6 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

universes of discourse need not be differentiated; for philosophical purposes

of critical analysis they must be kept distinct.
I realize that the preceding paragraph is cryptic to a degree that must
prove exasperating to the linguistic casualists and at least bai~ing to many
others; I have appended it, however, to indicate that any assumption to
the effect that the only alternative to Mr. Ryle's account of cognitive terms
is a Cartesian ghost, an unobservable and useless mind tucked away in a
bodily machine, is not necessarily valid. But whether the suggested third
option be acceptable or not, the main point of this paper still stands: the
ghostly concept of mind is due to a categorial mistake but not to any such
error as that to which Mr. Ryle attributes it. It comes not from treating
certain behavioral dispositions as episodes but from failure to note that,
despite their kinship to verbs of action both etymologically and in point
of demanding at least oblique complements if not direct accusatives, cogni-
tive verbs are dissimilar from them in their grammar in a larger sense. This
can be intimated by saying that it is relevant to ask what happened to the
object as a result of the action upon it, but not what modification it under-
went as an effect of its being cognized.
Received June 15, 19~

On Reduction
by JOHN G. KEMENY, DXaTMOUTrICOLL~.CE,and
PAUL O P P E N H E I M

The Concept ot Reduction

THE label "reduction" has been applied to a certain type of progress in
science. As this process has been the subject of much philosophical con-
troversy, it is the task of the philosopher of science to give a rational re-
construction of the essential features of reduction. W e will discuss the
basic features of this process informally, we will review two previous at-
tempts to make the concept precise, and we will offer certain improvements
which we hope will bring the philosophical characterization of reduction
closer to what actually happens in science.
Scientific progress may broadly be divided into two types: (1) an increase
AUTHORS'NOTE.The authors wish to thank C. C. Hempel for his constructive criticism
and for many helpful suggestions.
 ON REDUCTION 7
in factual knowledge, by the addition to the total amount of scientific
observations; (2) an improvement in the body of theories, which is de-
signed to explain the known facts and to predict the outcome of future
observations. An especially important case of the second type is the re-
placement of an accepted theory (or body of theories) by a new theory
(or body of theories) which is in some sense superior to it. Reduction is
an improvement in this sense.
W h a t are the special features of reduction? Since it is to be progress
in science, we must certainly require that the new theory should fulfill the
role of the old one, i.e., that it can explain (or predict) all those facts that
the old theory could handle. Secondly, we do not recognize the replace-
ment of one theory by another as progress unless the new theory compares
favorably with the old one in a feature that we can very roughly describe
as its simplicity. (We will try to make this more precise later on.) And
the special feature of reduction is that it accomplishes all this and at the
same time allows us to effect an economy in the theoretical vocabulary of
science.
These points can be made clearer by describing one of the goals of the
rational reconstruction of the process of reduction. The dispute between
the "mechanist" and "vitalist" can be stated as the question of whether
biology can be reduced to physics (or physico-chemistry). In terms of what
we have said above, we can reformulate this as a dispute as to the possi-
bility of forming a theory in physics which can take the place of the totality
of biological theories. Such a theory would have to explain all biological
phenomena (or at least all phenomena explainable by means of biological
theories), without introducing undue complexity into the theoretical struc-
ture of science. If we succeeded in doing this, then all the theoretical terms
of biology could be eliminated from the vocabulary of science, thus effect-
ing a considerable economy. This would be an example of reduction, the
reduction of biology to physics.1 W e will not take any stand on this dis-
pute, our interest in the present paper is only to make the process of re-
duction clear.
There are many examples of reductions that have been achieved. For
example, a great part of classical chemistry has been reduced to atomic
physics; and the classical theory of heat has been reduced to statistical
mechanics. These examples have been discussed at some length elsewhere.2
The dii~iculty lies in finding the essential features that such historical ex-
amples have in common.
It is hopeless to attempt a rigorous logical analysis of science in the
form in which we normally find it. It is not the role of the working scientist
to make his fundamental assumptions clear, and it is not reasonable to
expect that he will proceed according to rigorous logical rules. Hence, it is
8 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
customary for the philosopher of science to consider science in an idealized
form.
