Authority to Construe Law or Review

Composition of Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is composed of one Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices, all of
whom are appointed by the President from a list of recommendees presented by the Judicial and
Bar Council.

Membership and Qualifications

The members of the Supreme Court serve during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 or
unless removed by impeachment for any of the grounds provided by the Constitution.
According to the Constitution, for a person to be appointed to the Supreme Court, he must be:

1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;

2. at least forty years of age, and
3. have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines.
An additional constitutional requirement, though less precise in nature, is that a judge "must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Supreme Court, Jurisdiction

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
 (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.

Lower Courts, Jurisdiction

I. Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Every municipality in the Philippines has its own Municipal Trial Court. It is referred to
as such if it covers only one municipality; otherwise, it is called Municipal Circuit Trial
Court if it covers two or more municipalities.
II. Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
Municipal Trial Courts in the towns and cities in the Metropolitan Manila area, as
distinguished from the other political subdivisions in the Philippines, are referred to as
Metropolitan Trial Courts.
In cities outside Metropolitan Manila, the equivalent of the Municipal Trial
Courts are referred to as Municipal Trial Courts in Cities.
III. Regional Trial Courts
Regional Trial Courts were established among the thirteen regions in the Philippines
consisting of Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region (NCR). There are as many
Regional Trial Courts in each region as the law mandates.
IV. Shari'a Courts
Equivalent to the Regional Trial Courts in rank are the Shari'a District Courts which were
established in certain specified provinces in Mindanao where the Muslim Code on
Personal Laws is being enforced.
 Equivalent to the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts are the Shari'a Circuit Courts
which were established in certain municipalities in Mindanao.
There are five Shari'a District Courts and fifty one Shari'a Circuit Courts in existence.

V. Court of Tax Appeals

A special court, the Court of Tax Appeals, composed of a Presiding Judge and two
Associate Judges, is vested with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the
decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Commissioner of Customs on
certain specific issues.

VI. Sandiganbayan
A special court, the Sandiganbayan, composed of a Presiding Justice and eight Associate
Justices, has exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act [Republic Act No. 3019], the Unexplained Wealth Act [Republic Act No. 1379] and
other crimes or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office, including those employees in government-owned or controlled corporations.

VII. Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals, composed of one Presiding Justice and sixty eight Associate
Justices is vested with jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts and certain quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions.

Supreme Court, expanded Jurisdiction

The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: "Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine
Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what
was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.”

Oposa vs. Factoran

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising
new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the spetitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such
a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
 resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come

One liner:

Judicial Review, nature of.

- Is the power of the courts to test the validity of the executive and legislative acts in
light of their conformity with the Constitution.

Tatad vs. Energy

Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether
a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.
Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the
judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.

TATAD VS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

G.R. No. 124360 and 127867. November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a)
the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard
to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor
when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power.
3. Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

Discussions:

1. The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all
contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the
title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
2. Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, the Court states that:

“There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests
are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

3. A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies,

consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular
commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the
total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an
agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust,
 pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting
competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its
production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without
statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly
refers to the end.

Rulings:

1. The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court has adopted a liberal construction
of the one title – one subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up
refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.[i][20] We shall,
however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on new
entrants to the oil market.
2. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It
will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will
start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at
the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for
any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation
before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of
the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation
to the US dollar is stable.
3. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions
of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: “The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.”

Judicial Supremacy
- While the judiciary neither enjoy the power of the sword nor the pursue and so
regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary is
nonetheless vested with power to annul the acts of either the legislative and executive
or both of them when not comfortable to the fundamental laws of the land.
According to case of Francisco vs HP
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or validate enact of the
legislature, nut only assert the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
actual controversy their rights which that instrument secure and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed 'judicial supremacy' which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution.

The term "judicial supremacy" was previously used in relation to the Supreme Court's
power of judicial review, 43 43 yet the phrase wrongly connotes the bugaboo of a judiciary
supreme to all other branches of the government. When the Supreme Court mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it is upholding is not
its own supremacy, but the supremacy of the Constitution. 44 44 When this supremacy is
invoked, it compels the errant branches of government to obey not the Supreme Court, but the
Constitution.

Francisco vs House of Representatives

Impeachment; Political Question; Judicial Branch

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
 disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
 which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its

Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR.,
ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA,
GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO
CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN,
ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS
MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES,
EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY
GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO,
SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in
representation of the Members of the Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have
banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social
monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore,
prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen
for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose,
select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in
receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in
effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects
does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional
sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must

not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork
barrel.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in
this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is
unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I.

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an
alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there
indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that
PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves
the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

II.

The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the
law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the
Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition
is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it.”

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend
them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law
which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress
is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and
determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the
priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members
of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a
direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional
boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
_______________

NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary
Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771 (April 21, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service
Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.
(JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the
Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one
exploration well. The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine
mammals in the Tañon Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and
stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-
governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with
individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil
exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after
JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the
Philippines mutually terminated the service contract and oil exploration
activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of
review.

In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point
of whether the case was moot because the service contract had been
terminated. The Court declared that mootness is “not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.” Id., p. 12. Due to the
alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the case,
not to mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the
Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the
particular service contract had been terminated. Id.

Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court
narrowed them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their
stewards, have legal standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service
contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.

As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond

natural and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in
Philippine jurisprudence “moves towards simplification of procedures and
facilitating court access in environmental cases.” Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court
explained, “the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.” Id., p. 16-17.

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87
on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional
requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service
contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and
reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the
Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held
that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally
prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas. In order to
explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be performed in
accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted
that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore
its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS
area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized
through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not
specifically authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that no
energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.

UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203974,

April 22, 2014
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND; Hornbook doctrine is
that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act
beyond the Constitution’s mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of
power beyond what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity.
As elucidated by former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION; LEGISLATIVE

OR EXECUTIVE ACTS ARE VOID. Where the assailed legislative or executive act
is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As
the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern."
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. The above provision of the
civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether
legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and
affords no protection. x x x

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN HARMONY OF

THE CONSTITUTION. Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in
harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. In a long line of cases, the
cardinal principle of construction established is that a statute should be
interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure or if the
enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constitution, that interpretation
which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though it
may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import
of the language used.

POLITICAL LAW; MEANING OF QUALIFIED VOTERS THEREIN.Pursuant to

established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453
should be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If
one takes the plain meaning of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the
President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit
provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political units directly
affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in
view of the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by
the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the
city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units
directly affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.

POLITICAL LAW; POLITICAL UNITS DIRECTLY AFFECTED; DEFINED.In

identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite,
what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire
to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan
v. COMELEC and Padilla v. COMELEC are worth revisiting.

We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation
of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to
be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the
plebiscite. As held:

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it

imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable
to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental
would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries
in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected.