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March 2009 Decisions on Remedial Law

Posted on April 26, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. • Posted in Remedial Law • Tagged action to revive
judgment, appeal, certiorari, conspiracy, evidence, execution pending appeal, final decision, forum
shopping, information, injunction, intervention, jurisdiction, litis pendentia, mandamus, motion for reconsideration, offer of
testimony, Ombudsman, pre-trial, prescription, real party in interest, reconveyance, res judicata, service, testimony
Here are selected March 2009 decisions of the Supreme Court on remedial law:

Appeal; failure to file brief. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the authority of the Court
of Appeals to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief is a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a
dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness
must be observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case. In the
present case, the petitioner blames its former handling lawyer for failing to file the appellant’s brief on time.
This lawyer was allegedly transferring to another law office at the time the appellant’s brief was due to be
filed. In his excitement to transfer to his new firm, he forgot about the appeal and the scheduled deadline; he
likewise forgot his responsibility to endorse the case to another lawyer in the law office. Under the
circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held the failure to file the appeal brief inexcusable. Bachrach
Corporation vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. 159915, March 12, 2009.

Appeal; failure to file brief. Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure of the
appellant to file the appellants’ brief on time. However, the dismissal is directory, not mandatory. Hence, the
court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The
discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play,
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case . . . The circulars of this Court prescribing technical
and other procedural requirements are meant to promptly dispose of unmeritorious petitions that clog the
docket and waste the time of the courts. These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure,
not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain their
prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. Thus, in a
considerable number of cases, the Court has deemed it fit to suspend its own rules or to exempt a particular
case from its strict operation where the appellant failed to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period,
resulting in the appellate court’s failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. With more reason, there should be
wider latitude in exempting a case from the strictures of procedural rules when the appellate court has already
obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case and, as in this case, petitioners failed to file the appellants’ brief
on time. Felimon Bigornia, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 173017, March 17, 2009.
Appeal; late payment of docket fees. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal for late
payment of docket fees. Erlinda K. Ilusorio Vs. Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, G.R. No. 171656, March 17, 2009.
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; certification proceeding. The requirement for a certificate of non-forum
shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties
litigate their respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or
applicant. A certification proceeding, even though initiated by a “petition,” is not a litigation but an
investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character. Samahan ng mga Mangagawa sa Samma-Lakas
etc. vs. Samma Corporation, G.R. No. 167141, March 13, 2009.
Certiorari; material dates. There are three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari
brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or Resolution was received;
second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof
was received. In this case, petitioner failed to indicate all the three material dates, namely, the date of receipt
of the June 18, 2007 Order, the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration, as well as the date of receipt of
the denial thereof, which is the reckoning date of the 60-day period. Moreover, the certified true copies of the
assailed orders were not attached to the petition. Thus, the petition must be dismissed. Macapanton B. Batugan
vs. Hon. Rasad G. Balindong, et al., G.R. No. 181384, March 13, 2009.
Certiorari; motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions, namely: (1) when the issue raised is purely of
law; (2) when public interest is involved; or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has ruled
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non,
when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively
passed upon by the lower court. JP Latex Technology, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Romeo C. de Leon, et al., G.R. No.
177121, March 16, 2009
Evidence; offer of testimony. The failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to
establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which
characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally offered in court, fatally conflict with
every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused. It is this same reason that now moves us to reverse
the judgment of conviction in the present case. Ronald Carino and Rosana Andes vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009
Evidence; testimony. Well settled is the rule that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness is
sufficient for conviction. Likewise, the prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present
as witnesses. It need not present each and every witness but only such as may be needed to meet the quantum
of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other
witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. We have ruled that the
non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the
prosecution’s case. People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo “Rudy” Soriano, G.R. No. 171085, March 17,
2009,
Evidence; conspiracy. Jurisprudence teaches us that “proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence,
as the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more
persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the
details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.” Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons
aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among them to concert means is proved. Conspiracy was thus properly appreciated by the Sandiganbayan
because even though there was no direct proof that petitioners agreed to cause injury to the government and
give unwarranted benefits to Amago Construction, their individual acts when taken together as a whole
showed that they were acting in concert and cooperating to achieve the same unlawful objective. The barangay
officials’ award of the contract to Amago Construction without the benefit of specific plans and specifications,
the preparation of work programs only after the constructions had been completed, the issuance and
encashment of checks in favor of Amago Construction even before any request to obligate the appropriation or
to issue a disbursement voucher was made, and the subsequent inspection and issuance of certificates of
completion by petitioner employees despite the absence of material documents were all geared towards one
purpose-to cause undue injury to the government and unduly favor Amago Construction. Felix T. Ripalda, et
al. vs. People of the Philippines / Narcia A. Grefiel vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. / Cesar P. Guy vs. the
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166880-82, March 20, 2009.
Execution pending appeal. Discretionary execution is allowed only when the period to appeal has commenced
but before the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. The period to appeal where a motion for
reconsideration has been filed commences only upon the receipt of a copy of the order disposing of the motion
for reconsideration. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration, therefore, prevents the running of the
period to appeal. In the absence of an appeal from the decision, as the motion for reconsideration is still
unresolved, the execution ordered by the RTC cannot be properly considered as execution pending appeal. JP
Latex Technology, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Romeo C. de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 177121, March 16, 2009
Execution pending appeal. Well-settled is the rule that there can be no execution until and unless the
judgment has become final and executory, i.e. the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been
taken, or, having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the
court of origin, in which event, execution shall issue as a matter of right. In short, once a judgment becomes
final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court’s ministerial
duty.
Furthermore, as a matter of settled legal principle, a writ of execution must adhere to every essential particulars
of the judgment sought to be executed. An order of execution may not vary or go beyond the terns of the
judgment it seeks to enforce. A writ of execution must conform to the judgment and if it is different from, goes
beyond or varies the tenor of the judgment which gives it life, it is a nullity. Otherwise stated, when the order
of execution and the corresponding writ issued pursuant thereto is not in harmony with and exceeds the
judgment which gives it life, they have pro tanto no validity – to maintain otherwise would be to ignore the
constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law. Simeon
Cabang, et al. vs. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009.

Final decision. The DARAB decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 had long become final and executory, hence,
immutable and unalterable. It may thus no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Excepted from this rule is when the modification involves
correction of 1) clerical errors, 2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and 3) void
judgments. None of these exceptions is present in the case at bar, however. Julio Mercado vs. Edmundo
Mercado, G.R. No. 178672. March 19, 2009; see also Simeon Cabang, et al. vs. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo
Basay, G.R. No. 180587. March 20, 2009.
Final decision. Basic is the rule that when a party to an original action fails to question an adverse judgment or
decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law, he loses the right to do so, and
the judgment or decision, as to him, becomes final and binding. In this case, the petitioners are among the
several respondents in the cases decided by the DOLE-NCR and later on appealed to and upheld by the BLR.
Notably, however, s pointed out by Oredina, petitioners did not take any further action after the BLR issued its
Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. When Peñas challenged the BLR Resolutions by filing a
petition for certiorari with the CA, petitioners did not join him. Such was a serious procedural lapse that tolled
the finality of the BLR Resolutions as against them, thus, warranting the dismissal of the instant petition. As
admitted by petitioners, their counsel received the copy of the BLR Resolution[15] dated August 24, 2000
denying their Motion for Reconsideration on 31 August 2000. Petitioners, therefore, had sixty (60) days, or
until 30 October 2000, to file a petition under Rule 65 before the CA, This, petitioners failed to do.
For failing to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, petitioners are deemed to have acquiesced to the adverse
BLR judgment. There is, therefore, no cogent reason why petitioners should be allowed to come before this
Court to assail the decision rendered by the CA when they were never parties to the said action. Dolly A.
Ocampo, et al. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 150334, March 20, 2009
Information; conspiracy. The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and
Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and
Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to the
office and while in the performance of their official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped
each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident bad
faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and
prejudice of the government. The felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction
public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy
Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said
construction company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation of the accused in the
allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact that under Philippine law,
conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be
constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime
only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and
sedition.

When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set
forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only
because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-
principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is
collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of
all. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. Vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., G.R. No. 180122. March 13, 2009
Intervention. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, even though a non-party, is bound by the judgment
because aside from being a relative of or privy to Spouses Fernandez, she is also acting as their agent when she
occupied the property after the RTC ordered execution pending appeal in order to frustrate the
judgment. Sofia Aniosa Salandanan vs. Spouses Ma. Isabela and Bayani Mendez, G.R. No. 160280, March
13, 2009.
Intervention. Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of
Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As
regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and
immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment.
The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or
sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or
collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the
sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which is limited by considering “whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.”
To allow intervention, (a) it must be shown that the movant has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or is
otherwise qualified; and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur, as the first is not more important than the second.

The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The
permissive term of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting
or disallowing intervention. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. vs. Northeast Freight Forwarders, Inc.. G.R. No.
179516. March 17, 2009
Injunction. In this case, the petitioner’s mortgaged properties were already foreclosed, as shown by the
Certificate of Sale issued on November 19, 2001. The ownership of the lands-subject of the real estate
mortgage had been consolidated and transfer certificates of title had been issued in the name of the creditor It
is on this score that the Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
moot and academic. The court also held that it unnecessary for the Court to still dwell on petitioner’s argument
that it was not, under its By-Laws, empowered to mortgage its properties to secure the obligation of a third
party. Zomer Development Co. Inc. vs. International Exchange Bank, et al., G.R. No. 150694. March 13,
2009
Injunction; necessity for hearing. A hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Bank of the Philippines Islands vs. La Suerte Trading & Industrial Corp. etc., G.R. No. 164875,
March 20, 2009.
Jurisdiction. Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. It is elementary
that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in
accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The courts,
in rendering decisions, ought to limit themselves to the issues presented by the parties in their pleadings. A
judgment that goes outside of the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear
the parties is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of
fair play.
In an ejectment case, the only issue for resolution is the question of who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property in dispute. In this case, respondents’ complaint for ejectment before the MTCC
clearly stated that the subject matter of the complaint was Lot No. 934-B-4. In their answer to counterclaim,
respondents reaffirmed that the subject matter of the complaint was Lot No. 934-B-4. The MTCC’s
preliminary conference order limited the issue to whether petitioners had cottages on Lot No. 934-B-4.
Petitioners and respondents filed their position papers on the basis of the foregoing issue. Clearly, the issue in
the complaint for ejectment was limited to the possession of Lot No. 934-B-4. Therefore, the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, in ruling on the possession and ownership of Lot No. 934-B-7, went beyond the issue of the
case. Sps. Adriano and Norma Sioson, et al. vs. Heirs of Federico Avancena, etc., G.R. No. 161387, March
13, 2009
Jurisdiction; allegations in complaint. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which body
has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the
nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of an action and which
court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the essence of the
relief prayed for. Based on the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint, it is the HLURB, not the RTC,
which has jurisdiction over this case. Lourdes L. Eristingcol vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
167702. March 20, 2009.
Litis pendentia. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not
allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action.
This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of
controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake
of the stability of the rights and status of persons. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. Villarica
Pawnshop, Inc. etc. Vs. Sps. Roger & Corazon Gernale, et al. G.R. No. 163344, March 20, 2009.
Mandamus. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a
public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in
which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the
City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb
Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of
a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However,
mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing
to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not
refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same.
Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper
remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge
Bay. Nilo Hipos, Sr. representing Darryl Hipos, et al. vs. Hon. Teodoro A. Bay etc., G.R. No. 174813-
15, March 17, 2009
Motion for Reconsideration. It is a hornbook doctrine that the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion
for reconsideration is non-extendible. Provisions of the Rules of Court prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken are considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial businesses and strict
compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative.
The citation by the appellate court of the ruling in Amorganda is misplaced. In Amorganda, the Court stated
that the therein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration which was filed two calendar days late should have
been given due course by the appellate court, as the counsel’s mistaken belief that the last day for filing the
motion, a Saturday, was a legal holiday, is pardonable. The Court went on to note that “anyway, the delay of
two (2) calendar days – one of which was a Sunday- in the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not
prejudice the cause of private respondents, or that said private respondents suffered material injury by reason
of the delay,” and that “private respondents who appear to be guilty of coercion, stand to unjustly profit from
their fraudulent and deceitful act at the expense of petitioners.”
