ALEX ONG vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO [Adm. Case No. 2417.

February 6, 2002]

FACTS:

The complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent as legal counsel of one

Nemesia Garganian claiming for the support of the alleged child of the complainant with

the latter. A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose

Bueno (Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed

down the alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the

complainant and discussed the courses of action that he would take against the

complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian

and her son.

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the complainant’s brother

and that the complainant merely assumed his brother’s obligation to appease Ms.

Garganian who was threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with

the demands against him.

Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal (now

Prosecutor’s Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and

one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the

Anti-Dummy Law.

The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant,

Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant

before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation,

and the Office of the Solicitor General. According to the complainant, these cases were

subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.

The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. The

records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could

provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage

in his actions against the latter. The complainant branded the respondent’s tactics as

“highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical, constituting…malpractice of law and

conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.”
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice of law and conduct

unbecoming of lawyer.

HELD: YES.

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the

bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that “a lawyer shall employ

only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not

present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an

improper advantage in any case or proceeding.”

We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the

complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms.

Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule

19.01. His behavior is inexcusable. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules

that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or

proceeding and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards

of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be

disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private

capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and

improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport

himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the

legal profession.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of

conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a

period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act

will be dealt with more severely.

MAXIMINO NOBLE III v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, AC. No. 10628, 2015-07-01
Facts:
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint[2] for
damages against his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino
represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando
stated... the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-
0008689[3]/Issued on March 10, 2008."[4] Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing
of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have... already reflected
payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have
finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just
the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a
separate case for grave threats and estafa[5] against Orlando. When Maximino was
furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages,...
Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying,
among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with
his... unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never
appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as
[your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga
mismong abogado mong... polpol.
Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel[7]
in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x has never done
anything to protect the interests of the defendants in... a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous
amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted
services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x
x"... as well as a Compromise Agreement,[8] both of which he sent to Marcelo for his
signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with
violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
(CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850[9] and 1922[10], and prayed for the disbarment of
respondent as well as the award of damages.
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[15] dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of
the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to...
disclose the required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find
any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on
the part of
Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who are
brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to be
published and known by third person
Issues:
whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful... counsel.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.[23] In
Buatis Jr. v. People,[24] the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile,"
"carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another colleague as
defamatory and injurious which effectively... maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling
of insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is considered conduct
unbecoming of the legal profession.[
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo
as casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the
Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text
messages were clearly... intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the
use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo
immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct
against his colleague, in violation of the... above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's
voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against
him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill,
insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the... judicial decorum which
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion
of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and
uprightness... which should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives,
and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed
upon them.[26] Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely
relayed... to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have
been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another
lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando
to interfere and insult Maximino... to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case,
constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.[27]
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such... enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.[28] The Court has
consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR
when he maligned Maximino to his client.[29]
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the
IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the
complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for
disbarment. At most, his... violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the
complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his
professional... colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
FE A. YLAYA v. ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Adm. Case No. 6475, 2013-01-
30
Facts:
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two
( 2) parcels of land
Prior to the acquisition of these... properties,... was already the subject of expropriation
proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa
The RTC already fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit
P6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the property.
The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the
expropriation case as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property.
The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory
deed of sale" for the sale of... the property
The respondent then fraudulently without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to
their understanding converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute
Sale... selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia
Carlos So
The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother's sister) are his uncle
and his aunt... the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified
Complaint and To Dismiss the Case... the complainant executed an Affidavit... affirming
and confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale
IBP Commissioner... found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.01
(A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and
Canon 16
("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).
the IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP Commissioner's finding, but increased the
penalty imposed to two (2) years suspension and a warning... the respondent filed a
Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBP's findings
Issues:
whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13- SC
Ruling:
We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of
the IBP Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules
1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client's
properties. We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for
representing conflicting... interests without the written consent of the represented
parties... and
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
we agree with the respondent and find the evidence insufficient to prove the charge that
he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1)... the evidence against the
respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to
mislead the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and
the conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold...
no prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties
interested is the notary's relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity,
at that time the respondent notarized the documents.
We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting
interests without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the complainant;
under Canon 16 for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client's properties;...
and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED
A.C. No. 10689
ROMEO A. ALMARIO vs. ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA-AGNO
DEL CASTILLO, J.
January 8, 2018

FACTS:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint filed by complainant Romeo A.
Almario (complainant) before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar Atty. Dominica L. Agno (respondent lawyer), for
notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) without the personal appearance of one of
the affiants therein.

It is complainant's contention: (l) that the said SP A was falsified because one of the
affiants therein, Francisca A. Mallari (Mallari), could not possibly have executed the
same because she was in Japan at the time the SP A was executed, as certified to by
the Bureau of Immigration (BI); (2) that this SP A was used in the said civil case to
perpetrate fraud and deception against complainant resulting in the filing of Criminal
Case No. 452612-CR, for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Use of
Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia, (Pedia), the attorney-in-fact
mentioned in the SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer notarized the SPA although Mallari
did not personally appear before her; (4) that in the process of notarizing the SPA,
respondent lawyer also accepted a Community Tax Certificate (CTC), which is no
longer considered a competent evidence of identity pursuant to the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice; and (5) that, therefore, respondent lawyer violated Canons 1 and 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, xxx
In her Answer, respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and offered
the following arguments:1) On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan
and it was brought back to the Philippines on July 25, 2006 by Mallari's son, Roman
Mallari-Vestido; 2) The SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 for reasons of expediency,
because therein defendants were pressed for time in filing their Answer in the civil case,
and that in any event, Mallari undertook to have the SPA acknowledged before the
Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006, (thereby giving it retroactive
effect). Respondent lawyer claimed that the aforementioned circumstances showed that
she acted in good faith in notarizing the SPA; 3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the
SP A with red ribbon before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28,
2006; 4) Neither fraud nor deception was perpetrated as the parties in the said civil case
executed a Compromise Agreement, which was approved by the RTC; 5) Contrary to
complainant's claim, CTCs are still presently accepted as proof of personal identification
in cases where no other proof of personal identification is available; and, 6) That, if at
all, it was complainant himself who defrauded the RTC when he stated in his verified
complaint that Mallari is a resident of No. 973 Del Pan St., San Antonio, Tondo, Manila,
even though he knew that Mallari was in Japan at the time of filing of the civil case.
In a Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
lawyer liable for violation of Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and
recommended that she be suspended for six months as notary public.
On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting the
finding and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution dated May 3, 2014.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondent lawyer liable for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Whether or not the penalty of six months as the IBP had recommended is proper.

HELD:
(1) YES.
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a document is notarized is
underscored by Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - 'Acknowledgment' refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document,
declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act
and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the
authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules provides that:
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis
supplied)
These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or personal
presence of the person/s who executed a document, before notarizing the same. In
other words, a document should not be notarized unless the person/s who is/are
executing it is/are personally or physically present before the notary public. The
personal and physical presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature/s of the affiant/s therein and the
due execution of the document.
This Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, held that "notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routinary act[;i]t is imbued with public interest x xx."
In cognate or similar cases, this Court likewise held that a notary public must not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same persons who
executed the same, and personally appeared before him to attest to the truth of the
contents thereof. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.
In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent lawyer despite
the absence of Mallari, one of the affiants therein. Mallari could not have personally
appeared before respondent lawyer in Muntinlupa City, Philippines where the SPA was
notarized on July 26, 2006 because Mallari was in Japan at that time, as certified to by
the Bureau of Immigration.

(2) NO.
The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for two months, instead
of six months as the IBP had recommended. We are impelled by the following reasons
for taking this course of action: first, the apparent absence of bad faith in her notarizing
the SP A in question; second, the civil case wherein the flawed SP A was used ended
up in a judicial Compromise Agreement; and finally, this is her first administrative case
since she was commissioned as a Notary Public in 1973. In addition, respondent lawyer
invites our attention to the fact that she is already in the twilight years of her life.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Dominica L. Agno is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary

Public for the aforesaid infraction for two months and WARNED that the commission of
a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10679, March 10, 2015
PO1 JOSE B. CASPE, Complainant, v. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by P O1 Jose B. Caspe against Atty.

2
Aquilino A. Mejica for alleged violation of Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) specifically
Rules 1.03,3 1.04,4 and 10.015. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP
BOG) recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three years.6cralawred

Caspe alleged the controversy started when Atty. Mejica disregarded conflict of interest
rules. Caspe said that when he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Antonio
Rodriguez, Jr., Atty. Mejica served as Caspe’s counsel. When Rodriguez, Jr. filed his counter-
affidavit, it was Atty. Mejica who counseled and represented him.7cralawred

Caspe brought separate suits for damages and disbarment: one for conflict of interest8 and the
present complaint. Atty. Mejica tried to negotiate a settlement but Caspe refused. Atty. Mejica
allegedly then threatened Caspe that “he will help file cases after cases against the complainant
until he kneels before [him]. He will ‘put down’ complainant so much so that he will be removed
from the service.”9 From then on, Caspe alleged, Atty. Mejica maliciously encouraged the filing
of suits against him.

