KINDS OF PLEADINGS (Rule 6, Sections 1-13)

Cutaran, Jal Arana

1. Mongao vs. Pryce Properties, GR No. 156474, 16 August 2005

DOCTRINE: When the answer asserts affirmative defenses, there is proper joinder of issues that must be
ventilated in a full-blown trial on the merits. It cannot be resolved by a mere judgment on the pleadings.

An affirmative defense is one that is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but one
which, if established, will be a good defense.

Adolfo, Rochelle Angela Rabang

2. Dio vs. SBMA, GR No. 189532, 11 June 2014

DOCTRINE: The nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure
result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the
courprovided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity that
may warrant its outright dismissal.

Apolinario, Eufemia Mulimbayan

4. Bungcayao vs. Fort Ilocandia Properties, GR No. 170483, 19 April 2010

DOCTRINE: A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may
have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with,
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory
in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set
up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and
useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the
Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not
in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.
Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A "genuine
issue" is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim.

Arboleda, Anreinne Sabille Larizabal

5. Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc., GR No. 207970, 20 January
2016

DOCTRINE: The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the
defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are considered. It is an error for
the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another
case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.

PARTS AND CONTENTS OF PLEADINGS (Rule 7, Sections 1-6)

Bahia, Hannah Grace Israel

6. Vallacar Transit Inc vs. Jocelyn Catubig, GR No. 175512, 30 May 2011

DOCTRINE: Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere
speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served.

Bitong, John Eli Zuriel De Villa

7. Chua vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, GR No. 182311, 19 August 2009

DOCTRINE: If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed
without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if the forum shopping is willful
and deliberate, both (or all, if... there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.
In this case, petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 for the purpose of seeking a favorable
decision in another forum. Otherwise, they would not have moved for the consolidation of both cases. Thus, only
Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 is dismissed and the hearing of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-Branch 258
will be continued.

Boncayao, Paty Kaye Cedro

8. Zarsona Medical vs. PHIC, GR No. 191225, 13 October 2014

DOCTRINE: The submission of an SPA authorizing an attorney-in-fact to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping on behalf of the principal party is considered as substantial compliance with the Rules. The
rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, or the verification for that
matter “should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure — which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.”

Cabugatan, Muammar Montila

9. Anderson vs. Ho, GR No. 172590, 7 January 2013

DOCTRINE: The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal
party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the
same parties, issues and causes of action”
 Celino, Rayan Jen Cosalan
10. Vda. De Formoso vs. PNB, GR No. 154704, 1 June 2011

DOCTRINE:Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule
on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons.

Cuevas, Kathleen Allysa Marie Aquino

11. Metrobank vs. Santos, GR No. 157867, 15 December 2009

DOCTRINE: The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or other initiatory pleading.
The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading.

DALIPE, Ria Alisandra Tolentino

12. Argallon-Jocson and Tusing vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 162836, 30 July 2009

DOCTRINE: The lack of certification against forum shopping or a defective certification is generally not curable by
its subsequent submission or correction, unless there is a need to relax the rule under special circumstances or for
compelling reasons.

De La Serna, Samantha Grace Mauleon

13. Maranaw Hotel and Resort Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 149660, 20 January 2009

DOCTRINE: An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists.

Dela Pieza, Mary Joy Valle

14. Cagayan Valley vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR No. 151413, 13 February 2008

DOCTRINE: The determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale
applied is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or
certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations
in the petition.

Delos Santos, Janah Joaquin

 15. Fuentebella vs. Castro, GR No. 150865, 30 June 2006

DOCTRINE: Rule 7, Section 5 mandates the petitioner or the principal party must execute the certification against
forum shopping.

Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly
authorized director or representative.

Devesa, Imelda Mallari

16. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Santos, GR No. 152579, 4 August 2009

DOCTRINE:

Every pleading must be signed by the party our counsel representing him. An unsigned pleading produces
no legal effect; however, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall
appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended to delay.

Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, seeking to possibly get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal
or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be an institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.

MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS (Rule 8, Sections 1-13)

Diel, Joan Cervantes

17. Eliza Zuniga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, 197380, 8 October 2014

DOCTRINE: Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the
proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of
cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only allege the ultimate facts
or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if they cannot be
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined to
the four corners of the complaint, and no other.

Tie it up with rule 16 sec. 1(g): grounds for a motion to dismiss

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

Dominguez, Mary Grace Belmonte

18. Lazaro vs. Brewmaster International, 182779, 23 August 2010

DOCTRINE: The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint to constitute a cause of action is
whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer of the petition or complaint. To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action,
all documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered, particularly when referred to in the complaint.
consideration of the annexed documents should only be taken in the context of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.

the sales invoices are not actionable documents. They were not the bases of respondent’s action for sum
of money but were attached to the Complaint only to provide details on the alleged transactions. They
were evidentiary in nature and not even necessary to be stated or cited in the Complaint

Escudero, Thrishannel Pascual

19. Vda. de Daffon vs. CA, 129017, 20 August 2002

DOCTRINE: For certiorari to lie, it must be convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law; or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. In the case at bar, the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in
dismissing the petition for certiorari.

Gesmundo, Jeanette Elaine Ilagan

20. Canete vs. Genuino Ice Co., 154080, 22 January 2008

DOCTRINE: A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as
distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law.

Guinto, Roleen Wendee Napoles

21. Steelcase vs. Design International, 171995, 18 April 2012

DOCTRINE: We held in the case of Elayda v. Court of Appeals, that an admission made in the pleadings cannot
be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him. Thus, our consistent
pronouncement, as held in cases such as Merril Lynch Futures v. Court of Appeals, is apropos

The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the
same by entering into a contract with it. And the ‘doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to foreign
as well as to domestic corporations;’ "one who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is
estopped to deny its existence and capacity." The principle "will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a
foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such
person has received the benefits of the contract . . ."

HERNANDEZ, Corine Elizabeth Oandasan

22. Luistro vs. CA, 158819, 16 April 2009

DOCTRINE: Circumstances constituting the allegations of fraud must be stated with particularity under Section 5,
Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Kim, Hye Ri Drilon

23. Titan Construction vs. David, 169548, 15 March 2010

DOCTRINE: Where a party acted in complete disregard of or wholly overlooked Section 8, Rule 8 and did not
object to the introduction and admission of evidence questioning the genuineness and due execution of a
document, he must be deemed to have waived the benefits of said Rule.

Librojo, Joseph Macasaet

 24. Consolidated Bank vs. Del Monte Motor Works, 143338, 29 July 2005

DOCTRINE: SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. – When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for
an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

Mabanglo, Aily Liezel Molina

25. Guevarra vs. Eala, 7136, 1 August 2007

DOCTRINE: A Negative Pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at
least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission
of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held
that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

Mamisao, Michelle Espiritu

26. Halimao vs. Villanueva, A.C. 3825, 1 February 1996

DOCTRINE: The rule that a motion to dismiss is to be considered as a hypothetical admission of the facts
alleged in the complaint applies more particularly to cases in which the ground for dismissal is the failure
of the complaint to state a cause of action.

Manalansan, Lizel De Leon

27. Pacsport Inc Phils vs. Niccolo Sports, 141602, 22 November 2001

DOCTRINE: A final judgment on the merits in one would be a bar against the other on the ground of res judicata.
When the elements of litis pendentia exist, the action filed later should be abated to avoid multiplicity of suits
Matienzo, Joseph Napoleon Salvador
28. Panganiban vs. Pilipinas Shell Corp., 131471, 22 January 2003

DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the action for declaratory relief was filed earlier than the case for unlawful detainer
does not necessarily mean that the first case will be given preference. We have ruled that the earlier case can be
dismissed in favor of the latter case if the latter case is the mor
e appropriate forum for the ventilation of the issues between the parties.

Millado, Diane Angelica Juachon

29. Sunville Timber Products Inc vs. Abad, 85502, 24 February 1992

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action,
which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.

Ng, Lawrence Andrew Adlawan

30. Hacienda Bigaa Inc. vs. Chavez, 174160, 20 April 2010
DOCTRINE: Since Chavez raised the question of ownership or title in his answer, the issue of ownership became
a material consideration in the lower court's inquiry into the character, nature and extent of the parties’ claimed
possession.

Noval, Angelica Fronteras

31. Chu vs. Sps. Cunanan, 156185, 12 September 2011

DOCTRINE: As to the 4th requisite of res judicata, there is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are
the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
Absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for res judicata to apply because a shared identity of
interest is sufficient. Mere substantial identity of parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were
not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.

Oasan, Wendy Louise Macaraeg

32. Galindo vs. Heirs of Roxas, 147969, 17 January 2005

DOCTRINE: Section 4 , Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint.
In order to maintain an action action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is,
he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person,
and no suit can lawfully be prosecuted in the name of that person. The party bringing suit has the burden of
proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims.If a complaint is filed by one who claims to
represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint.

Padre, David Anthony Jr. Cervantes

33. Swedish Match vs. CA, 128120, 20 October 2004

DOCTRINE:

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD (Rule 9, Sections 1 to 3) AND WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS
(Rule 11, Sections 1 to 11)
Sections 5, 6 and 9 of The 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Sections 9, 11,12, 13 and 14 of the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases

Patriarca, Angelo Gabriel Bautista

34. Heirs of Favis Sr. vs. Gonzales, 185922, 15 January 2014

DOCTRINE: The second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule that
defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows
courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor of the second
sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can proceed only from the
exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical because there can be no ruling on a waived
ground.

Pujalte, Bianca Margarita Pardo

 35. Carniyan vs. Home Guaranty Corporation, 228516, 14 August 2019

DOCTRINE: Resort may be had to a petition for certiorari only in the absence of an appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that no judgment had yet been
rendered a quo, the petitioners, pursuant to Section 3(b) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, should have filed
a motion to lift the order declaring them in default. Failing to do so, their recourse to the CA via a petition for
certiorari was improper.

Quiñones - Egagamao, Karess Echem

36. Otero vs. Tan, 200134, 15 August 2012

DOCTRINE: A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the court in default. Loss of
standing in court, the forfeiture of one's right as a party litigant, contestant or legal adversary, is the consequence
of an order of default. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and
examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by the
court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him.

A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from raising any other ground in his appeal from the
judgment by default since, otherwise, he would then be allowed to adduce evidence in his defense, which right he
had lost after he was declared in default.

Raz, Mark Lorenz Saculo

37. David vs. Gutierrez-Fruelda, 170427, 30 January 2009

DOCTRINE: To the issue of default. One declared in default has the following remedies:

a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now
Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);

Rollo, Noel Jethro III Macaspac

38. Monzon vs. Spouses Relova, 171827, 17 April 2008

DOCTRINE: Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and NOT the failure to appear at
the hearing, is the proper ground to declare a party in default.

Roxas, Marlen Navaluna

39. Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, 151098, 21 March 2006

DOCTRINE:The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of the
prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be required if
the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and
to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the
complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any
countervailing evidence.
 Salvador, Patricia Ann Pongos
40. Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education, 139371, 4 April 2001

DOCTRINE:The remedies that are available to a defendant declared in default, are as follows: (1) a motion
to set aside the order of default under Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, if the default was
discovered before judgment could be rendered; (2) a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37, if
the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available; (3) a petition for relief under
Rule 38, if judgment has become final and executory; and (4) an appeal from the judgment under Section 1,
Rule 41, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been resorted to.

These remedies, however, are available only to a defendant who has been validly declared in default. Such
defendant irreparably loses the right to participate in the trial. Such defendant irreparably loses the right to
participate in the trial. On the other hand, a defendant improvidently declared in default may retain and
exercise such right after the order of default and the subsequent judgment by default are annulled, and the
case remanded to the court of origin.

Samonte, Maria Genevieve Castro

41. De Guia vs. De Guia, 135384, 4 April 2001

DOCTRINE: Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served separately
on the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct the
counsel to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence
of such notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality
and may be attacked directly or collaterally.

Santiago, Monette Victoria Catungal

42. Luna vs. Mirafuente, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1610, 26 September 2005

DOCTRINE: The word "shall" in Section 5 and Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
underscores their mandatory character. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of
the Rule and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of the suits covered thereby. To admit a late answer
is to put a premium on dilatory maneuvers — the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress.

Santillan, Edward Jayson Baterna

43. Ponciano vs. Parentela, 133284, 9 May 2000

DOCTRINE:ID.; ACTIONS; PLEADINGS; COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM; DEFINED. — A

compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have
against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the
sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and
will be barred in the future if not set up.

ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM, NOT COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94. — In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the
counterclaims pleaded by petitioners in their answer are compulsory in nature. The filing of a separate
action by petitioners would only result in the presentation of the same evidence as in Civil Case No.
TM-601. Proceeding from our ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital, petitioners need not file a
certification of non-forum shopping since their claims are not initiatory in character, and therefore, are
not covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
 Silva, Virna Grace Marasigan
44. Sps. Barraza vs. Campos, Jr., L-50437, 28 February 1983

DOCTRINE: There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the
running of the period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and
pending before the court, refers only to the original period of 15 days and not to the extension of time to
file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is
denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule
11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different
period. This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his answer not only
within the original 15 days period but also within "a different period (as) fixed by the court.

AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS (Rule 10, Sections 1 to 8)

Siron, Charmaine Grace Medina

45. Spouses Dionisio vs. Linsangan, 178159, 2 March 2011

DOCTRINE: To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of action, the test is whether such
amendment now requires the defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is completely different from that
stated in the original complaint.

Suarez, Jacob Almero

46. Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. S.R Farms, Inc., 161849, 9 July 2010

DOCTRINE:

The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original;
hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment.

Facts:
● On 25 March 1992, Continental Enterprises Ltd loaded a shipment of soya bean meal on board the M/V Hui
Yang at Bedi Bunder, India, for transportation and delivery to Manila, with the respondent, SR Farms Inc,
identified as the consignee/notify party.
● The shipment was said to weigh 1,100 mt and was covered by a bill of lading. The vessel was owned and
operated by Conti-Feed & Maritime Pvt Ltd (Conti-Feed), with the petitioner, Wallem Philippines Shipping
Inc (Wallem), as its local ship agent
● The cargo was part of a shipment in bulk. The shipment was discharged and transferred into the custody of
receiving barges. The offloading of the shipment was handled by Ocean Terminal Services Inc. A cargo
check revealed a shortage of 80.467 mt of soya bean meal.
● The respondent filed a claim for damages against Conti-Feed, RCS Shipping Agencies Inc (RCS), which it
thought was the local ship agent of Conti-Feed, Ocean Terminal Services Inc, and Cargo Trade, the
customs broker
● On 7 June 1993, the respondent filed an amended complaint impleading the petitioner Wallem, alleging that
Wallem, and not RCS, had in fact acted as Conti-Feed's ship agent
● The regional trial Court dismissed the respondent's complaint, as well as the opposing parties' counterclaims
and cross-claims.
● The respondent appealed to the CA.
● The CA reversed and set aside the trial Court's decision, ordering Conti-Feed and Wallem to pay the value
of the missing cargo.
● Wallem appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the claim against it was time-
barred.

Issue:
Whether or not that the filing of the Amended Complaint against petitioner should retroact to the date of the filing of
the original complaint.

Held:
 The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original;
hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment. It is true that, as an exception, this Court
has held that an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates
back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after
the service of the original complaint. The exception, however, would not apply to the party impleaded for the first time
in the amended complaint.
The rule on the non-applicability of the curative and retroactive effect of an amended complaint, insofar as newly
impleaded defendants are concerned, has been established as early as in the case of Aetna Insurance Co. v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation. In the said case, the defendant Barber Lines Far East Service was impleaded for the first
time in the amended complaint which was filed after the one-year period of prescription. The order of the lower court
dismissing the amended complaint against the said defendant on ground of prescription was affirmed by this Court.
In the instant case, petitioner was only impleaded in the amended Complaint of June 7, 1993, or one (1) year, one (1)
month and twenty-three (23) days from April 15, 1992, the date when the subject cargo was fully unloaded from the
vessel. Hence, reckoned from April 15, 1992, the one-year prescriptive period had already lapsed.
Having ruled that the action against petitioner had already prescribed, the Court no longer finds it necessary to
address the other issues raised in the present petition.

Tablizo, Darlymple Dayne Robles

47. Philippine Ports Authority vs. Gothong, 158401, 28 January 2008

DOCTRINE:

Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause
of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the
rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding .

Facts:
● William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. (WG&A), is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in
the shipping industry and Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is a government-owned and
controlled company.
● WG&A requested PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the said facility.
● Philippine Sports Authority (PPA) approved the request of WG&A to lease the Marine Slipway
from January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that respondent PPA turned over its
operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor Modernization Project.
● Aftersometime, PPA subsequently sent a letter to WG&A directing the latter to vacate the
contested premises stating that their contract had already expired.
● WG&A claims that the PPA unjustly, illegally and prematurely terminated the lease contract.
● After which, WG&A amended its complaint for the first time incorporated statements to the
effect that PPA is already estopped from denying that the correct period of lease is "until such
time that the North Harbor Modernization Project has been bidded out to and operations turned
over to the winning bidder”.
● Thereafter, WG&A filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second Amended Complaint. This
time, however, the complaint was already captioned as one for Injunction with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and damages and/or for
Reformation of Contract.
● The (RTC) respondent judge issued an Order denying the Admission of the Second Amended
Complaint
● WG&A then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the nullification of the
aforementioned RTC orders.
● The CA granted WG&A petition, thereby setting aside the RTC orders and directing the RTC to
admit WG&A second amended complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Hence, this petition

Issue: whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the admission of the second amended complaint.

Held:
a. The CA did not err in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Order denying the admission of respondent's second amended complaint.

Old law:

Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. — after the case is set for hearing, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears
to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of action or
defense is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section
shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an
opportunity to be heard.

Amended law:

SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused
if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court
upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after
notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

b. Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner
that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off
and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is
that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action
or defense."
c. However, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent
delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
d. Therefore, the application of the old Rules by the RTC almost five years after its amendment by
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the
petition is DENIED

Uriarte, Juan Carlos Gandeza

48. Sps. Lambino vs. Presiding Judge, 169551, 24 January 2007

DOCTRINE: A supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the
original complaint. A new and independent cause of action cannot be set up. It must be based on matters
arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the claim or defense presented
therein, and founded on the same cause of action.
 The admission or non-admission of a supplemental pleading is not a matter of right but is discretionary on the
court. Among the factors that the court will consider are: 1) resulting prejudice to the parties; and 2)
whether the movant would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to be denied.

FACTS:

● On July 21, 1994, petitioners Orlando M. Lambino, a lawyer, and his wife, Carmelita C. Lambino, secured a
housing loan of P600,000.00 from private respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI). Petitioners
executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement (MLA) over their property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title as a
security for the loan. Under the MLA, the proceeds of the loan would be released to petitioners depending
on the percentage of work completed.

● The parties agreed that private respondent would release the net proceeds of the loan by crediting their
Savings Account which petitioners maintained in the Valenzuela branch of the BPI and to debit from said
account all amounts that may be due from petitioners under the MLA and other documents executed in
connection thereto. However, petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations from January 15, 1995 to
May 15, 1995.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
● On May 22, 1995, private respondent filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the MLA with the Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Valenzuela City and sought to have the property sold to satisfy the balance of
petitioners' loan account.

● On June 26, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the MLA and the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale with a prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC of Valenzuela City. They
alleged therein that private respondent had released only P555,047.19 on a staggered basis out of their
P600,000.00 loan. They offered to pay their monthly amortization on their loan account, but the private
respondent required them to pay a monthly amortization of P12,900.00 effective December 1995. Despite
demand, private respondent refused to release the difference of P44,962.78 of their loan and to readjust
their monthly amortization conformably with the MLA. The court issued a TRO and the sale at public auction
was reset.

● Petitioners offered to settle the balance, less late payment charges, mortagage redemption insurance (MRI)
premium interest, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees, and liquidated damages in the total amount of
Php 305,042.57. They proposed to pay on monthly installments for a 15-year period, at an interest rate of
19% per annum. However, private respondent rejected the offer. The Court suspended pre-trial. There were
additional charges imposed upon petitioner's account. Petitioner objected to the liquidated damages and
foreclosure expenses. Petitioner objected to the aforecited damages. The hearing for petitioners to
adduce the evidence was set on September 17, 1998.

● On July 10, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint wherein they
alleged: a) Respondent made unauthorized deductions and advanced interest charges; b) Respondent also
unilaterally increased the rate of interest without the consent of the petitioners; c) The foreclosure and/of
liability of the plaintiffs should be limited only to the amount of the mortgage and cannot include other items
such as late payment charges, liquidated damages and attorney's fees.

● The trial court denied the motion of the petitioners. It held that under Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules of Court, only transactions, occurrences, and events which accrued after the date of the complaint
may be set forth in the supplemental complaint. CA affirmed the RTC.

● Petitioner's contentions:
○ They came to know of the escalating interests, penalties, liquidated damages and attorney's
fees charged by private respondent only after the complaint was filed on June 26, 1995, hence, the
failure to allege this in their complaint;

○ While interest was part of the agreement between the parties, the escalation of the interest
and the excessive penalties, excessive attorney's fees, and liquidated damages were not
discussed nor agreed upon before MLA was signed;
 ○ Respondent Court should have granted their Motion because the imposition of the escalating
and arbitrary charges by a banking or lending institution is unconscionable and unlawful.
● Respondent's contentions:
○ The supposed transactions, occurrences, or events alleged therein took place long before the
original complaint was filed. The Supplemental Complaint itself states that the charges, interests,
and penalties were charged against the petitioners sometime in July 25, 1994, September 5, 1994,
October 24, 1994, and November 15, 1994 before the filing of the original complaint.;
○ Petitioners filed their Supplemental Complaint only to delay the disposition of the case;
○ The interest, penalties and other charges imposed by private respondent on petitioner's account
are in accordance with the terms and conditions of the promissory note executed by the petitioners
and the MLA. Besides, petitioners received copies of statements of account during the pretrial
conference.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the Regional Trial Court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitioners’ Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint under Sec. 6, Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules of Court. [NO.]

RULING:

A supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original
complaint. A new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such a complaint.

The supplemental complaint must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the
claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action. However, although the facts occur
before the commencement of the suit, if a party does not learn of their existence until after he has filed his pleading,
he may file a supplemental pleading.

As a general rule, leave will be granted to file a supplemental complaint which alleges any material fact which
happened or came within the plaintiff's knowledge since the original complaint was filed, such being the office of a
supplemental complaint. The purpose of the rule is that the entire controversy might be settled in one action; to avoid
unnecessary litigation; prevent delay, unnecessary repetition of effort; unwarranted expense of litigants; to broaden
the scope of the issues in an action owing to the light thrown on it by facts, events and occurrences which have
accrued after the filing of the original pleading; to bring into record the facts enlarging or charging the kind of relief to
which plaintiff is entitled. It is the policy of the law to grant relief as far as possible for wrongs complained of growing
out of the same transaction and thus put an end to litigation.

The admission or non-admission of a supplemental pleading is not a matter of right but is discretionary on the court.
Among the factors that the court will consider are: (1) resulting prejudice to the parties; and (2) whether the movant
would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to be denied.

An opposing party who has had notice of the general nature of the claim or matter asserted in the supplemental
pleading from the beginning of the action will not be prejudiced by the granting of leave to file a supplemental
pleading. A motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading may be denied if he is guilty of undue delay or laches
which causes substantial prejudice to the opposing party.

Before they filed their original complaint, petitioners were already aware of the deductions made on the proceeds of
the loan, for interest charges, MRI premium, and fire insurance premium

And because petitioners had alleged all these charges in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it behooved
petitioners to have incorporated in their original complaint as a cause of action the alleged "illegal/unauthorized and
unconscionable" charges for MRI, escalating interest charges, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and foreclosure
expenses. They should have sought to nullify such charges in the original complaint, but they did not. They are thus
proscribed from incorporating the same via a supplemental complaint.

Veloria, Jasmin Mae Pama

49. Alpine Lending Investors vs. Corpuz, 157107, 24 November 2006
 DOCTRINE: Sections 1 and 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
SEC. 1. Amendments in general . — Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking an allegation or the name of
any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in
any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to
technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.

SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.

Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no
responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint in Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter
of right.

Facts:

● Pretending to help respondent, Estrella Corpuz, in securing a Garage Franchise from the Land
Transportation Office (LTO), Zenaida, respondent’s former neighbor, took from her the original registration
papers of her vehicle (Toyota tamaraw FX). Zenaida then pretended to be the owner of the vehicle, used the
respondent’s registration papers and retrieved the vehicle for Richmond auto center where it was being
repaired. She then took the vehicle with her and disappeared.
● Respondent reported the incident to the LTO Muntinlupa branch and was informed that zenaida mortgaged
her vehicle with petitioner Alpine using the chattel mortgage contract bearing her forged signature.
● Respondent informed the petitioner about the spurious mortgage and the latter then promised to comply with
her request to release the vehicle on the condition that zenaida should be criminally charged.
● Respondent filed for falsification of private documents and estafa against zenaida and eventually, a warrant
of arrest was issued against her. Petitioner still refused to turn over the vehicle.

Procedural History:

● Respondent filed a complaint for replevin filed in the RTC Branch 121, Caloocan City against Alpine Lending
Investors and Zanaida Lipa, docketed as Civil Case No. C-20124.
● Petitioner, instead of filing an answer to respondent's complaint, submitted to the RTC a motion to dismiss
on the ground that it is not a juridical person, hence not a proper party in the case.
● RTC denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss.
● Alpine filed a motion for reconsideration. (denied). RTC then directed respondent to file her amendment
complaint within 10 days but respondent filed her complaint with an accompanying Motion to Admit
Amended Complaint two (2) days late.
● On December 13 2002, RTC admitted the amended complaint.
● On January 3 2003, Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge respondent's motion to admit amended complaint
on the ground that the latter motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing.
● Respondent averred that her contested motion need not be accompanied by a notice of hearing as it is a
"non-litigated motion.
● On January 24, 2003, the RTC denied Alpine's motion to expunge for lack of merit. Alpine moved for a
reconsideration, but this was denied in an Order dated January 28, 2003.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in admitting respondent's amended complaint.

Held:

No, the court did not err in admitting respondent’s amended complaint. What petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No.
C-20124 was a motion to dismiss, not an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her
complaint in Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. The trial court's duty to admit the amended complaint was
purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint. It has always
been the policy of this Court to be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings in order that the real controversies
between or among the parties may be presented and cases be decided on the merits without delay.
 Villan, Vera Mae Angelica Salvador
50. Azolla Farms vs. CA, 138085, 11 November 2004

DOCTRINE:
1. Amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even
after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.

2. Courts are given the discretion to allow amendments of pleadings to conform to the evidence
presented during the trial

Facts:

· Petitioner Francis R. Yuseco, Jr., is the Chairman, President and Chief Operating Officer of
petitioner Azolla Farms International Philippines.

· In 1982, Azolla Farms undertook to participate in the National Azolla Production Program
wherein it will purchase all the Azolla produced by the Azolla beneficiaries in the amount not
exceeding the peso value of all the inputs provided to them.

· To finance its participation, petitioners applied for a loan with Credit Manila, Inc., the latter
endorsed it to its sister company, respondent Savings Bank of Manila (Savings Bank).

· Meanwhile the Board of Directors of Azolla Farms, passed a board resolution authorizing
Yuseco to borrow from Savings Bank an amount not exceeding P2,200,000.00

· The loan having been approved, Yuseco executed a promissory note on September 13, 1982,
promising to pay Savings Bank the sum of P1,400,000.00 on or before September 13, 1983.

· The loan was secured with the following: 1. Transfer of Yuseco’s residential property mortgage
from FNCB Finance to Savings Bank; 2. Assignment of Yuseco and Fraancisco Bargas’
shares of stock in Azolla Farms.

· Yuseco executed two more promissory notes on September 27, 1982 and January 4 1983
both for the amount of P300,000.

· However the Azolla Farms Project collapsed.

· Both Yuseco and Azolla Farms blamed Savings Bank and filed a complaint for damages
against it on October 3, 1983. Alleging that due to Savings Bank unjustifiably refusing to
promptly release the remaining P300,000 the timetable of the project was impaired, and the
project was negatively affected leading to its collapse.

· Savings Bank denied all the allegations in the complaint and alleged that there was evidence
of Yuseco diverting the funds, hence they decided to withhold the amount until Yuseco
promises to stop the inappropriate act.

· Trial ensued, after respondent, as defendant, rested its case, petitioners filed a motion to
admit amended complaint, alleging that the testimony of the witness raised the issue of the
invalidity of the promissory notes and the real estate mortgage, hence they sought the
amendment of the complaint to conform to the issues and evidence presented.

· Respondent objected to petitioner’s motion, however the trial court still admitted the Amended
Complaint.
 · The trial court annulled the promissory notes and real estate mortgages and awarded
damages to petitioners.

· Respondent appealed with the Court of appeals which reversed and set aside the trial court’s
decision.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court erred in admitting petitioner’s amended complaint

Held:

No. The Trial court cannot be faulted for admitting the amended complaint as it had the discretion to do so.
The Court of Appeals erred in treating petitioner’s amendment of the complaint as one involving amendments after
the case is set for hearing under Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, when it was made pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court which governs amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence. Section 5 is stated as
follows:

“When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do
so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.”

Further it was discussed in the case of Mercader v Development Bank of the Philippines, that the above stated
provision envisions two scenarios 1. When, evidence is introduced on an issue not alleged in the pleadings and no
objection was interjected and 2. When evidence is offered on an issue not alleged in the pleadings, but an objection
was interpolated. In cases where an objection is made the court may nevertheless admit the evidence where the
adverse party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created
by the evidence. In the case at hand petitioner believed that respondent’s evidence justified the amendment of their
complaint, and the trial court admitted to such amendment. It must be noted that courts are given the discretion to
allow amendments of pleadings to conform to the evidence presented during the trial as stated in the case of Bank of
America, NT and SA v American Realty Corporation where the court held that even without the necessary
amendment, the amount proved at the trial maybe validly awarded, while in the recent case of National Power
Corporation v Court of Appeals it was held that where there is variance in the defendant’s pleadings and the
evidence adduced at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to conform with the evidence. In addition
it was stressed in the case of Tiamco v Diaz that the rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly
where no surprises or prejudice is caused by the objecting party.
 Villanueva, Harvey John G.
51. Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. vs. CA, 161135, 8 April 2005

DOCTRINE:Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental
complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.

FACTS:

● Petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., obtained from private respondent Neal B.Christian loans
evidenced by three promissory notes.
●
● Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an
interest of 15% per annum payable every three months.
●
● In a letter, the respondent, Christian informed the petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans
and demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid interests in the total
amount of US$13,50
●
● The private respondent filed with the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the
petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. The same prayed that the trial court order them to pay him
jointly and solidarily.
●
● The petitioner corporation, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of action.
●
● The trial court rendered a decision declaring the first two promissory notes as already due and demandable
and that the interest on the loans had been reduced by the parties.
●
● It then ordered the petitioner corporation to pay Christian the amount of the principal obligation covered by
the promissory notes plus interest of 6% per month thereon until fully paid, with all interest payments already
paid by the defendant to the plaintiff to be deducted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a cause of
action during the pendency of the case?

RULING:

No.

Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual
merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities,
and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity
of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is
presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended
on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented
during the trial.

However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the
complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. For example, if a complaint
failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent upon which the cause of action depends, evidence showing
that such condition had already been fulfilled when the complaint was filed may be presented during the trial, and the
complaint may accordingly be amended thereafter. Thus, in Roces v. Jalandoni, this Court upheld the trial court in
taking cognizance of an otherwise defective complaint which was later cured by the testimony of the plaintiff during
the trial. In that case, there was in fact a cause of action and the only problem was the insufficiency of the allegations
in the complaint. This ruling was reiterated in Pascua v. Court of Appeals.
It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an
amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending.
Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court
upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person should not
be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature.

Furthermore, when the complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court no cause of action
has as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the terms of the three promissory
notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action, the private respondent had no
right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his complaint.
 Villareal, Marinel Rana
52. Young vs. Spouses Sy, 157745 & 157955, 26 September 2006

DOCTRINE: A supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists
side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes
that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the
action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind
of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. The purpose of the
supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the
plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the
relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.

FACTS:

● The case involves 2 petitions for review under Rule 45 which were consolidated. Both petitions originated
from a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-judicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure
Sale and Tax Declaration filed by the petitioner Genalyn D. Young.
● In her complaint, she alleged that the extra-judicial partition executed by her mother that adjudicated an
unregistered parcel of land solely in favor of the latter, is unenforceable, since at the time of the execution,
she (petitioner) was only 15 years old and no court approval had been procured; that the partition had been
registered with the Register of Deeds; that Lilia Dy obtained a loan from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy
(respondents) and mortgaged the subject property; that the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest
bidder, respondent Manuel Sy; that a Certificate of Sale for this purpose had been registered with the
Register of Deeds; and that, thereafter, respondents obtained in their name a tax declaration over the
property in question.
● The petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint, attaching the Supplemental
Complaint and she invoked her right, as co-owner, to exercise the legal redemption. The RTC denied the
Motion hence the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA denied the petition and held that the cause of action of the petitioner in the Supplemental Complaint is
entirely different from the original complaint; that the Supplemental Complaint did not merely supply its
deficiencies; and that, at any rate, in the event the trial court issues an adverse ruling, the petitioner can still
appeal the same, hence, the petition under Rule 65 is not proper. Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. While the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus (re: Supplemental Complaint) was
pending in the CA, trial in the RTC continued.
● On August 29, 2001, a day before the hearing slated for August 30, 2001, the petitioner filed a Motion to
Cancel Hearing, alleging that she was indisposed. On the day of the hearing, respondents, through counsel,
objected to the postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case for non-suit. The RTC sustained the
objection and issued the assailed August 30, 2001 Order dismissing the Complaint. On top of the foregoing
appeal, the petitioner, four months after filing her Notice of Appeal to the CA, filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70610 to annul the same RTC Orders that comprise
the subject matter of the ordinary appeal. The petitioner raised essentially the same issues. CA denied the
petition and held that the dismissal of the case by the RTC on the ground of non prosequitur has the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits that may constitute an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal
and not by certiorari; that the petitioner actually chose the mode of ordinary appeal by filing a Notice of
Appeal on January 31, 2000; and that since the remedy of appeal was available, then the petition for
certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, must fail.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping

HELD: Yes, the Petitioner guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata. The petitioner, by filing an
ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced
the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and
which eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition. The elements of litis pendentia are present
between the two suits. Both suits are founded on exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject matter—the
RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is
seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed
for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.

Viloria, Patricia Jean Mamaril

53. Philippine National Bank vs. Sps. Manalo, 174433, 24 February 2014

DOCTRINE: The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial
does not preclude an adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which may embody new
issues not raised in the pleadings, or serve as a basis for a higher award of damages.

When evidence is presented by one party, with the express or implied consent of the adverse party, as to
issues not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as regards those issues which shall
be considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied consent to the evidence thus
presented when the adverse party fails to object thereto (CJ Moran)

Facts: · Sps. Manalo secured an All-Purpose Credit facility in the amount of 1M with PNB to finance the construction
of their house, attaching a real estate mortgage over their property as security for the loan.
· The credit facility was renewed and increased several times until 1996, where the credit facility was
renewed for 7M, with a corresponding amendment to the existing REM, where their children's property
was added as a security for the loan. It was agreed that the Sps Manalo would make 30 mos payments
on the interest.
· Sps. Manalo failed to settle their unpaid account despite 2 demand letters, hence PNB foreclosed the
mortgage.
· After more than a year after the foreclosure sale, Sps Manalo instituted an action for nullification of the
foreclosure proceedings. They allege “that they had obtained a loan for P1M from a certain Tan upon
arrangements made by Yuvienco, then the General Manager of PNB’s Bangkal Branch where they had
transacted; that they had been made to understand and had been assured that the 1M would be used
to update their account, and that their loan would be restructured and converted into a long-term loan;
that they had been surprised to learn, therefore, that had been declared in default of their obligations,
and that the mortgage on their property had been foreclosed and their property had been sold; and that
PNB did not comply with Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
· PNB allege that “the 1M loan obtained by the Sps Manalo from Tan had been credited to their account;
that they did not make any assurances on the restructuring and conversion of the Sps Manalo’s loan
into a long-term one; that PNB’s right to foreclose the mortgage had been clear especially because the
Sps Manalo had not assailed the validity of the loans and of the mortgage; and that the Sps Manalo did
not allege having fully paid their indebtedness”

RTC: Foreclosure valid in favor of PNB

In the course of the presentation of their evidence, the Sps Manalo modified their position and claimed that
the loan document executed were contracts of adhesion which were null and void because they were prepared
entirely under the PNB’s supervision. They also questioned the interest rates and penalty charges imposed arguing
that these were iniquitous, unconscionable and therefore likewise void. Not having raised the foregoing matters as
issues during the pre-trial, the Sps Manalo are presumably estopped from allowing these matters to serve as part of
their evidence, more so because at the pretrial they expressly recognized the defendant PNB’s right to foreclose
upon the subject property. The RTC held, however, that the Sps Manalo’s "contract of adhesion" argument was
unfounded because they had still accepted the terms and conditions of their credit agreement with PNB and had
exerted efforts to pay their obligation; that the Sps Manalo were now estopped from questioning the interest rates
unilaterally imposed by PNB because they had paid at those rates for three years without protest; and that their
allegation about PNB violating the notice and publication requirements during the foreclosure proceedings was
untenable because personal notice to the mortgagee was not required.

CA: Affirmed RTC decision: Foreclosure proceedings validly initiated by PNB, modified interest
 PNB’s failure to indicate the rate of interest in the credit agreements would not excuse the Sps Manalo from
their contractual obligation to pay interest to PNB because of the express agreement to pay interest in the credit
agreements. Nevertheless, the CA ruled that PNB’s inadvertence to specify the interest rate should be construed
against it because the credit agreements were clearly contracts of adhesion due to their having been prepared solely
by PNB.

PNB could not unilaterally increase the rate of interest considering that the credit agreements specifically provided
that prior notice was required before an increase in interest rate could be effected. It found that PNB did not adduce
proof showing that the Sps Manalo had been notified before the increased interest rates were imposed; and that
PNB’s unilateral imposition of the increased interest rate was null and void for being violative of the principle of
mutuality of contracts enshrined in Article 1308 of the Civil Code. CA, relying on Eastern Shipping Lines, v. CA, fixed
the interest rate to be paid by the Spouses Manalo at 12% per annum, computed from their default.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN NULLIFYING THE INTEREST RATES
IMPOSED ON RESPONDENT SPOUSES’ LOAN AND IN FIXING THE SAME AT TWELVE PERCENT (12%) FROM
DEFAULT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
(i) THE SAME WAS RAISED BY THE RESPONDENTS ONLY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
(ii) IT WAS NEVER PART OF THEIR COMPLAINT
(iii) WAS EXLUDED AS AN ISSUE DURING PRETRIAL, AND WORSE,
(iv) THERE WAS NO FORMALLY OFFERED PERTAINING TO THE SAME DURING TRIAL.

Held: Yes. The RTC did not need to direct the amendment of the complaint by the Spouses Manalo. Section 5, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court specifically declares that the “failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues.”

According to Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. v. Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc., 247 SCRA 361 (1995):
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial does not preclude an
adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings, or
serve as a basis for a higher award of damages. Although the pleading may not have been amended to conform to
the evidence submitted during trial, judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of the issues
alleged but also on the basis of issues discussed and the assertions of fact proved in the course of trial. The court
may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although it had not been actually so
amended.

Chief Justice Moran put the matter in this way: When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or
implied consent of the adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as
regards those issues, which shall be considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied,
consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to object thereto.”

Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it even though the relevant
pleading had not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse
party. Put a little differently, so long as the basic requirements of fair play had been met, as where litigants were given
full opportunity to support their respective contentions and to object to or refute each other’s evidence, the court may
validly treat the pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the
basis of all the evidence

Yumul, Karlo Del Domingo

54. Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 110844, 27 April 2000

DOCTRINE:Pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings
and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as
extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not
offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered.
Facts:
● Alfredo Ching was charged RTC-Makati with 4 counts of estafa punishable under the Revised
Penal Code(RPC), in relation to the Trust Receipts Law.
● The information showed the following:
○ a. On 3 separate dates, Alfredo Ching executed a trust receipt agreement in favor of Allied
Banking Corporation in Makati City. This is in consideration of the receipt by Alfredo Ching
of the goods worth.
○ b. Alfredo Ching agreed to sell for cash with express obligation to remit to ABC proceeds
of the sale and/or turn over goods if not sold on demand.
● However, after having possession, Alfredo Ching misapplied and converted for his personal use
and benefit of said goods and/or proceeds.
● Thus, this case. Alfredo Ching filed a motion to Strike out information.
● RTC required the prosecutor's office to conduct a preliminary investigation.
● Alfredo Ching and Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. filed a case before RTC for declaration of nullity of
documents and damages against Allied Banking Corporation.
● Ching filed a petition before RTC for suspension of criminal proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question in civil action. The prosecution opposed.
● RTC denied the petition for suspension.
● Alfredo Ching filed MR which RTC denied and CA affirmed RTC denial. Thus this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegations in the complaint ceased to be judicial admission?

Ruling:
YES. The original complaint, having been amended, lost its character as a judicial admission, which would
have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence,
required its formal offer.
In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned
and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record.

BILL OF PARTICULARS (Rule 12, Sections 1 to 6)

 Cutaran, Jal Arana
55. Guy vs. Guy, 189486, 5 September 2012

DOCTRINE: In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for
dismissal since such a defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. However, the same does not apply to
intracorporate controversies. In fact, a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading in cases governed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure for IntraCorporate Controversies.

FACTS:
● Gilbert G. Guy (Gilbert) practically owned almost 80% of the 650,000 subscribed capital stock of GoodGold
Realty & Development Corporation.
● GoodGold’s remaining shares were divided among Francisco Guy (Gilbert’s Father) with 130,000 shares,
Simny Guy (Gilbert’s Mother), Benjamin Lim and Paulino Delfin Pe, with one share each, respectively.
● In 1999, the aging Francisco instructed Benjamin Lim, a nominal shareholder of GoodGold and his trusted
employee to collaborate with Atty. Emmanuel Paras, to redistribute GoodGold’s shareholdings evenly
among his children while maintaining a proportionate share for himself and his wife, Simny.
● Five years after the redistribution of GG’s shares of stock, Gilbert filed with the RTC of Manila, a Complaint
to declare the distribution null and void, and prayed for injuction against his mother, Simny, and his sisters.
Gilbert alleged, among others, that no stock certificate ever existed; that his signature at the back of the
spurious Stock Certificate Nos. 004014 which purportedly endorsed the same were forged, and, hence,
should be nullified.
● It was later withdrawn by Gilbert after the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) submitted a report to the
RTC of Manila authenticating Gilbert’s signature in the endorsed certificates.
● Gilbert again filed another case, now with the RTC of Mandaluyong alleging the same that he never signed
any document which would justify and support the transfer of his shares to his siblings and that he has in no
way, disposed, alienated, encumbered, assigned or sold any or part of his shares in GoodGold.
● Gilbert also added that the Amended General Information Sheets (GIS) of GoodGold for the years 2000 to
2004 which his siblings submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were spurious as
these did not reflect his true shares in the corporation.
● Gilbert’s siblings filed a manifestation claiming that the complaint is a nuisance and harassment suit, which
was granted by the RTC. Hence, a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON specific fraudulent allegation is required in an intracorporate suit?

HELD: YES. Failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts in intra-corporate controversies is indicative of a
harassment or nuisance suit and maybe dismissed motu proprio.

In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since
such a defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. Thus, failure to allege fraud or mistake with as much particularity
as is desirable is not fatal if the general purport of the claim or defense is clear, since all pleadings should be so
construed as to do substantial justice. Doubt as to the meaning of the pleading may be resolved by seeking a bill of
particulars.

Moreover, not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by corporate officers will bring the
case within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction, there must be sufficient nexus
showing that the corporation’s nature, structure, or powers were used to facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme.

Adolfo, Rochelle Angela Rabang

56. Salita vs. Magtolis, 106429, 13 June 1994

DOCTRINE: A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of
action." Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will support."

As stated by private respondent, the term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence
 by which these material elements are to be established."

It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove
the existence of those facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very
definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for
matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other
means.

FACTS:

○ Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita got married, a year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact and
subsequently, Erwin filed a petition for annulment on the ground of Joselita's psychological incapacity before the
RTC.
○ Therein it is alleged that "sometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the
time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter."
○ Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted.
○ Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita
Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that
she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession as a Doctor — upon petitioner's
time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose
intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
○ However, Joselita was not yet contended with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the "assertion in the Bill of
Particulars is a statement of legal conclusion made by petitioner's counsel and not an averment of 'ultimate facts,'
as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . ." But finding the
questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the RTC issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to
file her responsive pleading.
○ Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate
facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point
○ The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It held that to require more details thereof, to insist on a specification of
Salita's particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding 'circumstances of time, place and person' indicating
her alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularly as to
enable herein petitioner to property prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.

HELD:

Yes, the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more
details from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters.

Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of the private respondent's cause of action against her. On
the basis of the allegations, it is evident that the petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
Private respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was unable to understand and accept the demands
made by his profession, upon his time and efforts . . ." Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for more details
would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts.
For sure, the additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary,
and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the functions of a motion for bill of particulars.

We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic where we said —
 Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as names of persons, names of
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the
particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other
material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not
evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly
and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed
of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the
trial.

The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case. That ruling involves alleged
"misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power." The respondents
therein pray for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit acts should
be fully documented.

The instant case, on the other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not
unfeeling, to document each and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse will have
to prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins.

Angeles, Bernice Marie Sidocon

57. Baritua vs. Mercader, 136048, 23 January 2001

DOCTRINE: BILL OF PARTICULARS "Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a
pleading, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is
not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive
pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such
motion shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the
details desired."

FACTS:
● "The original complaint was filed against JB Lines, Inc. [Petitioner JB Lines, Inc.] filed a motion to dismiss
complaint, to strike out false-impertinent matters therefrom, and/or for bill of particulars on the primary
grounds that [respondents] failed to implead Jose Baritua as an indispensable party and that the cause of
action is a suit against a wrong and non-existent party. [Respondents] filed an opposition to the said motion
and an amended complaint.
● "In an Order dated December 11, 1984 the trial court denied the aforesaid motion and admitted the
amended complaint of [respondents] impleading Jose Baritua and alleged the following:
○ '(10) The late Dominador Mercader is a businessman mainly engaged in the buy and sell of dry
goods in Laoang, N. Samar. He buys his goods from Manila and bring[s] them to Laoang, Northern
Samar for sale at his store located in the said locality;

○ (11) Sometime on March 16, 1983, the late Dominador Mercader boarded [petitioners'] bus No. 142
with Plate No. 484 EU at [petitioners'] Manila Station/terminal, bound for Brgy. Rawis, Laoang
Northern Samar as a paying passenger;

○ (12) At that time, Dominador Mercader had with him as his baggage, assorted goods (i.e. long
pants, short pants, dusters, etc.) which he likewise loaded in [petitioners'] bus;

○ (13) The late Dominador Mercader was not able to reach his destination considering that on March
17, 1983 at Beily (Bugco) Bridge, Barangay Roxas, Mondragon, Northern Samar, while he was on
board [petitioners'] bus no. 142 with Plate No. 484 EU, the said bus fell into the river as a result of
which the late Dominador Mercader died.

○ (14) The accident happened because [petitioners'] driver negligently and recklessly operated the
bus at a fast speed in wanton disregard of traffic rules and regulations and the prevailing conditions
then existing that caused [the] bus to fall into the river.'
 ● The heirs of Mercader sued the petitioner for breach of contract of carriage.
● With the heirs of Mercader attaining a favorable judgment at the lower court and CA level, petitioner assails
the said decisions rendered therein with the Supreme Court via Petition for Review under Rule 45 on the
ground of procedural flaws, specifically questioning: (1) the jurisdiction of the lower court over the original
and amended complaints or over the subject matter of the case as the trial court was not paid the correct
amount of docket and other lawful fees; (2) the arbitrary disregard for petitioner’s constitutional right to
procedural due process and fairness as the appellate court denied their right to present evidence, to expect
that their evidence will be duly considered and appreciated and when the court passed sub silencio on the
trail court’s failure to rule frontally on petitioner’s plea for a bill of particulars; and (3) that both the RTC and
CA failed to adhere to the rule that their decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on
which they are based.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s procedural rights were disregarded as to the denial of their Motion for a Bill of Particulars

HELD:
No.

Motion for a Bill of Particulars

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it passed sub silencio on the trial court's failure to rule frontally
on their plea for a bill of particulars.

We are not impressed. It must be noted that petitioners' counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a motion
for a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten days from March 12, 1985 within which to do so. He, however, filed the
aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court. Moreover, such motion
was already moot and academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed their answer and several
other pleadings to the amended Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:

"Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a more definite
statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten
(10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they
are contained, and the details desired."

Apolinario, Eufemia Mulimbayan

58. Estardante vs. People, 156851-55, 18 February 2008

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman cannot be bound by the Bill of Particulars submitted by private
complainants. The act of the prosecutor in granting the petitioner's Motion for Bill of Particulars is an act
contrary to the express mandate of A.O. No. 7, to wit:

Section 4. Procedure — The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of
particulars be entertained. If the respondent desires any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be
clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner
provided in paragraph (f) of this section.

● Petitioner was the school principal of the Ramon Torres National High School (RTNHS) in Bago
City, Negros Occidental.
● Sometime in 1998, a group of concerned RTNHS teachers sent a letter to the Schools Division of
Bago City attaching a list of 15 irregularities allegedly committed by the petitioner, which the
private complainants requested to be investigated.
● Two complaints were eventually filed by private complainants against petitioner with the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas.
● The Ombudsman-Visayas forwarded the complaint to the Office of the City Prosecutor.
 ● The City Prosecutor served the petitioner with a subpoena requiring her to submit her counter-
affidavit.
● Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed before the City Prosecutor a Motion for Bill of
Particulars, alleging that there were no specific criminal charges that were stated in the
subpoenas, insisting that she cannot prepare for her counter-affidavit unless the criminal charges
and the laws she violated are specified.
● Additionally, she also filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit. The City
Prosecutor issued an Order attaching private complainants’ Bill of Particulars, which states that
she is charged for violation of Sections 68 and 69 of PD 1445.
● Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit limiting herself only to the charges specified in the Bill of
Particulars.
● The City Prosecutor then referred the case back to the Ombudsman-Visayas who found sufficient
grounds to hold petitioner liable for five counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and filed before the RTC the corresponding Information.
● Petitioner filed for a Motion for Reinvestigation before the RTC alleging, among others, that she
cannot be charged under RA No. 3019 and PD No. 1445.
● The RTC denied the motion. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration over the RTC’s denial of her
Motion for Reinvestigation, claiming that when the five Information for the violation of Section 3
(e) of RA No. 3019 were filed by the Ombudsman-Visayas, her right to due process was violated,
and that the Ombudsman-Visayas in effect went beyond the Bill of Particulars filed by the private
respondents.
● The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE/S:

(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) CANNOT NOW
QUESTION THE "BILL OF PARTICULARS" FILED BY COUNSEL FOR COMPLAINANTS;

(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WENT BEYOND THE "BILL OF
PARTICULARS" FILED BY THE COMPLAINANTS THROUGH THEIR COUNSEL, SHE WAS EFFECTIVELY
DENIED OF HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

HELD:

Petitioner insisted that the Ombudsman-Visayas should have limited the charges filed against her
to the crimes mentioned in the Bill of Particulars, and that the filing of the Informations charging her with
crimes different from those specified in the Bill of Particulars violated her right to due process. The OSG
countered this in claiming that a bill of particulars is not allowed by AO No. 7 (Rules of Procedure in the
Office of the Ombudsman), and that, therefore, the Ombudsman cannot be bound by the Bill of
Particulars submitted by private complainants.

The Court agrees with the OSG. Clearly, the act of the prosecutor in granting the petitioner’s
Motion for Bill of Particulars is an act contrary to the express mandate of AO No. 7. Petitioner argued that
the granting of the Motion for Bill of Particulars by the City Prosecutor should bind the Ombudsman. The
Court disagrees. Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 expressly provides that
those designated or deputized to assist the Ombudsman shall be under his supervision and control.
Indubitably, when the City Prosecutor is deputized by the Office of the Ombudsman, he comes under the
"supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutor's decision.

In the present case, petitioner has no valid basis for insisting that the Ombudsman-Visayas must
be bound by the erroneous act of the City Prosecutor in granting petitioner's Motion for Bill of Particulars.
Laws and jurisprudence grant the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to reverse or nullify the acts of
the prosecutor pursuant to its power of control and supervision over deputized prosecutors. Hence, it was
within the prerogative of the Ombudsman-Visayas not to consider the Bill of Particulars submitted by the
private complainants.
 The Supreme Court, however, opines that the filing of Informations for violation of RA No. 3019
against petitioner violated her right to due process. The Supreme Court did not find, after a thorough
examination of the records, that she was served with subpoenas and other documents apprising her of
her violations. While there is no rule that the initial complaint filed against an accused with the
prosecutor's office should specifically state the particular law under which he is being charged, it is a
basic elementary rule that the complaint should specifically allege the criminal acts complained of, so as
to enable the accused to prepare his answer or counter-affidavit accurately and intelligently.

FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS (Rule 13, Sections 1 to 19)

Arboleda, Anreinne Sabille Larizabal

59. Bracero vs. Arcelo, 212496, 18 March 2015

DOCTRINE: The receipt of petitioner’s counsel of a copy of the motion for execution amounts to effective official
notice of the Regional Trial Court Decision if he was not furnished a copy of the Decision. Rule 13, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court states in part that "[i]f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his
counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court." Notice sent directly to the
client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this rule admits exceptions. In Santiago, the SC considered the filing of a
motion for reconsideration as actual notice of the assailed Decision.

FACTS:

● The heirs of Victoriano Monisit filed a Complaint for Quieting of Titles/Ownership, Recovery of Possession
with Damages against Rodulfo Arcelo and Nestor Bracero over a 48,632-square-meter parcel of land
located in Lubo, Sogod, Cebu.
● The Complaint stated that Victoriano Monisit owned the 48,632-square[1]meter land. Sometime in 1982,
Nestor Bracero, claiming to be Rodulfo Arcelo's tenant, cultivated this 5,000-square-meter mortgaged
portion of the property.
● In 1993, Victoriano Monisit sued Nestor Bracero for the recovery of the property he cultivated for his failure
to share the products. Nestor Bracero countered that the land he cultivated belonged to Rodulfo Arcelo.
Both the complaint and the counterclaim were dismissed.
● Victoriano Monisit’s legal heirs extra-judicially partitioned his properties. His heirs Lourdes Menchavez,
Rogelio Ruelo, and Martiniana Apor inherited the lot as their share and immediately took possession.
● Meanwhile, Nestor Bracero expanded his occupation of the mortgaged portion of the property to the entire
48,632 square meters. He consequently drove out Victoriano Monisit's tenant worker Salvacion Montecillo
and his family.
● The heirs of Victoriano Monisit filed their Complaint for Quieting of Title/Ownership, Recovery of Possession
with Damages on January 8, 2004.
● Rodulfo Arcelo filed an Answer denying that Nestor Bracero was his tenant and claimed that he was only
impleaded as respondent to help the heirs oust Nestor Bracero from the property. Rodulfo Arcelo did not
claim ownership of the 5,000-square-meter portion. Nestor Bracero filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
prematurity, res judicata, and lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON the receipt of petitioner's counsel of a copy of the motion for execution amounts to effective official notice of the
RTC if he was not furnished a copy of the Decision.

RULING:

Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states in part that "[i]f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him
shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court." Notice
sent directly to the client is not notice in law. Nevertheless, this rule admits exceptions.
In Santiago, the court considered the filing of a motion for reconsideration as actual notice of the assailed Decision.
Formal service of the judgment is indeed necessary as a rule but not, as it happens, in the case at bar. The reason is
that the petitioners had filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of Judge Guadiz, which would indicate that
they were then already informed of such decision. The petitioners cannot now invoke due process on the basis of a
feigned ignorance as the lack of formal notice cannot prevail against the fact of actual notice.

In Ramos v. Spouses Lim, this court considered Atty. Estaniel's receipt of Atty. Datukon's Manifestation informing the
court that he had been formally substituted by Atty. Estaniel as counsel as "an alerting medium that a final ruling has
been issued by the trial court[.]" 67 Atty. Datukon filed this Manifestation after he was served a copy of the motion for
execution. 68 Thus, the court held that Atty. Estaniel's period to appeal the trial court Decision commenced from his
receipt of Atty. Datukon's Manifestation on April 1, 1996, when he was put on effective official notice of the Decision.

Petitioner's counsel was furnished with a copy of the motion for execution on September 11, 2009. As discussed by
the Court of Appeals, this motion categorically states that the trial court rendered its Decision on April 16, 2009, yet
petitioner's counsel filed no opposition. At that time, he did not file any motion asserting that he was not furnished
with a copy of the Decision. It was only on January 8, 2010 when his client informed him of the Writ of Execution did
petitioner's counsel file an Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution on the ground that he did not receive a copy
of the Regional Trial Court Decision. Jurisprudence reiterates that "[l]itigants who are represented by counsel should
not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases." This court has held that
"equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights" and a party should "periodically keep in touch with his
counsel, check with the court, and inquire about the status of the case."

Bahia, Hannah Grace Israel

60. UP vs. Dizon, 171182, 23 August 2012

DOCTRINE: The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the service should be made.

FACTS:
● UP entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders for the construction of
the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the campus of the
UPLB.
● In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted 3 progress billings
corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only 2 of the billings. The third billing was not paid
due to its disallowance by the COA.
● Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting Stern Builders and dela
Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid billing and to recover various
damages.
● RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Following the RTC's denial of its motion for
reconsideration, the UP filed a notice of appeal which was opposed by Stern Builders and dela Cruz on the
ground of its filing being belated and moved for the execution of the decision.
● The UP countered that the notice of appeal was filed June 3, 2002, within the reglementary period because
the UP's Office of Legal Affairs (OLS) in Diliman, Quezon City received the order of denial only on May 31,
2002.
● RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time and granted the private
respondents' motion for execution. The RTC issued the writ of execution and the sheriff of the RTC served
the writ of execution and notice of demand upon the UP, through its counsel.
● The UP filed an urgent motion to reconsider the order to quash the writ of execution and to restrain the
proceedings.
● However, the RTC denied the urgent motion. UP assailed the denial of due course to its appeal through a
petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari upon finding that the UP's notice
of appeal had been filed late.
● Stern Builders and dela Cruz filed in the RTC their motions for execution despite their previous motion
having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already been issued. The RTC
granted the motion to release the garnished funds. CA issued a TRO upon application by the UP.
● CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the UP's petition for certiorari, ruling that the UP had been
given ample opportunity to contest the motion to direct the DBP to deposit the check in the name of Stern
Builders and dela Cruz; and that the garnished funds could be the proper subject of garnishment because
they had been already earmarked for the project.
ISSUE/S:

1.WON the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the judgment award

2. WON the UP's prayer for the deletion of the awards of actual, moral damages and attorney’s fees could be granted
despite the finality of the judgment of the RTC

HELD:

1. No, the adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not
immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because the suability of the State did not necessarily mean its
liability. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing
from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC's writ of execution or
garnishment.

The CA and the RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the trust funds of the Government
and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the trusts were created
or for which the funds were received except upon express authorization by Congress or by the head of a government
agency in control of the funds, and subject to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations. An appropriation by
Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual damages (including
attorney's fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the "appropriations
earmarked for the said project.”

2. Yes, the settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final
decision of the RTC having already validated the claim. As such, Stern Builders and dela Cruz as the claimants had
no alternative except to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim. The RTC had no authority to direct
the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from the depository banks of the UP.

The UP's plea for equity warrants the Court's exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality
of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UP's right to due process. Here, the service of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he
was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the
service should be made. That counsel was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which was served with the denial only
on May 31, 2002. As such, the running of the remaining period of six days resumed only on June 1, 2002, rendering
the filing of the UP's notice of appeal on June 3, 2002 timely and well within the remaining days of the UP's period to
appeal.

Bitong, John Eli Zuriel De Villa

61. Heirs of Numeriano vs. Miranda, 179638, 8 July 2013

DOCTRINE: In action for revival of a judgment cannot modify, alter, or reverse the original judgment, which is
already final and executory.

Facts:

●
In 1994, the petitioners, representing themselves as the heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, a Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific
Performance, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-612, against the heirs of Pedro Miranda After trial, the RTC,
Branch 256, rendered a Decision Petitioners did not file any appeal hence the Decision became final and
executory.
● On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, which was not implemented.
 ● On July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a "Break-Open and
Demolition Order" in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years
have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in
its Order[13] dated August 16, 2005.
● This prompted the respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 05-131. Petitioners opposed the revival of judgment assailing, among others, the
jurisdiction of the RTC to take cognizance of the Petition for Revival of Judgment.
● On June 20, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision[16] granting the Petition.
● On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC,which was opposed by respondent on the
ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory.
● Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, insisting that
respondent's opposition is without merit.
● Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in its Order dated October
10, 2006. Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given
due course. The CA denied the Petition for Mandamus on the ground that the Notice of Appeal was filed out
of time.
● Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA.

Issues:

WHETHER X X X THE APPEAL WAS PERFECTED ON TIME?

WHETHER X X X THE LATE (ONE DAY) FILING WAS JUSTIFIED?

Held:

The Petition lacks merit. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from."Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings
may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt.
In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed
the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the
Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners' Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established
jurisprudence that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as
the date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing of that
pleading.Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the
16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed
out of time. Neither can petitioners use typhoon "Florita" as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of Appeal
because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13, 2006, the day petitioners' Notice
of Appeal was mailed via LBC. And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due course to the appeal despite its late
filing, the result would still be the same.The appeal would still be denied for lack of merit.

Boncayao, Paty Kaye Cedro

62. Villalongha, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 227222, 20 August 2019

DOCTRINE: Service of the court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally
effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding reglementary period for the
subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney.

Facts:
● Villongha siblings filed for annulment of sale and transfer certificates of title, damages, and attorney's fees
against their mother, Felipa Vda. de Villalongha and their other 3 siblings together with Bolton Bridge
Homeowners' Association, Incorporateda before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
● Plaintiffs Villalongha claimed that: (a) they are co-owners of the properties that used to be conjugal
properties of Felipa and her late husband, (b) in a Deed ofExtra- Judicial Settlement of Estate Felipa waived
her rights over her shares in the said lands; and (c) despite having lost all rights and interests on the said
 lands, Felipa subsequently sold to BBHAI the subject lands resulting in the issuance of TCT in the name of
BBHAI, which is now threatening or procuring to eject the plaintiffs from the subject lands
● Respondents Villalongha averred that she is the sole owner of the subject lands and that she has no
intention to donate her properties to her children;
● The RTC (a) dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs Villalongha failed to establish their claim
by a preponderance of evidence; (b) declared the extrajudicial settlement null and void; and (c) adjudged
Felipa as the sole owner of the subject lands.
● plaintiffs Villalongha appealed to the CA but was denied.
● A copy of the decision was sent to plaintiffs Villalongha's counsel and was received by a certain Ariel. The
counsel informed the court that: (a) he did not receive said notice; and (b) Ariel Hernandez is not his staff or
employee, and not personally known to him or to his associate.
● Atty. Advincula, Jr. also filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. The CA granted the motion to withdraw and
submitted the request manifestation for resolution.
● Virgilio received a copy of the said resolution and filed a notice of receipt, requesting for time to engage the
services of a new counsel. they also averred that there was no proper notice of the Decision on their former
counsel, Atty. Advincula, Jr.
● Respondents Villalongha countered that petitioners already had knowledge of the said Decision, and that
Virgilio even attached a copy of the same in his Judicial Affidavit yet petitioners failed to do anything to verify
if Atty. Advincula, Jr. received notice of said Decision and/or protect their remedial rights, if any
● The Decision had become final and executory. The Petitioners filed a Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment
but the CA did not act upon the motion.

Issue: whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in directing an entry of judgment in the case, and
denying petitioners' motion to recall the same, despite their claim of lack of proper service

Held: Yes. Rules of Court provides that "if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon
his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court." Thus, even if a party
represented by counsel has been actually notified, said notice is not considered notice in law.

In the case at bar, the registry return card pertaining to Atty. Advincula, Jr.'s copy of the notice was not returned to
the CA. the CA concluded that the notice was received by Atty. Advincula, Jr. on the basis of the reply to Postmaster
of Davao City, that a certain Ariel Hernandez received the notice. But in his request manifestation, Atty. Advincula, Jr.
denied having received such notice. It must be stressed that the mail matter must be received by the addressee or
his duly authorized representative since service on a person who was not a clerk, employee or one in charge of the
attorney's office is invalid. Service of the court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally
effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding reglementary period for the subsequent
procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney.Since Ariel Hernandez was not an employee and, thus, not
authorized to receive court decisions. his alleged receipt of the notice is without any effect in law, and cannot start the
running of the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal.

Cabugatan, Muammar Montila

63. Aguilar vs. Benlot, et al., 232806, 21 January 2019

DOCTRINE: whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to
other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing
was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the
pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11

FACTS:
 ● Edgardo M. Aguilar (Aguilar) was elected and had served as Punong Barangay of Barangay Bunga, Toledo
City, Cebu, for three consecutive terms. In the next Barangay Election he ran and was elected Barangay
Kagawad and ranked third. During the same elections, Aguilar’s sister, Emma Aguilar-Arias (Arias), was
elected Punong Barangay, while Leonardo Oralde (Oralde) and Emiliana Mancao (Mancao) were elected
Barangay Kagawads and ranked first and second, respectively.
● On December 2, 2010, Arias, Oralde, and Mancao resigned from their respective positions, citing personal
reasons and inability to concurrently fulfill official and familial obligations. Their resignations were accepted
and approved by the Mayor of Toledo City on the same day. Being third in rank, Aguilar succeeded as
Punong Barangay. Five days after, Aguilar was re-elected as President of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Toledo City, by which he once more earned a seat in the City Council.
● Subsequently, Oralde and Mancao were appointed back as Barangay Kagawads by the Mayor of Toledo
City. Arias, on the other hand, was hired as an employee of the city government after her resignation.
● Convinced that Arias, Oralde, and Mancao resigned from their respective positions to pave the way for
Aguilar’s succession as Punong Barangay, Elvira J. Benlot and Samuel L. Cuico filed a Complaint before the
Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 or The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees and Dereliction of Duty. According to them, the concerted resignations were part of
a ruse to enable Aguilar to serve a fourth consecutive term in circumvention of the three-term limit.
● During the intervening October 2013 barangay elections, Aguilar was re-elected as Punong Barangay, while
Arias and Oralde were re-elected as Barangay Kagawads. Treating this development as a condonation by
the electorate of their previous misconduct, the Ombudsman, in a Decision, dismissed the administrative
complaint against Arias, Oralde and Aguilar for being moot and academic pursuant to the Aguinaldo
Doctrine, also known as the doctrine of condonation. The administrative case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction as against Mancao, who was by then no longer in government service.
● On motion by Benlot and Cuico, the Ombudsman reconsidered its Decision through an Order dated
September 30, 2015. It reasoned that Aguilar and Arias could not benefit from the condonation doctrine
because they were not re-elected in 2013 to the same positions that they were elected for in the 2010
barangay elections. They were thus found liable for Grave Misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal
from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public office. As regards
Oralde, however, the condonation doctrine was viewed as applicable to him, who was elected as Barangay
Kagawad and served as such in both the 2010 and 2013 elections.
● Aguilar sought a review of his case before the CA, however, it dismissed the petition for failure to allege the
date when the September 30, 2015 Order of the Ombudsman was received, as well as for lack of
explanation why the petition was neither personally filed before the CA nor personally served to the parties.
● In his Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, Aguilar invoked that his counsel’s office messenger ran out
of time, so the petitions were mailed, even though the affidavit accompanying the petition averred personal
filing and service.
● In the exercise of its discretion on procedural defects, the CA did not find the reasons advanced by Aguilar
compelling. The CA declared that personal filing and service would have been more practicable than mailing
copies of the petition, considering that the Ombudsman, the CA, and counsels of the parties all have offices
in close proximity with each other within Cebu City.
● Aggrieved, Aguilar now seeks relief before the Supreme Court

ISSUE: What is the preferred mode in filing or service of pleadings? What is the rule when a party resorts to other
modes of service or filing?

RULING: The Court has often emphasized that the liberal interpretation of the rules applies only to justifiable causes
and meritorious circumstances [Turks Shawarma Company/Gem Zeñarosa, v. Pajaron, 803 Phil. 315, 317 (2017)].
As mandated by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, personal filing and personal service of pleadings remain
the preferred mode. In Aberca v. Ver (2012), this Court reiterated Domingo v. Court of Appeals (2010), as follows:

Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings
and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other
modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of
this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

Section 11 is mandatory. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, the Court held that::

Pursuant x x x to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers
must, whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party
 concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done
personally. x x x

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to the set of adjective rules requiring personal
service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or
paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to
why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause “whenever practicable.”

The court thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, is the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place
and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort
to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing
was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.

Celino, Rayan Jen Cosalan

64.Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp. vs. NAPOCOR, 161219, 6 October 2008

DOCTRINE: Under Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules, personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general
rule while resort to the other modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to the other
modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensable. If no
explanation is offered to justify resorting to the other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the
pleading comes into play.

Facts:

● NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners for the construction of the AGUS VI
Kauswagan 69 KV Transmission Line Project. NAPOCOR sought to expropriate 7,875 square meters of
petitioners' property.
● Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim and alleged that the expropriation should cover not only
7,875 square meters but the entire parcel of land.
● Petitioners claimed that the expropriation would render the remaining portion of their... property valueless
and unfit for whatever purpose.
● In its December 5 2001 Decision,The trial court fixed the fair market value of the 7,875-square meter lot at
P115 per square meter.
● The trial court also directed the commissioners to submit a report and determine the fair market value of the
"dangling area," affected by the installation of NAPOCOR's transmission lines.
● NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration.
● the trial court denied NAPOCOR's motion.
● In its 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision, the trial court declared that the "dangling area" consisted of
48,848.87 square meters and fixed its fair market value at P65 per square meter.
● The petitioners moved for the execution of the trial court's 5 December 2001 Decision and 19 March 2002
Supplemental Decision.
● the trial court partially granted petitioners' motion and issued the writ of execution for the 5 December 2001
Decision.
● petitioners filed a "motion to declare the supplemental decision as final and executory; and to issue the
corresponding writ of execution thereon."
Petitioners argued that NAPOCOR violated Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court because NAPOCOR
filed and served the notice of appeal by registered mail.
According to petitioners, NAPOCOR had all the vehicles and manpower to personally serve and file the
notice of appeal.
 ● NAPOCOR opposed petitioners' motion and alleged that its legal office is "severely undermanned" with only
one vehicle and one employee, acting as secretary, handling 300 active cases in Mindanao.
● The trial court granted petitioners' motion and denied NAPOCOR's notice of appeal. The trial court
considered the notice of appeal as not filed at all and, since the period of appeal had already expired,

Procedural History:

● On 23 August 2002, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals.

NAPOCOR argued that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and gravely abused its
discretion when it denied NAPOCOR's notice of appeal on the sole ground that it was not filed and served
personally.

● In its 27 February 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled in NAPOCOR's favor and set aside the trial
court's Orders.

The Court of Appeals also ordered the trial court to give due course to NAPOCOR's appeal.
The Court of Appeals declared that the trial court acted whimsically and capriciously when it denied the
notice of appeal and declared the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision final and executory.

● The Court of Appeals noted that service by registered mail was previously resorted to by both parties and
yet, this was the first time petitioners questioned NAPOCOR's mode of service.

The Court of Appeals added that the trial court should have given due course to NAPOCOR's appeal
because of the large amount of public funds involved considering the significant disparity between the area
sought to be expropriated and the "dangling area."

The Court of Appeals also said that the Rules should be liberally construed to effect substantial justice.

● Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.

● the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion.Hence, this petition.

Issues:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court's issuance of the 15 May 2002 and 24 June 2002
Orders was attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction

Ruling:

Under Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules, personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general rule while resort
to the other modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to the other modes, a written
explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensable. If no explanation is offered to
justify resorting to the other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading comes into play.

whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be
had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with.In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance
of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 6
In this case, NAPOCOR complied with the Rules. NAPOCOR's notice of appeal sufficiently explained why the notice
of appeal was served and filed by registered mail due to lack of manpower to effect personal service. This
explanation is acceptable for it satisfactorily shows why personal service was not practicable. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered the importance of the issue involved in the case. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did
not err when it ruled that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the 15 May 2002 and
24 June 2002 Orders.

Jurisprudence recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation because there are two
stages in every action for expropriation. The first stage is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit. The order of expropriation may be appealed by any party by filing a record on appeal. The second stage is
concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. A
second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just compensation

In this case, since the trial court fully and finally resolved all conceivable issues in the complaint for expropriation,
there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal. In its 5 December 2001 Decision, the trial court already
determined NAPOCOR's authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and fixed the just compensation for the
property sought to be expropriated. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. But after the trial court denied the
motion, NAPOCOR did not appeal the decision anymore. Then, in its March 19 2002 Supplemental Decision, the trial
court fixed the just compensation for the "dangling area."

NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration and the trial court denied the motion. NAPOCOR then filed a notice of
appeal. At this stage, the trial court had no more issues to resolve and there was no reason why the original records
of the case must remain with the trial court. Therefore, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal
because the original records could already be sent to the appellate court.

Cuevas, Kathleen Allysa Marie Aquino

65. Quelnan vs. VHF Philippines, 138500, 16 September 2005

DOCTRINE: Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days
from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.

Facts:
● An ejectment suit was filed by respondent VHF Philippines, Inc. against petitioner Quelnan.
○ The subject property involved is a condominium unit in Roxas Boulevard, Manila which respondent
claimed to have been leased by petitioner.
● The MeTC of Manila found that:
○ "summons together with a copy of the complaint was served [on petitioner] thru his wife on August
25, 1992 by substituted service"; and
○ petitioner "failed to file his answer within the reglementary period",
● In November 1992, the MeTC rendered judgment in favor for respondent and ordered Quelnan to vacate
premises and restore its possession to VHF;
● It also ordered to pay Php 1M (P1,077,497.77) as of June 1992 and monthly rental for the condominium unit
and parking lot with legal interest and additional attorney's fees.
● Copy of the decision was served on petitioner by registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on
account of petitioner's failure to claim the same despite the postmaster's three (3) successive notices on
November 25, 1992, December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992.
● No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC decision became final and executory.
● On May 18, 1993, a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on petitioner's wife
who acknowledged receipt thereof.
● On May 24, 1993, petitioner filed with the RTC at Manila a Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
● Petitioner alleged that he was never served with summons and was completely unaware of the proceedings
in the ejectment suit, adding that he learned of the judgment rendered thereon only on May 18, 1993 when a
notice of levy on execution came to his knowledge.
 ○ He thus prayed the RTC to annul and set aside the MeTC decision and the writs issued in
connection therewith.
● In June 1996, the RTC granted petitioner's petition for relief and set aside the MeTC decision.
○ The RTC explained that petitioner had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented
from taking an appeal for the reason that petitioner's wife, in a fit of anger, tore the summons and
complaint in the ejectment suit in the heat of a marital squabble.
○ To the RTC, this constituted excusable negligence as would justify the filing of the petition for relief
from judgment.
● Respondent sought reconsideration of the RTC decision but its motion was denied.
● This prompted the respondent to go directly to the Supreme Court on a petition for review, which petition
was remanded to the CA.
● In September 1997, the CA – found that the petitioner's petition for relief was filed with the RTC beyond the
60-day mandatory period.
● Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
reinstated that of the MeTC.
● Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied.
● Petitioner then filed to nullify and set aside the assailed decision and resolution of the CA on the following
grounds:
(1) The respondent in its petition for certiorari before the court of appeals did not question the orders of
the RTC of Manila dated October 26, 1995 and January 26, 1996.
(2) The MeTC of Manila never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, hence its decision cannot
become final and executory.
(3) The findings of fact of MeTC of Manila are not supported by the evidence on record and cannot be
considered as final and conclusive.

Issue: Whether or not the presumption of completeness of service of a registered mail matter under Rule 13, Section
10 of the ROC apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section
3 of the Rules.

Held: The Supreme Court does not take issue with petitioner that the 60-day period under Section 3, Rule 38, supra
should be reckoned from the time the aggrieved party has knowledge of the judgment. The Rule expressly says so.
We cannot, however, go along with his contention that it was only on May 18, 1993 when he became aware of the
judgment subject of his petition for relief.

The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to the petitioner through registered
mail at his given address on November 25, 1992. It should be noted that the petitioner was not represented by
counsel during the proceedings before the MeTC. The first notice to him by the postmaster to check his mail was on
November 25, 1992. Thereafter, subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on December 7, 1992 and
December 11, 1992. For sure, a certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the petitioner and thus
returned to the sender after three successive notices was issued by the postmaster. Hence, service of said MeTC
decision became effective five (5) days after November 25, 1992, or on November 30, 1992, conformably with Rule
13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:

SEC. 10.Completeness of Service. — Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary
mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides.
Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days
from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.

There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee. However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of
the first notice, service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days therefrom. In such a case, there arises
a presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. This means that the period to
appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given by the postmaster.
This is because a party is deemed to have received and to have been notified of the judgment at that point.
Moreover, the records are bereft of any showing why petitioner failed to claim his copy of the MeTC
decision. For sure, petitioner has not offered any explanation as to why he was not able to obtain a copy of said
decision despite the three notices sent to him by the postmaster. The failure to claim a registered mail matter of which
notice had been duly given by the postmaster is not an excusable neglect that would warrant the reopening of a
decided case.
 SUMMONS (Rule 14, Sections 1 to 23)
AM No. 11-3-6-SC, New Rule on Service of Summons on Foreign Juridical Entities

DALIPE, Ria Alisandra Tolentino

66. Express Padala (Italia), S.P.A. vs. Ocampo, 202505, 6 September 2017

DOCTRINE: The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be served personally on the defendant.
Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

For justifiable reasons, however, other modes of serving summons may be resorted to. When the defendant
cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, the rules allow
summons to be served by substituted service. Substituted service is effected by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Facts:
● In September 2002, BDO Remittance, a corporation with principal office in Italy, hired respondent Ocampo
as a remittance professor.
● In February 2004, respondent Ocampo was dismissed for misappropriating the sum of 24,035.60 euros
through falsifying invoices of money payments relating to money transfer orders from February to December
2003
● Consequently, BDO Remittance filed a criminal complaint against Ocampo before the Court of Turin, Italy
○ Ocampo pleaded guilty to the offense charged. She was convicted and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 6 months, but was granted the benefit of suspension of enforcement of sentence
on account of her guilty plea
● On September 22, 2008, BDO Remittance filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment with the RTC of
Mandaluyong
● The sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons on Ocampo in her local address alleged in the
petition to be located in Batangas
● However, the address was incomplete. Hence, the Sheriff sought help from the barangay officials who
pointed him to the house of Ocampo’s father, Nicasio Ocampo and Uncle, Victor Macahia.
○ Macahia informed the sheriff that he was only a caretaker of the house
● The sheriff proceeded to serve the summons upon Macahia
● After Ocampo failed to file an answer, BDO Remittance filed a motion to declare Ocampo in default which
was granted by the RTC
● The RTC rendered a decision in favor of BDO Remittance and recognized the decision of the Court of Turin
as binding in the Philippines
● Later, Ocampo was able to engage the services of a counsel who filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
with the CA
○ Ocampo principally argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in recognizing and
ordering the enforcement of the Court of Turin Decision
● The CA set aside the RTC decision and held that since Ocampo’s whereabouts were unknown, summons
should have been served in accordance with Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
○ Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Ocampo, and, hence, the
RTC decision against her is null and void.

Issue: Whether service of summons was validly effected upon respondent who lives in Italy, through substituted
service?
Ruling:
NO, the substituted service is improper in this case. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
a defendant's constitutional right to due process. As a rule, if a defendant has not been validly summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is void.

Substituted service presupposes that the place where the summons is being served is the defendant’s current
residence or office/regular place of business. Thus, where the defendant neither resides nor holds office in the
address stated in the summons, substituted service cannot be resorted to.

In this case, it is clear that Ocampo no longer resides in Batangas. The report stated that defendant and her family
were already in Italy without identifying any specific address. Hence, not being a resident of the address where the
summons was served, the substituted service of summons is ineffective. Accordingly, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Ocampo.

De La Serna, Samantha Grace Mauleon

67. Cathay Metal Corp. vs. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, 172204, 10 July 2014

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

● Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative allegedly entered into a joint venture agreement with
farmer-beneficiaries through certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in Silang, Cavite.2
● While respondent was negotiating with the farmer-beneficiaries, petitioner Cathay Metal Corporation entered
into Irrevocable Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB) contracts with the same farmer-beneficiaries.
● Under the IERB, the farmer-beneficiaries committed themselves to sell to petitioner their agricultural
properties upon conversion to industrial or commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of
prohibition from transferring title to the properties.

● In 1999, petitioner and the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of sale of the properties. Transfer
certificates of title were also issued in the name of the petitioner in the same year. The annotations in the
original titles were copied to petitioner's titles.
● Respondent’s Vice-President, Orlando dela Peña, sent two letters dated March 20, 2000 and April 12, 2000
to the petitioner, informing it of respondent’s claim to the properties. Petitioner did not respond.

● On September 15, 2000, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claims on its
transfer certificates of title with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. It served a copy of the petition by
registered mail to respondent's alleged official address at “Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna.”
● The petition was returned to sender because respondent could not be found at that address.
● The postman issued a certification stating that the reason for the return was that the “cooperative [was] not
existing.”
● Petitioner allegedly attempted to serve the petition upon the respondent personally. However, this service
failed for the same REASON.
● Upon petitioner's motion, the Regional Trial Court issued an order on December 15, 2000 declaring
petitioner’s substituted service, apparently by registered mail, to have been effected.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was not validly served with summons?

RULING:
 ● Relying on the provision, petitioner argued that respondent was sufficiently served with summons and a
copy of its petition for cancellation of annotations because it allegedly sent these documents to respondent’s
official address as registered with the Cooperative Development Authority.
● Petitioner further argued that the Rules of Procedure cannot trump the Cooperative Code with respect to
notices. This is because the Cooperative Code is substantive law, as opposed to the Rules of Procedure,
which pertains only to matters of procedure.

● The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only in this court. Article VIII,
Section 5(5) provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

● This means that on matters relating to procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of Procedure that will
govern. Proper court procedures shall be determined by the Rules as promulgated by this court. Service of
notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding is court procedure.
Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure.

Dela Pieza, Mary Joy Valle

68. Spouses Manuel vs. Ong, 205249, 15 October 2014

DOCTRINE:
Rue 14, Sec 6 Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing
a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

One cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of summons has nothing to do with
the location where summons is served. A defendant's address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit
tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of
personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service

Facts:

● Respondent Ong filed a complaint with the RTC against Spouses Manuel with having constructed
improvements - through force, intimidation, strategy, threats, and stealth on a property he supposedly
owned. Ong filed an amended complaint. Summons was then issued directed to the Spouses on Feb 3,
2010
● Ong filed a motion to declare the Spouses in default. Per the Sheriff’s return of summons, they attempted to
personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower, Bacong, Loacan, Itogon,
Benguet. However, the spouses requested the service be made at another time considering that petitioner’s
mother was then critically ill. Another attempt of personal service was made. However, after the Sheriff
Sales explained the content of the summons and the complaint, petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to sign
and receive it. Thus, Sales was prompted to merely tender the summons and complaint and to advise
Sandra Manuel to file their answer within 15 days which they failed to do. Hence, Ong asked that they be
declared in default.
● RTC then issued an order granting Ong’s motion to declare the Spouses in default. Ong then moved for the
ex parte presentation of evidence which was granted.
 ● Spouses Manuel then filed a motion to lift the order of default alleging that it is the sibling of Sandra Manuel
who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet. Thus,
summons could not have been properly served on them in the former address.
● They assumed that Ong and his companions mistook Sandra’s Siblings as the defendants. Also, they further
claimed that they only received via registered mail copies of a compliance and manifestation filed by Ong
and the scheduling of the ex parte presentation of evidence. Attached to the Spouses Manuel's motion to lift
order of default was their answer
● RTC denied the motion to lift order claiming that the motion was not sworn and they did not show that their
failure to timely file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
● On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Issue: Whether Spouses Manuel may be granted relief form RTC’s order of default.

Held:

No, jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants was validly acquired. Under Rule 14, Sec 6 of the ROC, it
provides that personal service of summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Tendering summons itself is a means of
personal service. In this case, the sheriff’s return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to
personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate
occasions. On the second occasion, he was constrained to tender the summons and the copy of the complaint.
Moreover, the Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant's address is
inconsequential. Rule is clear that in personally handing the summons to the defendant, what is determinative of
the validity of personal service is the person of the defendant, not the locus of service. Furthermore, A sheriff's
return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an
accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff. Thus, the
petition was denied and the CA decision was affirmed.

Delos Santos, Janah Joaquin

69. People’s General Insurance Corporation vs. Guansing, 204759, 14 November 2018

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, personal service is the preferred mode of service of summons. Substituted service
is the exception to this general rule.

For the sheriff to avail of substituted service, there must be a detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions showing
that a defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts.

Failure to serve summons means that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Absent proper service of summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant unless there is
voluntary appearance.

The filing of an answer and other pleadings is considered voluntary appearance.

FACTS:
● On February 4, 2006, Lizaso, Guansing's employee, was driving Guansing's truck along Legarda Street,
Sampaloc, Manila when he hit the rear portion of Andrea Yokohama's (Yokohama) Isuzu Crosswind.
● The strong impact caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other vehicles, rendering it beyond repair.
● Yokohama's Isuzu Crosswind was insured with People's General Insurance Corporation.
● Yokohama filed a total loss claim under her insurance policy, which paid the full amount of P907,800.00 as
settlement. Thus, People's General Insurance Corporation claimed to have been subrogated to all the rights
and interests of Yokohama against Guansing.
● People's General Insurance Corporation sought from Guansing reimbursement of the total amount paid to
Yokohama, less the salvage value of P470,000.00.
● Despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to reimburse the amount claimed.
● On August 28, 2006, People's General Insurance Corporation filed a Complaint for a sum of money and
damages against Guansing and Lizaso.
 ● The sheriff served the summons on Guansing's brother, Reynaldo Guansing. The sheriff's return did not
explain why summons was served on his brother instead of Guansing.

● On September 27, 2006, Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He alleged that he did not personally receive the summons.
● People's General Insurance Corporation argued that summons was properly served since substituted
service was an alternative mode of service.
● RTC denied MTD, Respondent filed MR, also denied.
● Petitioner filed Motion to Render Judgment. RTC ruled against Guansing.
● Guansing filed his Motion for Reconsideration, where he reiterated his contention that the Regional Trial
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person due to invalid service of summons.
● On March 8, 2011, Guansing filed an appeal 31 before the Court of Appeals. In a December 10, 2012
Decision, 32 the Court of Appeals ruled in Guansing's favor and held that the Regional Trial Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over him because summons was improperly served on his brother.
● Moreover, the sheriff did not provide an explanation on why the summons was not personally served upon
him.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Edgardo Guansing
through service of summons; - NO
2. Whether or not respondent Edgardo Guansing, in filing his Answer and other subsequent pleadings, voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. - YES

HELD:
1. No. As a rule, summons must be served personally on a defendant. Rule 14, Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules
of Court provide:

Section 6. Service in person on defendant . — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be

served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign
for it, by tendering it to him.

Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Sheriffs, in doing substituted service, must strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules. In this case, the sheriff should have established the impossibility of
prompt personal service before he resorted to substituted service. Impossibility of prompt personal service is
established by a sheriff's failure to personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within
this period, he or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to personally
serve the summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the sheriff's return why these attempts are
unsuccessful. Based on the Sheriff's Return in this case, the sheriff clearly failed to meet this requirement.

2. Yes. By filing his answer and other pleadings, respondent Guansing is deemed to have voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Respondent Guansing filed his: (1) Answer dated January 28, 2007;
(2) Pre-trial Brief dated February 27, 2007; (3) Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Postponement dated February 2,
2008; (4) Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2010; and (5) Notice of Appeal dated March 8, 2011.
 His filing of these pleadings amounts to voluntary appearance. He is considered to have submitted himself
to the court's jurisdiction, which is equivalent to a valid service of summons. By filing numerous pleadings,
he has confirmed that notice has been effected, and that he has been adequately notified of the proceedings
for him to sufficiently defend his interests. Respondent Guansing, who actively participated in the
proceedings, cannot impugn the court's jurisdiction. To reiterate, a long line of cases has established that
the filing of an answer, among other pleadings, is considered voluntary appearance and vests the court with
jurisdiction over the person. The rules are clear: the filing of an answer and other pleadings is considered
voluntary appearance. Respondent Guansing's actions lead to no other conclusion other than he voluntarily
appeared and submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction.

Devesa, Imelda Mallari

70. Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. vs. RCBC, 183370, 17 August 2015

DOCTRINE:

1. Section 11, Rule 14, Rules of Court - Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

2. Section 6, Rule 14, Rules of Court - Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

3. Section 7, Rule 14, Rules of Court - Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

FACTS:
● In October 2006, respondent RCBC filed a complaint against petitioner Nation Petroleum Gas (“NPG”) and
its directors and officers for civil damages arising from estafa in relation to violations of the Trust Receipts
Law.
● After an ex parte hearing was conducted, respondent’s prayer for preliminary attachment was granted and
the corresponding writ was issued.
● Thereafter, Sheriff served upon petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application for attachment,
respondent’s affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment.
● Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss. They asserted that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly served upon
Claudia Abante, who is merely a liaison officer and not one of the corporate officers specifically enumerated
in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
● Petitioners argued that the sheriff or the process server did not personally approach them at the respective
addresses stated in the complaint. Neither did they resort to substituted service of summons, and that, even
if they did, will not mean compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
● Respondent countered that there was a valid service of summons upon petitioners. With respect to the
corporation, Abante received the summons upon the express authority and instruction of the corporate
secretary, petitioner Melinda Ang
● As regards the individual petitioners, the Sheriff’s report reflects that they were served at their given
addresses, but they refused to acknowledge. Respondent stressed that said report is prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein and that the Sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official functions.
● A reply was filed by petitioners to support their contention that the court lacks jurisdiction over their persons
which was supported by affidavits.
● In its rejoinder with motion to strike, respondent stood firm in defending the court’s jurisdiction. Even if the
Sheriff’s report did not state in detail the fact that the summons was served upon individual petitioners
 through substituted service, respondent asserted that this does not conclusively prove that such service is
invalid because it may still be shown through extraneous evidence.
● RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and respondent’s motion to declare them in default. It upheld the
jurisdiction of the court on the persons of the petitioners.
● Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. CA dismissed the petition and denied
their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by service of summons
upon its employee.

2. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the individual defendants by resorting
to substituted service of summons despite absence of earnest efforts on the part of the serving officer to
serve summons personally.

HELD:

1. Yes. Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is clear that when the defendant is a corporation, partnership
or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made
on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following
the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Substantial compliance cannot be
invoked. The foregoing notwithstanding, there is still a valid service of summons in this case as Claudia
Abante received the summons not in her official capacity as petitioner corporation’s liaison officer but upon
receiving instructions to do so from Melinda Ang, an individual petitioner herein and the petitioner
corporation’s corporate secretary. It is clear, therefore, that Abante, in so receiving the summons, did so in
representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers competent under the Rules of Court
to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical person. Thus, while it may be true that there was no
direct, physical handling of the summons to Ang, the latter could at least be charged with having
constructively received the same which amounts to a valid service of summons.

2. No. Based on Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there was an improper service of
summons. The Sheriff was not able to explain in detail why substituted service was resorted to and the
precise manner by which the summons was served upon the individual petitioners. The disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed will not apply where it is shown in the sheriff
or server’s report that it is defective. To avail of the substitute service of summons, courts must rely on a
detailed enumeration of the sheriff’s actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite
diligent and reasonable efforts

Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The second sentence of
Section 20 Rule 14 of the Rules that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance” clearly refers to
affirmative defenses, not affirmative reliefs.

Diel, Joan Cervantes

71. Orion Security Corp. vs. Kaifam Enterprises Inc., 163287, 27 April 2007

DOCTRINE: special appearance by a party to a court to challenge the jurisdiction of said court based on
 the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court.
FACTS:
Petitioner Orion Security Corp is a domestic private corporation engaged in the business of providing security
services and the respondent is one of its clients. Respondent was unable to pay the petitioner for its rendered
services which led the petitioner to file a complaint for collection of sum of money. respondent’s representatives
allegedly refused to acknowledge their receipt when the sheriff tried to serve the summons and a copy of the
complaint to the secretary of the respondent's manager. The summons and the copy of the complaint were left at the
respondent's office.

When respondent failed to file an Answer, petitioner filed a motion to declare respondent in default. The trial court,
however, denied the motion on the ground that there was no proper service of summons on respondent.

Petitioner then filed a motion for alias summons, which the trial court granted. The process server again left the
summons and a copy of the complaint at respondent’s office through respondent’s security guard, who allegedly
refused to acknowledge their receipt.

Again, respondent failed to file an Answer. On motion of petitioner, respondent was declared in default. This allowed
the petitioner to adduce evidence ex parte.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution declaring it in default. Respondent alleged the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person due to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied the motion
for reconsideration.

On March 15, 2000, the trial court rendered a default judgment in favor of petitioner ordering the respondent to pay
the petitioner:

1. P513,839 as total amount of balance due to ORIO plus 12% interest rate;

2. P51,383 which is 10% outstanding obligation as atty’s fee.

3. P5,000 as litigation expenses and;

4. P3,563 for the costs.

An ordinary appeal was filed by the respondent alleging that the service of summons and copy of complaint was
improperly done and Court of Appeals ruled to set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the case to be
remanded to the RTC for more proceedings upon valid service of summons to the parties.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence the petition for review on certiorari to the
supreme court.

ISSUE:

1. whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent either by

a. valid substituted service of summons on respondent; or
b. respondent’s voluntary appearance in the trial court and submission to its authority.

HELD:

SC held that the petition is without merit. The courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. Jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon
them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.

In case of domestic private juridical entities such as respondent in the instant case, Section 11 of Rule 14 states:
Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served
personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to. In this connection, Section 7
of Rule 14 provides:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

In this case, records show that respondent’s president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel never received the summons against respondent, either in person or by substituted
service.

In substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the
defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter would
actually receive the summons. Here, petitioner failed to show that the security guard who received the summons in
respondent’s behalf shared such relation of confidence that respondent would surely receive the summons. Hence,
we are unable to accept petitioner’s contention that service on the security guard constituted substantial compliance
with the requirements of substituted service.

The court did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent by the latter’s voluntary appearance in court proceedings
since a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground
of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As the
respondent made a special appearance specifically to question the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of
invalid service of summons, the respondent did not submit to the court’s authority.

Since the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over respondent, either by valid substituted service of summons or by
respondent’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority, respondent cannot be bound by the trial
court’s judgment ordering it to pay petitioner a sum of money.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

Dominguez, Mary Grace Belmonte

72. Robinsons vs. Millares, 163584, 12 December 2006

DOCTRINE: Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil
action, service of summons is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any
judgment without such service, in the absence of a valid waiver, is null and void.

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through
personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure.

Personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary
in character. For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a)
personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or upon a
competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of business. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
FACTS:
● Celita Miralles, respondent, filed with the said court a complaint for sum of money against Remelita
Robinson, petitioner.
● Summons was served on petitioner at her given address. However, per return of service of Sheriff Maximo
Potente dated March 5, 2001, petitioner no longer resides at such address.
● On July 20, 2001, the trial court issued an alias summons to be served at No. 19 Baguio St., Alabang Hills,
Muntinlupa City, petitioner’s new address. Again, the summons could not be served on petitioner.
● Eventually, respondent filed a motion to declare petitioner in default for her failure to file an answer
seasonably despite service of summons. Trial court granted respondent’s motion declaring petitioner in
default and allowing respondent to present her evidence ex parte.
● A copy of the Order was sent to petitioner by registered mail at her new address. Upon respondent’s motion,
the trial court, on September 8, 2003, issued a writ of execution.
● On September 26, 2003, petitioner filed with the trial court a petition for relief from the judgment by default.
She claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over her and that all its proceedings are void.
● Trial court issued a Resolution denying the petition for relief. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied by the trial court.
● Petitioner’s contention: the service of summons upon the subdivision security guard is not in compliance
with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or staying at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly
authorized to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the substituted service of summons is
not valid and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court correctly ruled that a substituted service of summons upon petitioner has been validly
effected.

HELD: YES. That summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, it was ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service
must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is
considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the
letter of the procedural rules, that governs.
In the case at bar, it is seen that in his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the
security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to
proceed to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or
substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did
she deny having received the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security
guard, she must bear its consequences. (Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him or her. )

NOTES: In a civil action, service of summons is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Any judgment without such service, in the absence of a valid waiver, is null and void. Where the action is in personam
and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner
provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, thus:
● SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
● SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein; or
(b) by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof. Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the
latter mode of service being a method extraordinary in character.
For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established:
(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;
(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of business.

Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

Escudero, Thrishannel Pascual

73. Green Star Express, Inc. vs. Nissin-Universal Robina Corp., 181517, 6 July 2015

DOCTRINE: The rule now likewise states “general manager” instead of “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of
 merely “secretary”; and “treasurer” instead of “cashier.” It has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to
the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the
express mention of one person excludes all others, or expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must,
therefore, be made only on the persons expressly listed in the rules.

FACTS:
● On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation ( URC) owned figured in
a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.’ s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting in the
death of the van’s driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent
NissinUniversal Robina Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to ₱567, 070.68.
NURC denied any liability therefore and argued that the criminal case shall determine the ultimate liabilities
of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without prejudice, due to insufficiency of
evidence. Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the R TC of San
Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC’s employees, was the one who received the summons. On
February 6, 2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service.

ISSUE:
● Whether or not there is valid service of summons.

HELD:
● No. It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity
must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons
was received by its cost accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Court, which provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the
defendant is a domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be served only through its officers. Thus:
● Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service
may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.
● In the past, the Court upheld service of summons upon a construction project manager, a corporation‘s
assistant manager, and ordinary clerk of a corporation, private secretary of corporate executives, retained
counsel, and officials who had control over the operations of the corporation like the assistant general
manager or the corporation‘s Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. The Court then considered said
persons as “agent” within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of
summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized, The rule now likewise states “general
manager” instead of “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of merely “secretary”; and “treasure” instead
of “cashier.” It has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the
aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person
excludes all others, or expression unions est exclusion alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on
the person expressly listed in the rules. If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.

Gesmundo, Jeanette Elaine Ilagan

74. Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corp., 170943, 23 September 2008

DOCTRINE: The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as
an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

FACTS:
● This is a petition for review1 of the September 22, 2005 decision2 and December 29, 2005 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.
● Respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against in the RTC of
Pasig City.
 ○ The complaint, sought to collect the amount of PHP 698,502.10 representing petitioner’s unpaid
balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of
directors.
● Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address.
○ Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court (TC) allowed service of summons by
publication.
● Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate. Thereafter, respondent submitted the
affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of respondent’s
employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known
address.
● When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved that the case be set
for the reception of its evidence ex parte.
○ The TC granted the motion.
● Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer." He sought
reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by
respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by
the clerk of court.
○ The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It held that the rules did not require
the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of
court.
● Petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in the CA through
a petition for certiorari.
○ CA rendered its decision sustaining the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the
trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied reconsideration.
● Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the service of summons was valid. - YES.

HELD: YES.

● Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. – In any action
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by
leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and
in such places and for such times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied)

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts,
respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.

Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that substituted
service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was
significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because
of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only. This has been changed. The
present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

● Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court provides: …an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the
post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.

Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the
editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by
publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address. This
complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order
for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last
known address."
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court.
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the
complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

● Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against
him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit
Attached Answer." This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.

NOTES:

● Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court is now Section 16, Rule 14:
○ Section 16. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. — In any action
where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his or her
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, within ninety (90)
calendar days from the commencement of the action, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him or her by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such time as the court may order.

Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty
(60) calendar days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. (14)

● Section 19, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court is now Section 22, Rule 14:
○ Section 22. Proof of service by publication. — If the service has been made by publication, service
may be proved by the affidavit of the publisher, editor, business or advertising manager, to which
affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a
copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his or her last known address. (19)

● Section 20, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court is now Section 23, Rule 14:
○ Section 23. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall be deemed a voluntary appearance. (20)

Guinto, Roleen Wendee Napoles

75. Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, 165016, 17 June 2008

DOCTRINE: The normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted service
because personal service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary means of summoning defendants.
Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent resident may be by substituted service as
domiciliaries of a State are always amenable to suits in personam therein.

"Residence" is the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made,
even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. A plaintiff is merely required to know the
defendant's residence, office or regular business place. He need not know where a resident defendant actually is
at the very moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the person upon whom service was
actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or informs him about it
FACTS:
● Petitioner Dolores Montefalcon algae that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Respondent Vasquez.
 ● She filed a complaint for acknowledgment and support against the respondent praying that the latter be
obliged to give support to the co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as
father.
● Vasquez allegedly refused to give Laurence regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner
added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.
● A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Camarines Sur. Vasquez's grandfather
received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's mother informed the court of the non-service of
summons.
● Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default which the court denied for lack of proper service
of summons.
● The court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at his residence in Taguig upon petitioners' motion. A
Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted service on Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's
return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's surname
● Another alias summons was issued, also received by Bejer.
● Upon petitioner’s motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer despite the
substituted service of summons
● The court granted petitioner’s prayers and held that the Vasquez admitted the truth of the allegations by his
silence.
● Vasquez filed a notice of appeal which was granted by the appellate court. He argued that the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
● The CA ruled that the service of summons on Vasquez was defective as there was no explanation of
impossibility of personal service and an attempt to effect personal service.
● Petitioners filed a petition for review argued that substituted service is valid because Vasquez had left as
overseas seafarer when the sheriff served the summons in Taguig. Vasquez counters that because he was
abroad, service of summons should have been personal or by publication as substituted service is proper
only if a defendant is in the country.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez.

HELD:
● YES.
● Sec. 16 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that: When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be
also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section (extraterritorial service).
● Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also", it is not mandatory.
● Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer
on a defendant-seaman.
● To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if this is not
feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service.
● It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. It is a common knowledge
that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority
of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home address in the province where he originates.
● In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the
complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in either place.
● Personal service of summons was not practicable since the defendant was temporarily out of the country.
● Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs inquired about Vasquez's whereabouts, signifying that they did not
immediately resort to substituted service.
● In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified because previous
attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were evidently
exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official duty.
● Hence, there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez.

HERNANDEZ, Corine Elizabeth Oandasan

76. Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading Corp., 172242, 14 August 2007
 DOCTRINE: Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons
by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an
interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's
property has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other
manner the court may deem sufficient.
Facts:

● Respondent, a domestic corporation, entered into a Distribution Agreement Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia
Pte Ltd. (PEIA).

o By virtue of the said agreement, PEIA appointed the respondent as the sole distributor of its
products in the Philippines.

o PEIA, on the other hand, shall give the respondent a commission for the sale of its products in
the Philippines.

● Under the same Distribution Agreement, respondent shall order the products of PEIA, which it shall sell in
the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or f r o m Perkin-Elmer Instruments (Philippines) Corporation (PEIP),
an affiliate of PEIA.

o PEIA allegedly owned 99% of the shares of PEIP.

● On 2 August 1997, however, PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement, prompting respondent
to file before the RTC a Complaint 6 for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance
of a Writ of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP.
● RTC

o Issued order denying respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment.

o Motion for reconsideration was also denied.

● Respondent then filed Ex-Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize
Respondent's General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside of the Philippines, which the
RTC granted.

o But the said Alias Summons was served on and received by PerkinElmer Asia, a Singaporean-
based sole proprietorship, owned by the petitioner and, allegedly, a separate and distinct entity
from PEIA.

● PEIP moved to dismiss 11 the Complaint filed by respondent on the ground that it states no cause of action.
● Perkinelmer Asia, on the other hand, through its counsel, sent letters, to the respondent and to the RTC,
respectively, to inform them of the wrongful service of summons upon PerkinElmer Asia.
● Respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, together with the Amended Complaint
claiming that PEIA had become a sole proprietorship owned by the petitioner, and subsequently changed its
name to Perkinelmer Asia.
● Respondent filed Motion for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize Respondent’s
General Manager Richard Tee to Serve Summons outside of the Philippines. General Manager went to SG
and served summons on Petitioner.
● RTC denied Motion to Dismiss of PEIP
● Petitioner filed with RTC Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss on the ff. grounds:

1. RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner;
 2. Respondent failed to state cause of action against petitioner because it is not the real
party in interest;

3. Assuming arguendo that case was correctly filed, Distribution Agreement which was the
basis of claim grants PEIA right to terminate at any time;

4. Venue improperly laid.

● RTC denied Motion to Dismiss of Petitioner

o Respondent alleges Petitioner owns shares of stocks in PEIP and reveals that there is also an
allegation of personal property in the PH. Shares of stock represent personal property.

o Even though Amended Complaint is primarily for damages, it relates to property of Petitioner to
which it claims interest or an actual or contingent lien making it fall under Extraterritorial service
under Rule 14.15. Service of Summons was VALID.

● Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with TRO and or Preliminary Injunction with CA.

o CA affirmed RTC

● Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the service of summons was proper and RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.

Held:

No. The service of summons was defective, and that trial court thus failed in acquiring jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.

Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there are only four instances
wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by
extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an
interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property
has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.

o On the other when the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against
him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court.

In the case at bar, this Court sustains the contention of the petitioner that there can never be a valid
extraterritorial service of summons upon it, because the case before the court a quo involving collection of a sum of
money and damages is, indeed, an action in personam, as it deals with the personal liability of the petitioner to the
respondent by reason of the alleged unilateral termination by the former of the Distribution Agreement. Even the
Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 4 April 2004, upheld the nature of the instant case as an action in personam.

Kim, Hye Ri Drilon

77. NM Rothschild & Sons vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, 175799, 28 November 2011
 DOCTRINE: Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if
an action is in personam.

FACTS:

● Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company [hereafter, Lepanto] filed with the RTC of Makati City a
Complaint against Petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited, praying for a judgment declaring the
loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and for damages.
● Upon Lepanto’s motion, the RTC authorized Lepanto’s counsel to personally bring the summons and
Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of
summons on Petitioner.
● Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (a) the court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; (b)
the Complaint failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the
action is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
● The RTC denied the MD of the petitioner; according that there was a proper service of summons through the
DFA on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to do business in the
Philippines, nor filed with the SEC a Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom
summons, and other legal processes maybe served.
● RTC also held that the Complaint sufficiently stated a COA; The other allegations in the MD were brushed
aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated during the trial.
● Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
● Petitioner sought redress via Petition for Certiorari with the CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying its Motion to Dismiss.
● CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: WON THE RTC ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER (ON ACCOUNT
OF THE IMPROPER SERVICE OF SUMMONS).

HELD: NO.

The service of summons to petitioner through the DFA by the conveyance of the summons to the Philippine
Consulate General in Sydney, Australia was made pursuant to Section 15 of the Rules of Court, governing
Extraterritorial Service.

Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four instances wherein a defendant who is a
non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit:

1. When the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs;

2. When the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant
claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
3. When the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; and
4. When the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances,
service of summons may be effected by
a. personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
b. publication, also with leave of court; or
c. any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Proceeding from such enumeration, as held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation:
Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an
action is in personam.

When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case because, in actions in action in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in
such instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial service
of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair
play or due process.

On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the
action involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.

In Domagas v. Jensen, it was held that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding
is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose.

IN THE CASE AT BAR, the Complaint is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts between the
parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the
defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for entering into such contract.
It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches a property within the Philippines
belonging to the defendant, in which case the action will be converted to one quasi in rem.

Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the petitioner does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily appears in court.

Librojo, Joseph Macasaet

78. De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation, 194751, 26 November 2014

DOCTRINE: Section 7 substituted service: if , for justifiable cause the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
a. Leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein
b. By leaving the copies at the defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.

FACTS:
● This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original
certificates of title, filed against several defendants. One of the defendants is petitioner Aurora De
Pedro (De Pedro).

● The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan Development Corporation (RDC) before the
RTC of Antipolo City. Respondent RDC alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and
possessor of land.

● Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed. The officer’s return reads in part:

● AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of the Post
Office of Pasig there is no person in the said given address.

● Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication.

 ● RTC granted the motion. The summons and the complaint were published in People’s Balita.
Respondent moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in default for
failure to file their answers.

● The RTC granted the motion. The RTC issued an order declaring as nullity of the titles and free
patents issued to all defendants in respondent’s complaint, including the free patent issued to De
Pedro.

● De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the RTC a motion for new trial, De Pedro argued that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of
summons.

● Citing the officer’s return, De Pedro pointed out that summons was not personally served upon
her “for the reason that according to the messenger of the Post Office of Pasig there is no person
in the said given address”.

● De Pedro also argued that the case should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.
She alleged that there was a pending civil case filed by her, involving the same property, when
the respondent filed the complaints against her and several others. RTC issued an order denying
De Pedro’s motion for a new trial.

● The RTC ruled that summons was validly served upon De Pedro through publication, in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

● De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for new trial.

● CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirmed the denial of De Pedro’s
motion for new trial.

● De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA.

● De Pedro elevated the case to this court, but this was likewise denied.

● De Pedro filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment of the RTC on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having been dispossessed of her property without due
process.

● CA promulgated its decision denying De Pedro’s petition for annulment of judgment. CA ruled
that since petitioner already availed herself of the remedy of new trial, and raised the case before
the CA via petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a petition for annulment of judgment

● De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied. De Pedro filed before this court seeking the
reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro
HELD: The sheriff’s return must show the details of the efforts exerted to personally serve summons
upon defendants or respondents, before substituted service or service by publication is availed
Regardless of the type of action.

Whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem, the preferred mode of service of summons is personal
service. To avail themselves of substituted service, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the
sheriff’s actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable
efforts.

The sheriff’s return, which contains these details, is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on this
basis, the court may allow substituted service. Should the sheriff’s return be wanting of these details,
substituted service will be irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was presented.

Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary
appearance.

Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over:
(a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case;
(b) the thing or the res;
(c) the parties;
(d) the remedy.

Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity
to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected to deny
persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction.

Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect. The relation of due process to jurisdiction is
recognized even in administrative cases wherein the standard of evidence is relatively lower. Hence,
regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative.

A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction. Respondent’s
institution of a proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court with
jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with authority and
competence.

Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons. Thus, as a rule, summons
must be served personally upon the defendant or respondent wherever he or she may be found. If the
defendant or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or her.

Mabanglo, Aily Liezel Molina

79. Reicon vs. Diamond, 204796, 4 February 2015

DOCTRINE:The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an
original and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari
 petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been
made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides
that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not
apply.

Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon's certiorari petition outright for non-compliance with Section
3, Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule
13 of the Rules. The service of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel,
is what the rule properly requires, as in this case.

FACTS:

● Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-storey building erected thereon located at the corner of
Aurora Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Quezon City and entered into a contract of lease with
respondent Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. (Diamond) (January 9, 1991 Contract), for a
period of twenty (20) years, from January 15, 1991 to January 15, 2011, for a monthly rental of P75,000.00,
subject to periodical increments.
● In turn, Diamond sublet portions of the subject property to Jollibee Foods Corporation (Jollibee) and
Maybunga U.K. Enterprises (Maybunga), represented by its proprietor, Andrew D. Palangdao (Andrew).
● Beginning June 2006, Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due, and the checks it had issued by way of
payments from June 2006 to December 2006 were all dishonored upon presentment. This prompted Reicon
to send, a letter demanding the payment of the accrued rentals and terminating the January 9, 1991
Contract.
● Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over the portions of the subject
property they respectively occupy.
● On December 14, 2009, Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon,
Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew, and a certain Mary Palangdao (Mary) (defendants) before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City alleging that the January 9, 1991 Contract did not provide for its unilateral termination by
either of the parties.
● It also alleged that the act of defendants in entering into separate contracts, despite the existence of the
January 9, 1991 Contract, constitutes unlawful interference, for which they must be held solidarily liable for
damages.
● Diamond prayed that the unilateral termination of the January 9, 1991 Contract effected by Reicon, as well
as the separate contracts of lease it entered into with Jollibee and Maybunga, be declared invalid and illegal.
● Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over its
person, considering that the summons was not served upon its president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel, as required by the Rules of Court but upon a
houseboy/gardener, at a residence which is not the principal office of Reicon; (b) lack of legal capacity to
sue as a juridical person on the part of Diamond, its certificate of registration having already been revoked
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as early as September 29, 2003, per certifications
issued by the latter;[24] and (c) lack of cause of action, in the absence of the requisite allegations of the
ultimate facts constituting bad faith and malice on the part of the defendants as would support the cause of
action of “unlawful interference.”
● RTC RULING: the RTC denied Reicon’s (and Jollibee’s) motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that improper
service of summons is not among the grounds enumerated under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules allowing
for the dismissal of a complaint and that in ruling that Diamond’s legal existence can only be impugned in a
quo warranto proceeding.
● Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari
● CA RULING: the CA dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition without passing upon its merits based on the
following grounds: (a) non-compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition on Diamond
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules, and (b) non-compliance with the rule on service upon a party
through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules.

ISSUE: whether or not Reicon’s certiorari petition before the CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond.

HELD: Yes. Reicon's certiorari petition before the CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which covers cases originally Filed before the CA, provide as follows:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - The petition shall

contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. - The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by
his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.

In this case, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address in its complaint
before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since changed its address or had moved out.
Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in
light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above-cited, which merely entails service of
the petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel. Certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and
independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment
or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory
pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the
requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service
upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.

Mamisao, Michelle Espiritu

80. Rapid Realty and Development Corp. vs. Villa, 184197, 11 February 2010

DOCTRINE: It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance.

FACTS:

● In 2004, PET Rapid City Realty and Development Corp. filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
subdivision plans . . . mandamus and damages against several respondents including RES-Spouses
Orlando and Lourdes Villa.

● After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, the court process server Gregorio Zapanta
resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon RES-Sps’ househelp who did not acknowledge
receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names.

● Despite substituted service, RES-Sps failed to file their Answer prompting PET Rapid Realty to filed a
motion to declare them in default which was granted by the trial court.

● More than eight months later, RES-Sps filed a motion to lift the order of default claiming that on January 27,
2006, they officially received all pertinent papers such as the complaint and its annexes, motion to Dismiss
of the Solicitor General and the order granting the motion to declare them in default.

● They denied the existence of the two helpers who refused to sign and acknowledge the receipt of the
summons. And even if assuming such were true, the helpers had no authority to receive it.

● The trial court set aside the order of default and gave the RES-Sps 5 days to file their Answer, but the RES-
Sps did not, prompting the PET Rapid Realty to again file a motion to declare them in default which was
again granted by the trial court.

● RES-Sps filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) of the second order declaring them in default claiming that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons, but it was
denied.
 ● On appeal by certiorari to the CA, it annulled the trial court’s ruling stating that: a party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of
summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT UPON FILING THE MOTION TO LIFT THE ORDER OF DEFAULT.

HELD: YES.

It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this
rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration,
is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the
concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.[7]
(italics and underscoring supplied)

IN THE CASE AT BAR, the respondents alleged in their first motion to lift the order that: there is no reason why
they should not receive the orders since the subject of the case is their multi-million real estate property; that they
must be afforded due process of law since they were not furnished copies of pleasings by the petitioner.

Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose
only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the
court.

Manalansan, Lizel De Leon

81. PCIB vs. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi, et. Al, 171137, 5 June 2009

DOCTRINE: One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.

FACTS:
 - Petition for review on certiorari
- Sps. Amadeo were indebted to petitioner bank, as sureties for Streamline Cotton Development Corp. The
promissory notes became due and demandable, but sps. Amadeos failed to pay their outstanding
obligations despite repeated demands
- The obligation was at P10,671,726.61
- Petitioner bank also discovered that a month before the due date of the PNs, sps. Amaedeo sold three or
nearly all of their real properties to respondents; and sps. Amadeo also caused the transfer of the titles
covering those parcels of land
- Petitioner believed the transfers were fraudulent and thus filed an action for rescission and damages before
the RTC
- Upon service of summons to sps. Amadeo, the latter filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint violated the explicit terms of SC Circular 04-94, as the Verification was executed by petitioner’s
legal counsel
- Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss
- Sps. Amadeo argued that petitioner failed to release the loans to Streamline on the agreed date, thereby
constraining them to incur loans from third parties at high interest rates to keep the company afloat
- Loans covered by PDCs which had to be funded once the obligations fell due
- Sps. Amaedeo had to sell the subject properties to pay the loans
- They claimed that the purchase price for the 3 parcels of land was the fair market value
- Petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication on respondents. This was
denied on the ground that summons by publication cannot be availed of in an action in personam
- Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where they accused petitioner of not causing
summons to be served upon them and losing interest in the case. Petitioner filed its Opposition
- The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on account of (1) petitioner’s Compliance and Manifestation that it
had not lost interest in pursuing the case and (2) the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by
Publication that petitioner simultaneous filed with its Opposition

ISSUE: Whether there was voluntary appearance on the part of respondents as to confer the trial court with
jurisdiction over their persons.

HELD: YES
- Jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court
- One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
- The filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to
the court’s jurisdiction
- Conditional appearance: a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority
- Different from voluntary appearance
- Special appearance operates as an exception to the GR on voluntary appearance
- Objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set
forth in an unequivocal manner
- Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution
- Voluntary appearance (Busuego v. CA): a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice; an appearance in
whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person
- An appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or please or answer
- In the case at bar, respondents have acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the trial court as early as June 17,
2003, when they filed their MTD for Failure to Prosecute
- The motion did not categorically and expressly raise the jurisdiction of the court over their persons as an
issue
- The motion failed to qualify the capacity in which respondents were appearing and seeking recourse

MOTIONS (Rule 15, Sections 1 to 13)

Matienzo, Joseph Napoleon Salvador

82. Sarmiento vs. Zaratan, 167471, 5 February 2007
 DOCTRINE: A "motion for extension of time is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary
to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court on behalf of
one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or
parties.

FACTS

● On 2 September 2002, petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita
Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 36.
● On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
● Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City.
● In the Notice of Appealed Case, 5 the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance
with the provisions of Section 7 (b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply
memorandum within 15 days from receipt.
● Respondent's counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which to
file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due
to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness
for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the
computers because the wirings got wet. But the motion remained unacted.
● On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal.
● Petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Execution, while respondent moved for the Reconsideration. Both
motions were denied by the RTC on 31 July 2003.
● Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted in a decision
dated 17 August 2004. The appellate court nullified and set aside the 19 June 2003 and 31 July 2003
Orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondent's appeal. Consequently, respondent's
appeal memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
● In granting the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC erred in dismissing respondent's appeal for
failure to file the required Memorandum within the period provided by law
● It must be noted that respondent's appeal in the RTC was dismissed for failure to file the required
memorandum within the period allowed by law, as the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum was
not acted upon for failure to attach a notice of hearing. From the said dismissal, respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
● Corollary to the dismissal of the appeal by the RTC is the question of whether the lack of notice of
hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing
of the motion is a worthless piece of paper. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to
include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC,
the latter's motion is a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect.

ISSUE

Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is
fatal
RULING

No it is not fatal. The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the
substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension
was due to respondent's counsel's illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood, compounded by the
grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it
appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was
subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that
we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.

Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time . . . is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse
party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court
in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other
party or parties." As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by
the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard.
It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and
under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or
the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion."

Millado, Diane Angelica Juachon

83. Vette Industrial vs. Cheng, 170232-170301, 5 December 2006

DOCTRINE: A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due process intended to
afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the
adverse party is permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.

FACTS:
• These were consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari. where Cheng filed an action for specific
performance and damages against petitioner Vette Industrial Sales Co. for breaching their obligation contained in the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) .
• Under the MOA, the company acknowledged owing Cheng a sum of money as compensation for the shares
he transferred, insurance proceeds and signing bonus. In their answer with counterclaim, petitioner claimed that the
shares have already been paid; that the MOA is unenforceable and void. After failing to settle during mediation, the
case was referred back to the court.
• On the day of the Pre-trial, Cheng and his counsel Atty. Ferrer failed to appear, resulting in the dismissal of
the case. Cheng filed a motion for reconsideration.
• Petitioner claims that the motion was procedurally defective because it was not served three days before the
date of the hearing and no proof of service was given to the court, in violation of Sections 4 and 6 of Rule 15.
• The trial court granted the motion. Vette Industrial elevated the case to the CA. The ruling of the trial court
was vacated and Cheng’s complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Both parties assailed the ruling before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule of notice required under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court were violated.

RULING:
No. Although the Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, there are exceptions to the strict application
of this rule:
1. Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party successfully
shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein;
2. Where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
3. Where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court;
4. Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed."

A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due process intended to afford the
adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse
party is permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion. When the trial court received Cheng’s
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not immediately resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed Vette
Industrial to file their comment and also leave to file a rejoinder if Cheng files a reply.

The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to
promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and
proceeding. Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, SC is empowered to suspend their
operation.

Ng, Lawrence Andrew Adlawan

84. Boiser vs. Aguirre, A.M. RTJ-04-1886, 16 May 2005
 DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant, except those
motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing
must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.

FACTS

● Complainant Alfredo Boiser was the plaintiff in an ejectment case filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. On 11 July 2003, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of
complainant.
● The case was appealed to the RTC of Negros Occidental, Branch 55. On 15 October 2003, defendant-
appellant Salvador Julleza filed a motion to release bond on the ground that the MTC of Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, in its decision dated 11 July 2003, had already resolved the writ of preliminary injunction without
mentioning the applicant’s liability. On 16 October 2003, respondent judge granted the motion.
● Complainant alleged that the issuance by respondent judge of the Order dated 16 October 2003 is indicative
of his ignorance of the law considering that the motion did not state that he was furnished a copy of the
motion thereby depriving him of his right to due process. He also averred that the motion was a mere scrap
of paper for failure to state the time and date of hearing. He further alleged that respondent manifested
gross ignorance when he resolved to grant the motion to release the injunction bond considering that the
same was meant to answer for damages that he may suffer due to defendant’s continued illegal possession
of the land.

ISSUE

1. WON the motion to release bond is defective?

HELD

1. YES, the motion to release bond is defective.

The Rules of Court requires that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant, except those motions which the
court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to all
parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provide:

SECTION 4. Hearing of motion.- Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless
the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.

SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary.- No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of service thereof.

It appears that the Motion to Release Bond was defective as it did not have a proper notice of hearing. The date and
time of the hearing were not specified. Neither complainant nor his counsel was furnished a copy thereof. These were
never controverted by respondent judge.

Also, without proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial
cognizance. The rule mandates that the same shall not be acted upon by the court. Proof of service is mandatory.
 Noval, Angelica Fronteras
85. De los Reyes vs. Ramnani, 169135, 18 June 2010

DOCTRINE: While as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing, as an exception, there are non-
litigious motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party.

FACTS:
● In another civil case, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent herein over a subject property.
A writ of execution was issued and the branch sheriff conducted a public bidding and auction to which
respondent was the highest bidder. With this, a certificate of sale was executed in her favor on the same day
which was annotated at the back of the TCT.
● After 27 years, respondent filed a motion for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final
certificate of sale in her favor.
● Petitioner opposed on the ground that the motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and that the
trial court’s decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by prescription.
● The RTC ruled in favor of respondent holding that prescription is not applicable because less than a year
from the decision, respondent exercised her right to enforce the same through the levy and sale of property.
And although the certificate of sale was only annotated later on, petitioner did not exercise his right to
redeem the subject property within one year from said registration. Thus, what remains to be done is the
issuance of the final certificate of sale, which was however, not promptly accomplished at that time due to
the demise of the trial court’s sheriff. But the issuance of the final certificate of sale is a ministerial duty of the
sheriff in order to complete the already enforced judgment.
● Petitioner mover for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s motion for issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute final certificate of
sale is valid (or whether or not petitioner was afforded due process)

RULING: Yes. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right. As correctly
held by the trial court, the decision was already enforced when the subject property was levied and sold which is
within the five-year period for the execution of judgment by motion under the Rules of Court. Moreover, the CA
correctly ruled that the subject motions is a non-litigious motion. While as a general rule, all written motions should be
set for hearing, as an exception, non-litigious motions may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party. In the case at bar, the subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions.

Oasan, Wendy Louise Macaraeg

86. Preysler vs. Manila Southcoast Dev. Corp., 171872, 28 June 2010

DOCTRINE: The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not
deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate... the attainment of justice, and
courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice.

FACTS:
● Preysler filed with the MTC of Batangas a complaint for forcible entry against Manila Southcoast
Development Corporation. The subject matter of the complaint is a parcel of land with an area of 21,922
square meters located in Sitio Kutad, Barangay Papaya, Nasugbu, Batangas. The disputed land, covered by
TCT No. TF-1217 in the name of Preysler, is also within the property covered by TCT No. T-72097 in the
name of respondent company. TCT No. T-72097 covers three contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate
area of 86,507,778 square meters.
● The MTC ruled in favor of Preysler and ordered Manila Southcoast Development Corporation to vacate the
disputed land covered by TCT No. TF-1217 and to return the possession.
● The RTC reversed the MTC decision and dismissed the complaint. Preysler filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
 ● Preysler sent a copy of the MR to MSDC’s counsel by registered mail. During the scheduled hearing of the
motion, the RTC judge reset the hearing because the court’s calendar could not accommodate the hearing
of the motion. It was only on 3 March 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, that
respondent’s counsel received a copy of petitioner's MR. The rescheduled hearing was again reset because
the RTC judge was on official leave. The 7 May 2004 hearing was further reset to 6 August 2004.
● After the hearing, MSDC filed its Motion to Dismiss claiming that non-compliance with the three-day notice
rule did not toll the running of the period of appeal, which rendered the decision final.

● RTC denied the MR for failure to appeal within the 15 days reglementary period and declaring the 22
January 2004 Decision as final and executory. MR was fatally flawed for failure to observe the three-day
notice rule. Preysler filed an Omnibus MR of the Order. RTC dismissed the Omnibus Motion.
● A petition for certiorari was then filed with the CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion for alleged failure to observe the three-
day notice rule.
● CA dismissed the petition. The three-day notice rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court is mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma. As found by the
RTC, Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 12 February 2004 was received by respondent only on 3
March 2004, or six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004. All violations of Sections 4, 5,
and 6 of Rule 15 are deemed fatal. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three-day notice rule is absolute

HELD:

● The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the
lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not
deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules
should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate... the
attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
● In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on
notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused to the adverse party
since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties
were duly notified.
● This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the
requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. As an integral component of the
procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the
movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the
adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of
the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it
an opportunity to be heard.
● The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. x x x
● In this case, the CA ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the Court
of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration six
days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due
notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than five months after respondent
received a copy of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC.
● Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that "[e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice." Thus, the
date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In
this case, the petitioner's Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with
the notice requirement, respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at least three days before
12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondent's receipt on 9 November 2004
(Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004
(Friday), was within the required minimum three-days' notice. The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the
notice should be served by Tuesday at the latest, in order that the requirement of the three days may be
complied with. If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed
 from the post office, the date of the first notice of the postmaster should be at least five (5) days before
Tuesday. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted.

Padre, David Anthony Jr. Cervantes

87. PNB vs. Deang Marketing Corp., 177931, 8 December 2008

DOCTRINE:

*Rule 16 - Motion to Dismiss [provision deleted – relevant cases transferred to Rule 8]

DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS (Rule 17, Sections 1 to 4)

Patriarca, Angelo Gabriel Bautista

88. O.B. Jovenir Construction Development Corp. vs. Macamir Realty and Court of Appeals, 135803, 28 March
2006

DOCTRINE: Dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the
plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no
choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a
matter of right, regardless of ground.

FACTS:

● A complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with private respondents Macamir Realty and
Development Corp. (Macamir Realty) and spouses Rosauro and Gloria Miranda as plaintiffs, and petitioners
O.B. Jovenir Construction and Development Corp. (Jovenir Construction), Oscar B. Jovenir, and Gregorio
Liongson being among the defendants.

● The complaint, sought the annulment of certain agreements between private respondents and petitioners, as
well as damages. Respondents likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

● Ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, private respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
Thus, private respondents prayed that the plaintiffs be allowed to withdraw the complaint without prejudice.

● Private respondents filed another complaint against the same defendants save for Madeja, and seeking the
same reliefs as the first complaint. 11 days after the filing of the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, RTC granted
the Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
 ● Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the second complaint on the ground of forum-shopping. They pointed
out that at the time of the filing of the second complaint the first complaint was still pending. The Makati RTC
denied the Motion to Dismiss in an Order. Observing that at the time the Motion to Withdraw Complaint was
filed, none of the defendants had filed any answer or any responsive pleading. Thus, it was then within
respondents’ right to cause the dismissal of the complaint without having to await action of the court on their
motion. This Order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether a Motion to Withdraw Complaint requires affirmative action from the court before the complaint may be
deemed dismissed.

HELD:

● No, the Court finds no error on the part of the lower courts since the denial of the motion to dismiss is wholly
in accord with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

● Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure stated:

“Dismissal by the plaintiff — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, Indubitably, the provision ordained the
dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right at any time before service of the answer.”

● It is quite clear that under Section 1, Rule 17 of the old Rules, the dismissal contemplated therein could be
accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval
by the Court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice.
It is due to these considerations that the petition should be denied.

● Evidently, respondents had the right to dismiss their complaint by mere notice on 13 February 1997, since
as of even date, petitioners had not yet served their answer on respondents. The Motion to Withdraw
Complaint makes clear respondents' "desire to withdraw the complaint without prejudice." That respondents
resorted to a motion to effect what they could have instead by mere notice may be indicative of a certain
degree of ignorance of procedural rules on the part of respondents' counsel. Yet such "error," if it could be
called as such, should hardly be of fatal consequence. Petitioners posit that the "remedy" of filing a notice of
dismissal is not exclusive, respondents having the "option" of securing the court's approval to the dismissal.
On the contrary, the trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff
under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most
ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed,
since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground.

Pujalte, Bianca Margarita Pardo

89. Ching vs. Cheng, 175507, 8 October 2014

DOCTRINE :Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the plaintiff.
Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the prior
dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally
governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to dismiss.

FACTS:

● The factual antecedents of this case originates from a complicated family fued.
● The deceased Antonio Ching owned several businesses among which was Po Wing Properties,
Incorporated. His total assets are alleged to have been worth more than Php 380 million. It is also alleged
that while he was unmarried, he had children from 2 women.
● Petitioner Ramon Ching is the illegitimate and adopted child of the deceased and his common-law wife
Lucina Santos whereas respondents Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng are Antonio’s children with his
housemaid Mercedes Igne.
 ● On July 18, 1996, Antonio Ching was murdered. Petitioner then allegedly induced respondents Mercedes,
Jaime, and Joseph to sign an agreement and waiver to Antonio Ching’s estate in consideration of Php22.5
million. Thereafter, petitioner executed an affidavit of settlement of estate naming himself as the sole heir
and adjudicating upon himself the entirety of the estate.
● After 1 year, police found petitioner as the primary suspect and information was filed and warrant of arrest
was issued against him
● RTC of Manila Branch 6 (first case) October 7, 1998: The respondents Cheng filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching. The complaint was then amended, to implead additional
defendants including Po Wing Properties for the annulment of agreement, waiver, extra-judicial settlement of
estate, etc. against the petitioners and sometime after, Lucina Santos was allowed to intervene.
● A Motion to Dismiss was filed by petitioner Po Wing based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which the
court granted and the judgment becomes final and executory due to the inaction of the respondents.
● RTC of Manila Branch 20 (second case) April 19, 2002 - Respondents for the second time filed a
Complaint before the RTC which involves the same parties and the same cause of action. It then issued an
order transferring it to Branch 6.
● Before petitioners could file their responsive pleading, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, praying that
the case be dismissed but without prejudice.
● RTC granted the motion to dimiss the second case without prejudice on the basis that summons had not yet
served on petitioners. By which order, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents argued
that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the two-dismissal rule of Rule 17, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Court.
● Raffled to RTC of Manila Branch 6 (third case): While petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was still
pending, respondents for the third time filed a Complaint for Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement, etc. against the petitioners.
● Again, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the third case on the ground of res judicata, litis pendentia, forum
shopping, and failure to state cause of action which was denied by the trial court.
● RTC Branch 6 issued an omnibus order resolving both the motion for reconsideration in the 2 nd case and
the motion to dismiss in the 3rd. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and the motion to
dismiss, holding that the dismissal of the 2nd case was without prejudice and, hence, would not bar the filing
of the 3rd case.
● (first certiorari): October 8, 2004- While their motion for reconsideration in the 3rd case was pending,
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing
the order which upheld the dismissal of the second case.
● (second certiorari): December 28, 2004- The trial court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration in the 3rd case. The denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties to file a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a
temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals.
● March 23, 2006- The Court of Appeals rendered the decision in the first certiorari case dismissing the
petition. The appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties’ reliance on the "two-
dismissal rule" was misplaced since the rule involves two motions for dismissals filed by the plaintiff only . In
this case, it found that the dismissal of the 1st case was done at the motion of the defendants, while
the dismissal of the 2nd case was at the instance of the plaintiffs.
● Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed this present
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case, as
per the "two-dismissal rule".?

HELD: No. Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the plaintiff.
Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the prior
dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally
governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to dismiss.

As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the second time that
the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with
prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter
paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." When a complaint is dismissed a second
time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.

The dismissal of the second case was without prejudice in view of the "two-dismissal rule"

Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not only new defendants but
new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably
filed by the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, which states:
Section 1. Grounds.— Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
Under Section 5 of the same rule, a party may re-file the same action or claim subject to certain exceptions.

Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling the same claim that had been previously
dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss
can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff’s instance.

When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one prior dismissal at the
instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the defendants.

While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not necessarily follow that the re-
filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The circumstances surrounding
each dismissal must first be examined to determine before the rule may apply, as in this case. Thus, the trial court's
dismissal of the second case is not a bar to the filing of the third case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Quiñones - Egagamao, Karess Echem

90. Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 164797, 13 February 2006

Doctrine: The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation - republicae ut sit
litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo debet bis
vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the
public tranquility and happiness.

FACTS:

● There are four (4) cases involved in this controversy. The first case that was filed between the parties is Civil
Case No. 4365 for Unlawful Detainer litigated before the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija
entitled "Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion, plaintiffs, vs. Mariano `Boy' Bunag, Rolando
Bunag, Remedios Bunag, et al., Defendants." This case was decided on 6 November 1998 by the Municipal
Trial Court in favor of herein petitioner Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion.
● The second case is Civil Case No. 1600 for Quieting of Title, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 with "Carlos L. Bunag, Elias Bunag Natividad, Mariano Bunag, Salud Bunag Clanaoc
and Juliana Bunag Arevalo, as Plaintiffs and Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion as Heirs of Sps.
Carlos Maniquis and Marina Bunag, as Defendants." This case was dismissed for failure to prosecute as
evidenced by the Regional Trial Court Order dated 10 March 2000.
 ● The third case is Civil Case No. 2573-02 for Injunction, with "Mariano `Boy' Bunag and Rolando Bunag as
Petitioners against Carlos Bunag, Elias Bunag Natividad, Mariano Bunag, Salud Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana
Bunag Arevalo as Defendants." This case, which was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City,
Branch 35, was dismissed on ground of res judicata. The 6 November 2002 Order, in effect, ruled that there
is a substantial identity of parties in this case and in Civil Case No. 1600, a Petition for Quieting of Title.
● The fourth case is the instant controversy for Annulment of Title With Damages. Docketed as Civil Case No.
2583-02, it was lodged by herein private respondents Mariano "Bo[y]" Bunag and Rolando Bunag against
herein petitioners Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M. Concepcion before the sala of Branch 35, Regional
Trial Court of Gapan City.

ISSUE: Does res judicata apply in the case at bar?

HELD: YES. The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party
to the first and second action. Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The
addition or elimination of some parties does not alter the situation. There is substantial identity of parties when there
is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not
impleaded in the first case.

● In the case at bar, it is apparent that from the face of the complaint for Quieting of Title, private respondent
Rolando Bunag was not a party therein as his name does not appear in the title. This, notwithstanding, his
claim and that of the plaintiffs therein, which included private respondent Mariano Bunag, are the same - to
be declared the true owners of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22262
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67161 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent
Rolando Bunag and the plaintiffs are all heirs of the alleged owners of the parcel of land covered by OCT No.
22262. Private respondent Rolando Bunag, though not a party therein, shared an identity of interest from
which flowed an identity of relief sought, namely, to declare them the true owners of the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. 22262 and TCT No. 67161. Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-
law, thereby satisfying the requisite of substantial identity of parties.
● We likewise rule that there is identity of causes of action. Hornbook is the rule that identity of causes of
action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata
by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity
in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. 20
In Stilianopulos v. The City of Legaspi,21 this Court had this to say:

The underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases are
essentially the same -- adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of one of the two certificates
of title. Thus, it becomes readily apparent that the same evidence or set of facts as those considered in the quieting-of-
title case would also be used in this Petition.

● The difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial and is not a reason to exempt petitioner
from the effects of res judicata. The philosophy behind this rule prohibits the parties from litigating the
same issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as
it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Verily, there
should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject, once it is fully and fairly
adjudicated.
● We find no reason not to adhere to the doctrine of res judicata. A case for Quieting of Title had been filed for
the purpose of determining the ownership of the subject land, but same was dismissed because the plaintiffs
therein failed to attend the scheduled hearings for the presentation of their evidence. As above discussed, the
dismissal was an adjudication on the merits. They had all the opportunity to present all the evidence for their
cause but they failed to do so. It is undeniable that there was no denial of due process in this case.
 Raz, Mark Lorenz Saculo
91. Quintos vs. Nicolas, 210252, 16 June 2014

DOCTRINE: The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice satisfies one of the elements of res
judicata. It is understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal
with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for
partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. This is
pertinent to Article 494 of the Civil Code which discusses how the law generally does not favor the retention of co-
ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners’ specific shares so as to
prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494
of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-
owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which
is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Art. 494
is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There can still be res
judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of
the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines
that partition is improper for co- ownership does not or no longer exists.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli
Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings.
Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property, a 281 sqm.
parcel of land situated in Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 318717.

● The deceased parents left their 10 children ownership over the subject property. In 2002, respondent
siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52
and was raffled to the RTC at Camiling, Tarlac but was later on dismissed as neither of the parties
appeared and appealed.

● Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of
the 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and TCT No. 390484 was issued in the
names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. The siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the
property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale and Agreement of Subdivision, and the title was partially cancelled as a result.

● Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein they
alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in
favor of their 10 children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they received the subject property and
the house constructed thereon as their share. They had been in adverse, open, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the property for over 4 decades and are allegedly entitled to equitable title.
Participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deeds was denied.

● Respondents, on the other hand, countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by
estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share, which is an
admission petitioners’ part that the property is not entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly mortgaged the
property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the property.
Not having been repaid, the Candelarios accepted their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly,
respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res judicata; (No)

RULING:
● No. The Supreme Court mentioned the case of Rizal v. Naredo stating - We have held that res judicata
applied because after the parties executed a compromise agreement that was duly approved by the court,
the different portions of the owners have already been ascertained. Thus, there was no longer a co-
 ownership and there was nothing left to partition. This is in contrast with the case at bar wherein the co-
ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses
Candelario. Consequently, there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the
partition of the property through counterclaim.

● The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice satisfies one of the elements of res judicata.
It is understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal
with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to
ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
This is pertinent to Article 494 of the Civil Code which discusses how the law generally does not favor the
retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners’
specific shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law
provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common.

● Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under
Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive
right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned
by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be
amended by a procedural rule. Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with
prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.

● This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There can still be
res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective
shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the
court determines that partition is improper for co- ownership does not or no longer exists.

● The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches. We now proceed to petitioners’ second line of
attack. According to petitioners, the claim for partition is already barred by laches since by 1999, both
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet the respondent siblings only belatedly filed the
action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in 2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in against
respondent siblings, so too should respondent spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for
they could not have acquired a better right than their predecessors-in-interest.

● Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which––by
the exercise of due diligence––could or should have been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
either abandoned or declined to assert it. The principle is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not
really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with
the character of the petitioners’ title, but only with whether or not by reason of the respondents’ long inaction
or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do so
would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.

● As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected to
assert their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have abandoned their right
given that they filed an action for partition. The fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease
with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence that they are exercising rights of
ownership over the same.

Rollo, Noel Jethro III Macaspac

92. Eloisa Merchandising Inc. vs. BDO, 192716, 13 June 2012

DOCTRINE: The failure on the part of the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the
court or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, may result in the dismissal of the
complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the defendant. The burden to show whether the dismissal was
unjustified or there exists a compelling reason not to dismiss the case rests upon the petitioner.

FACTS:
 ● Respondent filed an action for foreclosure. Thereafter, petitioner sought to annul the real estate mortgage
which was the subject of the foreclosure proceedings. During the pendency of the foreclosure, respondent
bank was able to acquire a writ of possession from another court and consolidate the titles of the properties
to its name.

● 1st Dismissal - On the first scheduled pre-trial conference, petitioner failed to appear because its counsel
allegedly fell from the stairs of his house and had to attend to a hilot. As such, the case was dismissed.

● 2nd Dismissal - After reinstating the case and resetting the pre-trial conference to another date, the
petitioner failed to appear again, alleging that the counsel misplaced his calendar. Thus, the case was
dismissed for the second time.

● 3rd Dismissal - Despite reconsideration on Dec. 29, 2004, the petitioner failed to appear in the pre-trial
conference for the third time. As a result, the case was ordered dismissed on Sept. 20, 2005.

ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the case proper for failure to prosecute?

HELD:

● YES. Under Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the failure on the part of the
plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court or the Rules, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, may result in the dismissal of the complaint either motu proprio or
on motion by the defendant. The burden to show whether the dismissal was unjustified rests upon the
petitioner.

● This case has been at the pre-trial stage for two years already, and the petitioner did not proceed with its
case diligently as it did not do anything within the 9-month period from the last reinstatement of the case.

Roxas, Marlen Navaluna

93. Martinez vs. Republic, 160895, 30 October 2006

DOCTRINE:
The doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in default had evolved into a fairly
comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:
a. )The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec
3,Rule 18) b.) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for a new trial
under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; c. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has
become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d. He
may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41) A
defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order
of default.

FACTS:

● Petitioner Jose R. Martinez (Martinez) filed a petition for the registration in his name of three (3) parcels of
land included in the Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. The lots, individually identified as Lot No. 464-A, Lot
No. 464-B, and Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597, collectively comprised around 3,700 square meters. Martinez
alleged that he had purchased the lots in 1952 from his uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable
up to the 1870s. It was claimed that Martinez had remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the lots
had remained unencumbered; and that they became private property through prescription pursuant to
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Martinez further claimed that he had been constrained to
initiate the proceedings because the Director of the Land Management Services had failed to do so despite
the completion of the cadastral survey of Cortes, Surigao del Sur.
 ● The trial court set the case for hearing and directed the publication of the corresponding Notice of Hearing in
the Official Gazette. The OSG, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the
grounds that appellee's possession was not in accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141;
that his muniments of title were insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition and possession of the subject
parcels; and that the properties formed part of the public domain and thus not susceptible to private
appropriation
● Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general default, even against the
Republic of the Philippines, on 29 March 2000. This ensued when during the hearing of even date, no party
appeared before the Court to oppose Martinez's petition.
● The OSG filed a Notice of Appeal which was approved by the RTC. However, after the records had been
transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the RTC received a letter from the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
stating that only Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B were referred to in the Notice of Hearing published in the
Official Gazette; and that Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597 had been deliberately omitted due to the lack of an
approved survey plan for that property. Accordingly, the LRA manifested that this lot should not have been
adjudicated to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction. This letter was referred by the RTC to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action.

● The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC and instead ordering the
dismissal of the petition for registration. In light of the opposition filed by the OSG, the appellate court found
the evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support the registration of the subject lots.
● No motion for reconsideration appears to have been filed with the Court of Appeals by Martinez, who instead
directly assailed its Decision before this Court through the present petition.

● Petitioner Martinez - OSG no longer had the personality to oppose the petition, or appeal its allowance by
the RTC, following the order of general default.
● Respondent (RP/OSG) -
● Duly opposed Martinez's application for registration before the RTC
● Jurisprudence and the Rules of Court acknowledge that a party in default is not precluded
from appealing the unfavorable judgment
● RTC had no jurisdiction over Lot No. 370 since its technical description was not published in the Official
Gazette; an as found by the Court of Appeals the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient for
registering the lots in his name.

Issue:

Whether an order of general default issued by a trial court in a land registration case bars the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, from interposing an appeal from the trial court's subsequent
decision in favor of the applicant. - NO.

Held:

● By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in default had evolved into a fairly
comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:
● a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion,
under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule
37;
● c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
● d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
● |In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court, through Justice Callejo, Sr.,
again provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the defending party declared in default,
which we adopt for purposes of this decision:
 ● It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and his
right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal
from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the
amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the
plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is
contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the
assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were
otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the
trial court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the petitioner
sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on the evidence submitted by it only in the
Court of Appeals If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared in default
retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed
to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law,
even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm
that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was
no longer controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.

Salvador, Patricia Ann Pongos

94. Ko vs. PNB, 169131-32, 28 January 2006

DOCTRINE:. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon the motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court).

● The complaint, by the petitioner, in an action filed by petitioners in the trial court for Annulment of
Mortgage, Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-21064 and T-
21065 or 2TCTS, and Deed of Sale with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, alleged
that the assailed mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings were null and void since the written
consent of petitioners, as beneficiaries of the mortgaged property, were not secured.
● Respondent bank denied the claim and alleged that in the execution of the mortgage, petitioners in fact
gave their consent.
● During the course of the proceedings, petitioners and their counsel failed to attend a scheduled trial. Upon
motion of respondent bank, the complaint was dismissed.
● When the case was called, Atty. Lorenzo Castillo, counsel for the plaintiffs did not appear despite proper
notice. No plaintiff appeared. Atty. Eduardo Alcantara, counsel for defendant bank appeared.
● Atty. Alcantara manifested that there were numerous occasions in the past when plaintiffs and counsel did
not attend. He pointed out that there is an apparent lack of interest on the part of plaintiff to prosecute the
action. He moved to dismiss the case on that legal ground.

Issue: IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF THEIR
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE SCHEDULED HEARING

Held:No. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief
on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon the motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Section 3,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court).
The trial court dismissed the complaint due to petitioners and counsel's apparent lack of interest to prosecute the
case. Petitioners' counsel argued that their repeated failure to attend the hearing was caused by conflicts in his
schedule and by his lack of knowledge of the trial dates. He also contended that respondent bank and counsel have
been similarly guilty thereof, and that petitioners have informed the court of ongoing negotiations for the re-purchase
of the foreclosed property. Hence, petitioners invoke liberality and the primordial interest of substantial justice over
the strict enforcement of the rules of technicality.

We are not persuaded. In every action, the plaintiff is duty-bound to prosecute the same with utmost diligence and
with reasonable dispatch to enable him to obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same time, minimize the clogging of
the court dockets

Samonte, Maria Genevieve Castro

95. Laurel vs. Vardeleon, 202967, 5 August 2015

DOCTRINE: The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff
is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must
be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.

FACTS:

● On July 23, 2004, petitioner Alicia Y. Laurel filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership and/or quieting of title against respondent Ferdinand M. Vardeleon concerning a
20,306-square meter island in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan.
● Respondent denied the material allegations in the complaint, claiming that he bought the island
on April 9, 1973 from Avelina Casimero, and that petitioner was guilty of laches in filing her claim.
● In a July 6, 2005 Pre-Trial Order, petitioner was scheduled to present her evidence on three
separate dates: September 7, 2005; October 12, 2005; and November 23, 2005.
● On August 1, 2005, respondent moved to correct the Pre-Trial Order, in order to reflect therein
petitioner's supposed admission made during pre- trial that she knew of respondent's possession
of the subject property since 1975. Petitioner opposed the same.
● To correct the Pre-Trial Order. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court did
not act on the motion.
● On September 2, 2005, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the scheduled September 7, 2005
hearing to October 12, 2005 or any available date. The trial court granted the motion provided
that petitioner defrays the transportation expenses as well as the appearance fee of respondent's
counsel. Petitioner moved to reconsider, but the court failed to act on the same.
● During the scheduled October 12, 2005 hearing, petitioner was present, together with substitute
counsel Atty. Roy Villa and her first witness. Petitioner moved in open court to postpone trial on
the ground that there are pending motions that have to be resolved, and that the substitute lawyer
had yet to confer with the witness, since her true counsel, Atty. De la Vega - who originally
interviewed the witness - was not present.
● The trial court denied Laurel’s motion to postpone the trial. It likewise dismissed the civil case on
the ground of failure to prosecute on petitioner’s part, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the1997
Rules of Civil Procedure
● Laurel filed an appeal with the CA. She claimed that the trial court should not have dismissed her
case since she still had one more scheduled hearing, for the presentation of her evidence. The
CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint of Laurel should be dismissed due to failure to prosecute

HELD: No. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be
unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.
Petitioner's actuations indicate that she was not at all unwilling to prosecute her case; nor can it be said
that she "refused" to present her evidence. When she instituted Civil Case No. 7249 in 2004, petitioner
was already eighty-one (81) years of age. Yet, despite her advanced age, the record indicates that
petitioner attended the scheduled hearing of October 12, 2005, together with her counsel and the first
witness - only that the lawyer who attended was a mere proxy, and not petitioner's true counsel who
previously conferred with the witness. Moreover, in coming to court that day, petitioner and the substitute
counsel were acting in the honest belief that trial cannot proceed on account of pending incidents which
the trial court has failed to resolve, that is: 1) her motion for reconsideration of the trial court's September
7, 2005 Order directing her to defray respondent's counsel's transportation expenses and appearance
fees; and 2) respondent's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's August 19, 2005 Order denying his
motion to correct the Pre-Trial Order. Given the circumstances petitioner was confronted with at the time,
it is understandable that she should seek another continuance. Given her advanced age, determination,
the surrounding circumstances of the case, and the fact that no prejudice is caused to respondent by
further postponement of trial since petitioner - by prior agreement during pre-trial - is expected to
conclude her case within the agreed three settings, the trial court should have extended to petitioner the
courtesy she deserved by granting a continuance.

PRE-TRIAL (Rule 18, Section 1 to 10)

Santiago, Monette Victoria Catungal

96. LCK Industries Inc vs. Planters Development Bank, 170606, 23 November 2007

DOCTRINE: A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be or may
be taken up during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein or may be inferable therefrom by necessary
implication are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those that are expressly stipulated.

FACTS:

● The petitioner LCK obtained a loan from the respondent bank in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as evidenced
by two promissory notes. As a security for the loan obligation, petitioners-spouses Chiko and Elizabeth Lim
executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land registered under their names and located at Quezon
City. Later on, to secure the same obligation, another Real Estate Mortgage was executed over another
parcel of land also registered under the names of the petitioner-spouses located at Baguio City.

● Subsequently, petitioner LCK incurred default in its payment. Several demands were made by the
respondent bank to no avail. A final letter-demand was sent by respondent bank to petitioner asking for the
payment of its obligation of P2,962,500.00. However, petitioner LCK failed or refused to pay its obligation.

● Respondent bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the Baguio City property which was sold at the
public auction for P2,625,000.00. Since the proceeds were not enough to satisfy the entire loan obligation
which amounted to P2,962,500.00, respondent bank further caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the QC
property.

● Prior to the auction sale of the QC property petitioners filed with the RTC of QC an action for Annulment of
the Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale of the Quezon City property with Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction and with Damages against respondent bank and Atty. Anigan. In their
Complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent bank failed to comply with the necessary requirements for the
foreclosure and auction sale. The respondent averred that it had fully observed the posting and publication
requirements of Act No. 3135. Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of petitioners' complaint for lack of
merit.
 ● For failure of the counsels for both petitioners and respondent bank to appear in the scheduled hearing for
the issuance of temporary restraining order, the RTC deemed the prayer for TRO abandoned. Thereafter,
the RTC conducted a pre-trial conference where the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:

(3) a demand letter was sent to petitioner LCK by respondent bank stating that the remaining
balance of petitioner LCK's loan obligation was P2,962,500.00 as of 13 October 1997;
(4) a Notice of Auction Sale by Notary Public was made by the respondent bank in foreclosing the
Baguio City property, and in the Certificate of Sale issued by the Notary Public, the respondent
bank bid P2,625,000.00 for the property;
(5) the respondent bank also foreclosed the real estate mortgage over the petitioners' Quezon City
property and said defendant bank bid P2,231,416.67 for the property;

● In the Pre-Trial Order the The court defined the issues as follows:

(1) whether or not the petition was filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court;
(2) whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage by defendant bank was
made in accordance with the provisions of Act 3135, as amended; and
(3) whether or not the parties are entitled to their respective claims for attorney's fees and
damages.

● The parties were given 15 days from receipt of the Pre-Trial Order to make amendments or corrections
thereon. Thereafter, the parties agreed to submit their case for decision based on the stipulations and
admissions made at the pre-trial conference. On the same day, the RTC required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In their Memorandum, petitioners, aside from reiterating issues previously raised in
their Complaint, further claimed that there was an overpayment of the loan obligation by P1,856,416.67

● Thereafter, the RTC rendered its decision declaring the foreclosure and auction sale of the QC property
legal and valid but it ordered the respondent to return the overpayment made by the petitioners. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent which was denied by the RTC.

● Respondent appealed to the CA. The CA granted the appeal and deleted the award of overpayment in favor
of petitioners ruling that the primary purpose of pre-trial is to make certain that all issues necessary for the
disposition of the case are properly raised in order to prevent the element of surprise. Since the alleged
overpayment was only raised by the petitioners long after the pre-trial conference, the court a quo cannot
dispose of such issue without depriving the respondent bank of its right to due process. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE OF OVERPAYMENT WAS RAISED BY THE PARTIES AND INCLUDED
IN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER

HELD: NO BUT SUCH ISSUE CAN BE EVIDENTLY INFERRED FROM THE STIPULATIONS AND ADMISSIONS
MADE BY THE PARTIES THEREIN.

The conduct of pre-trial in civil actions has been mandatory as early as January 1, 1964 upon the effectivity of the
Revised Rules of Court. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between
the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering.

The purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court
as well of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial, or totally
dispense with it.
The parties themselves or their representative with written authority from them are required to attend in order to arrive
at a possible amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations
or admissions of facts and documents. All of the matters taken up during the pre-trial, including the stipulation of facts
and the admissions made by the parties, are required to be recorded in a pre-trial order.

Section 7, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Record of pre-trial. — The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination
thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the
action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made
by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall
explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.

In the Pre-Trial Order, the RTC defined the issues as follows:

(1) whether or not the petition was filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court;
(2) whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage by defendant bank was made in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135; and
(3) whether or not the parties are entitled to their respective claims for attorney's fees and damages.

Based on the admissions and stipulations during the pre-trial conference and the issues defined by the court
a quo as embodied in the Pre-Trial Order, the parties agreed to submit the case for the resolution of the RTC.
Both petitioners and respondent also manifested that they would forego their respective claims for attorney's fees,
leaving solely the issue of the validity of the foreclosure of mortgage and auction sale for the RTC's disposition.
However, in petitioners' Memorandum filed after the case was submitted for resolution, petitioners raised the
question of overpayment, a new issue that was included neither in their Complaint nor in the issues defined
in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the RTC.

Generally, pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case
are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at the pre-trial
conference all issues of law and fact they intend to raise at the trial. In Velasco v. Apostol, the Court highlighted
the aforesaid exception and ruled in this wise:

A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be or may be
taken up during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein or may be inferable therefrom by
necessary implication are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those that are expressly
stipulated.

The case at bar falls under this particular exception. Upon scrupulous examination of the Pre-Trial Order, it can
be deduced that the parties stipulated that the remaining sum of petitioner LCK's obligation as of 13 October 1997
was P2,962,500.00. In the same Pre-Trial Order, the parties likewise stipulated that the Baguio City property was sold
at the public auction for P2,625,000.00 and the Quezon City property for P2,231,416.67. On both occasions,
respondent bank emerged as the highest bidder. By applying simple mathematical operation, the mortgaged
properties were purchased by the respondent at the public auctions for P4,856,416.67; thus, after deducting
therefrom the balance of petitioner LCK's obligation in the amount of P2,962,500.00, an excess in the sum of
P1,893,916.67 remains.

Needless to say, the fact of overpayment, though not expressly included in the issues raised in the Pre-Trial
Order can be evidently inferred from the stipulations and admissions made by the parties therein. Even only
upon plain reading of the said Pre-Trial Order, it can be readily discerned that there was an overpayment.

Petitioner LCK's obligation with the respondent bank was already fully satisfied after the mortgaged properties were
sold at the public auction for more than the amount of petitioner LCK's remaining debt with the respondent bank. As
the custodian of the proceeds from the foreclosure sale, respondent bank has no legal right whatsoever to retain the
excess of the bid price in the sum of P1,893,916.67, and is under clear obligation to return the same to petitioners.

In any case, this Court would not allow respondent bank to hide behind the cloak of procedural technicalities in order
to evade its obligation to return the excess of the bid price, for such an act constitutes a violation of the elementary
principle of unjust enrichment in human relations.

Santillan, Edward Jayson Baterna

97. Paranaque Kings Enterprises vs. Santos, 194638, 2 July 2014

DOCTRINE: RULE 17, SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails
to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
FACTS:
● Respondent Santos entered into a Contract of Lease with Chua over eight (8) parcels of land located
in Parañaque City,, specifically giving the latter the "first option or priority to buy" the same in case
of sale. Chua then caused the construction of a 6-door commercial complex on the leased premises
but, by reason of business reverses, he was constrained to assign his rights thereon to Lee, who
likewise assumed all obligations under the lease contract with Santos. Lee, in turn, executed a Deed
of Assignment over the leased premises, including all improvements thereon, in favor of petitioner.
● On March 19, 1991, petitioner filed a Complaint before the RTC against Santos and respondent
Raymundo to whom Santos allegedly sold the leased premises for a consideration of
P5,000,000.00, without giving petitioner the opportunity to exercise its priority to buy the same.
● Petitioner claimed that, when it objected to the sale, Santos repurchased the subject properties for
the same price, and offered them to the petitioner for P15,000,000.00. The latter made a counter-
offer of P5,000,000.00 but, before replying thereto, Santos sold the subject properties again to
Raymundo on May 15, 1989 for P9,000,000.00. Petitioner argued that the sale was simulated and
that there was collusion between Santos and Raymundo (respondents).
● Respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint on the main ground that it stated no cause
of action. Raymundo alleged that there were, in fact, previous offers made to petitioner that the
latter simply ignored. Santos, on the other hand, maintained that petitioner had already recognized
and respected Raymundo's status as the new owner-lessor of the subject properties due to its
payment of lease rentals to Raymundo, and, as such, is now estopped. In addition, Santos claimed
that the deed of assignment executed in favor of petitioner did not include the "first option" clause
provided in the lease contract.
● The RTC dismissed petitioner's Complaint on the ground that it "does not contain any valid cause of
action." Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied
● Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case on appeal before the CA which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
● Eventually, the foregoing CA Decision was reversed on petition for review before the Court,upon a
finding that the Complaint "sufficiently alleges an actionable contractual breach" on the part of
respondents. Necessarily, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
● When respondents filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims (Answer), they claimed that
the first offer of P5,000,000.00 was declined by the petitioner "because it could not afford the price."
After Raymundo reconveyed the subject properties to Santos, the latter offered it again to petitioner
at the price of P15,000,000.00, which it found to be "ridiculous," insisting that P5,000,000.00 is the
"true and reasonable value" of the subject properties and that it is willing to buy the same only for
said amount. Nevertheless, the reduced price of P9,000,000.00 was allegedly offered to the
petitioner, but the latter refused and maintained its stance on the value of the said properties.
● Protesting that certain allegations in the Answer tended to vary, contradict, and falsify the findings of
the Court in the February 26, 1997 Decision, petitioner filed a Motion to Strike out from the Answer
 with Compulsory Counterclaims Certain Allegations or Matters (Motion to Strike Out), arguing that
respondents are bound by the following conclusive findings of the Court and, hence, may no longer
detract.
● The petition was denied by the RTC. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied and the case
was set for pre-trial on July 7, 1998.
● On July 2, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to cancel pre-trial claiming that a petition for certiorari and
prohibition were being prepared. The said petition was resolved by CA in favor of the petitioner in a
decision dated December 6, 1999 where it was determined that the Motion to Strike Out was denied
prematurely.
● The trial court then required the petitioner to start the pre-trial with the statement of its cause.
However, counsel for petitioner, refused to do so saying he would just furnish the court the following
day with a copy of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA. Consequently, upon
motion of the opposing counsel, the RTC (a) declared petitioner non-suited, and (b) dismissed the
Complaint in its Second Order of the same day.
● On September 22, 2010, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision affirming the First and
Second Orders both dated July 7, 1998, as well as the Order dated September 21, 1998. The same
court further denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Decision, hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld:

(a) the RTC's denial of petitioner's Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial, and

(b) the dismissal of the Complaint for failure of petitioner to proceed to pre-trial as directed by the
trial court.

HELD: YES. The Court ruled that the postponement of the pre-trial scheduled on July 7, 1998 was not
warranted.

Petitioner clearly trifled with the mandatory character of a pre-trial, which is a procedural device intended
to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of
surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the
clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases.

In this case, seven (7) years later, or in 1998, no pre-trial had been conducted as yet. Hence, the
cancellation of the pre-trial on 'the ground of the impending filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
as there was no proof at the time of the hearing that said petition was in fact filed, was obviously a dilatory
tactic designed for petitioner to control the proceedings of the court. The Court finds nothing improper,
irregular or jaundiced with the trial court's course of action.

The Court finally considers that this case was elevated to the CA for four (4) times, and this is the third
time that the Court has to resolve issues between the parties, at the instance of petitioner.

Petition denied.

Silva, Virna Grace Marasigan

98. Alarcon vs. CA, 126802, 28 January 2000

DOCTRINE: The rules have made mandatory that a pre-trial should first be conducted before hearing any case.
The parties themselves are required to attend or their representative with written authority from them in order to
arrive at a possible amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
 stipulations or admissions of facts and documents. All of the matters taken up during the pre-trial, including the
stipulation of facts and the admissions made by the parties are required to be recorded in a pre-trial order.
FACTS
● A sale entered into by the father of the petitioner to defendants (Juani, Baluyot and
Sulit), afterwards, the respondent entered into a sale with two other persons (Baluyot
and Sulit) – the father was empowered by a special power of an attorney
● Object of the sale: 5,000PHP for the 2,500 sq/m land of 10,000 sq/m total land area of
petitioner. 1,000 sq/m of Juani’s parcel of land was sold to Baluyot and 500 sq/m was
sold to Sulit
● A complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale with damages with the contentions by
the petitioner (1) the signature of Tomas Alarcon on the Deed of Sale was forged (2)
the sale did not have consideration, and (3) the Special Power of an Attorney of Tomas
Alarcon had been earlier revoked, thus he has no more authority to dispose of the land
of the petitioner, and further, the signature of the notary public who allegedly attested
the sale was falsified.
● It was averred by Baluyot and Juani that Juani, prior to the said sale of the land, was
the tiller-occupant of the subject land for 10 years, it was only when the father of the
respondent, Tomas Alarcon persuaded Juani to give up his right as a tiller of the land in
exchange of ownership of the 2,500 sq/m parcel of land. Persuaded, Juani and Tomas
Alarcon signed a “Kasunduan ng Pagbili,” and subsequently there was an executed Final
Deed of Sale which evidenced the sale of the 2,500 sq/m parcel of land, and thereafter,
engaged the services of a Notoray Public to facilitate the transfer of the titles to the
defendants.
● A pre-trial conference was set to which the parties were represented by their
counsels and made some admission of facts, and a partial decision was rendered
finding that the Kasulatan or the Deed of Sale is void ab initio for being a forged
document, and the three TCTs issues in favor of the defendants are null & void, thus
should be cancelled;

FACTS ADMITTED
a. The document of sale executed by Tomas Alarcon as the attorney in fact of the
petition over some portions of the land in question is a forged document which is a
subject to a pending criminal case
b. Such document had been registered with the Register of Deeds in Malolos Bulacan
c. After the registration of the forged document, the defendants were issued with a
TCT

● A month after the pre-trial conference a pre-trial order was issued providing that
no amicable settlement was reached by the parties, thus they proceeded to state
their respective contentions and made some admission of facts to which the trial
court rendered its partial decision
● Petitioner moved for the execution of the partial decision to end the litigation of
the case, and offered to drop the claim for damages against the defendants
 provided that they are also willing to waive their claims against him and his
father – Baluyot opposed and thus the denied the motion
● Few years after, the trial court issued an order granting the motion for execution
of the partial decision, which became final and executory because the
defendants failed to interpose an appeal from the Partial Decision, however, the
same decision cannot be executed because defendants refused to surrender
their TCT Owner’s Duplicate copies issued by the Register of Deeds
● Few years after, Juani filed with the CA petition to annul the Partial Decision
rendered by the trial court and granted the motion. The decision held that the
Partial Decision was vitiated with extrinsic fraud considering that Juani was
unlettered; that even if he was represented by lawyers in court, he did not
understand the proceedings in the trial court and the admissions made during
the pre-trial conference which claimed that the Deed of Sale was a forgery, and
the basis for the titles issued in favor of the defendants. Therefore, Juani is
deprived of the parcel of land he possessed prior to the sale of the subject 2,500
sq/m land.

ISSUE
Whether (or not) there was extrinsic or collateral fraud attendant in the case justifying the
setting aside of the Partial Decision of the trial court

RULING
No, there was none.

The SC found that it cannot be argued that there was extrinsic fraud since Juani was not
deprived from having a trial. Juani was properly represented by their counsel (Atty Reyes for
the defendants), and that the assailed Partial Decision provides that “all parties with their
respective counsels appeared.”

When a party retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsel's decisions regarding
the conduct of the case, especially when the client do not complain of the manner the counsel
handles their case, for the general rule is that client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel,
save when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of his day in court – which is inapplicable to the case since transcript of the pre-trial
conference hearing shows that the counsel for the defendants did not fail in his duties in
protecting the interests of his clients. Documents/evidence were presented, objections/denials
for lack of knowledge were interposed and admissions were properly made. In all of the
scheduled hearings before the trial court, Juani was always represented by counsel.

Admissions were clearly made in the pre-trial conference, which makes it conclusive upon the
parties making it.

The court explained that fraud is extrinsic;

a. it is employed to deprive a party (a) day/s in court which would effectively prevent
the assertion of rights to property
 b. prevented a party from presenting their entire case
c. operates upon matters as to how a judgment was procured

The purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts or admissions of facts is to expedite trial. the
rules made pre-trial mandatory; it should be first conducted before hearing any case. It requires
the parties or their representatives to attend with written authority from them to arrive at a
possible amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to
enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and documents – all to be recorded in a pre-trial
order.

Siron, Charmaine Grace Medina

99. Corpuz vs Citybank, 175677, 31 July 2009

DOCTRINE: To constitute excusable negligence, the absence must be due to petitioner’s counsel’s failure to take
the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of his carelessness, inattention or willful disregard of the
process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident.

FACTS:

● Azucena Corpuz was a cardholder of Citibank Mastercard. While in Italy, she dined at a restaurant to which
one of her cards got dishonored. Azucena incurred a bill of 378,000 liras at a shop which she intended to
charge to her credit cards.
● This time, both her VISA and Mastercard were dishonored, drawing her to pay the bill in cash. Azucena's
husband Renato inquired why his wife's credit cards were not honored, to which Citibank explained that her
check-payments had not yet been cleared at the time.
● Upon her return to the country, Azucena demanded the refund of her overseas call expenses amounting to
132,000 lira. Citibank did not respond to the letter, however, drawing Azucena to write Citibank for the
cancellation of the cards.
● Citibank still sent billing statements to Azucena, however, charging her interest charges and late payment
penalties. Only after Azucena's counsel informed Citibank of imminent legal remedies on her part did
Citibank indulge Azucena with a written explanation why her credit cards were not honored in Italy.
● Azucena and Renato later filed on November 12, 1999 a complaint for damages against Citibank at the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

● Spouses Azucena filed a complaint for damages against Citbank.

● Citibank answered in a compulsory counterclaim. They also filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue.
● On Citibank's counsel's motion, the trial court dismissed the spouses' Complaint and directed Citibank to
present evidence on its Compulsory Counterclaim.
● The spouses moved for reconsideration, citing their failure to attend the pre-trial conference was due to the
negligence of their counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not non-appearance at the pre-trial may be excused if there is a valid cause such as when a party forgets
the date of the pre-trial.

RULING:

NO. Section 5 of Rule 18 provides that the dismissal of an action due to the plaintiff’s failure to appear at the pre-trial
shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. In this case, the trial court deemed the plaintiffs-herein
spouses as non-suited and ordered the dismissal of their Complaint. As the dismissal was a final order, the proper
remedy was to file an ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari. The spouses’ petition for certiorari was thus
properly dismissed by the appellate court.

While Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court allows as an exception a valid cause for the non-appearance of a
party at the pre-trial, the instances cited by the spouses and their counsel hardly constitute compelling exigencies or
situations which warrant occasional flexibility of litigation rules.

As for the spouses' assertion that Section 5 of Rule 18 "does not give the defendant [Citibank in this case] the
alternative remedy of prosecuting its Counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive, in the same or separate action
because there is no longer any pending action where he can prosecute his claim", consideration thereof has been
rendered unnecessary by, as will be dealt with shortly, this Court's denial of Citibank's motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal of its herein petition. Suffice it to state that the spouses' view, apparently established in BA Finance v.
Co, had long been abandoned by the Court.

The failure of the spouses to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules or any order of the
court, the dismissal of their Complaint was essentially due to their fault and the therein defendant Citibank could still
prosecute its Counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.

ANALYSIS:

In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines where the counsel for the therein petitioner failed to calendar a scheduled pre-trial in
his diary, the Court held that “Petitioner's counsel's failure to record the date of pre-trial in his 1997 diary reflects his
carelessness, his failure to heed his responsibility of not neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, especially given
the fact that he was given a Special Power of Attorney to represent petitioner in the pre-trial and trial of the case and
that the repeated resettings of the pre-trial for a period of 1 year and more than 10 months had unduly prolonged the
disposition of petitioner's complaint which was filed in 1994 yet.

CONCLUSION:

Petitioner's counsel must know that pre-trial is mandatory. Being mandatory, the trial court has discretion to declare a
party non-suited. Absent a showing of grave abuse in the trial court's exercise thereof, as in the case at bar, appellate
courts will not interfere.

Suarez, Jacob Almero

100. Paredes vs. Verano, 164375, 12 October 2006

DOCTRINE: The absence of counsel for defendants at pretrial does not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare
the defendant as in default and order the presentation of evidence ex parte. Nothing in the rules of court sanctions
the presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pre-trial.
Facts:
● The legal battle between the parties began with a complaint for the establishment of a right of way filed by
the petitioners against respondents.
● The complaint culminated in a judgment by compromise. In the Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme
Hinunangan granted a 2 meter-wide right of way in favor of petitioners in consideration of the amount of Php
6,000.00 which petitioners agreed to pay.
● Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the Compromise Agreement,
respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners.
● In their answer, petitioners denied having violated the Compromise Agreement, and alleged that like them,
respondents were not actual residents of Barangay Tagnipa where the ―road right of way was established
and that respondent Cosme had already sold his only remaining lot in the vicinity to petitioner Paredes.
● Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of action. Pre-trial was initially set for 24 April
2003, but this was reset to 3 June 2003. But the pre-trial set on 3 June 2003 did not push through either
because none of the parties appeared. So, pre-trial was reset to 11 November 2003.
 ● However, petitioner Baybay was present in court along with other defendants was called. RTC was informed
then of a proposed settlement between the parties, although Baybay qualified his reaction by telling the
court that he would first have to inform his lawyer of the said proposal. RTC reset the pretrial for 23 January
2004.
● Before the new pre-trial date, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation of Willingness to Settle With
Request for Cancellation dated 5 January 2004.
● The hearing did push through on 23 January 2004. The private respondents and their counsel were present.
So were petitioners Baybay and Paredes, and co-defendant Alago, but not their counsel.10. RTC allowed
respondents to present their evidence ex parte, ―for failure of the defendants’ counsel to appear before the
RTC. Motion for recon – DENIED.
● Petition for certiorari – CA – dismissed for failure to attach duplicate original copies of annexes to petition as
well as other pleadings relevant and pertinent to the petition. Motion for recon with motion to admit additional
exhibits – DENIED.
● CA ruled that even with the submission by petitioners of the required pleadings and documents, the instant
petition must nevertheless failed. It conceded that under Sec 5 Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
it is the failure of the defendant, and not defendant’s counsel, to appear at the pre-trial that would serve
cause to allow plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.

Issue: Whether the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial, with all defendants themselves present, is
a ground to declare defendants in default and to authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte.

Held: No. Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the
pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative
shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise
ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Section 4 imposes the duty on litigating
parties and their respective counsel during pretrial. The provision also provides for the instances where the non-
appearance of a party may be excused. Nothing, however, in Sec 4 provides for a sanction should the parties or their
respective counsel be absent during pre-trial. The penalty is provided for in Sec 5 which penalizes the failure to
appear of either the plaintiff or the defendant, and not their respective counsel .The absence of counsel for
defendants at pretrial does not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the
presentation of evidence ex parte. Nothing in the rules of court sanctions the presentation of evidence ex parte upon
instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pre-trial. The Rules do not countenance stringent construction
at the expense of justice and equity.

Tablizo, Darlymple Dayne Robles

101. Sps. Salvador vs. Sps. Rabaja, 199990, 4 February 2015

DOCTRINE:
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases.

Under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:

a. failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an absent party.
b. A defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary
period.
c. if the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed with prejudice, unless otherwise
ordered by the court
d. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte
and the court shall render judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given the
privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court
will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant has forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its
own evidence.

Facts:
 ● Petitioner spouses (Salvador) are selling a particular property to Spouses Rabaja through their agent
Rosario Gonzales (Gonzales) to spouses Rabaja.
● Spouses Rabaja made several payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by Gonzales pursuant
to the SPA executed by Rolando Salvador.
● However, spouses Salvador informed Spouses Rabaja that they did not receive any payment from
Gonzales. Which prompted spouses Rabaja to suspend further payment
● As a consequence, they (Sps. Rabaja) received a notice to vacate the subject property from Spouses
Salvador for non-payment of rentals.
● Spouses Salvador instituted an action for ejectment against Spouses Rabaja.
● In turn, Spouses Rabaja filed an action for rescission of contract against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales
● Spouses Salvador filed their answer with counterclaim and cross-claim contending that there was no
meeting of the minds between the parties and that the SPA in favor of Gonzales was falsified.
● The pre-trial conference began but attempts to amicably settle the case were unsuccessful. It was formally
reset, but Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend.
● RTC issued the pre-trial order declaring Spouses Salvador in default and allowing Spouses Rabaja to
present their evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales to present evidence in her favor.
● MR was filed by spouses Salvador but denied
● RTC rendered the decision in favor of Spouses Rabaja which the CA affirmed.

Hence, this petition

Issue:
Whether or not spouses Salvador has reasonable grounds to justify their failure to attend the pre-trial conference to
lift the order of default

Held:
No. Spouses Salvador has no reasonable grounds to lift the order of default. They aver that their non-attendance was
due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and
indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of
their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as
plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as
defendants.

The failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-trial conference warrants the presentation of evidence ex parte by
Spouses Rabaja

On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not
result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in
default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend
the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte.

Under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:

● if the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed with prejudice, unless otherwise
ordered by the court
● If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and
the court shall render judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to
present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in
favor of the plaintiff, the defendant has forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.

Uriarte, Juan Carlos Gandeza

 102. Aguilar vs. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative, 209605, 12 January 2015

DOCTRINE: Failure to attend the pre-trial does not result in the "default" of the defendant. Instead, the failure of
the defendant to
attend shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof.

If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear,
then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis
thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the
defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited
the opportunity to rebut or present his own evidence.
FACTS:

● Petitioners Aguilar, Calimbas, and one Tantiangco were members of the respondent, Lightbringers Credit
Cooperative, from which they each obtained a loan.

● Upon failure to settle their respective obligations, the cooperative filed complaints for sum of money against
them, respectively, but it was consolidated by the MCTC of Bataan.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

● During the scheduled pre-trial conference, only the cooperative and its counsel appeared. So the MCTC
issued an order allowing the cooperative to present evidence ex parte.

● Now, Aguilar and Calimbas insisted that they should have the right to cross-examine the witness of the
respondent, notwithstanding the fact that these cases were being heard ex parte.

● In the interest of justice, the MCTC directed the counsels of the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the issue of whether or not a party who had been declared "as in default" might still participate in
the trial of the case. However, only respondent complied with the directive. So in its Order, the MCTC held
that since the proceedings were being heard ex parte, the petitioners who had been declared "as in default"
had no right to participate therein and to cross-examine the witnesses.

● MCTC - dismissed the complaint against Tantiangco but found Aguilar & Calimbas liable to the bank

● On appeal with the RTC - denied the appeal filed by petitioners; affirmed MCTC decision

● Petitioners’ Motion for reconsideration/new trial filed with the RTC - denied again

● Petitioners filed a Petition for review before the CA - Appellate court denied the petition

● Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration before CA - denied as well

ISSUE:

Whether MCTC properly issued the order allowing respondent cooperative to present evidence ex parte. [YES]

RULING:

The rule is that failure of the defendant to attend shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte
and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

In the present case, the petitioners failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference. They did not even give any
excuse for their non-appearance, manifestly ignoring the importance of the pre-trial stage. Thus, the MCTC properly
issued the Order allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.

As a matter of fact, the MCTC even showed leniency when it directed the counsels of the parties to submit their
respective position papers on whether or not Aguilar and Calimbas could still participate in the trial of the case
despite their absence in the pre-trial conference. This gave Aguilar and Calimbas a second chance to explain
their non- attendance and, yet, only the respondent complied with the directive to file a position paper. The MCTC, in
its Order, properly held that since the proceedings were being heard ex parte, Aguilar and Calimbas had no right to
participate therein and to cross-examine the witness.

Thus, as it stands, the Court can only consider the evidence on record offered by the respondent. The petitioners lost
their right to present their evidence during the trial and, a fortiori, on appeal due to their disregard of the mandatory
attendance in the pre-trial conference.

Veloria, Jasmin Mae Pama

103. Tolentino vs. Laurel, 181368, 22 February 2012

DOCTRINE:
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial.
The nonappearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor, or if a representative shall
appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes
of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise
ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then
his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his
evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege
to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor
of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.

Facts:

● For several years, petitioners have been in actual possession of the western portion of the property situated
in Barangay Balugo, Tagkawayan, Quezon that Respondents own. Respondents are the registered owner of
the land with an area of 1,056,275 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
43927. Petitioners developed the property with a total area of 620,000 square meters into fishponds.
● In 1993 and 1994, through Gustavo C. Tolentino, Sr., who was then representing the petitioners, informed
them that they were occupying the area they were occupying was inside the respondents' property and,
therefore, they should vacate and leave the same.
● Gustavo asked for time to verify respondents' claims and assured that if found to be true, the petitioners are
willing to discuss the situation. However, after a year of waiting in vain, Gustavo died and petitioners
continued to develop the area that they were occupying into fishponds, manifesting their unwillingness to
vacate the premises and restore the possession thereof in favor of respondents.

Procedural History:

● Respondents filed a suit against petitioners to recover the property and demand payment of unearned
income, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
● Petitioners, averred that the subject property is owned by the Republic and they are occupying the same by
virtue of a Fishpond Lease Agreement entered with the Department of Agriculture. Thus, their stay over the
property is lawful.
● On August 27, 1996, petitioners were declared in default, for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference.
However, the trial court set aside the default order and reset the pre-trial conference. Despite several
resetting of the pretrial conference of which petitioners were notified, petitioners failed to appear
● On March 21, 2000, the trial court issued an Order allowing respondents to present their evidence ex parte,
instead of declaring petitioners in default.
● the RTC ruled in favor of respondents, Ordering the petitioners to leave and vacate the portions of land, to
pay P20,000.00 per annum from October 13, 1995 until possession thereof is returned to the respondent,
 and to pay for the respondents’ attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus litigation expenses in the
sum of P10,000.00.
● petitioners challenged the trial court's decision before the CA.
● The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
● A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but was denied by the CA for lack of merit.
● Petitioners then filed this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioners were denied their day in court.

Held:

No, the court ruled that they failed to see the lack of due process claimed by petitioners. On the contrary, petitioners
were given more than ample opportunity to be heard through counsel. Lest it be forgotten, petitioners were first
declared in default on August 27, 1996, for their failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. However, the trial court
set aside the default order and the pre-trial conference was set and reset for several times. Nonetheless, petitioners
failed to appear on January 9, 1998, March 2, 1998, May 18, 1999, and March 21, 2000, prompting the trial court to
allow the respondents to present their evidence ex parte. Thereafter, judgment was rendered.

The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his
case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence
ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present
his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the
plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.

The trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and even reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners
in default. Notwithstanding, petitioners and their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded
the legal processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case without any valid cause.

Clearly, when the trial court allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte due to the continued failure of the
petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due process. Plainly, petitioners cannot complain that they
were denied due process. What the fundamental law prohibits is total absence of opportunity to be heard. When a
party has been afforded opportunity to present his side, he cannot feign denial of due process. Petitioners' repeated
failure to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence
before the trial court was essentially due to their fault.

Villan, Vera Mae Angelica Salvador

104. Saguid vs. CA, 150611, 10 June 2003

DOCTRINE:

Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that, the failure of the defendant to
file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may
present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.

The remedy is to file a motion for reconsideration showing that the failure to file a pre-trial brief
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect.

Facts:

· Petitioner Saguid cohabited with then seventeen year-old Gina Rey, who was still validly
married to another man , after a brief courtship.
 · They lived as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father.

· Saguid, worked as a captain of their own fishing vessel, while Gina worked as a fish dealer
before she decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992-1994.

· Due to her relationship with the relatives of Jacinto turning sour, the two decided to separate.

· Gina Rey, filed a complaint for partition and recovery of personal property with receivership
against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac.

· She alleged she has contributed the following:

o P70,000 for the completion of heir unfinished house, from her salary as an entertainer
in Japan

o P111,375 worth of appliances and furniture from her savings as a fish dealer.

· Hence she prays that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the
amount of P70,000 be reimbursed to her.

· Petitioner on the other hand claimed that the expenses for the construction of the house were
defrayed solely from his earnings as the captain of the fishing vessel, and that the meager
earnings of Gina as a fish dealer did not contribute any to the construction and appliances in
the house. Further the earnings she had from her work in Japan were spent for the daily needs
and business of her own parents.

· On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial
brief as required by the Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.

· Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on May 26, 1997, however it was subsequently
denied and private respondent Gina Rey was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

· The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, which was later affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, wherein the latter ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the
petitioner in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, wherein it is required that pre-trial briefs must be filed and that non-
compliance by defendant entitles plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.

Issues:

Whether the Trial Court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte

Held:

No. The trial court did not err in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte. The Court of
Appeals may have erred in declaring moot, the issue of whether the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex
parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre trial brief, due to the retroactive application of Section 6, Rule 18 of the
1997 Rules of Court; however even before the 1997 Rules of Court took effect, failure to file pre-trial briefs are given
the same effect as the failure to appear in trial and the party may be declared non-suited or considered as default
under Circular No 1-89 of the Supreme Court. Hence there was no error in the trial court’s decision to allow the ex
parte presentation of evidence. Further Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, failure of the
defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, the plaintiff may
present evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. However the defendant is not
without any remedy. The defendant may file a motion for reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In the case at bar, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, however, cannot be justified since his reason for it is insufficient to set aside the direct order.
Petitioner claims that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is due to him not being represented by a counsel. The court was
not swayed with this justification, there is nothing in the constitution, mandating that a party to a non-criminal
proceeding must be represented by counsel. Further petitioner chose to not be represented by a lawyer and he was
able to file a motion for extension to file an answer. Hence the Court finds it untenable that when the petitioner was
inconvenienced by the decision, he now claims that he be given some slack.
 Villanueva, Harvey John G.
105. Tiu vs. Middleton, 134998, 19 July 1999

DOCTRINE: Through silence, parties are deemed to have acquiesced to a Pre-trial Order allowing the
presentation of unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when either of the parties
are about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice.

FACTS:

● The respondents herein, the Middletons filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property,
accounting and damages against the petitioner Tiu before the RTC of Oroquieta City.

● Before the commencement of the trial, the court a quo sent a notice of Pre-trial Conference stating in part:
The parties are warned that witnesses whose names and addresses are not submitted at the pre-trial may
not be allowed to testify at the trial x x x. In his Pre-Trial Brief, Tiu averred that he would be presenting six
witnesses, but he did not name them.

● In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or
unnamed witnesses but rather, it simply provided that the defendant, herein the petitioner, Tiu, will present
six witnesses. It made no mention at all that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named.

● Significantly, it also stated that plaintiffs will offer ten witnesses, without however naming them.

● Trial ensued, and the respondents presented their witnesses in due course.

● When the petitioner’s turn came, Tiu called a certain Antonia as his first witness.

● Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the respondents objected, arguing that the witness
could not be allowed to testify because the petitioner had failed to name her in his pre-trial brief.

● Sustaining the respondents, the court then issued the assailed orders. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a judge can exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of testimony were not included in
the pre-trial?

RULING:

Yes.

The pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. It is essential in the
simplification and the speedy disposition of disputes. In light of the objectives of a pre-trial and the role of the trial
court therein, it is evident that judges have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed
in the pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect.

In his Pre-trial Order, however, the trial judge did not exercise his discretion to exclude the unlisted or
unnamed witnesses. Rather, it simply provided that the defendant will present six witnesses. It made no mention at all
that they would be barred from testifying unless they were named. Significantly, it also stated that plaintiffs will offer
ten witnesses, without however naming them. Since the Order allowed respondents (as plaintiffs before the trial
court) to present witnesses, it necessarily follows that it should grant the same right to petitioner.

Indeed, the court and the parties must pay attention not only to the pre-trial briefs, but also to the pre-trial
order. Section 7 of the same Rule states:

SEC. 7. Record of pre-trial. -- The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the
court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the
matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried.
The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of action, unless modified before trial to prevent
manifest injustice.

Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses shall control the
subsequent course of action. The court a quo proceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein,
respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the
petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents
acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioner's unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial
order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest
injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules of Court.
 Villareal, Marinel Rana
106. Kent vs. Micarez, 185758, 9 March 2011

DOCTRINE: Non - Appearance of Party, to ensure the attendance of the parties, it specifically enumerates the
sanctions that the court can impose upon a party who fails to appear in the proceedings which includes
censure, reprimand, contempt and even dismissal of the action.

FACTS:

● Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of real property and annulment of title against her parents and
brother. She alleged that the subject residential lot was purchased by her but was named under her parents
under an implied trust due to the difficulty in registering a real property in her name being married to an
American citizen. However, she learned from her sister that their parents sold the subject lot to her brother.
● After the issues had been resolved, the RTC ordered the referral of the case to the Philippine Mediation
Center (PMC). Conferences were then scheduled. Based on the Report of Mediator Esmeraldo O. Padao,
Sr. that respondents’ counsel and representative did not appear on the conferences, the RTC issued an
order allowing petitioner to present her evidence ex parte. It was later clarified by Padao that it was the
petitioner's counsel and representative who did not attend the mediation proceedings. With this, the RTC
issued Order dismissing the case. Motion for reconsideration to set aside the order, appealing the relaxation
of the rule on non-appearance in the mediation proceedings, was denied.
● Petitioner invoked that the dismissal of the case was not in accordance with applicable law and
jurisprudence. She claims that it was unjust because her representative and counsel did not deliberately
snub the mediation proceedings for they have attended twice the mediation conferences and only left when
respondent’s counsel had not yet arrived. Her reason for failing to attend the last scheduled conference was
due to some urgent matters caused by the sudden increase in prices of commodities.

ISSUE: Whether or not dismissal is the proper sanction for failure to attend the mediation process.

HELD: Negative. Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of the case, the Court finds the sanction too
severe to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case are devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant
disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA provides sanction including but not
limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such other sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure
to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during
mediation proceedings. The Court held that a mere censure or reprimand would have been sufficient for petitioner’s
representative and her counsel so as to be informed of the court’s intolerance of tardiness and laxity in the
observation of its order. By failing to do so and refusing to resuscitate the case, the RTC impetuously deprived
petitioner of the opportunity to recover the land which she allegedly paid for. Unless the conduct of the party is so
negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as for nonappearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal,
the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end.

Viloria, Patricia Jean Mamaril

107. Citibank N.A. vs. Chua, 102300, 17 March 1993

DOCTRINE: “Although the power of attorney in question does not specifically mention the authority of
petitioners counsel to appear and bind petitioner at the pre-trial conference, the terms of said power of
attorney are comprehensive enough as to include the authority to appear for the Citibank at the pre-trial
conference. In the same manner, the power of attorney granted to Citibank's employees should be
considered a special power of attorney.”

Facts: · Citibank, is a commercial banking corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Sps. Velez
were good clients of Citibanks cebu branch.
· Sps. Allege that Citibank extended them credit lines sufficiently secured with real estate and chattel
mortgages on equipment. Offering them a special additional accommodation of 5M to be availed of by:
 o Sps. would purchase check or checks from the Citibank by exchanging it with their
manager's check on a regular daily basis

o It was further agreed that on the following day, CITIBANK would again purchase from
the Spouses, check or checks, by exchanging the same with Spouses manager's
check, which check, however, will be deposited by the plaintiffs with their other banks
to cover the check or checks previously issued

o The same regular and agreed activity would be undertaken by the plaintiffs and
defendant CITIBANK herein every banking day thereafter;

· Sps tried to exchange with Citibank the 6 checks amounting to 3.095M, but Citibank refused, even after
repeated demands. Citibank suggested that the amount arrangement should be restructured to 30mos
with a prevailing interest on the diminishing value. Spouses agreed, they issued and delivered a check
in which was refused by Citibank, demanding instead the entire amount.
· Citibank states that prior to depositing the checks Velez would present his personal checks to a bank
officer asking the latter to have his personal checks immediately credited as if it were a cash deposit
and at the same time assure the bank officer that his personal checks were fully funded, gaining the
officers trust and confidence because of past transactions they would accommodate his request. They
never discovered that his personal check deposits were unfunded. Citibank filed a case for BP 22
against Velez.
· Sps Velez filed a case for specific performance with damages against Citibank. During the pre-trial
conference, counsel for Citibank appeared, presenting a special power of attorney executed by Citibank
officer Tarriela in favor of bank's counsel, the J.P. Garcia & Associates, to represent and bind the bank
at the pre-trial conference. The counsel for the Sps Velez orally moved to declare Citibank in default on
the ground that the special power of attorney was not executed by the Board of Directors of Citibank.
· Bank was then required to file a written opposition to declare it in default. In its opposition Citibank
attached another special power of attorney made by Ferguson, Vice President and highest ranking
officer of Citibank, Philippines, constituting and appointing the J.P. Garcia & Associates to represent
and bind the bank at the pre-trial conference and/or trial of the case. Judge Chua denied Sps. Velez
oral motion to declare Citibank in default and set the continuation of the pre-trial conference.
· On the scheduled pre-trial conference, Sps. Velez reiterated their oral motion to declare Citibank as in
default.
· Judge Chua issued an order declaring bank as in default. It reasoned out that "Defendant-bank,
although a foreign corporation, is bound by Philippine laws when doing and conducting business in the
Philippines, and its corporate powers could only be exercised by its Board of Directors (Sec. 23, B.P.
Blg. 68). The Special Power of Attorney executed by Ferguson in favor of the alleged Citibank
employees (Reyes, Solomon, Yu and Yap), assuming the same to be a delegable authority, to
represent the Citibank in the pre-trial conference, made no mention of J.P. Garcia & Associates as one
of the employees of the defendant. It stands to reason therefore, that the defendant-bank has no proper
representation during the pre-trial conference.
· Citibank then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE BANKS COUNSEL MAY VALIDLY REPRESENT CITIBANK DURING PRE
TRIAL?

Held: Yes. It is an error on the part of the Court of Appeals to state that the power of attorney given to the
four (4) Citibank employees is not a special power of attorney as required in paragraph 3, Article 1878 of the
Civil Code and Section 1 (a), Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. In the case of Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. Villaluz,
the special power of attorney executed by petitioner bank therein contained the following pertinent terms —
"to appear for and in its behalf in the above-entitled case in all circumstances where its appearance is
required and to bind it in all said instances".

“Although the power of attorney in question does not specifically mention the authority of petitioners counsel
to appear and bind petitioner at the pre-trial conference, the terms of said power of attorney are
comprehensive enough as to include the authority to appear for the Citibank at the pre-trial conference. In
the same manner, the power of attorney granted to Citibank's employees should be considered a special
power of attorney.”
 Corporate powers may be directly conferred upon corporate officers or agents by statute, the articles of
incorporation, the by laws or by resolution or other act of the board of directors. In addition, an officer who is
not a director may also appoint other agents when so authorized by the by laws or by the board of directors.
Such are referred to as express powers. There are also powers incidental to express power conferred. It is a
fundamental principle in the law of agency that every delegation of authority, whether general or special,
carries with it, unless the contrary be expressed, implied authority to do all of those acts, natural and
ordinarily done in such cases, which are reasonably necessary and proper to be done in order to carry into
effect the main authority conferred.

Since the by-laws are a source of authority for corporate officers and agents of the corporation, a resolution
of the Board of Directors of Citibank appointing an attorney in fact to represent and bind it during the pre-trial
conference of the case at bar is not necessary because its by-laws allow its officers, the Executing Officer
and the Secretary Pro-Tem, to execute a power of attorney to a designated bank officer, Ferguson in this
case, clothing him with authority to direct and manage corporate affairs.

Since the general power of attorney granted to Ferguson allows him to delegate his powers in whole or in
part, there can be no doubt that the special power of attorney in favor, first, of J.P. Garcia & Associates and
later, of the bank's employees, constitutes a valid delegation of Ferguson's express power to represent
Citibank in the pre-trial conference in the lower court.

Yumul, Karlo Del Domingo

108. Calalang vs. Court of Appeals, 103185, 22 January 1993

DOCTRINE: Dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of
the court. That discretion, however, must not be abused. Thus, courts may not enter a dismissal which is
not warranted by the circumstances of the case. The availability of this recourse must be determined
according to each case's procedural history, situation at the time of the dismissal and whether, and under
the circumstances of the particular case, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to
proceed with reasonable promptitude.

Facts:
● Respondent Filipinas Manufacturers Bank filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against
petitioner Conrado Calalang and 3 other defendants.
● Petitioner, after having been served with summons, filed a Motion to Dismiss.
● The other summoned defendant, Hugo Arca, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars.
● The two other defendants namely, the Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Salceda were also summoned
but only a clerk-employee of the Acropolis Trading Corporation received the summons while Rio Salceda
was no longer residing at his given address.
● Over a year later, the Motion for Bill of Particulars was granted.
● The Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner Calalang was left unresolved. The last pleading filed regarding the
Motion to Dismiss was the reply of petitioner Calalang to the opposition to the motion to dismiss by
respondent bank.
● This case has been set several times for pre-trial. Petitioner Calalang moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that respondent bank failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time.

Issue:
Whether or not there was failure of the plaintiff to prosecute.
Ruling:
No. To be a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary and dilatory
resulting in the trifling of judicial processes.
In Marahay vs. Melicor, the Court set forth the test for dismissal of a case due to failure to prosecute, to wit: While a
court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether,
under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe
the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
 INTERVENTION (Rule 19, Sections 1 to 4)

Cutaran, Jal Arana

109. Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Heirs of Miñoza, 186045, 2 February 2011

DOCTRINE:

Adolfo, Rochelle Angela Rabang

110. Pulgar vs. RT of Mauban, 157583, 10 September 2014

DOCTRINE: Intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation.
Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to
afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear
and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests.

FACTS:
○ In 1999, the Municipal Assessor of Mauban, Quezon issued 34 tax declarations on the buildings and
machinery comprising the Mauban Plant owned and operated by respondent Quezon Power (Philippines)
Limited, Co. (QPL) which upon its assessment it has a total market value of PhP29,626,578,291.00 and,
hence, PhP500 Million, more or less, in realty taxes per annum.
○ The Municipal Assessor maintained that the Mauban Plant was completed and already operational in
October 1999.
○ Subsequently, QPL filed with the Municipal Assessor a sworn statement declaring that the said properties
had a value of only PhP15,055,951,378.00.
○ On March 2021, QPL tendered to the Municipal Assessor the amount of PhP60,223,805.51 as first quarter
installment of the realty taxes on the plant, which the latter rejected.
○ Hence, QPL filed a Complaint for Consignation and Damages before the RTC against the Province of
Quezon, the Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Mauban, Quezon, and the Provincial
 Assessor and Provincial Treasurer of Quezon (defendants), depositing to the RTC the above-stated
amount in payment of the first quarter realty tax for 2001.
○ QPL essentially protested the Municipal Assessor's assessment for, among others, its lack of legal
authority to make such assessment and its supposed non-compliance with the prescribed valuation
process. For their part, defendants averred that QPL was estopped from denying the authority of the
Municipal Assessor since it previously paid realty taxes for its properties for the year 2001 based on the
assessment of the latter.
○ Pulgar filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-Intervention and Answer-in-Intervention (motion for
intervention), alleging that as a resident and taxpayer of Quezon Province, he has an interest in the
aggressive collection of realty taxes against QPL. By way of counterclaim, he prayed for the award of
moral damages and attorney's fees, anchoring the same on the "mindless disturbance of the forest and
marine environment whereon the power plant of QPL stands." Pulgar's motion was initially granted and
his Answer-in-Intervention was admitted.

● The RTC Ruling

○ The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in the absence of a payment of the tax assessed
under protest, which requirement QPL attempted to skirt by alleging in its complaint that it is the very
authority of the Municipal Assessor to impose the assessment and the treasurer to collect the tax that it
was questioning. Consequently, it also dismissed Pulgar's motion for intervention since with the dismissal
of the main case, the same had no leg to stand on.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing Pulgar's motion for intervention as a consequence of the
dismissal of the main case.

HELD:

No. The Court held that jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action. Accordingly,
an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.

In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's dismissal of Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his
intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. This recourse,
the Court, however, finds to be improper since the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted
in the dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the principal litigation — on jurisdictional grounds
at that — means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind
that:

Intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and

supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor . . .
unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely
to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the
pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or
protect such right or interests.

Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the right of
the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention ceases.
 CALENDAR OF CASES (Rule 20, Sections 1 and 2)

Angeles, Bernice Marie Sidocon

111. Ang Kek Chen vs. Bello, L-76344-46, 30 June 1988

DOCTRINE: The raffle of cases is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended
to insure impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases public suspicion regarding assignment of
cases to predetermined judges is obviated.

A violation or disregard of the Court’s circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be
countenanced. A party has the right to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal.

FACTS:
● Petitioner questions the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction committed by
respondent Judge Abundio Bello in violating Administrative Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974,
regarding the raffle of Criminal Cases Nos. 021429, 021430 and 021431, and prays that the Court orders
the outright dismissal of the cases.
● It appears from the records that on December 28, 1977, petitioner Ang was charged before the then Manila
City Court (now Metropolitan Trial Court), Branch VIII, with the crimes of "MALTREATMENT," "THREATS,"
and "SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES,"
● After the prosecution had presented its evidence, Ang filed a Demurrer to Evidence which was denied by the
respondent court. Ang elevated the incident to the Regional Trial Court of Manila on certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. The petition was likewise denied
(Order dated November 18, 1983). On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial
Court’s Order.
● Meanwhile, the then presiding judge of MTC Branch VIII (where the cases were pending) was promoted to
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. As a consequence, respondent judge, as officer-in-charge of the MTC
(Manila), directed the return of the case records to the Clerk of Court for "re-raffle." Petitioner, however,
alleged that he received the corresponding order only on August 23, 1984, or AFTER the cases had already
been actually "re-raffled" and assigned to respondent judge on August 16, 1984.
● On September 27, 1984, Ang filed a motion to re-raffle the cases, which was denied. The subsequent
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 1 Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
○ "1. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
the manner he conducted the raffle of Criminal Cases Nos. 021429, 021430 and 021431 Annexes
‘A,’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ hereof in gross violation of Circular No. 7 of this Hon. Court in his capacity as Acting
Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila resulting in the assignment to the branch
presided by himself of the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases and in denying peremptorily the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner contesting the manner of said raffle.

○ 2. This Hon. Court in the exercise of its rule making power and supervision over all lower courts as
demonstrated in several cases decided by it since its reconstitution under the present
administration in having displayed judicial statemanship and activism and in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction may order the outright dismissal of the said three (3) Criminal Cases Nos.
021429, 021430 and 021431 Annexes ‘A,’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ of this petition."
● On September 27, 1984, Ang filed a motion to re-raffle the cases, which was denied. The subsequent
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in raffling the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 7
of this Court (regarding the manner of raffle of cases)

HELD:
Yes. The principal issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion in violation of Circular No. 7 of this Court, regarding the
manner of raffle of cases, not denied or explained by public respondent, is not a trivial one. The raffle of cases is of
vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to insure impartial adjudication of cases. By
raffling the cases public suspicion regarding assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated.

A violation or disregard of the Court’s circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be
countenanced. A party has the right to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal.

When the respondent judge conducted the raffle of the three criminal cases in question, apparently in violation of the
Court’s Circular No. 7, he did not only arouse the suspicion that he had some ulterior motive for doing so, but he
violated the cardinal rule that all judicial processes must be done above board. We consider the procedure of raffling
cases to be an important element of judicial proceedings, designed precisely to give assurance to the parties that the
court hearing their case would be impartial. On this point, we found the petition meritorious.

The order of the respondent court denying petitioner’s motion to re-raffle the criminal cases in question, except
Criminal Case No. 021430 for threat which is hereby DISMISSED, is set aside and the said cases Criminal Cases
No. 021429 and 021431 are remanded to the Executive Judge for re-raffle in accordance with this Court’s Circular
No. 7.

SUBPOENA (Rule 21, Sections 1 to 10)

Apolinario, Eufemia Mulimbayan

112. Collado vs. Bravo, A.M. No. P-99-1307, 10 April 2001

DOCTRINE: "A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking
of his deposition." It is a process whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant before it; or a
compliance with its demands." Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending
before a court, a subpoena may not be issued.

FACTS:

● In a complaint-affidavit, Lorena O. Collado charged respondent Teresita G. Bravo, Clerk of Court

of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naguilian, La Union, with Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
● Complainant alleged that she received through priority mail, a subpoena from the MTC of
Naguilian, La Union, directing her to appear before the said court at 2:00 P.M., July 14, 1997.
The subpoena was duly signed by respondent in her capacity as Clerk of Court.
● Upon arriving at the MTC of Naguilian, the complainant talked to the respondent. When
complainant asked for copies of the complaint and other details of the case, respondent replied
that no complaint had been filed and her intention in issuing the subpoena was to allow a certain
Perla Baterina, the labor recruiter of complainant's son, Emmanuel Collado, to talk to
complainant. Complainant claimed that she felt humiliated, harassed, and experienced extreme
nervousness as a result of respondent's issuance of the subpoena.
● Respondent admitted issuing the subpoena. She claimed, however, that it was done with good
intentions since she only acceded to the urgent request of the spouses Rogelio and Perla
Baterina.
● In its Memorandum, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the complaint
be docketed as an administrative matter and respondent be fined Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) for Grave Misconduct with a Warning that the commission of a similar act would merit
a more serious penalty

ISSUE: Whether or not the subpoena is properly issued by the respondent?

HELD: No.
 Respondent knew there was no case filed against complainant. Neither complainant commenced
any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Respondent's act of
issuing the subpoena to complainant was evidently not directly or remotely connected with respondent's
judicial or administrative duties. It appears that she merely wanted to act as a mediator or conciliator in
the dispute between complainant and the Baterinas, upon the request of the latter. Respondent, then, had
absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena to the complainant.
Respondent as Clerk of Court is primarily tasked with making out and issuing all writs and processes
issuing from the court. She should have known or ought to know what a subpoena is.

The Court that respondent was using without authority some element of state coercion against
complainant who was understandably compelled to heed the contents of the subpoena resulting in her
humiliation. Such naked abuse of authority by a complainant could not be allowed to pass without
appropriate sanction. Accordingly, this Court has no recourse but to agree with the recommendation of
the OCA.

Arboleda, Anreinne Sabille Larizabal

113. Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, L-30266, 29 June 1984

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, in obtaining an injunction for infringement of a trademark, complainant is

entitled to an accounting and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as
incident to, and a part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition.
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a "subpoena duces
tecum," it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced
contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or
document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. A
"subpoena duces tecum" once issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance thereof is
unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if
the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of production
thereof.

FACTS:
● Respondent corporations sued the present petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Rizal for unfair
competition with damages and attorney's fees.
● In due time herein petitioner, answered the complaint and joined issues with the plaintiffs therein, with
respondent Judge. After they have presented about nine witnesses and various pieces of documentary
evidence, herein private respondents made a request to issue a subpoena duces tecum against the
treasurer of herein petitioner.
● Acting favorably on that request, said respondent Judge issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the
treasurer of the present petitioner to bring with him all sales invoices, sales books and ledgers which
recorded the sales of Plymouth Star Player rubber shoes from the time the corporation started
manufacturing and selling said shoes up to the present.
● Petitioner filed a motion in the court below praying that the subpoena duces tecum be quashed on the
grounds that: a. the said subpoena is both unreasonable and oppressive as the books and documents called
for are numerous and voluminous; b. there is no good cause shown for the issuance thereof; and c. The
books and documents are not relevant to the case pending below. The private respondents opposed that
motion of the petitioner.
● Acting on the said motion, respondent Judge issued the first controverted order denying the motion to quash
the subpoena duces tecum. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
● Petitioner Universal Rubber Products, Inc. filed its present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction,
alleging that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction.
● CA issued a temporary restraining order directing the respondent Judge of the trial court to refrain from
implementing his order. CA denied the petition.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the "subpoena duces tecum" is proper in a suit for unfair competition.

HELD:
As a general rule, in obtaining an injunction for infringement of a trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting
and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a part of, his property right,
and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition.

Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum," it must
appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant
and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence
has been so designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum" once issued by the court
may be quashed upon motion if the issuance thereof is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the
reasonable cost of production thereof.

In recovering the loss suffered by the aggrieved party due to "unfair competition," Sec. 23 of R.A. 166 grants the
complainant three options within which to ascertain the amount of damages recoverable, either:

(1) the reasonable profit which the complaining party would have made, had the defendant not infringed his said
rights; or

(2) the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement; or

(3) the court may award as damages a reasonable percentage based upon the amount of gross sales of the
defendant of the value of the services in connection with which the mark or tradename was issued in the infringement
of the rights of the complaining party.

The argument that the petitioner should first be found guilty of unfair competition before an accounting for purposes of
ascertaining the amount of damages recoverable can proceed. stands without merit. The complaint for unfair
competition is basically a suit for "injunction and damages". 10 Injunction, for the purpose of enjoining the unlawful
competitor from proceeding further with the unlawful competition, and damages, in order to allow the aggrieved party
to recover the damage he has suffered by virtue of the said unlawful competition. Hence, the collection of the
complainant (private respondent herein) for the accounting of petitioner's (defendant below) gross sales as damages
per R.A. 166, appears most relevant. For Us, to determine the amount of damages allowable after the final
determination of the unfair labor case would not only render nugatory the rights of complainant under Sec. 23 of R.A.
166, but would be a repetitious process causing only unnecessary delay.

Bahia, Hannah Grace Israel

114. Roco vs. Contreras, 158275, 28 June 2005

DOCTRINE: Subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the
taking of his deposition. There are 2 kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena
duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the
production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. The books and documents that
petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and
readily identifiable.

FACTS:
● Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed chicken. He purchased
his supply of dressed chicken from private respondent Cal's Corporation. As payment for his purchases,
petitioner drew 5 checks payable to Cal’s Corporation against his account with the PCIB. Cal's Corporation
deposited the above checks in its account with PCIB but the bank dishonored them for having been drawn
against a closed account. Thereafter, Cal's Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for
violation of BP 22.
● MTCC declared the cases submitted for decision on account of petitioner's failure to adduce evidence in his
behalf. Later, the same court rendered a judgment of conviction against petitioner.
● The petitioner went on appeal to the Regional Trial Court, contending that he was unlawfully deprived of his
right to due process when the MTCC rendered judgment against him without affording him of the right to
present his evidence. Agreeing with the petitioner, the RTC vacated the MTCC decision and remanded the
cases to it for the reception of petitioner's evidence.
 ● During the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum, requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both
of Cal's Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court on 19 May 1999
and to bring with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999.
● MTCC, then presided by Acting Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an order granting petitioner's
aforementioned request and accordingly directed the issuance of the desired subpoenas.
● The corporation itself maintained that the production of documents was inappropriate because they are
immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecuted.
● The MTCC, this time thru its regular Presiding Judge, Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied petitioner's
request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were
immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only
unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases.
● The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and accordingly affirmed the impugned resolutions of the RTC.

ISSUE/S: WON the courts committed reversible error in denying petitioner's request for the issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the 5 criminal cases for violation of BP 22 filed against
him and now pending trial before the MTCC

HELD: No, a subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of
an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. There
are 2 kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a
person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein
specified. The books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his
request with definiteness and readily identifiable.

The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case. It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books
and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden. Based on the
records below and as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner had been issued by Cal’s Corporation
with temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been
validated by the corporation itself. The production of the books and documents requested by petitioner are not
indispensable to prove his defense of payment. the irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear on their
very face thereof, what the fact that the requested Audited Income Statements, Audited Balance Sheets, Income Tax
Returns, etc. pertained to the years 1994 to 1999 which could not have reflected petitioner's alleged payment
because the subject transaction happened in 1993.

Bitong, John Eli Zuriel De Villa

115. People of the Philippines vs. Montejo, L-24154, 31 October 1967

DOCTRINE: The judge's order denying the motion for an order of arrest or citation in contempt amounted to
grave abuse of discretion since in criminal cases, the prosecution would be seriously handicapped if a material witness could
not be compelled by subpoena even if he resides hundreds of miles away from the place of trial.

Facts:

● A criminal case was filed in the CFI of Zamboanga City against Felix Wee Sit for double homicide and
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
● The trial commenced and it was stated that a certain Ernesto Uaje (Uaje) was a material and important
witness of the case as he was the eye-witness during the traffic incident.
● When the case was called for trial in the CFI of Zamboanga City, Uaje had returned to Montalban, Rizal
(where he resides)Pursuant to a formal request by the City Fiscal, Judge Montejo issued a subpoena
addressed to his house in Montalban, Rizal for him to appear at the trial.
● The subpoena was served to Uaje however he did not appear in court.
● The City Fiscal formally moved for an order of arrest or in the alternative, cite Uaje for contempt for willful
failure to appear at the trial of the case as a material witness but this motion was denied by Judge Montejo
(MOR was also denied) Argument of Judge Montejo.
● As a First and Special Affirmative Defense, they relied on the aforesaid Section 9 of Rule23 contending that
if a witness was not bound by a subpoena since his residence was admittedly not less than 50 kilometers
 from the place of trial, the failure to obey the same or to comply with it could not in any manner whatsoever
constitute contempt of court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Respondent Judge, in denying a motion for arrest of a material witness, in a criminal case, relying
upon Section 9 Rule 21 of the Rules of Court, acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

It was held by the Supreme Court that while the contention of the respondents was not lacking, such contention failed
to enlist the assent of a majority of the Supreme Court. What applied in the case at bar was actually Section 5 Rule
135 , and not Section 9 of Rule 21 that only applies to civil cases, which states that Every Court shall have power: (e)
To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein.

Boncayao, Paty Kaye Cedro

116. Genorga vs. Quintain, Adm. Matter No. 981-CFI, 29 July 1977

DOCTRINE:

COMPUTATION OF TIME (Rule 22, Sections 1 and 2)

Cabugatan, Muammar Montila

117. Neypes vs. CA, 141524, 14 September 2005

DOCTRINE:To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration. This is pursuant to the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate procedural rules in all courts.

FACTS:
● Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titled of land and/or reconveyance
against the Bureau of Forest Development and private respondents
● The trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint on February 12, 1998 on the ground that the
action has already prescribed.
● Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th
day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration.
● On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
● Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.
 ● The trial court denied the notice of appeal because it was filed 8 days late. Petitioners then filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 assailing the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA.
● Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day
they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within
the reglementary period for appeal.
● CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. The order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners timely filed their notice of appeal.

HELD: YES. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail
of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the
right to appeal.

Under Sec. 3 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court: The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.

A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to
it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

The Court has held in previous cases that the date of the order denying the motion for reconsideration is the final
order contemplated in the Rules.

On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead
opted to file a motion for reconsideration.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. This is
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate procedural rules in all courts.

The Court thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration)

Celino, Rayan Jen Cosalan

118. Luz vs. National Amnesty Commission, 159708, 24 September 2004

DOCTRINE:Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated
period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as
thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not
run until the next working day.

The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should be tacked to the original period and commences
immediately after the expiration of such period. Under the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, the CA
 has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension it granted from a date later than the expiration of
such period, regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.

FACTS:
● On July 18, 1988, petitioner was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal
possession of firearms) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
●
● On March 22, 2000, the petitioner filed an application for amnesty with the Local Amnesty Board for
Metro Manila. The board denied the said application.
●
● On August 26, 2002, the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) affirmed the decision of the Local
Amnesty Board. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the NAC, per its Resolution, a
copy of which was received by the petitioner on November 22, 2002.
●
● Under the NAC Administrative Order No. 2, petitioner had until December 7, 2002, a Saturday,
within which to file a petition for review of the said resolution with the Court of Appeals.
●
● On December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a motion in the appellate court for an extension of fifteen
(15) days from December 9, 2002, or until December 24, 2002 within which to file his petition. The
petitioner alleged therein that he had just engaged the services of counsel who needed additional
time to study the case and draft the petition. However, the petitioner failed to file his petition for
review.
●
● December 24, 2002 was declared a national holiday; December 25, 2002 was also a holiday.
●
● On December 26, 2002, the petitioner filed a second motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from
December 26, 2002 or until January 10, 2003, within which to file his petition. The petitioner filed his
petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 10, 2003.
●
● On January 13, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution granting the petitioner’s first motion for a fifteen-
day extension counted from December 7, 2002 or until December 22, 2002, within which to file said
petition.

● On February 20, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s second motion for having
been filed out of time. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 20, 2003
Resolution claiming that, since the last day to file his petition was a Saturday, December 7, 2002,
and the next day, December 8, 2002 was a Sunday, the last day for filing the petition was
December 9, 2002. He reasoned that since he filed his motion for extension of time to file his
petition for review on the said date, the said motion was timely filed.

● On August 19, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion, relying on A.M. No.
00-2-14-SC issued on February 29, 2000, which provides that any extension of time to file the
required pleading should be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that the
said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner timely filed his second motion for extension of time to file his petition for
review. NO, CA was correct in denying petitioners second motion for extension

HELD:
Section 1, Rule 22, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the
last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should be tacked to the original period and commences
immediately after the expiration of such period. Under the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 00-2-14-
SC, the CA has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension it granted from a date later
than the expiration of such period, regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a
legal holiday.

The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for granting the petitioner’s first motion for extension of fifteen
(15) days within which to file his petition for review, reckoned from December 7, 2002, and not from
December 9, 2002 as prayed for by the petitioner. In so doing, it merely applied, with fealty, Section 1,
Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, as clarified by the Court via its Resolution in A.M.
No. 00-2-14-SC. Had the CA granted the petitioner’s first motion for extension and reckoned the fifteen-
day period from December 9, 2002, instead of from December 7, 2002, the appellate court would have
acted with grave abuse of its discretion.

Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, we agree with the petitioner’s plea for a liberal
interpretation and application of A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC in light of the peculiar factual mileu in this case. It
appears that the petitioner’s counsel relied in good faith on the ruling of this Court in Moskowsky.
Moreover, the petitioner filed his petition for review on the same day, January 13, 2003, even before the
CA granted his first motion for extension of time to file his petition for review. In fine, when the CA
granted the petitioner’s first motion, the petitioner had already filed his petition for review even as his
second motion for extension had yet to be resolved by the CA. As we ruled in Labad v. University of
Southeastern Philippines:

The underpinning consideration in Moskowsky, Vda. de Capulong and in the case at bar, is the liberal
interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial justice. Petitioner would be outright denied her right to
appeal if the original period of December 26, 1998 would be the basis of the 15-day extension period.
While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless “it is an essential part of our
judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.”

The unfairness of the situation becomes even more apparent when we consider the fact that petitioner
received notice that the extension was to be counted from the original period and not from the date that
she had prayed for, a month after she had already filed her petition