W e will suppose that science, or at least those branches under discussion,
have been formulated within a formalized language. The statements of
the scientist are of two types: (1) Those reporting the results of his ob-
servations, or of the observations of other scientists that he is willing to
accept. (2) Generalizations, hypotheses, general laws, etc., that he believes
are correct. The former are his observational statements, the latter his
theoretical statements. Each wilt be expressedby a number of sentences
in the formalized language. And a set of sentences can always be replaced
by the single sentence that is the conjunction of the members of the set,
hence we do not distinguish between an observation (a theory) and a body
of observations (theories).
There is a part of the total extra-logical vocabulary of science that is
used in recording observations, while the remaining terms are used only in
the theories. These latter terms form the theoretical vocabulary. W e will
also speak of the theoretical vocabulary of a theory, which consists of that
part of the entire theoretical vocabulary of science that is used in the
formulation of this particular theory. There has been a good deal of con-
troversy as to just what the observational and theoretical terms are. Fortu-
nately for this discussion we need to suppose only that a separation has
been made; it is irrelevant for us how the two are distinguished. Given such
a criterion, we can recognize as (potential) observational statements all
statements of the language containing only observational terms.
It is further important to note that from a logical point of view there is
no difference between explanation and prediction. The distinction is a
pragmatic one, depending on whether the fact deduced is already known
or not yet observed. Hence we will use "explain" to cover both processes.
A certain oversimplification is involved in this schematic representation.
W e intentionally overlook the fact that most observations involve a margin
of error. W e will also assume that the existing theories are consistent with
all observations, which is unfortunately not always the case. This point will
occupy us further, later on.
In a reduction we are presented with two theories, T1 and T2, and with
the observational knowledge of today represented by the complex sen-
tence tO. (The superscript is added to emphasize that this is the body of
observations available at a given time t.) The theoretical vocabulary of T2,
Voc(T2), contains terms which are not in Voc(T1). (And, of course, we
must require that these terms be not definable in terms of Voc(T1). W e
add this additional requirement once and for all--it will not be explicitly
mentioned from here on.) But it turns out that Tt can explain all that Tz
can, and it is no more complex. Hence we drop T~. from our body of
 ON REDUCTION 9
theories, and strike out all terms in Voc(T2) which are not in Voc(T1).
Then we say that T2 has been reduced to T1. a
As an important special ease Voc(T1) may be a subset of Voc(T2). W e
will call this process internal reduction. W e must further point out that
some writers have not applied the term "reduction" to all such processes,
but only to the case where T1 and T2 are the bodies of theories of two
branches of science, B1 and B2, respectively. In this important special case
we will speak of the reduction of branch B2 to branch B~. And we can
again distinguish the internal reduction of a branch, where it is reduced
to a subbranch. (It should be pointed out that implicit in the last two
definitions is the identification of a branch by its theoretical vocabulary.)
Thus we distinguish four related processes, all of which are called reduction.
This discussion has been, of course, highly informal. W e gave only the
circumstances under which reduction may occur. W e must now ask what
exactly constitutes reduction.
Previous Detinitions
Let us start by examining the two definitions that have so far been
worked out in detail. Woodger offers us a definition of the internal reduc-
tion of a theory, and Nagel defines the reduction of a branch to another.
W e will sum up the essential points of these two definitions, in our termi-
nology.4 W e will speak of W-reduction and N-reduction, to identify these
definitions.
Detinition I. T~ is W-reduced to T: if:
(A) Voc(T~) is a proper subset of Voc(T2).
(B) For every term P in Voc(T2) but not in Voc(T~) there is a bi-
conditional (x) [Px ~- Mx] such that:
(t) M is in terms of Voc(T1).
(2) The biconditional is well established.
(C) The "translation" of T2 by means of the biconditionals--i.e., the
result of replacing each P in T2 by the corresponding M--follows
from T1.
In the Nagel definition, defining the reduction of a branch, reference
must be made to the theories of the branch, i.e., the theories at the given
time. Hence the parameter t enters.