In the case at bar, not only was there a considerable delay of 11 days beyond the 15-day reglementary period;
no explanation therefor was proffered by respondents. That respondents numbered more than a hundred does
not, per se, justify the relaxation of procedural rules. Motorola Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Imelda B. Ambrocio
et al., G.R. No. 173279. March 30, 2009
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant
facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint should the
Ombudsman find the complaint insufficient in form or substance, or the Ombudsman may proceed with the
investigation if, in the Ombudsman’s view, the complaint is in due form and substance. Hence, the filing or
non-filing of the information is primarily lodged within the “full discretion” of the Ombudsman. The Supreme
Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s
constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman, which is “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” However, the Supreme Court is not precluded
from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is grave abuse of discretion, in which case the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Court may be exceptionally invoked pursuant to Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Severino Vergara Vs. The Honorable Ombudsman Severino J. Lajara and Virginia G. Baroro,
G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009. See also Office of the Ombudsman vs. Ricardo Evangelista, et al., G.R.
No. 177211. March 13, 2009; Dinah C. Castillo vs. Antonio M. Escutin, et al., G.R. No. 171056. March 13,
2009
Prescription; action to revive judgment. The action to revive the judgment in the forcible entry case had not
prescribed. The judgment sought to be revived was rendered on August 25, 1975 and the motion for
reconsideration of the said judgment was denied on September 15, 1976. A writ of execution was in fact
issued. The writ of execution was not enforced, however, within five years or up to or on or about September
15, 1981. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 16681 ─ the action for revival of judgment ─ on August 26,
1985, was well within the 10-year prescriptive period. STRANGELY, the appellate court, in its challenged
decision of May 31, 2006, appears to have reckoned the 10-year prescriptive period from the finality of the
trial court’s decision up to the promulgation of its (the appellate court’s) decision on May 31, 2006, hence, its
ruling that 30 years had already passed from the finality of the trial court’s decision. Conrado Quesada, et al.
vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 177516. March 13, 2009
Prescription; reconveyance. An aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust, which prescribes in 10 years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the
property, provided that the property has not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value. An action for
reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully or fraudulently registered by another, to its
rightful and legal owner. If the registered owner, be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the
free patent was transferred, knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens title
belonged to another, who together with his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession thereof, and if the
patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof, the true owner may bring an action to
have the ownership of or title to the land judicially settled. The court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titled issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the
registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner
thereof. In the instant case, respondents brought the action for reconveyance of the subject lots before the RTC
only on 23 December 2004, or more than 12 years after the Torrens titles were issued in favor of petitioner
Perfecta on 9 October 1962. The remedy is, therefore, already time-barred. Perfecta Cavile, et al. vs. Justina
Litania-Hong, et al., G.R. No. 179540. March 13, 2009
Pre-trial; non-appearance. Non-appearance by the plaintiff in the pre-trial is a cause for dismissal of the
action. However, every rule is not without an exception. In fact, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of
Court explicitly provides that the non-appearance of a party may be excused if a valid cause is shown therefor.
Such a valid cause extant in the case at bar. Anson Trade Center, Inc. et al. vs. Pacific Banking
Corporation, represented by its liquidator, The President of the PDIC, G.R. No. 179999. March 17, 2009.
Real party in interest. A co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs since the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all;
and that Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 2016, reinforced by Presidential Decree No. 1517, which
prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/occupants, extends only to landless urban families who are rightful
occupants of the land and its structures, and does not include those whose presence on the land is merely
tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose
possession is under litigation. James Estreller, et al. Vs. Luis Migue Ysmael, et al., G.R. No. 170264, March
13, 2009
Res judicata. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled
if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. The doctrine of res
judicata is founded on a public policy against re-opening that which has previously been decided, so as to put
the litigation to an end. The four requisites for res judicata to apply are: (a) the former judgment or order must
be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. National Investment and Development
Corp. vs. Sps. Francisco and Basilisa Bautista, G.R. No. 150388. March 13, 2009.
Service. The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service, the
completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2) constructive
service, the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five days from the date the addressee
received the first notice of the postmaster. A party who relies on constructive service or who contends that his
adversary has received a copy of a final order or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the date the
addressee received the first notice sent by the postmaster must prove that the first notice was actually received
by the addressee. Such proof requires a certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee. Service of the NLRC decision via registered mail was deemed completed as of August 16, 1999, or
five days after the first notice on August 11, 1999. As such, PAL only had 10 days from August 16, 1999 to
file its motion for reconsideration. Its motion filed on October 29, 1999 was therefore late. Hence the NLRC
decision became final and executory. Philippine Airlines Inc vs. Heirs of Bernandin J. Zamora, G.R. No.
164267/G.R. No. 166996. March 31, 2009
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