ASSIGNMENT- LEGAL METHODS

CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT- 2

Submitted By Submitted To:

Saksham Dubey Aniruddh Panicker
B.A L.L.B(Hons) Faculty of Legal Methods
1st Semester
Submission On – 22/08/2019

National Law University, Jodhpur

Summer Session
(June-November 2019)
QUESTIONS

1) What is the hohfeldian analysis?

Answer :-
The principal aim of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's project was to clarify juridical relationships between
the relevant parties. His examination of rights is connected by methods for result and invalidation, and
not in the idea of right. He gives a calculated comprehension of rights in reality. Hohfeld's table presents
a distinction between four legal relationships. These concepts are duty, claim, liberty, no claim, power,
liability, disability, and immunity. He explained how these concepts logically related to one another
through Correlatives and Opposites.
Hohfeld's Table of Entitlements and Burdens:

Right(Claim-Right) Liberty Power Immunity

Duty No-Right Liability Disability

RIGHT
To say that X has a legal claim-right means that he is legally protected from interference by Y or against
Y's withholding of assistance with respect to X's project Z. Conversely, Y, who is to abstain from
interference, or is required to provide assistance in connection with X's project Z, is under a correlative
duty to do so. The correlativity stipulation commands that if X has a claim-right against Y, this entails
Y owing a duty to X,for example, if X has a claim-right that Y should deliver him goods, this entails Y
having a duty to deliver goods to X. One has to be very specific here. He who has the right must be able
to pinpoint another person with a correlative duty either in terms of shield or assistance. Hohfeld's
insistence that every right is a relation between no more than two persons attracted criticism from James
Penner who criticizes Hohfeld's analysis because it does not account for the distinction between rights
in personam and rights in rem. This is a very weak line of argument because Hohfeld, in defence, can
insist, as he does, that a right held against the whole world is, in reality, a set of various rights ad
infinitum and each of those rights is held against a particular person. The importance of grasping
Hohfeldian rights cannot be overestimated. For instance, in ordinary parlance we refer to an individual
having a right not to be tortured. This is not a 'right' in the strict Hohfeldian sense because the state (or
any other person) is under no correlative duty to abstain from torturing people. Instead, the person's
'right' not to be subjected to torture is protected by the array of normative protections guaranteed by the
state through the general laws against assault, trespass etc. Therefore, the general right not to be
assaulted sets the protective perimeter within which a person's legal 'right' to be free from torture can
exist.
LIBERTY
To put it plainly, freedom is just a nonappearance of an obligation to keep away from the activity. The
correlativity of this jural relationship demonstrates that the individual against whom the freedom is held
has a no-right concerning the movement to which the freedom relates. This, in any case, does not imply
that he himself does not have a freedom to meddle in the movement. Assume that A is bothered by
individuals who smoke in his region. He meets S (smoker) in an open spot, who begins to smoke in his
quality. A requests that he stop, yet S discloses to him, he has a 'privilege' to smoke here (given the
nonattendance of any lawful forbiddances). S is befuddling his privilege. He doesn't have a right (in the
Hohfeldian sense) to smoke, yet just a freedom (a more fragile right). Despite the fact that person has a
no-right concerning his action of smoking, A do have a freedom himself (inside the limitations forced
on me by S's authentic rights) to block S’s smoking, state, by raising A’s voice or urging other
individuals to ridicule S for his smoking propensity, which may make him stop. The significant point
is that in pretty much every situation outside the Hobbesian condition of nature, an individual who acts
in accordance with his freedom, for example, S, would successfully be protected, though defectively,
from the infringement on his freedom by ownership of some essential lawful Hohfeldian rights, for
example, the rights against ambush, battery, trespass etc. Hohfeld's examination consequently gives a
reasonable understanding about what the lawful position of S is (for example what rights he has). As
should be obvious, had it not been for Hohfeld giving us an exact jargon, S would confuse his freedom
with a right, and as needs be would be not able precisely report the impact of his qualification. He would
not be right in saying to A that A can't prevent him from smoking since he has a privilege to smoke in
an open spot, since it puts me under no obligation not to meddle with his smoking. This by and by
demonstrates the functional advantage of Hohfeld's exquisite and clear investigation. An issue may
emerge when two contending freedoms emerge in the field of statute. A decent representation of this is
media law in the United Kingdom whereby opportunity of articulation and the privilege to protection
are frequently clashing interests. The courts attempt to adjust these interests, yet the state customarily
is under no obligation to accommodate either intrigue. In this manner, it will in general be the thought
of good and social standards and standards which administers the legal executive's support of one
enthusiasm over the other. Hohfeld calls attention to that it is the stirring up of worth driven goals that
has confounded the importance of rights; rather, the explanation of rights should help the legal executive
to adjust interests without giving a conceivable inclination a chance to barge in.

POWER
To put it plainly, a power is one's capacity to modify legitimate (or moral) relations. For example, N
can have the ability to go into an agreement with S whereby S concurs (for a thought) to avoid smoking
in N’s quality. In this manner, N has the ability to change their lawful relations in that N makes S
authoritatively bound (just as himself). S, in this way, has a risk, which is correlative to control, in that
he is obligated to having his lawful relations modified by N’s activity of intensity. Hohfeld's
investigation clears the handy significance of the term control; on bunch events, legal counselors have
made disarray by alluding 'to one side' to accomplish something when, truth be told, they mean a
Hohfeldian capacity to accomplish something. Assume X takes J’s vehicle. Does he reserve an 'option'
to sell it on to Y? On the off chance that X offers it to Y, who is the genuine buyer for worth, he can
pass great title on to him. Accordingly, X has a Hohfeldian capacity to play out the closeout of J’s
vehicle. Be that as it may, he isn't at freedom (in Hohfeld's sense) to do as such, in light of the fact that
freedom is the nonattendance of an obligation not to do the demonstration, though here, X's closeout of
the stolen vehicle to Y is a lawful wrong and he along these lines plainly ruptures his lawful obligation
by selling it. In spite of the fact that he has viable capacity to move the title, he doesn't have a freedom
to do as such. How confounding would it be to state that X has a privilege to sell the vehicle, yet he
doesn't reserve an option to sell the vehicle without Hohfeld's exact jargon? Hohfeld's investigation to
be sure explains the lawful position of the gatherings and can all the more precisely foresee the impact
of the changes in their individual lawful positions.

