 72.

3. Deal w i t h demilitarization.
 93

of V e r s a i l l e s whioh your own countrymen helped to draw up,

• 1
you have no j u s t r i g h t to expect i t to a c t beyond 1935;"

The acceptance of the i d e a o f a committee would have

meant the d e l a y i n g o f a s i n c e r e rapprochement between France

and Germany beyond 1935. p o i n c a r e at t h i s time seemed to

f a v o r the p l a n of an immediate settlement r a t h e r than the

c r e a t i o n of machinery which would serve t o prolong h o s t i l i t y

by r a i s i n g p o i n t s of c o n t e n t i o n between the two c o u n t r i e s .

The l e g a l i t y o f the committee was questioned and a board of

j u r i s t s decided t h a t b r i a n d had no l e g a l r i g h t to demand a

committee o f t h i s type a c c o r d i n g to the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s '

and that? the problem of Rhineland s u p e r v i s i o n should be left

i n the hands o f a committee c r e a t e d under the Locarno Agree-

3
ments. The B r i t i s h and B e l g i a n governments had announced

t h a t t h e i r troops would be withdrawn by the end of the year

1929. T h i s p l a i n l y p l a c e d the onus on B r i a n d . On the finan-

c i a l q u e s t i o n , he remained adamant i n s i s t i n g " i l ne f a i t au-

4 1

cune c o n c e s s i o n . " U n t i l a s a t i s f a c t o r y f i n a n c i a l settlement

1. A r t i c l e 429, c l a u s e 3 p r o v i d e d f o r c o n t i n u a t i o n of the oc-

c u p a t i o n i f Germany had not f u l f i l l e d her o b l i g a t i o n s .
Stresemann's appeal f o r j u s t i c e obtained much support
both from many French people and o u t s i d e of France as
well.

2. V a l l i n , C h a r l e s , L*Occupation F r a n c a i s e Des Pays Rhenans,

Revue P o l i t i q u e et p a r l e m e n t a i r e , Tome 148, 10 Octobre,
1929, p. 124; He maintains t h a t continued o c c u p a t i o n
had become an anachronism and would be d i f f i c u l t to
defend.

3* Toynbee, op* c i t . , p:. 180.

4. Anon*, La Conference de l a Haye, L'Europe JMouvelle,

No. 602, 24 Aout, 1929, p. 1131.
 94

had. been reached, he r e f u s e d t o t i e France down t o a d e f i n i t e

date f o r evacuation. He i n s i s t e d t h a t i n the settlement the

Young P l a n should be c o n s i d e r e d as i n d i v i s i b l e , i f i t were

1

not i t would be tantamount to d e m o l i t i o n . A t the Hague the

B r i t i s h C h a n c e l l o r o f the Exchequer, Philip Snowden,insisted

upon a l a r g e r share o f the R e p a r a t i o n payments f o r B r i t a i n

which demand was oonceded by B r i a n d o n l y a f t e r Snowden gave

vent t o a great show of rage which one French w r i t e r says

2
compromised the f i n a n c i a l s e o u r i t y o f the B r i t i s h Empire.
An agreement was reached between the B r i t i s h , B e l g i a n , Ger-
3

man, French, I t a l i a n and Japanese delegations. I n the Cham-

ber o f Deputies the c r y was r a i s e d that B r i a n d had compromised

the s e c u r i t y o f France; M. F r a n k l i n - B o u i l l o n s t a t e d that Ger-

many was a l r e a d y at work b u i l d i n g r a i l r o a d s f o r m i l i t a r y pur-

' 4
poses near the French f r o n t i e r . I n view of the f a c t t h a t the
5

new French war budget brought i n at t h i s time by M. Maginot—.

the m i n i s t e r o f war, set a s i d e 4,567,000,000 f r a n c s f o r war

purposes, 2,900,000,000 o f which was f o r a new l i n e of f o r t i -

f i c a t i o n s a l o n g the Rhine f r o n t i e r , the French government

1. Huddleston, S i s l e y , The Hague, New Statesman, v o l . 33,
No* 850, August 10, 1929, p. 546.

2. Anon., L'Accord de p r i n c i p e a l a Haye, L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

NO. 603, 31 Aout.,, 1929, p. 1151.

3. Documents o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1929, p. 4.

4; Le Temps, December 19, 1929, c i t e d by Toynbee, op. cit.,

1929, p. 187.

5. Anon., More Armaments f o r F r a n c e , Manchester u u a r d i a n

Weekly, v o l . 22, No. 1, January 3, 1930, p. 10.
 95

seemed to be q u i t e aware o f any danger. B r i a n d r e p l i e d to

h i s accusers t h a t this, was no time to be c r i t i c i s i n g the lack

o f measures o f s e c u r i t y - - " . . . p o u r q u o i done n'ont e l l e s pas

ete i n s c r i t e s dans l a t r a i t e ' d e V e r s a i l l e s ? Pourquoi?" This

r e t o r t was q u i t e j u s t i f i e d f o r B r i a n d had had no p a r t i n the

making o f t h a t t r e a t y owing to the hatred w i t h which he was

2

regarded by Glemenceau. B r i a n d had to take c r i t i c i s m even

from h i s own p e r s o n a l supporters f o r h i s acceptance of a

post under T a r d i e u , but l i k e Stresemann, B r i a n d would work

3

w i t h any man f o r the sake of f u r t h e r i n g h i s p o l i c y . Both

men were to a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent above p a r t y . T a r d i e u sup-

ported B r i a n d but when the death o f Stresemann took p l a c e he

f e a r e d t h a t the n a t i o n a l i s t r e a c t i o n i n Germany would r e s u l t

In an i n c r e a s e i n the t e n s i o n between Germany and France.

France e a g e r l y awaited the r e s u l t o f a vote taken by the Ger-

man n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r , iiugenberg, based on the rejection

o f the Young P l a n and i n a g e n e r a l d i s a p p r o v a l o f Franco-

4

German n e g o t i a t i o n s . The people r e j e c t e d i t by an 86fo v o t e .

As a r e s u l t the new S o c i a l Democratic F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , Dr.

1. Documents of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1 9 2 9 , p. 5 9 .
E x t r a c t s from Speech o f M. B r i a n d on F o r e i g n P o l i c y
i n the Chamber, December 2 7 , 1 9 2 9 .

2. L l o y d George, The T r u t h About the Peace T r e a t i e s , v o l . 1,

p. 5 8 1 .

3. D'Abernon, I V i s c o u n t ) , Stresemann, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,
, v o l . 8, No. 2, January 1 9 3 0 , p. 2 0 8 .

4. Anon., France and Germany, Round Table, v o l . 2 1 , June 1 9 3 1 ,

p. 5 0 6 .
 96

Curtinis was a b l e t o decree t h e endorsement o f the Young F l a n

1
and t h e agreements made a t The Hague. The r a t i f i c a t i o n o f
2
the F r e n c h Chamber o f Deputies was obtained on A p r i l 4, 1930

and soon a f t e r T a r d i e u Informed t h e German ambassador a t P a r i s

t h a t the French t r o o p s would be e n t i r e l y withdrawn. This

was completed by the t h i r t i e t h o f June.

The vote i n the Chamber o f Deputies was a vote i n f a v o r

o f the p o l i c y o f B r i a n d . I t a l s o s i g n i f i e d t h a t the French

government had c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e p a c i f i c s p i r i t o f t h e 'Ger-

man people and i n the good f a i t h o f the German government.

But what guarantees o f s e c u r i t y were l e f t f o r France after

the e v a c u a t i o n o f t h e Rhineland? M. T i r a r d , the French High

Commissioner i n the Rhineland s a i d that the withdrawal o f

French t r o o p s removed " l e d e r n i e r , l e s e u l o b s t a c l e an r a p -

prochement a 1*entente s i n c e r e et d e f i n i t i v e e n t r e l a France

- 4

et l'Allemagne." There were the Locarno F a c t s and the B r i a n d -

K e l l o g g Pact, w h i c h , i f h o n e s t l y adhered to,would p r o v i d e ample

security. But c o u l d t h e y be h o n e s t l y adhered'to? There were

p o w e r f u l elements i n France which b e l i e v e d t h a t several

1. German Freedom, Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 22,

No. 11, March 14, 19 30, p. 207.

2. Fayen, Edouard, Le Douzieme D ' A v r i l , La R a t i f i c a t i o n du

F l a n Young, P a r i s , J o u r n a l - d e s liconomistes, Tome 96,
A v r i l , 1930, p. 3.

3. Huddleston, S i s l e y , French F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Contemporary

Review, v o l . 140, J u l y 1931, p. 1.

4* Anon., line ide c l a r a t i o n de M. T i r a r d sur 1'evacuation de

l a Rhenanie, L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 642, 31 M a i ,
1930, p. 830.. .
thousand s o l d i e r s on the Rhine were f a r b e t t e r s e c u r i t y f o r

France than a hundred F a c t s . "C'est notre armee q u i , par sa

s e u l e e x i s t e n c e r e m p l i t l e r o l e de l a gendarmerie inter-

national, q u i l ' o n a r e f u s e ' a l a socie'te des i M a t i o n s . " Yet

France had taken the s t e p . The R h i n e l a n d had been evacuated

and whether Frenchmen thought t h e i r f r o n t i e r was the Rhine

or the V i s t u l a was o f no matter now. I f the growing f o r c e s

o f the r e a c t i o n a r y elements won out i n Germany there was t h e

r a p i d l y r i s i n g Maginot l i n e o f f o r t i f i c a t i o n s b u t
/ i f the

moderates remained i n c o n t r o l and r e a s o n triumphed then the

p o l i c y o f B r i a n d would be v i n d i c a t e d .

1. Dumont-Wilden, L*, L a France Accusee, Revue Bleue,

No. 22, 15 Novembre, 1930, p. 696*
 CHAPTER V.

FRANCE AND THE YEARS OF CRISIS, 1929-1932

 CHAPTER V.

FRANCS AND THE YEARS OF CRISIS. 1929-1932

The e v a c u a t i o n o f the Rhineland by the occupying forces

removed one o f the most p r e s s i n g causes of b i t t e r n e s s between

France and Germany. B r i a n d w i t h h i s great knowledge of Eur-

opean a f f a i r s r e a l i z e d the t e r r i f y i n g weakness o f the rela-

t i o n s h i p s o f European n a t i o n s and f e l t that a f u r t h e r e f f o r t

should be made to strengthen those bonds already e x i s t e n t *

To t h i s end he i n t r o d u c e d to the t e n t h meeting of the League

1
Assembly a p l a n f o r c l o s e r c o o p e r a t i o n between European

nations* A l r e a d y numerous pacts had been made between the

n a t i o n s , a l l p r o f e s s e d l y aiming at the p r e v e n t i o n of any fut-

ure war. As B r i a n d s a i d , " I t h i n k t h a t among peoples con-

s t i t u t i n g g e o g r a p h i c a l groups, l i k e the peoples o f Europe,

there should be some k i n d of F e d e r a l bond; i t should be pos-

s i b l e f o r them to get i n touch at any time, to confer about

t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , to agree on j o i n t r e s o l u t i o n s and to es-

t a b l i s h among themselves a bond o f s o l i d a r i t y which w i l l

enable them, i f need be, to meet any grave emergency which
2
might a r i s e . " T h i s p r o p o s a l on the p a r t of B r i a n d was not

o r i g i n a l w i t h him. During the Great War o f 1914-1918 F r i e d -

r i c h Naumann p u b l i s h e d a book " M i t t e l Suropa? which had a

g r e a t c i r c u l a t i o n i n C e n t r a l Europe* During the decade

1. September 5, 1929.

2* Toynbee, op. c i t * , 1930, p. 136.

98
 99

f o l l o w i n g the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s one of the most important

a p o s t l e s o f the Fan-Europe i d e a was Count Coudenhove-nalergi,

a d i s t i n g u i s h e d A u s t r i a n p u b l i c i s t , who by h i s great qualities

1

o f p e r s o n a l i t y helped keep the i d e a a l i v e . Commenting on the

i n f l u e n c e which Coudenhove-Jiaiergi had on B r i a n d , A l f r e d

Duff Cooper remarks, " . . . I had known...that he was working

on plans f o r the f e d e r a t i o n o f European n a t i o n s which was

known as the Fan-Europa movement and t h a t he had gained the

.support o f no l e s s a person than A r i s t i d e B r i a n d ; . . . " With

t h i s support the movement took on a new importance. Of the

great French statesman's a c t i o n , Count Coudenhove-Jialergi

wrote, "Une f o i s accomplie l a l i q u i d a t i o n d e f i n i t i v e de l a

guerre...l'Europe se trouve en f a c e de l a d e o i s i o n siuvante;

ou b i e n retomber dans l e systeme des a l l i a n c e s et des contre-

a l l i a n c e s , qui i l ya quinze ans a conduit a l a guerre N

mon-

d i a l e , ou b i e n se r e u n i r en un s e u l b l o c , a f i n de c o n s t i t u e r ,
3

par l a c o l l a b o r a t i o n de t o u t e s l e s n a t i o n s * . . . " His proposal

found a f a v o r a b l e r e c e p t i o n on a l l s i d e s and t h i s encouraged

him t o seek the concrete views of twenty-six European n a t i o n s

1. Amery, L . S. IThe Right Hon.), The B r i t i s h Empire and the

Pan-European Idea, London, j o u r n a l of the K o y a l I n s t i -
t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . IX., No. 1,
January, 1930, p. 1.

2* Cooper, A. Duff, The Second World War, London, Jonathan

Cape, 1939, p. 92.

3. Dumont-Wilden, L., Les S t a t s - U n i s D»Europe, Revue Bleue,

No. 16, 7 Aout, 1929, p. 508.
Count Coudenhove-Jialergi i n v o s s i s c h e - Z e i t u n g i s
cited.
 100

through a "Memorandum d'Union F e d e r a l e Europeenne" dispatched

1

on May 17, 1930.

P r i o r to h i s advocacy o f the i d e a of a European Federa-

tion, Briand s 1
work i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i e l d had been l a r g e -

l y negative i n c h a r a c t e r , t h a t i s , he u t i l i z e d h i s great qual-

i t i e s to the smoothing away o f d i f f i c u l t i e s which beset post-

war Europe, he was always, however, working f o r the s e c u r i t y

of France. By the p l a n f o r a u n i t e d S t a t e s of Europe he

hoped to s t r e n g t h e n t h a t s e c u r i t y and yet t o make a move t o -

wards the g o a l he had envisioned—the eventual political

union o f n a t i o n s i n c o n t i n e n t a l Europe through t h e i r immediate

economic union*

In l o o k i n g at t h i s p r o p o s a l put forward by B r i a n d from

the stand-point of s e c u r i t y there i s one important factor

which must be r e c a l l e d , namely, the a t t i t u d e of European

n a t i o n s towards, the u n i t e d S t a t e s o f America. For s e v e r a l

years i t had been f e l t i n Europe t h a t the American n a t i o n

c o n s t i t u t e d a d i s t i n c t menace t o the s e c u r i t y o f European
2
peoples. M. Dumont-Wilden, an a u t h o r i t a t i v e French c r i t i c ,

w r i t e s t h a t although B r i a n d has warned t h a t t h i s proposed

F e d e r a t i o n must not be i n t e r p r e t e d as being d i r e c t e d against

the u n i t e d S t a t e s , t h i s p r o j e c t i s i n t e r p r e t e d by a great

number o f Europeans "comme une reponse au berger a l a bergere

1. Text i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , S p e c i a l b u l l e t i n ,
. June, 1930, p. 325

2. Aron, Robert and Dandieu, Armaud, America: Europe's

Cancer, L i v i n g Age, v o l . 341, October, 1931, p. 117.
( t r a n s l a t e d from "Europe".)
 101

l'Amerique, m a i t r e s s e du t r e s o r m e ^ a l l i q u e du monde manifeste

1 ' i n t e n t i o n de c o l o n i s e r l a v i e l l e Europe, ou du moins de l a

r e q u i r e a une s o r t e de v a s s a l i t e ' economique v e r s l a q u e l l e l e

1
p l a n Young n'est qu'un premier pas." I n 1930, European n a t i o n s
purchased goods t o the value o f §21,341,000,000 from the

united States and American c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d i n Europe amounted

2
to $650,000,000. T h i s heavy f i n a n c i a l h o l d which the u n i t e d

S t a t e s was g e t t i n g i n Europe was p a r t l y due t o the f a c t t h a t

3
Europeans had become f a s c i n a t e d by American l i f e . An attempt

was made t o draw a p a r a l l e l between the u n i t e d s t a t e s and

Europe. I f , w i t h her v a s t h i n t e r l a n d and no i n t e r n a l t a r i f f s ,

the u n i t e d S t a t e s could become so prosperous, s u r e l y European

4

n a t i o n s c o u l d e l i m i n a t e t h e i r t a r i f f s and do t h e same. Only

the sober t h i n k e r s r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e s t a t e s o f Europe could

not be u n i t e d without t h e peoples, t h a t passports and f r o n -

t i e r s are o n l y outward s i g n s , t h a t t h e i n n e r substance, the

national s p i r i t i s the f a c t o r which makes peoples r e a l l y dif-

ferent* i n America i n d u s t r y i s homogeneous, p r o d u c t i o n i s

devoted t o no p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , b u t i n Europe t h e

1. Dumont-Wilden, L. jLes'Etats-unis D'Europe, op. c i t . ,

No. 16, 17 Aout, 1929, p. 508.-

2* B i d w e l l , r . W., The New American T a r i f f : Europe's

Answer, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 9, No. 1, October, 1930,
p* 13.

3. Luddecke, Theodor, Germany Goes American, L i v i n g Age,

v o l . 338, duly 1, 1930, p* 544. ( t r a n s l a t e d from
R e v i s t a de Occidente o f Madrid.)

4. Mitrany,. David, i-an-Europe—A Hope o r a Danger, London,

P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 1, No. 4, 1930, p. 457.
 102

n a t i o n a l s o f d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s are engaged i n a v a r i e t y o f

p r o d u c t i o n , the nature o f which has been e s t a b l i s h e d through

1

many y e a r s o f t r a d i t i o n , p o s s i b l y i n France, above a l l coun-

t r i e s , have craftsmen been b i t t e r opponents to s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n

and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n i n d u s t r y . J u s t as a man raises his

arm to ward o f f a blow so does a country use the t a r i f f to

protect i t s trade, i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y possible that fear

oould be turned i n t o t r u s t and r i v a l r y i n t o cooperation,

however, as some non-European n a t i o n s have a g r e a t e r volume

of t r a d e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l European c o u n t r i e s than those coun-

t r i e s have w i t h each o t h e r , i t would be very d i f f i c u l t t o

e r e c t a European F e d e r a t i o n without i n c l u d i n g these n a t i o n s .

T h i s would defeat one o f the b a s i c purposes o f the F e d e r a t i o n - -

i t would g i v e the u n i t e d s t a t e s of America even a g r e a t e r

h o l d i n European markets.

The r e p l y o f o f f i c i a l Germany to the Memorandum con-

veyed t o B r i a n d the concurrence o f Stresemann i n the p r o p o s a l

2

i n s o f a r as economic u n i o n was concerned, he saw i n the p l a n

a means whereby Germany's recovery c o u l d be advanced through

p r o t e c t i o n f o r her i n d u s t r i e s and the i n c r e a s e d markets which

would r e s u l t from a lowering o f t a r i f f b a r r i e r s by her n e i g h -

bors. However, the, n o n - o f f i c i a l German p r e s s saw a s i n i s t e r

1. Madariaga, S a l v a d o r de, Our Muddling World, Forum, v o l .

83, January .1, 1930, p. 9. He mentions the wine and
dress i n d u s t r y as being good examples.

2. Anon., Reponse du gouvernement allemand, L'Europe

N o u v e l l e , Mo. 659, 27 Septembre, 1930, p. 1388.
 103

motive behind the p l a n , i t was i n t e r p r e t e d as a new diplo-

matic move to strengthen the hegemony o f the French R e p u b l i c

1

i n i t s e f f o r t s to dominate c o n t i n e n t a l Europe. The moderate

French press, on the other hand, a s s e r t e d t h a t the p l a n was

simply an e f f o r t to get back to the p r o t o c o l o f 1924, but of

t h i s view i t can be said that i t proves t h a t French p o l i c y

has not changed, i t was an attempt to o b t a i n guarantees,

perhaps of a p a c i f i c type, yet still they were guarantees.

Briand speaks i n h i s Memorandum o f agreements or s e c u r i t y as

a v i t a l n e c e s s i t y before economic u n i t y could be achieved,

it i s f a i r l y obvious t h a t he i s t h i n k i n g o f s e c u r i t y i n the

French sense, because he o n l y too w e l l knows t h a t the British

and F r e n c h view o f the use of s a n c t i o n s are at complete var-

iance. The
B r i t i s h government was c r i t i c i z e d f o r i t s c o o l
2
r e p l y to the Memorandum but i t was f e l t i n ^ r e a t B r i t a i n that
the p l a n o f B r i a n d would cause an unnecessary d u p l i c a t i o n of
3

the League machinery and was i n addition a disguised attempt

by B r i a n d to i n c r e a s e French s e c u r i t y .

1. Hanotaux, G a b r i e l , Le P r o j e c t D'Union Europe'ene, Revue

des Deux Mondes, Tome 58, 15 Aout, 1930, p. 766,
c i t i n g B e r l i n e r Tageblatt.

Stone, W. T., The B r i a n d F l a n f o r European Union, F o r e i g n

P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , v o l . VI* No. 14,
September 17, 1930, p. 261*

2. Anon*, Europe Meets H i a n d Half-way, IMew York, N a t i o n ,

r

v o l . 131, Wo. 3395, J u l y , 1930, p. 112.

3. Anon*, Reponse du gouvernement B r i t a n n i q u e , L'Europe

N o u v e l l e , No. 659, 27 Septembre, 1930, p. 1397.
 104

On March EO, 1931, the news t h a t A u s t r i a and Germany

intended to consummate an economic union e l e c t r i f i e d Europe.

I t had been r e a l i z e d from the nature of the r e p l i e s r e c e i v e d

by B r i a n d from European n a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y t h a t i n p r o t e c t i o n -
1

i s t Europe economic union among most n a t i o n s was impossible.

Yet the b i t t e r d e n u n c i a t i o n which B r i a n d accorded the proposed

Austro-German move r e v e a l e d t h a t i n the mind o f B r i a n d even

the broad v i s i o n o f economic union i n Europe was secondary to

French s e c u r i t y . Yet economic union was the very p o l i c y which

B r i a n d had been u r g i n g f o r Europe. In a d d i t i o n the principle

of r e g i o n a l economic agreements had a l r e a d y been endorsed by

i
the supporters of European union at the 1930 Assembly o f the

League. Whether the move had been premeditated or not by Dr.

C u r t i u s , the 0- rman F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r and

e his Austrian counter-

p a r t , Dr. Schober, i s o f l i t t l e consequence; i t d i d put Briand

i n a very awkward p o s i t i o n . I t gave Europe, e s p e c i a l l y the

r e v i s i o n i s t c o u n t r i e s , the p r e r o g a t i v e of doubting Briand*s

sincerity. However, i t should be s a i d i n h i s f a v o r t h a t he

might have been i n f l u e n c e d somewhat i n h i s stand by P C Benes

of C z e c h o - S l o v a k i a . Germany and A u s t r i a formed the g r e a t e s t

markets f o r Czecho-Slovakian goods so t h a t any union which

those two n a t i o n s might consummate v/ould l i k e l y be a s e r i o u s

blow commercially to Czecho-Slovakia.

A r i s t i d e B r i a n d was a realistic idealist, his ideal was

1. S o r e l , R., F e d e r a t i o n europeenne, F a r i s , J o u r n a l des
E*conomistes, Tome 97, Octobre, 1930, p. 198.
 105

the United States o f Europe. H i s r e a l i s m l a y i n the use

of t h i s union as a means f o r g a i n i n g further security for

France. However, l e a d e r s o f Germany and A u s t r i a were r e a l -

i s t s as w e l l . Yet when they t r i e d to s o l v e a problem which

faced t h e i r two c o u n t r i e s without c o n s u l t i n g France, Briand

l o s t some o f h i s i d e a l i s m . His vigorous denunciation of

A n s c h l u s s l e d to i t s r e f e r e n c e to the Permanent Oourt o f In-

ternational Justice. A r u l i n g was given by which i t was de-

clared i l l e g a l . T h i s d e c i s i o n was based on A r t i c l e 88 of

the T r e a t y of S t . Germain and the Geneva P r o t o c o l o f October

1
4, 1922. By the l a t t e r A u s t r i a promised to undertake no

agreements which would endanger her economic independence.