In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Romulo Gaduena,10 a
barangay tanod, harassed Jan Mark Busa and Marcelino Jataas with a gun. Caspe, who was on
duty, together with PO1 Onofre Lopeña responded. They recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver
which was turned over to the Can-avid Police station. The incident was recorded in the police
blotter. Gaduena evaded arrest with the help of barangay captain Prudencio Agda and other
barangay tanods11 who allegedly clobbered Caspe and took his gun. In the interest of peace
and harmony, the Chief of Police12 called and requested that Caspe desist from filing charges
against the barangay captain and tanods, specifically Gaduena. Caspe acceded.

However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint13 for serious slander by deed
against Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit14 of two barangay tanods. It was
alleged that Caspe kicked, collared and slapped Gaduena’s face. This prompted Caspe to
disregard the agreement with the Chief of Police and he filed cases against
the tanods. Suspecting that Atty. Mejica encouraged Gaduena to file the case against him,
Caspe filed the cases for damages15 and disbarment16 against Atty. Mejica before the IBP.

In its July 4, 2008 Order,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) ordered Atty.
Mejica to submit his answer.

A Notice of Mandatory Conference was issued on September 22, 2008 for a hearing scheduled
on October 21, 2008.18 Atty. Mejica, however, failed to appear. The hearing was rescheduled
on November 18, 2008.

On November 13, 2008, Atty. Mejica filed a manifestation that he never received a copy of the
complaints against him. He asked that the hearing be postponed and rescheduled and that
copies of the complaint be furnished to him.19 The hearing was thus rescheduled to January 13,
200920 and a copy of the complaint was sent to him via a private courier, LBC. It appeared
however that he did not claim the mail.21cralawred

On December 9, 2008, Atty. Mejica once more manifested that he did not receive any notice
from LBC of any mail to be claimed. He also expressed misgivings on the shift from registered
mail to the use of a private courier to send copies of the complaint. He requested that a copy of
the complaint be sent to him via registered mail.22cralawred

Atty. Mejica failed to appear in the January 13, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD issued an order
warning him that his failure to appear in the next rescheduled hearing would render him in
default and the case would be submitted for decision.23cralawred

Atty. Mejica failed to appear for the February 3, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD ordered the case
submitted for decision.24cralawred

In its Report and Recommendation,25 the IBP CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rules
1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR. It stated that Atty. Mejica was corruptly motivated in
encouraging the filing of suits against Caspe making good his threat to file case upon case
against the latter until he kneels before him. Notice was taken that this was Atty. Mejica’s
second infraction for a similar offense. In Baldado v. Mejica,26 he was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three months.27 The IBP CBD thus recommended that Atty.
Mejica be suspended from the practice of law for one year.28cralawred

In its April 15, 2013 Resolution, the IBP BOG adopted the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP CBD.29Atty. Mejica moved for reconsideration.30cralawred

In its May 3, 2014 Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for reconsideration and modified
the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to three years.31 The resolution noted that
Atty. Opinion, member of the BOG and counsel of Caspe for this case, stepped out of the room
when the case came for discussion and did not participate in the voting.32cralawred

Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that he received a
Notice of Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did not appear since he did not
receive a copy of the complaint and was not ordered to answer. For the scheduled February 3,
2009 Conference, Atty. Mejica reasoned that it was impossible for him to attend the meeting
since he received the Notice in the afternoon of February 3, 2009.33 Furthermore, he was not
given the opportunity to answer. Atty. Mejica also maintained that he never threatened Caspe
because he was not present during the preliminary conference where he allegedly uttered the
threatening words.34cralawred

We adopt the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.

The only question the Court takes up in disbarment proceedings is whether the member of the
bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not.35 This Court has stated that a lawyer may
be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in good moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor
as to render him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.36cralawred

In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is
required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken
judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.37 The Court has
required that a complainant has the onus of proving the charges against respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.38cralawred

Based on the Report and Recommendation, the Court is convinced that there is sufficient
evidence to sanction Atty. Mejica. The following observation by the IBP CBD is well
taken:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x First, when the cases were initiated and filed against PO1 Caspe through the help of [Atty.
Mejica], he was already facing disbarment and civil cases which the former filed against
him. Second, these cases [were] filed after [Atty. Mejica] made [the] threat [to] file cases
against PO1 Caspe by reason of [the] refusal to withdraw the disbarment and civil cases. Third,
a gap of more than five months elapsed between the incident of December 21, 2007 and the
filing of the grave slander by deed and that during this period, the chief of Police who [was]
presumed to have regularly performed his job did not prosecute the criminal cases against
[Gaduena] and companions. Fourth, during [the] said period, PO1 Caspe who [was] presumed
to have taken ordinary care of his cause did not file the criminal cases against [Gaduena] and
companions. Fifth, the existence of a settlement agreement between PO1 Caspe and Brgy.
Captain Agda, Kagawad Sobresida and the other tanods is therefore factual, but despite such
settlement, the case for grave slander by deed was still filed with [Atty. Mejica] as
counsel. Sixth, PO1 Caspe filed this disbarment case only after the grave slander by deed and
the multiple attempted murders were filed against him with the help of [Atty. Mejica]. Seventh,
and most importantly, despite ethical proscription, [Atty. Mejica] served as counsel for the
criminal complainants against PO1 Caspe.39cralawlawlibrary

The IBP CBD concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the cases
against PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. We agree that the confluence of
circumstances points to Atty. Mejica’s corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing cases against
Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.