IMMUNITY
In the event that X has an invulnerability against Y, it implies that Y has no capacity to change X's
legitimate position concerning any privileges secured by the insusceptibility. For example, if the state
has no capacity to put M under an obligation to wear a cap when M goes out, M has resistance in that
regard, and the express an incapacity (a correlative to insusceptibility). Simmonds takes note of that
'Established Bills of Rights every now and again present broad and significant resistances, to the extent
that; they handicap the council from instituting particular sorts of law. This demonstrates receiving
Hohfeldian investigation of rights is significant given its lucidity and exactness to guarantee that the
state does not overwhelm the person. As, demonstrated so far how helpful Hohfeld's examination can
be in getting an unmistakable sight of the jural relations of the gatherings included and their lawful
positions. In reality, as has been recommended, Hohfeld's work has turned out to be significant, not just
in the characterization and explanation of rights components themselves, yet additionally in the
connection between the non-Hohfeldian employments of the term ideal, for example when a benefit (a
non-supreme right) can coincide with another benefit. To further represent how Hohfeld's examination
explains legitimate connections and the significance of 'rights' by utilizing the instance of Quinn v.
Leathem to a limited extent II. One needs to take note of that the stipulative idea of Hohfeld's
examination of rights shows a systematically clear plot which figures out how to avoid the perplexity
and complexities which are typically present in hypotheses of rights which try to legitimize rights,
bringing into the condition different justificatory components. Rather than Hohfeld, consider, for
instance, scholars, for example, Dworkin, Kymlicka, Kant and MacKinnon who look to legitimize
rights, fundamentally as far as the different qualities they serve. Seemingly, this adds superfluous
intricacy to the idea of right.
Hohfeld’s correlatives concept says that there exists interest on the opposing side of legal relationships.
A power is the capacity to create or change a legal relationship. If someone has a power, it exists with
respect to someone else who has a liability. For example, when someone makes an offer of a contract,
that gives the offeree the power to create a contract by accepting the offer or declining it. If the power
to create the contract is exercised, then both parties have rights and duties with respect to each other
and are liable for the same. Courts have power, only if any party exercises their power to commence a
lawsuit. Similarly, if someone has an immunity, it exists with respect to someone else who has a
disability. Sovereigns are immune because courts lack power over them, in which case courts are said
to have a disability with respect to sovereigns. The main point of difference is that the concepts of the
first square are static in the sense that they and do not change with time. The concepts of the second
square revolve around powers and are dynamic in the sense that they are bound for a period of time and
they create or extinguish legal relation so we can say that they make changes in the position.

2) Where does the analysis fall short?

Answer:-
At the point when Hohfeld clarifies something with the nullification of other he doesn't resolve a few
ambiguities. It clarifies benefit as the nonattendance of a case by other individual and furthermore
characterizes benefit as invalidation of obligation. So as indicated by Hohfeld there is no positive
benefit. Another test to the plan is that the Hohfeldian plan depends on the resistance of squares wherein
some segment does not have free presence of itself significance here that one data may not plainly
clarify the nearness of one or the refutation of other. Since this equivocalness isn't settled, the hypothesis
by Hohfeld is accepted to be inadequate.
The misrepresentation of the Hohfeldian plan can be redressed by speaking to this plan in triangle of
potential outcomes. In the triangle of conceivable outcomes, the reliant piece of the square of resistance
are joined to frame an autonomous segment, different parts speak to the possibility of freedom and
opportunity. This has 3 points of view of: -
- What is legally necessary in type of lead is isolated into, 'no direct legally necessary', 'direct legally
necessary' and 'no prerequisite by law for lead or no direct'.
- From the point of view of the individual whose activity is to be progressed is separated into an
obligation to do, an obligation not to do and no necessity of an obligation to do or not to do.
- From the point of view of an individual having interest is separated into qualification by lead, no
privilege by direct and no prerequisite of a privilege or not.

3) Right to Information act with Hohfeldian approach?

Answer :-
The RTI Act, 2005 was presented with the sole target of enabling individuals, containing debasement,
and acquiring straightforwardness and responsibility the working of the Government. The Right to
Information Act orders that auspicious reaction be given to any resident who requests data from an
administration division about realities or information concerning it, inside 30 days. It very well may be
clarified by the Hohfeldian examination. As the residents currently reserve a privilege to request any
snippet of data from the concerned government office, the administration has a relating obligation to
give them access to the equivalent inside 30 days. There can likewise be no case on this right. As there
exists a freedom for the natives to get the data, there doesn't exist an obligation to not get the data by
the residents.
The state under RTI is at risk and engaged to discharge the concerned snippets of data in light of the
activity of the residents capacity to request the data. In this way, as the state has the risk, it doesn't have
the resistance to not to discharge the data. As the natives have the ability to request the data, they are
not crippled to not request the data.