The d e c i s i o n against the Union was g i v e n by a group of eight

judges which i n c l u d e d French, P o l i s h , Rumanian and Italian.

With the exception o f the I t a l i a n , a l l the o t h e r leading

s t a t e s v o t i n g a g a i n s t .Anschluss were c l o s e l y connected w i t h

France. B r i t i s h and American judges voted i n favor of the

2
Union* T h i s d e c i s i o n weakened the p r e s t i g e of t h i s Court.

Some E n g l i s h comment was particularly caustic. The Spectator

remarked t h a t " i t was a choice between the s a f e t y of the

T r e a t i e s and the s a f e t y o f Europe. E v i d e n t l y the sanctity

1. Dean, V e r a M i c h e l e s , European E f f o r t s f o r Economic

C o l l a b o r a t i o n , F o r e i g n p o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n Information
S e r v i c e , v o l . V I I . , No. 12, August 19, 1931, p. 233.

2. Glasgow, George, Germany, The Hague and Disarmament,

Contemporary Review, v o l . 140, October, 1931,
p. 522.
 106
., 1
o f the T r e a t i e s won out." The tone o f the French press was

•just as sharp from the opposite side. The writer."Pertinax"

2

c a l l e d f o r Briand*s removal from o f f i c e . However, the lat-

t e r * s apparent success r e s u l t e d i n the r e t i r e m e n t o f Dr. Cur-

t i u s i n d i s g r a c e and h i s departure from o f f i c e marked the end

3
o f the p o l i c y of Stresemann i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . National
4
S o c i a l i s m was on the ascendant i n Germany. The German n a t i o n
was undergoing a f a r - r e a c h i n g t r a n s f o r m a t i o n * Only two years

had passed s i n c e the r e a c t i o n a r y referendum of Hugenherg was

so soundly defeated and now many m i l l i o n s i n Germany "run

a f t e r any r a t - c a t c h e r as i f he were 'the P i e d - P i p e r of Hamlin*

or e l s e they go i n t o e c s t a c i e s over t i n s e l - d e c k e d m i l i t a r y
5
f i g u r e s * " Such was the Germany under the growing power o f

the groups of r e a c t i o n .

" T i l l France can change her s p i r i t , " wrote d. S t . Loe

6
Strachey i n 1923, "Europe cannot r e c o v e r . " T h i s same comment

1; Anon., Germany and Europe, London, S p e c t a t o r , vol. 146,

dune 13, 1931.

2* P e r t i n a x , B r i a n d Must Go, L i v i n g Age, v o l * 339, November

1930, p. 240. ( t r a n s l a t e d from Echo de P a r i s . ]

3. C a r r ; E. H. I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s s i n c e the Peace
T r e a t i e s , London, Macmillan, 1938, p. 139.

4; Glasgow, George, The German C r i s i s , Contemporary Review,

v o l . 138, November, 1930, p. 653.
N a z i s gained 12 seats i n 1928, 107 i n 1930.

5; W o l f f , Theodor, The Republic W i l l L i v e , L i v i n g Age,, v o l .

339, November, 1930, p. 237* ( t r a n s l a t e d from
Berliner Tageblatt.j

6. Strachey, J". S t . Loe, R e p a r a t i o n s and Debts, Spectator,

v o l . 130, dune 23, 1923, p i 1032*
 107

might have been made o f the France o f the years of crisis.

Frenchmen looked askance at the changes t a k i n g p l a c e i n Ger-

many. T h e i r f e e l i n g was marked by deep s u s p i c i o n . In 1930

the German s t a t e insurance fund f a c e d a d e f i c i t o f £20,000,000

and an e x t r a fc20,000,000 was needed f o r s p e c i a l r e l i e f and

1
unemployment schemes* One French Senator, l o o k i n g at the
s i t u a t i o n i n Germany asked how i n face o f the d i r e f i n a n c i a l
s t r e s s i n Germany could the budget f o r the Reichswehr be i n -
creased from 178,000,000 marks i n 1929 to 197,000,000 i n
2

1930. The f a i l u r e o f the p o l i c y o f Stresemann combined w i t h

the s t r i n g e n t economic c o n d i t i o n s l e d t o a d e c l i n e i n the power

o f the S o c i a l Democratic p a r t y . A corresponding increase i n

the s t r e n g t h of the extreme elements, the N a t i o n a l Socialists,

3

took p l a c e . Behind the growing s t r e n g t h o f these two groups

the broadening shadow o f the Reichswehr became apparent. All

Frenchmen were d i s t u r b e d by these c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n Germany,

y e t , l i k e i n the days b e f o r e Locarno, elements f a v o r a b l e t o

compromise came to the f o r e i n France. The French people

were i n a prosperous c o n d i t i o n . "La France est un e'den. Nos

r e s e r v e s d'or notre epaigne r e c o n s t i t u e a , notre industries sans

1. L l o y d , G. M i , The Edge o f the P r e c i p i c e , New Statesman
and N a t i o n , v o l ; 1, No. 6, (new s e r i e s ) , June 13,
1931, p. 569.

2. E c c a r d , F r e d e r i c , Le' Budget M i l i t a i r e Allemand en 1930,

Revue P o l i t i q u e et P a r l e m e n t a i r e , Tome 144, 16 Juille.t,
1930, p. 2.

3. Dobb, Maurice, The C r i s i s i n Germany, London, Labour

Monthly, v o l ; 13, August, 1931, p. 491.
 108

chomage, n o t r e p o p u l a t i o n de bon sens content d'une p o l i t i q u e

e x t e r i e u r e t r a n q u i l l e , autour de b i e n s r a r e s aux regards

d'une Europe sans argent et sans t r a v a i l en de grandes r e -

1

g i o n s , minee d'armes c l a n d e s t i n e s . ' ;

These moderate f o r c e s

put forward p r o p o s a l s f o r a c t i v e Franco-American c o o p e r a t i o n

i n a f i n a n c i a l e f f o r t to help stave o f f the f i n a n c i a l dis-

a s t e r i n Europe which a l l f e l t to be impending. l e t the

statesmen i n France were not s u f f i c i e n t l y convinced t h a t they

should advance funds to help the great J i r e d i t - A n s t a l d t , when

A u s t r i a so r e c e n t l y t r i e d .to endanger French s e c u r i t y through

the Anschluss p r o p o s a l . French a s s i s t a n c e was offered to

A u s t r i a o n l y at the cost o f i m p o s s i b l e p o l i t i c a l concessions*

B r i t a i n came to the a i d o f A u s t r i a n f i n a n c e w i t h an o u t r i g h t

l o a n which staved o f f the t o t a l c o l l a p s e of the bank u n t i l the

2

A u s t r i a n government c o u l d take i t over. The e f f e c t o f these

d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t h i s A u s t r i a n bank r e s u l t e d i n a g e n e r a l l a c k

of confidence i n other c o u n t r i e s b o r d e r i n g on f i n a n c i a l panic

and only the p r o p o s a l of p r e s i d e n t Hoover of a y e a r s ' mora-

t o r i u m prevented a p o s s i b l e European f i n a n c i a l c o l l a p s e . In

view o f the f a c t t h a t the French f e l t they had made a major,

s a c r i f i c e under the Young F l a n t h e y o b j e c t e d to i t s b e i n g set

a s i d e i n t h i s manner, i n a statement before the Chamber of

Deputies B r i a n d had s t a t e d t h a t the Young F l a n was a final

1. Anon., La P r o s p e r i t e ' d e l a France, L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

1MO. 675, 17 J a n v i e r , 1931, p. 68.

2. Anon., ( e d i t o r i a l ) , L i v i n g Age, v o l . 340, No. 4379,

August, 1931, p. 527.
 109
1
settlement. Hence he came i n f o r much abuse when i t was

l e a r n e d t h a t the Hoover Moratorium would n e c e s s i t a t e what was

s t a t e d to be a temporary postponement o f the Young P l a n , but

what was f e l t by a l l would be permanent i n view of world con-

ditions. Even, the S o c i a l i s t s i n the Chamber v o t e d s o l i d l y

f o r the government i n i t s d e n u n c i a t i o n of the manner i n which

2

the moratorium was proposed; Prance a l r e a d y had aroused

world h o s t i l i t y over her a t t i t u d e i n the K r e d i t - A u s t a l d t pro-

blem and v i r t u a l i s o l a t i o n was not an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . However,

one French w r i t e r observed t h a t , " i f there could be no pros-

perity i n Europe without p r o s p e r i t y i n Germany, there can be

3

no p r o s p e r i t y i n Germany without o r i n s p i t e of Prance."

The eventual concurrence o f Prance i n the Hoover Moratorium

came too l a t e to be o f much h e l p . The psychological improve-

ment which had followed the announcement of the moratorium

had d i s s i p a t e d and i n the month which f o l l o w e d conditions in

Germany became so d i f f i c u l t that t h a t country had practically

to d e c l a r e a moratorium on her short-term loans. T h i s had a

s e r i o u s r e a c t i o n i n England, which country had heavy i n v e s t s

4
ments i n Germany. England's f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e was endangered.
1; Anon., M. B r i a n d * s D e c l a r a t i o n , Manchester Guardian Week-
l y , v o l ; 24, No. 24, June 12, 1931, p. 464.

2. Anon*, French Stand on the Hoover P r o p o s a l , London,

S t a t i s t , v o l ; CXVIII., No. 2784, duly 4, 1931, p. 14;

3. Loc. c i t . , c i t i n g M. Gignoux i n dournee Industrielle.

4. Armstrong, H. F., France and!the Hoover F l a n , F o r e i g n

A f f a i r s , v o l . 10, No. 1, October, 1931, p. 30.
Great B r i t a i n had 1,800,000,000 marks i n v e s t e d i n Ger-
many* France had 300,000,000 marks i n v e s t e d , a c o n s i d -
e r a b l e p a r t being through Great B r i t a i n .
 110

Although the B r i t i s h withdrawal from the g o l d standard

was the f i r s t major defeat r e c e i v e d by France i n her progress

towards n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y through f i n a n c i a l dom-

inance i n Europe yet t h i s set-back was more than counter-

balanced by other successes achieved by the French. I n the

south-east Hungary was f o r c e d to d i s c o n t i n u e her accord w i t h

Italy; The Hungarian government c o u l d get no f i n a n c i a l a i d

from e i t h e r I t a l y or Great B r i t a i n * I t had t o meet the p r i c e

.1

o f the French. T h i s can be regarded as a great triumph f o r

Briand's I t a l i a n p o l i c y i n i t i a t e d s h o r t l y a f t e r Locarno.

France had become undisputed a r b i t e r o f Balkan f i n a n c e through

her monetary p o s i t i o n i n Europe. T u r n i n g to the New World we

see, the u n i t e d s t a t e s f o r c e d to bow t o the d i c t a t e s o f L a v a l

under t h r e a t o f t a k i n g measures which might r e s u l t i n the c o l -

l a p s e of the d o l l a r . The French statesman l e f t 7/ashington

w i t h Mr. Hoover's promise to grant France a free hand i n Eur-

opean f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s upon the e x p i r y o f the Hoover Mora-

2

t o r i u m on June 1, 1932. The most d i s c o r d a n t note from the

French p o i n t of view was Senator Borah's i n s i s t e n c e that the

best guarantee of French s e c u r i t y would be the r e v i s i o n of

3
the Feace T r e a t y o f 1919. The whole French p o l i t i c a l and
1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1931, p* 100 f f .

2* Anon*, Re'sultats de c i n q j o u r s aux E t a t s - U n i s , L'Europe

N o u v e l l e , No. 717, 7 Novembre, 1931, p. 1487.

3. Anon., The Franco-American Discussions, S t a t i s t ,

v o l . CXYIII.., No. 2801, October 31, 1931,
p. 592.
 Ill

f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y aimed t o prevent any f u r t h e r d e s t r u c t i o n of

the s a c r e d documents which formed this treaty.

Why, i t might be asked, c o u l d France pursue t h i s appar-

e n t l y extremely s e l f i s h p o l i c y ? The answer can be found i n

the f a c t t h a t she was apparently s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . The pros-

p e r i t y o f *jreat B r i t a i n depended l a r g e l y on the p r o s p e r i t y

of the w o r l d , but i n P a r i s t h i s g r e a t f i n a n c i a l success l e d

to t h e development of the b e l i e f t h a t France c o u l d aggravate

the world w i t h p e r f e c t equanimity as any consequences would

leave her comparatively u n a f f e c t e d . Franco-Rumania r e l a t i o n s

presented a p a r t i c u l a r l y g l a r i n g example of the French system.

In Romania the French government allowed the f a i l u r e of one

1
of the l a r g e s t banks t o take p l a c e , because i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
f r i e n d l y t o K i n g C a r o l , was f a v o r a b l e t o the f u r t h e r i n g of the
2

German c o n n e c t i o n r a t h e r than the F r e n c h . Yet the "spider

and f l y " p o l i c y o f the French would not permit the c r i s i s to

go too f a r , f o r thus i t would endanger French i n t e r e s t s . The

French exports t o the whole o f the Danubian countries, amounted

to o n l y a s m a l l f r a c t i o n of the n a t i o n a l t r a d e but French se-

c u r i t y r e q u i r e d t h a t a keen i n t e r e s t i n Balkan economic and

political l i f e be m a i n t a i n e d . The t h r e a t to French s e c u r i t y

was o f f a r g r e a t e r scope than merely the q u e s t i o n o f f i n a n c e .

That was but the l e v e r . The main concern o f France was to

1; Banca Marmorosch and Co., L t d .

2. Armstrong, H. F., Danubia: R e l i e f or Ruin, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 10, No. 4 , . J u l y , 1932, p. 610.
7 /o of French exports went t o the Balkan area i n 1927-28.
u
 112

use Rumania as a means to prevent Germany and R u s s i a from be-

coming too f r i e n d l y . I t was the drench ambition to i s o l a t e

both Germany and R u s s i a . F o r c a p i t a l i s t i c France, Russia

c o n t r i b u t e d the most dangerous enemy o f the day. S i n c e the

days of R a p a l l o , Russo-German r e l a t i o n s had been comparatively

harmonious. Besides c o n s i d e r a b l e commercial c o n t a c t , German

o f f i c e r s had been a c t i v e i n t r a i n i n g the r e o r g a n i z e d Russian

army and the extent o f Reichswehr i n f l u e n c e i n the Red Army

1

was a constant source o f f e a r to the French. Russian f o r e i g n

p o l i c y s i n c e 1926 had been c o n s i s t e n t l y based on an o f f e r

f i r s t made i n t h a t year to guarantee h e r s e l f s e c u r i t y by the

c o n c l u s i o n o f non-aggression p a c t s w i t h whatever n a t i o n s would

c o n s i d e r i t to be i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s to enter one. It

was the aim of the French R a d i c a l S o c i a l i s t l e a d e r , H e r r i o t ,

to promote a settlement between R u s s i a and Rumania over the

disputed t e r r i t o r y of Bessarabia* H i s e f f o r t s brought a new

o r i e n t a t i o n t o French p o l i c y which showed a d i f f e r e n t view of

the problem o f s e c u r i t y .

When H e r r i o t became premier i n the s p r i n g o f 1932, his

a t t i t u d e towards R u s s i a showed the change i n o f f i c i a l French

policy. H i s e f f o r t s were completed by a F r a n c o - s o v i e t Pact

of Mon-rAggression o f which he s a i d , "The present t r e a t y com-

p l e t e s a whole s e r i e s of non-aggression t r e a t i e s which must

1. E c c a r d , Fre'derip, P o l i t i q u e De L'Allemagne et de l a
R u s s i e A L E g a r d De La France, Revue P o l i t i q u e et
f

P a r l e m e n t a i r e , v o l * 146, 10 Mars, 1931, p. 329.

 113
1
c o n t r i b u t e towards the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f peace." A Polish-

R u s s i a n non-aggression t r e a t y had been signed i n J u l y , 1932,

f o l l o w e d l a t e r by a c o n c i l i a t i o n convention. Herriot felt

i f he c o u l d encourage the Rumanian government t o come t o an

understanding w i t h R u s s i a over the problem o f B e s s a r a b i a the

g r e a t e r o e r t a i n t y o f peace which would r e s u l t would be a

means t o i n c r e a s e d s e c u r i t y f o r Prance.

N e g o t i a t i o n s towards a Russo-Rumanian understanding were

begun a t Warsaw between M. Cadere, the Rumanian m i n i s t e r a t

Warsaw and M. L i t v l n o f f . These n e g o t i a t i o n s were f r u i t l e s s ,

due some a u t h o r i t i e s s t a t e , t o the machination o f Andre' T a r -

d i e u , who hated H e r r i o t i n t e n s e l y , and the i d e a o f a Franco-

R u s s i a n rapprochement even more. Thus i t can be seen how i n -

t e r n a l a n i m o s i t i e s between p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s can be made t o

s e r i o u s l y disrupt French foreign p o l i c y . Somewhat the same

t a c t i c s had been used by H e r r i o t * s own R a d i c a l S o c i a l i s t

p a r t y t o s e r i o u s l y h i n d e r T a r d i e u i n h i s work at the London

N a v a l Conference, by b r i n g i n g about h i s temporary d e f e a t over

2

an i n t e r n a l f i n a n c i a l q u e s t i o n , i t i s one o f the p e c u l i a r -

i t i e s o f the French p o l i t i c a l system t h a t a government c a r r y -

i n g on a very important n e g o t i a t i o n i n the f o r e i g n sphere

can be brought down over a comparatively i n s i g n i f i c a n t phase

1. Anon., P a c t s o f Non-Aggression, Manchester Guardian

Weekly, v o l . 27, No. 23, December 2, 1932, p. 445.

2. Glasgow, George, A F r e n c h R e s p i t e , Contemporary .Review,

v o l . 137, A p r i l , 1930, p. 513.
 114
1
in internal policy, 'i'his f a i l u r e of F r e n c h p o l i c y t o encom-

pass the s i g n i n g o f the Non-Aggression Pact between R u s s i a

and Rumania was a d i s t i n c t blow t o the e f f o r t s o f some F r e n c h

statesmen to guard t h e i r e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r s because i t meant

defeat i n t h e i r p l a n t o complete the o i r c l e of c o u n t r i e s bound

to Franoe by promises not to make war;

What can be estimated as t h e b a s i c o b j e c t i v e behind

F r e n c h p o l i c y i n the y e a r s o f c r i s i s ? Frenoh eyes were still

d i r e c t e d a t Germany across the Rhine. The e f f o r t s t o b u i l d

up a u n i o n among the n a t i o n s of Europe as was e n v i s i o n e d by

B r i a n d f a i l e d and F r e n c h statesmen from then onward proceeded

to s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r country's s e c u r i t y through the establish-

ment o f the f i n a n c i a l hegemony o f F r a n c e . T h i s was supported

by non-aggression t r e a t i e s . I t was u n f o r t u n a t e that this

p o l i c y i n both i t s phases aroused only b i t t e r n e s s i n the Ger^

man people who naturally f e l t t h a t French e f f o r t s were aimed

at domination, i f not s t r a n g u l a t i o n , o f the German f i n a n o i a l

s t r u c t u r e and the e x c l u s i o n o f Germany from normal c o n t a c t s

w i t h her n e i g h b o r s . Such was the legaoy of s u s p i c i o n which

f o l l o w e d i n the wake o f the French s e a r c h f o r s e c u r i t y .

1. S i e g f r i e d , Andre', Tableau des P a r t i e s en France, P a r i s ,

Bernard G r a s s e t , 1930, p. 153 , f f .
 CHAPTER VI..

BRIAND AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT 1931-1952

 CHAPTER Y I .

BRIAND AND THE STRUGGLE POR DISARMAMENT. 1921-1952

"We are the hollow men

We are the stuffed, men
Leaning t o g e t h e r
Headpiece f i l l e d w i t h straw. Alasl...."
T. S. E l i o t , 1925.

S i n c e the c l o s e o f the Conferences which drew up the

T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s , the world has become accustomed to

w i t n e s s i n g two forms o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l g a t h e r i n g s whose pur-

p o r t was t o advance the cause of p e a c e — i n the f i r s t case the

meeting o f i d e a l i s t s without power and i n the second the meet-

1

ing o f r e a l i s t s without p r i n c i p l e s . These conferences and

meetings came i n the wake o f the Great War o f 1914-1918 when

the p a s s i o n s o f the great n a t i o n s of the w o r l d were unleashed

and the road towards the s e t t l e m e n t o f d i f f e r e n c e s was bound

to be a d i f f i c u l t one to t r a v e l . A l l peoples of the w o r l d

had s i n c e r e l y hoped t h a t the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s would pro-

v i d e the n a t i o n s w i t h s e c u r i t y which would then be able t o

reduce t h e i r great armament, however, i t d i d not i n the

French view g i v e France adequate guarantees so when P r e s i d e n t

Harding i s s u e d an i n v i t a t i o n to take p a r t i n a conference at

Washington to d i s c u s s the problem o f disarmament, A r i s t i d e

B r i a n d , who was premier o f France at t h e time, accepted w i t h

what might be c l a s s i f i e d as mental reservations.

The Washington Conference had been summoned p r i m a r i l y to

1. Anon., Lessons from Washington, New Statesman, v o l . 18,

December 17, 1921, p. 308.

115
 116

d i s c u s s the problems o f the P a c i f i c . A l t h o u g h France was

v i t a l l y concerned i n p a c i f i c q u e s t i o n s , her main i n t e r e s t at

t h i s time was i n the I t a l i a n demand f o r n a v a l p a r i t y which was

r a p i d l y assuming the p r o p o r t i o n s of a major i s s u e . In view

o f t h i s f a c t and a l s o c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t the French people were

e x p e c t i n g him to cooperate i n any e f f o r t towards disarmament

and yet to p r o t e c t French s e c u r i t y , B r i a n d went to Washington

w i t h no predetermined f i x e d p o l i c y . Andre' T a r d i e u maintained

t h a t t h i s was a s e r i o u s blunder f o r B r i a n d to make; He felt

that a concrete p o l i c y formulated i n advance would have en-

1

abled the French d e l e g a t i o n to present a stronger f r o n t . It

was f e l t by a l a r g e s e c t i o n o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n France t h a t

France had s u f f e r e d repeated d i p l o m a t i c d e f e a t s through Clem-

enceau i n the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s and B r i a n d hoped that

through h i s p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at Washington he would

be able to s t i m u l a t e American i n t e r e s t i n the French p o s i t i o n .

A second f a c t o r which B r i a n d f e l t to be of great impor-

tance was the need to convince the delegates at Washington

t h a t i n the present s i t u a t i o n of u n c e r t a i n t y i n Europe fur-

t h e r French land disarmament i n Europe was impossible. At the

same time he r e a l i z e d t h a t he must convince the men at the

Conference t h a t a peace p o l i c y was the dominant f e a t u r e of

F r e n c h diplomacy.. T h i s was proclaimed at V e r s a i l l e s , at S t .

Nazaire.and now a t Washington. B r i a n d had a difficult

1. T a r d i e u , Andre', The P o l i c y of France, Foreign A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 1, No. 1, September 15, 1922, p. 11. :
 117

assignment. He had to p r o c l a i m t o the world t h a t h i s country-

would consent t o no f u r t h e r l a n d disarmament y e t at the same

time he was expected by h i s countrymen t o so present the

F r e n c h case t h a t the world would not t h i n k France militaristic;

What was the s p e c i f i c reason l y i n g behind Briand*s stand

on the q u e s t i o n o f land disarmament? It- was French apprehen-

s i o n r e g a r d i n g Germany and R u s s i a . T h i s f e a r was widely f e l t

i n s p i t e o f the f a c t t h a t t h e French p r e s i d e n t of the I n t e r -

Allied Commission had r e p o r t e d that Germany had disarmed i n

accordance w i t h the c o n d i t i o n s l a i d down i n the T r e a t y o f

1
Versailles. The d e l e g a t e s at Washington were anxious that

something concrete i n the way o f r e d u c t i o n should be a c h i e v e d .

People throughout the world were b e g i n n i n g t o t h i n k that a l l

Conferences must i n e v i t a b l y meet w i t h the same d i s a p p o i n t -

ments which had r e s u l t e d h e r e t o f o r e a t Geneva. Critics,

sympathetic to the work b e i n g undertaken at Washington p o i n t e d

out, t h a t the d i f f i c u l t y f a c e d a t Geneva, namely t h a t the

C o u n c i l was i n a sense p r i m a r i l y t o a d m i n i s t e r the T r e a t y of

2

V e r s a i l l e s , should not impede the e f f o r t a t Washington.

