Centeno v Hon.

Pornillos

Officers of a Civic Organization - Centeno, Yco, and others solicited from Judge Adoracion
Angeles a contribution of Php 1500 for the group’s fund drive to renovate the chapel of
BARRIO TIKAY Bulacan.

Judge Angeles filed a criminal complaint against them stating that they solicited donations
without the benefit of a permit pursuant to PD 1564 the SOLICITATION PERMIT LAW.

Centeno and the others filed a motion to quash stating that what is contemplated and
enumerated in PD 1564 are: (“CHARITABLE” and “PUBLIC WELFARE”) purposes. They argue
that donations for religious purposes does not fall within the ambit of “CHARITABLE”.

The TRIAL COURT FOUND THEM GUILTY. Ordered to pay a fine of P200. on appeal, the CA
held them guilty and modified the punishment to imprisonment and fine.

SC held that: PD1564 states that any person or group or corporation must secure from the
DSWD a permit before they receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes.

The issue is whether or not religious affairs are to be construed as CHARITABLE purposes.

No. The EXPRESS MENTION OF ONE THING IS THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS.

-The 1987 Constitution, The TAX CODE, the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, and NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE all TREAT the words “religious” and “charitable” as SEPARATE and
DISTINCT from each other. The Framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within the coverage of CHARITABLE purposes.

-Constitution itself has a provision wherein terms “charitable” and “religious” were
separated by the word “OR” indicating that they are distinct.

-All religious purposes are all charitable purposes however, not all charitable purposes are
religious purposes. It is capable of different significations.

-this is a penal statute. It is to be construed in favor of the accused.

Petitioner is not criminally liable.

REPUBLIC v IAC

Spouses Pastor had deficient income taxes from the year 1955 to 1959. in 1963 the Bureau
of Internal Revenue assessed that they owed the Government Php17,117.08. They
subsequently availed of TAX AMNESTY under PD 23, PD 213, and PD 370 therefore paying
the fees thereof. The BIR then commenced an action in court to compel the Spouses to pay
the assessed value of P17,117.08. Spouses argue that they have paaid the TAX AMNESTIES
and therefore the Government cannot anymore recover what was owed.

RTC rendered a decision stating that the couples indeed have settled their dues under PD
213. By accepting the payment of the amnesty income taxes the Government waived its
right to recover.

BIR appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court stating that couple did not qualify for the
tax amnesties as those do not apply to people with pending assessments pursuant to
REVENUE REGULATIONS No. 8-72 and 7-23.

Spouses contend that PD 213 contains NO EXEMPTIONS. It explicitly states that the taxpayer
concerned shall be EXEMPT from ANY LIABILITY arising from or incident to his failure to file
his income tax return and to pay the tax due thereon. The IAC dismissed the complaint.

SC HELD THAT: since they paid the fees under the TAX Amnesty, they were granted not only
an exemption but an amnesty. The government therefore is estopped from collecting the
deficiency.

Even if REVENUE REGULATION did provide an exemption to PD213 it is nevertheless VOID

for going against the clear mandate of the statute. A REVENUE REGULATION MAY NOT
PREVAIL OVER A PROVISION OF A STATUTE. That would be administrative legislation.

Tax statutes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer.

GALLARDO v BORROMEO

Fernando Gallardo filed with the COURT of AGRARIAN REFORMS a complaint to terminate
the lease Borromeo had on Gallardo’s agricultural land. Gallardo recently retired and wanted
to cultivate the land himself. The RTC dismissed the case. The CA affirmed.

Court applied RA 6389 which stated that a landowner’s desire to cultivate the land himself is
NOT a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant.

SC Held:
The time that GALLARDO filed his complaint, RA 3844 was in effect which allowed
LANDOWNERS who wanted to cultivate their own land to terminate leases with their
renters.

During the pendency of the cases the provisions were amended by RA 6389. but, they must
not be given retroactive effect. LAWS are PROSPECTIVE in nature unless otherwise stated in
the statute itself. Since congress did not state that the statute must be given retroactive
effect, it may not apply to cases already pending.

Gallardo’s petition is granted.

ALBINO CO v CA

Albino Co entered into an agreement with a salvaging firm to salvage and refloat a sunken
vessel. He drew a check as part of an agreement to secure payment of an obligation in the
sum of P361,528. The check was deposited and was DISHONORED which prompted the
company to file a criminal complaint against Co pursuant to BP 22 which eventuated to the
former’s conviction. The CA likewise affirmed the decision. The basis of the conviction was
the case of QUE v. PEOPLE.

THE SC held that: the check in question was drawn 4 yrs PRIOR to the QUE case. During the
time that the check was drawn, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE CIRCULAR no. 4 WAS IN EFFECT stating
that if a check is issued merely for a guarantee or to secure payment of an obligation, it is
not a criminal offense pursuant to BP 22. This circular was deemed erroneous and was years
later amended. Nevertheless, at the time of the DRAWING of the check the law was that it
was legal for him to do so. It was only years after that the QUE ruling and the Circular
criminalized the act. They cannot be given retroactive application.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS and CIRCULARS are to be given PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION.

Co was relying on the ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR whose opinions are to be afforded great
respect. Furthermore, this case is a criminal case. It must be decided in favor of the accused.

Petition dismissed.

TAN JR v CA
Case stems from a parcel of land owned by Jaime Tan. For consideration of an ammount of
P59,200 he executed a deed-of-sale in favor of spouses Magdangal. After Tan died, his Heirs
(herein referred to as Tan heirs) filed a case to REFORM the deed of sale indicating that it
was not a deed of sale but was to CONCLUDE AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.

After some litigation, the Court ordered Magdangal Spouses to return the titles after the
TANS will reimburse them for the amount of the land WITIHN 120 DAYS after FINALITY OF
JUDGEMENT.

Copy of the FINAL Judgement was given to the parties on OCTOBER 5, 1995.

Clerk of Court however entered the judgement in the Book of Entries on MARCH 13, 1996.

On MARCH 21, Magdangals filed in the RTC a MOTION for CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF
POSSESSION. Alleging that 120 days have past from OCTOBER 5 and that the TANS failed to
make the payment therefore the land was theirs.

TAN contended that the 120 day period did not start from OCT 5 but on the date the Clerk of
Court made the entries in the Book of Entries which was MARCH 13, 1996.

SC held that from 1991 - 1996 the rules that govern Finality of Judgement was RULE 51 of
the Revised Rules of Court. It states that the entry into the Book of Entries shall be the day
the judgement becomes executory.

THE 1997 REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE however, amended the rule stating that the
judgement becomes executory at the time the parties are furnished copies of the
judgement.

SC HELD that: RULES OF PROCEDURE CAN BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. However, if

we apply the 1997 rule, it would be prejudicial to Tan’s VESTED right to recover the land. It
should therefore, NOT be given retroactive application. It would result to great injustice. Tan
may have the right to recover.