Association For Asian Studies

Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia
Author(s): Nancy J. Smith-Hefner

Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May, 2007), pp. 389-420
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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The Journalof Asian Studies Vol. 66, No. 2 (May) 2007: 389-420.
? 2007 Association ofAsian Studies Inc. doi: 10.1017/S0021911807000575
Women
Javanese and theVeil inPost-Soeharto
Indonesia
NANCY J. SMITH-HEFNER
This article examines the practice and meanings of the new veiling and oflsla
mization more generally for young Muslim Javanese women in the new middle
class. Drawing on eight months of ethnographic research in the Central Java
city of Yogyakarta in 1999 and three subsequent one-month visits during
2001, 2002, and 2003, I explore the social and religious attitudes offemale stu
dents at two of Yogyakarta's leading centers ofhigfier education: Gadjah Mada
a
University, nondenominational state university, and the nearby Sunan Kali
jaga National Islamic University. The ethnographic and life-historicalmaterials
discussed here underscore that the new veiling is neither a traditionalist survival
nor an antimodernist reaction but rather a
complex and sometimes ambiguous
young Muslim women to reconcile the
effort by opportunities for autonomy
and choice offered by modern education with a heightened commitment to the
profession of Islam.
1970s and 1980s witnessed a

resurgence in the symbols and practice of
The Islam throughout the Muslim world. One particularly vivid expression of this
has been Muslim women's or
religious development donning of the headscarf
veil (inArabic, hijab; in Indonesian,jilbab). Although in the popularWestern
an anti
imagination, veiling is often identified with traditionalist politics and
Western women
rejection of modernity, contextual studies of and Islamization
of and motives for veiling are
suggest that the meanings complex, varied, and
highly contested. Besearch from diverse Muslim countries indicates that this
"universalized" expression of Muslim piety often carries with it localized refer
ences to tradition, as well as
politics, class, and status, public and personal
ethics (Ask and
Tjomsland 1998). Case studies also reveal that the new
veiling
is not among the old and traditional but among young,
particularly prevalent
well-educated, and socially assertive members of the urban middle class.1 This
is the case in Indonesia, which is the focus of the
certainly present paper.
Since the early 1990s, veiling has become especiallywidespread among high
Nancy J. Smith-Hefner (smhefher@bu.edu) is an Associate Professor in the Department of

Anthropologyat Boston University.
1See, forexample, research on women and veiling in Jordanand Algeria (Jansen1998), Malaysia
(Nagata 1995; Ong 1990), Egypt (Duval 1998; Macleod 1991, 1992; Mahmood 2005; Zuhur
1992), and Turkey (White 2002).

390 Nancy J. Smith-Hefner
school students and on campuses in cities such as

college cosmopolitan Bandung,
Medan, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta.
some 88.7
With percent of its 220 million people professing Islam, Indonesia
is the world's most nation. Almost half of the
populous Muslim country's Muslims
reside on the island of Java. Until the Islamic resurgence of the 1980s, however,
the Islam to which the majority of Javanese subscribed was a
spiritualistic blend
of Javanese traditions and normative Islam (Geertz I960; Woodward 1989).
Many Javanese Muslims admit that a generation ago, they were lax in their
of the of Islam,
performance pillars including daily prayers, the annual fast,
and the payment of religious alms. Few women wore the Muslim headscarf.
Those who did tended to be older women from the ranks of rural traditionalists
or the Muslim merchant class. On as well as in banks,
college campuses, govern
ment offices, and business establishments, skirts or dresses and
Western-style
short-sleeved blouses were the norm.
When I firstlived inYogyakartaduring the late 1970s, less than3 percent of
the Muslim female student wore the veil on the campus of
population Gadjah
Mada University, the country's oldest and national
university.
second-largest
to surveys that I conducted 1999, 2001, and 2002, the percen
According during
of Muslim women on campus who veil has risen to more than 60
tage percent.
The practice of is even more among female students in tech
veiling widespread
nical and medical In these faculties, a small but number of
programs.2 striking
women have a con
adopted the chador (in Indonesian, cadar), full-length garb
of a robe
sisting long, drably colored, and shapeless complemented by socks and
sometimes even worn with the chador, the veil is
gloves. When typically designed
to cover not the hair, ears, and neck but also the face, so that a woman's
only only
eyes are visible to the public.
The "new veil" preferred by most Indonesian women is less radical and
today
enveloping than the chador. It nonetheless differs considerably from the loose
as the or in
fitting headscarf known kerudung kudung, which previous gener
ations was worn women and is still some
by pious Javanese today preferred by
older or traditionalist Muslim women. The kerudung is
typically made from
a soft, translucent fabric (chiffon, silk, or cotton batik). It is over
light draped
the hair or over a close-fitting hat, with the ends tied or casually draped over the
shoulders. Parts of a woman's neck and hair may remain visible. By contrast, the
new veil, or is a of nontransparent fabric folded so as
jilbab, large square piece
to be drawn around the face and pinned so that
tightly securely under the chin
the hair, ears, and neck are completely covered. The fabric reaches to the
2In absolute terms, the number of women in medical and technical fields who wear the veil is
the relatively small numbers of women in these fields?but in terms,
small?given percentage
the is A female medical student at the nondenominational Mada
phenomenon striking. Gadjah
that all six Muslim women students in her wore the veil; two of
University reported department
them wore the chador.
Among
dental students, reports were dramatic.
equally

Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia 391
shoulders, with some the chest. The colors among reli

styles covering preferred
gious conservatives are either solids or, alternately, black or brown, the
pale
effectofwhich is intended to be modest and deliberatelyunalluring.The new
is a
worn with or tunic and a
veil typically loose-fitting, long-sleeved blouse
or loose, wide
long, ankle-length skirt legged pants and flesh-colored socks.
Unlike modern, Western of dress, then, the and its associated cloth
styles jilbab
are to cover and obscure the of the body, albeit not
ing styles designed shape
so as the chador.
nearly radically full-length
There is, however, a paradox in this far-reaching change inMuslim women's
dress. Veiling has spread not on the heels of social immobility or traditionalization
but in the wake of far-reaching changes conventionally associated inWestern
social theory with economic development and cultural "modernity." These devel
opments, the impact of which firstbegan to be felt in the late 1970s, have
included the expansion of mass education, the movement of women into
public employmentand theprofessions,heightened social and spatialmobility,

in the in the economic and class struc
changes family, and fundamental changes
tureof society(Blackburn2004; Hull and Jones1994;Bobinson 2000; Sen 2002).
As the disproportionately
high incidence of veiling and chadorwearing among
female medical and technical students indicates, has most
veiling spread
widely among the segmentof the female studentbody that is best positioned
to reap the benefits of recent educational and economic All this
changes.
makes the cultural significance of veiling for Muslim women and gender roles
all the more intriguing.
This article examines the practice and meanings of the new veiling and of
more women in the new
Islamization generally for young Muslim Javanese
on in the central
middle class. Drawing eight months of ethnographic research
in 1999 and three one-month visits
Javanese city of Yogyakarta subsequent
during 2001, 2002, and 2003, I explore the social and religious attitudes of
at two of centers of
female students Yogyakarta's leading higher education:
Mada a nondenominational state
Gadjah University, university, and the nearby
Sunan Sunan Kali
Kalijaga National Islamic University (Universitas Islam Negeri
The ethnographic and life-historical materials discussed here underscore
jaga).3
this article focuses on the experience of young women, over the five years of my
3Although
research, I conducted 150 interviews with numbers of young men and
in-depth near-equal
women who were currentlyattendingor had recentlygraduated fromGadjah Mada University
or the Sunan National Islamic University. Interviews were
Kalijaga open-ended, though they gen
covered the topics of education, and were
erally religion, family life, gender, sexuality. Respondents
selected from across academic and and a of Muslim
departments disciplines expressed variety
orientations (modernist, traditionalist, secularist, activist, and conservative). All interviews were
conducted me in Indonesian and Javanese and took in varied locations (on campus, at
by place
at students' home, or in caf?s), on the student's and
my home, depending preference availability.
All interviews were and transcribed. All translations are own. Interviews with
taped fully my youth
were supplemented by a surveyof 200 students (equally divided between theNational Islamic
and Mada and between male and female on similar
University Gadjah University respondents)

that the new is neither a traditionalist survival nor an antimodernist reac

veiling
tion but a sometimes women
complex and ambiguous effort by young Muslim to
reconcile the opportunities for autonomy and choice offered modern edu
by
cation with a commitment to the of Islam.
heightened profession
Models of Gender and Class in Java
A small on women and the family in Java

irony of research during the late
1970s was that few researchers, Western or Indonesian, were aware that the
was in the of an Islamic After the pioneering
country early phases resurgence.4
studies ofHildred Geertz (1961) and Robert Jay (1969), research on Javanese
women and the household turned to questions of class, gender and
inequality,
economic development (Hart 1978; Hull 1975; Stoler 1975, 1977; White
1976). These studies offered welcome
insights
into class and
gender dynamics
that had been overlooked in earlier work, but
they often neglected the specific
influence of Islam. The policies of President Mohammed Soeharto's New
Order regime (1966-98) reinforced this tendency: During the first two
decades of Soeharto's rule, his
regime discouraged of
public expressions
Islamic piety and was as more
widely regarded supportive of "Javanist" and
secular-nationalist values than Islam (Emmerson 1978; Hefner 2000).
within a framework and
Working broadly economic-developmental drawing
on research conducted in the mid-1970s, and Valerie
sociologist demographer
Hull published an importantarticle in 1982 on the changingnature of gender
roles among the emerging middle class in rural central in
Java, titled 'Women
Rural Middle Class: or (Hull 1982). Hull's work is
Java's Progress Regress?"
to the present discussion because
particularly relevant she examines the situation
of women of similar
background and age as the mothers of the young
Javanese
women inmy own Her research thus offers an baseline for com
study. important
recent inwomen's roles with the situation a generation earlier.
paring changes
Hull began her article of economic modernization
by noting that models
assume that educational is to the status
widely expansion always beneficial of
women. Women's in is seen as conducive to
participation higher education
smaller in and most a
family size, participation family planning, generally,
more for women in the and is
egalitarian position family public life. Education
also linked, Hull observed, to rates of female
higher employment, membership
issues, as well as more informai interviews with teachers, and and

parents, religious community
leaders, for a total of more than 200 interviews.
4A notable and to this trend is the work of L. Peacock (1978).
important exception James
of the mothers of the women in my were from rural areas
5Many study surrounding Yogyakarta,
similarto those described byHull; some had moved to the cityas young brides.

in civic and the expansion of extrafamilial social participation (Hull

organizations,
1982, 78-79).
Hull went on to note that in to their counterparts in the Muslim
comparison
world and the premodern West, Javanese women have long played a prominent
role in the family and public life. For centuries, Javanese women have owned
farm land, operated small businesses, and had the right to initiate divorce.
When mass education first became broadly available in Indonesia in the 1950s,
there were few cultural to women's in
relatively impediments participation
that at the idealized level of expression,
schooling. Hull recognized Javanese
do tend to see the husband as the patriarchal head of the household.
However, as Hull also noted, in the less idealized of everyday fife, the
conduct
husband-wife is conceived as one of rather than
partnership complementarity
economic it is common in
subordination. In household matters, Java for rural
women to contribute substantially
to household income; many even take
the family budget. In addition, as other
primary responsibility for managing
researchers have noted, it is common in Java for both men and women to view
women as more resourceful and in the of money than
responsible handling
men (Hull 1982, 79; see also Brenner 1995; Geertz 1961; Keeler 1987; Smith
Hefner 1988).
summarized the conventional view of the status of women in
Java,
Having
however, Hull introduced a wrinkle into the account. The wrinkle concerns
the position of women in
high-status circles, especially among
members of the
traditional aristocracy and court elite, known as As the ranks of the colo
priyayi.
nial bureaucracy swelled with native administrators during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the category of priyayi was extended to include
not in state administration. Clifford
only aristocrats but all Javanese employed
Geertz (1960) identifiedthe priyayi as an importantsubculturalelite, distin
concern for the
guished by their Javanese arts, status-sensitive speech and
most important for the present discussion, their general lack of
etiquette, and,
interest in Islamic piety. Although later scholars would point out that, in fact,
many priyayi were pious Muslims (Bachtiar 1973; Woodward 1989), Geertz
the as relativists.
regarded priyayi mystical
To this summary portrait, Hull added the observation that the priyayi also
in their
differed from lower-status Javanese family and gender organization.
Unlike their rural counterparts, the demands of family honor for priyayi
women often that women remain secluded in their homes and not be
required
to the bustle of the public world. As these restrictions
exposed status-demeaning
illustrate?and as was made famous in the letters of the great Javanese
published
priyayi writer Kartini (now a heroine of Indonesian national culture; see Sears
1996; Tiwon 1996)?priyayi women were tomore severe social controls

subject
than their counterparts in other sectors of Javanese society. Priyayi girls were
with limited education and were often forced to marry at a
provided only
young age and to a husband chosen by theirparents (Cote 1995). Equally

