Topic: Violation of the Instructions to Head Watchers issued by the Office of the Bar

Confidant (bringing a digital camera inside the bar examination room)

Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

RE: Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, during the 2011 bar examinations, B.M. No. 2482,
April 1, 2014

Facts: The Office of the Bar Confidant designated Tiongson, an employee of the Court of
Appeals, to serve as head watcher for the 2011 Bar Examinations on 6, 13, 20 and 27
November 2011. During the second Sunday of the bar examinations, Tiongson brought his
digital camera inside Room No. 314. Padilla, Puruganan and Padre alleged that after the
morning examination in Civil Law, while they were counting the pages of the questionnaire,
Tiongson took pictures of the Civil Law questionnaire using his digital camera. Tiongson
allegedly repeated the same act and took pictures of the Mercantile Law questionnaire after
the afternoon examination.

In a Memorandum addressed to the CA Clerk of Court Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen, the OBC
revoked and cancelled Tiongson’s designation as head watcher for the remaining Sundays of
the bar examinations. The OBC found Tiongson guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct
for violating a specific provision in the Instructions to Head Watchers prohibiting the
bringing of cameras to the bar examination rooms.

Issue: Whether Melchor Tiongson is guilty of Grave Misconduct for violating the Instructions
to Head issued by the Office of the bar Confidant.

SC: NO

Misconduct is grave if corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule is present; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. If any of the
elements to qualify the misconduct as grave is not manifest and is not proven by substantial
evidence, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple
misconduct. On the other hand, dishonesty refers to a person’s disposition "to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity
in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray."

Tiongson is liable for simple misconduct only, because the elements of grave misconduct
were not proven with substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the
OBC.

The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classify simple misconduct as
a less grave offense punishable by suspension for one month and one day to six months for
the first offense. Under the same Rules, we can consider Tiongson’s length of service in the
CA of 14 years, more than ten years of service in the bar examinations and his first time to
commit an infraction as mitigating circumstances in the imposition of penalty. As a CA
employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards required of every
court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the
judiciary. Thus, he must be reminded that his infraction was unbecoming of a court
employee amounting to simple misconduct.
 Topic: Gross Ignorance and Grave Abuse of Discretion on the part of the Judge
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion

Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014

Facts: Petitioner Lorenzana filed a complaint against respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia Austria.
He alleged that in the course of special proceeding, the respondent committed Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence,
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection,
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise petitioner alleged that respondent
committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge,
allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper
body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath
except probably a brassiere.

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she
crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she
did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings.
She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a
mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature because
judicial remedies were still available. As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary
period, she contended that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period
prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section
11, Rule 4 of the Rules pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.

In arriving at its recommendation the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that
the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to
prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

Issue: Whether respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion.

SC: NO

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by
bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant
failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually
proven. Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
renders him liable. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts are erroneous.

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve
the dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a
whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing
himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Accordingly, the
respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of
exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of
arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.
 Topic: Code of Judicial Conduct
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion

Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2,
2014

Facts: In the Verified Complaint, Dulang filed a complaint against respondent judge Mary
Jocylen Regancia for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence,
serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty. He alleged that on May 4, 2009, he
moved for the resolution of an ejectment case, given that the same had been filed as early
as year 2000 and had already been submitted for resolution. Notwithstanding the summary
nature of the ejectment proceedings, Judge Regencia rendered a Judgment dismissing the
ejectment case only on February 18, 2011 or more than 11 years since its filing. Likewise
petitioner filed before the OCA, alleging that despite the filing of a notice of appeal from
Judge Regencia’s February 18, 2011 Judgment, the latter nevertheless issued an
Order dated August 1, 2011 directing the postmaster and postal carrier of the Cebu Central
Post Office, Cebu City to certify Dulang’s receipt of a copy of the said Judgment. In this
regard, Dulang accused Judge Regencia of gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence,
serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty, contending that by filing his appeal, the
latter was already stripped of her jurisdiction over the case and should not have issued the
said order. Dulang claimed that this effectively stalled the administration of justice, much to
his prejudice.

In her Comment Judge Regencia maintained that no trial was held in Civil Case No. 212-B as
the parties merely filed their respective position papers and that she could have easily
resolved the said case if not for another case pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Branch 59. She also commented that she issued the August 1, 2011 Order
because the defendant in the ejectment case, Emmanuel Flores opposed Dulang’s notice of
appeal. She explained that this order was merely intended to determine whether or not
Dulang filed his appeal within the reglementary period.

Issue: Whether Judge Regencia may be held administratively liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision.

SC: YES

Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that "a judge shall dispose
of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods" and echoed
in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary which provides that "judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery
of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness."

It is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B was already submitted for resolution on October
17, 2008. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which
clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position
paper within which a decision thereon must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia
rendered judgment only about two (2) years and four (4) months later, or on February 18,
2011. While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and,
thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the
plight of judges and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from
promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to
justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in
delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision
 Topic: Suspension from the Practice of Law
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes

Jose Francisco T. Baens v. Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio, A.C No. 10378, June 9, 2014

Facts: This is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of respondent for violation of
Canons 15, 17, 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, commenced
thru a complaint-affidavit filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by complainant.

In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant alleged, among others, that the respondent: (1)
despite receiving the sum of 250,000.00 to cover for the expenses in the said case, failed to
file the corresponding petition, and it was the complainant’s wife who successfully
instituted Civil Case No. 2463-08, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on December 8,
2008; (2) even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons dated
December 15, 2008, belatedly filed an Answer and was able to file it only on March 13, 2009
which was after the 15-day period stated in the Summons; (3) failed to make an objection
on the petition on the ground of improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife
were and are residents of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of the
case and thus failed to discover and attend all the hearings set for the case; and (5) as a
result, Civil Case No. 2463-08 was decided on October 27, 2009 without the complainant
being able to present his evidence.

In his Answer, the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and explained that:
(1) after a meeting with the complainant, he drafted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage and asked the complainant to go over said draft after which he proceeded to
file the same with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City; (2) the complainant was
aware that said petition will be filed in Malabon City as the latter had signed the verification
and certification of the petition; (3) the case became pending and was later on withdrawn
because of the complainant’s refusal to testify; (4) what contributed to the delay in filing
the Answer was the fact that he still had to let the complainant go over the same and sign
the verification thereof; (5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the case because he
did not receive any notice from the trial court; and (6) it was only on December 2, 2009
when he found out that the trial court has already rendered its decision and that the
complainant had changed counsels.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of the Code and
recommended that the respondent be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of
law on the ground that respondent failed to diligently attend to the case and was grossly
negligent in discharging his responsibilities considering the fact that he has already been
fully compensated. The IBP Board of Governors increased the recommended period of
suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year.
Issue: Whether respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.

SC: YES

The Court sustained the IBP’s findings and the recommended sanction of suspension from
the practice of law since the attendant facts of the case show substantial evidence to
support the respondent’s delinquency.

The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or notices from
the trial court is highly intolerable. In the first place, securing a copy of such notices, orders
and case records was within the respondent’s control and is a task that a lawyer
undertakes. Moreso, the preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter of procedure
that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of the respondent. It was
incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental to the
advancement of his client’s cause of action.

Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of the progress of
his client’s case with the trial court, and neither did he resort to available legal remedies
that might have protected his client’s interest. Although a lawyer has complete discretion
on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy
or defense within the authority of law to support his client’s interest. When a lawyer agrees
to take up a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the
latter’s rights.

Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness, and
loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.

In this case, the respondent’s reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his client of due
process and his actions were evidently prejudicial to his clients’ interests. A lawyer’s duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any
court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging
their termination even without prodding from the client or the court.

Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable."
It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the complainant’s case,
he became duty-bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to champion
his cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy and
defense that is authorized by law, the respondent fell short of what is expected of him as an
officer of the Court.
 Topic: Duties of a Lawyer
Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

Euprocina I. Crisostomo, et al. v. Atty. Philip Z.A. Nazareno, A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014

Facts: Complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached
to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its
counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings
have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or
agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had been filed by herein
complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment
complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In
addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary
public since he only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the
certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1,
2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment.

IBP Investigator recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a period of six (6)
months for his administrative violations. The Investigating Commissioner found that there
were unassailable proofs that the certification against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s
ejectment complaint against Sps. Sioting had been erroneously declared, considering that at
the time Rudex filed the said complaint in September 2002, Sps. Sioting’s rescission
complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was already pending. Hence, it was
incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more so, since both complaints
involve the same transaction and essential facts, and a decision on the rescission complaint
would amount to res judicata on the ejectment complaint. In this relation, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim innocence of his omission since
he was not only Rudex’s counsel but the notarizing officer as well. Having knowingly made
false entries in the subject certifications against forum shopping, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held administratively liable and
thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report
and Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty from a suspension of six (6)
months to only one (1) month.

Issue: Whether Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable and accordingly
suspended for a period of one (1) month.

SC: YES
The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed. Separate
from the proscription against forum shopping is the violation of the certification
requirement against forum shopping.

Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court,
and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.

In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which read as
follows:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.

In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be
held administratively liable. Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each
set of cases, Atty. Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the
canons of the Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related
cases in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.
Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him
despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s resolution on
his administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be imposed, the Court deems it
proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat, a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law
was imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made false
and untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s infractions
are of a similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the
foregoing discussion, had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby suspends him
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public,
considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a
separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record
in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page
number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his
register. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.

Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all
the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material
falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not
aware of any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum.
The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated
as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in the case of
Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, to wit:

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false

statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may
be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In
this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
 Topic: Disbarment; Duty of a lawyer in receiving the money of his clients
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes

Amado T. Dizon v. Atty. Norlita de Taza, A.C. No. 7676, June 10, 2014

Facts: This concerns an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Norlita De
Taza for the latter's demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money from her client
purportedly to expedite the proceedings of their case which was pending before the Court.

Complainant alleged that he, along with his siblings engaged the services of Romero De Taza
Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of
Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.The complainant claimed that, Atty.
De Taza demanded the sum of P75,000.00 from him to expedite the proceedings before the
Court. This amount was over and above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by
a contract.

According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier or in
January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty.
De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the
Court.

On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and
learned that the Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to
Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case was still pending. Thereafter, on November 6,
2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarment against Atty. De Taza. He also
attached several affidavits and documents from other individuals who attested that Atty. De
Taza issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda
Pineda executed an affidavit which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De
Taza issued 11 checks in her favor amounting to P481,400.00, which were all dishonored by
the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.

In a Resolution, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court to file a Comment. However, the
copy of the Resolution was returned unserved. The Court, in its Resolution, held that the
said copy of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as
having waived the filing of her comment. The case was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a
period of two years from the practice of law.

Issue: Whether Atty. de Taza should be held administratively liable for issuing bouncing
checks, demanding and/or receiving money from her clients under the guise of having the
proceedings before the court expedited.
SC: YES
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the accusations
against her. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a hindrance for the
Court to mete out an appropriate sanction. "In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required." Based on the documentary evidence
submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for
borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid
without any reason. The complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De
Taza’s involvement in an estafa and violation of BP No. 22 case filed before the Office of the
City Prosecutor in Angeles City for drawing checks against a closed account, among other
complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such conduct, while already off-
putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is
exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not
only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and fairness.

"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows
the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to
the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her
commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and
irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem."

Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as she
had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can
be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said
scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her clients. Without a
doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when
she even used the name of the Court to defraud her client.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer
must immediately return the money to his client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty.
De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have
even been made in the first place.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do
so.

"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because
they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."

"The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice.
For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial
system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated."

All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and
recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza
from the practice of law for two years.
 Topic: Fidelity to Duty of Court Personnel; Impartiality and impropriety of a judge
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Emilie Sison-Barias v. Judge Marino E. Rubia, et al, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014

Facts: Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of
respondent Judge Marino Rubia. The cases are intestate proceeding, guardianship
proceeding and a civil action for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real
properties. In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and
part of the estate of complainant’s husband was involved.

Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for
issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique
"Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a data
encoder in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna.

Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito, met with respondent
Pecaña on February 20, 2010. During this meeting, complainant informed respondent
Pecaña of the delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of
administration.

Respondent Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Biñan, Laguna.
Complainant went there with Enrique. Respondent Pecaña then informed complainant that
she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had already given
administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael.

Issue: Whether the respondents are administratively liable.

SC: YES

For respondent Pecaña, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that
could cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.

As a court employee, respondent Pecaña should have known better than to interact with
litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the general public places in
the judiciary. Respondent Pecaña should have refused to meet with complainant in her
home. She should have refused any other form of extended communication with
complainant, save for those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This
continued communication between complainant and respondent Pecaña makes her
culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of propriety mandated of court
personnel.

Respondent Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the
former’s knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in
addition to the text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all forms
of communication with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of
complainant’s attempts to communicate with her. Respondent Pecaña failed to do so.
Instead, she continued to communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising
complainant against filing an administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.

Respondent Pecaña violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:

CANON I: FIDELITY TO DUTY

Respondent Pecaña’s actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court
personnel uphold integrity and prudence in all their actions. Respondent Pecaña should,
thus, be held administratively liable for her actions. Respondent Judge Rubia committed
gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia
violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his
office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaña’s actions by
virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge
of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. As a judge, he had the authority
to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were under his direct supervision,
act in accordance with the esteem of their office.

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but
also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a
fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.

Canon 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to
the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to suggest to a litigant what to do to resolve
his case for such would generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with one party.
A litigant in a case is entitled to no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judges
are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not only must a judge render a just decision, he is
also duty bound to render it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and its integrity. Respondent's conduct in the instant case inevitably invites doubts about
respondent's probity and integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach.

CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.

Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent
Judge Rubia violated the notions of propriety required of his office. Respondents have
relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting was a chance encounter, and, thus, no
impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself.

Respondent Judge Rubia’s actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their
dealings inside and outside the courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost
the requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety fundamental to his office. He cannot be
allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.
 Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility (Rules 10.01; 11.02; 18.04); Expectations of
honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in dealings with client
Ponente: Justice Lucas Bersamin

Henry Samonte v. Atty. Gines Abellana, A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014

Facts: On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative
complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as the
plaintiff in Civil Case. In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts
of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana. On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty.
Abellana to comment on the administrative complaint.

In his comment dated April 6, 1990, Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of
documents. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless.

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in handling certain aspects
of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to the defendants’ answer with counterclaims in
order to deny the new matters raised in the answer.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana.

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year.

Issue: Whether Atty. Abellana is lawfully suspended from the practice of law for one year.

SC: YES

In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest,
imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding,
are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they
have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has
taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession.

By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by
no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are
emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
 Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for
information.

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in
his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to
outright falsification by superimposing "0" on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing
that he had already filed the complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on
June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was
himself the cause of the belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct
amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not
excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less
corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty
and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his
transactions with his client.

The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was entirely
warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the
formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he
could not deny because the RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the
order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some
tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the interest of
justice.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only
thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any
resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds
committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to
continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a
member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.

The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the
Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were
unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually
finished presenting his client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty.
Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with
mistrust.
 Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility (Canon 17; Canon 18, Rule 18.03, Rule 18.04;
Canon 15)
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido Reyes

Almira C. Foronda v. Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr., A.C. No. 9976, June 25, 2014

Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by lmira C. Foronda against Atty. Jose L. Alvarez,
Jr. before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). The
grounds are the following:
(1) Fraud and deceit in luring the complainant in transacting business with
the respondent;
(2) Dishonesty and misrepresentation when the respondent misinformed the
complainant that her annulment case was already filed when in fact it was
not;
(3) Issuing unfunded checks as payment for the respondent's obligations to
the complainant;
(4) Violation of Canon 15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities
when the respondent represented to the complainant that he knows of court
personnel who will help facilitate the complainant’s annulment case;
(5) Violation of Canons 16.01 and 16.03 for failure to return the
complainant’s money despite numerous demands; and
(6) Violation of Canon 18.04 when the respondent misinformed the
complainant regarding the status of her annulment case.

Issue: Whether Atty. Alvarez, Jr. violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SC: YES

In his Supplemental Affidavit, Atty. Alvarez admits the delay and apologizes for it. For
delaying in filing the petition for complainant, respondent should be deemed guilty of
violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which pertinent
read:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
 Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
the negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Respondent lied about the delay. The allegations of complainant about how respondent lied
to her about the delay in the filing of the petition are very detailed. While denying he
misrepresented to complainant that the petition has been filed when it was not,
respondent did not care to refute also in detail the allegations of complainant. In his
Answer, he simply denied the same for the reason that he has no sufficient information to
form a belief as to the truth thereof. It should be noted, however, that the allegations
pertains to things respondent said and did, and are therefore, matters which he knew or
should have known. His denial is therefore tantamount to an admission. In doing so,
respondent is guilty of violating not only Canon 15 but also Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read:

CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY

IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.

Respondent induced complainant to lend him money at 5% interest per month but failed to
pay the same. This is admitted by respondent. Rule 16.04 provides that a lawyer shall not
borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Obviously, respondent borrowed money from his
client and his client’s interest was not fully protected. In fact, respondent repeatedly failed
to comply with his promise to pay complainant. The fact that he subsequently paid
complainant more than the amount due from him as part of the settlement of the criminal
complaint filed by her against him hardly serves to mitigate his liability.

He issued two sets of checks which were dishonored when presented for payment. This is
admitted by respondent.
 Topic: Suspension from the practice of law
Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen

Victor Lingan v. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmu P. Baliga, A.C. No. 5377, June 30,
2014

Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo
Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga on November 16, 2000. Complainant alleged that
respondents, both notaries public, falsified certain public documents, as follows:

A complaint for annulment of title with damages filed by Isaac Villegas against complainant
with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Respondent Calubaquib signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the complaint as notary public and
entered the same as Doc. No. 182; Page No. 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996, which
according to the records of the National Archives, the document entered as Doc. No. 182;
Page 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996 in respondent Calubaquib’s notarial register was an
affidavit of one Daniel Malayao.

A special power of attorney dated September 10, 1996 executed by Isaac Villegas
appointing respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-fact to “enter into a compromise
agreement under such terms and conditions acceptable to him” which was notarized by
respondent Baliga and entered as Doc. No. 548, Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996,
which according to respondent Baliga’s notarial register, Doc. No. 548; Page No. 110; Book
No. VIII; Series of 1996 pertains to an affidavit of loss of one Pedro Telan, dated August 26,
1996.

A petition for reappointment as notary public for and in Tuguegarao,Cagayan by respondent

Baliga, which was notarized by respondent Calubaquib and entered in his notarial register
as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08, Book No. CXXX, Series of 1995. However, Notarial Register
Book No. CXXX was for the year 1996 and entered there as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08 was a
cancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11, 1996.

Respondents Calubaquib and Baliga both admitted the incorrectness of the entries and
simply attributed them to the inadvertence in good faith of their secretary and legal
assistants to whom they had left the task of entering all his notarial documents.

Issue: Whether respondents violated the Notarial Practice Law.

SC: YES

It is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his
notarial register. Section 245 of the Notarial Law provides that every notary public shall
keep a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all
his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part
thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees therefore. The failure of
the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial
acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of commission under Section
249 (b).

Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections
by passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists
despite our open condemnation. Respondents, especially Calubaquib, a self-proclaimed
“prominent legal practitioner,” should have known better than to give us such a simple-
minded excuse.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized to do so
may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those
not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the
public, the courts and the administrative offices in general.

Being not only lawyers but also public officers, respondents should have been acutely aware
of their responsibilities. Respondents’ acts did not amount to mere simple and excusable
negligence. Having failed to perform their sworn duty, respondents were squarely in
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
 Topic: Disciplinary action against lawyer
Ponente: Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno

Mercedita de Jesus v. Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit, A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014

Facts: A disbarment complaint filed by De Jesus against respondent on the grounds of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.

Complainant alleged that respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a
public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a
result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money.
Respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent without the
signature of the lessees. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered
by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a
certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said
agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant submitted three

Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene
Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina
B. Limpioso (Limpioso).

IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate

revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary
public for two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without
the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted
respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three
SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real
estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also
recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The IBP
Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year.

Issue: Whether respondent can be subjected to disciplinary action.

SC: YES

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial
seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents
diminished.

In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged
market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s
liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant is

incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she
could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease
agreement is not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on
various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were
either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a
ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a
document be signed in his or her presence.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the
very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Thus, in acknowledging that
the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no
falsehood.
 Topic: Administrative case for disbarment
Ponente: Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno

Dante La Jimenez & Lauro G. Vizconde v. Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr., Adm. Case No.
8108, July 15, 2014

Facts: Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the
"Alabang Boys") were the accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In a Joint Inquest Resolution the
charges were dropped for lack of probable cause.

It was revealed during one of the hearing conducted by the House Committee on Illegal
Drugs that respondent had prepared the release order for his three clients using the
letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul
Gonzales.

Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated
that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a
highly irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use the
DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar.

For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for legal processes. Atty.
Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in
drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter
was not a government prosecutor.

In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges
against his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the
immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the accused,
together with their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release his
clients. Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him
to prepare and draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was
overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be
expedited." In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release order was not signed by
the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all.”

Issue: Whether respondent is administratively liable.

SC: YES
Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer
shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment
and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper
behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-
bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the
outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith in the judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To
that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest, which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.

Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyer
shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his
client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the
law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an
attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell
short of these exacting standards.
 Topic: Quantum of Evidence in disbarment; Canon 7 of Code of Professional
Responsibility; Duty of Lawyers
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido Reyes

Raul M. Francia v. Atty. Reynaldo V. Abdon, A.C. No. 10031, July 23, 2014

Facts: In a verified complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Committee
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), Raul M. Francia prayed for the disbarment and imposition of
other disciplinary sanctions on Labor Arbiter Reynaldo V. Abdon for violation of the lawyer's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In his position paper, the complainant alleged that he had a meeting with the respondent at
the Makati Cinema Square to seek his assistance with respect to a pending case in the Court
of Appeals involving the labor union of Nueva Ecija III Electric Cooperative (NEECO III). The
respondent, who is a LA at the National Labor Relations Commission, San Fernando,
Pampanga, told the complainant that he can facilitate, expedite and ensure the release of a
favorable decision, particularly the award of assets and management of NEECO III to the
union. To bolster his representation, he told him that the same regional office where he was
assigned had earlier rendered a decision in favor of the labor union and against the National
Electrification Administration. With the respondent’s assurance, the complainant yielded. In
December 2006, the complainant met the respondent to discuss their plan and timetable in
securing a favorable ruling from the CA. The respondent told him that in order to facilitate
the release of such favorable decision, the union must produce the amount
of P1,000,000.00, a considerable portion of which is intended for Justice Sundiam, the
ponente of the case and the two member justices of the division, while a fraction thereof is
allotted to his costs.

Shortly thereafter, the complainant met the respondent again and handed him the amount
of P350,000.00, which was raised out of the individual contributions of the members of the
union, as partial payment for the agreed amount and undertook to pay the balance as soon
as the union is finally allowed to manage and operate the electric cooperative. In turn, the
respondent assured him that a favorable ruling will be rendered by the CA in no time. On
January 4, 2007, the union was advised by their counsel that the CA has already rendered a
decision on their case and the same was adverse to them. This infuriated the union
members who then turned to the complainant and demanded for the return of the
350,000.00 that they raised as respondent’s facilitation fee. The respondent promised to
return the money but asked for a few weeks to do so. After two weeks, the respondent
turned over the amount of P100,000.00, representing the unspent portion of the money
given to him and promised to pay the balance of P250,000.00 as soon as possible. The
respondent, however, reneged on his promise and would not even advise the complainant
of the reason for his failure to return the money. Thus, the complainant was constrained to
give his car to the union to settle the remaining balance which the respondent failed to
return.
Issue: Whether respondent should be disbarred.

SC: NO

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the Court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court found that the
evidence submitted by the complainant fell short of the required quantum of proof. Aside
from bare allegations, no evidence was presented to convincingly establish that the
respondent engaged in unlawful and dishonest conduct, particularly in extortion and
influence-peddling. Firstly, the transcript of the alleged exchange of text messages between
the complainant and the respondent cannot be admitted in evidence since the same was
not authenticate in accordance with A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, pertaining to the Rules on
Electronic Evidence. Without proper authentication, the text messages presented by the
complainant have no evidentiary value. The Court cannot also give credence to the
affidavits of Pena and Demillo which, on close examination, do not prove anything about
the alleged transaction between the complainant and the respondent. The complainant
miserably failed to substantiate his claims with preponderant evidence. Surely, he cannot
prove the respondent’s culpability by merely presenting equivocal statements of some
individuals or relying on plain gestures that are capable of stirring the imagination.
Considering the lasting effect of the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment
on a lawyer’s professional standing, the Court cannot allow that the respondent be held
liable for misconduct on the basis of surmises and imagined possibilities. A mere suspicion
cannot substitute for the convincing and satisfactory proof required to justify the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer.

The respondent, however, is not entirely faultless. He has, nonetheless, engendered the
suspicion that he is engaged in an illegal deal when he introduced the complainant to
Vistan, who was the one who allegedly demanded P1,000,000.00 in facilitation fee from the
union members. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a "lawyer
shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." For, the strength
of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. It is every lawyer’s
duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping
his actions beyond reproach. The Court reiterated its directive to the members of the Bar to
be mindful of the sheer responsibilities that attach to their profession. They must maintain
high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.
 Topic: Court Officers; Gross Inefficiency
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion

Flora P. Holasca v. Anselmo P. Pagunsan, A.M. No. P-14-3198, July 23, 2014

Facts: In her complaint-affidavit, Holasca charged Sheriff Pagunsan with Gross Misconduct
and Serious Dereliction of Duty in connection with his delay and refusal to implement the
writ of execution issued in an ejectment case. Holasca was the plaintiff in the ejectment
case. After obtaining a favorable judgment, she sought the execution of the decision
through Sheriff Pagunsan. She narrated that on February 11, 2009, Sheriff Pagunsan,
accompanied by a male companion,(allegedly a Process Server) and Francisco J. Calibuso, Jr.
(Clerk of Court III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cavite City, went to the occupied
to serve a copy of a Writ of Execution. There, Sheriff Pagunsan allegedly told the defendants
not to talk to anybody regarding the payment of damages in the ejectment case. Sheriff
Pagunsan likewise told the defendants: "marami pala kayong gamit na pwede kong hilain
pero huwag kayong mag-alala, hindi ako hihila kahit ano".Before leaving the premises,
Sheriff Pagunsan advised the defendants to see him in his office on February 13, 2009.
Holasca further alleged that Sheriff Pagunsan did not conduct an inventory of all the
chattels found inside the house of the defendants, or evict the latter from its premises.

Issue: Whether Sheriff Pagunsan with Gross Misconduct and Serious Dereliction of Duty

SC: YES

Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice because they are tasked to
execute final judgments of the courts, which would otherwise become empty victories for
the prevailing party, if left unenforced. As agents of the law, sheriffs are mandated to
uphold the majesty of the law, as embodied in the decision, without unnecessary delay to
prevent injury or damage to the winning party. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-
up" the sheriff’s implementation of the writ. Once the writ is placed in their hands, sheriffs
are duty-bound to proceed and see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly
delayed. The duties of the sheriff in implementing writs of execution are explicitly laid
down in the Rules of Court (Rules).

Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules provide for the manner a writ for
the delivery or the restitution of real property shall be enforced by the sheriff. Section 14,
Rule 39 of the Rules, on the other hand, requires sheriffs to execute and make a return on
the writ of execution after its implementation. These provisions leave no room for any
exercise of discretion on the part of the sheriff on how to perform his or her duties in
implementing the writ. A sheriff’s compliance with the Rules is not merely directory but
mandatory.
In the present case, The Court found that Sheriff Pagunsan was remiss in performing his
mandated duties. To recall, the Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC on February 4,
2009. Sheriff Pagunsan served the Writ on February 11, 2009, giving the defendants three
(3) days or until February 14, 2009 within which to voluntary vacate the premises. However,
there was no showing that the writ had been fully implemented or the property delivered
to the complainant on February 14, 2009. In fact, the records would show that Sheriff
Pagunsan did not return to the premises on the said date or any date thereafter; nor made
any personal follow-ups from the defendants. In short, no other action was undertaken by
Sheriff Pagunsan to implement the writ of execution.In addition to Sheriff Pagunsan’s delay
and reluctance to implement the writ, he also failed to collect the money judgment in favor
of Holasca. Despite the opportunity to collect, Sheriff Pagunsan did not do anything. In his
answer, he even admitted that he did not conduct an inventory of the defendants’ personal
properties. Such failure to carry out what is purely a ministerial duty, together with his
delay in the implementation of the writ, demonstrates his incompetence and gross
inefficiency in the performance of his official duties. For Sheriff Pagunsan’s lapses in the
procedures in the implementation of the writ of execution, the Court found him guilty of
Gross Inefficiency. Under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 gross
inefficiency is classified as a grave offense. Gross inefficiency is punishable by suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal from
the service for the second offense. However, considering that this is Sheriff Pagunsan’s first
infraction, he should be meted with the penalty of suspension of nine (9) months and one
(1) day without pay after taking into account the attendant circumstances, namely, the
excessive disregard of the cited Rules of Court provisions, mitigated by the character of the
offense as the first by Sheriff Pangusan.

Moreover, Calibuso’s participation in the ejectment case is clearly not connected with his
judicial duties as court personnel. Nonetheless, the Court stressed that Calibuso, as an
employee of the judiciary, must maintain a neutral hands-off attitude in dealing with party-
litigants, in this case, in the execution of a decision.
 Topic: Disbarment; Violation of Notarial Law
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido Reyes

Aemerita B. Mahilum v. Atty. Samuel Sm. Lezama, A.C. No. 10450, July 30, 2014

Facts: On May 24, 2006, the respondent notarized a Deed of Donation executed by her
estranged husband, Rodolfo Mahilum as donor, and their common daughter, Jennifer
Mahilum-Sorenson as donee, pertaining to the donor's share of one-half portion over a
parcel of land. Attached to the complaint is a copy of the deed of donation dated February
7, 2006 bearing the signatures of Rodolfo and Jennifer, as well as the notarial seal and
signature of the respondent on the acknowledgment portion attesting to the personal
appearance of Rodolfo and Jennifer before him when the same was notarized on May 24,
2006. According to the complainant, she has personal knowledge that Jennifer could not
have personally appeared before the respondent on May 24, 2006 or even on February 7,
2006 because during those dates, she was in the United States of America (USA) working at
the State Fund Office in California.

In his Answer, the respondent asserted that the donor, donee and instrumental witnesses
to the donation were all physically present when the document was signed. He stated that
he is personally acquainted with Rodolfo and he had no reason to cast doubts upon him
when he introduced his daughter Jennifer who came all the way from the USA to visit her
father. The respondent further averred that the complainant has a long-running feud with
Rodolfo and she and some of their common children are using this complaint as part of her
personal vendetta against Rodolfo who happens to be friends with the respondent. The
parties were summoned for mandatory conference before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Negros Occidental Chapter, whereby both of them undertook to present
documentary evidence showing the actual whereabouts of Jennifer during the dates in
question.

The complainant submitted a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration showing the
arrival and departure records of Jennifer in the Philippines. Based thereon, Jennifer did not
enter the Philippines in the year 2006. Despite opportunity to submit evidence rebutting
the foregoing certification, the respondent failed to file any.

Issue: Whether respondent’s notarial commission should be revoked.

SC: YES

The Court agreed with and sustains the IBP’s finding that the official record from the Bureau
of Immigration showing that Jennifer never traveled to the Philippines in the year 2006
substantially established that indeed she could not have personally appeared before the
respondent when he notarized the deed of donation on May 24, 2006. Certainly, the
conclusive import of the contents of such certification cannot be overcome by the
respondent’s mere counter-allegations unsupported by any corroborative proof.

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law mandates that affiants must
personally appear to the notary public. Corollary, under Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules
on Notarial Practice of 2004, a commissioned notary public is enjoined from performing a
notarial act unless the affiant is: (1) in his presence at the time of the notarization; and (2)
personally known to him or otherwise identified by him through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.

The purpose of the rule was emphasized in Angeles v. Ibañez, thus: The physical presence of
the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the
acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act and deed.
The respondent is, without doubt, familiar with the above rules and duties, having been a
notary public for 35 years. But he, nonetheless, failed to observe them. Contrary to the
IBP’s findings that such failure was due to carelessness; the Court found and so held that
the respondent deliberately disregarded the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Notarial
Law. It must be emphasized that the public and the courts accord conclusiveness of due
execution in notarized documents. By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the
instrument, the respondent misled the public that Jennifer personally appeared before him
and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the deed when in fact she did not.
Such misconduct can also usher in precarious legal consequences should the deed of
donation later on spawn court intervention.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby found Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama GUILTY of violating the
Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, his incumbent
notarial commission is REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public for ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Topic: Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
Facts: In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of
honor in her best friend’s wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of
America. To facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought
the services of respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer.
Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services
(Contract), whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US
immigrant visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration
therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment
and undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.
The parties likewise stipulated that should complainant’s visa application be
denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for
records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order,
respondent is obligated to return the said downpayment.4 However, respondent failed
to perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even
scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the
downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and
the instant administrative complaint against respondent.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating
the CPR.
Ruling:
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard
of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this
regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration
lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of
her US visa and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal
services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but
merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly
processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pineda’s
identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-
serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of
any probative value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly,
respondent’s deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his
obligations under the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa
in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such
client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted
to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable, as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR
when he failed to refund the amount of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature of
this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return
upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics.
Topic: Habitual Absenteeism
Per Curiam
A.M. No. P-14-3232 August 12, 2014
Re: Report of Judge Rodolfo D. Vapor, Municipal Trial Court in Cities [MTCC],
Tangub City, Misamis Occidental, on the Habitual Absenteeism of Filigrin E. Velez,
Jr., Process Server, same court.
Facts: Judge Rodolfo D. Vapor, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Tangub City,
Misamis Occidental, informed the Office of the Court Administrator of the habitual
absenteeism of Filigrin E. Velez, Jr., the process server of his court. He reported that for
the first quarter of 2011, respondent Velez incurred twenty-three (23) absences.
Respondent Velez admitted having incurred the aforesaid absences. He
explained that the absences were reasonable because he was undergoing treatment for
liver disease, urinary tract infection and iron deficiency at that time.
On 1 December 2011, Judge Vapor informed the OCA that respondent Velez
failed to report for work for the entire months of October and November 2011. He
recommended that respondent Velez be dropped from the rolls.
In his letter dated 20 February 2012,Judge Vapor reported that while
respondent Velez returned to work for the month of January 2012, he was no longer
given any task and his duties were distributed to the court’s utility worker and sheriff.
Judge Vapor reiterated his recommendation for the dropping of respondent Velez from
the rolls.
The OCA recommended that respondent Velez be found guilty of habitual
absenteeism and, accordingly, be dismissed from the service.
Issue: Whether or not Velez is guilty of habitual absenteeism and, accordingly, be
dismissed from the service.
Ruling: Yes.
Under Administrative Circular No. 14-2002, an officer or employee in the civil
service shall be considered habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences
exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the leave law for at least
three (3) months in a semester or at least three (3) consecutive months during the year.
It is evident from the records that respondent Velez is guilty of habitual
absenteeism for incurring unauthorized absences for the period covering 1 January up
to 1 December 2011. In the Resolution dated 11 July 2012 in A.M. No. 12-6-47-MTCC,
the Court disapproved the application for leave filed by respondent Velez for the period
1 March 2011 up to 1 December 2011. All the absences he incurred during that period
were thus considered unauthorized.
Respondent Velez was earlier charged for his unauthorized absences and
tardiness in2009. Accordingly, the Court in a Resolution dated 23 April 2012 in A.M. No.
P-11-2899, suspended him for six (6) months and one (1) day. This instant
administrative case is therefore the second incursion of respondent Velez.
Under Section 46 (b) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, frequent unauthorized absences in reporting for duty is classified as a grave
offense punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for
the first offense and dismissal from the service for the second offense.
Topic: Dishonesty and Misconduct
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
A.M. No. P-14-3222 August 12, 2014
(Formerly AM. OCA IPI NO. 11-3609-P)
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE B. LAGADO and CLERK OF COURT II JOSEFINA C.
EMPUESTO, both of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, MAHAPLAG, LEYTE,
Complainants, vs. CLERK II BRYAN ANTONIO C. LEONIDO, Respondent.
Facts: Complainants alleged that on February 22, 2011, respondent Clerk II Bryan
Antonio C. Leonido intercepted and withdrew checks representing their second
quincena salary as well as their share in the Judiciary Development Fund and Special
Allowance for Judges Fund from the Mail Distribution Center, Postal Office of Tacloban,
Leyte without their authority and knowledge.
According to complainants, Leonido was able to claim the subject checks from
the postal office by submitting a forged authorization purportedly from Clerk of Court II
Josefina C. Empuesto and presenting a photocopy of his Supreme Court identification
card. Thereafter, Leonido allegedly kept the subject checks in his possession without
informing complainants of such fact. Learning about what had transpired, residing
Judge Jose B. Lagado repeatedly tried contacting Leonido, but to no avail.
Eventually, on February 25, 2011, complainants were able to recover the subject
checks through Leonido’s wife who turned them over to a certain Edgar M. Miralles, a
court aide of the MTC. As complainants averred, this was not the first time that Leonido
fraudulently intercepted checks of other MTC employees.
Issue: Whether or not Leonido should be held administratively liable for Dishonesty
and Grave Misconduct.
Ruling: Yes.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray;
unworthiness; lack of integrity; lackof honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and
lack of fairness and straightforwardness.13 It is a malevolent act that makes people
unfit to serve the judiciary.
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention
and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either
to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failureto discharge the duties of
the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.
In this case, the OCA correctly found Leonido guilty of Dishonesty and Gross
Misconduct for fraudulentlyintercepting the subject checks through the use of a falsified
authorization letter purportedly signed by Empuesto and keeping such checks in his
possession without the complainants’ knowledge and authority. The subsequent return
of the subject checks to their lawful owners is of no moment as it did not change the
unlawful nature of Leonido’s acts which is tantamount to stealing.

Topic: Removal of a Judicial Officer

Ponente: PERALTA, J.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2390 August 13, 2014
JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE SIBANAH E. USMAN, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Catbalogan City, Samar, Respondent.
Facts: An administrative complaint was filed by Josephine Jazmines Tan (complainant)
against Judge Sibanah E. Usman (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan City, Branch 28, Samar for bribery and corruption, relative to Civil
Case No. 7681 and Criminal Case No. 6536.
Complainant is one of the plaintiffs and accused in Civil Case No. 7681 and
Criminal Case No. 6536, respectively, then pending before Branch 28, presided by
respondent. She claimed that relative to said cases, respondent was paid P250,000.00
by their opponent, a certain Allan Tan, through Jaime Cui, Jr., as evidenced by a receipt
stating: "Received P250,000.00 (Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos) from Mr. Jaime
Cui, Jr. as full payment in CC No. 6536 & 7681 to be given to Judge S.E. Usman" and
signed by Nilda C. Cinco, OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of the same court.
Complainant further accused respondent of knowingly issuing an unjust
interlocutory order when he cited her in contempt. She pointed out that in A.M. No. RTJ-
11-2266,2 the Court found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent argued that since complainant's allegations and issues had already
been raised and threshed out in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2266, following the principle of res
judicata, the instant complaint should not be given due course. Respondent countered
that the allegations of bribery and corruption are baseless and unfounded.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), due to the conflicting versions of
the parties, recommended that the instant administrative complaint be referred to the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals in Cebu City, for raffle among the justices in
Cebu City on who shall conduct the investigation.
After investigation and evaluation, the Investigating Justice recommended that
the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of evidence.
Ruling: Yes.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. The
complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Bare
allegation would not suffice to hold respondent liable.9 In the absence of showing direct
and convincing evidence to prove the alleged bribery, respondent judge cannot be held
guilty of said charge.
In the instant case, no evidence was presented showing that respondent in fact
accepted or received money or anything from Cui in relation to the subject cases.
Neither was there any evidence to show that respondent judge unlawfully or
wrongfully used his official function for his own benefit or personal gain.
By merely presenting a "receipt" with a tenor that money in the amount of
P250,000.00 was received by Nilda Cinco in behalf of respondent to support an
accusation of bribery will not stand alone. As correctly observed by the OCA, while it
may be considered as proof that indeed there was money received, it does not prove
however that respondent received the same.
Notably, while complainant presented the subject receipt, there was no
allegation as to how she acquired the receipt and from whom she obtained said receipt.
It did not help also that the due execution and authenticity of said receipt was not
sufficiently established considering that the parties thereto, Mr. Cui and Ms. Cinco,
swore in their affidavits and during the hearing that no money was received and that no
receipt was issued thereto. Likewise, complainant, despite notice, failed to attend the
hearing of the case, hence, she failed to substantiate and corroborate her claim of
bribery and corruption against respondent.
Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a
misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal from the bench, the
quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.
The Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any graver offense, as in this case, the evidence against him should be
competent and derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent
belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, competent
evidence should be presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus, the ground
for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Such is the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in
office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, respondent enjoys the presumption
of regularity in the performance of his duties as well as the presumption of innocence.

Topic: Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty and Gross Misconduct on the Part of a
Clerk of Court
Per Curiam
A.M. No. P-06-2227 August 19, 2014
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIO N.
MELCHOR, JR., FORMER CLERK OF COURT VI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
16, NAVAL, BILIRAN (now PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
CALUBIAN-SAN ISIDRO, LEYTE), Respondent.
Facts: A financial audit was conducted by the Fiscal Monitoring Division of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) from March 14 to 20, 2006, on the books of account of
then Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran (RTC), Atty.
Mario N. Melchor, Jr. (Melchor). The audit covered the court transactions from
September 1, 1997 to February 28, 2006.
In the course of the fiscal audit examination, members of the financial audit team
discovered evidence of irregularities in the handling of the financial transactions of the
court as well as shortage in its financial accountabilities. There were shortages of
massive amounts from various funds collected and handled by Melchor totaling
P1,939,547.80.
Melchor failed to remit numerous cash bonds collected from the cases,
amounting to P715,841 .00 to the Court's legitimate bank account. When folders of
several cases were examined, the audit team found evidence of unrecorded collections
of cash bonds. Worse, official receipts were cancelled to conceal the unreported
collections. In lieu of the supposed cancelled transactions, new receipts were then
issued containing considerably understated amounts of the bonds collected.
Melchor likewise failed to present and maintain an official cashbook for the
Fiduciary Fund from September 1, 1997 up to the time of the audit. Anent the (Judicial
Development Dund) JDF and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF), no
entries were made in the cashbooks from October 25, 2005 up to the time of audit.
As recommended by the audit team, Hon. Enrique C. Asis, Executive Judge of
RTC, Naval, Biliran immediately relieved Melchor from his duties and responsibilities.
Melchor, thereafter, assumed office as Municipal Circuit Trial Collli (MCTC )Judge
of Calubian San Isidro, Leyte, but had yet to receive his initial salary for lack of clearance
from the Financial Management Office. He prayed that the administrative case against
him be considered closed and terminated.
The OCA revealed that the amounts of P2,505.00 and P20.00 returned by
Melchor were not the only sho1iages that he failed to remit on time. As previously
illustrated in the table, he likewise incurred shortages in the collection for the JDF in the
amount of P40,873.00, which was restituted only on March 14, 2006; SAJF for the
amount of P99,326.80 and returned only on March 16, 2006; and FF collections totaling
P796,841,00 that was restituted on various dates, the latest being on March 24, 2006.
In the Resolution, the Court denied Melchor's request for the release of his initial
salary and other benefits as Presiding Judge of MCTC, Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte.
The OCA held that although the shortages were eventually restituted as reflected
in the deposit slips presented to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, it should be not
disregarded that Melchor violated various court circulars. The OCA likewise opined that
Melchor's promotion as a judge should not be taken to mean that the infractions he
committed while in the service as Clerk of Court were forgotten.
Issue: Whether or not Melchor should be dismissed from service.
Ruling: Yes.
By his own admission, Melchor knowingly used the court funds in his custody to
defray the hospitalization expenses of his child. As Clerk of Court, Melchor was
entrusted with delicate functions in the collection of legal fees. He acted as cashier and
disbursement officer; and was tasked to collect and receive all monies paid as legal fees,
deposits, fines and dues, and controls the disbursement of the same. He was designated
as custodian of the court's funds and revenues, records, properties and premises, and
should be liable for any loss or shortage thereof.
Administrative Circular No. 3-200035 equally requires that the aggregate total of
the deposit slips for any particular month should always be equal to, and tally with, the
total collections for that month as reflected in the Monthly Report of Collections and
Deposits and Cash Book. Evidently, the accounting of the total collections and
remittances did not tally in this case.
SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93, as incorporated into the 2002 Revised Manual
for Clerks of Court, likewise provide the guidelines for the accounting of court funds. All
fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned,
upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depository bank. In SC Circular
No. 5-93, the Land Bank was designated as the authorized government depository.
Furthermore, Section B( 4) of Circular No. 50-9537 directs that "all collections from
bailbonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within
twenty four (24) hours by the Clerk of court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, in the name of the court as instructed in Circular No. 13-
92."
Court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as clerk of court and
cash clerks, should deposit immediately with the authorized government depositories
the various funds they have collected. Being the custodian of court funds and revenues,
it was Melchor's primary responsibility to immediately deposit the funds received by
his office with the Land Bank and not to keep the same in his custody.
By failing to properly remit the cash collections constituting public funds,
Melchor violated the trust reposed in him as the disbursement officer of the Judiciary.
Delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes gross neglect of duty because this
omission deprives the court of interest that could have been earned if the amounts
were deposited in the authorized depository bank. It should be stressed that clerks of
court are required by SC Circular No. 13-92 to withdraw interest earned on deposits,
and to remit the same to the account of the JDF within two (2) weeks after the end of
each quarter. Delay in the remittance of court funds in the period required casts a
serious doubt on the court employee's trustworthiness and integrity. As held In Re:
Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao Del Norte and
Office of the Court Administrator v. Recio, failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the
court funds is tantamount to gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave
misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The audit team likewise uncovered that the cash shortages in the collection of
various court funds, such as the GF, SGF, JDF, SAJF for the Judiciary Fund, and FF.
Although the said shortages were already restituted, his failure to deposit the correct
amount upon collection was already prejudicial to the court, it did not earn interest
income on the said amount or was not able to otherwise use the said funds. Thus,
even when there is restitution of funds, unwarranted failure to fulfill these
responsibilities deserves administrative sanction, and not even the full payment of
the collection shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability.
Melchor's failure to manage and properly document the cash collections
allocated for the JDF is likewise a clear violation of Administrative Circular No. 5-93.
The fact that Melchor tampered with several official receipts of the cash bond
collections, even devising a way to further conceal his misdeed, demonstrated a serious
depravity on his integrity. It exemplified gross dishonesty, which undermines the
public's faith in courts and in the administration of justice as a whole.
Undoubtedly, the said transgressions and Melchor's blatant violation to comply
with the aforementioned Court circulars designed to promote full accountability for
public funds does not only amount to gross neglect; it also constitutes grave
misconduct. It should be emphasized that the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court
requires strict compliance of the rules and regulations of the collection and accounting
funds,
Melchor's promotion as a judge during the pendency of this case cannot be
considered by the Court either as a mitigating or an exculpatory circumstance to
excuse him from any administrative liability. A judge is still bound by the same
principle enshrined in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution. Melchor's current
position in the judiciary will not merit any leniency from the Court.
In the same vein, Melchor's contention that the withholding of his salary as a
judge was already penalty in itself. It was a mere precautionary measure and not in any
way a form of penalty as he would still be compensated for actual service rendered.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that Melchor is guilty of dishonesty, gross
neglect of duty and gross misconduct. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct are classified as grave offenses with the corresponding penalty of dismissal
for the first offense. All his retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, are
forfeited and he is barred from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 Topic: Award of Attorney’s fees
Ponente: Justice Mariano del Castillo

Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casino, Inc. v Fernandez, G.R. No. 193426, September 29,
2014

Facts: On July 1, 1997, respondent filed Civil Case No. 237-0-97 for recovery of sum of
money with damages against petitioner, on the premise that on June 13, 1997, he went to
Legenda with his brothers Ludwin and Deoven; that he handed over Legenda casino chips
worth US$6,000.00, which belonged to him, to his brothers for the latter to use at the
casino; that petitioner accosted his brothers and unduly and illegally confiscated his casino
chips equivalent to US$5,900.00; and that petitioner refused and continues to refuse to
return the same to him despite demand. His Complaint prayed for the return of the casino
chips and an award of P50,000.00 moral damages, P50,000.00 exemplary damages,
P30,000.00 attorney's fees, P20,000.00 litigation expenses, and costs.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals awarded Attorney’s fees in favour of the
respondent

Issue: Whether the award of Attorney’s fees is proper

SC: YES

The award of attorney's fees is proper. Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees
may be recovered when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim, or in any other case where
the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered. Petitioner's act of arbitrarily confiscating the casino chips and treating Ludwin
and Deoven the way it did, and in refusing to satisfy respondent's claim despite the fact that
it had no basis to withhold the chips, confirm its bad faith, and should entitle respondent to
an award.
 Topic: Gross Immoral Conduct for failure to promptly account to his client the funds
received in the course of his professional engagement and return the same upon demand
Ponente: Justice Mariano del Castillo

Rolando Viray v. Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas, A.C. No. 7337, September 29, 2014

Facts: Complainant engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case he filed
against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III. On February 26, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of complainant and ordered the nominal award amounting to P189,491.60.00.
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued relative to decision. During the
implementation of the writ, complainant discovered that respondent had already collected
in instalments the total amount of P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Complainant also
discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is authorized to
receive payments on his behalf. Complainant made several verbal demands to the
respondent to remit to him the amount of P95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of
P20,000.00. But respondent did not respond.

Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly
account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement and
return the same upon demand.

SC: YES

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. The Code of Professional Responsibility demands

the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to
lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship. Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the
lawyer the duty to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "a lawyer shall deliver the
funds of his client when due or upon demand."

In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions received payments for attorney's fees
and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez.
But respondent neither informed the complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting
thereon. Respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said amount,
which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Such failure and
inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an accounting and return the
money after demand raises the presumption that he converted it to his own use. His
unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action
against him.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client.
He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has
collected for his client. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the
money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to
make a prompt accounting. Moreover, a lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate his
client's money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney's fees.
Respondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon
demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral
soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
 Topic: Violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Impropriety
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion

Conrado Abe Lopez v. Judge Rogelio Lucmayun, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837, September 24,
2014

Facts: Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and the respondent met in a
waiting shed in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu. At that meeting, the respondent allegedly
deceived him into signing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of a lot.
Unknown to the complainant, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-called
"Waiver of Rights" that the respondent had deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his
ownership of the lot. After signing the document and as notarized by a certain Atty. Arturo
C. Mata without the complainant’s presence, the respondent allegedly told the complainant
that he no longer had any right over the property. In March 2005, the father of the
respondent, Pedro Lucmayon, ordered him to cease cultivating the land because of the
Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.

Issue: Whether respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Impropriety

SC: YES

Respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. As a general
rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or
other fiduciary. The intent of the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and
interests of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial duties and to
allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of his official functions.
When a member of the bench serves as administrator of the properties of private
individuals, he runs the risk of losing his neutrality and impartiality, especially when the
interests of his principal conflicts with those of the litigant who comes before his court. The
only exception to this rule is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member
of his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian
or fiduciary will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. The Code
defines "immediate family" as being limited to the spouse and relatives within the second
degree of consanguinity. In this case, since complainant clearly does not fall under
respondent’s "immediate family" as defined, the latter’s appointment as the former’s
attorney-in-fact is not a valid exception to the rule.

Respondent is Guilty of Impropriety. Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. By
the very nature of their work, judges should observe an exacting standard of morality and
decency. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a
private individual. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A
judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. A
judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion. In the administrative complaint, the respondent’s acts of: (1) making the
complainant sign at least two (2) documents – consisting of SPA and Waiver of Rights –
without the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the notarization of the documents
outside the presence of the executor, amount to impropriety.
 Topic: Violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR; Misappropriating client’s money
Ponente: PER CURIAM

CF Sharp Crew Management Inc. v. Nicolas c. Torres, A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014

Facts: Complainant hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by profession, as its
Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to serve as its legal counsel and to
oversee the administration and management of legal cases and medical related claims
instituted by seafarers against complainant’s various principals.

In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondent’s request, complainant
issued checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00, P97,100.00,
and P296,808.40 as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and
Chua. However, complainant later discovered that, save for the check in the amount of
145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the checks to the seafarers and
instead, had them deposited at International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch.
With respect to Sampani, complainant also discovered that he only received the amounts
of P216,936.00 andP8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out of the requested amount
of P652,013.20, through checks not issued by complainant.

In a Report and Recommendation dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found respondent administratively liable for violating the CPR, and accordingly
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year.

Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

SC: Yes.

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP in its
report and recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be imposed
upon respondent; and (b) the monetary award in favor of the complainant.

It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary
and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature
of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property
collected or received for or from his client. This is the standard laid down by Rules 16.01
and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. x x x.
 In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation
of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics.

In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had duly
proven its charges against respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed respondent’s
modus operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance of checks purportedly for the
purpose of settling seafarers’ claims against the complainant’s various principals, only to
have such checks (except for the check in the amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado)
deposited to an unauthorized bank account, particularly International Exchange Bank,
Banawe, Quezon City Branch. It is well-settled that "when a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client." This, respondent failed to do.

Clearly, respondent’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and

confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his client’s interests which
he is duty-bound to protect. They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
CPR which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct." Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and
dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit
to practice law.

Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the
penalty recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers misappropriated their clients’ money, the Court imposed upon them the ultimate
penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, the
Court disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his client’s money intended for securing a
certificate of title on the latter’s behalf. Similarly, in Freeman v. Reyes, the same penalty
was imposed upon the lawyer who misappropriated the insurance proceeds of her client’s
deceased husband.
 Topic: Disbarment
Ponente: Justice Martin Villarama, Jr.

Mariano R. Cristobal, v. Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta, A.C. No. 9925, September 17, 2014

Facts: Complainant engaged the services of Renta Pe & Associates Law Office for the filing
of a "petition for recognition for the minors Codie Darnell Green and Matthew Darnell
Green" before the Bureau of Immigration. Respondent as the managing partner signed the
"Special Contract of Legal Services" in behalf of said law office. Respondent also received
from complainant the "full and package price" of P 160,000 for the filing of the petition for
recognition. No such petition, however, was filed.

Thus, the instant complaint was filed against respondent for the latter's failure to file the
petition for recognition and return the amount of P160,000 despite demand.

In his comment, respondent explained that the petition for recognition was not filed
because Anneth Tan, the one supposed to file the petition, misplaced it and did not inform
him of such fact. He also claimed that he begged complainant to forgive him and assured
him that he will return the money. However, respondent failed to refund the money on
time for he was "hard up in funds." Eventually, he was able to save enough and refunded
the money to complainant. Respondent likewise begs forgiveness from the Court and
promises not to repeat his mistake.
In addition, respondent submitted complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance. In the said
affidavit, complainant said that respondent cried for forgiveness and that he has forgiven
him. Complainant confirmed that respondent had already refunded the amount he paid.

Issue: Whether respondent must be disbarred for violating Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

SC: No.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. x x x x
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

The court held that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer's duty to serve
the client with competence and diligence.

Here, it is beyond doubt that respondent breached his duty to serve complainant with
diligence and neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. He himself admits that the petition
for recognition was not filed, seeks forgiveness from the Court and promises not to repeat
his mistake. Complainant also submitted official letters from the Bureau of Immigration that
indeed no such petition was filed. That Anneth Tan supposedly lost the petition for
recognition and failed to inform respondent cannot absolve him of liability for it was his
duty not to neglect complainant's case and handle it with diligence.

The court note that while respondent failed to refund immediately the amount paid by
complainant, he nevertheless exerted earnest efforts that he eventually was able to fully
repay complainant and begged complainant's forgiveness.

In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Bautista, we found Bautista negligent in handling Voluntad-

Ramirez's case and ruled that he is guilty of violating Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. We admonished Bautista to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duty to his clients and ordered him to restitute to
Voluntad-Ramirez P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee. In said case, we cited Carino
v. Atty. De Los Reyes where the respondent lawyer who failed to file the complaint-affidavit
before the prosecutor's office restituted the P10,000 acceptance fee paid to him. The
respondent lawyer in Carino was reprimanded by the Court with a warning that he should
be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

Therefore, the court find Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta LIABLE for violation of Canon 18 and Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
 Topic: Malpractice as a Notary Public; Territorial Jurisdiction in Notarization
Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. v. Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe, A.C. No. 7184, September 17,
2014

Facts: Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. charged respondent, previously of the Public Attorney's
Office, for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary
public and/or lawyer, alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary
public for the City of Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled
"Extra judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva" dated
"25th day of 1999" (subject document), stating that he is a "notary public for and in the City
of Marikina." To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification dated May 26, 2005
issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City,
certifying that per the court’s record, respondent is not a commissioned notary public for
the City of Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of issuance. Respondent admitted
that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of the subject document but denied that he
was not commissioned as a notary public at that time. To prove his defense, he attached a
Certification dated August 23, 2006 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Pasig City, certifying the fact of his appointment as notary public for the City of Pasig and in
the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999
under Appointment No. 98. Further, respondent, thru the comment, incorporated his own
administrative complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of a fellow
lawyer in view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him.

In a Report and Recommendation, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent

guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyer’s oath. In view of the foregoing, it was
thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the
practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a
notary public, the Investigating Commissioner did not recommend that he be disqualified as
such.

On reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution dated March 8, 2014,

modified the penalty stated in its previous resolution, imposing, instead, the penalty of
reprimand with warning, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public
for the decreased period of one (1) year.

Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable.

SC: NO

Respondent, admitted himself that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of
Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years
1998-1999, thus, could not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of
Marikina, as said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e.,the
RTC of Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from
Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:
Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term– A person commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day
of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless
either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the
Rules of Court.

Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, of which Section 240, Article II
states:
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be
co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila
shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial
act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.

For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the
City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not,
respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the
lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.

Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the
issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than
casual.

With respondent’s liability herein established, and considering further the attendant
circumstances of this case, take for instance, that he is a first time offender and that he had
already acknowledged his wrongdoings, the Court finds that suspension for a period of six
(6) months from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In addition, he is disqualified
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and, his notarial
commission, if currently existing, is hereby revoked.
 Topic: Violation of Rule 1.01 Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil v. Atty. Roberto L. Uy, A.C. No. 9115, September 17,
2014

Facts:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy for
unprofessional and unethical conduct. Private complainant Rebecca was adjudged as the
sole and exclusive legal heir of Pacita Uy Lim by virtue of an order issued by RTC. Rebecca
averred that respondent continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order
declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties. She added that
respondent mortgaged a commercial property in favor of the PS Bank despite an existing
trust agreement. Respondent however denied Rebecca’s allegations. The IBP issued a
recommendation finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of
suspension. Despite Rebecca’s motion to withdraw, the administrative case filed continued.

Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable.

SC: YES

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal profession,
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty –

depends on the factual circumstances of each case.

The court finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted
mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He
should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property
violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the
Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant
measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that
of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to
what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.
01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.
 Topic: Violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Imelda Cato Gaddi v. Atty. Lope M. Velasco, A.C. No. 8637, September 15, 2014

Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by Imelda Cato Gaddi against Atty. Lope M.
Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Gaddi was the Operations and Accounting Manager of the Bert Lozada Swimming School
(BLSS) when she broached the idea of opening a branch of BLSS in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya
(BLSS in Solano) to Angelo Lozada (Angelo), the Chief Operations Officer of BLSS. Believing
that Angelo agreed, Gaddi opened a BLSS in Solano. However, Angelo informed the
management that he did not authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelo’s complaint, the
police officers apprehended the swimming instructors of BLSS in Solano. Worried, Gaddi
pleaded with Angelo’s wife, Kristina Marie, and the BLSS Programs Manager Aleza Garcia for
permission to leave the office and proceed to Nueva Vizcaya. Instead of acceding to her
plea, they commanded Gaddi to make a handwritten admission that the BLSS in Solano was
unauthorized. They warned Gaddi that she cannot leave the office without the handwritten
admission. Thus, Gaddi conceded in doing the handwritten. Subsequently, Gaddi found out
that Angelo filed a complaint against her regarding the BLSS in Solano using her handwritten
admission, which was already notarized by Velasco. Thus, Gaddi filed the present complaint
against Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Issue: Whether respondent violated the 2004 rules on notarial practice.

SC: YES

Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, and routinary act. Notarization converts a
private document to a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face; for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the signatory to the document is in the notary’s presence personally at
the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of notarization, the
signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or mark the notary public’s notarial register. The
purpose of these requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatory’s free act and deed. If the
signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to
perform a notarial act. A notary public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or
seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.
In the present case, contrary to Velasco’s claim that Gaddi appeared before him and
presented two identification cards as proof of her identity, the notarial certificate, in rubber
stamp, itself indicates: “SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS APR 22, 2010 x x x AT
MAKATI CITY. AFFIANT EXHIBITING TO ME HIS/HER C.T.C. NO.__________ISSUED
AT/ON___________.” The unfilled spaces clearly establish that Velasco had been remiss in
his duty of ascertaining the identity of the signatory to the document. Velasco did not
comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, that is, to require the
presence of Gaddi; otherwise, he could have ascertained that the handwritten admission
was executed involuntarily and refused to notarize the document. Furthermore, Velasco
affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial certificate. Velasco did not even present his
notarial register to rebut Gaddi’s allegations. It is presumed that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Topic: Disbarment for Failure to File the Petition for Adoption despite receiving his Legal
fees
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Melody R. Nery v. Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana, A.C. No. 10196, September 9, 2014

Facts: This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nevy against Atty. Glicerio A.
Sampana for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for
making Nevy believe that the petition was already filed.

Despite demand to reimbursed the amount of Php 100,000.00 she paid him, private
respondent refused to do so. Sampana argued that Nery’s allegations were self-serving and
unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for
both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially
frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil status and nationality of
the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the
alien adopter would be married to a close relative of Nery, the intended adoption by an
alien could be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including
the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the
Japanese Embassy certification. Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the
certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it
because he was still waiting for the certification. Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to
the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the
proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment
case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to
refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
The IBP found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed
the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees.

Issue: Whether the recommendation of the IBP should be affirm.

SC: YES

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives

rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves
full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes
it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.

Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of
annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the
petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client.
Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the
alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be
possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of
the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the
petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He even
kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds
upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to
the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession.
 Topic: Disbarment; Unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against
judges and personnel of the courts
Ponente: Justice Lucas P. Bersamin

Presiding Judge Jose L. Madrid, Regional Trial Court, Br. 51, Sorsogon City v. Atty. Juan S.
Dealca, A.C. No. 7474, September 09, 2014

Facts: On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault” then pending in Branch 51 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L.
Madrid. The former then petitioned to re raffle the case because of previous adverse
encounters with the presiding judge where he does not appear before the incumbent judge,
and the latter will not hear cases handled by the undersigned. This petition, however was
not granted and prompted Judge Madrid to file a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar
Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then
moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents
between them. On his comment, the respondent stated that because of the petitioner’s
failure to grant his proper motions in said criminal case, he should be disbarred. Upon
investigation of IBP-Sorsogon, it found that Respondent filed, among others, four cases
which aroused out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to
secure a favorable action from the court, and all these four cases are precipitated by the
adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the respondent that instead of
resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his
clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the
court.

Issue: Whether Atty. Dealca filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility

SC: YES

The court does not agree on the argument of respondent that he filed such administrative
cases against judges and court personnel because as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to
bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.
The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation
thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other
disciplinary action. The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to “wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty.
Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or
unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims
and caprices of his clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate, so must he equally
guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s
duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is
equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass
them, among other things. Ergo respondent indeed filed frivolous administrative and
criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility
 Topic: Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts
Inimical to Judicial Service
Ponente: Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe

Office of the Court Administrator v. Executive Judge Owen Amor, RTC, Daet, Camarines
Norte, A.M. No. RTJ- 08-2140 October 7, 2014

Facts: According to the memorandum filed by Judge Manuel E. Contreras against

Respondent Executive Owen Amor, he had acted in grave abuse of authority, Grave
Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service because of
instances he had committed; one of which is the impounding of a tricycle because it
bumped the respondent’s vehicle and the owner was unable to pay the amount demanded
for the incurred damages, such act of the judge was then concealed by Head Guard Quintin
Fernandez. Another act of respondent which is considered as Acts Inimical to Judicial
Service is his habitual absence especially during Mondays and Fridays, resulting in delays in
the disposition of cases in violation of existing laws and circulars on speedy trial. One
particular act of such judge also shows gross insubordination and Acts Inimical to Judicial
Service when he visited Judge Contrera’s sala and suggested that he should not follow
through the charge of indirect contempt against one Atty. Freddie Venida because he had
much gold, instead he should exploit such situation to gain from Atty. Venida which was
rejected by Judge Contrera. The memorandum then was treated as an administrative
complaint to which respondent was required to comment, but to no avail. Thus, the Court
issued a Resolution dated July 2, 2001, ordering respondent to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, and to submit his
comment on Judge Contreras’s Memorandum which was then again unheeded. Respondent
then filed a certificate of candidacy for the 2002 Barangay Elections, resulting in his
automatic resignation from the service effective June 7, 2002

Issue: Whether respondent acted in grave abuse of authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Insubordination, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service

SC: YES

Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who,

under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment,
or other injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority; while Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling and such acts are inimical to judicial
service, and thus, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as they
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s
faith in the Judiciary.
The respondent is correctly found to be guilty of the charges against him. Respondent’s
failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded him constituted a waiver of
his right to defend himself. In the natural order of things, a man would resist an unfounded
claim or imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human nature to remain silent
and say nothing in the face of false accusations. As such, respondent’s silence may thus be
construed as an implied admission and acknowledgement of the veracity of the allegations
against him. Respondent was also correctly found guilty of Gross Misconduct and
Insubordination for refusing to comply with the numerous directives of the Court to file a
comment on the administrative complaint against him. Verily, a judge who deliberately and
continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of the Court is guilty of the
same. Such willful disobedience and disregard of the directives of the Court constitute grave
and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity
attached to his office. In this case, it is noteworthy that respondent was afforded several
opportunities, not to mention a generous amount of time to comply with the Court’s lawful
orders, but he has failed and continuously refused to heed the same. Hence the totality of
respondent’s acts warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service.
 Topic: Notarizing false Affidavit
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes

Domado Disomimba Sultan v. Atty. Casan Macabanding A. C. No. 7919, October 8, 2014

Facts: Complainant was running as mayor in the May 2014 election thereby filing his
certificate of candidacy. Consequently, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of
Candidacy for Municipal Mayor dated April 10, 2007 was notarized and submitted by the
respondent to the COMELEC, withdrawing the complainant’s candidacy without the latter’s
knowledge or authorization. When complainant learned such, he alleged that he neither
executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody to prepare a document to
withdraw his COC. He asked that the withdrawal be ignored and that his name be retained
on the list of candidates. The COMELEC Second Division then found merit in the
complainant’s petition and ordered the reinstatement of his name in the list of candidates
for the position of mayor; a subpoena was then given and required the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to study the signature appearing on the Affidavit of Withdrawal because
it was elevated to the COMELEC en banc; the result then stated that the signature in the
Affidavit of Withdrawal and the specimen signatures of the complainant were not written
by one and the same person. On May 14, 2008, the complainant filed the present
administrative complaint against the respondent with prayer for his disbarment. The
respondent was then suspended from the practice of law for six months and suspended
from being commissioned as Notary Public for two years. As adjudged by the IBP Board of
Governors

Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable based on the allegations
on the complaint

SC: YES

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of

evidence.

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

In the case at bar, the complainant adduced preponderant evidence that his signature was
indeed forged in an affidavit which the respondent notarized and submitted to the
COMELEC. Consequently, the respondent should be held administratively liable for his
action. "Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his
shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent
to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to;
most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions." In fact, the respondent admitted that the affidavit was notarized in his office
without the presence of the complainant. Hence Atty. Casan Macabanding is found
administratively liable for misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law for one
year. Further, his notarial commission, if any, is revoked and he is disqualified from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years.
 Topic: Grave Misconduct
Ponente: Justice Estala Perlas-Bernabe

Re: Anonymous letter v. Judge Corazon Soluren, A.M. No. P-14-321, October 8, 2014

Facts: In the Anonymous Letter, it was alleged that Judge Soluren had been instructing the
party-litigants to deposit with her court settlement money for various cases in her sala. It
was elaborated that Tuzon would merely acknowledge receipt of the settlement money for
the different cases through handwritten notes without issuing any official receipts therefor;
after which, Judge Soluren would order the dismissal of the corresponding cases. However,
when the parties requested for the release of the said money, Tuzon would fail to timely
comply with the same.

In an Indorsement dated March 5, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
referred the Anonymous Letter to Executive Judge Evelyn A. Turla (Executive Judge Turla) of
the same RTC, for her discreet investigation and report. In compliance, Executive Judge
Turla sent a letter dated March 15, 2013 to the OCA with Tuzon’s comment attached
thereto, stating that she did not find any act of irregularity or any unauthorized collection
on the part of the RTC.

Tuzon admitted his receipt of various amounts as settlement money for the different
cases pending before Judge Soluren’s sala. He, however, explained that, on orders of Judge
Soluren, he merely accepted the said amounts from the parties who were willing to settle
the civil aspect of their respective cases and kept them in the court’s vault. He also admitted
not having issued official receipts for the amounts he received, not being an accountable
officer in possession of such receipts.

The OCA deemed Tuzon’s acts as a form of Grave Misconduct for which he should be held
administratively liable.

Issue: Whether Tuazon should be held administratively liable for the charge of Grave
Misconduct as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator.

SC: NO

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply a wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or
willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to
differentiate Grave Misconduct from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule, must be manifest in
the former.

When Tuzon readily acknowledged that he accepted various amounts of settlement money
from party-litigants and kept them in his custody without authority to do so and without
issuing any official receipts, he clearly went beyond his duties as a Legal Researcher of the
RTC as enumerated in Item 2.2.1, Subsections 2 (2.2.), Section D, Chapter VI, Volume I of the
2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, as follows:
2.2.1. Legal Researcher
(1) verifies authorities on questions of law raised by part[y]-litigants in cases
brought before the Court as may be assigned by the Presiding Judge;
(2) prepares memoranda on evidence adduced by the parties after the
hearing;
(3) prepares outlines of the facts and issues involved in cases set for pre-trial
for the guidance of the Presiding Judge;
(4) prepares indexes to be attached to the records showing the important
pleadings filed, the pages where they may be found, and in general, the
status of the case;
(5) prepares and submits to the Branch Clerk of Court a monthly list of cases
or motions submitted for decision or resolution, indicating therein the
deadlines for acting on the same; and
(6) performs such other duties as may be assigned by the Presiding Judge or
the Branch Clerk of Court.

Considering the absence of any proof that Tuzon’s actions were tainted with corruption, or
with a clear intent to violate the law, or would constitute a flagrant disregard of an
established rule – say for instance, by the actual misappropriation of any amount which
came to his possession – Tuzon cannot be held liable for Grave Misconduct but only for
Simple Misconduct which is punishable by suspension for a period of one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months at the most without pay. That being said, the Court deems it
proper to impose the maximum of the foregoing penalty.
 Topic: Section 2 Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Judge Juan Gabriel H. Alano vs. Padma L. Sahi, A.M. No. P-14-3252, October 14, 2014

Facts: In the administrative complaint filed by Judge Juan Gabriel H. Alano of the 2nd MCTC
of Sumisip, Maluso and Lantawan, Basilan Province against Padma L. Sahi (Sahi), Court
Interpreter I of the same court, alleged that Sahi brokered for party litigants and solicited
money and gifts in exchange for favorable decisions in the election protest cases pending
before his court, despite constant reminders to his staff that they should never demand,
solicit, or receive money, gifts or other benefits from any party litigants.

On her part, Sahi denied that she defied the order given by Judge Alano in relation to
soliciting gifts or money from party litigants.

The Court ordered Executive Judge Reynerio G. Estacio of the RTC of Zamboanga Del Sur,
Branch 14 for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Estacio was convinced that
respondent had indeed, been into the activities of brokering for party litigants and soliciting
money or gifts, in consideration for favorable decision. Judge Estacio therefore
recommended that Sahi be dismissed from service, with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporation, and forfeiture of all her benefits, except accrued leave credits.

Issue: Whether Sahi violated Section 2 Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel

SC: YES

Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, provides that "court
personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or
implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions,"
while Section 2(e), Canon III states that "court personnel shall not x x x solicit or accept any
gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which it
could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the court
personnel in performing official duties."

In the present case, the corrupt practice of Sahi in soliciting and receiving bribe money from
party litigants on the pretext that they will obtain a favorable judgment undoubtedly
degraded the judiciary and diminished the respect and regard of the people for the court
and its personnel. Such practice constitutes grave misconduct in office which is appalling. It
is a grave offense that carries an equally grave penalty. Under Section 22(c) of Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws, gross misconduct is classified as a grave offense. The penalty for this
offense is dismissal even for the first offense.
The Court has repeatedly held that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with
an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. The Court cannot countenance any act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.
 Topic: Dishonesty, Usurpation of Official Functions and Illegal Exaction
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Frumencio E. Pulgar v. Paul M. Resurreccion, A.M. No. P-09-2673, October 21, 2014

Facts: Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar denounced in a complaint-affidavit Court Interpreter Paul

M. Resurreccion of the RTC, Br 276, in Muntinlupa City, for committing acts of extortion,
illegal exaction, and blackmail by using his position to extort money from him, a law
practitioner, inexchange for non-existent goodwill, and for violation of Administrative
Circular No. 31-90.

Court Stenographer Maricar M. Eugenio testified in favor of Resurreccion. She thereby laid
the responsibility for the ex parte reception of the evidence on Gina Bacayon, then the
acting clerk of court. She claimed that being the stenographer recording the ex parte
presentation of evidence on February 26, 1997, she was the one who had asked for the
payment of the transcript of the stenographic notes from Atty. Pulgar. However, her
testimony invited suspicion of her covering up Resurreccion’s malfeasance, leading to her
being likewise investigated and made to answer for dishonesty.

In the report and recommendation of investigating Judge Guerrero, he held Resurrecion not
liable for extortion because there was neither force nor intimidation commited by him in
demanding money from a lawyer or litigant. However, Resurrecion was found guilty of
exacting money for some legal fees that do not exist. Judge Guerrero found impropriety on
the part of Eugenio covering up the wrongdoings of their comrade by testifying falsely and
should also be penalized for trying to mislead the Court by making such false testimony. Her
actuation amounts to neglect in the performance of her official function as co-player in the
administration of justice.

In the first report of the OCA, the dismissal of Resurrecion from service and show cause
from Eugenio for her not to be held administratively was recommended. In the second
report, Eugenio was found GUILTY of dishonesty and simple neglect of duty

Issue: Whether Resurreccion is guilty of grave misconduct due to acts of dishonesty,

usurpation of official functions and illegal exaction.

SC: YES

To enforce the constitutional tenet, that a public office is a public trust, the Court has
incessantly reminded that officials and employees involved in the administration of justice
should faithfully adhere to their mandated duties and responsibilities. Any act of
impropriety on their part - whether committed by the highest judicial official or by the
lowest member of the judicial workforce - can greatly erode the people's confidence in the
Judiciary. This is because the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the
conduct of its personnel; hence, it becomes their constant duty to maintain the good name
and standing of the Judiciary as a true temple of justice.

The Supreme Court ruled that the recommendation of the OCA for the immediate dismissal
of Resurreccion from the service is warranted. His acts of dishonesty, usurpation of official
functions and illegal exaction demanded that we classify his acts as grave misconduct. In
grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest.
They were so in his case. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consisted in his acts
of unlawfully or wrongfully using his position or character of his office to procure some
benefit for himself or for another, contrary to the rights of others. The collection of the fees
had no legal basis whatsoever; hence, his illegal exactions were outrightly and plainly
corrupt. It then becomes unavoidable for us to judge his transgressions as motivated by the
lust for money and power, rather than having proceeded from his unfamiliarity with
standing rules and guidelines.

Dismissal from the service was called for because of the grave nature of Resurreccion's
offense, he thereby revealed his absolute unworthiness to remain in the service of the
Judiciary. Indeed, he should not be allowed to serve a minute longer in the Judiciary lest the
reputation and integrity of the service be prejudiced. Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, serious dishonesty and grave
misconduct, among others, are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service.
 Topic: Dishonesty
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Concerned Citizens of Naval, Biliran v. Florante F. Ralar, A.M. No. P-14-3278, October 21,
2014

Facts: Petitioner charged Florante F. Ralar, Court Stenographer III of Branch 37 of the
Regional Trial Court in Caibiran, Biliran with dishonesty through falsification of public
documents. It was alleged that he did not state in his application his having been previously
employed in the Bureau of Post. Upon verification, it was found out that prior to his
employment in the Judiciary he had been actually employed as a Letter Carrier and was
dismissed for committing mail pilferage. He misappropriated his collection when he was
employed as a Revenue Collection Clerk. Despite knowing nothing about stenography, he
had obtained a falsified certification of his knowledge of stenography to secure an
appointment to his present position. He had even asked court litigants for money in
consideration of assistance extended to them in cases pending in court.

Ralar denied the accusation of dishonesty and averred that all allegations against him is
unsubstantiated.

The Office of the Court Administrator found basis to hold Ralar guilty of dishonesty.

Ralar’s Personal Data Sheet (PDS) showed that the latter deliberately concealed the fact
that he was previously charged administratively and was eventually penalized for acts of
dishonesty while he was still an employee of then Bureau of Post. His PDS also showed that
portions in same inquiring as to “whether he have been formally charged” and “have been
found guilty of any administrative offense” where the latter put a check mark beside the
boxes indicating "No" answers.

The fact that respondent Ralar affixed check marks in the "No" answer box clearly shows his
intention to misrepresent himself in order to gain employment in the government. Indeed,
his actuations fall squarely as an act of dishonesty.

OCA recommended the dismissal of Ralar from the service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.

Issue: Whether Ralar is guilty of dishonesty.

SC: YES

Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a
question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty,
consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the
act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.

Ralar’s invocation of the right to face and to confront his accusers was misplaced, for the
charge was soon easily substantiated by the results of the OCA’s legitimate queries put to
the various offices of the public service in which he had previously served.

He committed falsification of an official document when he did not disclose in his written
application for his present position his having been formally charged administratively, and
having been found guilty of such charge became indisputable. His omission, being designed
by him to misrepresent his qualifications for the position he sought, constituted gross
dishonesty that the Court cannot tolerate.

No more essential is that policy than in the Judiciary, for no other office in the Government
exacts the greatest demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from public employees
and officials than the Judiciary. As such, the Judiciary deserves the best from all its
employees and officials. Dishonesty and falsification – malevolent and abhorrent – have no
place in the Judiciary.

Ralar was guilty of dishonesty, which is defined as the absence of integrity; the disposition
to betray, cheat, deceive, or defraud; or the intentional violation of truth. Pursuant to
Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Case in the Civil Service,
dishonesty, classified as a grave offense, is penalized with dismissal for the first offense.
 Topic: Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer of the Court
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Jean Paul V. Gillera, et al. v. Maria Consuelo Joie Fajardo, A.M. No. P-14-3237, October 21,
2014

Facts: An administrative complaint was filed before the OCA against Maria Consuelo Joie A.
Fajardo, the Court Sheriff of Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna.
Complainants alleged that respondent committed conduct unbecoming a court officer by
her (a) non-payment of house rental fees; (b) issuance of bouncing checks; (c) falsification
of a deed of absolute sale and Official Receipt No. 8010; (d) harassment; and (e) ill-gotten
wealth.

Complainants Spouses Jean Paul and Suzette Gillera owned a house and lot and they leased
it to respondent Maria Consuelo Joie A. Fajardo. Fajardo issued three post-dated checks for
the November 2007, December 2007, and January 2008 rentals. The bank, BDO, dishonored
the first two checks for being drawn against a closed account. Fajardo ignored demands to
replace the checks and failed to pay the rentals.

Spouses Gillera incurred debts to MMG Construction and Development Corporation, a

family corporation owned by complainant Atty. Jillina M. Gerodias. The Spouses Gillera
were then leasing MMG's warehouse. Spouses Gillera designated HFC another Gerodias-
owned company, to sell their house and lot occupied by Fajardo and apply the proceeds to
their debt with MMG.

Fajardo offered to buy the house and lot from HFC on the condition that the mortgage with
BDO over the house and lot should first be discharged. HFC paid the Spouses Gillera's loan
with BDO to release the mortgage.

Fajardo and HFC agreed on the sale of the house and lot for P3.1 million with F350,000.00
as earnest money and the balance to be paid after one (1) month. Fajardo failed to pay the
balance. After seeking extensions, she issued HFC three (3) post-dated checks but the same
bounced.

Fajardo claimed that she was issued Official Receipt No. 8010 and given the deed of
absolute sale signed by the Spouses Gillera as sellers and Fajardo's mother as buyer. She
continued to occupy the property without paying rent, prompting the Spouses Gillera to file
for unlawful detainer.

Issue: Whether guilty of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of the court

SC: YES
Sheriffs, as front-line representatives, play a crucial role in our justice system, having the
important task of executing our courts' final judgments. Sheriffs must conduct themselves
with integrity at all times as "once he[/she] loses the people's trust, he[/she] diminishes
the people's faith in the judiciary." Respondent's acts failed to meet the high standards of
conduct expected from the position held.

She anchored her non-payment on an alleged agreement with complainant Suzette Gillera
that rental arrears would be written off if respondent buys the house and lot, and her
contention that her mother did buy the house and lot. Both Executive Judge Sonia T. Yu-
Casano and the Office of the Court Administrator found that no agreement materialized. In
fact, the court in the ejectment case found respondent liable for rental arrears. Thus,
respondent's continuous refusal to pay a just debt amounts to "conduct unbecoming of a
public employee."

Worse, respondent testified during investigation that her mother had bought the house and
lot, and respondent produced anew documents already rejected by the ejectment court.

It was found that respondent presented a falsified Official Receipt No. 8010 and passed off a
deed of absolute sale copy, bearing her mother's signature, to serve as a faithful
reproduction of a nonexistent original document.

Fraudulently issuing bouncing checks behavior compounds respondent's acts of presenting

forged documents and making untruthful testimony, all in all depicting her as "lacking in
personal honesty and good moral character that render her unworthy of public confidence."

Dishonesty refers to "intentionally making a false statement on any material

fact." Dishonesty involves "a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."

The rules consider dishonesty as a grave offense such that the first offense merits
dismissal from the service and carries with it "cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision." Dishonesty need not be
committed in the performance of official duty as to warrant the penalty of dismissal.

And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if
a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect
his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest
official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his
government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty
against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the
office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain
influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and
dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and
actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office
and the discipline and morale of the service.

This court has emphasized that "court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness
and honesty to maintain the people's respect and faith in the judiciary." Consequently their
conduct "must not only be, but must also be perceived to be, free from any whiff of
impropriety, both with respect to their duties in the judiciary and to their behavior outside
the court." This court will not tolerate acts or omissions "diminishing or tending to diminish
public trust and confidence in the courts."
Topic: Legal Ethics - Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct)
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by its President,
ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 10134. November 26, 2014

Facts:
This is complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine Association of Court
Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17,
2008 against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE,
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was
submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention
in Iloilo City; that during the 12th convention, an election of officers was conducted and
Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on the
last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing Board of Directors, including
Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of
30,000.00as term-end bonus for each PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not
submit a liquidation report for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies
belonging to the association as a matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated
June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz; and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board
Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty.
Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo
conventions.

Issue:
Is the respondent liable?

Ruling:
Yes. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their
dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing
parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth
and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and
with fidelity to the courts and their clients.
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which
society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he
or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her
running for re-election, including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown
not by her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her
involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers,
including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely
not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/
inactions.
Topic: Legal Ethics - CANON 2 (SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer);
CANON 4 (SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities); and CANON 3 (SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary)
Ponente: SERENO, C.J.
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D.
TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L.
NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M.
COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, AND MARIVEL B. ISON, Complaints, v. PRESIDING JUDGE
JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., BRANCH 45, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE OCCIDENTAL
MINDORO, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ], January 12, 2015

Facts:
Complainants were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public
market of Occidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T. Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly
wanted to demolish the public market, so that the Municipality can use the space to erect
the new “San Jose Commercial Complex.” Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants filed a
Petition for Prohibition With Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the Municipality and Mayor
Villarosa. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to
respondent’s sala.
While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the case,
were all allowed inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing, only 12 out of the
more than 500 members accompanying complainants on that day were allowed to
enter. Worse, all the complainants were escorted out of the courtroom except for Julieta D.
Toledo, who was scheduled to give her testimony that day. Complainants also claimed that
the questions propounded by respondent to their witnesses “were all geared towards
establishing” that they should have no right to oppose the Mayor’s plan, as “this will be
good for all and the progress and development of the municipality.” At the next hearing
held on 3 July 2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a call. He exited
through the door used by the judge and the employees of the court.
Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent “argued,
berated, accused, scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without basis or
justification.” They further claimed that respondent judge asked complainants “confusing
and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause of
petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary.”
Thus, complainants filed the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations
of the canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Issue:
Is the judge liable?

Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners claim that respondent berated, scolded, confused and admonished
their witnesses without basis or justification. In the 2 July 2012 hearing, the investigating
justice found that apart from raising his voice when addressing Toledo and making
“abrasive and unnecessary statements to her,” respondent also made “insulting, sometimes
needlessly lengthy statements” in open court. Respondent failed to conduct himself in
accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack
of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his
language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient
control.
This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which read:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.cralawred
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s
permission to leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the
former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor
should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must
not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.
Thus, respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which reads:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Topic: Betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information obtained from his client
to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of another person
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

Daria O. Daging v. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis, A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014

Facts: This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint filed
by Daria O. Daging before the IBP, Benguet Chapter, against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis.

Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased
from Benjie Pinlac a building space located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where she
operated the bar.

Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis & Sabling Law Office
signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling. This eventually resulted
in the signing by the complainant, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer
Agreement.

Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the
lease. Together with Novie Balageo and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music
bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over
the operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as
business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later
renamed Amarillo Music Bar.

Complainant filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo before the MTCC, Branch 1,
Baguio City. At that time, Davis & Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer
Agreement remained subsisting and in force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for
Balageo in that ejectment case and filed, on behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition
to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation finding respondent

guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information obtained from his client
to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of another person. He recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Upon motion of the respondent, it reduced the penalty
imposed to six months suspension.

Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of
information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage
of another person.
SC: Yes.

It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005
with respondent's law firm. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement,
respondent represented and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the
defendants in the ejectment case complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact,
respondent filed on behalf of said Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26,
2005 when respondent withdrew his appearance for Balageo.

Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides:
Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client." The prohibition
against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer
has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. In Quiambao
v. Atty. Bamba, this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case
is actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction
between Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal
matter complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he
could not have taken advantage of an information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the
Retainer Agreement. We are not impressed.

A lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the
services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took
advantage of any information acquired by his law firm in the course of its professional
dealings with the complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably
aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have
immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other
members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they
would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and
Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension
from the practice of law ranging from six months to two years.

Topic: Bribery, Gross Misconduct, Immorality and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act or R.A. No. 3019
Ponente: Per Curiam

Marilou T. Rivera v. Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290, November 18, 2014

Facts: Complainant filed a complaint-affidavit with Office of the Court Administrator

charging respondent judge with bribery, gross misconduct, immortality and violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Rivera maintained that Judge Blancaflor should be charged with immorality for maintaining
an illicit relationship with Villamar, who is not his wife.

In a Supplemental Affidavit, dated July 29, 2008, Rivera reiterated her charge that Judge
Blancaflor committed gross misconduct in (1) fraternizing with litigants;(2) maintaining an
illicit affair with a woman not his wife; and (3) exhibiting personal bias and prejudice against
her in her efforts to obtain bail bonds for Catuday and Namplata.

Justice Fernando found Judge Blancaflor guilty of (1) bribery, gross misconduct and violation
of R.A. 3019; and (2) immorality. She recommended that the judge be dismissed from the
service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office, and
likewise recommended the forfeiture of the judge’s retirement benefits.

Issue: Whether the recommendation is proper.

SC: Yes.

The Court upheld Justice Fernando’s findings and recommendation as it found sufficient
basis to dismiss respondent Judge Blancaflor from the service

On the charge of bribery, gross misconduct and violation of R.A. No. 3019.

While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion to reduce bail,
it appears from the records that he abused this prerogative in the cases of Catuday and
Namplata. Through Judge Blancaflor’s inaccessibility (he was usually not in the court in the
afternoon) and refusal to take action on their pleas for provisional liberty, Catuday and
Namplata and the people working for the approval of their motions (Rivera and De Mata)
suffered inordinate delay and frustrations in securing the motions’ approval. In more ways
than one, Judge Blancaflor gave De Mata and Rivera a run-around in Catuday’s and
Namplata’s cases for no plausible reason other than the judge’s strong antipathy towards
Rivera.

This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which mandates that "judges shall perform their judicial duties without
favor, bias or prejudice," and that they "shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out
of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary."

Judge Blancaflor denied the allegations, contending that Catuday’s motion was not filed
with the OCC and never reached him. Justice Fernando found otherwise, citing the Order of
Judge Ongkeko, Vice-Executive Judge of the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, granting the motion
when Judge Blancaflor was attending a seminar in Tagaytay City. Judge Ongkeko could not
have issued the order had it not been filed with the OCC. But what was more surprising was
Judge Blancaflor’s refusal to acknowledge and to act on the order of approval. This belies
Judge Blancaflor’s excuses for not acting on Catuday’s motion and lends credence to
Rivera’s submission that the judge’s refusal was to spite her.

The same thing happened when Rivera processed Namplata’s bail bond. As the records
show, Judge Blancaflor approved Namplata’s motion for reduction of bail. The judge
admitted his approval during the investigation. When he was asked: "Do you clearly
remember Judge that you reduced it as shown by your signature from P60,000,00
to P40,000.00 bail?," he answered: "That is correct sir, that day," referring to March 27,
2008. Yet, he refused to approve Namplata’s temporary release. In fact, in his Comment to
Rivera’s supplemental complaint, he disowned the marginal note he made on a copy of
Namplata’s motion reducing his bail bond to P40,000.00.

It is unfortunate that Judge Blancaflor lost sight of the exacting standards demanded of the
office of a judge in the Leroncase. Time and again, judges have been reminded thatas
magistrates, they must comport themselves in such a manner that their conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as the
epitome of integrity and justice. Sad to state, Judge Blancaflor failed to pass this "searching
scrutiny."

On the charge of immorality – for allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar
who is nothis wife – Justice Fernando aptly observed that Judge Blancaflor offered no
evidence, except general denials to disprove his moral indiscretion, which appeared to be
widely known in the community at the time material to the case. As the records show,
statements made here and there by witnesses and personalities drawn into the case
confirm the special relationship between Judge Blancaflor and Villamar such that Villamar
had no hesitation in speaking for the judge on matters concerning him and his work.
Topic: Extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
court employee; Ephemeral electronic communications in evidence
Ponente: Per Curiam
Ella M. Bartolome v. Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, A.M. No. P-11-2979, November 18, 2014

Facts: Ella M. Bartolome filed against Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer III, RTC,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, charging her with extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct
and conduct unbecoming of a court employee.

The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount
of P200,000.00, which was later reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case
for annulment of marriage. She further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the
case decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings of
the case.

Based on the complainant’s pleadings and evidence, the OCA, submitted its Report to the
Court, finding enough evidence to prove the respondent’s involvement in anomalous
activities and recommending immediate dismissal.

Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty of the charge and dismissed from service.

SC: Yes.

The respondent’s bare denial cannot overcome the evidence supporting the complainant’s
accusation that she demanded money on the promise that she would facilitate the
annulment of her (complainant’s) marriage. The respondent’s actions from the time the
complainant started communicating with her on October 21, 2009 and thereafter through a
series of messages they exchanged via SMS, until the entrapment operation on November
11, 2009, showed that the complaint is indeed meritorious. The respondent’s text messages
sent to the complainant corroborate that she promised to expedite – in exchange for a
monetary consideration ofP160,000.00 and that she would provide the lawyer who would
file the annulment case – the complainant’s annulment case once it is filed.

Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain

conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text
messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic
forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has
personal knowledge thereof. In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the
probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering the present case. The
complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal
knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through
cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her conversations
with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the cellphone number
reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated was hers.
She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the Imus
Cavite Police conducted

The Court totally agrees with the OCA’s finding that the respondent is guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The respondent’s
assertion that Bartolome is a fictitious name because the complainant has not stated in her
complaint her exact address is preposterous in light of the evidence of direct personal and
text message contacts between them. In the absence of supporting evidence, the claim that
the complaint against her is pure and simple harassment orchestrated by persons with
grudge against her, is mere conjectural allegation.

As a public servant, nothing less than the highest sense of honesty and integrity is expected
of the respondent at all times. She should be the personification of the principle that public
office is a public trust. The respondent unfortunately fell extremely short of the standards
that should have governed her life as a public servant. By soliciting money from the
complainant, she committed a crime and an act of serious impropriety that tarnished the
honor and dignity of the judiciary and deeply affected the people’s confidence in it. She
committed an ultimate betrayal of the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, thereby creating the impression that decision
can be bought and sold. The Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so
called "bad-eggs" in the judiciary. We have been resolute in our drive to discipline and, if
warranted, to remove from the service errant magistrates, employees and even Justices of
higher collegiate appellate courts for any infraction that gives the Judiciary a bad name. To
stress our earnestness in this pursuit, we have, in fact, been unflinching in imposing
discipline on errant personnel or in purging the ranks of those undeserving to remain in the
service.
Topic: Grave misconduct, dishonesty, estafa and other deceits
Ponente: Per Curiam

Angelito Miranda v. Ma. Theresa M. Fernandez, Clerk III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon
City, A.M. No. P-14-3270, November 18, 2014

Facts: The complaint was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. After finding that
the respondent is a court employee, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed and referred
the complaint to this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate
action, pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, et al.

The complainant acts as an agent of money lenders Manuel P. Miranda and Josephine
Miranda Cabusao (creditors). The respondent obtained a loan of P124,800.00 from the
creditors, through the complainant. The transaction was evidenced by an Agreement which
provided that the amount of loan shall be paid in equal installments of P2,600.00 every 15th
and 30th day of the month until fully paid; the first payment was to start on January 12,
2010.

As security for the loan, the respondent surrendered her ATM Card No. 1727165289 to her
creditors to allow them to withdraw the amount of P2,600.00 every payday from her
salaries deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines.

On July 15, 2010, the respondent’s creditors went to the bank to collect the amount due
from her bank account. When the respondent’s ATM card was inserted into the ATM
machine, it was retained by the ATM machine with the advisory receipt stating "Invalid
Card." This happened because the respondent had blocked her ATM card to prevent
withdrawals by her creditors. It appeared that the respondent reported to the LBP that she
had lost her ATM card. The report enabled her to withdraw her salary over the counter and
led to the issuance of a new ATM card in her favor.

A day after discovery of the fraud, the complainant sent the respondent a demand
letter which she ignored. She continuously failed to comply with her undertaking. The
complainant, acting as the representative of the creditors under a Special Power of
Attorney dated July 19, 2010, filed the present administrative complaint against the
respondent.

Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty as charged.

SC: Yes.

The Court directed the respondent to show cause why she should not be disciplined or held
in contempt for her failure to file the required comment despite her receipt of the two (2)
directives from the OCA, and to submit the required comment within five (5) days from
receipt thereof. The resolution carried the warning, that upon further failure, the Court shall
take the necessary action against her and decide the administrative complaint on the basis
of the record at hand. The respondent received a copy of the June 10, 2013 resolution on
July 30, 2013, but still failed to comply. Thus she is considered to have waived her right to
submit controverting evidence.

Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
provides that a public employee’s failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary
action. Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, as modified by the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, defines "just debts" as those (1) claims
adjudicated by a court of law or (2) claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor. By the respondent’s failure to file her comment on the complaint
despite the OCA’s two (2) directives and warning, she is deemed to have admitted the
existence and justness of the claim against her. The obligation having remained unpaid
since the demand was made upon her conclusively speaks of her willful refusal to settle the
same.

The respondent’s liability does not end there. The blocking of the ATM card she
surrendered to her creditors and her act of securing a new ATM card from the LBP to avoid
payment of her indebtedness constitute dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a court
employee. Dishonesty refers to the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.

The respondent has failed to file her comment on the letter complaint despite receipt of the
two (2) directives sent to her and the show cause resolution of June 10, 2013. The
respondent’s failure to comply with the Court’s directives constitutes gross misconduct
and insubordination. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, or an unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; misconduct is grave if
it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the
law or to disregard established rules, as established by substantial evidence.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19,s. 1999 classifies willful failure to pay just debts as a light
offense punishable by reprimand for the first offense. Dishonesty and grave misconduct are
both classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal for the first offense.

It is clear that the respondent is guilty of the offenses charged. As an employee of the
judiciary, the respondent is held to the highest ethical standards to preserve the integrity of
the courts. These standards include the moral and legal duty to settle contractual
obligations when they become due. To preserve decency in the judiciary, court employees
must comply with just contractual obligations and act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards. The respondent’s actions, although arising from a private transaction, stained
the image of her public office. Like any other member of the judiciary, the respondent is
expected to be a model of fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in
her personal actuations, involving business and commercial transactions.

The Court finds the respondent separately liable for three administrative offenses of willful
failure to pay just debts, gross misconduct and insubordination and dishonesty. She has
demonstrated her unfitness to be in the judiciary service, thus warranting her dismissal
from the service.

Under Section 55, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, when the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty
to be imposed should be that which corresponds to the most serious charge or count and
the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances
Topic: Dishonesty for allowing another person to take his 2000 Civil Service Professional
Examination-Computer Assisted Test
Ponente: Per Curiam

Civil Service Commission v. Herminigildo L. Andal, Security Guard II, Sandiganbayan,

Quezon City, A.M. No. SB-12-19-P, November 18, 2014

Facts: Herminigildo L. Andal is employed as permanent Security Guard II of the

Sandiganbayan. The investigating officer, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado,
found him guilty of dishonesty for allowing another person to take his 2000 Civil Service
Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT). Justice Jurado recommended
that respondent be meted out the principal penalty of suspension from office for one year,
and the accessory penalties of being barred from taking any civil service examination and
disqualification from promotion.

The Supreme Court en banc issued a Resolution re-docketing the case as an administrative
matter. In the same Resolution, the Court resolved to refer this case to then Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Justice Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The Court adopted the recommendations of the OCA. However, due to the administrative
case against Justice Gregory S. Ong, then pending before the Supreme Court, the same
directed the Sandiganbayan to refer the instant case for investigation, report and
recommendation to the most senior justice after Justice Ong.

Petitioner CSC claimed that respondent had applied for the CSPECAT scheduled for 24
January 2000 and that it appeared that he passed the test with a rating of 81.08%. But
based on the differing photographs in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) and his Civil Service
Application Form, the CSC averred that he had not taken the test himself.

Respondent admitted that he could not have taken the test on 24 January 2000, since he
was in the province nursing an alcohol hangover. As his defense, he maintained that he had
not authorized another person to take the test for him. Respondent alleged that the
impersonation was perpetrated by a group of employees who disliked him for revealing
their drinking sprees and doping sessions to their superiors. He further narrated that in
2007, he learned from his co-employee, Larry Lincallo, that the impersonator was
Emmerson Nucom, the latter’s high school classmate. Aggrieved, respondent executed a
Complaint-Affidavit in 2012 charging Nucom with impersonation before the CSC.

Justice Jurado disbelieved the claims of respondent. Moreover, Justice Jurado disregarded
the circumstance that respondent had filed an impersonation case against Nucom. For the
investigating officer, the five-year hiatus between knowledge of the identity of the
impersonator in 2007 and the execution of the Complaint-Affidavit in 2012 belied the
authenticity of the claim that respondent was aggrieved by the impersonation.
Thus, Justice Jurado sided with petitioner and found respondent guilty of dishonesty. But
the investigating officer did not dismiss but only suspended him.

Issue: Whether the respondent if guilty of dishonesty.

SC: Yes.

After a judicious examination of the records, the partially adopt the above
recommendation. Justice Jurado’s Investigation Report and Recommendation is supported
by the evidence on record showing that respondent did not take the CSPE-CAT of 24
January 2000. Firstly, by claiming that he was nursing a hangover on the day of examination,
respondent was effectively admitting that he did not take the test; and logically, he did not
earn for himself the 81.08% passing rate. Secondly, the pictures in his Civil Service
Application Form and PSP are entirely different. In other words, it cannot be doubted that
another person took the test under his name.

Despite this established fact, respondent still tries to refute the charge of dishonesty by
claiming that the actual examinee impersonated him and took the test without his
knowledge. Indeed, to be found guilty of dishonesty, there must be substantial evidence
that respondent intentionally made false statements or practiced deception in securing his
permanent employment with the Sandiganbayan.

Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in this administrative case, is
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. This standard is satisfied in the present case so long as there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained
of, even if the evidence may not be overwhelming or even preponderant.

The impersonation theory of respondent, claimed to be perpetrated by his officemates, is

incredible.

First, the claim of respondent is self-serving and uncorroborated by any witness. Second, it
is more reasonable to believe that the employees who had an axe to grind against him
would rather have him fail than pass the test. Third, as Justice Jurado aptly pointed out, it
defies reason that the actual examinee would take the test for the benefit of another
without any recompense. Fourth, even assuming arguendo that respondent had an
unauthorized impersonator, he should have alerted the CSC or the Sandiganbayan as soon
as he received the passing grade. Respondent’s scheme of passing the blame to the actual
examinee is old hat.

All told, the facts of this case cannot support the conclusion that respondent was
completely innocent of dishonesty in obtaining his eligibility for permanent employment
with the Sandiganbayan. Respondent, who admitted that he did not take the test, took
credit for his false rating. Worse, after knowing that another person had taken the test on
his behalf, he did not even attempt to earn his eligibility on his own accord. Basic honesty
would have required transparency and uprightness in the actions of an employee of the
judiciary.

By perpetrating his false eligibility and letting it remain on record, respondent concealed
and distorted the truth in a matter of fact relevant to his office. His actions thus speak of his
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.

The reduced penalty of suspension cannot be justified by the alleged mitigating

circumstances of satisfactory performance, length of service and non-utilization of the
acquired eligibility.

Dishonesty cannot be tolerated from government officials or employees, even when official
duties are performed well. First-time offenders found guilty of grave dishonesty involving
falsification of their civil service examination results already merit the penalty of dismissal
from service.
Topic: Serious neglect of duty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019
Ponente: Per Curiam

Novo A. Lucas v. Rolando A. Dizon, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-12-3076, November 18, 2014

Facts: Novo A. Lucas (complainant) charged in a complaint-affidavit Rolando A. Dizon,

Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
with serious neglect of duty and violation of R.A. No. 3019, for delaying the implementation
of the Writ of Execution issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Domingo in a case for
collection of sum of money against Francisco Pascual.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He claimed that when he and complainant
first met, he explained the process of implementing the writ especially the need to demand
from Pascual the fulfillment of the judgment before any seizure of personal properties could
be made. He accused complainant of not being interested in the rules as his concern
centered on proceeding immediately to Pascual’s residence. He claimed that on the day
they were to proceed to Pascual’s residence, complainant informed him that there was no
need to proceed to the house of Pascual because an arrangement had been made.

OCA found respondent liable for gross neglect of duty but agreed with Investigating Judge
Tribiana that there was no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of R.A. No.
3019 against respondent.

Issue: Whether the respondent liable for gross neglect of duty.

SC: The transaction is an equitable mortgage.

The last standing frontier that the victorious litigant must face is often another difficult
process– the execution stage. In this stage, a litigant who has won the battle might lose the
war. Thus, the sheriffs, being agents of the court, play an important role, particularly in the
matter of implementing the writ of execution. Indeed, sheriffs "are tasked to execute final
judgments of courts. If not enforced, such decisions are empty victories of the prevailing
parties. They must therefore comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement
writs promptly and expeditiously. As agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge
their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the court’s writs and
processes and implementing its order, they cannot afford to err without affecting the
integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice."

Engraved in jurisprudence is the rule that the sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ is
purely ministerial. Once the writ is placed in his or her hands, a sheriff is obligated to
execute the order of the court strictly to the letter and with reasonable promptness, taking
heed of the prescribed period required by the Rules.
In this case, respondent is charged for failing to perform his ministerial functions in the
implementation of the writ of execution issued in favor of complainant. In this regard, the
Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA that respondent’s omissions clearly
qualify as gross neglect of duty.

Lastly, respondent utterly failed to make periodic reports, thus, depriving the court of the
opportunity to know and ensure the speedy execution of its decision. Pursuant to Section
14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, such periodic report is mandatory, to wit:
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution.– The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court
issuing it immediately after judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during
the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a
report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the
judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set
forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies
thereof promptly furnished the parties. Had he done so, the difficulties he had in dealing
with complainant would have been mitigated. Records also show that this is not the first
instance that respondent faced issues of this kind. The Court takes note that in another
administrative matter, respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for simple
neglect of duty. This time around, however, the circumstances prevailing in this case reveal
respondent's gross and palpable neglect of his sheriff duties - a grave offense according to
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service
Rules), which is punishable with dismissal from the service.

Hence, for the infractions committed, respondent should be meted out the penalty of
dismissal from service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of all his retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Topic: Absolute Sale v. Equitable Mortgage
Ponente: Per Curiam

Office of the Court Administrator v. Mrs. Aurora T. Zuniga, et al, A.M. No. P-10-2800,
November 18, 2014

Facts: This case originated from the financial audit conducted by the Fiscal Monitoring
Division (FMD) of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the books of account of
the Municipal Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes (MTC). The financial review was brought
about by the fund shortages discovered by state auditor Madeleine S. Rivera of the
Commission on Audit (COA) for the period from August 21, 2003 to June19, 2007 in the
amount of P294,797.75.

Specifically, the financial audit team examined the books of account of the MTC covering
the period from March 3, 1985 to March 31, 2008, under the following accountable officers:
Mrs. Aurora T. Zuñiga (respondent), Mrs. Paz T. Tacorda, Mrs. Minda H. Cervantes, Mr.
Pepito F. Lucero, Mr. Garibaldi L. Sarmiento, and Ms. Sonia T. Bagadiong.

The financial audit team reported that these court employees shared the task of acting as
Officer-in-Charge/Accountable Officer from 1985 up to the dates of the audit. The audit
team disclosed that Tacorda incurred a shortage of P10.00 from the Judicial Development
Fund (JDF); Cervantes, P4,100.00 from the Fiduciary Fund (FF); Lucero, P1,095.00 from the
JDF and P600.00 from the General Fund (GF); Sarmiento, 384.00 from JDF andP1,626.00
from the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF), although said amounts were
already restituted on April 25, 2008; and Zuñiga a total of P278,811.85, as well as
accountabilities from her FF collections.

Issue: Whether the respondents are guilty of the charges.

SC: Yes.

After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court finds the recommendation
of the OCA to be correct.1awp++i1
SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93, as integrated in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of
Court, provide the guidelines for the accounting of court funds. All fiduciary collections
upon receipt shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned with an
authorized government depository bank. In SC Circular No. 5-93, the LBP was designated as
the authorized government depository. Furthermore, Section B(4) of Circular No. 50-95
directs that all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections
shall be deposited with the LBP within twenty-four (24) hours by the Clerk of Court
concerned as instructed in Circular No. 13-92.
Zuñiga, as Clerk of Court, was entrusted with the delicate functions of collecting legal
fees. She acted as cashier and disbursement officer of the court and was tasked to collect
and receive all monies paid as legal fees, deposits, fines and dues, and controls the
disbursement of the same. She was also designated as custodian of the court’s funds and
revenues, records, properties and premises, and should be liable for any loss or shortage
thereof.
Zuñiga, however, failed to properly account for her FF collections and to judiciously deposit
the same with the Land Bank within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt. She was also
unable to explain the shortage ofP269,363.35 from her July 10, 2007-March 31, 2008
transactions. Moreover, she failed to provide proper documentation to completely support
the cash bond withdrawals amounting to P232,860.00 spanning from June 26, 1992 to
December 31, 1995 which she claimed to have been refunded to bondsmen/litigants.
Circular No. 50-95 provides for the guidelines on how to make withdrawals from the court
fiduciary funds.
As can be gleaned from the said provision, supporting documents such as a court order
from the judge authorizing the withdrawal and acknowledgment receipts of the bondsmen
or litigants must be fully presented. Failure to strictly comply with these requirements
would make the withdrawals unauthorized. Thus, after recomputation, Zuñiga still had a
shortage of P134,050.00 representing unauthorized FF withdrawals due to insufficient
documentation.

Clearly, Zuñiga’s unorganized method of managing and documenting the cash collections
allocated for the JDF was a serious violation of Administrative Circular No. 5-93, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
3. Duty of the Clerks of Court, Officers-in-Charge or accountable officers.- The
Clerks of Court, Officers-in-Charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, or their
accountable duly authorized representative designated by them in writing,
who must be accountable officers, shall receive the Judiciary Development
Fund collections, issue the proper receipt therefor, maintain a separate cash
book properly marked CASH BOOK FOR JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND,
deposit such collections in the manner herein prescribed, and render the
proper Monthly Report of Collections for said Fund.

In fact, Zuñiga’s unjustified failure to comply with the Court’s circulars designed to promote
full accountability for public funds even constitutes gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct. No protestation of good faith can override the mandatory observance of court
circulars. It should be emphasized that the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court requires
strict compliance with the rules and regulations of the collection and accounting funds
Topic: Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M.
No. 01-9-09-SC
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Dorothy Fe Mah-Arevalo v. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional Trial Court of Palompon,

Leyte, Branch 17, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360, November 19, 2014

Facts: Dorothy Fe Mah-Arevalo (complainant), Court Stenographer of the Regional Trial

Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 (RTC), filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), against Judge Celso L. Mantua (respondent) of the same court,
accusing him of Disgraceful/Immoral Conduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct,
Dishonesty, Violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Gross Violation of the Judicial Code of
Conduct, Abuse of Authority, and Gross Ignorance of the Law.

It was alleged that respondent: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly his chamber, as his
residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his staff, especially
by a former Utility Worker of the Metropolitan Trial Court of the same station, Dyndee
Nuñez; (c) used the court process server, Benjamin Pepito, as his personal driver; (d)
delegated his work load to his legal researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape, because he could no
longer attend to the same due to his many vices; (e) committed gross ignorance of the law
when, in one criminal case that he handled, he proceeded to trial and allowed the private
complainant to testify in open court even if the accused was not assisted by counsel, and
furthermore, extorted money from the accused in the amount of P200,000.00; (f) asked for
gasoline, personal allowance, and other benefits from the local government; and (g) failed
to decide cases within the prescribed 90-day period because he was waiting for litigants to
offer him monetary consideration.

Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, and accordingly, recommended that he be fined in the amount of
25,000.00. Giving credence to complainant’s consistent and spontaneous answers as well as
her demeanor in the witness stand during her testimony, the Investigating Justice
concluded that respondent indeed made his chamber in the Hall of Justice as his residence,
a prohibited act under SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
Similarly, the Investigating Justice also believed Nuñez’s testimony that respondent indeed
brought his mistress and slept with her inside his chamber, finding no reason for Nuñez to
fabricate a story. The Investigating Justice, however, exonerated respondent from the other
charges for failure of the complainant to substantiate the same.

Issue: Whether the respondent should be held administratively liable for Immorality and
violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.

SC: Yes.
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be
used for functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose.
In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his
chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out
by both the Investigating Justice and the OCA, respondent’s defense that he rented a house
did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is
possible that a person could be renting one place while actually and physically residing in
another.

Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of
Immorality. Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also
‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward
good order and public welfare.’" It is a serious charge which may be punishable by any of
the following: (a) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(b) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.

In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an extramarital
affair with his mistress. There is no doubt that engaging in an extra marital affair is not only
a violation of the moral standards expected of the members and employees of the judiciary
but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which the Court
abhors and is, thus, punishable.
Breach of the Lawyer’s Oath
Code of Professional Responsibility
Ponente: J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA., A.C. No. 4697/ A.C. No. 4728,
November 25, 2014

Facts: Herein complainant and respondent entered into a "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 involving a parcel of coconut land for P15,000.00. Under
the said deed, respondent represented that he has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in
fee simple" the subject property and that the said property is "free from all liens and
encumbrances." The deed also provided that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years
within which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased within the said period, "the
parties shall renew the instrument/agreement."
Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in
the deed, and no renewal of the contract was made even after complainant sent
respondent a final demand dated May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property.
Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the property until December 1989 when
he received letters from the Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that
the property was mortgaged by respondent to RBAI, that the bank had subsequently
foreclosed on the property, and that complainant should therefore vacate the property.
Complainant was alarmed and made an investigation. He found out that TCT No. T-
662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB)
as early as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings; that TCT No. T-3211 was
cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and his wife on January 4, 1982
pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27,1979 between PNB and respondent; and
respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on
the property, and subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27,
1991. Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the property by RBAI.
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant
administrative cases against respondent. In both complaints, complainant sought the
disbarment of respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Consolidated Answer filed before the IBP, respondent denied that his
agreement with complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He claimed that it was an equitable
mortgage and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from the
produce of the land, the total amount would have exceeded P15,000.00.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation with modification as follows: respondent is (1) suspended
from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future
shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00 received
in consideration of the pacto de retro sale, with legal interest.

Issues: 1. Whether respondent violated his oath as a lawyer.

 2. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SC: YES.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering
respondent to return the P15,000.00 consideration, plus interest.
1. Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is
actually one of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations
in his transaction with complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly
show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing required from lawyers, for which respondent should be held
administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he
undertook to "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and "conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion." He gravely violated his oath.
2. Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he
entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" with the latter. He made it appear
that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant
the owner’s copy of the said certificate oftitle, when the truth is that the said TCT had
already been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He
did not even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently
issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982, or barely a month after the
execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross
dishonesty and deceit against complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal
processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other
hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers. HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/nov2014/ac_4697_2014.html" \l "fnt22" 22
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such
element.
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be
untrustworthy; lacking inintegrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straightforwardness. On the other hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:
The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the "Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.
Respondent’s breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good faith, and
dishonesty are compounded by his gross disregard of this Court’s directives, as well as the
orders of the IBP’s Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court
pursuant to the Court’s referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation), which caused delay in the resolution of these administrative cases.
Respondent’s disregard of the directives of this Court and of the Investigating
Commissioner, which caused undue delay in these administrative cases, contravenes the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two
years, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.
 Topic: Reinstatement of a Disbarred Attorney
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Conrado N. Que v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., A.C. 7054 November 11, 2014

Facts: In a decision dated December 4, 2009, the SC disbarred Atty. Revilla from the
practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of
multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood
and deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent
and unauthorized appearances in court.

The respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion praying that
his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the SC En
Banc resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit. He stressed that the penalty of
disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and weak;
and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing
dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the
practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all
humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter
Church, Quezon City.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law
again, but to be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of
mind. He expressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility
for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated
as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract
evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter
Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.

Hence, this motion for reconsideration for the third petition to SC.

Issue: Whether or not respondent be reinstated in the roll of attorneys

SC: No. While Revilla expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility
of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to
invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The
respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the
legal profession. SC thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely
reformed.

The Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition,

however, the SC stressed that in considering his application for reinstatement to the
practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral
reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this
point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate
to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his
membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.
 Topic: Neglect of Client’s interest
Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

Felipe Layos v. Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva, A.C. No. 8085, December 1, 2014

Facts: Atty. Marlito Villanueva is Felipe Layos’ counsel in a criminal case wherein the
former’s constant failure to appear during court hearings resulted in the RTC’s issuance of
an Order waiving the defense’s right to cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite the
issuance of such order, respondent remained absent and thus, complainant was only able to
move for reconsideration, thru respondent, only four (4) years later which was denied in an
Order. Aggrieved, complainant, also thru respondent, filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals. However, the petition was dismissed and CA likewise chastised
respondent for his “lack of candidness and fervor on his part to champion the cause” of his
client, considering that, inter alia: (a) respondent never bothered to know the outcome of
the hearings where he was absent from; (b) it took respondent a long amount of time
before moving to reconsider the RTC’s June 26, 2003 Order; and (c) respondent never
questioned the appearances of other lawyers as complainant’s counsel during his
absence. Citing as basis such disquisition by the CA, complainant filed the instant
administrative case against respondent.

Respondent denied being remiss in his duty as complainant’s counsel.

IBP Commissioner found respondent administratively liable and recommended that he be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Issue: Whether should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.

SC: YES

Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to
serve his client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep
abreast of all the developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the same,
as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify
his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate
review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize
misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not
leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In this
connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or
nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As such, the lawyer is expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him
has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but
also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.

In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002 hearing due to car
trouble, respondent no longer kept track of complainant’s criminal case and merely
assumed that the same was already amicably settled and terminated. Thereafter, when
respondent finally knew that the case was still on-going, he attended the November 15,
2005 hearing, and discovered the RTC’s issuance of the June 26, 2003 Order which is
prejudicial to complainant’s cause. Despite such alarming developments, respondent did
not immediately seek any remedy to further the interests of his client. Instead, he passively
relied on the representations of the court employees that they would send him a copy of
the aforesaid Order. Worse, when he finally secured a copy on April 4, 2006, it still took him
over a year, or until April 21, 2007, just to move the RTC to reconsider its June 26, 2003
Order. Naturally, the RTC and the CA denied the motion for being filed way beyond the
reglementary period, to the detriment of complainant. Clearly, respondent failed to
exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment.

While the Court agrees that respondent should be held administratively liable for the
foregoing acts and thus, must be suspended from the practice of law, it nevertheless deems
that the IBP’s recommended period of suspension of six (6) months is too harsh a penalty,
given the complainant’s seeming disinterest in the developments of his own case. This is
evidenced by complainant not communicating with respondent, getting other lawyers
referred to him by his friends despite having a counsel of record, and being indifferent
despite being informed of a standing warrant of arrest against him.

It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts in the
prosecution or defense of a client’s cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence
and candor not only protects the interests of his client, he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession. Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in
this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the
legal profession, strict compliance with one’s oath of office and the canons of professional
ethics is an imperative.
 Topic: Violation of the code of professional responsibility and lawyer’s oath; Effect of
contributory cause on complainant’s side
Ponente: Justice Jose Mendoza

Raul C. Lanuza and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III and Pablo R. Cruz,
A.C. Nos. 7687 and 7688, December 03, 2014

Facts: On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision favoring Lanuza and directing PHI to
reinstate him with full backwages.

As the records would show, PHI moved for reconsideration of the said CA decision, but the
CA denied the motion in its July 4, 2007 Resolution. On July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received
by registered mail the Notice of Resolution from the CA. Thereafter, Atty. Garcia received by
registered mail the Compliance, dated July 26, 2007, filed by PHI, through the PRC Law
Office. In the said Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of Resolution was received
on July 23, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt (2nd return receipt) sent back to the
CA.

Wondering about the delay in the delivery of the registered mail to the respondents, Atty.
Garcia requested the Quezon City Central Post Office (QCCPO) to issue a certification as to
the date of the actual receipt of the said Notice of Resolution by the PRC Law Office. In the
October 25, 2007 Certification issued by the QCCPO, Chief of the Records Section Fallarme,
stated that the Registered Letter No. S-114 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by
Postman Pecante and duly received by Calucag on July 16, 2007, based on the log book of
postman Pecante.

The complainants claimed that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz must have induced Calucag to alter
the true date of receipt of the Notice of Resolution or at least had the knowledge thereof
when she signed and stamped on the 2nd return receipt the date - July 23, 2007. They
contended that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz stood to benefit from the additional seven (7) days
derived from the alleged altered date as they, in fact, used the altered date in their
subsequent pleading. Attys. Magsalin and Cruz falsely alleged such in the compliance filed
before the CA; the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
on certiorari; and the petition for review on certiorari filed before this Court. The
complainants insinuated that Atty. Magsalin and Atty. Cruz deliberately misled the CA and
this Court by filing the above-mentioned pleadings with the full knowledge that they were
already time barred.

In its March 9, 2009 Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag

(Commissioner Hababag) recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit.

Issue: Whether Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and Go should be held administratively liable based
on the allegations in the complaints.
SC: NO
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the
complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes
the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh
penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as
an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.

In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be inconclusive, thus,
insufficient to hold the respondents liable for the acts alleged in the complaint.

Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return
Receipts as to the dates of the CA receipt of the notices, decision and resolution by the
respondents, there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove that the respondents
intentionally and maliciously made it appear that they received the CA notices, decision and
resolution later than the dates stated in the QCCPO Certifications. The complainants would
like to impress upon the Court that the only logical explanation as to the discrepancy on the
dates between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts was that the
respondents must have induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt by the CA for the
purpose of extending the period to file, the otherwise time-barred, motion for
reconsideration. Verily, this leap of inference proffered by the complainants is merely
anchored on speculation and conjecture and not in any way supported by clear substantial
evidence required to justify the imposition of an administrative penalty on a member of the
Bar.
 Topic: Notarization by the office secretary in the absence of the lawyer
Ponente: Justice Jose Mendoza

Atty. Aurelio Angeles, Jr. v. Atty. Renato Bagay, A.C. No. 8103, December 03, 2014

Facts: A letter was submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr., the Provincial Legal Officer of
Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr., Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay, for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the
time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer
who had information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country.
The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to be
notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent sign the
documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents came
out of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was
found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and
returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
was also attached to the letter.

When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint,
the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008
Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather “a report on, and endorsement
of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country,” and that any advice
on how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.

On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for appropriate action.

This Court, in its Resolution, dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty.
Angeles, Jr., dated September 30, 2008, and require respondent to comment on the said
letter.

In his comment respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were documents
notarized using his name while he was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found
out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his knowledge and
authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the import of the
notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that he had
terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.

The Court then referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
The report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III as Investigating
Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June 11, 2008, was not
verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the
comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that
respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in
most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his
office secretary. He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while
he was abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of
the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his negligence
in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records
especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent
failed to live up to the standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its
Resolution, dated September 28, 2013 immediate revocation of respondent’s commission
as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2)
years.

Issue: Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was
out of the country constituted negligence.

SC: YES

Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18
documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of
the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible
for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that
a “Notary Public” refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these
Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts
of a notary public.

Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not
authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his
office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and
register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these
items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be
countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an
inescapable likelihood that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such
carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.

Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is
commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial
register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.

As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21
years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and
this was his first and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on
guard and could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer
negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was
deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus,
the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment
as Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a
notary public not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but
also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of
notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public
but also as a lawyer. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed
upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any.

Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly
assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary
to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By
leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge,
he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people
who came into his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity
being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into
public documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their documents
was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose
documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession was eroded.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.

Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant

responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties
imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not
an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The protection
of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be
prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in
general.

It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document

into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof
of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
the integrity of public instruments would be undermined.

Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not
take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance.
 Topic: Violation of Code of Professional Responsibility
Ponente: PER CURIAM

Erlinda Foster v. Atty. Jaime Agtang, A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

Facts: IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a complaint filed by Erlinda
Foster against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful” acts as a lawyer.
Respondent was directed to answer but failed to do so.

Respondent was notarized a deed of absolute sale which the complainant entered into with
Tierra Realty. Complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract and complainant paid the
acceptance fee and for incidental expenses.

Respondent asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his
car to which the complainant agreed without interest. Being aware that Tierra Realty was
attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased, complainant referred
the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation
of contract with damages. Respondent requested and received from complainant the
amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for
the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and
Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.

On April 23, 2010, respondent requested an amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the
moment of urgency or emergency.” Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent
the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given
to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed gave the amount of
P25,000.00 and the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment. On
November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount and complainant
handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by
respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she
personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of
respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the
order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion
for reconsideration.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with
a message from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned
therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were
not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s
directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a
present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the
following month.

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her

counsel, after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been
acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant requested
respondent to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the
actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and

recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Issue: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

SC: YES

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however,
modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting
interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is
“not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined
for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.”

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing
that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules,
due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to
be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act
customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00
as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was
complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would
propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the
complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her
complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing
fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due,
consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from his client.” Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for
the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various
amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not
deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to
return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client. When a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer
must immediately return the money to the client.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this
juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his
client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court.
Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his
client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal
that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “a lawyer shall
not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client,
not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. Nowhere in the records, particularly in
the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions
provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. The acts of requesting and receiving
money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his
lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his
obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards
of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their
duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations.

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is
not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the
lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent
must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds
it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that
complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing
party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a
client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation
from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of
the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.” 33 Thus, even if
lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of
interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties
after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant
against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of
attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of
the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the
fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this
confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR. For the practice of law is “a profession, a form of public
trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess
good moral character.” The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a
wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. The acts of the
respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His
incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society
render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining
the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for
representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of
disbarment.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession.” The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper
and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney.”
 Topic: Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Lawyers Oath; Lawyer-
client Privilege
Ponente: Justice Jose Mendoza

Caroline Castañeda Jimenez v. Atty. Edgar B. Francisco, A.C. No. 10548, December 10,
2014

Facts: Commission on Bar Discipline received a complaint filed by Caroline Castañeda

Jimenez against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR.

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion Realty and Development
Corporation’s corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a
disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to
her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s
transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale and transfer of
Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his
law office. Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in the transactions
involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the truth of the allegations in
his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and
confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer.

IBP-BOG adopted and approved the findings of the CBD which found Atty. Edgar B.
Francisco administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law.

Issue: Whether there were Violations of Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath

SC: YES

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the
best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any
act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference to the law not only
speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of
the public. Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all
lawyers.

Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is “unlawful.” “Unlawful” conduct does not
necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element. To be “dishonest” means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness and straightforwardness while conduct that is “deceitful” means the
proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon.

Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.19 “To say that lawyers must at all times
uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be
overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most
sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law.”

When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to “obey the laws,” “do
no falsehood,” and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their
clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be
emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of
truth and justice, and must be held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of
action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and Disclosure of Privileged Communication

With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and

disclosure of privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-
BOG.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.” “The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a
client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation
from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with the client. Part
of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests…” Thus, even
if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline
professional employment if the same would trigger a violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest.

Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo, the
Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client

relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of

disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was given.

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his
counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for
the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record
fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to
establish the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are
further bereft of any indication that the “advice” regarding the sale of the Forbes property
was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence.
 Topic: Disbarment; Violation of a lawyer’s duty under the Code of Professional
Responsibility; Retaining Lien
Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen

Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro v. Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440,
November 26, 2014

Facts: Complainants engaged the services of respondent to facilitate the transfer of title to
property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to complainants. They gave respondent
a check for P68,250.00 for the payment of transfer taxes and a check for P13,800.00 for
respondent’s professional fee.

Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-ups.

Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay. Respondent refused to
return the amount complainants gave for the transfer taxes. Complainants were then issued
a certificate to file action. They also sent a letter demanding the refund of the money
intended for the transfer taxes. Respondent still did not return the money.

The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and
16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the disciplinary action of
“censure and warning”.

Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his clients.

SC: YES

It has been said that “[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the
high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the
norms and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.”

An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly
retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear; he

should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the
money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure
either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the
money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The lawyer’s failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.

Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to
complainants’ name. He continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his
duty. However, after three (3) years and several demands from complainants, respondent
failed to accomplish the task given to him and even refused to return the
money. Complainants’ alleged failure to provide the necessary documents to effect the
transfer does not justify his violation of his duty under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has
the following elements:
(1) lawyer-client relationship;
(2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and
(3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees.
Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account
between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client
which may come into the attorney’s possession in the course of his employment.

Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present
evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of cases he
worked on for complainants remains unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim
for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or properties.
Topic: Sheriff's duties as an agent of the law
Ponente: Lucas Bersamin

Conchita Bahala vs. Cirilo Duca, Sheriff III, MTCC, Br. 1, Cagayan De Oro City
A.M. No. P-08-2465
January 12, 2015

Facts: On August 6, 1999, the MTCC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 98-July-817 that
was adverse to Bahala. Pending appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a judgment
on the compromise agreement of the parties, pursuant to which Bahala paid the balance of
the money judgment, remained in the premises during the agreed extension of two years,
and paid her monthly rentals. By the end of the two-year extension, she offered to sell the
building standing on the property that she had supposedly built in good faith. Not wanting
to pay for the building, the plaintiff opted to execute the judgment. On August 1, 2002,
Sheriff Duca served the writ of execution, but demanded P2,000.00 from her in order to
delay its implementation. She delivered the amount demanded on a Saturday at the Hall of
Justice in the company of her friend, Helen Peligro. Bahala averred, too, that Sheriff Duca
had served the writ on her more than 10 times, and that she had given him either P200.00 or
P100.00 each time. In 2003, she started to evade Sheriff Duca whenever heserved the writ.
Without filing his return on the writ, Sheriff Duca served a notice of auction sale on
February 21, 2003, stating the amount of P210,000.00 as the rentals-in-arrears due and
demandable. The amount was allegedly his erroneous computation of the rentals-in-arrears
due because it was not based on the decision of the RTC. Consequently, Bahala opposed the
sale. The RTC ruled in her favor.
Despite the clear order of the RTC, Sheriff Duca proceeded with the auction sale on
May 13, 2003,7 and awarded the building to the plaintiff as the sole and highest bidder. He
subsequently forcibly removed all the personal belongings of the actual occupants of the
building, and placed them outside the building and along the street. He padlocked the
building, and warned Bahala and her lessees not to re-enter the premises. When she told
him that his act was illegal, he retorted: Akong himuon ang akong gusto, akong ning i-
padlock ang imong building, walay makabuot sa ako. (I will do what I want. I will padlock
your building and nobody will stop me from doing this). Later that afternoon, she started to
voluntarily demolish the building, but he ordered her to stop the demolition, threatening to
file a case against her otherwise.
Sheriff Duca denied all the allegations.
The Court resolved to re-docket this case as a regular administrative matter, and
referred it to the Executive Judge of the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City for investigation and
recommendation.
In his report,then Executive Judge Edgardo T. Lloren found and concluded that
Sheriff Duca had committed simple misconduct for not filing his periodic report on the writ
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and for adopting the computation of
arrears made by the plaintiff. Accordingly, Judge Lloren recommended that Sheriff Duca be
suspended for six months and one day without pay; and that the charges for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act be dismissed for lack of merit.
 The OCA agreed with Judge Lloren’s finding that Sheriff Duca had committed simple
misconduct in basing the amount stated in the notice of auction sale on the computation
submitted by the plaintiff. It also found Sheriff Duca liable for simple neglect of duty for not
complying with the requirements of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and
recommended his suspension without pay for six months and one day with stern warning
against the commission of similar acts or omissions.

Issue: Whether or not the recommended penalty is proper.

SC: No.

As an agent of the law, a sheriff must discharge his duties with due care and
utmost diligence. He cannot afford to err while serving the court’s writs and processes
without affecting the integrity of his office and the efficient administration of justice.15
He is not given any discretion on the implementation of a writ of execution; hence, he
must strictly abide by the prescribed procedure to avoid liability.
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires a sheriff implementing a writ of
execution (1) to make and submit a return to the court immediately upon satisfaction in
part or in full of the judgment; and (2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied infull, to make a
report to the court within 30 days after his receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction
could not be made. He shall continue making the report every 30 days in the proceedings
undertaken by him until the judgment is fully satisfied in order to apprise the court on the
status of the execution and to take necessary steps to ensure speedy execution of decisions.
Although Sheriff Duca thrice served the writ on Bahala, he filed his return only on
October 7, 2003 after her property had been levied and sold on public auction. His excuses
for his omission, that his "job was not yet finished," and that he had informedthe plaintiff
on the status of its implementation, did not exculpate him from administrative liability,
because there is no question that the failure to file a return on the writ constituted "simple
neglect of duty," defined as the failure of an employee to give his attention to the task
expected of him, signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.

In this regard, the OCA correctly observed:

As deputy sheriff, respondent could not be unaware of Section 14, Rule 39 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure x x x

xxxx

Based on the foregoing, it is mandatory for a sheriff to make a return of the writ of
execution to the court issuing it. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30)
days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason or
reasons therefore. The court officer is likewise tasked to make a report to the court every
thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full or its
effectivity expires. The raison d’ etrebehind this requirement is to update the court on the
status of the execution and to take necessary steps to ensurethe speedy execution of
decision.
A careful perusal of the records show that the writ of execution was issued on
August 1, 2002. However, it was only more than a year later or on October 7, 2003 when
respondent sheriff was able to file his return of the writ. In his testimony before the
investigating judge on March 7, 2005, he was not even sure on when he first served the writ
of execution upon complainant but admitted of having served the same at least three (3)
times yet he failed to timely make a sheriff’s return as required under Section 14, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent though belatedly submitted his sheriff’s return and
furnished a copy thereof to the complainant only on October 7, 2003.
Due to respondent’s failure to make a timely return and periodic progress report of
the writ, the court was obviously unaware of the auction sale of defendant’s property
conducted by respondent-sheriff on March 3, 2003 that in its Order dated May 5, 2003, it
enjoined respondent sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of defendant’s property
and directed him to execute the parties’ agreement regarding ejectment and removal of
defendants’ buildings/structures from the leased property of the plaintiff. By then, subject
property was already auctioned and awarded to plaintiff, being the highest bidder and
defendant’s agents already ejected from subject property per his Sheriff’s Return of Service
dated October 7, 2003.
Clearly, respondent sheriff is derelict in his submission of the returns thereof. His
explanation that "his job was not yet finished and … talked to the plaintiff regarding the
same"is utterly wanting. A finding that he was remiss in the performance of his duty is thus
proper under the attendant circumstances. For such nonfeasance, respondent is guilty of
dereliction or simple neglect of his dutyas a sheriff, because he failed to submit his Report
of Service within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof and make periodic reports to the
court until the judgment was fully satisfied. In fine, the gravamen of respondent’s
shortcoming is in his failure to observe Sec. 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Without doubt, Sheriff Duca played an indispensable part in the administration of
justice. His duties as a sheriff included the prompt enforcement of judgments and the
efficient implementation of orders and writs issued by the court. Any move or actuation in
the discharge of his duties that denoted complacency, or reflected inefficiency, or
constituted impropriety would equate to the disregard of the office he held. Thus, his lapses
in complying with Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court constituted sufficient ground to
order his dismissal, suspension from office or payment of a fine.
Sheriff Duca’s liability was not limited to his failure to file the return on the writ.
The OCA recommended that he be found liable also for simple misconduct because he
was guilty of the irregularity of relying on the computation of the plaintiff in charging
Bahala for the arrears in rentals amounting to P210,000.00.
Compounding this liability was his admission of not inquiring whether Bahala had
paid her rentals or not to the plaintiff.
To be sure, the amount of P210,000.00 stated in the notice of levy did not conform
with the writ of execution that stated the following amounts to be due to the plaintiff from
Bahala.
 It was Sheriff Duca’s duty as court sheriff to know the computation of the amount
due in accordance with the writ of execution. He should have ensured that only those
ordained or decreed in the judgment would be the subject of execution. To accomplish
this, he must himself compute the correct amount due from the judgment obligor or
garnishee based strictly on the terms of the executory judgment, and, if necessary, he must
verify the amount from the court itself; in other words, he could not rely on the
computations submitted by private individuals not duly authorized to do so by the issuing
court. He could not delegate the official duty to compute or reckon the amounts to be
realize through execution to such individuals. In adopting the computations submitted by
the plaintiff without himself determining whether the computations conformed to the
terms of the judgment and the writ, he was guilty of simple misconduct, an act that related
to any unlawful conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination
of the cause.
Sheriff Duca should discharge his duties as a court sheriff with utmost care and
diligence, particularly that which pertained to the implementation of orders and processes
of the court. In the discharge of his duties, he acted as an agent of the court, such that any
lack of care and diligence he displayed would inevitably cause the erosion of the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.
The Court modified the recommended penalty of suspension from office without pay
for six months and one day. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty and simple misconduct are less grave offenses
punishable by suspension from office of one month and one day to six months for the first
offense. The offense charged being Sheriff Duca's first violation, he was appropriately
punished with suspension from office without pay for three months, with a stern warning
that the commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Topic: Quantum meruit
Ponente: Marvic Mario Victor Leonen

The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs.The Commission on Audit
and/or Reynaldo A. Villar and Juanito G. Espino, Jr. in his capacities as Chairman and
Commissioner, respectively

G.R. No. 185544

January 13, 2015

Facts: Clark Development Corporation, through its legal officers and after the law firm’s
acquiescence, "sought from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel [‘OGCC’] its
approval for the engagement of [Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo] as external
counsel."
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel denied the request. Clark
Development Corporation then filed a request for reconsideration.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, through Government Corporate
Counsel Amado D. Valdez (Government Corporate Counsel Valdez), reconsidered the
request and approved the engagement of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo. It
also furnished Clark Development Corporation a copy of a pro-forma retainership contract
containing the suggested terms and conditions of the retainership. It instructed Clark
Development Corporation to submit a copy of the contract to the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel after all the parties concerned have signed it.
In the meantime, Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo commenced rendering
legal services to Clark Development Corporation. At this point, Clark Development
Corporation had yet to secure the authorization and clearance from the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel or the concurrence of the Commission on Audit of the
retainership contract. According to the law firm, Clark Development Corporation’s officers
assured the law firm that it was in the process of securing the approval of the Commission
on Audit.
Clark Development Corporation, through its Board of Directors, approved Laguesma
Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo’s engagement as private counsel. In 2003, it also approved
the assignment of additional labor cases to the law firm.
Consequently, SClark Development Corporation requested the Commission on Audit
for concurrence of the retainership contract it executed with Laguesma Magsalin Consulta
and Gastardo. According to the law firm, it was only at this point when Clark Development
Corporation informed them that the Commission on Audit required the clearance and
approval of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel before it could approve the
release of Clark Development Corporation’s funds to settle the legal fees due to the law
firm.
 Theresfter, State Auditor IV Elvira G. Punzalan informed Clark Development
Corporation that its request for clearance could not be acted upon until the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel approves the retainership contract with finality.
Government Corporate Counsel Agnes VST Devanadera (Government Corporate
Counsel Devanadera) denied Clark Development Corporation’s request for approval on the
ground that the proforma retainership contract given to them was not "based on the
premise that the monthly retainer’s fee and concomitant charges are reasonable and could
pass in audit by COA." She found that Clark Development Corporation adopted instead the
law firm’s proposals concerning the payment of a retainer’s fee on a per case basis without
informing the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. She, however, ruled that the law
firm was entitled to payment under the principle of quantum meruit and subject to Clark
Development Corporation Board’s approval and the usual government auditing rules and
regulations.
Afterwards, Clark Development Corporation relayed Government Corporate Counsel
Devanadera’s letter to the Commission’s Audit Team Leader, highlighting the portion on the
approval of payment to Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo on the basis of quantum
meruit.
The Commission on Audit’s Office of the General Counsel, Legal and Adjudication
Sector issued a "Third Indorsement" denying Clark Development Corporation’s request for
clearance, citing its failure to secure a prior written concurrence of the Commission on Audit
and the approval with finality of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. It also
stated that its request for concurrence was made three (3) years after engaging the legal
services of the law firm.
This was appealed to, but the Commission on Audit rendered the assailed decision
denying the appeal and motion for reconsideration. It ruled that Clark Development
Corporation violated Commission on Audit Circular No. 98-002 dated June 9, 1998 and
Office of the President Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated August 27, 1998 when it engaged
the legal services of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo without the final approval
and written concurrence of the Commission on Audit. It also ruled that it was not the
government’s responsibility to pay the legal fees already incurred by Clark Development
Corporation, but rather by the government officials who violated the regulations on the
matter.
Clark Development Corporation and Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo
separately filed motions for reconsideration, which the Commission on Audit denied in the
assailed resolution dated November 5, 2008. The resolution also disallowed the payment of
legal fees to the law firm on the basis of quantum meruitsince the Commission on Audit
Circular No. 86-255 mandates that the engagementof private counsel without prior
approval "shall be a personal liability of the officials concerned."
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo filed the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the Commission on Audit erred in ruling that petitioner should not
be paid on the basis of quantum meruit and that any payment for its legal services should
be the personal liability of Clark Development Corporation’s officials.
2. Who shall be liable to pay the law firm?
SC: 1. No.
The Commission on Audit did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disallowing
the payment to petitioner on the basis of quantum meruit.
Respondents disallowed Clark Development Corporation from paying petitioner on
this basis as the contract between them was executed "in clear violation of the provisions of
COA Circular No. 86-255 and OP Memorandum Circular No. 9[.]" It then ruled that the
retainership contract between them should be deemed a private contract for which the
officials of Clark Development Corporation should be liable, citing Section 10385 of
Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines.
In jurisprudence, quantum meruit:
— literally meaning as much as he deserves — is used as basis for determining an attorney’s
professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery ofattorney’s fees on
the basis of quantum meruitis a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running
away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids
unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is
entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into
account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.
Here, the Board of Directors, acting on behalf of Clark Development Corporation,
contracted the services of petitioner, without the necessary prior approvals required by the
rules and regulations for the hiring of private counsel. Their actions were clearly
unauthorized.
It was, thus, erroneous for Government Corporate Counsel Devanadera to bind
Clark Development Corporation, a government entity, to pay petitioner on a quantum
meruit basis for legal services, which were neither approved nor authorized by the
government. Even granting that petitioner ought to be paid for services rendered, it
should not be the government’s liability, but that of the officials who engaged the services
of petitioner without the required authorization.

2. The officials of Clark Development Corporation.

The amendment of Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-255 by Commission on
Audit Circular No. 98-002 created a gap in the law, because the liability of the officials who
violated the circular was removed.
It cannot be denied that petitioner rendered legal services to Clark Development
Corporation.1âwphi1 It assisted the corporation in litigating numerous labor cases90 during
the period of its engagement. It would be an injustice for petitioner not to be compensated
for services rendered even if the engagement was unauthorized.
The fulfillment of the requirements of the rules and regulations was Clark
Development Corporation’s responsibility, not petitioner’s. The Board of Directors, by its
irresponsible actions, unjustly procured for themselves petitioner’s legal services without
compensation.
To fill the gap created by the amendment of Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-
255, respondents correctly held that the officials of Clark Development Corporation who
violated the provisions of Circular No. 98-002 and Circular No. 9 should be personally
liable to pay the legal fees of petitioner, as previously provided for in Circular No. 86-255.
Bases:
Section 103 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:
SEC. 103. General liability for unlawful expenditures. -Expenditures of government funds or
uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of
the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.

Jurisprudence:
The fee of the lawyer who rendered legal service to the government in lieu of the OSG or
the OGCC is the personal liability of the government official who hired his services without
the prior written conformity of the OSG or the OGCC, as the case may be.
Topic: Fiduciary relationship between the counsel and the client
Ponente: Bienvenido Reyes

Marilen G. Soliman vs. Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy

A.C. No. 10568
January 13, 2015

Facts: Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy in 2009 in connection
with a partition case. In accordance with the Retainer Agreement between the parties,
Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latter’s
engagement, Soliman paid her P25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no
longer institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were amenable
to the partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to the
said property from the coowners to the individual owners; the P25,000.00 already paid to
her was then treated as payment for her professional services.
In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy P16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax.
In the second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay in the
issuance of the titles to the property because of the failure of the other co-owners to
submit certain documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that someone from the Register
of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of P80,000.00. Atty.
Amboy told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the amount to P50,000.00.
Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount of P8,900.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as
payment for the real property tax for the year 2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the
amount of P50,000.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as payment for the latter’s contact in
the RD.4
Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property were then only
awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However, Atty. Amboy failed to deliver the
respective certificates of title of Soliman and her co-owners to the subject property. In
2010, Atty. Amboy’s secretary informed Soliman that their contact in the RD was asking for
an additional P10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Soliman
then refused to further pay the amount being asked by Atty. Amboy’s
secretary.6Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty. Amboy for any update on the release of
the said titles, but the latter was not responding to her queries. Soliman and Atty. Amboy’s
secretary went to the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman
asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the 50,000.00 as payment for the release of the said
titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having received any amount to facilitate the release of the
titles and claimed that the reason why the same could not be processed was that Atty.
Amboy failed to file certain documents.
Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the pertinent
documents she gave to her for the processing of the titles to the property or give back the
P50,000.00 that was already paid to her.
For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but
denied having received any amount from the latter pursuant to the said agreement.
On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Report and
Recommendation,10 which recommended the suspension of Atty. Amboy from the practice
of law for six (6) months. The Investigating Commissioner opined that Atty. Amboy violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to observe due diligence in dealing with
Soliman. It also opined that she failed to inform the latter of the status of the proceedings
for the issuance of the said titles.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the
modification that the period of Atty. Amboy’s suspension from the practice of law was
increased from six (6) months to two (2) years and that she was ordered to return the entire
amount she received from Soliman.
Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 20, 2013, but it was
denied.

Issue: Whether or not the the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of Governors should be
affirmed by the Court.

SC: Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his clientand that he should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. A lawyer is mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence;to never
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed of the status of his
case and respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving P25,000.00 as
payment for her professional services, failed to submit material documents relative to the
issuance of separate certificates of title to the individual owners of the property. It was her
negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she
asked from Soliman the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid to her "contact" inside the office
of the RD in order to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Further,
notwithstanding the payment of P50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of
the said certificates of title. Insteadof procuring the release of the certificates of title as she
promised, Atty. Amboy asked for an additional P10,000.00 from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing
with a client. Atty. Amboy’s acts undermined the legal processes, which she swore to
uphold and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to respectthe law
and legal processes.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of
P50,000.00 which she paid inorder to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To
reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila, denied having received
any amount from Atty. Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman after a demand
therefor was made following her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title,
Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to a
client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. "A lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he
has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment."
Thus, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy was found GUILTY of violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18,
and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. Furthermore, she was also ordered to return to Marilen G. Soliman the entire
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) she received from the latter, plus legal
interest thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
Topic: Gross misconduct - ground for disbarment
Ponente: [Per curiam]

Fernando W. Chu vs. Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr.

A.C. No. 10573
January 13, 2015

Facts: Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his
company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). Atty. Guico’s legal services included
handling a complaint for illegal dismissal brought against CVC. The Labor Arbiter Herminio
V. Suelo rendered a decision adverse to CVC. Atty. Guico filed a timely appeal in behalf of
CVC.
According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty. Guico’s
residence in Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial
amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a
favorable decision. On June 10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had
raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his office at No. 48
Times Street, Quezon City, and togive the money to his assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo)
Manahan. Chu complied, and later on called Atty. Guico to confirm that he had delivered
the money to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty. Guico instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007
at the UCC Coffee Shop on T. Morato Street, Quezon City. Atthe UCC Coffee Shop, Atty.
Guico handed Chu a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. The draft
decision6 was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper apparently emanating from the
office of Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to
encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could only produce
P280,000.00, which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office on July 10, 2007 accompanied by his
son, Christopher Chu, and one Bonifacio Elipane. However, it was Nardo who received the
amount without issuing any receipt.
Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December 2007.
However, Atty. Guico referred him to Nardo who in turn said that he would only know the
status after Christmas. On January 11, 2008, Chu again called Nardo, who invited him to
lunch at the Ihaw Balot Plaza in Quezon City. Once there, Chu asked Nardo if the NLRC
Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the negative and simply told
Chu to wait. Nardo assured that the money was still with Atty. Guico who would return it
should the NLRC Commissioner not accept it.
On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC. Chu confronted
Atty. Guico, who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Atty. Guico caused the preparation and
filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal
counsel on May 25, 2009.
The IBP Commissioner, after Chu filed his complaint, found that Atty. Guico had violated
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and
receiving P580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view
of his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt for the
legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the IBP Commissioner Villanueva, but
modified the recommended penalty of disbarment to three years suspension.

Issue: What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?

SC: Yes.
Chu credibly insisted that the draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper
emanating from Atty. Guico’s office, inferring that Atty. Guico commonly printed
documents on used paper in his law office. Despite denying being the source of the draft
decision presented by Chu, Atty. Guico’s participation in the generation of the draft decision
was undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chu’s insistence by conceding that
the used paper had originated from his office, claiming only that used paper was just
"scattered around his office." In that context, Atty. Guico’s attempt to downplay the
sourcing of used paper from his office was futile because he did not expressly belie the
forthright statement of Chu. All that Atty. Guico stated by way of deflecting the imputation
was that the used paper containing the draft decision could have been easily taken from his
office by Chu’s witnesses in a criminal case that he had handled for Chu, pointing out that
everything in his office, except the filing cabinets and his desk, was "open to the public xxx
and just anybody has access to everything found therein." In the Court's view, therefore,
Atty. Guico made the implied admission because he was fully aware that the used paper had
unquestionably come from his office.
Guico committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving P580,000.00
from Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the
allegations in his defense, but such denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony of
Chu. We cannot but conclude that the production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was
intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable
result in the labor case.
The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to
retain membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should
not render any service or give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very
laws that he was bound to uphold and obey, for he or she was always bound as an attorney
to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession.
Verily, he or she must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession. Any lawyer found to
violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal
profession.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the
large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus
violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually
using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon
appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit,
and were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to
delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer
as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the
law.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave
misconduct is "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment."28 There is no question that any gross
misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to
manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension
or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission
of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.

Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the
practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be
disbarred, for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal
profession.
Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be ordered to
return the amount of P580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That amount was exacted by Atty.
Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the latter’s interest as the client. Although the
purpose for the amount was unlawful, it would be unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully
account for and to return the money to Chu. It did not matter that this proceeding is
administrative in character.
Hence, Atty. Guico was found guilty of the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01
and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was DISBARRED from
membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His name was ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.
Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility
Ponente: Martin S. VILLARAMA, JR.

A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015

GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN

Facts: In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer
and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of
Companies. He resigned from his post and transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center as the
Vice President for Finance. On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of
Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS
for LCI for “updating purposes”. The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President. Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions
and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC. On
July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of
the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of
LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he
elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any
notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He has
never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI. Atty. Limpin admits that
she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and
President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements.
It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary
dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good
faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD
meeting held on March 3, 2008. The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution
adopted in toto the CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration but was denied in
the March 21, 2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Issue: Whether Atty. Limpin is guilty as charged.

SC: Yes.
The Court adopted the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has
violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR. Members of the bar are reminded
that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as
loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating
the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and
has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.tualLawlib
 Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section
27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, the Court agreed
with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and
that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the
company. It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder
of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements
contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment
is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no
submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. In
filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which
did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Also, in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los
Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules
enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty.
Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
The Court held respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon
1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she was
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
 Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility
Ponente: Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen

Reynaldo G. Ramirez v. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang - Margallo, A.C. No. 10537, February 3,
2015

Facts: Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) engaged Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty.

Margallo) services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title. He alleged that Atty.
Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she be given 30% of the land
subject of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees. It was also agreed upon that Ramirez
would pay Atty. Margallo P1, 000.00 per court appearance.

The RTC ruled against Ramirez. Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment.
She committed to file the Appeal before the CA. The Appeal was perfected and the records
were sent to the CA. Ramirez was directed to file his Appellant’s Brief and so he notified his
counsel who likewise agreed to prepare one. Ramirez then kept on asking his counsel for
any updates on the appeal. Atty. Margallo afterwards informed Ramirez that his Appeal had
been denied. She told him that the CA’s denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his
filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis of his claim. Atty. Margallo also
informed him that they could no longer appeal to the SC since the Decision of the CA had
been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.
Ramirez went to the CA. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April
13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the
reglementary period.

Ramirez then filed a complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17
and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By way of
defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for
travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed
Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the case. She denied
ever having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value
of the land subject of the controversy.

The dispute was set for mandatory conference before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Commission. The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a
penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Upon MR of Ramirez, the recommended
penalty was increased to suspension from practice of law for two (2) years. Atty. Margallo
then filed a Petition for Review and alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension
was too severe considering that she had been very careful and vigilant in defending the
cause of her client. She also averred that this was the first time a Complaint was filed
against her.
Issue: Should the petition be granted?

SC: No.

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to
Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo

and her client was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost
complainant Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal
cause was orphaned not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because
a person privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite
diligence. Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the
Appeal is a poor excuse. There was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with
her client. This is an admission that she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of
an assumption. Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect
complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member
of the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year suspension is too severe

considering that it is her first infraction cannot be sustained. Atty. Margallo’s neglect
resulted in her client having no further recourse in court to protect his legal interests. This
lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her alleged
competence as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that we communicate that lawyers
must actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be no more room for an
inertia of mediocrity.
 Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility; proper penalty
Ponente: Justice Estela M. Perlas - Bernabe

Spouses Henry A. Concepcion and Blesilda S. Concepcion v. Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa, A.C.
No. 10681, February 3, 2015

Facts: Atty. Elmer A. Dela Rosa served as the retained lawyer and counsel of spouses Henry
A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda) from 1997 until August 2008. As
such, he handled many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among
others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said
business, however, failed to materialize. Aware of the fact that his clients had money intact
from their failed business venture, Atty. Dela Rosa called Henry to borrow the amount of
P2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with interest, 5 days thereafter. The spouses
agreed to lend him the amount and so issued 3 checks in his name. However, Atty. Dela
Rosa failed to make good his promise. Despite repeated demand from the spouses and even
from their new lawyer, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, Atty. dela Rosa still did not pay the
agreed amount. He even claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault, one of his other clients,
was the real debtor.

The spouses then brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa but
still to no avail. Hence, they filed a letter-complaint before the IBP – CBD charging Atty. Dela
Rosa with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers from borrowing
money from clients unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice.

Upon recommendation of the Investigating Officer, Atty. dela Rosa was found guilty
of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money
from his clients unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or
by independent advice; (b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which
provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and properties of his client that may
come into his possession. Atty. Dela Rosa’s actions degraded the integrity of the legal
profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. his failure to
appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD.

The IC then recommended that Atty. Dela Rosa be disbarred and that he be ordered
to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest. The IBP Board of
Governors approved the IC report but reduced the penalty against the respondent to
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered the return of the P2,500,000.00
to the complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.

Issue: W/N Atty. Dela Rosa should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR?

SC: Yes.
 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his
client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes,
this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. Atty. Dela Rosa borrowed money from
spouses Concepcion who were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on
the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in Atty. Dela Rosa,
spouses Concepcion relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus
interest within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his
obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day. Accordingly, there is no
quibble that Atty. Dela Rosa violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.

In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay
the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in
so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should
be equally held administratively liable on this score.

Considering the amount involved and atty. Dela Rosa’s refusal to pay his debt, the SC
deems it apt to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the IBP's
recommendation to suspend him indefinitely. The SC ruled that its decision should not
involve Atty. Dela Rosa’s civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction
separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. Hence, the
IBP's recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this
administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.
Topic: Disbarment by reason of conviction for the crime of homicide which involves moral
turpitude.
Ponente: Per Curiam

Garcia v. Atty. Sesbreño, A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 03, 2015

Facts: On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the
Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in
1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his
profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in 1992, Virginia filed a petition for the
annulment of their marriage, which was eventually granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros
Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years
old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned
from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed
a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal
Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that
homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to
continue his practice of law.

A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint
for disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD . In his answer to the complaint,
Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase “with the inherent
accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the
accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the
sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude.
Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and
desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

Issue: whether or not the conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

SC: Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty
for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is
an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his
fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was
discussed by this Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:
 This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be ascertained whether
moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime asmalum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral
turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It
follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the
meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases
are reached.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full
civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In
that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an absolute and unconditional pardon” which
restored his “full civil and political rights,” a circumstance not present in these cases. Here,
the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the
President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive clemency merely “commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty
imposed on Sesbreño. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only
partially extinguished criminal liability.
 Topic: Suspension of a lawyer for falsification of documents
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe

Spouses Umaguing v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015

Facts: As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK
Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because
of this, complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera.
On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee
of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the
amount of P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than
enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only
took action when the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5Atty. De Vera then rushed
the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two
(2) of these attachments are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica
(Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At
the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they
were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed
AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin
or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names. The signing over of
Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-
Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty.
DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and
competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants
asked the former to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in
excessive fees he collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the
case. In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.

In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged
against him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents
for election protest based on the statements of his clients. Atty. De Vera then explained
that the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise
stated that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the
corresponding criminal offense.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. De Vera will be held administratively liable

SC: The SC ruled on the affirmative.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every
lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These
expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of
every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s
Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of
the Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God

Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document
before a court.
 Topic: Disqualification from being commission as a Notary Public
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe

Salita v. Atty. Salve, A.C. No. 8101, February 04, 2015

Facts: On December 14, 2002, Salita – the registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Tagum City (subject property)–applied for a loan from one Jocelyn Rodriguez (Rodriguez) in
the amount of P50,000.00 and, in such regard, signed blank documents, including an
“incomplete” Promissory Note . Subsequently, here structured the aforesaid loan and
further signed several documents prepared by the latter, including two (2) Real Estate
Mortgage Agreements dated November 9, 2005 and November 18, 2005. On November 15,
2006, Salita was able to pay his loan in full. Notwithstanding such full payment, Rodriguez,
on September 17, 2007, instituted an ejectment complaint against Salita presenting in
furtherance of his cause the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale and the two (2) REM
instruments signed by the latter. Upon checking the said documents, Salita discovered that
the Deed of Absolute Sale had already been notarized by Atty. Salve and his Community Tax
Certificate Numbers were allegedly falsified.

Aggrieved, Salita filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against
Rodriguez and Atty. Salve. Salita likewise filed the instant administrative case against Atty.
Salve. In his defense, Atty. Salve vehemently denied that he falsified the Deed of Absolute
Sale.
In a Report and Recommendation dated January 4, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner dismissed Salita’s complaint for lack of merit.

In a Resolution dated December 29, 2012 (December 29, 2012 Resolution), the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation dismissing the case for lack of merit.

On reconsideration, however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution dated

March 8, 2014 (March 8, 2014 Resolution) setting aside its December 29, 2012 Resolution
and accordingly, recommended the suspension of Atty. Salve’s notarial commission for a
period of three (3) months. It, however, failed to state the reasons for imposing the
suspension.

Issue: Whether or not Salve should be held administratively liable.

SC: The SC ruled in the affirmative.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants
cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal
knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should
appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same. The function of a notary
public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. By affixing his
notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private
document into a public document. In doing so, Atty. Salve, as borne from the records of this
case, effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all the parties therein personally
appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known to him; (c) they were the same
persons who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution
of the instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily
and freely executed the same.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Reynaldo T. Salve is found GUILTY of gross negligence

in his conduct as a notary public. His notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED
and he isDISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years.
 Topic: Misconduct/Judicial Ethics
Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Jill M. Tormis v. Judge Meinrado P. Paredes , A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No.
11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015

Facts: In her affidavit/complaint dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with
grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the
first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She
averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her
mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams
in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her
position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once
but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his
discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a
“court-noted addict.” She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates
who was present, Rhoda L. Litang(Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother.
To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and
transfer to another law school in Tacloban City. He also disclosed that in the case entitled
“Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis” (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from
the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the
temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending
before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein
and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that
committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a
cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary release
of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,” docketed
as Criminal Case No. 148434-R, then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio
case). Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his
actuations.

Judge Paredes however denied the accussations of Jill in his comment and stated
that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated and
as a result recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis thus, Judge Tormis is now using Jill
to get back at him. He also averred that although he discussed in his class the case of
Lachica v. Tormis, he never discussed the involvement of Judge Tormis in the marriage
scams nor her sanctions and that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and
credibility. Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he
personally accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita
Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in
accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive
judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays
and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure. As
Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a
Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of
Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official
receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash
bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative
cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it
was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.

Issue: Whether Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned because of his actuations.

SC: The Supreme Court adopted the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except
the penalty of reprimand as being imposed as reprimand. Judge Paredes is indeed guilty of
conduct unbecoming a Judge when he uses of intemperate language during class
discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as
corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and
inexcusable.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied
by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of
expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges,
like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not
without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on
judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of expression,
Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He
should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should
have been more circumspect in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with
greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of
this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held
administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class
discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a
judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private
activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:
 CANON 2: INTEGRITY: Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the
court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be
emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy
of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public
scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and
exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance
of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.

As regards to Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct when
he personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes
justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in
Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on
petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays,
and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the
executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a
temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said
procedure, he cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail
bond in the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17
(a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail
bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or
the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges
are authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental
to the performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant
case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an
Executive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail.
Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the
judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive
judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes
was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on
Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays. Relative to the
matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity
reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up
by sufficient evidence.

The Supreme Court ruled that, considering that this is the first offense of judge
Paredes the penalty to be imposed should be admonition and not reprimand.
 Topic: Notarization Law; Presence of the Parties before the Notary Public; Obedience of
Lawyers; Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ponente: Leonenj, J.

Anudon v. Cefra, A.C. No. 5482, 10 February 2015

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be
present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be
acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty.

Facts: Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita) are brother- and
sister-in-law. Complainants and Jimmy’s brothers and sister co-own a 4,446-square-meter
parcel of land located in Sison, Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
69244. Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and
Juanita. He was admitted to the bar in 1996. He practices law and provides services as
notary public in the Municipality of Sison, Pangasinan.

On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over a land
covered by TCT No. 69244. The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon
(Alfonso), Benita Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared
as vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the vendee.

Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified. They alleged
that they did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty.
Cefra. The National Bureau of Investigation’s Questioned Documents Division certified that
Jimmy and Juanita’s signatures were forged. This is contrary to Atty. Cefra’s
acknowledgment over the document, which states:

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Municipality of Sison, personally appeared
JOHNNY ANUDON, ALFONSO ANUDON, BENITA ESGUERRA, JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA
ANUDON, who exhibited to me their respective Community Tax Certificates as above-
indicated, known to me and known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
Deed of Absolute Sale and acknowledged to me that the same is their free act and voluntary
deed.

This instrument, which refers to a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of lot, consists
of two pages and have been signed by the parties and the respective witnesses on each and
every page thereof.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1998.

(Sgd.)
ARTURO B. CEFRA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1999
PTR NO. 2461164; 1-7-98

SISON, PANGASINAN

In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was
physically impossible for their brothers and sister, Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Johnny and Benita were in the United States on the day the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite.

Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
with Jimmy and Juanita as witnesses, filed a case of falsification of public document against
Atty. Cefra and Paran.

Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint with this
court on August 6, 2001 questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra’s conduct as lawyer and
notary public.

In the Resolution dated September 19, 2001, this court required Atty. Cefra to
comment on the administrative complaint. Atty. Cefra filed multiple Motions for Extension
of Time, which this court granted. Despite the allowance for extension of time, Atty. Cefra
did not comply with this court’s order to file a Comment. This court fined Atty. Cefra in the
Resolutions dated March 12, 2003 and November 17, 2003. In both Resolutions, this court
directed Atty. Cefra to file his Comment.

Atty. Cefra’s continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court to order his
arrest and commitment. Thus, the National Bureau of Investigation’s agents arrested Atty.
Cefra at his residence on January 14, 2007.

Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment on January 15, 2008. In his defense, Atty.
Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the sale of the property covered by TCT
No. 69244. He narrated that on July 10, 1998, Juanita and Jimmy’s wife Helen Anudon went
to his residence to consult him on how they could sell the land covered by TCT No. 69244 to
Paran. Atty. Cefra claimed that he assisted in the preparation of the documents for the sale,
which included the deed of sale and the acknowledgment receipts for payment. On August
13, 1998, Paran’s relatives, Viola Carantes and Lita Paran, brought the Deed of Absolute Sale
to the residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnny’s son, Loejan Anudon (Loejan) to have the
document signed.23 Viola Carantes and Lita Paran informed Atty. Cefra that they witnessed
Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign the document. Loejan affixed the signatures for his father,
Johnny, and his uncle and aunt, Alfonso and Benita.

Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny, Alfonso,
and Benita "with the full knowledge and permission of the three." He allowed this on the
basis of his belief that this was justified since Loejan needed the proceeds of the sale for the
amputation of his mother’s leg. It clearly appeared that Loejan forged the three (3)
signatures. Loejan did not have formal authorization to sign on behalf of his father, uncle,
and aunt.

According to Atty. Cefra, he "notarized the questioned document in good faith,

trusting in complainants’ words and pronouncements; with the only purpose of helping
them out legally and financially."

After receiving Atty. Cefra’s Comment, this court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.

During the investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Juanita appeared
without any counsel and manifested her intention to solicit the services of the Public
Attorney’s Office. She also informed the Investigating Commissioner that her co-
complainant, Jimmy, had already passed away. The mandatory conference was held on
February 20, 2009. On the same day, the Investigating Commissioner issued an Order
terminating the mandatory conference and requiring the parties to submit their respective
Position Papers.

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefra’s conduct in notarizing the
Deed of Absolute Sale violated the Notarial Law. In addition, Atty. Cefra violated Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
Hence, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty. Cefra’s
notarial commission and the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from reappointment as notary
public for two (2) years. The Investigating Commissioner also recommended the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-24937 dated May 14, 2011, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner. However, they recommended that the penalty imposed on
Atty. Cefra be modifed: Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year and immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission and Perpetual
Disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public.

Atty. Cefra filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to temper the recommended penalty against him. In Resolution No. XXI-2014-
9342 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
proposed to lower its original penalty against Atty. Cefra: Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, his notarial practice, if presently
existing, immediately REVOKED and his notarial practice SUSPENDED for two (2) years.

On September 9, 2014, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that both parties no
longer filed a Petition for Review of Resolution No. XXI-2014-93.
Issue: Whether Atty. Cefra should be given a penalty.

SC: Yes.
We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility in notarizing a document without requiring the presence of the affiants.

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a

document. As this court previously explained:

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are
not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the
courts and administrative offices generally.

The earliest law on notarization is Act No. 2103. This law refers specifically to the
acknowledgment and authentication of instruments and documents. Section 1(a) of this law
states that an acknowledgment "shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in
the place where the act is done."

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the
affiant to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an

individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete
instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document
was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document,
declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and
deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign
in that capacity.

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document—
 (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the
document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary
public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the law.

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document
express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial
practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures
that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it. This
cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public
acknowledging the document.

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is
true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for
notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s
representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document.
Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the
vendee.

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in
the document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of
forgery became real.

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also
guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "a
lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a
Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to
comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order
until he was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his
Comment on January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s
actions show utter disrespect for legal processes.

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts.”

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, "wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive
issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in2008. Clearly,
his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this
infraction.

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified
to take into account all his acts of misconduct.
 Topic: Gross ignorance of the law
Ponente: Justice Marvic M.V.F Leonen

Chua Keng Sin v. Judge Job M. Mangente, Metropolitan Trial Court, Brance 54, Navotas
City, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015

Facts: Chua Keng Sin and his brother Victorio Chua separately filed their complaints for
slight physical injuries against each other before the Lupong Tagapamahaya. Chua Keng Sin
filed his Complaint earlier than Victorio. When Victorio learned that his Complaint would be
considered as a counterclaim, he decided not to attend the scheduled hearings set by the
Lupon. Instead, Victorio filed a Complaint for attempted murder against his brother before
the Office of the City Prosecutor. Due to Victorio’s failure to appear before a Lupon, Chua
Keng Sin was able to file a Complaint for slight physical injuries with the Office of the City
Prosecutor as well. The Lupon also issued a Certification to Bar Action/Counterclaim . . .
against Victorio due to his failure or refusal to appear in the hearing. The two claims were
jointly heard and it was recommended that both brothers be charged with slight physical
injuries. The separate cases filed were then raffled to separate branches of the MTC.

The case against Chua Keng Sin was raffled to Branch 54 of the MTC, presided by
Judge Mangente. Chua Keng Sin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Victorio’s
Complaint was filed in court without the required certification to file action. Furthermore,
the Lupon had issued a certification to bar action/counterclaim against Victorio. The MTD
was denied on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading . . . under the Rule on Summary
Procedure. An MR of the Order was filed. After almost two (2) years, Judge Mangente
denied the MR on the ground that the Lupon had issued a certificate to file action. In the
meantime, Chua Keng Sin filed a Motion for determination of probable cause assailing the
Resolution of the reviewing prosecutor for upgrading the offense of slight physical injuries
as charged with to attempted homicide. The same Motion was denied by Judge Mangente
even before the expiration of the period for Chua Keng Sin to file his Reply.

Chua Keng Sin then filed a Complaint against Judge Mangente for gross ignorance of
the law and gross inefficiency relative to a criminal case for slight physical injuries. Chua
Keng Sin argued that Judge Mangente’s refusal to grant his MTD was violative of Section
412 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which prohibits the filing or institution of a
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
Lupon directly in court of any other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before the Lupon, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon. Contrary to Judge Mangente’s
interpretation, the certification to file action issued by the Lupon was in favor of Chua Keng
Sin, not his brother Victorio. The certification did not authorize Victorio to pursue his own
action. Chua Keng Sin further argued that Judge Mangente’s denial of his MTD was also
violative of "Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which provides
for the dismissal of cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement. Complainant also averred that the delay in
resolving the Motion was in violation of Rule 37, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It
was decided two (2) years after the prosecution filed its Comment, instead of resolving it
within 30 days from the time it was submitted for resolution.

As to the denial of his Motion to determine probable cause, Chua Keng Sin averred
that Judge Mangente violated his right to due process when the Motion was resolved
before the expiration of the period given to him to file his Reply.

Issue: Is Judge Mangente guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

SC: Yes. Judge Mangente is suspended from service for six months with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.
"Anything less is gross ignorance of the law." There is gross ignorance of the law when an
error committed by the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." It may also be
committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence
because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted).

Judge Mangente was careless in disposing the Motions filed by Chua Keng Sin, in a
criminal case no less. The OCA correctly underscores that his experience as a public
attorney and prosecutor should have ingrained in him well-settled doctrines and basic
tenets of law. He cannot be relieved from the consequences of his actions simply because
he was newly appointed and his case load was heavy. These circumstances are not unique
to him. His careless disposition of the motions is a reflection of his competency as a judge in
discharging his official duties.

Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence to dispense cases

callously and in utter disregard of procedural rules. Whether the resort to shortcuts is borne
out of ignorance or convenience is immaterial. Judges took an oath to dispense their duties
with competence and integrity; to fall short would be a disservice not only to the entire
judicial system, but more importantly, to the public. Respondent's failure must not be
brushed aside. We find the imposition of suspension for six (6) months to be justified.
Topic: Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10, Section 46
(Serious dishonesty); Career Service Professional Eligibility
Ponente: Per Curiam

Civil Service Commission, as represented by Director IV Maria Leticia G. Reyna v. Jovilyn B.

Dawang, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court, Talugtog, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-
15-3289, February 17, 2015

Facts: Respondent Jovilyn B. Dawang is a Court Stenographer 1 in the Municipal Trial Court
of Talugtog, Nueva Ecija. Dawang had been working as a stenographer for various courts in
a temporary capacity since 1993, until she qualified as a permanent employee upon
obtaining her Certificate for Career Service Professional Eligibility. In the Letter dated June
21, 2011, the Civil Service Commission informed the Office of the Court Administrator that it
was charging Dawang with serious dishonesty. According to the Civil Service Commission,
Dawang conspired with another individual during the Career Service Professional
Examination held on August 18, 1996. Dawang, then Jovilyn S. Borillo, asked an
impersonator to take the examination in her stead. The impersonator placed her own 2x2
photograph on the picture-seat plan of the examination under the name of Jovilyn S.
Borillo. The complete personal circumstances and alleged signature of Dawang were affixed
on the documents for the exam. "The impersonator passed the examination and
consequently, a Certificate for Career Service Professional Eligibility was issued in the name
of Dawang." Dawang filed a modified Personal Data Sheet on October 11, 1996. In its Item
No. 18, she included the qualification "Career Service Professional" with a rating of 84.86%.
On May 29, 2007, the Examination, Recruitment, and Placement Office required Dawang to
show cause "why she should not be administratively charged for having employed fraud in
acquiring her Career Service Professional Eligibility.”
Dawang did not comply with the Examination, Recruitment, and Placement Office's Show
Cause Order. On May 17, 2011, the Civil Service Commission found a prima facie case
against Dawang, and she was formally charged with two (2) counts of serious dishonesty.

Issue: Whether Dawang is guilty of serious dishonesty.

Ruling: Yes.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Office of the Court Administrator's Report. Dawang's
acts constituted serious dishonesty. Upon examination of Dawang's photograph on the
picture-seat plan of the August 18, 1996 Career Service Professional Examination and her
photographs on her Personal Data Sheets, the Court shared the Civil Service Commission
and the Office of the Court Administrator's conclusion that the individual whose picture
appears on the picture-seat plan is not Dawang. The differences are apparent even to an
ordinary person.

Allowing another person to take the examination on one's behalf is an act of dishonesty.
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." The Court further held that
even if it will believe Dawang's narrative, her acts after learning she apparently passed the
exam are marred with serious dishonesty. When she received the letter from the Civil
Service Commission and the Certificate of Eligibility without her taking an actual
examination, her first instinct was to confirm her eligibility. She did not question how she
could have passed without physically taking the examination.

Despite her knowledge that the examination was on August 18, 1996, nothing in Dawang's
narrative shows that she went to the Civil Service Commission on such date. An honest
individual would have inquired why she did not receive through post the notice informing
her to take the examination. Only a dishonest individual would accept the favorable results
of an examination she did not take. Dawang's Personal Data Sheet filed on October 11, 1996
documented her dishonesty. She wrote that her Civil Service Eligibility included "Career
Service Professional." On the field for date, she wrote "August 18, 1996." She also noted
that her rating was "84.86%" and that the place of examination was "Juan Sumulong High
Sch. M.M." She had the courage to write all these details, yet she admitted in her sworn
statement that she did not take the examination on August 18, 1996. If she did not take the
examination on the said date at the said venue, then it is impossible for her to score in the
examination. Yet, in her Personal Data Sheet, she declared under oath that she did.

Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10, Section 46,
serious dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service. In Civil
Service Commission v. Dasco, this court dismissed a court stenographer who
misrepresented that she took the Career Service Professional Examination. The facts
in Dasco are identical with the facts of this case. The difference is that respondent
in Dasco stated that the disparity between her appearance on the picture-seat plan and her
actual appearance was because the latter was affected by stress and fatigue, and that the
signatures were different because she was pasmado when she signed one of the documents.

For her dishonesty, Dawang does not deserve to be a stenographer in the judiciary. She
should be dismissed from service.
 Topic: Violation of Civil Service Rules
Ponente: Per Curiam

Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Reynaldo C. Alcantara, Utility Worker I, Br. 70, and
Joseph c. Jacinto, Electrician, Hall of Justice, both of the Regional Trial Court, Burgos,
Pangasinan, A.M. No. P-15-3296, February 17, 2015

Facts: This case stemmed from an undated Letter-Complaint, addressed to Executive Judge
Elpidio N. Abella, Regional Trial Court, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, charging respondents
Reynaldo C. Alcantara and Joseph C. Jacinto with the commission of several illegal activities
in violation of Civil Service Rules. Alcantara worked as Utility Worker I, Branch 70, Regional
Trial Court, Burgos, Pangasinan, whereas Jacinto was an electrician at the Hall of Justice in
the same city.

In the Report dated July 17, 2013, Executive Judge Abella recommended that Alcantara and
Jacinto be immediately dismissed from service. He found that as early as 2009, Alcantara
and Jacinto received and encashed checks of their co-workers without consent. Executive
Judge Abella found that Alcantara's and Jacinto's actions constituted grave misconduct and
recommended their dismissal from service.

Issue: Whether respondents are guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty.

SC: Yes.

The Supreme Court adopted the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court
Administrator.

Dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of, integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Grave
misconduct is committed when there has been '"a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer.' The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be
established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct."

In Rojas, Jr. v. Mina, respondent was found guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty for
stealing and encashing Special Allowance for Judges and Justices checks payable to several
trial court judges without their consent. Similarly, in Re: Loss of Extraordinary Allowance
Check No. 11-6739 of Judge Eduardo Jovellanos, respondent Rosario Santos was held
responsible for stealing, encashing, and converting for her personal use the amount covered
by the check issued to Judge Eduardo U. Jovellanos.
In this case, Alcantara and Jacinto admitted to taking and encashing checks of their co-
workers without permission. There is no doubt that their acts of repeatedly stealing the
checks and forging the signatures of their co-workers constitute grave misconduct and
dishonesty. Their alleged remorse for what they have done does not erase the transgression
they committed. "This Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine
its efforts toward an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image
in the eyes of the public." Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, Rule 10, Section 46, serious dishonesty and grave misconduct are punishable by
dismissal from service even if for the first offense. This court held that “we have not
hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty. This Court had never and will never tolerate nor
condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish,
or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.
Topic: Violation of administrative code; Habitual absenteeism is considered prejudicial to
the best interest of the public service
Ponente: Per Curiam

Office of the Court Administrator v. Tyke J. Sarceno, A.M. No. P-11-2930, February 17,
2015

Facts: As early as on December 4, 2009, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended the bringing of an administrative complaint for habitual absenteeism against
respondent Tyke J. Sarceno, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, in Manila. The
recommendation was based on a finding that Sarceno had incurred 92 days of unauthorized
absences in the months of June 2009 to September 2009, inclusive.

In his comment, Sarceno explained that he had been experiencing abdominal pains, high
fever, and influenza in the latter part of May 2009; that when the abdominal pain had
become unbearable in the following month, he had applied for sick leave; that he did not
seek medical assistance but only resorted to self-medication, believing that he was only
experiencing a common illness; that due to this, he could not produce a medical certificate
to support his application for sick leave; that in July 2009, he had applied for vacation and
sick leaves alternately to cover his absences; that he had then sought medical assistance
upon finding out that he was also suffering gonorrhea; that he had returned to work on
August 14, 2009 to file the necessary leave application; that he had applied for vacation
leave to cover the whole month of September 2009 because the nature of his illness had
required an extended time for recovery; that he had harbored neither malicious intent nor
bad faith in incurring his absences; that he entreated that the medical certificate attached
to his comment be accepted, confessing that he had belatedly filed it due to
“embarrassment and threat of ridicule” brought about by his sickness; and that he was
committing himself to “correct his shortcomings and serve with enthusiasm and
excellence.”

Even so, Sarceno continued to incur unexplained absences. His continuing absenteeism was
discovered by Atty. Caridad A. Pabello, Chief, Administrative Services of the OCA, who had
meanwhile sent a telegram requesting Presiding Judge Germano Francisco D. Legaspi of
Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court in Manila to direct Sarceno to submit his bundy cards
for July 2010 and August 2010 lest the OCA would recommend that Sarceno’s salary be
withheld; Accordingly, Judge Legaspi recommended that Sarceno be dropped from the rolls,
or, in the alternative, that appropriate administrative charges be brought against him for
habitual absenteeism. On February 22, 2012, the Court promulgated its resolution dropping
Sarceno’s name from the rolls, and declaring his position as Clerk III of Branch 31 of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila as vacant.
Issue: whether the court is correct in its action.

SC: Yes
Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 provides that an employee in the Civil Service shall be
considered habitually absent if he or she incurs “unauthorized absences exceeding the
allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the law for at least three (3) months in a
semester or at least three (3) consecutive months during the year.”

The OCA found that Sarceno had incurred absences totaling 92 days spread in the months
of June, July, August, and September, all in 2009. Such absenteeism already merited the
imposition of the penalty for habitual absenteeism. Still, Judge Legaspi reported that as of
the writing of his letter to Atty. Bahia on September 8, 2010, Sarceno had incurred a total of
37 absences in 2010, 34 of which were in the months of July, August and September, all in
2010. The OCA observed that as of the writing of its AMFA on December 14, 2010, Sarceno
had remained absent without official leave. The frequency and the number of Sarceno’s
absences rendered him guilty of habitual absenteeism, and indicated that he had thereby
exceeded the allowable days of monthly leave credits.

Conduct is prejudicial to the public service if it violates the norm of public accountability
and diminishes – or tends to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary. By the habituality
and frequency of his unauthorized absences, Sarceno did not live up to the degree of
accountability, efficiency, and integrity that the Judiciary has required of its officials and
employees. His position as Clerk III was essential and indispensable to the Judiciary’s
primary mandate of the proper administration of justice. This mandate dictated that he as a
court employee should devote his office hours strictly to the public service, if only to repay
and serve the people whose taxes were used to maintain the Judiciary. His habitual
absenteeism severely compromised the integrity and image that the Judiciary sought to
preserve, and thus violated this mandate.
 Topic: violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Conflict of interest
Ponente: Leonen, J.:

Roberto Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583, February 18, 2015

Facts: In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-
Complaint against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was
falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in
fact, she died in 1990.

Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla. Paragraph 6 of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit
the estate of said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir
entitled to her estate.

Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano
Turla, filed a Complaint for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
temporary restraining order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.

The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla,
which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos
drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended
that Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months. It found that Bernardino failed to
prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was falsified and used
it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to
prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s estate.

In the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline.

Issues: Whether Atty. Santos violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months
from the practice of law is proper.

SC: Yes.
The court accepted and adopted the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolution but modified the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law
from three (3) months to one (1) year.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a
lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received from
their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully
inform their counsels of the facts of their case.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, this court explained what conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would
necessarily refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed
to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As
stated in the Report of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Likewise, the court accepted and adopted the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that
respondent violated Canon 10, Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states:

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
The respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of
Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to
the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of
the bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in
failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the
Lawyer’s Oath but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The court noted that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10,
2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that
has the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.

Parenthetically, it is the Supreme Court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to
discipline lawyers. Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can
only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. Its
recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section
1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person." However,
this authority is only to assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine
factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring
lawyer.

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of the
court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This disciplinary authority is
granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court. The Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this
court.
Topic: Affixing signature at the jurat portion of the administrative complaint prepared by
her father
Ponente: Sereno, CJ.

Benito B. Nate v. Judge Lelu P. Contreras, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Virac,
Catanduanes, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406, February 18, 2015

Facts: This administrative case concerns allegations that respondent Judge Lelu P.
Contreras committed three counts of grave misconduct while she was still holding the
position Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court in Iriga City, Camarines Sur (RTC-Iriga
City). According to the complaint, respondent allegedly notarized an administrative
complaint; certified a document (a labor complaint) as a true copy of the original; and
appeared as counsel for her father in a hearing before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Clerks of court are indeed authorized to act as ex officio notaries public under the
Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court. On
the other hand, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees prohibit public officials and employees from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. The 2004 Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice were not yet in force when respondent committed the purported offenses.

Issues: Whether Contreras is administratively liable for the following acts:

1. Affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the administrative complaint
prepared by her father
2. Authenticating documents as genuine copies of the original labor complaint
3. Appearing as counsel before the IBP on behalf of her father

SC:
1. YES. Respondent’s act of affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the
administrative complaint prepared by her father had no direct relation to her work
as the then clerk of court of RTC–Iriga City. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
the proceedings involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys shall be
conducted before the IBP. This means that clerks of court are not among the touch
points in the regular procedure pertaining to complaints against an attorney. Neither
may a pleading in a case involving lawyers be filed with the RTC.
2. YES. We apply the same legal reasoning to the second act of respondent being
complained about; that is, her certification of a copy of her sister-in-law’s labor
complaint.1âwphi1 Respondent herself admits that the document was filed before
the National Labor Relations Commission in Naga City, not the RTC–Iriga City. Thus,
in the regular course of her duties, she would not have come across, encountered,
or been in custody of the document. While we agree with her that clerks of court are
allowed to perform the notarial act of copy certification, this act must still be
connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties – meaning to say, it
 must be done in connection with public documents and records that are, by virtue of
their position, in their custody.
3. We recognize that the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees does allow for limited exceptions. Section 7(b) thereof in relation to Rule
X, Section 1(c) of its implementing rules, provides that public officials and employees
are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution, law, or regulation; and under the condition that their
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.
In the instant case Respondent has satisfactorily proved that she was granted
authority by this Court to "represent her father in Administrative Case No. 6089
provided that she files the corresponding leaves of absence on the scheduled dates
of hearing of the case and that she will not use official time in preparing for the
case."
 Topic: Lawyer-client relationship
Ponente: Reyes, J.

Michael Ruby vs. Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot, A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015

Facts: The complainant engaged the services of the respondents. On September 15, 2009,
complainant gave Atty. Espejo the amount of P50,000.00 as payment for filing fee. However
the actual filing fee that was paid by her was only 7,5610 and she failed to account for the
excess amount given despite several demands. Thereafter the complainant alleged that the
respondents failed to update him as to the status of his complaint. He further claimed that
Atty. Bayot had suddenly denied that he was their counsel. Atty. Bayot asserted that it was
Atty. Espejo alone who was the counsel of the complainant and that he was merely a
collaborating counsel. Atty. Bayot further claim that Atty. Espejo, trough complainant's
consent, merely assisted for the sole purpose of drafting a complaint. He pointed out that
he had no part in the retainer agreement that was entered into by the complainant and
Atty. Espejo. He also denied having any knowledge as to the P50,000.00 that was paid to
Atty. Espejo as filing fee. The IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution suspending the
respondents from the practice of law for a period of one year. On march 22, 2014, the
Board of Governors issued a resolution which dismissed the case insofar as Atty. Espejo in
view of her demise.

Issue: Whether Attorney-client relationship exist between Attorney Bayot and complainant

SC: Yes.

The evidence on record including Atty. Bayot's admissions point to the conclusion that a
lawyer-client relationship existed between him and the complainant. Atty. Bayot was the
one who prepared the complaint that was filed with the RTC. He likewise prepared the
motion to serve summons through publication. He likewise appeared as counsel for the
complainant in the hearings of the case before RTC and advise the complainant on the
status of the case. More importantly, Atty. Bayot admitted that he received P8,000.00
which is part of the acceptance fee indicated in the retainer agreement. The foregoing
circumstances clearly established that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty.
Bayot and the complainant. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received
in any matter pertinent to his profession. Further, acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship.
 Topic: Willful neglect of duty and serious misconduct due to graft and corruption and
extortion
Ponente: Per Curiam

Astorga and Repol Law Offices, represented by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares v. Alexander D.
Villanueva, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City, A.M. No. P-09-
2668 February 24, 2015

Facts: This is an administrative Complaint filed by Astorga and Repol Law Offices against
Alexander D. Villanueva, Sheriff IV of Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City for
"willful neglect of duty and serious misconduct in office due to graft and corruption or
extortion with a prayer that a penalty of dismissal . . . or other appropriate sanctions be
meted against him." Astorga and Repol Law Offices represented FGU Insurance Corporation
in a Complaint for damages filed against NEC Cargo Services, Inc. The Complaint was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City and raffled to Branch 66 presided by Judge
Ricardo R. Rosario. On August 23, 2004, Judge Ricardo R. Rosario issued a Decision in favor
of FGU Insurance Corporation. NEC Cargo Services, Inc. and Albert Tamayo, a third-party
defendant-appellant, appealed the Decision before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals denied the Appeal in its Resolutions dated July 20, 2005 and December 20, 2005.
These Resolutions became final and executory. Presiding Judge Joselito C. Villarosa issued
the Order granting Astorga and Repol Law Offices’ Motion to Appoint Special Sheriff. Sheriff
Villanueva was assigned to execute the Decision.

On October 29, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva and Atty. Arnold B. Lugares (Atty. Lugares) started
coordinating with each other for the execution of the Decision. During the meeting, Sheriff
Villanueva allegedly demanded P8,000.00 to execute the Decision.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack
of evidence. It found that Atty. Lugares’ failure to prosecute the case invited suspicion that
the Complaint was not filed with sincerity of purpose, or that a settlement was reached to
cover up his misconduct. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Atty.
Lugares should show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing an
unfounded Complaint against Sheriff Villanueva.

In the Resolution, Supreme Court adopted the recommendations of the Office of the Court
Administrator by dismissing the case and requiring Atty. Lugares to show cause.

Atty. Lugares filed a Compliance with Motion for Reconsideration where he manifested that
he was willing to prosecute the case. He alleged that "he was not furnished . . . a copy of the
Investigation Report of Judge Salvador." He claimed that no amicable settlement was
reached with Sheriff Villanueva and that he had no improper motive in filing this case. He
attached as annexes the photographs of the text messages that Sheriff Villanueva sent him.
In the Resolution dated March 5, 2012, this court recalled the Resolution dated June 22,
2011 dismissing the administrative Complaint for lack of evidence and ordered the case to
be reopened.

Executive Judge Pozon concluded that Sheriff Villanueva did not commit gross neglect of
duty. He stated that Atty. Lugares was not able to provide evidence to substantiate his claim
that Sheriff Villanueva did not perform his duty. On the other hand, Sheriff Villanueva was
able to provide the affidavit of Atty. Escasiñas, Jr., confirming that when Sheriff Villanueva
met with Atty. Lugares, it was to ensure the execution of the Decision.

Issue: Whether respondent Sheriff Alexander D. Villanueva is guilty of misconduct due to

willful neglect of duty and corruption or extortion.

SC: Yes.
Court must reverse the findings of Executive Judge Pozon. Respondent should be subject to
disciplinary sanctions.

A review of the facts is called for when the finding of a lack of administrative liability is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence, but an examination of the record shows
that there is evidence to support the allegations.99Even if respondent is initially exculpated
based on an alleged lack of evidence to support the allegations, this court can still conduct
its own assessment of the evidence on record and impose the corresponding administrative
liability.100
Respondent’s neglect to faithfully execute his duties as Sheriff is supported by
substantial evidence.

In Executive Judge Pozon’s Report and Recommendation, he stated that Atty. Lugares failed
to provide evidence showing that respondent committed the actions alleged in the
Complaint. His exculpation of respondent from liability was primarily based on the fact that
Atty. Lugares was unable to present his outgoing text messages.

Contrary to Executive Judge Pozon’s position, however, Atty. Lugares was able to prove that
respondent committed actions that warrant administrative liability.

In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages were
admitted as evidence and given probative value by this court.104 In those cases, the court
considered the content of the text messages and the identification of the person sending
them as substantial evidence to prove the commission of administrative offenses.

Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he received in his cellular phone. He
attached photographs of the screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages as they
were received. He submitted respondent’s calling card105 that contained the same phone
number seen in the text messages. Through this calling card, he was able to prove that
respondent was the source of the text messages. Respondent denied meeting with Atty.
Lugares, but he never denied sending the text messages to him.
The content of the text messages from respondent and the circumstances within which they
were made constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of administrative liability.
The presentation of text messages that Atty. Lugares sent to respondent is not necessary.
Respondent’s text messages sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual evasion of duty to
implement the Writ of Execution. The contents of the text messages sufficiently prove his
manifest refusal to properly implement the Writ of Execution.

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and must be dismissed from the service.

Having found substantial evidence to prove Atty. Lugares’ allegations, respondent must be
held accountable by this court. He has failed to uphold the high standard of integrity
required by a position in the judiciary. He has violated Canon 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted
benefits, privileges or exemptions for themselves or for others.
SEC. 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or
explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official
actions.

Respondent has been found guilty of soliciting money from litigants in order to execute his
duties as a Sheriff. This deplorable behavior in some court personnel must be stopped.
 Topic: Gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct
Ponente: Per Curiam

Office of the Court Administrator v. Clerk of Court Emmanuela A. Reyes, Municipal Trial
Court, Bani, Pangasinan, A.M. No. P-10-2872, February 24, 2015

Facts: Office of the Court Administrator issued a Memorandum relative to the examination
conducted on Reyes’s books of accounts covering the period of June 15, 2004 until March
31, 2009. It directed Reyes to explain in writing why she should not be held administratively
liable for the delayed remittances of collections of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF),
Fiduciary Fund (FF), Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF), Sheriff’s Trust Fund
(STF), and Mediation Fund (MF) for the years 2004 to 2009. Interests earned on Fiduciary
deposits which were withdrawn from the Fiduciary Fund Account were likewise not
deposited promptly to the proper fund account on the day they were withdrawn. Reyes
reasoned out that since no one called her attention, she had presumed that there was
nothing wrong as long as the court’s collections were intact in her possession. Also, the
Landbank branch in Alaminos City is fourteen (14) kilometers away such that she would only
go to the bank if she needed to withdraw from the court’s Fiduciary Fund Account. As to
the interests on Fiduciary deposits, Reyes did not present any explanation.

The audit team then evaluated said explanation and it found that the delayed remittances
resulted to loss of interests that should have otherwise been earned had the collections
been deposited promptly to their respective fund accounts. Lack of provision for
transportation expenses is a lame excuse for non-remittance of collections, since personal
money spent for a valid undertaking would be subject to reimbursement. Reyes should also
have immediately remitted the aforesaid interests to the proper fund account on the day
they were withdrawn. After a thorough review and evaluation of the case, the OCA
recommended that Reyes be directed to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for the interest that should
have been earned and deposit the same to the SAJF Account. Reyes was likewise sternly
warned that a repetition of her failure to promptly remit the court’s collections to their
respective fund accounts in the future would be dealt with more severely.

For failing to submit the court’s monthly financial reports to the Revenue Section,
Accounting Division, Financial Management Office (FMO), OCA, Reyes’s salaries were
withheld in February 2009. These were, however, subsequently released in November 2010
upon her compliance with the directives of said office.

Thereafter, Reyes was directed to comment to another OCA Memorandum dated April 16,
2012 with regard to the audit team’s examination of her books of accounts for April 1, 2009
to October 31, 2011 and December 2, 2011 to January 6, 2012. Reyes was required to
explain the shortages she incurred amounting to P217,869.40, partial unremitted
collections of P112,175.00, unauthorized withdrawal of P82,755.00 from the Municipal
Treasurer’s Office (MTO) of Bani in May 2005, late issuances of several Official Receipts in
December 2011, and delayed remittances of collections of the JDF, FF, SAJF, General Fund
(GF), STF, and MF for the years 2009 to 2011. She was also directed to deposit the total
amount of P217,869.40 but she was only able to settle P35,110.00, still leaving a deficit of
P182,759.40. As to the unauthorized withdrawal of P82,755.00, Reyes explained that she
withdrew the amount upon instruction of Emmanuel R. Odero, former Sheriff IV of the
Alaminos RTC and Officer-in-Charge, in order for the latter to remit the same to the SC
Account. But when she gave the money to Odero, the official receipt was also left with
him. For the late issuances of receipts, Reyes merely blamed this to the confusion and
harried minds brought about by the holidays. However, she failed to justify the incurred
shortages and delayed remittances of collections.

From the audit report and investigation, the OCA recommended that Reyes be dismissed
from the service for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct, with forfeiture
of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the
government service, including government-owned and controlled corporations. It also
ordered her to deposit any remaining balance of the shortages and penalties within one (1)
month from receipt of the Court’s Resolution, after the money value of her leave credits
shall have been applied to her accountabilities. Further, it imposed a fine of P5,000.00 for
the non-remittance and delayed deposit of court collections, and a penalty of P1,437.28 for
the loss of interest that should have been earned had the collections been immediately
remitted.

Issue: Whether Reyes be dismissed from the service for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty
and grave misconduct, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in the government service, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.

SC: Yes.

The Court affirms the findings and recommendations of the OCA. Reyes should thus be held
administratively liable for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct.

After her salaries were released, Reyes was not only late in her deposits, she had also
ceased remitting her collections beginning July 2011 and resumed her non-submission of
financial reports to the FMO, OCA. If not for the emergency audit of her accounts at the
Bani MTC on January 9, 2012, her continuous abuse of authority as an accountable officer of
the court would have gone unnoticed. Reyes also failed to present any proof that the court
ordered her to withdraw the amount of P82,755.00 from the Bani MTO in May 2005.

The undeposited collections and delayed remittances resulted to loss of interests that
should have accrued had the collections been deposited promptly to their respective fund
accounts. Under Section 3-C of the JDF and SAJF procedural guidelines in Administrative
Circular No. 35-2004, as amended, dated August 20, 2004, the daily remittance of JDF and
SAJF collections is required. In relation to this, Section 4 of OCA Circular No. 50-95 provides
that all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other Fiduciary collections shall be
deposited by the Clerk of Court concerned, within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt
thereof with the Landbank of the Philippines. Indubitably, Reyes violated the trust reposed
upon her as a collecting officer of the judiciary. The Court cannot tolerate non-submission
of financial reports, non-reporting and non-deposit of collections, undue delay in the
deposit of collections, unauthorized withdrawal, and non-explanation of incurred shortages
and undeposited collections. Reyes failed to fully settle her deficit in the court funds
despite the ample time given to her to do so. The request for an extension of time to be
able to come up with the amount needed is merely a delaying tactic to evade full
responsibility for the violation committed.

Said infractions certainly constitute gross negligence, dishonesty, and grave misconduct
which are serious offenses that deserve the penalty of dismissal under Section 52, Rule IV of
the Civil Service Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases. Failure to completely settle her
accountability may likewise give rise to criminal liability.
 Topic: Conflicting interests
Ponente: Perlas- Bernabe, J.

Wilfredo Anglo v. Atty. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, et al., A.C. No. 10567, February 25, 2015

Facts: Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm Valencia Ciocon
Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of which Attys.
Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were
partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty.
Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. On September
18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by
FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael
Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same law
office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this
disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR.

Respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia Ciocon Dabao
Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their association is
not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements." According to
them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of the
entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and
the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive
his own professional fees exclusively. As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with
the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively.
Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They
averred that complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela
and not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case
filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge
of complainant’s labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof. IBP Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of
interest and recommended that they be reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty.
Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010.

The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the
respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently,
there was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having
been retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the
qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation prov
ides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client.

Issue: Whether respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of

the pertinent provisions of the CPR.
SC: Yes.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney
to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those
of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste; the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer
to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's
confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional
employment.
Topic: Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

ANTONINA S. SOSA vs ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA

A.C. No. 8776; MAR 23, 2015

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of P500,000.00 to Atty.
Mendoza at an interest of P25,000.00 to be paid not later than September 25, 2006. They
agreed that a penalty or collection charge of 10% per month shall accrue in case of default.

To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note
and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00.

Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to
pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check. She acceded and deferred
the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendoza’s promise that he would later pay. The
check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it sometime
in October 2006; it was “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” Ms. Sosa then obtained the
services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera, to legally address Atty. Mendoza’s failure to
pay.

On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter to Atty. Mendoza demanding
payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored the
demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and Registry Return
Receipt. Likewise, he did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to
pay.

In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the complaint
for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law for six (6)
months, likewise ordering him to return the amount of the debt with legal interest.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Mendoza is liable not only administratively but also civilly.

RULING:

NO.
 While the Supreme Court agreed with the punishment meted out by the IBP, it
differed with its recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan
plus legal interest.

The case is solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action
for collection of a sum of money. The administrative complaint only requires substantial
evidence to justify a finding of liability, while a civil action requires greater evidentiary
standard of preponderance of evidence.

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the

complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
Topic: Disbarment
Jessie T. Campugan and Robert Torres v. Atty. Federico Tolentino, Jr. et al.;
and
Jessie Campugan and Robert Torres v. Atty. Constantine Caluya, Jr. et al.
A.C. No. 8261 and A.C. No. 8725; March 11, 2015
DECISION: BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Atty. Victorio, Jr. is the counsel of the complainants Campugan and Torres in a civil
action for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546, impleading
defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City. They caused the annotation on the title their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the
notice of lis pendens. Complainants alleged that the property covered by the subject TCT
was inherited by them from their parents, nevertheless, it was unlawfully registered under
the name of defendants. During the pendency of the trial, both parties entered into an
amicable settlement which caused the dismissal of the case. The annotation in the title was
later on cancelled pursuant to letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.,
counsel of defendants. Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an
appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority (LRA).

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their
having paid him for his professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had
abandoned their case. They submitted that the cancellation resulted from the connivance
and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking
advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty.
Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the
new annotations. Hence, they filed a disbarment case against Atty. Tolentino, Jr., Atty.
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Cunanan, Atty. Quilala and Atty. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court
order that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for disbarment should prosper.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court held that it is a well entrenched rule that a lawyer may be
disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test
is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of
the Court. However, it appears in this case that the officers of the Registry of Deeds merely
acted on their ministerial duty in the cancellation of the annotation. In Gabriel v. Register of
Deeds of Rizal, the Court underscores that: x x x [W]hether the document is invalid,
frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court
of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought
to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.”

With respect to the conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, such
was not established by clear and convincing evidence. The records indicated their own
active participation in arriving at the amicable settlement. Even assuming that the lawyers
initiated and participated in the settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong herein
because pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – A
lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement. Anent the complainants’ charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr.,
his assistance resulted to a fair settlement, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to
counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not show any unfaithfulness. Therefore, Atty.
Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters
subsequent to the termination of civil case, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. The
Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to
the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement
between the attorney and the client.
Topic: Lawyer’s Liability

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe

Shirley Olayta-Camba v. Atty. OtilloSyBongon

Facts: In her complaint, complainant alleged that on March 1, 2000, she engaged the
services of respondent for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the real
estate properties of the late BernabeOlayta, situated in the Municipalities of Camalig and
Guinobatan, both in the province of Albay. In connection therewith, she claimed to have
given the aggregate amount of P112,499.55 to respondent, broken down as follows: (a)
P20,000.00 as partial payment for legal services; (b) P162.00 as payment for certification
fees; (c) P5,000.00 as advance payment for the reconstitution of titles; (d) P30,000.00 as
payment for land taxes and titling of properties; (e) P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; (f)
P19,337.55 as payment for documentary stamps on the estate of BernabeOlayta; and (g)
P28,000.00 as payment for Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Taxes. Despite the foregoing,
respondent failed to update complainant regarding the status of the matters referred to
him. Thus, complainant terminated her engagement with respondent and demanded for
the return of P112,499.55, but to no avail. Hence, she filed the instant complaint before the
Court.

In his defense, respondent asserts, inter alia, that he only received P55,000.00 and
that the rest of the money was received by a certain Rowena Delos Reyes-Kelly who was not
an employee of his law firm. Further, respondent averred that he had already offered to
return the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant, claiming that he already earned the fees
for legal services in the amount of P20,000.00 for having studied the matter entrusted to
him and drafted the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition (Deed) that underwent several revisions.
The Court, in a Resolution dated August 15, 2011, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In a Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2013, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03,Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed engaged

respondent’s services, and that the latter received legal fees in connection therewith.
Despite this, respondent did not perform his undertaking in accordance with the
engagement and likewise failed to return complainant’s money despite demands. The
foregoing acts were deemed to be in violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as the CPR, thus,
rendering respondent administratively liable for the same. However, in view of
respondent’s old age, his condition of having undergone a triple heart bypass surgery, and
considering that this is his first offense, the Investigating Commissioner opted to mitigate
the administrative penalties imposed upon respondent.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts
complained of.

Ruling: After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-
bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule
18.03, Canon 18of the CPR.

As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, complainant

engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles
to the real estate properties of the late BernabeOlayta, as well as preparing the Deed, and
in connection therewith, allegedly gave various amounts to respondent, of which the latter
admitted the receipt of only P55,000.00. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply
with his undertaking and offered the excuse that the reconstitution of the titles and the
preparation of the Deed were delayed due to the Deed’s several revisions; and that
BernabeOlayta’s surviving heirs were living in different places, making it difficult to secure
their presence, much less obtain their signatures to the said Deed.

Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR
when he failed to refund the amount of P55,000.00 that he personally received from
complainant despite repeated demands.

Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for
the intended purpose. Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be returned
immediately to the client. As such, a lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client
despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his
lack of integrity, as in this case.

Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the
legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employmentand, hence, must be disciplined accordingly.