B r i a n d , however, l u c i d l y expressed the French stand, that

France must m a i n t a i n m i l i t a r y supremacy over Germany, and

would be prepared to reduce her armament o n l y i f by means

1. Abbot, A. H., The League Disarmament A c t i v i t i e s — a n d the

Washington Conference, New York, P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e
Q u a r t e r l y , Academy o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 37,
No* 1, March, 1922, p. 1*

2. Anon., Former Conferences t h a t F a i l e d — a n d Succeeded,

L i t e r a r y D i g e s t , v o l . 71, November 12, 1921, p. 44;
 118

o f s e c u r i t y guarantees, some other n a t i o n s would pledge their

support t o h e r i n case o f a g g r e s s i o n by Germany.

In h i s speech B r i a n d expressed t h e hope t h a t owing t o

1

h i s stand France would not become m o r a l l y i s o l a t e d . He

pleaded f o r t h e r e c o g n i t i o n by other Powers o f t h e j u s t i c e o f

the French stand on armaments and p o i n t e d out t h a t h i s coun-

t r y had reduced t h e s i z e o f her army by s h o r t e n i n g t h e term

of s e r v i c e from three t o two y e a r s . However, the American

critic f e e l s t h a t B r i a n d s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d h i s cause by

s t r e s s i n g t h e dangers o f a t t a c k by Germany and R u s s i a . The

world saw the former p r o s t r a t e d and t h e l a t t e r i n t h e t h r o e s

2

o f r e v o l u t i o n , so i t f a i l e d t o see Briand*s p o i n t ; To many

of t h e delegates a t Washington, B r i a n d was p l e a d i n g f o r a

cause which they c o n s i d e r e d was a r e g i o n a l concern. Briand

a p p a r e n t l y had f a i l e d t o see t h i s view;

The stand taken by B r i a n d was deeply r e g r e t t e d by the

l e a d i n g E n g l i s h delegate, A r t h u r B a l f o u r ; B r i a n d had pre-

d i c t e d t h a t England would make t h e Washington Conference the

arena f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f the Anglo-French d u e l which had

developed i n t h e immediate post-war y e a r s , a t h i n g which he

3
was s i n c e r e l y anxious to a v o i d . B a l f o u r d i d h i s best t o
1. November 21, 1921; Speech made a t the T h i r d P l e n a r y
S e s s i o n o f the Conference;

2. Anon., The Washington Conference, Independent, v o l . 107,

December 3, 1921, p. 233.

3. Tabouis, Genevieve, P e r f i d i o u s A l b i o n — E n t e n t e C o r d i a l e ,
(.translated by j . A. Dempseyj , London, Butterworth,
1938, p. 200.
 119

d i m i n i s h the f e a r s o f B r i a n d by the promise t h a t i f a sit-

u a t i o n s i m i l a r to t h a t o f 1914 should develop again, B r i t i s h

1 .
aid would a g a i n be forthcoming. However, the French states-
man was adamant i n h i s stand and f e e l i n g that n o t h i n g f u r t h e r
c o u l d be accomplished i n r e s p e c t to l a n d disarmament t h e Con-
f e r e n c e turned to the n a v a l q u e s t i o n , une competent E n g l i s h
c r i t i c m a i n t a i n s t h a t by thus dropping the s u b j e c t of land
armaments from the agenda of the Conference, the r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s o f the n a t i o n s t a k i n g p a r t made t h e i r f i r s t serious
2

mistake*

A F r e n c h m i l i t a r y attache' has s a i d , "The main, i f not the

o n l y , French n a v a l problem c o n s i s t s i n p r o t e c t i n g the t r a n s -

p o r t a t i o n of the r e s o u r c e s i n man-power and raw m a t e r i a l s

of the F r e n c h - A f r i c a n b l o c k a c r o s s the mediterranean to
3
France." The most popular a u t h o r i t a t i v e o p i n i o n at the time

i n France h e l d t h a t f o r t h i s purpose warships were not a;-

s a t i s f a c t o r y p r o t e c t i v e weapon as they were too v u l n e r a b l e

and too c o s t l y . Submarines and aeroplanes supported by a

group of very f a s t c r u i s e r s were c o n s i d e r e d t o be the most

s a t i s f a c t o r y means of n a v a l p r o t e c t i o n . In 1920 i n his re-

p o r t on the n a v a l program o f France, Gustave de KerguezeCj

1. Chaput, H o l l a n d A., Disarmament i n B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y ,

London, George A l l e n and Unwin, 1935, p. 280*

2. Anon., The Peacemakers a t Washington, Manchester Guardian

Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 5, February 3, 1922, p. 84.

3* B u e l l , K. L., Anglo-American N a v a l Understanding, F o r e i g n

P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , v o l . 5, No. 10,
J u l y 24, 1929, p. 172. C i t a t i o n from Brassey's Naval
and S h i p p i n g Annual, 1928, p. 37.
 120

spokesman f o r the Chamber Committee on Naval A p p r o p r i a t i o n s ,

recommended the permanent abandonment o f work on f i v e battle-

s h i p s which had been a u t h o r i z e d i n 1916, w i t h the d e c l a r a t i o n

t h a t France r e f u s e d to e n t e r upon an armaments race and was

prepared to be acknowledged as a second r a t e n a v a l power i n

s p i t e o f the 54,484 m i l e s o f c o a s t - l i n e which she had to pro-

1

t e c t throughout her Empire.

When B r i a n d turned to c o n s i d e r the problem of n a v a l r e -

d u c t i o n he found that an agreement a l r e a d y had been reached

by Great B r i t a i n , the u n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan to reduce t h e i r

c a p i t a l s h i p s t r e n g t h to the extent o f approximately 40 per-
2
oeht. I t was not f e a s i b l e to reduce the tonnage o f France

and I t a l y by the same r a t i o . . B r i a n d asked f o r a maximum

replacement s t r e n g t h o f 550,000 t o n s . The S e c r e t a r y o f State;

o f the u n i t e d S t a t e s informed B r i a n d t h a t i f he p e r s i s t e d i n

h i s demand the Conference would be a f a i l u r e and the respon-

s i b i l i t y f o r t h a t catastrophe would be on h i s shoulders.

3
B r i a n d gave way and accepted the f i g u r e o f 175,000 t o n s .
4

Anglo-American pressure had f o r c e d the hand of B r i a n d . There

i s no q u e s t i o n but t h a t the stand taken by the French

1. Kerguezec, Gustave de, French Naval Aims, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,
v o l . 4, No. 3, A p r i l , 1926, p. 372. Great B r i t a i n has
66,044 m i l e s , u. S. A. 16,507, Japan 4,822 and I t a l y
3,889 m i l e s o f c o a s t - l i n e .

2. Toynbee, A. J . , Survey of i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1920-23,

p. 495.

3. Loc. c i t . , footnote 1.

4; I c h i h a s h i , Yamato, The Washington conference and A f t e r ,

S t a n f o r d u n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1928, p. 68 f f .
 1.21

d e l e g a t i o n had f o r the time r u f f l e d t h e B r i t i s h , but an under-

s t a n d i n g w i t h France s t i l l remained the " f i x e d p o l i c y " o f
1
Britain* Y e t , i n a d d i t i o n t o the a g r e e i n g to the tonnage

problem, B r i a n d acknowledged, through M. S a r r a n t , whome.heehad

l e f t a t Washington a f t e r he r e t u r n e d t o France, the p r i n c i p l e

of n a v a l p a r i t y with I t a l y i n r e s p e c t t o b a t t l e s h i p s , heavy
2

c r u i s e r s and a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . I f I t a l y should interpret

t h i s c o n c e s s i o n as a p p l y i n g t o t h e whole f i e l d o f n a v a l con-

s t r u c t i o n and should b u i l d t o the French l e v e l i t would mean

t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n of France would be s e r i o u s l y menaced i n t h e

Mediterranean;

Why d i d B r i a n d a p p a r e n t l y g i v e way i n these phases o f the

naval discussions? I n t h e f i r s t case France was i n a s e r i o u s

internal financial situation. Her o r d i n a r y budget was be-

tween f o u r and f i v e times l a r g e r than t h a t of 1913 and she

3

would probably be able t o meet l e s s than h a l f o f i t . B r i a n d

hoped t h a t by e n t e r i n g an agreement and thus promoting and

not h i n d e r i n g the progress o f n e g o t i a t i o n s he might be able

to improve Franco-American r e l a t i o n s to t h e extent t h a t i n

the f u t u r e h i s country might be able t o o b t a i n some form o f

1. Moulat, H , B*, A H i s t o r y o f European Diplomacy, 1914-1918,

London, Edward A r n o l d , 1927, p. 245, c i t i n g , New York
Times, aanuary 12, 1922, p. 16.

2. Macartney, H. H. and Cremona, P a u l , I t a l y ' s F o r e i g n and

C o l o n i a l p o l i c y , 1914-19 37, London, uxford u n i v e r s i t y
.tress, 1938, p. 137.

3. Huddleston, S i s l e y , , F r a n c e ' s P o s i t i o n and P o l i t i c s ,

contemporary Review, v o l . 19, March, 1921, p. 289*
French Budget—1913—4,738,000,000 f r a n c s ,
1921—22,327,000,000 f r a n c s .
 122
1
a s s i s t a n c e from the u n i t e d S t a t e s . France signed the Wash-

i n g t o n o r F i v e Power T r e a t y on February 6, 1922, which laid

down a d e f i n i t e replacement tonnage f o r each o f the f i v e Powers

t a k i n g p a r t , namely,

Great B r i t a i n ^ - 5 2 5 , 0 0 0 tons.
United States--525,000 tons.
Japan-- 315,000 tons.
France— 175,000 tons.
Italy-- 175,000 tons, 2

Much o f the enthusiasm-which B r i a n d had hoped t o arouse

In America through h i s c a p i t u l a t i o n on the c a p i t a l , s h i p issue

was d i s s i p a t e d by h i s r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t h i s country could not

accept any t h e s i s which l e d to the p r o p o r t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n

of a u x i l i a r y c r a f t on the same s c a l e as that accepted f o r

3

c a p i t a l ships. The French regarded the use o f a u x i l i a r y craft

as e s s e n t i a l l y d e f e n s i v e i n n a t u r e and t h e r e f o r e not to be

c l a s s e d i n the same grouping as c a p i t a l s h i p s f o r p r o p o r t i o n a l

reduction. Over the submarine i s s u e perhaps the most b i t t e r

a n t i - F r e n c h f e e l i n g was aroused. As a r e s u l t o f the t e r r i f i c

l o s s to t h e i r merchant s h i p p i n g d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f i n t e n s i v e

U-boat campaigns, the B r i t i s h proposed the complete abolition

o f the submarine. L o r d Lee suggested t h a t a l l submarines

4
should be taken out i n t o deep water and s c u t t l e d . To Franoe

1. Huddleston, S i s l e y , France and Washington, New Statesman,

v o l . 18, NoA 444, October 15, 1921, p. 39.
2. Latimer, Hugh, Naval Disarmament, Chatham House Monographs,
No. 3, London, Royal I n s t i t u t e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s ,
1930, p. 9. 1

3. Fay, M. B., L * O p i n i o n Americaine et l a France, Correspon-r

dant, Tome-287, 25 Mai, 1922, p. 577.
4. Anon., France's Demand f o r Submarines, L i t e r a r y D i g e s t ,
v o l . 72, No. 1, January 7, 1922, p. 7,
 123

t h i s was an absurd p r o p o s a l . One j o u r n a l , I n t r a n s i g e a n t of

P a r i s , remarked t h a t the F r e n c h b r a i n cannot comprehend the

emotion which has taken p o s s e s s i o n of at l e a s t a p a r t of B r i -

t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n over the i d e a t h a t Prance w i l l not r e -

1

nounce her submarine defense. The French r e f u s e d to c o n s i d e r

any submarine r e s t r i c t i o n except a f t e r the establishment of a

minimum of 90,000 tons f o r a l l n a t i o n s w i s h i n g t o m a i n t a i n a

submarine f o r c e . T h i s would be t h r e e times as l a r g e as the

2

then e x i s t e n t t o t a l tonnage of F r a n c e . Nothing more r e s u l t e d

from the d i s c u s s i o n on submarines except t h a t the N a v a l Com-

m i t t e e of the Conference adopted s e v e r a l r e s o l u t i o n s condemn-

i n g the i l l e g i t i m a t e use of undersea v e s s e l s . In these

3

r e s o l u t i o n s the French concurred.

The French d i f f i c u l t i e s at Washington were i n c r e a s e d

w i t h the p u b l i c a t i o n of some a l l e g e d l y s e c r e t documents which

gave d e t a i l s of correspondence between France and japan i n

which they promised to support each other i n an e f f o r t t o

curb American power i n the Far E a s t . One document from the

French F o r e i g n O f f i c e to the m i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s i n

Tokio i s supposed to have c o n t a i n e d the f o l l o w i n g statement,

"...America's i n t e n t i o n to secure f o r h e r s e l f a p l a c e i n Sov-

i e t R u s s i a has been f r u s t r a t e d by our p o l i c y . Americans a r e . . .

1. Anon., B r i t a i n P u z z l e d by France, The L i t e r a r y D i g e s t ,
v o l . 72, No. 3, January 21, 1922, p. 17.

2. Anon., Drawing the S t i n g of Submarines, Manchester Guard

i a n Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 1, January 6, 1922, p. 9.

3. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1920-1923, p. 497.

 124

pushing the E a s t e r n q u e s t i o n so as t o secure supremacy i n the

1
East*" Although the a u t h e n t i c i t y o f these documents was a t

once questioned^yet they d i d great damage t o t h e French cause

at Washington as they made B r i a n d appear h y p o c r i t i c a l i n h i s

advocacy o f an honest peace p o l i c y . I n a d d i t i o n they pro-

v i d e d food f o r thought f o r those elements which maintained

t h a t B r i a n d had u l t e r i o r motives i n h i s cautious p o l i c y i n

r e s p e c t t o disarmament.

Briand's main c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e disarmament problem

made a t Washington was h i s c l e a r e n u n c i a t i o n off the i r e n c h

s t a n d — n o r e d u c t i o n without adequate compensating guarantees

by other powers. Although the r e c e p t i o n which h i s e f f o r t s

at Washington r e c e i v e d a t home and abroad were a t complete

variance—he r e t u r n e d to a t r i u m p h a l r e c e p t i o n — y e t h i s s i n -

c e r i t y i s not t o be doubted. B r i a n d i s o f t e n dismissed as

a s c i n t i l l a t i n g but shallow statesman y e t he d i d see as e a r l y

as t h e Washington Conference t h a t b e f o r e disarmament c o u l d be

achieved i n r e a l i t y there must be a moral disarmament i n Ger-

2

many. I t has been p o i n t e d out e a r l i e r i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n t h a t

B r i a n d made too great an i s s u e o f t h e danger from Germany.

He s t r e s s e d t h i s so e m p h a t i c a l l y t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t he d i d

h o l d out t h e o l i v e branch to Germany was overlooked* He s a i d ,

1. Nevinson, H. W., D e c i s i o n s i n c o n f l i c t w i t h America,

Manchester uuardian Weekly, v o l . 6, No. 1, January 6,
1922, p. 7.

2. Anon;, The Heart o f Briand*s Appeal, Mew York, indepen-

dent and Weekly Review, v o l . 107, No. 3794, December
3, 1921, p. 227.
 125

There i s one p a r t o f Germany t h a t i s f o r peace;

There are many people, e s p e c i a l l y among the work-
i n g c l a s s e s , who want t o work....We s h a l l do every-
t h i n g to h'elp t h a t Germany and i f she wants to
r e s t o r e her balance i n the bosom o f a p a c i f i c
r e p u b l i c . . .we can help her and we s h a l l be a b l e -j_
to contemplate the f u t u r e w i t h f e e l i n g s o f s e c u r i t y .

Yet B r i a n d f e a r e d the s e c r e t machinations of Hugo S t i n n e s and

his i n d u s t r i a l i s t f r i e n d s going on behind the s h e l l o f a weak

democratie government; i t was towards these men that Briand

directed h i s attacks. M o r a l disarmament i n the mind o f B r i -

and c a l l e d f o r the p e a c e f u l elements of the people of Germany

to curb the r e a c t i o n a r y i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and t h e i r monarchist:

allies, unly i n t h i s way c o u l d disarmament be made a r e a l i t y

in Europe.

i n s p i t e o f the f e e l i n g that was c u r r e n t i n France at

the time o f the Washington Conference t h a t the Anglo-Saxon

rowers were a n t a g o n i s t i c to France, B r i a n d never l o s t sight

of h i s p l a n to r e s t o r e amicable, r e l a t i o n s between h i s country

2
and England, i f t h i s could be accomplished the disarmament

problem c o u l d be approached from another a n g l e . An opportun-

i t y came t o B r i a n d a t the London Conference, December 18-22,

1921. Mr. L l o y d George remarked t h a t the a t t i t u d e adopted

by B r i a n d a t Washington had had a very adverse e f f e c t on pub-

l i c opinion i n B r i t a i n . B r i a n d used t h i s statement as an ex-

cuse f o r b r i n g i n g up a p r o p o s a l f o r an Anglo-French A l l i a n c e ,

s t a t i n g that such an a l l i a n c e would enable France to reduce

1. Loc. c i t .

2. F o u r n o l , E t i e n n e , M. A r i s t i d e B r i a n d , Revue Bleue, No. 11,

3 J u i n , 1922, p. 327.
 126

her m i l i t a r y burdens. T h i s p r o p o s a l was i n l i n e with his

a s s e r t i o n at Washington that t h e r e could be no r e d u c t i o n of

armaments u n l e s s guarantees were f o r t h c o m i n g . These con-

v e r s a t i o n s were continued at Cannes, February 6-13, 1922,

where B r i a n d put forward the i d e a of a m i l i t a r y convention to

1

supplement the r e c i p r o c a l guarantee under d i s c u s s i o n . Kis

defeat was. brought about by the d i r e c t interference of pres-

ident M i l l e r a n d , who supported by the Gauche R e p u b l i c a i n e

group and Poincare' f e l t that Briarid was p l a y i n g " f a s t and

l o o s e w i t h the r i g h t s of Prance as l a i d down i n the T r e a t y o f
2
Versailles." Briand resigned. He was accused by the Chamber

of Deputies o f weakness which i n the French view i s a synonym

f o r reasonableness. In t h i s way ended another e f f o r t o f B r i -

and t o b r i n g about some measure o f disarmament i n Prance.

During the p e r i o d immediately f o l l o w i n g the r e t i r e m e n t

of B r i a n d from o f f i c e , Franco-German r e l a t i o n s reached a very

low p o i n t . Premier P o i n c a r e ' s speech at B o i s - l e - P r e t r e on

September 23, 1922, s t r u c k the warning note announcing the

coming i n v a s i o n of the Ruhr which took p l a c e f o u r days later.

B r i a n d was o f the common people and i t was the common people

of France who,put an end t o t h i s dangerous adventure. The

m a j o r i t y of French v o t e r s f o r c e d Poincare' from o f f i c e and i n

doing so showed that i t s t i l l f e l t that France could not f i n d

1. Cmd. 2169 No. 35, 1924.v?.p. 121, Statement o f the Views of

the F r e n c h Government sent to Mr. L l o y d George by M.
B r i a n d on January 8.

2. B a i n v i l l e , Jacques, The F r e n c h R e p u b l i c , 1870-1935, London,

Jonathan Uape, 1936, p. 237.
 127

s e c u r i t y through, the separate e x e r c i s e of m i l i t a r y f o r c e i f

that p o l i c y a l i e n a t e d the p u b l i c o p i n i o n o f the r e s t o f the

world.

The e f f o r t to t r a c e Briand*s attempts t o achieve some

measure of disarmament i n France i s , d u r i n g the p e r i o d between

his withdrawal from o f f i c e i n 1922 and h i s r e t u r n to power i n

1925, marked by h i s c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h other French statesmen

i n the promoting of the D r a f t T r e a t y o f Mutual A s s i s t a n c e and

the Geneva P r o t o c o l . Both o f these e f f o r t s sought some means

to assure s e c u r i t y f o r France so t h a t disarmament could become

a realitjr. The D r a f t T r e a t y had been aeceptable t o the French

d e l e g a t i o n at Geneva and i n t h i s i t was supported by the

F r e n c h g e n e r a l s t a f f which f e l t t h a t the "complementary agree-

ments" encouraged by the D r a f t T r e a t y would n u l l i f y the whole

purpose of the scheme i n that they would g r e a t l y a i d i n pre-

1

v e n t i n g disarmament * Edouard H e r r i o t presented the French

case at Geneva and he was a b l y a s s i s t e d , to a great extent

behind the scenes, by B r i a n d and o t h e r French statesmen such

as Loucheur, Paul-Poncour and H e n r i de j o u v e n e l . Even although

the Geneva P r o t o c o l never became a r e a l i t y i t gave B r i a n d an

o p p o r t u n i t y t o stand f o r t h as a l e a d i n g a p o s t l e o f the new

s p i r i t o f peace abroad i n France--prompted by thB r e a c t i o n

from the F r e n c h i n v a s i o n o f the Ruhr. A t the F i f t h S e s s i o n

of the League Assembly he gave the o f f i c i a l acceptance o f the

1. D e l l , Robert, Peace, Disarmament and the League, New

Statesman, v o l . 23, August 2, 1924, p. 484;
 128
1
French government o f the Geneva r r o t o c o l . Once again i n t h e

s t r u g g l e f o r disarmament B r i a n d was coming to the f o r e - f r o n t .

I n s p i t e o f the f a c t that Great B r i t a i n r e j e c t e d t h e P r o t o c o l

a n e w ' f e e l i n g o f e v e n t u a l success was evinced i n many q u a r t e r s .

With t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e t h e s i s i n r e s p e c t to the pro-

blem o f disarmament t h a t t h e r e should be no disarmament w i t h -

out p r e v i o u s guarantees o f s e c u r i t y t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f

France i n t h e e a r l y post-war p e r i o d was marked by a tendency

to f l u c t u a t e . When he succeeded to the p r e m i e r s h i p , j i e r r i o t

had adopted a p o l i c y o f c o n c i l i a t i o n towards Germany but

e a r l y i n 1925 he d i s c a r d e d t h i s - c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y and took

advantage of some breaches o f the disarmament c l a u s e s of the

T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s by Germany t o delay t h e e v a c u a t i o n o f

the Cologne zone o f the K h i n e l a n d . With t h i s apparent r e -

v e r s a l o f p o l i c y i t would not be l i k e l y that a disarmament

3

program would be encouraged.

The f a l l o f h e r r i o t on A p r i l 10, 1925, over a monetary

q u e s t i o n brought F a i n l e v e ' t o o f f i c e as premier, ne s e l e c t e d

B r i a n d as h i s F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r . P a i n l e v e ' l e n t a w i l l i n g hand

i n the n e g o t i a t i o n of the-;Locarno reace .tacts, ne had es-

caped from the past which so i n f l u e n c e d Clemenceau at the

r a r i s Peace Conference. " J ' a i vecu," s a i d Fainleve', "a

1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1924, p. 52.

2. League o f N a t i o n s o f f i c i a l J o u r n a l , A p r i l , 1925, p. 490,

c i t e d by Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1925, v o l . 2, p. 24, f o o t n o t e 1

3. Anon., France and S e c u r i t y , Cologne as B a r g a i n i n g P i e c e ,

Manchester Guardian Weekly, v o l . 12, No. 9,
February 27, 1925, p. 176.
 129

Geneve c o t e a cote avec B r i a n d , l e s semaines de 1925 on f u t

1

p r e p a r e ' l e pacte de Locarno." '.Hiere i s no doubt t h a t B r i a n d

and Painleve'hoped t h a t the s e c u r i t y which f o l l o w e d the s i g n -

i n g o f t h e Locarno pacts would r e s u l t i n disarmament, poin-

care', w i t h a l a deeply s i n c e r e man had s a i d , "Nous o u b l i e r o n s

l e s crimes allemandsl e jour ou nous serons surs q u ' i l s ne

2
recommenceront pas." B r i a n d took the opposite view. He
3 -
s a i d , "Pour q u ' i l s ne commencent pas, o u b l i o n s - l e s . " B r i a n d

was u n d e r t a k iout
brought n g very
a p o l if co yr c which was
i b l y by not
Pai n l e without
ve, risks. This

. . . i l n'est pas de geste c i v i l i s a t e u r q u i n ' a i t ,

x
a son o r i g i n e , comporte' des r i s q u e s , et c'est
parce que ces r i s q u e s ont e'te brave's que l'hum-
a n i t e ' a progressed E n t r e une p o l i t i q u e q u i n'est
pas sans p e r i l , e t une p o l i t i q u e q u i mene sure*-
ment a. un de'sastre, notre c h o i x e s t f a i t . 4

T h i s was a v e r y b o l d and courageous stand t o take, but B r i a n d

at the same time was not a c t i n g without "protecting his rear."

On February 26, i n an address t o t h e Chamber o f Deputies, he

remarked,

B i e n des flammeches v o l t i g e n t en Europe demeurent

menacantes, b i e n des flammeches encore t r o p p r o -
dies'* des bar i l s de poudre q u i n'ont pas ete' en-
leve's;;.. Gardons notre f o r c e . " 5

1. P a i n l e v e , P a u l , p a r o l e s e t E c r i t s , .taris, E d i t i o n s R i e d e r ,
1936, p. 559.

2. Barthelemy, Joseph, Apres Locarno: Vers Les E t a t s - - u n i s

D'Europe, Kevue P o l i t i q u e e t p a r l e m e n t a i r e , Tome 125,
Novembre, 1925, p. 238.

3. Loc. c i t .
4. Chaumeix, Andre , Les T r a i t e s de Locarno, Revue de r a r i s ,
/

Tome 6, Novembre, 1925, p* 227.

5. Anon., A Propos Du Desarmament, Revue des Deus Mondes,
Tome 33, 1 Mai, 1926, p. 124.
 130

A f t e r Locarno p a i n l e v e ' and B r i a n d took care to p o i n t out

that i n f u t u r e the m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n of France would be

1

e n t i r e l y defensive i n character. In l i n e w i t h t h i s policy

the m i l i t a r y budget had been g r e a t l y reduced i n 1926 compared

to t h a t o f 1922. I n the l a t t e r year the French government

set a s i d e 3,190,000 g o l d f r a n c s f o r the armed f o r c e s w h i l e

2

i n 1926 the sum had decreased t o 1,251,000 g o l d f r a n c s . The

r e t u r n of the Grown P r i n c e to Germany and the e l e v a t i o n of

F i e l d - M a r s h a l von Hihdenburg to the P r e s i d e n c y had caused

c e r t a i n uneasiness i n France which the Locarno Pacts had gone

f a r to e l i m i n a t e , but u n t i l the League of n a t i o n s obtained

an armed f o r c e of i t s own the danger of war would continue

to e x i s t . T h e r e f o r e every n a t i o n had the r i g h t t o prepare

i t s own system o f defense although aiming at no specific

o t h e r power*

it c o u l d be s a i d t h a t Germany was the f i r s t of the Powers

which signed Locarno to d e r i v e concrete advantage from i t s

terms. The e v a c u a t i o n of the B r i t i s h f o r c e d from the Cologne

Zone o f Occupation c o i n c i d e d w i t h the s i g n i n g o f the t r e a t y

i n London on December 5, 1925. B r i a n d was quick to press

home to Germany the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s gesture, in a letter

to the German ambassador i n P a r i s he s a i d , "En f a i s a n t ainsi

c o i n c i d e r l e de'but de 1* evacuation avec l a s i g n a t u r e des

accords de Locarno, l a conference marque l a c o n f i a n c e dont

1. La Bruyere, Kene', France's New Army and wavy, Current

H i s t o r y , v o l . 24, N o . l , A p r i l , 1926, p. 21.

2. Anon., A Propos Du De'sarmament, p. 124.

 131

sont animes l e s gouvernements represented par e l l e , que c e t t e

s i g n a t u r e inaugurera une n o u v e l l e periode dans l e u r s r e l a t i o n s

1 ,
avec l'Allemagne." The Locarno Agreements were based on the

t h r e e - s i d e d formula o f a r b i t r a t i o n , s e c u r i t y and disarmament

and although most o f t h e t r e a t i e s which make up these agree-

ments d e a l w i t h the f i r s t two problems, the short paragraph

t o u c h i n g on disarmament i s very s i g n i f i c a n t . I t s t a t e s , "They

(the C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s ) undertake t o g i v e t h e i r s i n o e r e

c o o p e r a t i o n t o the work r e l a t i n g t o disarmament a l r e a d y under-

taken by the League o f Nations and t o seek the r e a l i z a t i o n

2

t h e r e o f i n a g e n e r a l agreement*" B r i a n d , i n common w i t h t h e

other n e g o t i a t o r s o f t h e Pact f e l t t h a t a r e a l forward step

had been taken towards disarmament. "Away w i t h rifles,

machine-guns, cannons!" he c r i e d , "Room f o r c o n c i l i a t i o n ,

3

a r b i t r a t i o n , and p e a c e l "

During the S i x t h Assembly o f the League w h i c h met i n

September, 1925, a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g upon the League C o u n c i l

to take steps towards convening a Conference f o r the Reduction

4

and L i m i t a t i o n o f Armaments was brought forward. In accor-

dance w i t h t h i s request the C o u n c i l arranged f o r t h e formation

1. Anon., L e t t r e de M. B r i a n d a l'Ambassadeur Allemand, von
rioesch, L'Europe iMouvelle, No. 406, 28 Novembre, 1925,
p. 1619. -

2. Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. and Langermann, P. E*, i n f o r m a t i o n

on the Problem o f S e c u r i t y , London, George A l l e n & Un-
win, Locarno Conference, October, 1925.
3. Stern-Rubarth, Edgar, op. c i t . , p. 117.
4. League o f Nations Documents, C. P. D. I . , Documents o f the
P r e p a r a t o r y Disarmament Conference, S e r i e s I . , p, 5.
C i t e d by Wheeler-Bennett, j . W., Disarmament and
S e o u r i t y , 1925-1931, p. 46, f o o t n o t e 1.
 132

o f a p r e p a r a t o r y Commission to study the problem o f disarm-

ament. The f i r s t and second s e s s i o n s of t h i s Commission were

h e l d i n 1926 but i t was not u n t i l March, 1927, a t the meeting

o f t h e t h i r d s e s s i o n t h a t the French stand was c l e a r l y de-

1
fined. "M. B r i a n d s a i s i s s a n t . . . l a b a l l e au bond, aceepta

d'entamer l e s n e g o o i a t i o n s " and t h r o u g h M. Paul-Boncour

summarized the French view "a s e c u r i t e ' l i m i t e d desarmament

2

limited" A t 7/ashington B r i a n d had maintained t h a t u n t i l some

guarantee was p r o v i d e d , h i s country must m a i n t a i n m i l i t a r y

s u p e r i o r i t y over Germany. Even a f t e r Locarno, sincere though

he undoubtedly was, B r i a n d f e l t t h a t France had disarmed

u n i l a t e r a l l y t o the lowest p o i n t i n keeping w i t h n a t i o n a l

safety. The F r e n c h D r a f t proposed the l i m i t a t i o n o f a l l

e f f e c t i v e s , land, sea and a i r i n s e r v i c e and i n formations o r -

ganized on a m i l i t a r y b a s i s . The p e r i o d o f s e r v i c e was a l s o

to be l i m i t e d and l a n d war m a t e r i a l was t o be c o n t r o l l e d

through t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f budgeting e x p e n d i t u r e . The B r i t i s h

a l s o put forward a D r a f t and t h e problem o f harmonizing the

two p l a n s occupied t h e P r e p a r a t o r y Commission u n t i l December,

1930.

The e f f o r t s o f B r i a n d were not c o n f i n e d s o l e l y t o t h e

work o f the P r e p a r a t o r y Commission. The whole o f the p e r i o d

1925-1931 was a time i n the h i s t o r y o f Europe when the f o r e i g n

p o l i c i e s o f a l l n a t i o n s were d i r e c t e d towards f i n d i n g some way

1. Anon., L a preparation .du desarmament, L'Europe JMouvelle,

No. 483, 14 M a i , 1927, p. 634s.

2* Loc. c i t .
 133

i n which t o e s t a b l i s h peace on a f i r m e r b a s i s . B r i a n d , the

French f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r at t h e time the Locarno T r e a t i e s were

consummated, had come t o be regarded by Frenchmen as the

l o g i c a l man t o best p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s o f France w h i l e at

1
the same time t o d i r e c t i t i n t h e s p i r i t of Locarno. Follow-
i n g t h e F i r s t S e s s i o n o f the P r e p a r a t o r y Commission h e l d i n
May 1926, B r i a n d was f a c e d w i t h t h e important problem o f r e -
c o n c i l i n g these two f a c t o r s . A t t h a t S e s s i o n a wide d i v e r -
gence o f o p i n i o n was r e v e a l e d on t h e q u e s t i o n o f n a v a l l i m i t -
2

ation. Great B r i t a i n and France were i n f a v o r o f f i x i n g the

s i z e o f v e s s e l s i n each category w h i l e ^ r i a n d advocated total

tonnage without f i x i n g v e s s e l s i z e . In order t o r e c o n c i l e

the d i v e r g e n t views i f possible,' P r e s i d e n t C o o l i d g e i s s u e d

an i n v i t a t i o n to the n a v a l Bowers t o take p a r t i n a conference.

B r i a n d r e f u s e d because he f e l t t h a t such a conference on a

l i m i t e d f i e l d o f the whole disarmament problem would jeopar-

d i z e the chances f o r success o f the "movement f o r g e n e r a l d i s -

armament, lie maintained t h a t the n a v a l problem eould not be

isolated. I t must be r e c a l l e d , however, t h a t statesmen do not

always make t h e i r innermost thoughts p u b l i c . At t h i s time

I t a l y , under the F a s c i s t regime was extending her sphere o f

interest. There i s not much doubt t h a t B r i a n d was alarmedj

1; Dumont-Wilden, L., Les Accords de Locarno et La N o u v e l l e

u r i e n t a t i o n p o l i t i q u e , Revue Bleue, No. 21,
7 Novembre, 1925, p. 708;

2. Anon., La premiere s e s s i o n de l a commission p r e p a r a t o i r e

de l a conference du de'sarmement, L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,
No. 437, 3 J u i l l e t , 1926, p. 912.
 134

by t h i s expansion*

Briand, i n s p i t e o f h i s d e c l a r a t i o n s i n 1927 t h a t t h e

n a v a l problem could not be i s o l a t e d from the main f a c t o r o f

general disarmament was prepared i n March, 1928, t o take p a r t

i n discussions with the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, S i r Austin

Chamberlain. Great B r i t a i n was prepared t o make same con-

c e s s i o n on t h e m i l i t a r y s i d e i f Briand would g i v e way i n some

respect on t h e n a v a l * i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t Chamberlain i n

making these p r o p o s a l s t o Briand was m i n d f u l o f the l a t t e r ' s

statement at t h e seventh s e s s i o n o f t h e League Assembly when

he s a i d t h a t i n order t o achieve success i n n e g o t i a t i o n i t

might be necessary to grant " c e r t a i n e s concessions r e c i p r o -

1
ques." In addition a proposal of t h i s nature found favor

with Briand i n s o f a r as i t opened up a l a r g e r s e c t i o n o f t h e

disarmament problem I n i n v o l v i n g p a r t o f the French land force

the t r a i n e d r e s e r v e s . The agreement at which B r i a n d and Cham-

b e r l a i n u l t i m a t e l y a r r i v e d enlarged the l i m i t e d c a t e g o r i e s t o

four. In a d d i t i o n to a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s and c a p i t a l s h i p s ,
2

already l i m i t e d under the Washington t r e a t y , c r u i s e r s armed

w i t h more than s i x i n c h c a l i b r e guns and submarines o f more

than 600 tons were t o be i n c l u d e d . Briand surrendererd.the

1. D i s c o u r s prononce' par M. B r i a n d , m i n i s t r e des a f f a i r e s

etrangeres de France,- & l a septieme se'ance de 1'As-
semble' de l a Socie'te' de N a t i o n s , l e 10 septembre, 1926,
L'Europe Nouvelle, No. 449, 18 Septembre, 1926, p. 1321

2. i b i d . , Note de l'ambassade de l ' A n g l e t e r r e au ministe're

des a f f a i r e s e'trangeres en date du 28 j u i l l e t , 1928,
IMQ. 562, 17 novembre, 1928, p. 1581.
 135

theory so long h e l d by the French i n r e s p e c t to g l o b a l t o n -

nage i n fa>vor of l i m i t a t i o n by category and i n consenting to

take p a r t i n d i s c u s s i o n s i n the n a v a l phase o f disarmament

alone he.abandoned the stand t h a t n a v a l , l a n d and a i r arma-

1

ments are interdependent. T h i s removed the two major d i f -

f i c u l t i e s which h e r e t o f o r e p a r a l y z e d the e f f o r t s of the pre-

p a r a t o r y Commission. B r i a n d secured the i n s e r t i o n i n t h i s

Anglo-French Compromise o f 1928 the important p r o v i s i o n that

the same maximum tonnage f o r submarines and cruisers should

be f i x e d f o r a l l the g r e a t n a v a l Bowers'. B r i a n d s a i d t h a t
t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n of e q u a l i t y was only a q u e s t i o n of " c h i f f r e s
2
de p r e s t i g e " and t h a t France would not b u i l d up to the limit.

The f i r s t r e a c t i o n of the United S t a t e s t o these conversations

was f a v o r a b l e as they represented an e f f o r t by two nations

to r e a c h an agreement by mutual c o n c e s s i o n , however, when

the c o n d i t i o n s o f the compromise were r e v e a l e d both official

3

and p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m was severe. The agreement would a l l o w

the b u i l d i n g of c e r t a i n h i g h l y e f f i c i e n t f i g h t i n g s h i p s w h i l e

imposing r e s t r i c t i o n s on those types e s p e c i a l l y s u i t e d to the

needs of the u n i t e d S t a t e s .

1. Anon., A P l e a f o r an independent F o r e i g n r o l i c y : The

Anglo-French Compromise, The Round Table, v o l . 19,
December, 1928, p. 17.

2. B u e l l , R. L.,'Anglo-American N a v a l understanding, F o r e i g n
p o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , No. 10,
J u l y 24, 1929, p. 182.

3. L e t t r e de M. Norman Armour, Charge d ' a f f a i r e s des E t a t s -

. u'nis a P a r i s , a M. A r i s t i d e B r i a n d , 28 septembre, 1928,
v

L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 562, 17 Novembre, 1928, p. 1582.

 136

Why d i d B r i a n d and Chamberlain make t h i s Compromise

without c o n s u l t i n g the u n i t e d S t a t e s i n accordance with t h e

t r a d i t i o n o f the Washington Conference, and Germany as r e q u i r e d

by the s p i r i t o f Locarno? B r i a n d had made a s e r i o u s e r r o r .

The a c t i o n s of the French and B r i t i s h statesmen r e v e a l e d t h e

weakness o f a l l e f f o r t s made towards disarmament s i n c e t h e

end o f t h e war of 1914-1918. Each was l o o k i n g a t t h e problem

of s e c u r i t y from a narrow, n a t i o n a l i s t view-point. Briand

had consented t o an agreement by which France and B r i t a i n

would make t h e i r own p o s i t i o n secure, without thinking o f the

s e c u r i t y o f other i n t e r e s t e d n a t i o n s . Germany could not ap-

p r e c i a t e Briand's p o i n t , t h a t i f England and France came to

an understanding then t h e s e c u r i t y o f Germany would be i n -

creased. T h i s f a i l u r e t o c o n s u l t Germany aroused again i n t h e

German mind t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t France s t i l l h e l d t h a t her own

s e c u r i t y continued t o r e s t on t h e permanent disarmament o f

Germany. Briand had l e f t t h e Locarno road. The o l d system

of s e c r e t diplomacy was back, i t was charged. B r i a n d was deep

ly hurt, i n a speech b e f o r e the Chamber o f Deputies, he com-

p l a i n e d t h a t as soon as an agreement, towards disarmament was

arrived a t the world c r i e d out "pas pour q u i , mais contre q u i . "

One French c r i t i c w r i t e s , "M. B r i a n d , M. Faul-Boucour ont eu

r a i s o n de denoncer avec emotion, ce q u ' i l y a v a i t de t r a g i q u e

dans l a s u s p i c i o n que declenche, a u s s i t o t annonce', tout accord

conclu entre deux grandes n a t i o n s de'sireuses, par c e t a c c o r d -

1. Wheeler-Bennett, J . W*, Disarmament and S e c u r i t y Since Loc

arno, wew i o r k , Macmillan, 1932, p. 135.
 137

meme et par l e s concessions b i l a t e ' r a l e s q u ' i l comporte, de

hater l a s o l u t i o n dont depend 1 ' e v o l u t i o n p a c i f i q u e de

I
l'Europe." The Anglo-French Compromise c o l l a p s e d hut i n s p i t e

of t h i s B r i a n d t r i e d to hold the B r i t i s h to t h e i r agreement

concerning trained reserves, i n a speech before the house of

Commons r e l a t i v e t o t h i s problem Lord Cushendun d e c l a r e d t h a t

the B r i t i s h government "were under no o b l i g a t i o n i n the

2
matter;..."

In 1925 B r i a n d had given F r e n c h p o l i c y a d e f i n i t e o r i e n -

t a t i o n based on the Locarno s p i r i t . At t h a t time no s t a t e s -

man was accused of h a r b o r i n g anything but the l o f t i e s t motives.

In the years f o l l o w i n g Locarno the f o r c e s In o p p o s i t i o n to

Briand's p o l i c y were s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g i n power. One of the

f a c t o r s most r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s trend was t h e armament p r e s s ,

not only i n France and Germany but i n other c o u n t r i e s as w e l l .

In a d d i t i o n t o the press, the armament i n d u s t r y was a power-

f u l f a c t o r because i t s r a m i f i c a t i o n s are so wide-spread i n the

3

i n d u s t r i a l l i f e of the country i n which i t i s l o c a t e d . In

France these elements c a r r i e d on such a continued attack on

B r i a n d a f t e r h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Stresemann at T h o i r y t h a t

F r e n c h p u b l i c o p i n i o n began to have f e a r s t h a t p o s s i b l y the

p o l i c y o f B r i a n d was not i n the best i n t e r e s t s of France.

1. Ormesson, Wladimir d, Rentre'e...., L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

IMo. 555, 29 Septembre, 1928, p. 1302.

2. C i t e d i n Wheeler-Bennett, J . W., opp cit., p. 141.

3. Spender, J . A., These Times, London, C a s s e l l , 1934, p. 110.

 138

I f B r i a n d and Stresemann had had t h e i r way, France

and Germany t o g e t h e r would have l e d t h e world t o
peace. That they f a i l e d t o do so was v e r y l a r g e l y
the work o f those who thought o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y
i n terms o f s e l l i n g guns. 1

One f a c t o r p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the i n c r e a s i n g dif-

f i c u l t y which B r i a n d encountered i n h i s disarmament efforts

2

was the r e a c t i o n i n Germany t o every c o n c e s s i o n made by France.

A l t h o u g h c h a u v i n i s t i c elements l i k e t h e press o f the Hugen-

berg-Konzern c o u l d not be s a i d t o r e p r e s e n t t h e German people

yet continued r e f e r e n c e s t o the i n j u s t i c e s o f the V e r s a i l l e s

3
T r e a t y d i d not f i n d a f a v o r a b l e r e c e p t i o n In France. The

v i c e - p r e s i d e n t o f the Chamber o f Deputies and Rapporteur o f

the War Budget f o r the Chamber s a i d , M$me, a diffe'rentes

ft

r e p r i s e s , empruntant l a t r i b u n e de l a P r e s s e , j e l ' a i crile

au pays tout e n t i e r e , je me s u i s ef force" de montre c e t t e nuee

Infernale" qui s ' e l e v e i a - b a s dans l ' E s t gagnant de p l u s en

p l u s v i t e n o t r e c i e l b l e u de France." A more concrete F r e n c h

r e a c t i o n was the s t a r t i n g o f c o n s t r u c t i o n on t h e w a l l o f f o r -

t i f i c a t i o n s on t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r o f France, t h e Maginot

5
Line* French o p i n i o n was b e g i n n i n g t o harden. As e a r l y as

1. i\ioel-Baker, P h i l i p , The P r i v a t e Manufacture .of Armaments,

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , 1937, v o l . 1, p. 58.
2. Stresemann i n h i s Memoirs has spoken i n t h i s v e i n , i t is
almost c e r t a i n t h a t these p e r s o n a l thought ! were- never-

meant f o r p u b l i c a t i o n .
3. Ohaumeix, Andre', L ' E t a t D ' E s p r i t De L'Allemagne^Paris, Re-
vue de P a r i s , Tome 1, F e v r i e r , 1926, p. 943.
4. B o u i l l o u x - L a f o n t , M., Geneve e t L ' A v i a t i o n Allemand, Revue
de P a r i s , Tome 6, Movembre, 1926, p. 481.
5. Brown, F., War S t r e n g t h o f France, Current H i s t o r y , v o l .
42, No. 2, May, 1935, p. 197.
 139

1926 one F r e n c h w r i t e r warned Stresemann t o "Stop your para-

keets from r e p e a t i n g 'We d i d not cause the war, we d i d not

cause the war!* Who knows we may s t r a n g l e them one o f these

1
days." G e n e r a l Maginot some years l a t e r c l e a r l y expressed

t h i s f e e l i n g when he s a i d , "Two c o n d i t i o n s are necessary to

ensure p e a c e — t h e p e a c e f u l c o u n t r i e s must remain s t r o n g and

2

the w a r l i k e ones must keep t h e i r mouths shut." I t i s small

wonder t h a t w i t h such a f e e l i n g b e g i n n i n g t o take h o l d i n

France t h a t the French d e l e g a t i o n went t o the London N a v a l

Conference w i t h no i l l u s i o n s about a moral m i s s i o n , r a t h e r

was i t s watch-word "en garde".

I t is a f a c t o r o f g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t the f i r s t indi-

c a t i o n o f the French stand a t t h e London Naval Conference was

3

not made by B r i a n d but by Andre T a r d i e u , the Premier gt France

at the time. Before the F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Naval Committee o f

the Chamber he s t a t e d t h a t n a v a l disarmament c o u l d not be

d e a l t w i t h as a separate problem and that the d e c i s i o n s

reached at the London iMaval Conference would have t o form

p a r t o f the b a s i s o f the coming World Disarmament Conference.

Thus i t w i l l be seen that the man who so s e v e r e l y criticized

B r i a n d f o r h i s h a n d l i n g o f the F r e n c h case at t h e Washington

Conference w i l l now be w i t h B r i a n d at London or at l e a s t

1. F l e r s , Robert de, Germany i s to Blame, L i v i n g Age, v o l .

331, No. 4294, p. 293, ( t r a n s l a t e d from P a r i s F i g a r o ) .

2. B a r t l e t t , Vernon, N a z i Germany E x p l a i n e d , London,

V i c t o r - G o l l a n c z , 1933, p. 195.
3. Anon., De but de Conference, L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No.
/
625,
1 F a v r i e r , 1930, P. 194.
 140

nearby a t P a r i s , i n a s u p e r v i s o r y c a p a c i t y , He was determined

t h a t t h e r e would not be a r e p e t i t i o n o f t h e c a t a s t r o p h e o f
1
Washington.

P r i o r t o t h e assembling o f t h e Conference a Memorandum

was sent by the French government t o the n a t i o n s which were

2

t o take p a r t i n t h e Conference s e t t i n g f o r t h the French s t a n d .

T h i s enabled them t o take the i n i t i a t i v e i n the n e c e s s i t y o f

r e l a t i n g disarmament t o , s e c u r i t y and n a t i o n a l needs and on

the q u e s t i o n o f l i m i t a t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f t o t a l tonnage.

h a v i n g paved t h e i r way i n t h i s manner, the French had a t a c t -

3

ical advantage.

During t h e p e r i o d o f t h e Conference c a l l e d the F i r s t

Phase, t h e French d e l e g a t i o n announced t h a t a n a v a l b u i l d i n g

p l a n had been l a i d down i n France which by 1936 would g i v e her

4

a n a v a l s t r e n g t h o f 724,479 t o n s . I f guarantees were f o r t h -

coming b o l s t e r i n g French s e c u r i t y , a r e d u o t i o n o f t h i s total

would be c o n s i d e r e d . The p e r i o d c a l l e d t h e Second Phase was

marked by the absence o f the Frenoh d e l e g a t i o n from London

1. T a r d i e u , Andre', The P o l i c y o f France, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,
v o l . 1, No. 1, September 15, 1922, p. 11.

2. B u e l l , H. L., The London N a v a l Conference, F o r e i g n P o l i c y

A s s o c i a t i o n News S e r v i c e , v o l . V I . , No. 6, May. 28,
1930, p. 102.

3. Anon., Naval Conference Makes P r o g r e s s , Manchester

Guardian Weekly, v o l . 22, No. 5, January 31, 1930,
p. 84.

4. I b i d . , Short Adjournment o f t h e N a v a l Conference, v o l . 22,

No. 8, February 21, 1930, p. 144.
 141

owing t o the defeat o f t h e T a r d i e u C a b i n e t on i n t e r n a l issues.

While the French d e l e g a t i o n was absent t h e remaining delegates

concluded t h a t i n order f o r the Conference t o meet w i t h suc-

cess i t would be necessary t o reduce the b u i l d i n g program o f

France and t o s o l v e t h e problem o f p a r i t y between I t a l y and

Franc e.

With the r e t u r n o f B r i a n d to London a f t e r t h e r e c a l l o f

,Tardieu t o t h e p r e m i e r s h i p , the problem o f s e c u r i t y came to

the f o r e ; I n accordance w i t h the Memorandum o f December 20,

1929, t h e r e c o u l d be no f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n by France without

reinforced security. B r i a n d r e t u r n e d t o t h e o l d stand o f

French statesmen, security f i r s t , however, French o p i n i o n was

adamant t h a t the s e c u r i t y q u e s t i o n could not be s o l v e d o n l y

by a new guarantee from Great B r i t a i n — t h e p a r i t y problem with

I t a l y must a l s o be s e t t l e d . I n France i t was f e l t that I t a l y

was p u r s u i n g a p o l i c y o f p r e s t i g e whereas i n France s u p e r i o r -

i t y over I t a l y was f e l t t o be a n e c e s s i t y . B r i a n d hoped t h a t

Great B r i t a i n would consent t o a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A r t i c l e

16 o f t h e League Convenant which would go c o n s i d e r a b l y i n the

1

d i r e c t i o n towards d e v e l o p i n g a formula, however, i n s o f a r as

no s o l u t i o n c o u l d be reached over the p a r i t y q u e s t i o n w i t h

I t a l y , B r i a n d suggested t h a t the best p l a n would be f o r t h e

Conference to draw up a Three-Bower Bact between Great Britain,

u n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan among which Bowers some agreement had

1. Lippmann, Walter, The London N a v a l conference, F o r e i g n

A f f a i r s , v o l ; 8, No. 4, J u l y , 1930, p. 499.
 142
1
been reached, he r e f u s e d to c o n s i d e r a Four-Bower Fact which

would leave I t a l y out. He f e l t t h a t a Four-i?Ower Bact would

i n t e n s i f y r a t h e r than reduce the danger o f the Italo-French

p a r i t y i s s u e thus r e n d e r i n g disarmament through l i m i t a t i o n

even more i l l u s o r y , i t would exasperate Italy. "M. Briand

a mis l a une f o i s de p l u s , au s e r v i c e de l a p a i x l a grande

2

f i n e s s e de son jugement;" I t a l i a n c r i t i c s were not so laud-

atory. One great M i l a n j o u r n a l , the G o r r i e r e d e l l a S e r r a ,

3
s a i d t h a t at London, France had committed a grave e r r o r , while
I I Popolo d * I t a l i a s t a t e d t h a t w h i l e working f o r peace the
4

b a s i s f o r a new war had been l a i d . Perhaps the most inter-

e s t i n g comment was not made at a formal s e s s i o n at a l l but at

the ceremony o f the s i g n i n g o f the T r e a t y when B r i a n d s a i d ,

"Competition i n armaments i s no longer p o s s i b l e a f t e r the

5

London Conference o f 1930."

T h i s o p t i m i s t i c statement by B r i a n d was somewhat pre-

mature f o r on h i s r e t u r n to P a r i s he found h i m s e l f facedc'with

a problem of great importance, rhe s i t u a t i o n i n Germany was

1. B u e l l , R. L., op. c i t . , p. 109.

2. Joxe, L o u i s , Conclusions '"a Londres, L'Europe Nouvelle,

No. 639, 19 A v r i l ' i 1930, p. 615.

3. Pernot, Maurice, I t a l i e et La France apres l a Conference

de Londres, L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 639, 10 Mai, 1930,
p. 719;

4. Anon., F i v e Powers S i g n the Naval T r e a t y , Manchester

Guardian.Weekly, V o l . 22, No. 17, A p r i l 25, 1930,
p. 328.

5. Loc. c i t .
 143

t a k i n g a grave t u r n w i t h the i n c r e a s e i n power of the National

S o c i a l i s t and Communist f o r c e s and the f a i l u r e to reach a

s o l u t i o n of the I t a l i a n n a v a l q u e s t i o n f u r t h e r complicated

the outlook f o r h i s p o l i c y of understanding, he was on the

defensive. The f a c t t h a t he brought forward at t h i s time the

p r o p o s a l f o r a U n i t e d S t a t e s of Europe i s evidence enough t h a t

he was beginning to d e s p a i r of a c h i e v i n g s e c u r i t y through d i s -

armament, at. l e a s t i n the immediate f u t u r e , i n the Chamber

of Deputies i t was argued that the p u b l i c a t i o n of the .Feder-

a t i o n i d e a r e v e a l e d t h a t Governments o f Europe were d i v i d e d

i n t o two camps* r e v i s i o n i s t and a n t i - r e v i s i o n i s t , the League

o f Nations had f a i l e d to organize peace on a s o l i d foundation,

and the B r i a n d - K e l l o g g Fact was without force* i n his own

defense B r i a n d maintained t h a t h i s was the only p o l i c y . Ger-

many was a n a t i o n o f s i x t y m i l l i o n i n t e l l i g e n t people and a

f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r who d i d not t r y to d i m i n i s h the danger of

such a neighbor by agreements and understandings would fall

1
to do h i s duty. Nevertheless, d u r i n g the course of the same'

debate, T a r d i e u , while s u p p o r t i n g B r i a n d , warned t h a t f u r t h e r

disarmament o f France would -be governed by the conduct of the

German d e l e g a t i o n at the s e s s i o n s of the P r e p a r a t o r y Commission.

He i n s i s t e d t h a t u n t i l the German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s stopped de-

manding t h a t France reduce her. agmament to the l e v e l f o r c e d

1; Documents on I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1930, E x t r a c t from

Speech o f M. A r i s t i d e B r i a n d i n the chamber of Deputies,
November 14, 1930, p. 89.
 144
1
upon Germany, France would do n o t h i n g more* A p o l i c y of

understanding was f i n e , s a i d the French premier, but no chances

would be taken on the f u t u r e , as B r i a n d had been prepared to

do a f t e r Locarno. The way o f France must be c l e a r ahead.

The p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g the London Conference was f u r t h e r

complicated f o r B r i a n d by h i s f r u i t l e s s e f f o r t s t o r e a c h

some agreement w i t h I t a l y over t h e p a r i t y i s s u e . Negotiations

between B r i a n d and S i g n o r Grandi were c o n t i n u a l l y upset by

the v i o l e n t speeches o f premier M u s s o l i n i who r i d i c u l e d the

French i n s i s t e n c e t h a t France must have a s u p e r i o r f l e e t t o

the I t a l i a n s and boasted that he was prepared to b u i l d s h i p

2
f o r s h i p w i t h France. The problem was f u r t h e r complicated
by the new o r i e n t a t i o n o f I t a l i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y — t h e r e were
3

s i g n s o f an Italo-German rapprochement. To the R i g h t i s t i n

France t h i s was claimed t o be the d i r e c t outcome o f the p o l -

i c i e s of Briand.

To the world at l a r g e i t was f e l t t h a t the T r e a t y o f

Locarno and t h e e n t r y o f Germany i n t o t h e League would p r o v i d e

France w i t h the e x t r a measure o f s e c u r i t y which she f e l t was

needed so b a d l y . When the P r e p a r a t o r y Disarmament Commission

was s e t up i t was expected t h a t t h e problem o f s e c u r i t y would

1. I b i d . , E x t r a c t from t h e Speech o f M. Andre'Tardieu i n the

Chamber o f Deputies, November 14, 1930, p. 89.

2. Anon., Les V i s i t e s de M. Grandi, L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 645, 21 J u i n , 1930, p. 921*

3* V e r m e i l , Edmond, Danger from Germany, Revue P o l i t i q u e et

P a r l e m e n t a i r e , Tome 144, 10 A v r i l , 1930, p. 169*
 145

be absorbed by the g r e a t e r problem o f disarmament. Thus, as

the e f f o r t s towards disarmament progressed and armaments de-

creased i n q u a n t i t y , then as a n a t u r a l c o r o l l a r y , the secur-

ity of France would i n c r e a s e . As the p e r i o d 1930-31 advanced

i t was seen t h a t t h i s was not to be the case. As f a r back as

Locarno B r i a n d had felt t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s between France

and Germany were to be e v e n t u a l l y r e g u l a t e d . l e t both at

Locarno and T h o i r y , t h e r e i s s t r o n g evidence t o show t h a t the

sentiments o f not only B r i a n d , but Stresemann as w e l l , were,

1
not i n harmony w i t h a great p a r t o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e peoples.

P u b l i c o p i n i o n was more n a t i o n a l i s t i c than e i t h e r statesman

2
thought; T h i s r e s u l t e d i n France i n an extreme r e l u c t a n c e On

the p a r t o f many to g i v e up the guarantees which t h e i r country

had r e c e i v e d i n the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s .

In s p i t e of the growing n a t i o n a l i s t o p p o s i t i o n i n France

B r i a n d , a f t e r the London Naval Conference, was still deter-

mined to p r e s s forward his policy. Speaking before the

E l e v e n t h Assembly he s a i d ,
The Disarmament q u e s t i o n has j u s t been r a i s e d from
t h i s platform. Obviously a l l our work f o r peace
must, u n l e s s accompanied by i t s necessary c o r o l l a r y —
1 mean the l i m i t a t i o n and r e d u c t i o n o f armaments—
remain hazardous and cause many disappointments to
the N a t i o n . The promise l a i d down i n the Covenant
must t h e r e f o r e be f u l f i l l e d . . . ; Whatever bad times
we go through...! p e r s o n a l l y mean disarmament to go
s t r a i g h t ahead. So l o n g as 1 am where 1 am there

1; L a i s , Maurice, Stresemann, Revue des S c i e n c e s Politiques,

Tome 55, Uctobre-Decembre, 1932, p. 365.

2. L i c h t e n b e r g e r , H e n r i , The T h i r d R e i c h , New York, The

Greystone P r e s s , 1937, p. 29.
 146
1
w i l l be no war."

Yet, i n s p i t e of t h i s statement, when the D r a f t Convention of

1930 came up f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n i n December 1930, the French

government took the stand t h a t u n l e s s A r t i c l e L I I I . o f the

Convention was adopted, France would not r a t i f y the Conven-

tion. This A r t i c l e says i n p a r t ,

The present Convention s h a l l not a f f e c t the pro-

v i s i o n s o f the p r e v i o u s t r e a t i e s under which c e r -
t a i n of the h i g h C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s have agreed
to l i m i t t h e i r land, sea or a i r armaments and have
thus f i x e d i n r e l a t i o n to one another t h e i r r e - 2
s p e c t i v e r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s i n t h i s connection.

There was no doubt t h a t i n the German mind t h i s was meant as

a r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s * Germany was to

3

be kept i n a bond of p e r p e t u a l i n f e r i o r i t y . T h i s was not the

p o l i c y of Briand. Then why was i t put forward as the policy

o f the French government o f which B r i a n d was an i n t e g r a l part?

Simply because, B r i a n d i s s t i l l n o m i n a l l y the d i r e c t o r of

French f o r e i g n p o l i c y , but a c t u a l l y he.:is being used more i n

the nature of a f r o n t by the n a t i o n a l i s t forces, Also Briand

was aware o f the mood o f the French people and even he felt

t h a t the Germany o f Luther and C u r t i u s was rapidly departing

from the ways of Stresemann.

C o n f i r m a t i o n of the c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h i s c o n c l u s i o n come

1. V e r b a t i m Record o f the E l e v e n t h Assembly, September 11,

1930, c i t e d by P h i l i p iMoel-Baker, op. c i t . , v o l . 1,
p. 519 f f .
2. A r t i c l e L l I I . of the D r a f t Convention, signed December^,
1930. ' '
3. i i e i b r o n n e r , Andre', La Reduction Des Armaments: Ses Diffi-
c u l t e s , Kevue Des Sciences p o l i t i q u e s , Tome"-''55,
Octobre-Decembre, 1932, p. 254.
 147
to by the Germans i n r e s p e c t to the French stand i n the d i s -

armament i s s u e was g i v e n i n the speech of one of the f o r e -

most French delegates a t Geneva, M. M a s s i g l i when he said,

When the.,Conference meets, a c e r t a i n number of

r o w e r s , " i n c l u d i n g France, w i l l submit p r o p o s a l s
i n f i g u r e s , f o r the l i m i t a t i o n of t h e i r armaments,
xhese p r o p o s a l s w i l l be i s o l a t e d i n r e l a t i o n t o a
g i v e n s i t u a t i o n ; they w i l l correspond t o a g i v e n
degree o f s e c u r i t y . . . . By the t e x t ( A r t i c l e L l I I )
the Fower.-s': concerned d e f i n e the c o n d i t i o n s under
which they accept the f i g u r e s f o r l i m i t a t i o n to
be i n s e r t e d i n r e g a r d to themselves, i n the Con-
v e n t i o n . . .. 1 .

i h i s i s the statement of M. m a s s i g l i , but B r i a n d was the

head o f the French d e l e g a t i o n . The B r i a n d who endorsed this

speech was not the B r i a n d o f the Locarno days, i t i s a Briand

who i s on the d e f e n s i v e . Behind t h i s speech can be seen the

shadow of r o i n c a r e ' a n d Foch. B r i a n d was b e g i n n i n g to f i n d

2

t h a t the "pens made from the same s t e e l as cannons" were be-

g i n n i n g t o command an ever-widening audience i n France, in

view o f the t e n s i o n at the time of the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the

Convention i t was f e l t by many t h a t an important success had

been achieved i n the s t r u g g l e to disarm, not so much f o r what

the Convention c o n t a i n e d , but simply because o f i t s very e x i s -

tence.

The e v a c u a t i o n of the Rhineland took p l a c e i n June of

1930 and i f B r i a n d ' s p o l i c y of appeasement had borne h e a l t h y

f r u i t , the f u t u r e of Franco-German r e l a t i o n s would have become

1. Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1930, p. 120.

2. M; B r i a n d speaking to a Committee of Women's O r g a n i z a t i o n s

at Geneva, September 23, 19 30. C i t e d by Noel-Baker,
op. c i t . , v o l . I . , p. 255.
 148

brighter. Two months l a t e r 107 N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t s were

1

e l e c t e d to the K e i c h s t a g . T h i s confirmed French p u b l i c o p i n -

i o n i n the b e l i e f t h a t each c o n c e s s i o n made t o the Germans by

B r i a n d only l e d to f u r t h e r demands. Thus the b e l i e f grew

stronger t h a t B r i a n d ' s p o l i c y of appeasement was an illusion

which was l e a d i n g France t o r u i n . T h i s growing t e n s i o n be-

tween France and Germany had a d i r e c t b e a r i n g on the n e g o t i -

a t i o n s between I t a l y and France on the n a v a l q u e s t i o n which

f o l l o w e d the London Naval Conference. A f t e r much c o n s u l t a t i o n ,

a p r o p o s a l whereby I t a l y i n 19 36 would have a n a v a l tonnage of

441,256 tons to 670,723 tons f o r France was accepted by the

Italians. The French F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Committee o f the Cham-

ber of Deputies, however, turned i t down, m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t i t

would approve o n l y those agreements which were connected w i t h

guarantees f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y which had a l r e a d y been

obtained or might be i n the f u t u r e , i n making t h i s decision

the F r e n c h government l i n k e d t h i s problem o f disarmament w i t h

the broader q u e s t i o n of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . The

d e c i s i o n was made on the same day on which the proposed cus-

toms u n i o n between A u s t r i a and Germany was announced. Briand

says o f t h i s p l a n i n an address to the French Senate, " S i vous

me maintenez v o t r e c o n f i a n c e , je t i e n d r a i jusqu'au bout dans

1 ' a t t i t u d e que je v i e n s d ' i n d i q u e r avec l ' e s p o i r formel que

l'Allemagne et l ' A u t r i c h e prevenues de nos i n t e n t i o n s ne

p e r s i s t e r o n t pas a accomplis ce que l a France c o n s i d e r e

1. Ormesson, Wladimir d, France, London, Longmans Green,

1939, p. 83.
 149
1
comme l a v i o l a t i o n d'engagements solonnels." Thus we have

B r i a n d , the "man o f peace", condemning the a c t i o n o f Germany

and Austria. Hope f o r disarmament was waning i n Europe.

So great had t h e pressure o f events i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l

f i e l d become i n the l a t t e r p a r t o f 1931 w i t h the consequent

embitterment o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s that i t was f e l t i n

many q u a r t e r s t h a t i t would be a wise step t o postpone the

World Disarmament Conference which was ,to open February 2,

1932. T h i s move was urged by many statesmen o f the L e f t i n

France who f e l t t h a t i f the Conference could be postponed

u n t i l a f t e r the French G e n e r a l e l e c t i o n i n May, 1932, a new

government, f r e e d from c o n t r o l o f the n a t i o n a l i s t s might b r i n g

i n a change o f p o l i c y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . B r i a n d was

determined however that postponement should not take p l a c e .

He s i n c e r e l y f e l t that a conference i n February would h e l p

to c l a r i f y the s i t u a t i o n which was growing extremely complex.

At the T w e l f t h Assembly o f t h e League o f Nations h e l d a t Gen-

eva i n September 1931, he made the formal announcement that

France -did not propose t h a t the Disarmament Conference should

2
be delayed, let on the other s i d e o f the p i c t u r e a l e s s pro-

mising;; prospect i s observed. The n a t i o n a l i s t elements o f the

Government are e q u a l l y determined and i n some cases v e r y frank

1. Anon., E x t r a i t s de d i s c o u r s p r o n o n c e p a r M. B r i a n d au
/

Senat l e 28 mars, L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 686,

4 A v r i l , 1931, p. 481.

2. Address by B r i a n d b e f o r e the T w e l f t h Assembly o f the

League o f N a t i o n s , September, 1931. C i t e d by J . W.
Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and S e c u r i t y , 1925-31,
p. 346.
 150

as t o t h e i r stand. They would c o n s i d e r granting juridical

e q u a l i t y t o Germany, hut a c t u a l e q u a l i t y i n armaments France

1

was not prepared to g r a n t . To them Germany had never recog-

n i z e d t h a t the d i s a b i l i t i e s under which she s u f f e r e d were the

I n e v i t a b l e consequences o f d e f e a t . Behind the scenes but

undoubtedly a s t r o n g f o r c e u r g i n g t h a t the Conference be h e l d

on the designated date was the F r e n c h General S t a f f , which

s t r o n g l y supported Maginot, the M i n i s t e r o f War; T h i s group

f e l t t h a t i f the Conference was h e l d i n February t h a t , i n view

of t h e d i f f i c u l t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , i t would l i k e l y
2
break down. T h i s would leave France, f r e e o f any blame f o r

i t s f a i l u r e , r a t h e r would she be given c r e d i t f o r so v i g o r -

ously u r g i n g t h a t i t be h e l d ;

On J u l y 15, 1931, the French government had i s s u e d a

very important document r e l a t i v e t o the coming World Disarm-

ament Conference i n which was s e t f o r t h the keynote o f t h e

3

French stand, "security f i r s t . " T h i s document r e i t e r a t e d the

stand taken on many p r e v i o u s occasions t h a t f u r t h e r guarantees

must precede f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n of.armaments on the part of

France. By t h i s Memorandum i t was shown t h a t France had no

i n t e n t i o n o f abandoning the t h e s i s t h a t a p e r p e t u a t i o n o f the

i n e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s imposed upon the defeated powers was

1. Cot, P i e r r e , France and Disarmament, S p e c t a t o r , v o l . 148,

January 9, 1932, p. 38.

2; Toynbee, op. c i t . , 1931, p. 287, footnote 1.

3. Documents o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1931, p. 43. E x t r a c t

from the French Memorandum, J u l y 15, 1931, League
Document, 19 31, IX 9.
 151

e s s e n t i a l t o the s e c u r i t y of Europe.

B r i a n d ' s p o s i t i o n was badly shaken by the Austro-German

Custom's p r o p o s a l and a l t h o u g h t h i s scheme was condemned by

the Hague Uourt, i t n e v e r t h e l e s s i n f l u e n c e d Briand.. i n h i s

a t t i t u d e towards Germany. Coupled with t h i s reverse i n the

f o r e i g n f i e l d was h i s u n s u c c e s s f u l attempt t o a t t a i n the P r e s -

idency o f t h e R e p u b l i c * B r i a n d f a i l e d t o a p p r e c i a t e the t r u t h

o f the o l d axiom i n French p o l i t i c s , t h a t any statesman who

has shown very pronounced views and taken a prominent p l a c e

i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e had b e t t e r not t r y f o r the P r e s i d e n t i a l

post* These two s e r i o u s r e v e r s a l s , one i n the p o l i c y on which

he had based h i s whole p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , t h a t o f r a p -

prochement w i t h Germany, and t h e o t h e r i n what he f e l t was a

p e r s o n a l d e f e a t , convinced him t h a t h i s p o l i t i c a l race was

n e a r l y run. Perhaps t h i s f e e l i n g t h a t he had been thwarted

caused him t o n e g l e c t a r e a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o take a stand a t

Geneva on t h e p r o p o s a l fp>D an Arms Truce put forward by S i g -

1

nor Grandi o f I t a l y on September 8, 1931. On September 11,

B r i a n d made a speech b e f o r e the League Assembly i n which he

made no r e f e r e n c e t o the I t a l i a n p r o p o s a l , even although i t

had been g i v e n a g e n e r a l l y f a v o r a b l e r e c e p t i o n by other na-

tions. The French had. always i n s i s t e d t h a t s e c u r i t y should

precede a r b i t r a t i o n and disarmament; Briand brought t h i s doc-

t r i n e up a g a i n . i\iot content w i t h t h i s he f u r t h e r complicated

1. Anon., I n s t a n t H a l t i n Armaments, Manchester Guardian

Weekly, v o l . 25, JMo. 11, September 11, 1931, p. 205.
 152

the s i t u a t i o n by s t a t i n g t h a t France would be w i l l i n g to

disarm only i f the T r e a t y o f Mutual A s s i s t a n c e was r e v i s e d .

T h i s was the most extreme o f a l l proposals i n v o l v i n g the use

1

of m i l i t a r y sanctions.

On January 7, 1932, A r i s t i d e B r i a n d r e t i r e d from the

Quai d'Orsay. Was i t a r e t r e a t ? Had h i s p o l i c y f a i l e d ? Cer-

t a i n l y d u r i n g t h e seven years he had spent a s . F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r

he had gone t h e f u l l c i r c l e i n h i s a t t i t u d e towards disarm-

ament. Some French c r i t i c s f e l t t h a t at Locarno he was pre-

pared t o r i s k the s e c u r i t y o f France i n order t o g i v e Germany

every chance, let a t Geneva i n t h e f a l l o f 1931 he brought

up t h e T r e a t y o f Mutual A s s i s t a n c e . I t was the gesture, not

of t h e B r i a n d , who w i t h the flame o f i d e a l i s m burning deep

in h i s s o u l , s t r o v e w i t h Stresemann f o r the new day, but o f

a man who has l o s t the z e s t f o r b a t t l e . B r i a n d had become

merely t h e symbol o f the f o r e i g n p o l i c y which was f a s t d i s a p -

p e a r i n g i n France, B i s power was gone, ne was t h e f r o n t

used by the new f o r c e s to make t h e i r p o l i c y a c c e p t a b l e , lie

had f a i l e d t o r e a c h h i s g o a l . Upon h i s departure from o f f i c e

his country had a stronger m i l i t a r y establishment than ever

before* France d i d not y e t f e e l secure.

1. Anon., M. B r i a n d and Disarmament, Manchester Guardian

weekly, v o l ; 25, No. 12, September 18, 1931, p. 223.
CHAPTER V I I .

EPILOGUE
 CHAPTER V I I .

EPILOGUE

To estimate the c o n t r i b u t i o n of A r i s t i d e B r i a n d to the

s e c u r i t y of Prance i s a d i f f i c u l t task. It is d i f f i c u l t not

s o l e l y because the s t r u c t u r e of peace which he so l a b o r i o u s l y

b u i l t up crashed almost immediately a f t e r h i s retirement from

o f f i c e , but a l s o because of the very nature o f the man himself*

B r i a n d was an o p p o r t u n i s t b o t h i n h i s p e r s o n a l l i f e and

in h i s p o l i t i c a l career, h i s opportunism i s l a r g e l y due to

the f a c t that he was a realist, i t was h i s appreciation of

reality that caused B r i a n d to stay i n o f f i c e a f t e r he had had

two successive r e v e r s e s — t h e r e j e c t i o n of the Franco-German

rapprochement p l a n which grew out of the T h o i r y conversations

and the r e f u s a l o f h i s government to r a t i f y the Anglo-French-

I t a l i a n N a v a l Agreement o f 1931. he d i d not r e s i g n because

he f e l t that t o stay i n o f f i c e would be t o accomplish more

than i f he had withdrawn from the government. His a p p r e c i a t i o n

of the r e a l i t y o f the European p i c t u r e caused him to be con-

t e n t to watch and wait a f t e r h i s r e c a l l from the Cannes Con-

ference because he knew t h a t w i t h a s t r o n g l y n a t i o n a l i s t

Chamber l i t t l e c o u l d be accomplished along the l i n e s he i n t e n -

ded to f o l l o w , he must await the swing o f the p o l i t i c a l pen-

dulum. That t h i s swing had taken p l a c e was seen by t h e en-

thusiasm which was aroused by the s i g n a t u r e of the Locarno

1
Pacts. The T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s had been humanized.

1. B o i s , J u l e s , A r i s t i d e B r i a n d , Member of Twenty-one French.

C a b i n e t s , Current H i s t o r y , v o l . 31, lMo. 3, December,
1929, p. 529.

153
 154

Locarno was the climax of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of B r i a n d .

I t s whole s p i r i t was a compromise, an appeal to the humanity

which B r i a n d so f a i t h f u l l y b e l i e v e d i n , but above a l l he felt

t h a t Locarno was the work o f a r e a l i s t , he b e l i e v e d t h a t he

had a grasp not only on the p u l s e o f France, but on t h a t o f

the new Europe as w e l l . For t h i s reason the defeat o f h i s

Franco-German rapprochement e f f o r t was a profound blow t o him

but he s t i l l h e l d t r u e t o h i s great i d e a l — F r a n c e secure in

a Europe at peace.

A statesman has a two-fold task; i n the f i r s t instance

he must be an advocate of the i n t e r e s t s o f h i s own country

p r i m a r i l y , and i n the second case he must be an architect

t r y i n g to improve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t has been

s a i d by many r e s p o n s i b l e t h i n k e r s that Briand d i d not guard

the s e c u r i t y o f France s u f f i c i e n t l y , t h a t he was willing to

b a r t e r i t away f o r the sake of compromise, i e t never once

d i d Briand r e f u s e t o agree to the a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r the armed

f o r c e s s e t a s i d e by the French governments i n which he served.

In s p i t e of t h i s f a c t he f e l t another road could be travelled

besides t h a t o f armed might to reach h i s g o a l of security;

he b e l i e v e d t h a t Anglo-French c o o p e r a t i o n was imperative f o r

the w e l l - b e i n g o f France. For t h i s reason he accepted a

reduced n a v a l s t r e n g t h f o r France at V'/ashington i n the hope

of being a b l e to d r i v e a wedge between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and

1
Great B r i t a i n ; F a i l i n g t o do t h i s he only saved h i s p o l i t i c a l

1. C a r r , P h i l i p , A r i s t i d e B r i a n d , Contemporary Review,
v o l . 141, A p r i l , 1932, p. 431.
 155

l i f e by h i s famous speech i n defense of French land armaments.

B r i a n d had t r i e d f o r the f r i e n d s h i p of Great B r i t a i n once—

he was to t r y again* poincare', the n a t i o n a l i s t , scorned Bri-

t i s h a d v i c e and sent French t r o o p s i n t o the Ruhr. I t i s an

open q u e s t i o n as to which French statesman was thinking pri-

m a r i l y o f the s e c u r i t y of h i s country.

B r i a n d hated war. There i s no reason t o d i s b e l i e v e the

a s s e r t i o n he made a t Guerdon on June 19, 1931, i n which he

r e c a l l e d w i t h what h o r r o r war f i l l e d h i s s p i r i t and that ever

s i n c e he took o f f i c e he had persevered i n h i s e f f o r t s to g a i n

1

s e c u r i t y f o r France and peace i n Europe. His s i n c e r i t y i n h i s

low© of peace was b e l i e v e d i n by the statesmen of other count-

r i e s w i t h whom he came i n c o n t a c t , i t was b e l i e v e d i n by the

common people of other lands and those of prance as w e l l . The

great success of Locarno f o l l o w i n g so c l o s e l y upon the con-

demnation of the T r e a t y o f Mutual A s s i s t a n c e and the Geneva

P r o t o c o l l e d Frenchmen to b e l i e v e both i n h i s s i n c e r i t y and

h i s method. As time progressed many began to q u e s t i o n h i s

method. H i s g r e a t e s t and most d e s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c s were the

nationalist l e a d e r s and t h e i r p r e s s whose independence of the

armament i n d u s t r y was often questioned. The a c c u s a t i o n of the

n a t i o n a l i s t press began and ended w i t h the one thought—the

war g u i l t of Germany* That view would brook no compromise.

B r i a n d b e l i e v e d i n rapprochement which would c a l l f o r com-

promise.

1. Anon., M. B r i a n d s F i g h t f o r Peace, Manchester Guardian

1

Weekly, v o l . 24, H . 25, June 19, 1931, p. 491.

Q
 156

B r i a n d was a r e v o l u t i o n a r y , a r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n method.

For him the s e c u r i t y o f France through peace i n Europe was

the only g o a l — b u t the ways to reach t h a t g o a l were many.

One o f h i s o u t s t a n d i n g methods was through the f o s t e r i n g o f

the i d e a of the T r e a t y f o r t h e R e n u n c i a t i o n o f War. In the

Assembly o f the League o f iMations the i d e a was r e c e i v e d i n

silence; U n t i l t h i s suggestion o f B r i a n d was brought before

them the delegates had t a l k e d o f p e a c e — a n d thought o f war;

They l i v e d i n p e r p e t u a l f e a r t h a t war would come because o f

some hole i n the Covenant h i t h e r t o u n d i s c l o s e d . Briand's

p r o p o s a l wrought a r e v o l u t i o n i n t h e i r whole concept. I t was

the p r o p o s a l o f an u n f e t t e r e d mind, l e t i t was too r e v o l u -

tionary; The world responded w i t h l i p - s e r v i c e , y e t each na-

t i o n made r e s e r v a t i o n s i n i t s own s o u l . .

A r i s t i d e B r i a n d was an i d e a l i s t , tie was a r e a l i s t . Be

had the support o f m i l l i o n s throughout the world i n h i s quest.

He was s i n c e r e y e t h i s e f f o r t s came to nought. Why? The

answer i s found i n the s t o r y o f h i s s t r u g g l e . He knew where

h i s g o a l l a y , but t h e narrow-minded statesmen o f the European

n a t i o n s c o u l d not wait f o r him t o f i n d a s a f e way. One o f h i s

keenest y e t most a p p r e c i a t i v e c r i t i c s d e s c r i b e s him as having

"a dynamic and ardent h e a r t , an a r t i s t i c s e n s i b i l i t y , which

had t r a n s f e r r e d a commonplace u g l y o b s t i n a t e wrangle to the

l o f t i e s t and n o b l e s t plane, and which f i n a l l y had squandered

1
i t s e l f f o r a dream."

1. Stern-Rubarth, Edgar, op. c i t . , p. 275.

 157

In h i s l a s t speech b e f o r e the Assembly o f the League o f

N a t i o n s B r i a n d spoke of the approaching World Disarmament Con-

f e r e n c e o f 1952. "We are approaching," he s a i d , "a date on

which the eyes of the people are more and more a r d e n t l y fixed...

Itwill.bea.solemn hour...never w i l l the n a t i o n s have borne

heavier r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . W i l l the n a t i o n s , who can do every-

t h i n g , leave unanswered the t e r r i b l e i n t e r r o g a t i o n which still

1

weighs us down?" Were these words a p o r t e n t o f t h e f a t e of

h i s own policy? Looking back over the y e a r s we see t h a t the

p a s s i n g o f B r i a n d was f o l l o w e d by the c o l l a p s e of h i s work.

For B r i a n d ' s p o l i c y was w i t h i n the v e r y s o u l o f the man him-

self. When the spark went out of t h a t soul'-after the an-

nouncement of the Austro-German Customs p l a n was made, i t

l e f t a hollow s h e l l which soon gave way. Yet perhaps no

g r e a t e r t r i b u t e to t h i s statesman o f France who struggled

sometimes not w i s e l y , but always v a l i a n t l y , f o r the s e c u r i t y

of h i s country, can be found than i n the words of a little

o l d woman who murmured over h i s b i e r , "God keep your soul.

2
r o the peacemakers may God g i v e h i s peace."

1. September, 1931; C i t e d by Wickham Steed, The B r i a n d I

Knew, F o r t n i g h t l y Keview,'vol. 131, A p r i l 1, 1932,
p. 409.

2. Slocomb, George, A M i r r o r to Geneva, London, .Jonathan

Cape, 1937, p. 175.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRINTED DOCUMENTS. PERSONAL NARRATIVES. SPEECHES

A Primer on Europe's Armament Makers

who P r o l o n g War and D i s t u r b Peace.

(Text o f Wye R e s o l u t i o n ) .

Washington, U n i t e d S t a t e s .

Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1934.

A scathing denunciation of t h i s industry. I t s

wide r a m i f i c a t i o n s give i t a h o l d i n almost every
s e c t i o n o f the i n d u s t r i a l l i f e o f the m a j o r powers.

Armaments Xear Book,

League o f N a t i o n s p u b l i c a t i o n ,

IX, Disarmament, 1930, LX2,

S i x t h 1 ear.

S t a t i s t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the armed f o r o e s o f
League members i n 1930.

B a i n b r i d g e , w. M. A Report on the P r e s e n t C o n d i t i o n s i n

t h e Ruhr and R h i n e l a n d .

New York, O f f i c e o f the M i l i t a r y Order

of F o r e i g n W rs, 1923.
a

A r e p o r t made by a p h y s i c i a n who made a t o u r

through t h i s a r e a . I t i s sympathetic t o the French
case. Value d o u b t f u l .

Borah, W; E . M u n i t i o n s Manufacturers Should be Curbed.

(Speech i n t h e United S t a t e s Senate,

March 5, 1934J.

I
 II

Washington, United S t a t e s .

Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 19 34.

An i s o l a t i o n i s t speaks.

Command Papers (Cmd.),

London, H i s Majesty's S t a t i o n e r y Office.

Of these documents a v a i l a b l e f o r t h i s study, No.

2169 on the A n g l o - F r e n c h t e n s i o n , (1919-23), Nos.
2525, 2764 on the Locarno Conference and Nos. 3547,
3485 on the London Naval Conference of 1930 are o f
most v a l u e .

Germany Speaks.

London, Thornton Butterworth, L t d . , 1938.

T h i s volume i s composed o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f a r t i c l e s
c o n t r i b u t e d by 21 l e a d i n g N a z i P a r t y members or
State o f f i c i a l s . Some o f these men are d i r e c t l y
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r German p o l i c y and because of t h a t
f a c t t h i s volume i s o f great i n t e r e s t , i t contains
a Foreword by Joachim von Hibbentrop.

L a n s i n g , Robert. The Peace N e g o t i a t i o n s , A P e r s o n a l

Narrative.

New York, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1921.

An account by a member o f the American d e l e g a t i o n

to the Peace Conference. He b r i n g s out some o f the
weaknesses o f P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n .

L l o y d George, David.The T r u t h About the Peace T r e a t i e s .

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , L t d . , 1938,

2 volumes.

An attempt as the w r i t e r says i n h i s P r e f a c e , to

present "the case as a whole t o t r a i n e d judges and
to a j u r y o f c i t i z e n s . "
 Ill

S e s s i o n a l Paper, No. 47, 12 George V ,

A 1922;

conference on t h e L i m i t a t i o n o f Armament

h e l d at Washington, November 12, 1921

to February 6, 1922.

uttawa, F. A. A c l a n d , 1922.

A r e p o r t on the Washington Conference.

S h o t w e l l , J . T. A t the P a r i s Peace Conference.

New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937.

An e s s e n t i a l source as i t was w r i t t e n by an Amer-

i c a n h i s t o r i a n present a t the Conference.

Stresemann, Gustav. Essays and Speeches on V a r i o u s Subjects

( T r a n s l a t e d by C. R. Turner!).

London, Thornton Butterworth, Ltfl. , 1930;

T a r d i e u , Andre .
7
The T r u t h About the T r e a t y .

I n d i a n a p o l i s , the B o b b s - M e r r i l l Co., 1921.

A F r e n c h c r i t i c i s m o f the T r e a t y by an important
statesman o f France.

The T r e a t i e s o f Peace, 1919-1923.

New York, The Carnegie Endowment f o r

I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace, 1924, 2 volumes.

These volumes c o n t a i n some e x c e l l e n t maps by L t .

C o l . Lawrence M a r t i n which help t o c l a r i f y the
s e t t l e m e n t ; There i s a l s o a summary o f t h e l e g a l
b a s i s o f the new boundaries.

T r e a t y o f Peace between t h e A l l i e d and

A s s o c i a t e d Powers and Germany, signed at

 IV

V e r s a i l l e s , June 38, 1919.

London, H i s Majesty's S t a t i o n e r y Office,

1919. ( T r e a t y S e r i e s , No. 4).

What R e a l l y Happened at P a r i s ; The Story

of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919.

New York, C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1931.

T h i s volume i s a s e r i e s o f c r i t i c i s m s compiled by
S. M. House and C h a r l e s Seymour, made by v a r i o u s
American delegates and observers at the Conference.

Wheeler-Bennett, J.W. ed.,

Documents on international Affairs.

London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press,

v o l s , 1929^1953.

These volumes o f documents are very v a l u a b l e as

a supplement to P r o f e s s o r Toynbee's Survey of
international Affairs.
 /

MEMOIRS

Benes, Eduard. My War Memoirs.

( T r a n s l a t e d from the Czech', by P a u l

Server),

London, George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1928.

T e l l s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f Prance w i t h t h e Czechs
d u r i n g t h e l a t t e r y e a r s o f t h e Great War and i n the
e a r l y y e a r s a f t e r t h e peace.

Chamberlain, Austen. Down the Y e a r s .

London, C a s s e l l and Company, L t d . , 1935.

A s e r i e s o f sketches o f t h i s statesman's experiences

over a l o n g p e r i o d i n B r i t i s h p u b l i c l i f e .

Foch, M a r s h a l . Memoirs.

( T r a n s l a t e d by C o l . T. B e n t l e y Mo t t ) .

New York, Doubleday, Doran and company,

1931.

The reader i s l e f t w i t h the problem as t o whether

the A l l i e s d i d r i g h t i n not i n s i s t i n g on a complete
peace.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf.

( T r a n s l a t e d by E . T. S. Dugdale).

New York, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1933.

T h i s volume shows how b i t t e r n e s s on t h e p a r t o f

some Germans a g a i n s t France i n c r e a s e d r a t h e r than
d e c l i n e d w i t h the p a s s i n g o f t h e y e a r s .

House, C o l o n e l . i n t i m a t e Papers.

London, E r n e s t Benn, L t d . , 1926-28.

These Papers, arranged as a n a r r a t i v e by C h a r l e s

Seymour are o f great use i n the study o f t h e P a r i s
Peace Conference.

V
 VI

P o i n c a r e , Raymond, Memoirs.

( T r a n s l a t e d and adapted by S i r George

Arthurj.

London, W i l l i a m heinemann, L t d * , 1928.

2 volumes.

Of c o n s i d e r a b l e value as i t a s s i s t s i n the under-

s t a n d i n g o f the man whose work had such a bearing
on t h a t of B r i a n d .

R£ddfe#, L o r d . War Diary.

London, Ivor N i c h o l s o n and Watson, L t d . ,

1933.

The p e r i o d c o v e r i n g the Peace Conference i s of

great i n t e r e s t ;

Steed, Wickham. Through T h i r t y Y e a r s .

New York, Doubleday, Page and Company,

1924, 2 volumes.

An i n t e r e s t i n g account by the Vienna correspondent

and l a t e r the e d i t o r o f the London "Times". Gives
the j o u r n a l i s t ' s view-point of some of the entan-
glements i n the p o l i t i c a l background of the post-
war p e r i o d .

Stresemann, Gustav. D i a r i e s , L e t t e r s and rapers.

( E d i t e d and T r a n s l a t e d by E r i c Suttonj.

London, The M a c m i l l a n Co., Ltd., 1937.

2 volumes.

These volumes form an i n v a l u a b l e r e f e r e n c e i n the

study of the Franco-German problem.
 SECONDARY—GENERAL SURVEYS

A b e l , Theodore; Why H i t l e r Came to power.

New York, P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1938;

T h i s w e l l - w r i t t e n volume m a t e r i a l l y a s s i s t s i n t h e
comprehension o f t h i s e n g r o s s i n g problem.

A n g e l l , J . W. The Recovery o f Germany;

New Haven, Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1929..

Armstrong, H. F. Europe Between Wars,

New York, The Macmillan Co., 1934.

A good g e n e r a l survey but b r i e f i n some fields.

Ashton, H. S. Clamour f o r c o l o n i e s .

London, Thornton Butterworth, L t d . , 1936.

B a i n v i l l e , Jacques. The T h i r d F r e n c h R e p u b l i c , 1870-1935.

London, Jonathan Cape, 1935.

The w r i t e r does not h o l d much o f a b r i e f f o r

B r i a n d ' s work.

Barthele'my, Joseph. The Government o f France.

( T r a n s l a t e d by J . B. M o r r i s ) .

London, G. A l l e n and unwin, L t d . , 1924.

B a r t l e t t , Vernon. iMazi Germany E x p l a i n e d .

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , L t d . , 1933.

B u e l l , R. L-. A H i s t o r y o f Ten Years.

New York, The M a c m i l l a n Co., 1928;

T h i s i s an e x c e l l e n t g e n e r a l r e f e r e n c e .

VII
 VIII

B u e l l , R. L. Poland, Key t o Europe,

new York, A. A. Knopf, 1939.

A c l e a r and a u t h o r i t a t i v e volume.

B u e l l , R. L. The Washington conference of 1922.

New York, D. A p p l e t o n and Company, 1922.

Burns, 0. D e l i s l e ; 1918-1928: A Short h i s t o r y o f the World.

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , L t d . , 1928.

C a r r , E, H. i n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s s i n c e the Peace

Treaties.

London, The Macmillan Co., 1938.

The w r i t e r of t h i s volume gives a survey of the

p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g the War o f 1914-18 which i s made
more v a l u a b l e by the a d d i t i o n o f a group of s p l e n -
d i d maps.

Chaput, R o l l a n d A. Disarmament i n B r i t i s h F o r e i g n p o l i c y .

London, George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1935.

D i s c u s s e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f French p o l i c y to t h a t
of B r i t i s h i n many phases of the post-war p e r i o d .

Chardon, H e n r i . L ' O r g a n i z a t i o n de l a R e p u b l i c pour l a

Paix.

New Haven, Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1926,

A study o f t h e French p o l i t i c a l scene i n the e a r l y

years "after 1918.

Chase, E. P. and V a l e u r , Robert.

Democratic Governments i n Europe..

New York, T. Nelson and Sons, L t d . , 1935.

 IX

C h u r c h i l l , Winston. The Aftermath;

New York, C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1929.

The w r i t e r d i s c u s s e s the problem o f s e c u r i t y at

considerable length.

C l a r k , R. T. The F a l l of the German R e p u b l i c .

London, George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1935.

Cole, G. D. H. and M. I .

The I n t e l l i g e n t Man's Review o f Europe

Today.

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , L t d . , 1933.

C o l e , G. D. H. The I n t e l l i g e n t Man's Guide Through

World Chaos.

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , L t d . , 1933.

Cooper, A. D u f f . The Second World War.

London, Jonathan Cape, 1939.

Of e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i n view o f the p o s i t i o n o f
i t s author.

Crabites, P i e r r e . Benes, Statesmann o f C e n t r a l Europe.

New York, Coward-McCann, i n c . , 1936.

Dawson, V/. H. Germany Under t h e T r e a t y .

London, George A l l e n and Unwin, L t d . , 1933.

Dean, V e r a Micheles. Europe i n R e t r e a t .

New York, A. A. Knopf, 1939.

Contains a f i n e chapter on the s h i f t i n g trends i n

European governments.
 X

D e l l , Robert. My Second Country ( F r a n c e ) .

London, John Lane, L t d . , 1920.

D i l l o n , E. J . The Peace Conference.

London, Hutchinson and Company, ( n . d.)

T h i s w r i t e r i n s i s t s that the best way t o judge the

l e a d e r s who made the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s i s i n
t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards R u s s i a ;

Dutch, Oswald. Thus Died A u s t r i a .

London, Edward A r n o l d , 1938.

E i n z i g , Paul. Finance and P o l i t i c s .

London, The Macmillan Uo., 1932.

A good study o f the Years of c r i s i s from the

f i n a n c i a l side.

Gathorn-Hardy, G. M. A Short H i s t o r y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s .

London, Oxford u n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1934.

A v e r y a u t h o r i t a t i v e work.

Glasgow, George. From Dawes to Locarno.

London, E r n e s t Benn, L t d . , 1925.

Greenwood, H. P. The German R e v o l u t i o n ;

London, George Routledge and Sons, L t d . ,

1934;

Hart, L i d d e l l . Foch, t h e Man o f Orleans.

London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1931.

Gives a good i n s i g h t i n t o the l i f e o f t h i s great

m i l i t a r y leader.
 XI

Hawtrey, R. G. Trade D e p r e s s i o n and the Way Out.

London, Longmans Green and Company, 1931.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . France.

London, E r n e s t Henn, L t d . , 1926

Huddleston, S i s l e y . France and the F r e n c h .

New York, C. S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, L t d . , 1925.

I c h i h a s h i , Yamato. The Washington Conference and A f t e r .

Stanford u n i v e r s i t y press, 1928.

A u s e f u l study by a Japanese commentator.

K e l l o r , Frances and Hatvany, A n t o n i a .

S e c u r i t y i&gainst War.

New York, The M a c m i l l a n Co., 1924;

T h i s d e t a i l e d study goes i n t o many o f t h e elements

of the s e c u r i t y problem and gives a u s e f u l a n a l y s i s ,

Keynes, J'." M. Essays i n P e r s u a s i o n .

London, The M a c m i l l a n Co., 1931.

K i n g - H a l l , Steven. Our Own Times, 1913-1934.

London, Ivor N i c h o l s o n and Watson, L t d . ,

1934, 2 volumes;

"Valuable as a source o f f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n ;

L a j o s , Ivan Germany's War Chances.

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , L t d . , 1939.

T r a c e s some o f the present problems i n Europe to

the immediate post-war p e r i o d .
 XII

Latimer, Hugh. N a v a l Disarmament.

(Chatham house Monographs, No. 3 ) .

London, uxford U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1930.

L e s c h a r t i e r , G-eorges.

French p o l i c y and Disarmament*

New York, Columbia u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1927,

T h i s volume i s an e s s e n t i a l r e f e r e n c e work.

Lichtenberger, Henri.

The T h i r d R e i c h .

New York, The Greystone p r e s s , 1939.

T h i s i s a v a l u a b l e r e f e r e n c e owing t o i t s e x c e l l e n t
c o l l e c t i o n o f documents.

Macartney, M. H. H. and Cremona, Paul.

I t a l y ' s F o r e i g n and C o l o n i a l p o l i c y ,

1914-1937.

London, Oxford u n i v e r s i t y Press, 1938.

T h i s volume b r i n g s out the I t a l i a n s i d e t o t h e

Franco-Italian disputes.

Michon, Georges. The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1891-1917.

London, George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1929,

Good background r e f e r e n c e on the r e l a t i o n s h i p of

France w i t h C z a r i s t R u s s i a .

Mouat, R. B. A g i s t o r y o f European Diplomacy, 1914-

1925.

London, Edward A r n o l d , 1927.

 XIII

Muir, Ramsay. The P o l i t i c a l Consequences o f the Great

War.

London, Thornton Butterworth, L t d . , 1930.

Munro; W. B. The Governments o f Europe.

New York, The M a c m i l l a n Co., 1925.

Murray, G i l b e r t . The o r d e a l of t h i s feneration.

London, George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1929.

P r o f e s s o r Murray f e e l s t h a t world peace i s a pro-

blem of the s p i r i t .

Myers, Benys. World Disarmament.

Boston, World peace Foundation, 1932.

A good study, d e t a i l e d and w e l l documented.

Newfang, Oscar. World F e d e r a t i o n .

New York, Barnes and iMoble, I n c . , 1939.

Nicolson, Harold. Peacemaking, 1919.

London, Constable and Company, L t d . , 1933,

A well-balanced analysis.

Noel-Baker, P h i l i p . The p r i v a t e Manufacture o f Armaments.

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , L t d . , 1937.

2 volumes.

A remarkable study, v e r y b i t t e r a g a i n s t p r i v a t e
manufacture. H i s case i s amply proven, however.

Nomad, Max. (pseud.jRebels and Renegades.

New York, The M a c m i l l a n Co., 1932.

 xrv
U s e f u l i n s o f a r as i t deals w i t h the e a r l y life
of B r i a n d .

Ormesson, Wladimir d'.

Franoe.

( T r a n s l a t e d by J . L i May).

London, Longmans Green and Company, 1939.

The w r i t e r makes out a good case f o r France.

P a s c a l , Roy. The N a z i D i c t a t o r s h i p .

London, George Routledge and Sons, L t d . ,

1934.

Patterson, E r i c J . Poland.

London, Arrowsmith, 1934.

Gives a g e n e r a l survey, but good i n the e a r l y

period.

P a t t e r s o n , E. M* The World's Economic Dilemma.

New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1930.

Payen, Fernand. Raymond Poincare', l'homme—le parlementaire-

l'avooati

P a r i s , B. G r a s s e t , 1936i

A good study o f t h i s F r e n c h statesman whose l i f e

and work so g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d B r i a n d ' s e f f o r t s .

Poincare', Raymond. How France i s Governed.

London, T. F. Unwin, 1915.

Old, but u s e f u l f o r background r e a d i n g .

 XV

Reboul, l e c o l o n e l . L'Armee.

P a r i s , M a r c e l Seheur, 1931.

Renouvin, P i e r r e . La c r i s e europe'ene et l a grande guerre

I1904-1918).

P a r i s , P. A l c a n , 1934.

Good background r e f e r e n c e .

Rowell, Newton W. The B r i t i s h Empire and fiforld peace,

Toronto, V i c t o r i a C o l l e g e p r e s s , 19S2.

Of i n t e r e s t and value because o f the stand taken

l a t e r by the Empire a t u-eneva,

Sarolea, Charles. Europe and the League o f n a t i o n s .

London, G. B e l l and Sons, L t d . , 1919.

Schuman, P. L. The N a z i D i c t a t o r s h i p .

New York, A. A. Jinopf, 19 35.

Of v a l u e f o r i t s thorough treatment o f the e a r l y

phases o f the N a z i movement.

Schuman, P. L. War and Diplomacy i n the Prench R e p u b l i c .

New Tork, McGraw-Hill Book Co., L t d . , 1931.

worth-while f o r i t s d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the Prench

p o l i t i c a l system.

S c o t t , A. p. An i n t r o d u c t i o n to the peace T r e a t i e s ,

Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago p r e s s , 1920.

S f o r z a , Count c a r l o . D i p l o m a t i c Europe s i n c e the T r e a t y of

Versailles.

new Haven, Yale u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1928.

 XVI

A statesman's view of the problem.

S h o t w e l l , J . T. War as an Instrument of N a t i o n a l P o l i c y .

Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929.

essential.

i i i e b u r g , F r i e d r i c h . Who are these French?

New York, The M a c m i l l a n Co., 1938.

A German's study o f the French people, lie f i n d s

i n h i m s e l f a r e a l a f f e c t i o n f o r them.

S i e g f r i e d , Andre'. A Study in Nationality.

New Haven, Yale u n i v e r s i t y F r e s s , 1930.

S i e g f r i e d , Andre'. Post-War B r i t a i n .

( T r a n s l a t e d from the French by H. H.

Hemmingj.

London, Jonathan cape, L t d . , 1924.

S t u d y i n g England through French eyes i s u s e f u l i n

d e v e l o p i n g a balanced v i e w - p o i n t .

S i e g f r i e d , Andre'. Tableau des p a r t i e s en France.

P a r i s , B. G r a s s e t , 1930.

Valuable reference.

Slocomb, George. A M i r r o r t o Geneva.

London, Jonathan cape, L t d . , 1937.

The w r i t e r ' s i n t i m a t e d e t a i l s o f l i f e i n Geneva a r e

very i n t e r e s t i n g . He h e l p s to humanize a subject
which by i t s very nature tends t o be a b s t r a c t .

s o l t a u , K. H. French p o l i t i c a l Thought i n the n i n e t e e n t h

century.
 XVII
London, E r n e s t henn, L t d . , 1931.

Gives a v a l u a b l e background i n the f i e l d o f French

thought i n r e s p e c t t o government.

Sontag, K . J , England and Germany: Background of

C o n f l i c t , 1848-1894.

i\i'ew l o r k , D. Appleton-Century co., 1938.

B r i n g s out the bases of c o n f l i c t between these

two rowers, h e l p s to understand the p l a c e o f France
as a n a t i o n between the two.

Sontag, K . J'. European Diplomatic h i s t o r y .

iMew l o r k , Century Co., 1933.

Soupault, P h i l i p p e , i h e American i n f l u e n c e i n France.

S e a t t l e , u n i v e r s i t y of Washington Book

S t o r e , 19 30.

Deals w i t h the bsroad i n f l u e n c e s of American life in

French customs and t h i n k i n g .

Soward, F r e d e r i c H. Moulders of n a t i o n a l Destinies,

London, uxford u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 19 38.

A s e r i e s of s t u d i e s of world statesmen of whom

B r i a n d i s one.

Spender, o. A. These Times.

London, c a s s e l l and Company, L t d . , 1934.

A volume which provokes much thought.

Stannard-Baker, Kay. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement.

new York, Doubleday, page and Company,

1923, 3 volumes.
 XVIII

These v a l u a b l e volumes c o n t a i n important m a t e r i a l

from p r e s i d e n t ' W i l s o n ' s h i t h e r t o unpublished doc-
uments and papers.

s t e f f e s , «J . P. Disarmament.

(George s c h r e i b e r , ed.}.

Koln, G i l d e - V e r l a g , G. M. b. h. 1933.

The disarmament problem from a r e l i g i o u s angle.

Stern-Rubarth, Ldgar.

Three Men Tried.

London, Duckworth, 1939.

An e x c e p t i o n a l l y f i n e volume, not only f o r i t s s t y l e

but f o r i t s keen a n a l y s i s o f the l i f e and work o f
B r i a n d , Stresemann and S i r Austen Chamberlain.

Tabouis, Genevieve. P e r f i d i o u s A l b i o n - - E n t e n t e C o r d i a l e .

( T r a n s l a t e d by J . A. Dempsey).

London, Thornton Butterworth, L t d . , 1938.

. A n o t a b l e volume marked by i t s f i n e study o f the

Anglo-French problem i n post-war y e a r s .

Tabouis, Genevieve. The L i f e o f J u l e s Cambon.

( T r a n s l a t e d from the French by C. F.

Atkinson).

London, Jonathan Cape, 1938.

T a r d i e u , Andre'. Sur l a Pente.

P a r i s , E'. Flammarion, 1935.

Temperley, A. C. The Whispering G a l l e r y o f Europe.

London, C o l l i n s , 1938.
 XIX

A survey o f the p o l i t i c a l scene i n Europe w r i t t e n

i n a popular s t y l e .

Temperley, H. W. V. ed.

A H i s t o r y o f the peace Conference o f

Paris.

London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s and Hod-

der and Stoughton. 6 volumes.

The thorough study o f these volumes i s e s s e n t i a l .

They c o n t a i n many documents o f t h e utmost v a l u e .

Toynbee, A r n o l d J . Survey o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s .

London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , volumes

1920-23--1932 i n c l u s i v e .

The nine volumes used i n t h i s study were o f i n v a l -

uable a i d . They c o n t a i n many e x t r a c t s from speeches
and o f f i c i a l documents which make them an e s s e n t i a l
s o u r c e . V a l u a b l e Appendices present s t a t e documents.

Toynbee, A r n o l d . The World A f t e r the peace Conference.

London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1925.

An a u t h o r i t a t i v e study by one o f England's foremost

historians.

V a l e n t i n , A n t o n i n a . Stresemann.

( T r a n s l a t e d by E r i c Sutton).

London, Constable, 1930.

I n v a l u a b l e because of i t s i n t i m a t e p e r s o n a l . i n f o r -
mation about Stresemann.

Vaucher, P a u l . Post-War Prance.

London, Thornton b u t t e r w o r t h , L t d . , 1934.

 XX

Werth, A l e x a n d e r . f r a n o e i n Ferment.

London, d a f r o l d ' s L t d . , 1934,

Very u s e f u l r e f e r e n c e work.

Werth, A l e x a n d e r . The D e s t i n y o f F r a n c e .

London, Hamish Hamilton, 1937.

A p e n e t r a t i n g survey. The w r i t e r possesses an

i n t i m a t e knowledge o f Frenoh i n t e r n a l problems but
i s p e s s i m i s t i o as to the f u t u r e o f Franoe. There are
too many medioore p o l i t i c i a n s s t r i v i n g f o r p o s i t i o n .

Wheeler-»Bennett, J . W.

Disarmament and S e c u r i t y S i n c e Locarno,

1925-1931.

New York, The M a c m i l l a n Co., 1932.

C o n t a i n s many e x t r a c t s from o f f i o i a l documents and

speeches. The w r i t e r c o v e r s the whole p e r i o d s t a t e d
i n t h e t i t l e i n a v e r y thorough manner, d i s c u s s i n g
and weighing problems i n a method v e r y h e l p f u l t o t h e
student.

Wheeler-Bennett, J . W.

I n f o r m a t i o n on t h e R e d u c t i o n o f Armaments.

London, George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1925.

T h i s volume covers t h e p e r i o d 1919-1925. B e s i d e s

b e i n g w e l l documented i t compares t h e d i f f e r e n t pro-
p o s a l s put forward by statesmen and l e a d e r s o f d i f -
f e r e n t n a t i o n s i n a way which c l a r i f i e s t h i s d i f f i c u l t
problem.

Wheeler-Bennett, «T, W.

The Disarmament Deadlock.

London, G. Routledge and Sons, L t d . , 1934.

A valuable contribution to t h i s series of studies.

 XXI

Deals w i t h the background o f the Conference and the

deadlock of t h e year 1931.

Wheeler-Bennett, J . W.

The F o r g o t t e n Peace.

New York, W i l l i a m Morrow and Company,

1939.

The s t o r y o f B r e s t - L i t o v s k and the a t t i t u d e of Ger-

many, which was a n y t h i n g but m e r c i f u l .

Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. and Langermann, F. E.

I n f o r m a t i o n on the Problem o f S e c u r i t y .

London, George A l l e n and unwin L t d . , 1927.

An e s s e n t i a l r e f e r e n c e on the e a r l y post-war period.

T r e a t i e s are quoted.

Wheeler-Bennett, J . W. and Latimer, Hugh.

Information on the R e p a r a t i o n Settlement.

London, George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1930.

Besides c o n t a i n i n g a u s e f u l d i s c u s s i o n o f the Rep-

a r a t i o n s problem, t h i s volume has a v a l u a b l e s e r i e s
o f documents. The Text o f the Young P l a n i s
printed i n f u l l .

Woolf, Leonard, ed* The I n t e l l i g e n t Man's Way to prevent War.

London, V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , L t d * , 1933.

A s e r i e s o f essays on t h i s problem by leading

thinkers;

Zimmern, A l f r e d . Europe i n Convalescence.

London, M i l l s and Boon, L t d . , 1922.

 SECONDARY—ARTICLES, ESSAYS, REVIEWS

Abbot, A. H. The League Disarmament A c t i v i t i e s — a n d the

Washington Conference.

New York, The P o l i t i c a l Science Q u a r t e r l y ,

v o l . 37, No* 1, p. 1.

Abejjon, V i s c o u n t d'. Stresemann*

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 8, No. 2, January, 1930, p. 208.

A very f i n e short commentary on the l i f e and work

of Stresemann.

Aftalion, Albert. La S i t u a t i o n Economique De La France*

La Revue de P a r i s ,

Tome 6; 15 Decembre, 1931, p. 776.

Aiglat. Armaments e t Se'curite'*

P a r i s , Le Correspondant,

Tome 302, 10 J a n v i e r , 1926, p. 10*

Amery, L. S. (The R t . Hon.).

The B r i t i s h Empire and t h e Pan-European

Idea.

London, J o u r n a l o f the Royal I n s t i t u t e

of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s ,

v o l . IX, No. 1, January, 1930, p. 1.

An e s s e n t i a l article*

Armstrong, H. F. Danubia: R e l i e f or R u i n .

XXII
 XXIII

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 10, No. 4, J u l y , 1932, p. &10.

A competent study o f the economic phase o f the

Danubian problem.

Armstrong, H. F. France and t h e hoover F l a n .

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 10, No. 1, October, 1931, p. 30.

Aron, Robert and Dandieu, Arnaud.

America: Europe's Cancer.

New York, L i v i n g Age,

v o l . 341, October, 1931, p. 117 (trans-

l a t e d from 'Europe');

America i s g r a d u a l l y p e n e t r a t i n g and d i s r u p t i n g
European l i f e .

Aubert, L o u i s . France and I t a l y .

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 9, No. 2, January, 1931, p. 237.

Anon;, A P l e a f o r an Independent F o r e i g n P o l i c y :

The Anglo-French Oompromise.

London, The Round T a b l e ,

v o l . 19, December, 1928, p. 17.

Anon., A Propos Du Desarmament.. -•,

La Revue des Deux Mondes,

Tome 33, 1 M a i , 1926, p. 124;

 XXIV

As R u s s i a sees England and France.

New York, The L i t e r a r y D i g e s t ,

vol. 75, No. 3, October 21, 1922, p. 20.

Comparison des postes des depenses mil-

i t a i r e s de l'Allemagne et de l a France.

P a r i s , L'Europe nouvelle,

No. 429, 8 Mai, 1926, p. 647.

Dehut de Conference.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 625, F e v r i e r , 1930, p. 194.

Drawing the S t i n g o f Submarines;

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

vol. 6, No. 1, January 6, 1922, p. 9.

E n t r e l e t r a i t e ' de V e r s a i l l e s et l e pacte.

L'Europe N u v e l l e ,
0

No* 399, 10 Octobre, 1925, p. 1338.

European Economic and p o l i t i c a l Survey.

P a r i s , Reference S e r v i c e on I n t e r n a t i o n a l

Affairs,

No. 18, May 31, 1926, p. 14;

Europe Meets B r i a n d half-way.

New York, The N a t i o n ,

vol. 131, No. 3395, J u l y , 1930, p. 112.

 XXV

France and Germany.

London, The Round T a b l e ,

v o l . 13, March, 1 9 2 3 , p.'237.

France and S e c u r i t y , Cologne as B a r g a i n -

ing Piece.

The Manchester Guardian 7v eekly,

7

v o l . 12, IMo. 9, February 27, 1925, p. 176.

France C h i l l s Disarmament hopes.

The L i t e r a r y D i g e s t ,

v o l . 110, No. 1, August 8, 1931, p. 8.

Some American o p i n i o n a t t h i s time i s not v e r y

sympathetic t o France.

France's Demand f o r Submarines.

The L i t e r a r y D i g e s t ,

v o l . 72, No. 1, January 7, 1922, p. 7.

France, England and the Ruhr.

London, The N i n e t e e n t h Century,

v o l * 93, May, 1923, p. 652.

France's Network o f A l l i a n c e s .

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 17, No. ,19, November 11, 1927, p. 364.

France's R e c o g n i t i o n o f S o v i e t R u s s i a .

The L i t e r a r y D i g e s t ,

v o l . 83, No. 9, -November 29, 1924, p. 18.

 XXVI

F r a n c o - S o v i e t Trade.

New York, F o r e i g n F o l i c y , I n f o r m a t i o n

Service,

v o l . VI, No. 9, November 26, 1930, p. 371.

The Malady o f Europe.

The Round T a b l e , '

v o l . 12, September, 1922, p. 751.

French Stand on the hoover proposal$

London, The Statist,

v o l . CXVIII, No. 2784, J u l y 4, 1931, p. 14.

A v a l u a b l e r e f e r e n c e from the economic angle.

F i v e Powers S i g n the Naval T r e a t y .

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l * 22, No. 17, A p r i l 25, 1930, p. 328.

A note o f d i s c o r d i s heard.

Former Conferences t h a t Failed—and

Succeeded*

The L i t e r a r y Digest,

v o l . 71, No. 7, November 12, 1921, p. 44.

French uneasiness at u-erman c r i t i c i s m .

The Manchester Guardian Y/eekly,

v o l . 19, No* 12, September 24, 1928, p. 224.

Germany and Europe.

London, The S p e c t a t o r ,
 >acvn •

v o l . 146, dune 13, 1931, p. 923.

Germany and Europe.

The S p e c t a t o r ,

v o l . 146, dune 13, 1931, p. 923.

An e f f o r t t o e x p l a i n the German p o s i t i o n i n r e s p e c t
to Jiuropefe problems*

I n s t a n t h a l t i n Armaments*

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 25, No. 11, September 11, 1 9 3 1 J p. 205,

italo-Erench Relations,

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 17, No. 24, December 16, 1927, p. 465.

Italo-German R e l a t i o n s .

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 17, No. 24, December 16, 1927, p. 465.

Pacts o f non-Aggression.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 27, No. 23, December 2, 1932, p. 445.

i n d i c a t e s the t r e n d towards pacts and a l l i a n c e s

even d u r i n g the World Disarmament Conference.

La Conference de l a haye.

L'Europe n o u v e l l e ,

No. 602, 24 Aout, 1929, p* 1131.

La Ne'gociation rhe'nane.
 XXVIII

L'Europe Nouvelle,

Mo. 553, 15 Septembre, 1928, p. 1239.

La premiere s e s s i o n de l a commission

p r e p a r a t o i r e de l a conference du desarma-

ment .
4
L'Europe Nouvelle,

No. 437, 3 Juillet, 1926, p. 912.

La p r e p a r a t i o n du desarmament.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 483, 14 Mai,

1927, p. 623.

La Problem de l a Se'curite'.

Le Correspondant,

Tome 301, Octobre, 1925, p. 493.

V a l u a b l e r e f e r e n c e as i t i s concerend s o l e l y with
t h i s problem.

La P r o s p e r i t e ' de l a France.

L'Europe Nouvelle,

No. 675, 17 J a n v i e r , 1931, p. 68.

Prance had not yet been h a r d - h i t by the financial

crisis.

La Reponse de M. B r i a n d *a Mr. Kellogg.

L'Europe Nouvelle,

No.- 530, 7 Avril, 1928, p. 450.

La S e c u r i t e ' o o n t i n e n t a l e .

L'Europe Nouvelle,
 XXIX

No. 365, 31 J a n v i e r , 1925, p. 134.

La i i i e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l contre l a Franc

son arme'e et ses c o l o n i e s i

Le Correspondant,

Tome 299, 10 M a i , 1927, p. 321.

Makes out a severe indictment a g a i n s t R u s s i a .

Le p r o j e c t J i e l l o g g .

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 532, 21 A v r i l , 1928, p. 551;

Le P r o t o c l e De Geneve e t La Reduction

Des Armaments.

La Revue Des Deux Mondes,

Tome 25, 1 J a n v i e r , 1925, p. 39.

The French wished f o r a r e t u r n t o the Geneva

Protocol.

Le Rhin vu de Geneve.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 554, 22 Septembre, 1928, p. 127.

Le t r a i t e ' f r a n c o - y o u g o s l a v .

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 509, 12 Novembre, 1927, p. 1494.

L'Accord de p r i n c i p e V l a liaye.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 603, 31 Aout, 1929, p; 1151.

 XXX

Anon., L'Anne'e de Locarno.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 410, 26 Decembre, 1925, p. 1723.

Expresses hope f o r a new o u t l o o k i n European

relations.

Anon., Les V i s i t e s de M. Grandi.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 645, 21 J u i n , 1930, p. 921.

Anon., Lessons from Washington*

London, The New Statesman,

v o l . 18, December 17, 1921, p. 308.

Anon., M. Briand and Disarmament.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 25, Mb. 12, September 18, 1931, p. 223.

Does not a l t o g e t h e r b e l i e v e i n B r i a n d ' s s i n c e r i t y .

Anon., M. B r i a n d ' s Terms t o Germany.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 8, No. 6, February 10, 1928, p. 104.

Anon., More Armaments f o r France.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

Vol. 22, No. 1, January 3, 1930, p. 10.

Anon., N a v a l Conference Makes P r o g r e s s .

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 22, No. 5, January 31, 1930, p. 84.

 XXXI

Reponse du gouvernement allemand.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 659, 27 Septembre, 1930, p. 1388.

Response du gouvernement B r i t a n n i q u e .

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 659, 27 Septembre, 1927, p. 1397.

Re'sultats de c i n q j o u r s aux E t a t s - U n i s *

L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 717, 7 Novembre,

1931, p. 1487.

Short Adjournment o f the Naval Conference.

The Manchester Guardian VJeekly,

v o l * 22, in'oi 8, February 21, 1930, p. 144.

The w r i t e r asks i f t h i s adjournment forecasted

failure;

The B r i a n d F l a n f o r European Union.

Foreign P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n Information

Service,

v o l . V I , No. 14, September 17, 19 30, p. 216.

The Franco-American D i s c u s s i o n s ;

The Statist,

v o l . GXVIII, wo. 2801, October 31, 19 31,

p. 592.

The French I n v a s i o n o f the Ruhr.

New York, C u r r e n t H i s t o r y ,
 XXXII

v o l ; XVII, No, 5, February, 1923, p. 711.

C r i t i c a l o f the French a c t i o n .

Anon., The French F o i n t o f View.

The Round T a b l e ,

v o l . 21, June, 1930, p; 507.

Anon., The French F r e e s and R u s s i a .

London, The N a t i o n and Athenaeum,

vol. 34, No. 19, February 9, 1924, p. 659.

" Many i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c l o s u r e s r e g a r d i n g the v e n a l i t y

o f the French p r e s s a r e made.

Anon,, The Heart o f B r i a n d ' s A p p e a l .

New York, The Independent and Weekly

Review,

vol. 107, No. 3794, December 3, 1921,

p. 227.

A sympathetic American criticism*

Anon*, The League and R h i n e l a n d .

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

vol; 19, No. 25, December 21, 1928, p; 490.

Anon., The Locarno Treaties.

The Round T a b l e ,

vol. 16, December, 1925, p. 4.

Anon., The Outlawry o f War.

The Round T a b l e ,
 XXXIII

v o l . 18, dune, 1928, p. 455.

A valuable study.

The Regeneration of Germany.

London, The Q u a r t e r l y Review,

No. 484, A p r i l 25, 1925, p. 231.

The Peace Makers a t f/ashington.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 6, No. 5, February 3, 1922, p. 84.

A comprehensive d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s conference.

The S e c u r i t y of Prance.

The Nation,

v o l . 116, No. 3014, A p r i l 11, 1923, p. 406.

The Washington Conference.

The Independent and weekly Review,

v o l . 137, No. 3794, December 3, 1921,

pi 233.

T r a i t e ' d ' a l l i a n c e d e f e n s i v e entre l'ltalie

et l ' A l b a n i e , signe' a T i r a n a , l e 22

Novembre, 1927.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 513, 10 Decembre, 1927, p. 1647.

T r a i t e ' franco-yougoslav*

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 513, 10 Decembre, 1927, p. 1645.

 XXXIV

Anon., T r e a t y Pledges on E v a c u a t i o n .

The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l ; 19, No. 23, December 7, 1928j p. 445.

Anon., une d e c l a r a t i o n de M. T i r a r d sur 1'evac-

u a t i o n de l a Rhe'nanie.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 642, 31 Mai, 1930, p. 830.

Anon., une emule de Mata-Hari.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 363, 31 J a n v i e r , 1925, p, 137.

Anon., War by Due P r o c e s s o f Law.

New York, The New R e p u b l i c ,

v o l . 31, No. 425, January 24, 1923, p. 211,

Anon., What France Wants.

The New R e p u b l i e ,

v o l . 27, No. 363, November 16, 1921, p* 21.

Anon. Why France and I t a l y don't get a l o n g .

The L i t e r a r y D i g e s t ,

v o l . 93, No. 9, May 28, 1927, p* 17*

Barthelemy, J .
Apres Locarno: V e r s Les E t a t s - u n i s
D'Europe.

P a r i s , La Revue p o l i t i q u e et r a r l e m e n t a i r e ,

Tome 125, Novembre, 1925, p. 238*

T h i s w r i t e r breathes an a i r o f hope f o r the f u t u r e .

B a r t l e t t , Vernon. Struggle f o r Security.

London, The Contemporary Heview,

vol. 141, May, 1932, p. 589.

A comprehensive a r t i c l e .

Bernus, r i e r r e . The hoover P l a n : Speaking f o r Pranee*

The L i v i n g Age,

vol. 340, August, 1931, p. 540. (Trans-

l a t e d from J o u r n a l des D e b a t s j .

B i d w e l l , F. W. The new American T a r i f f : Europe's Answer,

Mew York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 9, Mo. 1, October, 1930, p. 13.

Bonnet, Georges, Les e'cheances de 1925*

L'Europe Nouvelle,

No. 374, A p r i l 18, 1925, p. 514.

B o u i l l o u x - L a f o n t , M. Geneve et L ' A v i a t i o n Allemande.

La Revue de P a r i s ,

Tome 6, Novembre, 1926, p* 481.

Bourget-raiHeron, M.-

Franee i n Decay.

The L i v i n g Age,

v o l . 341, October, 1931, p. 124. (Trans-

l a t e d from L * O p i n i o n j .

Brown, P. War S t r e n g t h o f France,

Current H i s t o r y ,
 XXXVI

v o l . 42, No. 2, May, 1935, p. 197.

B u e l l , R. L. Anglo-American understanding.

Foreign p o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n Information

S e r v i c e , v o l , V, No. 10, J u l y 24, 1929,

p. 182.

B u e l l , R. S. Economic I m p e r i a l i s m .

New l o r k , Forum and Century,

v o l . 84, October, 1930, p. 213.

This i s a valuable a r t i c l e . Economic f a c t o r s are

stressed.

B u e l l , R. S. The London N a v a l Conference.

F o r e i g n p o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n News S e r v i c e ,

v o l . V I , No. 6, May 28, 1930, p. 102.

D i s c u s s e s the Conference i n many o f i t s v a r i e d

phases*

Bugnet, C h a r l e s . The New French Army.

New York, Outlook and Independent,

v o l . 154, A p r i l 23, 1930, p. 646.

Cambon, J u l e s . The Bases o f r r e n c h F o r e i g n p o l i c y .

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 8, No. 2, January, 1930, p. 173.

T h i s w r i t e r p r e s e n t s a c l e a r p i c t u r e o f the bases
o f French p o l i c y i n the f o r e i g n f i e l d .

Chaumeix, Andre. L ' E t a t D ' E s p r i t De L'Allemagne.

La Revue de P a r i s ,

p'ome;!, F e v r i e r , 1926, p. 943.

 XXXVII

Chaumeix, Andre. Les Traites de Locarno.

La Revue de r a r i s ,

Tome 6, Novembre, 1925, p. 227.

Chernov, V i c t o r . bolshevik Romance and R e a l i t y .

New l o r k , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 5, No. 2, January, 1927, p. 309

A d i s c u s s i o n o f R u s s i a n aims i n r e s p e c t t o Western
Europe.

Cocks, P. Seymour. The American Dove and t h e B r i t i s h Lamb,

London, xhe S o c i a l i s t Review,

June, 1928, p. 8.

Cot, rierre. France and Disarmament*

The S p e c t a t o r ,

v o l . 148, January 9, 1932, p. 38.

Cot Pierre. iiow Germany can be Saved.

The L i v i n g Age,

v o l . 339, January, 19 31, p. 455. (Trans-

l a t e d from Revue des V i v a n t s j .

Coudenhove-Kalergi, Count R i c h a r d .

The ran-3£urope c u t l o o k .

Journal o f the Royal i n s t i t u t e of i n t e r -

national A f f a i r s , v o l * X, NO. 5, September,

1931, p. 638.

An a u t h o r i t a t i v e a r t i c l e b y one o f the a p o s t l e s o f
the ran-Piurope i d e a .
 XXXVIII

Cunningham, T. M. Disarmament: Some European Difficulties,

Ihe N i n e t e e n t h Century,

vol. H I , January, 19 32, p. 49.

Davenport, E. H. J'Accuse La prance.

London, The new Statesman and n a t i o n ,

vol. 3, no. 45, (New S e r i e s ) , January 2,

1932, p. 17.

Dean, v e r a to. European E f f o r t s a t Economic Collaboration.

New xork, F o r e i g n p o l i c y R e p o r t s ,

v o l . V I I , No. 12, August 19, 1931, p. 233.

Degouy, l e c o n t r e - a m i r a l .

Dans L a S a r r e .

La Revue Des Deux Mondes,

Tome 18, 15 novembre, 1923, p. 430.

Dell, Robert. peace, Disarmament and the League.

The New statesman,

vol. 23, no. 614, August 2, 1924, p* 484.

Dell, Robert. The Age-Long Franco-German C o n f l i c t .

Current h i s t o r y ,

vol. 34, August, 1931, p. 658.

uobb, Maurice. The C r i s i s i n Germany.

London, T h e Labour Monthly,

vol. 13, no. 8, August, 19 31, p. 491.

A good a r t i c l e from the s o c i a l i s t i c view-point.

 XXXIX

Doyle, i i . Cr, France's i n t e r n a t i o n a l View-point Today.

current nistory,

v o l . 29, November, 1928, p. 331.

D r e x e l , Constance. Armament Manufacture and Trade.

New-xork, Carnegie Endowment f o r i n t e r -

national peace ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n c i l i a t i o n ) ,

• No. 295, December, 1933, p. 531.

Dublin, Louis I . T O Be o r not To Be.

new l o r k , Harper's Monthly,

v o l . 161, September, 1930, p. 492.

Some s t a r t l i n g f i g u r e s on s u i c i d e d u r i n g the y e a r s
•. o f c r i s i s are given.

D u l l e s , A l l a n W. M i s c o n c e p t i o n s About Disarmament.

New xork, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 5, No. 3, A p r i l , 1927, p. 412.

Dumont-Wilden, L. La France Accuses.

P a r i s , L a Revue Bleue, (La Revue P o l i t i q u e

et L i t t e r a i r e ) , No. 22, 15 Novembre, 1930,

p. "696.

An e f f o r t t o defend France's stand.

Dumont-Wilden, L. La France et Les A l l i a n c e s .

La Revue Des Deux Mondes,

Tome 1, 15 Mai, 1924, p. 272.

Dumont-Wilden, L.' La R a t i f i c a t i o n du Facte B r i a n d - K e l l o g g .

 XL

La Revue Bleue,

No. 3, 2 F e v r i e r , 1929, p. 87.

Dumont-Wilden, L. Le P r o t o c l e de Geneve et La Question de

Se'curite'.

La Revue Bleue,

No. 5, 7 Mars, 1925, p. 171.

Dumont-Wilden, L. Le Reglement de l a p a i x .

La Revue Bleue,

No. 11, 1 J u i n , 1929, p. 340.

Dumont-Wilden, L. Les Accords de Locarno et La Nouvelle

Orientation Politique.

La Revue Bleue,

No. 21, 7 Novembre, 1925, p. 708.

Dumont-Wilden, L. Les E t a t s - U n i s D'Europe.

La Revue Bleue, Mo. 16, 17 Aout, 1929,

p. 508.

Eccard, F r e d e r i c . La Menace Sovie'tique.

P a r i s , L a Revue P o l i t i q u e et P a r l e m e n t a i r e ,

Tome 148, 10 J u i l l e t , 1931, p. 5.

Eccard, Fre'deric. Le Budget M i l i t a i r e Allemand en 1930.

La Revue P o l i t i q u e e t P a r l e m e n t a i r e ,

Tome 144, 10 J u i l l e t , 1930, p. 2.

Accuses Germany o f s e c r e t m i l i t a r y activity.

 • XLI

E c c a r d , F r e d e r i c , p o l i t i q u e de L'Allemagne e t de l a R u s s i e A

L*Egard De La France.

La Revue P o l i t i q u e et p a r l e m e n t a i r e ,

Tome 146, 10 Mars, 1931, p. 329.

The Russian menace t o French i n t e r e s t s i s o u t l i n e d .

An a l l i a n c e between R u s s i a and Germany i s d i s c u s s e d .

Fay, M i B. L'Opinion Americaine et l a France.

Le Correspondant,

Tome 287, 25 Mai, 1922, p. 577.

F l e r s , Robert de and Sauerwein, J u l e s .

Stresemann and France.

The L i v i n g Age,

v o l . 331, No. 4294, November 15, 1926, p.

291. (Translated from P a r i s Figaro).

F o u r n o l , E t i e n n e . M. A r i s t i d e b r i a n d .

La Revue Bleue,

No. 11, 3 J u i n , 1922, p. 327.

French, B. L. Disarmament as a f f e c t e d by Freedom o f the

Seas.

Current h i s t o r y ,

v o l . 31, December, 1929, p. 481.

Garnett, Maxwell. The World C r i s i s and the Disarmament

Conference.

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 141, February, 1932, p. 144.

 XLII

The economic c o n d i t i o n o f t h e world must have a

h e a r i n g on t h e Conference.

Gaston, "Victor. L a P o l i t i q u e e x t e r i e u r e de l a cologne.

La Revue Bleue,

No. 25, 1 De'cembre, 1923, p. 825.

Gathorn-Hardy, G. M.The Fourteen P o i n t s and the T r e a t y o f

Versailles.

London, Oxford, 1939, (Pamphlets o f

World Affairs).

Gedye, G. E . R. France A s t r i d e M i d d l e Europe.

The oontemporary Review,

v o l . 140, October, 1931, p. 446.

A splendid article.

Gedye, G. E . R. The F a s c i s t T h r u s t i n A u s t r i a .

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 138, December, 1930, p. 712.

A u s t r i a n i n t e r n a l problems had a d e f i n i t e bearing

on French p o l i c y ;

Gerando, P. de Les Balkans Apres Le P a c t s de T i r a n a .

La Revue P o l i t i q u e et p a r l e m e n t a i r e ,

Tome 130, 10 Mars, 1927, p. 422.

Glasgow, George. Conference P r e l i m i n a r i e s : France and

Great Britain.

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 141, January, 1932, p. 101.

 XLIII

Glasgow, George. French I n f l u e n c e on B r i t i s h Policy.

Kingston, Queen's Quarterly,

vol. 36, October, 1929, p. 563.

Glasgow, George, Germany, the Hague and Disarmament.

The Contemporary Review,

vol. 140, October, 1931, p. 522.

Glasgow, George. The German C r i s i s .

The Contemporary Review*

vol. 138, November, 1930, p. 653*

Gunther-,- John. F r e n c h Gold and the Balkans.

New York, The N a t i o n ,

vol. 133, No. 3462, November 11, 1931,

p. 511.

French f i n a n c e had wide r a m i f i c a t i o n s i n the

Balkans.

H a l l g r e n , M. A. What France R e a l l y Wants.

New York, The N o r t h American Review,

vol. 233, February, 1932, p. 100.

Hanotaux, G a b r i e l . Le P r o j e c t D'Union.Europeenne.

La Revue Des Deux Mondes,

Tome 58, 15 Aout, 1930, p. 766.

H a r r i s , H. W i l s o n . Geneva and the World.

The Contemporary Review,

vol; 138, October, 1930, p. 545.

 XLIV

Harris, H. W i l s o n . The Breakdown at Geneva.

The Contemporary Keview,

v o l . 129, A p r i l , 1926, p. 416.

Heibronner, Andre'. La Re'duction Des Armaments: Ses D i f f i c u l t e s ,

Paris, La Revue Des Sciences p o l i t i q u e s ,

Tome 55, Octohre-Decembre, 1932, p. 254.

H e r r i o t , Edouard. The Program o f L i b e r a l France %

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 2, No. 4, June 15, 1924, p. 558.

A very important a r t i c l e ^ , . p a r t i c u l a r l y v b e c a u s e l o f
i t s author.

H i r s t , F. W. Some R e a l Causes o f the Slump.

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 138, November, 1930, p. 554.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . A Diplomatic S h i f t i n g .

The New Statesman,

v o l . 31, January 2, 1928, p. 249.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . An A c t o f F a i t h .

The New Statesman,

v o l . 31, September 1, 1928, p . 628,

Huddleston, S i s l e y . Briandissimo.

The New Statesman,

volw 26, March 20, 1926, p. 702.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . European A l l i a n c e s .
 XLV

The New Statesman,

v o l . 31, A p r i l 21, 1928, p. 38.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . France and the World.

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 141, January, 1932, p. 9.

A review o f the French p o s i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l

a f f a i r s a t the time o f B r i a n d ' s r e t i r e m e n t .

Huddleston, S i s l e y * France's P a r t .

New York, The A t l a n t i c Monthly,

v o l . 130, August, 1922, p. 269.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . France's P o s i t i o n and p o l i t i c s .

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 19, March, 1921, p. 289.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . French F o r e i g n P o l i c y .

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 140, J u l y , 1931, p. 1.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . M. Poincare 's P o l i c y .

/

The F o r t n i g h t l y Review,

v o l . 117, March, 1922, p." 366.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . The Group System.

The New Statesman,

v o l . 36, December 27j 1930, p. 353.

Huddleston, S i s l e y . The Hague.

The New Statesman, v o l . 33.

August 10, 1929, p. 546.

 XLVI

Hyams, P. La B e l g i q u e et L'Oeuvre de M. Leon

Delacroix.

Le Correspondant,

Tome 281, 10 Decembre, 1920, p. 769.

Jouvenel.,.. Henri de. Prance and Italy.

new York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 5, No. 4, J u l y 27, 1927, p. 546.

A masterly d i s c u s s i o n o f the F r a n c o - I t a l i a n problem.

J o u v e n e l , Henri de. pas d'entente franco-allemande sans

l'Europe.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 452, 9 octobre, 1926, p. 159.

Jouvenel, Robert de. A French Debate on the League of N a t i o n s .

The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 521, May, 1924, p.

951, ( T r a n s l a t e d from La Grande Revue).

He was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h P a u l Reynaud i n t h i s debate.

Joxe, L o u i s . Conclusions a Londres.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 639, 19 A v r i l , 1930, p. 815.

S t a t e s the French view of the London Conference on

n a v a l problems.

Kautsky, Karl. Germany S i n c e the War.

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, No. 2,

December 15; 1922, p. 101.

Pleads f o r a more sympathetic treatment of Germany.

 XLVI I

Kennedy, A. L. France and the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s .

The F o r t n i g h t l y Review,

vol. 119, dune, 1923, p. 881.

Kerguezec, Gustave de.

French N a v a l Aims.

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 4, No. 3, A p r i l , 1926, p. 372.

A v e r y u s e f u l study o f t h i s q u e s t i o n . An e f f o r t i s
made t o e x p l a i n the F r e n c h need f o r s p e c i a l types
of vessels.

La Bruyere, R. France's New Army and Navy. •

current History,

v o l . 24, A p r i l , 1926, p. 21.

E s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h a t t h i s a r t i c l e was
p u b l i s h e d when the Locarno s p i r i t was at i t s height.

L a i r , Maurice. Stresemann.

La Revue des S c i e n c e s p o l i t i q u e s ,

Tome 55, Octobre-Deceiabre, 19 32, p. 365.

Landry, Adolphe. L ' E v o l u t i o n De La C r i s e Economique en

Septembre, 1930.

La Revue P o l i t i q u e et P a r l e m e n t a i r e ,

Tome 145, 10 Novembre, 1930, p. 125.

La V a l e t t e , J . de. France and Germany Today, the P l a i n Truth.

The N i n e t e e n t h Century,

v o l ; 96, December, 1924, p. 769.

A very u s e f u l reference.
 XLVIII'

Lippmann, W a l t e r . The London N a v a l Conference;

New xork, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 8, No. 4, d u l y , 1930, p. 499.

Lippmann, ?/alter. The Intimate papers of C o l o n e l house;

iMew York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 4, No. 3, A p r i l , 1926, p. 382.

A commentary on these famous Papers.

L l o y d , C. M. The Edge o f the p r e c i p i c e .

The New Statesman and N a t i o n , v o l . 1,

No. 6, (new s e r i e s ) , June 13, 1931, p. 569.

L o u t r e , C ami'He. La Reunion des j u r i s t e s a. Londres.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e , No. 394,

5 Septembre, 1925, p. 1173.

Luddecke, Theodor. Germany Goes American.

The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 338, J u l y 1, 1930,

p. 544. ( T r a n s l a t e d from R e v i s t a de

Occidente o f M a d r i d ) .

Machray, R. The Red R e a c t i o n to Locarno.

The F o r t n i g h t l y Review,

v o l . 119, January 1, 1926, p. 158.

The S o v i e t government was very c y n i c a l .

Madariaga, S. de. Our Muddling World.

Forum and Century,

v o l ; 83, January 1, 1930, p. 9.

 XLIZ

Madariaga, S. de. The D i f f i c u l t y o f Disarming.

Geneva, I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Re-

lations, 1931, p. 284.

Mar combes, J r i . France; a r o r c e f o r peace.

Forum and Century,

v o l . 87 * March, 1932, p. 21.

Maurice, Jf. B , The D r a f t T r e a t y of Mutual A s s i s t a n c e .

J o u r n a l o f the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e o f

International A f f a i r s ,

vol.' H I , Mo. 2, March, 1929, p. 47.

Maurice, P. B ; Lord Esher's p r o p o s a l s f o r the L i m i t a t i o n

o f Armaments.

j o u r n a l o f the B r i t i s h i n s t i t u t e o f

international Affairs,

vol. 1, Mo. 4, J u l y , 1922, p.. 101.

M e l v i l l e , 0. F. I t a l y , France and Southeastern Europe.

The F o r t n i g h t l y Review,

v o l . 129, May, 1928, p. 646;

Montgomery, G. R. S e c r e t r a c t s o f France and I t a l y w i t h

Turkey.

Current h i s t o r y ,

v o l . 14, March, 1921, p. 203.

M i t r a n y , David. Pan-Europe-—A Hope or a Danger.

London, The P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y ,

vol; 1, Mo. 4, September, 1930, p. 457.

 L

Nevinson, H. W. D e c i s i o n s i n C o n f l i c t w i t h America.

"The Manchester Guardian Weekly,

v o l . 6, No. 1, January 6, 1922, p. 7.

Newman, i i . W. P. Pranco-italian Relations.

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 138, August, 1930, p. 155.

A u s e f u l d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s problem by a m i l i t a r y
writer.

Ormesson, Wladimir d . T
_

L ' E v a c u a t i o n de l a Rhenanie.

La Revue de p a r i s ,

Tome 4, 11 Aout, 1929, p. 492.

Ormesson, Wladimir d'.

Rentree....

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 555, 29 Septembre, 1928, p. 1302*

Payen, Edouard. Le Douzieme D ' A v r i l , La R a t i f i c a t i o n Du

P l a n Young.

P a r i s , Le J o u r n a l des Economistes,

Tome 96, A v r i l , 1930, p. 3.

Pernot, Maurice. I t a l i e et l a Prance apres l a Conference

de Londres.

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 639, 10 Mai, 1930, p. 719.

"Pertinax". B r i a n d Must Go.

 LI

The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 339, November, 1930,

p. 240. ( T r a n s l a t e d f o r Echo de Paris).

B r i a n d i s r u i n i n g the French p o s i t i o n .

P i non, Rene'. French Case f o r the ^Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s .

Current History,

v o l . 34, August 31, 1931, p. 646.

The T r e a t y must be enforced to assure security for

France.

Pinon, Rene* rermament Guiding P r i n c i p l e s of F r e n c h

Foreign P o l i c y .

Current h i s t o r y ,

v o l . 30, May, 1929, p. 206.

P o l y z o i d e s , Adamantios T.

The Mistakes of France,

Current H i s t o r y , v o l . 14, June 10, 1921, p.573.

P r i c e , J ; M. I n f l u e n c e of P a r i s on the Comity o f Nations,

The F o r t n i g h t l y Review,

v o l . 117, June, 1922, p. 977.

Raffalovich, G. War Clouds, i n South Europe.

Outlook and Independent,

v o l . 158, June 8, 1931, p. 304.

Rakovsky, C. The F o r e i g n P o l i c y of S o v i e t Russia.'.

New York, F o r e i g n Affairs,

v o l . 4, No. 2,- J u l y , 1926, p. 574.

 LII

Richmond, A d m i r a l H. Some Elements o f Disarmament.

The F o r t n i g h t l y Review,

vol. 131, February 1, 1932, p. 149.

Rober-Raynaud, M. La France en S a r r e .

L'Europe N o u v e l l e ,

No. 507, 29 Octobre, 1927, p. 1455.

Roland, Romain. Broaden, Europe or L i e .

The N a t i o n , v o l . 132, No. 3433,

A p r i l 22, 1931, p. 443.

A p l e a f o r a wider o u t l o o k .

R o o s e v e l t , N. The Ruhr Occupation*

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 4, No. 1, October 25, 1925, p. 112.

Sanchez, J . A. M. de.

A Year of. M. Poincare .7

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 6, No. 1, uctpber, 1927, p. 41.

Sanchez, J . A. M. de.

F u r t h e r Economic Consequences o f the Peace.

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

vol. 1, No. 1, September 15, 1922,' p. 158.

S i e b u r g , p.' Briand.

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

vol. 10, No. 4, J u l y , 1932, p. 586.

 LIII

Siegfried, Andre. The Psychology o f French p o l i t i c a l parties.

J o u r n a l o f the R o y a l I n s t i t u t e o f Inter-

national A f f a i r s ,

v o l . V I I , No. 1, January, 1928, p. 12.

Smith, H. A. The Problem o f Disarmament i n the L i g h t

of History.

J o u r n a l o f the Royal I n s t i t u t e o f i n t e r -

national A f f a i r s ,

v o l . X, No. 5, September, 1931, p. 600.

Sorel, R. Federation europe'enne.

Le J o u r n a l des Economistes,

Tome 97, Octobre, 1930, p. 198.

Steed, Wickham. Locarno and B r i t i s h - i n t e r e s t s .

J o u r n a l of the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e o f

i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l * IV, No. 6,

November, 1925, p. 286.

Steed, Wickham. The P o s i t i o n of France,

j o u r n a l o f the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e o f

i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . I I , No. 2,

March 20, 1923, p. 65.

A very f i n e d i s c u s s i o n by a competent o b s e r v e r .

Stoddard, L. What France R e a l l y Wants.

Forum and Century,

v o l . 86, December, 1931, p. 374.

 LIV

S t o l p e r , G. Lessons of the World Depression.

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 9, No. 2, January, 1931, p; 243.

Stone, W. T. The B r i a n d F l a n f o r European union.

Foreign p o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n Information

S e r v i c e , v o l . VI, No. 14,

September 17, 1930, p. 261.

A very v a l u a b l e study. The w r i t e r concludes t h a t

B r i a n d was anxious to improve the French economic
p o s i t i o n through the proposed European union.

Strachey, J , S t . Loe.

R e p a r a t i o n s and Debts.

The Spectator,

v o l . 130, June 23, 1923, p. 1032.

Swanwick, ri. M. The S e c u r i t y F a c t .

London, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . V I I , N§. 1, J u l y , 1925, p. 5.

T a r d i e u , Andre'. French and German u n i t y .

The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 306, J u l y 3, 1920,

p. 153. ( T r a n s l a t e d from L'Illustration).

Touhy, F. France's Rhineland Adventure.

The Contemporary Review,

v o l . 138, J u l y , 1930, p. 29.

A good review of t h i s episode i n the l i g h t o f l a t e r

developments.

V a l l i n , Charles. L ' O c c u p a t i o n F r a n c a i s e Des Pays Rhenans,

 LV

La Revue P o l i t i q u e et Farliementaire,

Tome 148, 10 Octobre, 1929, p. 124.

V e r m e i l , Edmond. Danger from Germany.

La Revue P o l i t i q u e e t p a r l e m e n t a i r e ,

Tome 144, 10 A v r i l , 1930, p. 169.

Villard, u. G. prance A g a i n s t the World.

The N a t i o n , v o l . 133, No. 3449,

August 12, 1931, p. 149.

V i v i a n i , Rene. What the French Statesmen have t o say

about Disarmament.

Outlook and independent,

v o l . 129, September 21, 1921, p. 86.

Wiekersham, G. W, The Pact o f P a r i s : A Gesture ©r a Pledge'

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 7, No. 3, A p r i l , 1929, p. 356.

W i l l i a m s , J . H, The C r i s i s o f t h e Gold Standard.

New York, F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,

v o l . 10, No. 2, January, 1932, p. 173.

Wolff, Theodor. The R e p u b l i c W i l l Live.

The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 339, November, 1930,

p. 237. ( T r a n s l a t e d from Berliner

Tageblattj.

Wright, C. E . E l l i n g t o n .

The Rhineland, Past and F u t u r e .

 LVI

The N a t i o n and Athenaeum,

v o l . 35, No. 21, August 23, 1924,

p* 635.

A good a n a l y s i s o f the elements envolved i n the

Rhineland problem.