394 Nancy J. Smith-Hefher
were not to engage in

important, priyayi girls supposed demeaning physical
labor, with the notable exception ofthat associated with the relatively prestigious,
home-based industry of batik cloth painting and production (Brenner 1999;
Gouda 1995; Hull 1982; Koentjaraningrat 1985). A young women's employment
in other was inconsistent with
enterprises priyayi status because extrafamilial
labor was regarded as a threat to her family's good name.
In women's in Java
evaluating gender ideology and employment during the
1970s, Hull discovered that rather than using education to
propel themselves
into women to be
heightened public activity, middle-class Javanese seemed
a
moving toward pattern of female domesticity
neo-priyayi and restricted
were access to formal edu
public participation. Although they provided with
cation and extrafamilial employment, women in the
emerging middle class
tended to be more, not less, focused on the household. Equally important,
rather than developing greater influence or equality in the family, the authority
of women in the new middle class seemed static or in decline (Hull
1982, 80).6
In fact, Hull's research found that women who worked outside the home
were criticism. The interviewees who made
frequently targets of biting social
these criticisms included not only members of the middle class but also village
women who were to work economic consensus
compelled by hardship. The
among these informants was that women who worked outside the home
could not care for their children. Hull discovered, then, that
adequately
middle-class women with the means to do so not to work outside the
opted
home so as to devote
themselves to childrearing and homemaking. Equally sig
nificant, these women also tended to have more children than their lower-class
counterparts. In short, among educated middle-class women, Hull saw a trend

toward heightened domesticity and social insularity rather than greater equal
were evidence
ity and public involvement. All of these trends, Hull concluded,
of diminished female autonomy and social "regress" rather than "progress"
(Hull 1982, 90).
Women and Contemporary Social Change
The young women who were the focus of my research in 1999 and the early
2000s were raised in a Java that was significantly different from that of their
women
mothers?the generation of described by Hull. Among other things,
Hull linked this pattern to several factors: the priyayi notion that is an index of lower-class
working
status, New Order state that identified women's role as that of wife and mother,
policies primary
and Western models of middle-class that represent women as contented homebodies
"modernity"
and consumers (Hull 1982). This New Order ideological representationof women as selfless
mothers and wives has been referred to as state "motherism" or "ibuism" and is discussed in
detail byMadelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis (1992) and Julia I. Suryakusuma (1996).

these young women have benefited from the educational policies of the New
Order government, which succeeded in edu
achieving near-universal primary
cation and dramatically increasing women's in and ter
participation secondary
tiaryeducation (Jones1994; Oey-Gardiner 1991). Between 1965 and 1990, the
40
percentage of young adults with basic literacy skills skyrocketed from
to 90 percent. The percentage of youths completing senior
percent high
schoolgrew from4 percent tomore than30 percent (Hefner2000,17). Although
continue to consider
female enrollments lag those of males, the gap has shrunk
In 1971, there was a 48 excess of males over females in school
ably. percent
enrollmentsat the universitylevel;by 1990, thatgap had shrunkto 29 percent
(Hull and Jones 1994, 164-68). These educational developments have been
a substantial movement of women into the civil service and
accompanied by
professions.
This new women are also all of the compulsory reli
generation of graduates
courses conducted in all Indonesian schools. Since 1967, two to three hours
gious
of religious education each week has been a state-mandated feature of Indone
sian education from school through For Muslim students, these
grade college.7
courses have focused on basic tenets of Islamic doctrine and
teaching practice
while considerable success, it seems?those aspects of
undermining?with
Javanisttradition(kejawen) that are regarded as polytheistic (syrik)and thus
incompatiblewith Islam (Hefner 1993; Liddle 1996).
In the since Hull's
twenty-five years study, the Islamic resurgence has offered
women a if to both the neo
young Javanese powerful, complex, alternative
priyayi and modernization models of gender. The phenomenon of veiling is
indicative of this change. Bather than an icon of Islamic traditionalism or antimo
dernization, formost middle-class Muslims, veiling is a symbol of engagement in