DeSnition 2. B2 is N-reduced to B1 at time t if:
(A) The theoretical vocabulary of B2 at time t contains terms not in
the theoretical vocabulary of BI at time t.
(B) For every such term P there is a biconditiona] ( x ) [ P x ~ Mx] such
that:
(1) M is in terms of the theoretical vocabulary of B~.
(2) The b/conditional is well established.
10 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
(C) The translation of the theories of B2 at t by means of these bi-
conditionals follows from the theories of B1 at t.
The connection between the two definitions is the following: B2 is N-re-
duced to B1 at time t if and only if the coniunction of the theories at t of Bx
W-reduces the coniunction of the theories at t of the combined branches.
W e can simplify this by introducing the following notation: Let
Wred(T1,T2) and Nred(B~,B2,t) stand for the terms defined in defini-
tions 1 and 2, respectively. And let tT~ be the coniunction of all theories
of the branch B at time t. Then Nred(Bi,B2,t) if and only if Wred(tTm,
tT 2).
Because of this close connection between the two definitions, the fol-
lowing analysis will apply to both concepts.
Our first question is whether C in definition 2 is independent of the
rest. Nagel calls B the condition of "definability" and C the condition of
"derivability." He points out that derivability is impossible without de-
finability. 5 He then goes on to say that, although definability is a necessary
condition, it is not in itself sufficient to assure derivability. But the opposite
seems to be the case.
Let T be the translation of tTB2 by means of the biconditionals. Then
T follows from accepted theories (the theories of B2) by means of further
well-established theories (the biconditionats), and hence T must be recog-
nized as a well-established theory. Furthermore, T makes use of the theo-
retical vocabulary of B1 only, hence it is one of the well-established theories
of branch B1. Thus it must either be one of the conjunctive terms of tTBi
or at least it must follow from this. In either case T, which is the transla-
tion of tT~2 is a consequence of tT~i. Hence derivability is automatically
assured.
There appear to be two ways of salvaging Nagel's claim that derivability
is an independent condition. The first one is a pragmatic one, namely an
appeal to the fact that T need not appear in any scientific publication as a
theory of Bi. According to this method a theory is recognized as a theory
of the branch today only if it has actually been written down, and was so
labeled. Thus it is entirely possible that there is a consequence of the ac-
cepted theories of science today which belongs to that branch but is not
called a theory of this branch. Nagel seems to have had this in mind; but
we feel that such pragmatic considerations are irrelevant to a logical analysis.
The other alternative is to impose an additional condition on the re-
ducing theory, which is not automatically satisfied by T. An example will
help to clarify the situation.
Classical chemistry" may be thought of as dealing with various ele-
ments, so that its theoretical vocabulary will have such terms as "hydrogen
gas" and "oxygen gas" in it. As typical of its theories we may take the very
 ON REDUCTION 11
simple example "'two volumes of hydrogen gas and one volume of oxygen
gas combine dto form a very stable liquid." Let us now go to a stage of
atomic physics in which we have a simple model of the atom (such as
Bohr's), but no elaborate theory like that of quantum mechanics. W e may
take as a primitive of this stage of atomic physics the concept of "atomic
number," defined by the positive charge of the nucleus of the given atom.
Our biconditionals identify hydrogen gas with gas whose atoms have num-
ber 1, and oxygen gas with gas whose atoms have number 8. The translation
of our sample theory is "two volumes of gas whose atoms have number 1
and one volume of gas whose atoms have number 8 combine to form a
very stable liquid." (For the sake of the argument let us take "stable" and
"liquid" as observational terms.) This is certainly a theoretical statement
from atomic physics, and it would be most unnatural to deny it the status
of an accepted theory of this field. Hence our chemical theory is replaced
by a physical one. And yet we hesitate to call this process reduction.
If we are asked why we hesitate to accept the process, we will give an
answer somewhat as follows: "The reducing theory is no better than the
one supposedly reduced. W h a t gain is there for science if a simpler theory
is replaced by a more complex one?" This sort of consideration was briefly
mentioned in our introduction, and we must now try to make it more
precise. As a first approximation we might say that the reducing theory
should be simpler than the theory reduced. But this is not the complete
answer. If the reducing theory is much stronger, it would seem reasonable
to allow it some additional complexity. W h a t our intuition tells us is that
we must be satisfied that any loss in simplicity is compensated for by a
sufficient gain in the strength of the body of theories. W e need some
measure that combines strength and simplicity, in which additional com-
plexity is balanced by additional strength. Let us express this combined
concept by talking about how well a theory is systematized. ( W e realize
that this concept is in need of precise definition, but at least we can make
it intuitively clear?) W e will then require that the reducing theory be at
least as well systematized as the theory reduced.
Without the requirement of systematization we cannot even understand
the need for theories. After all tO, the totality of our observations to date,
can (trivially) explain all that we have observed. Any theory can be re-
placed, for the purposes of explanation and prediction, by the set of all
observational statements that follow from it. This set is normally infinite,
but it is recursively enumerable. What can a theory add to this? It is im-
portant to realize that it cannot add anything. The role of a theory is not
to give us more facts but to organize facts into a practically manageable
form. In place of an infinite set of observation statements we are given a
reasonably simple theory. Such a theory has the same explanatory ability
12 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
as the long (or infinite) list of statements, but no one will deny that it is
vastly simpler and hence preferable to such a list.
Only thus do we see the need for introducing theoretical terms. Any-
thing that we want to say about actual observations can be said without
theoretical terms, but their introduction allows a much more highly sys-
tematized treatment of our total knowledge. Nevertheless, since theoretical
terms are in a sense a luxury, we want to know if we can get along without
some of them. It is, then, of considerable interest to know that a set of
theoretical terms is superfluous since we can replace the theories using
these by others in which they do not oeeur, without sacrificing the degree
of systematization achieved by science to this day.
Hence we suggest that in Definition 2, C be replaced by:
(N-C 0 There is a theory T1 of B1 which is at least as well systematized
as tTB2, and from which the translation of tTB2 by means of the
bieonditionals follows.
Because of the connection between W-reduction and N-reduction, it is
desirable to modify the former also, replaeing C by:
(W-C') T1 is at least as well systematized as T2, and the translation of
the latter by means of the bieonditionals follows from the former.
W e might also consider strengthening both of these conditions by in-
serting "is better systematized" in place of "is at least as well systematized."
In either ease we note that C' is now independent of the other conditions,
since there is no reason why the translation of a theory should be as well
systematized as the theory itself; on the contrary, in all eases we can think
of, the translation is more complex than the original theory.7
The second point to be made is a very minor one. There is some sug-
gestion on the parts of both Nagel and Woodger that the bieonditionals
be "tested." It is very difficult to see how such bieonditionals could be
tested in general without using other theories. They connect highly ab-
stract terms from the theoretical vocabulary, whose connections to experi-
ence may be very complex. For example, P alone may not be connected
to experience, but only in some complex combination with other theo-
retical terms Q,R, . . . Then what would a test of ( x ) [ P x ~ Mx] be?
On the other hand, according to the definition we have two well-established
theories (e.g., Tx and T~ in Definition 1 ), which are independent without
the biconditionals, but of which one is deducible from the other by means
of the bieonditionals. Since these theories have their own evidences, this
ability to connect the evidence of T2 to Tx should be sufficient justification
for the biconditionals. It may even be the only possible type of justification.
This, if correct, means that requirement B2 is unnecessary in both defini-
 ON REDUCTION 13
tions. This would be very- satisfying also, since B2 introduces a pragmatic
element into the definitions.
Our last point is the most important one. There are two oversimplifica-
tions in both the Woodger and Nagel definitions: (1) They assert that
the translation of T2, and precisely that, follows from T1. (2) They believe
that the connection between the two theories is by means of simple bi-
conditionals.