With respect to Atty. Mejica’s claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e., he was not able
to receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason for him not to have attended the
mandatory conference, we find this untenable.
Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar
of the Philippines provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 5. Non-appearance of Parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings. a) Non-appearance

at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall be deemed a waiver of
right to participate in the proceeding. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted.
Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating
Commissioner.cralawlawlibrary

Atty. Mejica during the course of these proceedings has missed all four scheduled hearings
supposedly since he was not furnished any copy of the complaint. Records suggest however
that a copy of the complaint was sent to him on August 25, 2008, a mail which he did not
claim. He submitted two manifestations in response to notices he received. He was thus
placed on notice that there was an action against him.

It is the Court’s opinion that Atty. Mejica’s attitude toward the proceedings before the IBP
indicates a lack of respect for the IBP’s rules and procedures. In Cabauatan v. Venida,40 we
stated that in not heeding the IBP’s directives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x Respondent’s refusal to obey the orders of the IBP “is not only irresponsible, but also
constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming
of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are
expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the
court.” Respondent should be reminded that -
As an officer of the court, [he] is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere
request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true
of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against
lawyers.

Respondent should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and maintaining the
respect due to the courts, respect for law and for legal processes, and of upholding the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession in order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer
effectively.41
cralawlawlibrary

In Heenan v. Espejo,42 a lawyer’s unjustified refusal to heed the directives of the IBP and to
appear at the scheduled mandatory conference constituted a blatant disrespect for the IBP
amounting to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. We looked back on our ruling in Almendarez, Jr. v.
Atty. Langit,43 where we stated that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the
IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the
mandatory conference x x x he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer
is expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must
observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly
constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court
has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys.44cralawlawlibrary

We thus hold that Atty. Mejica further violated Canon 1145 of the CPR which calls for a lawyer to
observe and give due respect to courts and judicial officers.

Given that this is Atty. Mejica’s second infraction, we thus rule it appropriate under the
circumstances to impose a two-year suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.03,
1.04 and 10.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 10451 February 4, 2015

SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in
his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of Mariecris Umaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.2

The Facts

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections
for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this,
complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On
November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of
₱30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
₱30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to
prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the
necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments
are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera
(Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid
affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately
unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip)
and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera
and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were
done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had
all the documents notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat (Atty. Manguiat).8 Later,
however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in
the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign
the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of
Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty.
De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to
rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among
others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a
mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that
the affidavits at hand were falsified.11

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing;
and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.12

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his
non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the
particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera,
Judge Belosillo received ₱60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order
to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for
the case if the complainants would give him ₱80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge
Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.13

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty.
De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to
withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the ₱60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected
from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case.14

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.15

In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against
him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election
protest based on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing of
Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was
Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He
added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As
he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in
view of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case.18 To
add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants
executed a document entitled "Release Waiver & Discharge,"19 which, to him, discharges him
and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, including the
instant administrative case.

After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and
recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21

While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated
in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respectto
the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to
comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-
Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could
sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing,
and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was found to be
credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the
backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done on
November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed
that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of
advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the
affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the
election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession.24

In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to
adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified
document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.

On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated

February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing
the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by
the records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6)
months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar,
for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country
has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28

I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also
to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It
is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this
light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."

After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in
holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e., Almera’s
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the
election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that
nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that the
IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during disciplinary
proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts– are given the opportunity to first-hand observe
their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on
the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution
dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score.
Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but
another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life,31 and that he
had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less of the participation
in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere
general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed
participated in the procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of
the claim of falsification.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation – is
that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated
retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a
mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly
improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the
documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to
represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate preparation34 or allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.35

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned "Release
Waiver & Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged
him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present
case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott36 that:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.1âwphi1 What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record,
the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended
the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in
court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the same
here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
₱60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses
intrinsically related to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby
can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one's misdeeds committed
against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary sanctions.43

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating

the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a stem warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will
be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia

Umaguing the amount of ₱60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of further
administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice