Remedial Law Review - Digest
Prof. Salvador
JUDGMENT
Sps. Consing v CA, Carpio | 10 March 20041
Facts:
- Petitioner-spouses Antonio and Soledad Consing were sugar-farm
landowners in Negros Occidental. They have an annual agricultural
crop loan with PNB Victorias Branch, part which is an allocation
for procurement of fertilizer.
- In 1975, Sps. Consing purchased on credit various grades of
fertilizer through the private respondent, Sugar Producers’
Cooperative Marketing Association (SPCMA), amounting to
P607,950.
- For the purchase, the Sps. Consing presented to the SPCMA a
certification of its crop loan line issued by PNB and a promissory
note chargeable against PNB. The 1975-76 crop loan line was
P3,907,000, out of which P1,389,400 was allotted for the purchase
of fertilizer.
- When SPCMA presented the promissory note, PNB refused to honor
it as the Sps. Consing no longer had a fertilizer line with PNB. As
such, SPCMA filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money.
- TC ruled in favor of SPCMA, affirmed by the CA.
- The ruling was for the Sps. Consing to pay SPCMA the sum of
P1,243,325, which included the principal, interest, liquidated
damages, and attorney’s fees, plus the legal rate of interest from
Nov. 08, 1977 (date of filing of the complaint) until fully paid.
Additionally, Sps. Consing were ordered to pay 10% of the
total unpaid obligation as attorney’s fees. The Sps. Consing
argue that there was a double imposition of interest on its liability
and thus pray for a reduction.
- The ruling of the TC did not set out the legal basis for such
decision, but the CA did lay down the reasons why the Sps.
Consing were liable.
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Von Ferrera
Issues:
1. What is the amount that should be paid by the Sps. Consing?
2. What is the requirement demanded by the Constitution from the
courts in for rendering their decisions?
Held:
1. Sps. Consing are ordered to pay P1,243,325 to SPCMA, plus
interest of 1% per month or 12% per annum based on the terms
and conditions of the contract embodied in the Fertilizer Order.
The contract also stipulated that, in case of delay in the payment of
the obligation, the Sps. Consing will have to pay 25% of the
amount due as attorney’s fees and expenses of collection, plus 10%
of the indebtedness as liquidated damages which in either case,
shall not be less than P250.
The SC ruled that there was a double imposition of the attorney’s
fees by the TC when it included in its ruling an additional 10% of
the total unpaid obligation as attorney’s fees. Such award has no
legal basis.
After the judgement of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, interest at 12% per annum shall
be additionally imposed on the total obligation until full
payment (as it is deemed as a forbearance of credit).
Note: (from Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA)
When an obligation is breached:
1. the interest rate for a loan or forbearance of money is
12%; &
2. the interest rate for an award of damages, not due from
an obligation constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is 6% which may be imposed at the discretion of
the court.
2. Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: “No decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.”
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The SC found it too gross to ignore the failure of the TC to measure
up to the standard set by the Constitution.
Heirs of Valdez vs. CA2
FACTS
Two conflicting resolutions were issued on the same date in the same
case. The first resolution dismissed the case without prejudice for violation
of the provision against forum shopping. The other required the
respondent (petitioner herein) to comment. What is the effect, under the
unique circumstances of this case, of these twin resolutions?
The controversy has its roots in a civil case - an action for quieting of title
and declaration of nullity of transfer certificates of title before the RTC in
Antipolo City. The heirs and spouses Malvar were among the plaintiffs in
the civil case. The RTC granted them an injunction order and,
subsequently, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to place them in
possession of the parcel of land disputed in the case.
Lopez Resources went to the CA to question the application of the order
and writ that the RTC issued in the civil case. Its petition for certiorari and
prohibition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76286 (first petition) and was
assigned to the Ninth Division. Lopez Resources filed another similar
petition (re-filed petition) - docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77615 and assigned
to the Seventh Division - after the first petition was dismissed without
prejudice.
The heirs and spouses Malvar seek to reverse the resolutions in the cases
filed by Lopez Resources before the CA.
ISSUES:
Dissatisfied with the above CA resolutions and arguing that both cases
should be dismissed, the petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in CA-G.R.SP No.
76286 when it issued on the same date the two conflicting May 5, 2003
resolutions. NO.
2. WON the August 1, 2003 resolution is valid. YES.
3. WON the re-filing of the same petition before the CA constituted a
palpable act of forum shopping justifying the dismissal of both petitions.
NO.
HELD:
Petition lacks merit.
1. The fact that the Ninth Division of the CA committed a monumental
error cannot be erased. But the error was not in the court's intent on what
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Tonton Mina
to do with the forum shopping violation it found. In both resolutions, what
is clear is that the court intended to allow a rectification of the deficiency
in Lopez Resources' non-forum shopping certification in view perhaps of
what it perceived to be the merits that the face of the petition showed.
Thus, in the first May 5, 2003 resolution, the CA resolved to dismiss the
petition but without prejudice to its re-filing. In the second resolution, it
ordered the filing of comment by the respondents, with the obligation on
the part of Lopez Resources to rectify the deficiency in its non-forum
shopping certification. (Basis: Section 5, Rule 7)
That the CA could also require the respondents to comment, with the
obligation on the part of the petitioner to undertake rectification, is not
without support from established jurisprudence. In several cases, we
allowed initiatory pleadings or petitions with initially defective verifications
and certifications of non-forum shopping on the ground of substantial
compliance. We reasoned that strict compliance with the requirement
merely underscores its mandatory nature, in that, it cannot be dispensed
with or its requirements altogether disregarded.
Thus, either way, the CA would have been correct. In the absence of any
showing that the twin issuance was attended by partiality, or by hostility
to one party as against another, or in open and patent disregard of the
applicable laws, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction exists in the CA action.
Because the mistake was on the part of the court, it is axiomatic that none
of the parties should suffer for the mistake.
To look at the matter from another perspective, the issuance of two
conflicting resolutions - one for dismissal, the other for the continuation of
the case, with one canceling out the other - can only mean that no
definite, specific determination was made by the court.
2. For the fact the CA can issue such orders or resolutions necessary in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, the SC holds that the Ninth Division's
clarificatory resolution of August 1, 2003 is valid. The CA never lost
jurisdiction over the case despite the re-filing of the petition; jurisdiction,
once acquired, is not lost except for reasons that are not present in this
case and need not be fully discussed here. The Sixth Division, to where
the ponente of the re-filed petition was transferred, ultimately removed all
uncertainties when it ordered the cancellation of the raffle of the case and
ordered the incorporation of the contents of its rollo with the rollo of the
first petition - CA-G.R. SP No. 76286. This move is likewise valid under the
circumstances as the re-filing was a direct off-shoot of the CA's mistake; it
carries the same justification attendant to the remedial measures
addressing the mistake.
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3. The question of whether Lopez Resources forum shopped when it re-
filed its petition is largely rendered moot and academic by the terms of the
assailed May 5, 2003 order which dismissed the case without prejudice.
Lopez Resources, who cannot be blamed for the CA's mistake, only
followed what the assailed order allowed. Thus, we cannot say that it
forum shopped by filing another petition while the first petition was
pending. Insofar as it was concerned, its first petition had been dismissed
without prejudice; hence, there was no bar, either by way of forum
shopping, litis pendentia or res adjudicata, to the petition it re-filed.
Petition DENIED and the Court of Appeals DIRECTED to resolve the
petition for certiorari and prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 76286 with utmost
dispatch.
INTRAMUROS TENNIS CLUB, INC. (ITC), et al. vs. PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY (PTA), et al.3
FACTS
PTA owns the Victoria Tennis Courts located in Intramuros, Manila by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1763. In a Memorandum of Agreement
(“MOA”), the PTA transferred the management, operation, administration
and development of the Victoria Tennis Courts to Philippine Tennis
Association (PHILTA) for a period of ten (10) years commencing on June
15, 1987. ITC is an affiliate of PHILTA and has for its members tennis
players and enthusiasts who regularly use the facilities of the Victoria
Tennis Courts.
During the effectivity of the MOA, PTA wrote a letter to PHILTA
enumerating alleged violations by PHILTA of the terms and conditions of
the MOA and demanding the surrender of the possession of the Victoria
tennis courts. PTA wrote a second letter to PHILTA requesting the latter to
vacate the premises of said tennis courts to give way to PTA’s golf course
expansion program with Club Intramuros.
ITC and PHILTA instituted a case for “preliminary injunction, damages,
and prayer for temporary restraining order” with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (RTC). The petition alleged that PTA’s demand to vacate was a
unilateral pre-termination of the MOA, under the terms of which PHILTA
was allowed the management of the tennis courts until June 15, 1997. It
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Dan Avila
also alleged that by complying with PTA’s demand to vacate, ITC stands to
sustain liability because it had prior commitments to use the Victoria
Tennis Courts for several activities.
The temporary restraining order was granted. Eventually, the RTC also
granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, based upon a finding
that PTA in pursuing the golf course expansion program was in effect
unilaterally pre-terminating the MOA.
PTA and Club Intramuros filed a motion to dismiss (on June 16, 1997),
stating that in view of the expiration of the MOA petitioners’ cause of
action was rendered moot and academic, which the RTC granted. The RTC
ruled to lift the writ of preliminary injunction and to declare PTA entitled
to the possession of Victoria Tennis Courts. It further declared that the
action has become moot and academic by reason of the expiration of the
MOA upon which ITC and PHILTA’s rights were based. ITC and PHILTA
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
While the case was pending therewith, PTA and Club Intramuros filed
a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal invoking that
under Section 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court
judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by appeals taken
therefrom.
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. --- Judgments in
actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and
support, and such other judgments as are now or may
hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be
enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by
an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the
trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellee court in its
discretion may make an order suspending, modifying,
restoring or granting the injunction, receivership,
accounting, or award of support. (Underscoring supplied)
PTA and Club Intramuros: There was an urgent necessity on their part to
immediately take possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts “by reason of its
being heavily deteriorated and unsanitized because of ITC and PHILTA’s
failure to maintain its good condition.”
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ITC and PHILTA: Reliance on Section 4, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court was erroneous because that provision contemplates an instance
where an action for injunction was granted, not a situation as the one
herein where the judgment was for the lifting of an injunction earlier
issued. They maintain that the applicable provision is Section 2, Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court, which accords the appellate court
discretionary power to order execution of a judgment or final order
pending appeal, “upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after
due hearing.”
Discretionary execution. ---
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. ---
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the
case and is in possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the
filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order
execution of a judgment or final order even before the
expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate
court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons
to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
The CA Second Division granted the motion for execution pending
appeal, declaring that since the lease agreement under the MOA had
already expired and PTA had made it clear that there will be no renewal of
the said agreement, PTA as lessor is entitled to exercise all its rights of
ownership and possession over the Victoria Tennis Courts. It also
observed that the ITC and PHILTA’s appeal from the order of the RTC was
merely dilatory, and that the outcome of the appeal will not in any way
alter the fact of PTA’s entitlement to the possession and administration of
the Victoria Tennis Courts.
Their motion for reconsideration denied, ITC and PHILTA filed this petition
under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. WHETHER the CA gravely abused its discretionary power to order
execution pending appeal as prescribed in Section 2, Rule 39 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court – NO.
2. WHETHER the CA gravely abused its discretion in finding good
reasons to grant private respondents’ motion for execution pending
appeal – NO.
RATIO
A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto --- such as an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented
at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for
instance.
First Issue
Following Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the CA may
order execution pending appeal subject to the following conditions: (1)
there must be a judgment or final order; (2) the trial court must have lost
jurisdiction over the case; (3) there must be “good reasons” to allow
execution; and (4) such good reasons must be stated in a special order
after due hearing. Undoubtedly, the RTC order which granted private
respondents’ motion to dismiss and lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction is a “final order” within the contemplation of Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ITC and PHILTA maintain that the said RTC order could not be the proper
subject of execution because it was still appealed to respondent court, but
this merely confuses the concept of a “final” judgment or order from
one which has “become final” (or to use the more established term,
“final and executory”) --- a distinction that is definite and settled.
A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto --- such as an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented
at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
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parties are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for
instance. It is to be distinguished from an order that is “interlocutory”, or
one that does not finally dispose of the case, such as an order denying a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, or granting a
motion for extension of time to file a pleading. As such, only final
judgments or orders (as opposed to interlocutory orders) are appealable.
A “final” judgment or order in the sense just described becomes “final
and executory” upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom
where no appeal has been duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom
having been taken, the judgment of the appellant court in turn
becomes final. It is called a “final and executory” judgment because
execution at such point issues as a matter of right.
By its provisional nature, the remedy of execution pending appeal requires
only a “final” judgment or order (as distinguished from an “interlocutory”
order) and not a “final and executory” judgment or order. The RTC order
aforementioned is a final order within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court, inasmuch as it makes an adjudication on
the merits of the case and dismisses ITC and PHILTA’s action. The latter
in fact, impliedly recognized the finality of this RTC order when they
filed an ordinary appeal (and not a petition for certiorari) therefrom with
the CA.
Second Issue
Execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule
that only a final judgment may be executed. Thus, the existence of “good
reasons” is essential for it is what confers discretionary power on a court
to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. These reasons must be stated
in a special order --- for unless they are divulged, it would be difficult to
determine whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised in the
case.
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the
lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse
party who may have apparently no case but to delay. There must be
superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury
or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the
judgment. Were it otherwise, execution pending appeal may well become a
tool of oppression and inequity instead of an instrument of solicitude and
justice.
The CA was well within its discretion in issuing its questioned
resolutions, which clearly set out the reasons for granting private
respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal. The observation on
the deteriorating and unsanitary conditions of the Victoria Tennis Courts
came from tennis players who regularly use the said courts, and there is
no indication that the letter was contrived or fabricated simply to procure
for private respondents the restoration of possession of the Victoria Tennis
Courts. More importantly, PHILTA no longer had any legal right to the
possession and management of the Victoria Tennis Courts because the
lease agreement between PTA and PHILTA had already expired on June
15, 1997. Obviously, PTA as the lessor and owner of the tennis courts had
every right to regain possession thereof.
Judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by the pendency
of an appeal taken therefrom. This rule has been held to extend to
judgments decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary
injunction, which are immediately executory.
Petition DISMISSED.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Jesus Fernandez v CA [J. Chico-Nazario, 2005]4
FACTS: Concepcion Olivares filed a Complaint dated 23 January 1993 for
unlawful detainer against Jesus Fernandez. The Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila (MeTC) dismissed the Complaint for lack of sufficient cause of
action.
Olivares appealed to the RTC of Manila and the latter reversed the MeTC,
ordering Fernandez to pay rental arrearages, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs in a decision dated 02 May 1994. On 28 June 1994,
Fernandez received a copy of the decision. On 12 July 1994 or 14 days
after receipt of the decision, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
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Cams Maranan
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On 29 November 1994, Fernandez received an order denying his MR.
On 01 December 1994, Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review which was granted. Said
resolution was received by Fernandez on 12 December 1994.
On 09 December 1994, Fernandez filed a Motion for New Trial, before the
RTC of Manila, citing newly discovered evidence of receipts proving his
rental payments. In view of his Motion for New Trial, Fernandez filed on
29 December 1994 in the CA a Motion to Withdraw his Petition For Review
which the court duly noted in its resolution dated 19 January 1995.
RTC denied the Motion for New Trial. It explained that when Fernandez
went to the Court of Appeals and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review, and the Court of Appeals accordingly acted on the
same by granting the extension sought, jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over the parties and the subject matter had already attached.
ISSUE/HELD: (sub-issue: WON the RTC lost jurisdiction upon the filing of
the Notice of Appeal – NO, to perfect the appeal, the party has to file the
petition for review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period.
The law and its intent are clear and unequivocal that the petition is
perfected upon its filing and the payment of the docket fees.)
Main issue: WON the Motion for New Trial was filed on time – NO.
RATIO: Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court providing for the
period to file a motion for new trial in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 is in
point.
Section 1, Rule 37. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved
party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and
grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of said party.
Sec. 3, Rule 41. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In the case at bar, Fernandez received a copy of the RTC Decision on 28
June 1994. Fourteen (14) days after the receipt of the decision or
specifically on 12 July 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration. This
motion was denied by the RTC and the Order of denial was received by
Fernandez on 29 November 1994.
Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, he had only one
(1) day left to file a motion for new trial since a motion for new trial should
be filed within the period to appeal, that is, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment. The motion for new trial suspends the running of
the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which an appeal
must be perfected. Hence if denied, a movant, like Fernandez in this case
has only the balance of the reglementary period within which to appeal. It
bears repeating that Fernandez received a copy of the RTC decision on 28
June 1994.
Applying Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, he had fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the RTC decision to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. He filed a motion for reconsideration fourteen (14) days
after receipt of the decision. The motion was denied and he had only the
remaining one (1) day to file a motion for new trial which day fell on 01
December 1994. Since 30 November 1994 was a holiday, Fernandez had
up to 01 December 1994 to file the motion for new trial.
Extant from the records, instead of a motion for new trial, he filed before
the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion for extension of
time to file petition for review. Thereafter, and pending the resolution of
his motion before the Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to the RTC
and filed on 09 December 1994 a motion for new trial.
Applying the foregoing, Fernandez’s motion for new trial was filed out of
time. The fifteen (15)-day period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be
extended.
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People v. Odilao, 2004 | Austria-Martinez5
Facts:
Odilao, along with two others, was charged with Estafa for allegedly for
misappropriating from Trans Eagle Corporation a luxury car known as
"Jeep Cherokee Sport 4wd."
A warrant of arrest against respondent was then issued by the Executive
Judge. Upon motion of respondent, the Executive Judge directed the City
Prosecutor to conduct reinvestigation.
Finding no probable cause, Asst. City Prosecutor Capacio filed with the
trial court a Motion to Dismiss. Private complainant Bugash filed an
urgent motion to disregard the reinvestigation report before the court, and
a petition for review before the DOJ.
The trial court (1) deferred the arraignment until the petition for review
would have been finally resolved by the DOJ, and (2) held in abeyance the
resolution of the motion to dismiss until the DOJ shall have resolved the
petition for review.
A year after, private complainant filed with the trial court a Motion to
Suspend Resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.
RTC: Denied the motion to dismiss; and declared that the motion to
disregard the reinvestigation report to be moot and academic, rationalizing
that Rules of Court vests authority to the trial court to rule on the
presence or absence of probable cause. Motion for reconsideration was
denied.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in the CA.
CA: Granted the petition and directing the RTC to defer the proceedings
until the petition for review before the DOJ has been resolved.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. While the
same was pending resolution, private complainant Bugash filed a motion
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Regie Mendoza
for reconsideration before the CA. The CA granted the motion for
reconsideration per its Resolution, thereby reversing its own Decision.
Issue: WON it is valid for the CA to take cognizance and rule on a motion
for reconsideration filed before it despite the pendency of a petition for
review on certiorari on the same case before the SC.
Ruling: NO.
Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(effective August 22, 2002) explicitly provides thus:
SEC. 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. -
No motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted
upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme
Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for
extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or
motion is subsequently filed, the motion for
reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed
abandoned.
The Court of Appeals ought not to have acted on the motion for
reconsideration of private complainant Bugash. It should have
considered said motion which, in the first place, was without the
conformity of the OSG, the representative of petitioner People of
the Philippines, as having been abandoned by the filing of herein
petition by the OSG, pursuant to the aforequoted Section 15, Rule
VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.
Note: the Supreme Court still ruled on the substantive issue,
citing the interest of speedy and orderly administration of justice.
It upheld the RTC decision denying the motion to dismiss of the
assistant city prosecutor and directing the implementation of the
warrant of arrest against respondent, for being in accordance with
our rulings in Crespo vs. Mogul, etc.
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