The first of these points ignores the fact that the old theory usually
holds only within certain limits, and even then only approximately. For
example, in the reduction of Kepler's laws to Newton's we must restrict
ourselves to the case of a large central mass with sufficiently small masses,
sufficiently far apart, around it. And even then the laws hold only ap-
proximately-as far as we can neglect the interaction of the planets. While
these points are of fundamental importance, there is no way of taking them
into account as long as we tacitly assume that our theories are correct. If
we abandon this (contrary-to-fact) assumption, then the problem of re-
duction becomes hopelessly complex. Hence we will go along with the
previous authors in their first oversimplification.8
However, there seems to be no justification for the second oversimplifica-
tion. Any actual example has to be stretched considerably if it is to exem-
plify connections by means of biconditionals, and most examples will under
no circumstances fall under this pattern. It seems to us that an entirely
unnecessary feature was introduced here.

New Detinitions
As we see it, the essence of reduction cannot be understood by compar-
ing only the two theories; we must bring in the observations. It is not the
case that the vocabulary of T2 is in any simple way connected with the
vocabulary of T1, but only that T1 can fulfill the role T2 played, i.e., that
it can explain all that T2 can and normally more. This suggests the follow-
ing modification of the given definitions. W e take as fundamental the
concept of the reduction of a theory T2 by means of TI relative to observa-
tional data O. W e abbreviate this as Red(T1,T2,O).
Definition 3. Red(T1,T2,O) if:
(1) Voc(T2) contains terms not in Voc(T1). °
(2) Any part of O explainable by means of T2 is explainable by T~.1°
(3) T1 is at least as well systematized as T2.
W e must ask, however, what we can do about the undesired parameter O.
One possibility is to put tO for O, that is, relativize reduction with respect
to the present moment. Thus we get the concept that Tx today reduces T2.
Definition 4. Redt(T~,T2) if and only if Red(T1,T2,0t).
14 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
And the corresponding internal reduction concept:
Definition 5. Intred t(Ti,T~) if and only if Redt(T1,T~) and Voc(T1) is
a proper subset of Voc(T~).
The above is a very restricted notion of reduction, but no doubt some
authors have this in mind. If we do not want to put a particular value of O
into Definition 3, we must eliminate the undesired variable by quantifica-
tion. And this seems to lead to a very fruitful approach.
Definition 6. Red(T1,T2) if for every O consistent with T~,
Red (T1,T2,O).ll
Definition 7. Intred(Ti,T~) if Red(T1,T2) and Voc(Ti) is a proper sub-
set of Voc(T~).
There is a natural way of basing the reduction of branches on these
concepts, namely by taking the theoretical body of the branch (at a given
time) as the T~ in question} 2
Delinition 8. Red(B1,B2,t) if and only if there is a theory T1 in B1 at t
such that Red (Ti,tTB~).
Definition 9. Intred(B1,B2,t) if and only if Red(Bi,B2,t) and B1 is a
branch of B~.
W e would like, of course, to make these definitions independent of t.
There is the obvious procedure of choosing t as "the present moment,"
which appears to be Nagers procedure. But there is no analogue of the
quantification of O. It is reasonable to require that the reducing theory
should serve in lieu of the reduced one no matter what the facts turn out
to be, but it is not reasonable to require that it should reduce every theory--
true or false. Hence in this case we must relativize to the present moment.
Definitions 6-9 represent our proposed definition of reduction.
Let us study definitions 6 and 7 (definitions 8 and 9 are just special
cases). Condition 1 in the former requires that Voc(T2) have certain
terms not in Voc(T1), and in the latter definition this is strengthened by
requiring that in addition Voc(T1) be a subset of Voc(T~). The other
two conditions are the same for both definitions. Condition 3 requires that
T1 be at least as well systematized as T~. W e could, if desired, strengthen
this to "better systematized." Condition 2 is the only one to which the
universal quantifier applies. Thus we have: For any observational state-
ment O, consistent with T2, if T2 can explain the same part.
This formulation allows a variety of interpretations of "explain." But
let us use the commonest one: TM T can explain a part of O if there are two
"non-overlapping" parts, O~ and O~, such that T - O 1 implies 02. Thus
the above condition becomes: If, for two given "non-overlapping" observa-
 ON REDUCTION 15
tional statements (such that T2 is consistent with both) T2" O1 implies
02, then so does TI" O1. In particular, O1 may be empty (analytically
true). Thus a necessary, condition is that if T2 implies an observational
statement, then so does T1. But this is also suftieient; because if T2" O1
implies 02, then T2 implies O1 D O~, hence TI implies O1 D 02, hence
TI" O1 implies 02. This establishes the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Red(T1,T2) if and only if (1) Voc(T2) contains terms not
in Voe(T1), (2) every observational statement implied by T2 is also
implied by T1, and (3) T1 is at least as well systematized as 312. We have
Intred(T1,T2) if and only if the same three conditions hold, and in
addition Voe(T1) is a subset of Voe(T2).
