Gashem Baksh vs CA
customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou
Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange
student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the
end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they
expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting
sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to
slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual
intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating
Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her
that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later
sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he
cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an
Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because
of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the
deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into
sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals.
She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to
Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino
traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good
and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect
our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts
of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the
breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the
absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry
was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be
recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or
if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.
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Nikko Hotel et al. vs Reyes
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden. The party was being held for a prominent Japanese national. The
person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the executive secretary of the
hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay
Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who
invited Reyes to the party. When she ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite
Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food
and leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a
policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he
said that he was invited by another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he
was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him and ordered him in a loud voice to
leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he
was calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party
like a common criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to
be treated humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the right to ask Reyes to leave
the party but she should have done it respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been
employed by the hotel for more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be
polite at all times. It is very unlikely for her to make a scene in the party she was
managing. That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which
provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim
told him to leave, Lim did so very close to him – so close that they could almost kiss.
This only proves that Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear whatever is it that she’s
going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not
demean Reyes. They do not know each other personally. She has no reason to treat
him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under
the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens
himself to the risk of being turned away, and thus being embarrassed. The injury he
incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting
Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present
any supporting evidence to support any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon
himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.
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Globe vs CA
Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several
thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and
to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the
report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week
forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a
“crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover,
petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the
lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and
from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias.
Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against
private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January
1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone
Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T.
Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay
him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs;
hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a
hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks
about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”,
and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed
by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners
against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious
and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article
19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee
should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for
damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners
clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
Cudia vs Superintendent of the PMA
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination
in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm
to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR
teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a
result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported
Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was
dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter
concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late
because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was
meted with demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content
with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he
incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his
appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR
class was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the
TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers
concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the
English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a
student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may
be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before
3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because
again, on that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their
examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the
teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the teacher,
rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although
there were at least two students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the
three of them cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that
instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO
sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly
violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said
his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of
their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed
of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the
parties involved were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC
reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found
Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting
vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice of
chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain
their vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering, the
dissenter was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he
changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately
placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military
officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were
irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case
of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights
to due process, education, and privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief
of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA
opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of
policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
HELD:
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA
and its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual
controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or
instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that
judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to
say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA,
have surrendered parts of their civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are
disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less,
question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by
enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper
functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater
degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal
from PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes
his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be deprived
of such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not
exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon
which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the
courts.
(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the
Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below
discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is
still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this
case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against
him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would
undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and
submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The
HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was
submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing.
During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him
and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the
witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion
of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter,
the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level – from the OIC
of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the
PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG
(Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General
Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further,
a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA
senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally,
he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by
these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be
used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that
Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of
cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA
conducts investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is
automatically terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law
(Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by
the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom.
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this
case, based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes
any form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of
the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed
to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be
severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation
of due process -also considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.
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De jesus vs Syquia
FACTS: Antonia Loanco de Jesus, 20 years old, and Cesar Syquia, 23 met in a barber
shop where de Jesus worked as cashier. They had a relationship and Antonia got
pregnant with a baby boy. During her pregnancy, Syquia often visited her. He even
wrote a letter to a reverend father saying that he wanted his name to be given to the
child. When he went to Japan and China, he was writing letters to Antonia reminding
her to keep herself in good condition so that their junior would be strong. When she
gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house in Manila where they lived as
a family for a year. She became pregnant again but Syquia left her to marry another
woman. During the christening of the child which Syquia arranged, he decided to give
the child the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
ISSUE: W/N there would be damages for breach to marry and W/N Syquia is compelled
to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child
Ruling: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and
the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by
Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.
“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of
the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the
father's resolution to admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide
damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on
this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance
allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise
pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to
the amount of pension.
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Magbanua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents all surenamed Perez
alleging that they are shared tenants of the defendants, and that the latter divert the
flow of water from their farm lots which caused the drying up of their landholdings and
asked to vacate their areas for they could not plant palay due to lack of water. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to pay
moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the IAC
which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the IAC, the trial
court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision because the former believe
that as a shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as agricultural lessees in
peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings.
Issue:
WON the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.
Held:
The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and
each of the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by
the defendants .
Ratio:
Under the law, the landowners has an obligation to keep the tenant in the
peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. In this case, it shows that the
petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make them
vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff's rights and caused
prejudiced to the latter by the diversion of water. Under Article 2219 (10), the Civil
Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same
Code which provides, Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage. The defendants acted in an oppressive manner which is contrary
to the morals of the petitioners and therefore, they are liable for the compensation to
the latter.