People vs.

Cañete (2003)

Facts: Alma, a 12 year-old girl, was already sleeping when her uncle, Kakingcio Cañete then
inserted his private organ into Alma’s vagina and made a push and pull movement of his body.
The next day, Kakingcio attempted to repeat the same, but Alma ran away. She went up the hill
to reveal to Alejandra, the common-law wife of Kakingcio, that the latter raped her.

Alejandra accompanied Alma to the barangay captain and complained against Kakingcio. The
medico-legal examination found that she had healed lacerations in her cervix.

An Information was filed with the RTC of Leyte charging Kakingcio with rape. Kakingcio, assisted
by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. When he testified, Kakingcio denied having
sexually assaulted Alma. He interposed the defense of alibi.

RTC: rendered a decision finding Kakingcio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and imposing
on him the penalty of death.

Accused: When the prosecution tried to elicit from the offended party how appellant’s penis
could have been inserted into her vagina with his pants still on and the appellant’s counsel
objected to the question, the presiding judge himself took the cudgels for theprosecution and
propounded questions on the private complainant. Worse, the presiding judge posed leading
questions to the private complainant. The presiding judge was biased and partial to
theprosecution.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in participating directly and actively in the presentation and
reception of the prosecution's evidence.

Held: NO. A presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the
course of evidentiary rules. The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not be
incomplete or obscure. He must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to
witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth.

Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examinationof a Child Witness which took
effect on December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading
questions may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will
further the interest of justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not
to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:

Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. – The court shall exercise control over the questioning
of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) protectchildren from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.

PEOPLE vs GO Case Digest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES v. BENNY GO
411 SCRA 81 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The search and seizure of articles must be limited to those which are particularly
described in the search warrant.

FACTS: A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appelant Benny Go in search of
evidence for the violation of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know as the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met Jack Go, son of the Go and
restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the time they then called on two
baranggay kagawads to act as witnesses on the said search. They then siezed properties and objects
even those which were not included in the warrant. When they were almost finished with their search
Go arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses was made to sign the inventory reciept.

Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for violation of R.A. 6425. Upon
hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the prosecution against Go. However,
the two witnesses questioned the validity of some of the evidence presented such as the inventory
receipt as well as the illegal drugs said to have been seized from the search.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense cahrged. On appeal, Go
assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search performed by the raiding team and
the admissibility of the evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the properties seized
that were not included in the search warrant.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be returned to Go

HELD: It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be
seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time, the raiding team characterized the
seizure of the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals
and stamp pads as ―seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in
the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.

To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against Go for alleged possession of instruments or
implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the
Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellant‘s residence.

The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been
turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is,
therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a ―plain view‖ of the
items from his vantage point in the sala.

In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the ―plain
view‖ doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things
belonging to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly
described, must thus be ordered returned to him.

Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been
certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may not be returned
and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to law.

Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered
returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY GO

Facts: The police officers conducted a test buy operation at the residence of the accused where
they bought P1,500.00 worth of shabu but they did not arrest the accused at that time. Instead,
they applied for a search warrant based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of
illegal drugs in his house. When they arrived at the residence of the accused, they “sideswept a
car of the accused parked outside his house. When the son opened their gate and went out, the
police officers introduced themselves, informed him that they had a search warrant entered the
house and handcuffed the son of the accused to a chair. They summoned two (2) barangay
kagawads to witness the search. They were able to seize the following: (a) “one plastic bag
containing yellowish substance”, (b) a weighing scale, (c) assorted documents; (d) passports; (e)
bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check writer; (i) several dry seals and (j) stamp
pads; (k) Chinese and Philippine Currency and and appellant’s (l) Toyota Corolla car. An inventory
was made signed by the police officers the kagawads and the son of the accused. There was
likewise an affidavit of orderly search but not under oath. Accused was charged with illegal
possession of shabu. One of the kagawads testified that shabu was not even one of the items
seized and inventoried. What originally appeared was merely “Chinese Medicine”, but replaced
with shabu. After trial, accused was convicted. He questioned the validity of the search.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty in
implementing the search warrant by the police officers.

HELD: No. The raiding team’s departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, taken together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of
appellant’s residence, tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this
Court to apply the exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence.
This must necessarily be so since it is this Court’s solemn duty to be ever watchful for the
constitutional rights of the people, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. In the oft-
quoted language of Judge Learned Hand:
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As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong,
will that wrong be repressed.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question

determinable from a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the purpose of the
search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.

Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules authorizing
search and seizure is required, and strict compliance therewith is demanded because:

x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace
and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private
affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search
and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several
irregularities in the manner by which the search of appellant’s residence was conducted.

Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and
authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to
believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation,
the deliberate sideswiping of appellant’s car was unreasonable and unjustified.

There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the policemen
entered appellant’s residence. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm and fear produced
in one suddenly confronted under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all the
more was unjustified as was his continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and
Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible restraint.

Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10

of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized.

After the inventory had been prepared, it was presented to appellant for his signature without
any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt and to the
assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against
him. In People v. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign
receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the
constitutional right to remain silent.

The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of
appellant’s custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner
by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellant’s residence.

The “Affidavit of Orderly Search” is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the search. Not
having been executed under oath, it is not actually an affidavit, but a pre-prepared form which
the raiding team brought with them. It was filled up after the search by team leader SPO1
Fernandez who then instructed appellant to sign it as he did instruct Jack Go, KagawadManalo
and Kagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses.

More importantly, since the “Affidavit of Orderly Search” purports to have been executed by
appellant, the same cannot establish the propriety and validity of the search of his residence for

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he was admittedly not present when the search took place, he having arrived only when it was
“almost through.”

In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged “Affidavit of
Orderly Search,” prepared without the aid of counsel and by the very police officers who
searched his residence and eventually arrested him, provides no proof of the regularity and
propriety of the search in question.

On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellant’s residence
failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. – No

search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (Underscoring supplied)

As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of
the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing theshabu,
did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e.appellant
(who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a
procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from actually observing and
monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter of the law:

As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a
procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises
unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law
are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in
another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.

That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second
floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among
the witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section
8, Rule 126 provides that the search should be witnessed by “two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality” only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the
premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of appellant’s residence clearly should
have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were
without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.

G.R. No. 132371 April 9, 2003 People vs. Simbahon, 410 SCRA 94

FACTS: Police operatives, together with the chairman of the barangay which had jurisdiction over
the place, and a member of media, served Search Warrant No. 95-100 upon appellant Danilo
Simbahon, Maricar Morgia, and Charito Mangulabnan at their residence. Thereafter, the team
began conducting a search of all the rooms in accordance with the search warrant, and found
under the bed a brick of dried flowering tops suspected to be marijuana wrapped in a newspaper,
a black bullet pouch containing six (6) live ammunitions, and sachets of white crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu. After the search, an inventory receipt of the items seized from
the house of the suspects was prepared and, together with an affidavit of orderly search was
signed by Danilo Simbahon. Appellant Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon was chargedfor alleged
violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1866, penalizing the illegal possession of firearms. The
Court found him guiltyof the crime charged against him in Criminal Case No. 95-142514 thereby
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and to pay the cost.

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However, appellant contended that the court erred in convicting him because the search warrant
served was invalid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was invalid.

HELD: Yes. The record shows serious defects in the search warrant itself which render the same
null and void.

The caption as well as the body of Search Warrant No. 95-100 show that it was issued for more
than one offense — for violation of RA 6425 and for violation of PD 1866. In Tambasen v. People,
et al., it was held:

On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 123 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of
Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversive Law.
Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a “scatter-shot warrant” and totally null and void.

Likewise, the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The
rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. The constitutional requirement
is a description which particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place, so as to exclude all
others. In the case at bar, only the application for search warrant contained the address of the
place to be searched. The search warrant issued by the court merely referred to appellant’s
residence as “premises”, without specifying its address. The Constitution and the Rules of Court
limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. The absence of a particular
description in the search warrant renders the same void.

Finally, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search warrant issued for the search of
appellant’s house. The seizure by the police officers conducting the search of articles not
described in the search warrant was beyond the parameters of their authority under the search
warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement
is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses
may not be committed.20 Neither can the admissibility of such seized items be justified under the
plain view doctrine, for the bricks of marijuana in this case were found not inadvertently or in
plain view. Rather, they were found after a meticulous search under the bed, wrapped in a
newspaper and inside a plastic bag.

Microsoft Corporation vs Maxicorp, Inc.

In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows
Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of Maxicorp.
Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit
from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase,
they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz”.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz
as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He
even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician, who showed the
judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The
RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and
unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed
the legality of the warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of

5
Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or
Sacriz’ name hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what
they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement
and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were
clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in Sacriz’ name does not
render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a
specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is
determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it was improper for the
Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI
Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

PEOPLE VS.ANG CHUN KIT

FACTS: ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national and reputed to be a member of a Hong Kong-based
drug syndicate
operating in Metro Manila, was collared by NARCOM operatives in a buy-bust operation after he
sold to
an undercover agent for P400,000.00 a kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu.
His car
also yielded more of the regulated drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex box. The accused refuted the
charges.
However, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, found appellant Ang Chun Kit also known as "Romy Ang" guilty of selling shabu in
violation of
Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425, as amended, sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered him
to pay
a fine of P30,000.00. Hence this appeal.

The accused maintains his innocence and faults the trial court in not holding that the crime could
not have
been committed under the circumstances narrated by the arresting officers and that the alleged
buy-bust
operation was a frame-up and the evidence merely planted. He argues that the prosecution was
not able
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since every piece of evidence presented against him
is tainted
with constitutional infirmities.

ISSUE: WON conviction of Ang Chun Kit was proper?

HELD: With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already said in People v. Morico
that "when an
arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he does not admit
the
commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is
merely a
statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an
arrest. It is a
police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves.
It is not
an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction."
But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun Kit's conformity to the questioned
documents has not been a factor in his conviction since his guilt has been adequately
established by the
detailed and unshaken testimonies of the officers who apprehended him. Hence even
disregarding the
questioned documents we still find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
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The alleged inconsistencies do not detract from the established fact that the accused was caught
in
flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation since the arresting agents were able to give
an
otherwise clear and convincing account of the circumstances leading to the arrest of the
accused. And, in
every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs what is material and indispensable is the
submission
of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place between the seller and the poseur-buyer.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Ang Chun Kit also known
as
"Romy Ang" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling methamphetamine hydrochloride in
violation of
Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amended, sentencing him to life imprisonment and ordering him to
pay a
fine of P30,000.00 is AFFIRMED.
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA

7NOV

G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.
The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals

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Held:1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes
such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.

G.R. NO. l-27434 September 23, 1986

Genaro Guñi, et al vs. CA

FACTS:
The three haciendas owned by TABACALERA were negotiated by the late Praxedes T.
Villanueva, predecessor-in – interest of petitioners ( Genaro Guñi, et al.) sometime in 1949. However,
having insufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell
one of the hacienda to Santiago Villegas. As alleged the TABACALERA will only agree to the
transaction between Villanueva and Villegas only upon having a guaranty by which Gaspar Vicente
stood as a guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The guarantee was embodied in a
document.
ISSUE:
1. May respondent Gaspar Vicente testify on the matters of fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes T. Villanueva which contributes a claim of demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 123,
Section 26 Par C, now Rule 130, Section 20 Paragraph (A)?
2. May not a written promise to sell dated October 24, 1949 be novated into a verbal agreement
of lease during the lifetime of the promissorr, whose death occurred on November 12, 1951, by facts
and circumstances substantiated by competent oral evidence in this case?
3. Should the promise in a promise to sell, who paid Php. 12,460.24 which was to be accounted
and to be credited as rental after five (5) years of lease, who in his original complaint did not allege
nor prove damages, except the sum of Php. 2,000 as attorney’s fees, receive a judgment for
damages in the amount of Php. 74, 056.35 which consists of Php. 37, 121.26 plus legal interest for
the crop years 1950-51 to 1958-59 and for Php. 3, 624.18 to Php. 4, 374.78 for every crop year
subsequent to 1958 – 59 plus interes?

RULING:

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1. Yes. Gaspar Vicente can testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva which contribute a claim of demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 130, Section 20,
Paragraph (A).

When Vicente took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of
property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting & surrender of fields nos. 4 &
13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters
of facts occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought
against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate / deceased person.

2. The novation of the written contract / promise to sell into a verbal agreement lease was clearly
and conveniently proven not only by the testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the acts and
conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the contract/ promise to sell.

3. The third issue no longer necessary for discussion in said case for the petitioner have clearly
and sufficiently shown that the contract / promise to sell was a subsequently novated in a verbal lease
agreement which follows that they are entitled to a favorable decision on their counterclaim.