In many special eases (in particular when the universe of discourse is
finite) there will be a strongest observational consequence of T2, say T*~.
In these eases we may replace the second condition by the requirement
that T1 implies T*~.
Next we want to show that the Woodger and Nagel definitions are spe-
eial eases of ours. At least this is the ease if the definitions are modified by
changing C to C'. and since there is some doubt about the desirability of
requirement B2, we will prove our results irrespective of whether B2 is
included or not.
Theorem 2. If in Definition 1 condition C is replaced by ~V-C', then it
defines a special ease of Definition 7. And the same holds even if B2 is
omitted.
Proof: The only condition of Theorem 1 that is not obviously fulfilled is
the second condition. Let T'2 be the translation of T2 by means of the
bieonditionals. Take any interprettaion of Voc(T1) that makes T1 true.
Since T'~ follows from T1, it too must be true under this interpretation.
Now extend the interpretation to Voe(T2) by making the P in each
bieonditional synonymous with its M. This makes all the bieonditionals
true. And since according to these T2 and T'2 are equivalent, T2 must
also be true under the interpretation. Thus any observational statement
implied by T2 must be true. This shows that under any interpretation
making T1 true, an observational statement following from T2 must
also be true. Which proves that any observational statement following
from T~ must also follow from T1. (And B2 was not used.) Q.E.D.
Quite analogously we can prove:
Theorem 3. If in Definition 2 condition C is replaced by N-C', then it
defines a special ease of Definition 8. And the same holds even if B2 is
omitted.
The question arises of why a method of translation should be essential
16 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
for Woodger and Nagel but not for us. The answer lies in the fact that
they attempt to establish a direct connection between two theories, while
our connection is indirect. If one theory is to follow from another, it must
be translatable into the vocabulary of the latter. 14 But it is entirely possible
that a theory should be able to explain all facts that another can, without
there being any method of translation. Of course, each set of theoretical
terms must be connected to observational terms, and hence to each other,
but this connection is normally much weaker than a full translation.
Naturally, we do not exclude the possibility that reduction may be ac-
complished by means of a translation. That is why the previous definitions
(at least in the modified form) are special cases of our corresponding defi-
nitions. But we maintain that they cover what is an extremely special case.
W e have offered four definitions for types of reductions, but it must not
be supposed that there is any sharp distinction between them. Generally
a case of reduction is classified as of one of the four types, but that does
not exclude that it could have been classified otherwise. Given a case of
Red(T1,T~), we could just as well have described it as the internal reduc-
tion Intred(T1,Tl"T2). Or we could have taken the branches BI and B2
which have T1 and T~_ as their theories (i.e., if we are willing to call them
branches), and speak of Red (B~,B2,t). Or we could take Ba to be the union
of B1 and B o and speak of Intred(B~,Ba,t). It all depends on what we wish
to recognize as a single theory (or body of theories) and what we call a
branch. It is rather that there is one process of reduction that is describ-
able from four different points of view.
Take as an example the reduction of pre-Newtonian mechanics (includ-
ing celestial mechanics) to Newton's theories. W e may think of each body
of theories as reduced to the newly created body, and then take this as an
example of Definition 6. Or we may think of the totality of previous
theories (which presumably used all of Newton's theoretical terms) as
reduced, in which case it is an example of Definition 7. And in this case
there is pretty nearly a method of translation, so this is as near as we ever
come to an example of Definition 1. But when we pass to the reduction of
Newtonian mechanics to relativity theory, there is nothing that even re-
motely resembles the translation by means of biconditionals.
Similarly for the reduction of branches. The more or less complete re-
duction of chemistry to physics has been used as a standard example. It is
optional whether we take this as an example of Definition 8 or whether
we speak of the reduction of physico-chemistry to physics, in which case
it is an example of Definition 9. And while some attempts have been
made to show that something like biconditional translation does exist, this
certainly is not the case if quantum mechanics is taken as the reducing
science.
 ON REDUCTION 17
In conclusion, we hope to have shown that the two previous definitions
were too narrow in that they excluded most actual cases of reduction. W e
have presented reasons for the belief that narrowness is an unavoidable
fault of any definition trying to establish direct connections between
theories. Of course, we are open to correction on this point. But if this
is right, then our much wider alternative is the natural choice.
Independently of this we argued for the inclusion of an additional con-
dition, namely that the reducing theory be as well (or better) systematized
as the theory reduced. It is on these two points that our definition must
be judged.
It must be pointed out that our definition shares with the previous ones
a serious oversimplification. W e are ignoring the fact that the theory to
be reduced may be only approximately true, and only with certain restric-
tions at that. W e certainly would not want to require that an incorrect
prediction of T2 should be a consequence of T1. W e might suggest that
it is some modification T'2 of T2 that is actually reduced to T1.1~ But such
a T'2 is not usually formed, and it may be very difficult to formulate it. In
addition, we would still be ignoring the fact that T'2 holds only approxi-
mately.
Further Research
There are several related concepts which deserve consideration. The
authors hope to discuss them in a future paper. They are here listed in
the hope that others may be interested in some of these problems.
While Definitions 6 and 7 seem to answer all questions concerning the
reduction of one theory to another, there are some questions about the
reduction of branches not answered by Definitions 8 and 9. W e often hear
speculation about whether a branch B2, which is not today reduced by B1,
is in some sense "reducible" to it. Presumably this involves some hypothesis
about the future development of science. W e should also consider cases
in which, although B2 is not reduced to B1, some part of it is. This would
lead to a concept of "partial reduction" and possibly even a numerical
measure of the "reductive power" of a branch of science.
There is an especially important special case of reduction that deserves
independent treatment. This is reduction by means of a micro-theory.
There is also a clear connection to Feigl's "levels of explanation, ''~6 and
it would appear to be fruitful to carry his ideas further by means of the
definitions here offered.
Received ]uly 24, 1955
NOTES
In this example the economy is achieved by eliminating some biological terms.
This reduces the number of theoretical terms in science as a whole. But it is not neces-
sarily the case that the reducing branch has fewer terms than the branch reduced. It
18 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
may be the case that physics has fewer terms than biology, but this question is never
considered in the reduction-literature.
2There is an excellent discussion of the reduction of theories of heat to statistical
mechanics by E. Nagel in his "The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences,"
in Science and Civilization, edited by R. C. Stauffer (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1949).
s While the terms of Voc(T~) now become logically superfluous, there may be good
extra-logical grounds for keeping them. The replaceable terms may be less abstract than
the terms of Voc(Tx), and hence more convenient to work with. It may also be the case
that Tx is less well confirmed than T~, and hence we hesitate to make a final replace-
ment--at least till further e~Sdence is available.
' C f . J. H. Woodger, Biology and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1952), and E. Nagel, "Mechanistic Explanation and Organismic Biology," in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 11, no. 3 (March 1951). W e hope
that we have done no injustice in translating these definitions into the terminology of
the present paper.
Nagel makes use of the same type of argument as was used by Poincar6 to show
that science cannot give us value-judgments, since a value-statement cannot follow from
a factual premise: The argument is based on the supposed fact that a term missing from
the premises cannot occur in the conclusion of an argument, in any essential form. But
from the premise P(a) we can conclude P(a) v Q(a), showing that the argument
is not strictly correct. (This counter-example was shown to the authors by C. G. Hempel,
who is apparently the first one to have noticed the loophole.) Nevertheless, while the
argument is not correct, the conclusion is essentially all right. While predicates not
in the premises (and independent of terms in the premises) may occur in the conclu-
sion, they play an inessential role. For example, if such a predicate is replaced every-
where by its negation, the conclusion still follows.
6 While the concept of the simplicity of a theory is still in need of considerable study,
some partial results toward its explication are available. In some cases there will be com-
plete agreement among scientists as to which of two theories is simpler; for example, if
one can be stated in a single line, while the other--using the same vocabulary--requires
several pages to state, then there would be little room for argument. The first two steps
toward an explication were taken by Karl Popper in Log/k der Forschung (Vienna:
Julius Springer, 1935) sections 39-464, and by John G. Kemeny in "The Use of Sim-
plicity in Induction," PhilosophicaIReview, vol. 625, no. 3 (July 1953). This concept
of simplicity is a purely syntactic one applicable to theories as a whole. It must be
distinguished from certain nonsyntactic concepts, as well as from Nelson Goodman's
measure of the simplicity of sets of predicates.
Since in a translation atomic sentences are, in general, replaced by molecular ones,
there is little doubt as to the general validity of this claim.
s The authors are indebted to C. G. Hempel for clarifying their thinking on this point.
9 That this condition occurs in all definitions of reduction is due to the historic usage
of 'reduction.'
1oThe usage of 'explain' will be discussed below. There is a definite connection be-
tween this condition and the concept of "systematic power." The present condition im-
plies that sp(Ta,O) > or --~ sp(T~,O), but it is stronger than the latter. Cf. "Systematic
Power," by the present authors, in Philosophy of Science, vol. 22, no. 1 (January 1955).
"Every O" means, of course, every conceivable set of observational data, which in
turn means that O can be any observational statement. W e require that O be consistent
with T~, since otherwise we get queer explanations in which the "initial conditions" are
inconsistent wtih the theory, and hence anything follows from the two together. There
is no harm, however, in allowing O to be inconsistent with T1. Similarly, it does no
harm to apply the definitions to a self-contradictory T1. The resulting "reductions" are
merely uninteresting.
"Branch" is here taken in a syntactic, rather than pragmatic, sense. B1 is a branch
of B~ if its theoretical vocabulary is a proper subset of the theoretical vocabulary of B~.
 FURTHER REMARKS ON DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS 19
Cf. C. G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," Philosophy
of Science, vol. 15 (1948). While this definition is adequate for many purposes, it is
oversimplified in some ways.Theorem 1 depends on the form of this definition, but our
general approach is consistent with any explieatum of 'explain.'
1~Cf. footnote 6.
i~For example, T'~ may state that T~ holds under specifiedconditions.
le Cf. H. Feigl's contribution to the symposium on operationism in the Psychological
Review, vol. 52, no. 5 (September 1945).

Further Remarks on Definition and Analysis

by I R V I N G M. C O P I
UNIVERSITY O F M I C H I G A N

A NUMBERof acute criticisms have been directed against some of the views
presented in my essay "Analytical Philosophy and Analytical Propositions"
(this journal, December 1953). I welcome them as providing stimulation
and opportunity for penetrating more deeply into the issues involved.
The central notion in my discussion is that of a theoretical de/init/on.
A theoretical definition of a term is intended to formulate a theoretically
adequate characterization of the objects to which that term applies. One
gives a theoretical definition of a term to attach to the term, as intension,
t h a t property which in the context of a given theory is most useful for
understanding or predicting the behavior of those entities which comprise
the (usual) extension of that term.
In his "Definitions in Analytical Philosophy" (this journal, April 1954)
Michael Scriven has correctly observed that a given theoretical definition
is compatible with a wide range of different theories (p. 38). Several dif-
ferent theories may have the same vocabulary (of terms or of concepts), or
they may have parts of their vocabularies in common. And that common
area of vocabulary may be all that is used in the definition of a given
term. With respect to a theoretical definition, therefore, Mr. Scriven is
right in saying that it is incorrect to talk of the theory which underlies it.
I am therefore happy to accept his suggestion that my remarks on this
point should be modified. I would say now that accepting a theoretical
definition involves accepting as correct some theory in whose terminology
the definition is formulated.
It should be clear, however, that a theoretical definition may be disputed
for either (or both) of two different reasons. One may dispute a theoretical
definition because of disagreement with the theory one believes to under-