a modern, albeit world. Although itsmeanings are varied and con
deeply Islamic,
tested, for most Muslim women, veiling is an instrument for heightened piety
and public participation rather than domestic insulation. Equally significant,
Muslim women themselves often contrast this pattern of Muslim mobility to
what they identify as traditional priyayi values, which they describe as confining,
even "feudal" (f?odal) (Dzuhayatin2001).
At the same time, however, the cultural terms for this heightened partici
as well as its differ from those offered to
pation, practical consequences,
women in the West. The difference suggests that the
postfeminist relationship
of the individual to society in general and of female sexuality to religious commu
in can be in a manner that is
nity particular organized significantly different from
that of women in modern Western or liberal societies. Modernity, we are
reminded, ismultiple in its

meanings and organizations, not least of all when it
In some it should be the was not until the

parts of Indonesia, noted, regulation implemented
mid-or even late 1970s.

comes to gender (cf.Abu-Lughod 1998; Haddad and

Esposito 1998;Mahmood
2005; Ong and Peletz 1995).
The Politics of Veiling
One reason that Hull

and other scholars a generation ago tended to overlook
the Islamic resurgence across Indonesia in the 1970s is that their
taking place
research focused on in rural as to urban
developments opposed Java. Had Hull
her in the universities around in the
begun study Yogyakarta rather than villages
outside of town, she might have a
gotten significantly different impression.
Although in the firstyears of the 1970s, theywere stilla minority influenceon
campus, Muslim student groups such as the Islamic Student Association
(Himpu
nan Mahasiswa Islam) and other mosque-based associations were
already well
established on urban and they were to
campuses, beginning implement ambi
tious programs of religious (dakwah) to their fellow students (Collins
"appeal"
2004; Kraince 2003).
At Gadjah Mada University in the late 1970s, there was a new
spirit of Islamic
activism that, rather than just
emphasizing prayer and religious study, sought to
Islam it to social and stu
de-privatize by linking political transformation. Muslim
dents
sponsored scholarship programs for poor village youth, sent proselytization
(dakwah) teams into and villages, for
neighborhoods organized cooperatives
transportation and health services, and most generally, developed a cadre of acti
vists dedicated to the "Islamization" of student life. Muslim activists associated
with the Salahuddin in
campus mosque, particular, took the lead in coordinating
the stated-mandated
religious classes required of every university student.
Although the student-run instruction conformed to official curricula, student
activists used these forums to recruit new members and to
challenge
the state's of Islam (Madrid 1999; Rahmat and
depoliticized understanding
Najib 2001).
The new Islamic activism in the wake of in
emerged far-reaching changes
campus life. After 1978, the Soeharto-led New Order government enacted
laws aimed at "campus normalization" that
effectively prohibited explicit political
on campus. These laws
activity unwittingly benefited Muslim and other religious
groups because state controls less heavily on
weighed religious organizations than
they did secular bodies. the full brunt of state restrictions,
political Spared
Muslim student organizations were well to take of the
positioned advantage
antiregime mobilization that swept university campuses
during the final years
of Soeharto's reign (Hefner 2000; Kraince 2003; Madrid 1999). Young women
activists in a on
jilbab became familiar sight the front lines of the demonstrations
thateventuallybrought down the regime inMay 1998. Veiling offeredfemale
activists from threats of violence
symbolic protection during prodemocracy
rallies. It was also intended to to the
public that the students'
cause was
signal

a moral one, not merely a matter of power (Madrid 1999; Bahmat and
politics
Najib 2001). For young women activists, then, veiling was not a symbol of
Islamic traditionalism or domestic confinement but a vehicle for
heightened
mobility and public political activism (Brenner 2005; cf. Mahmood 2005;
White 2002).
Until 1991, theNew Order governmentprohibitedveiling in government
offices and in state schools. Indonesian school children and all
nonreligious
wear standard uniforms of a color, style,
government employees designated
and fabric. For women and girls, these uniforms have long consisted of a
a short-sleeved blouse or Prior to 1991, there was
knee-length skirt and jacket.
no veiled option for students or government Women
long-skirted, employees.
who veiled in opposition to the state's policy faced discrimination and the deri
sion of their fellow students, and coworkers. Even more serious,
employers,
theyfaced thepossibilityof expulsion fromschool or the loss of theirjob.9
When the restrictions on veiling were lifted, many students
reported that
came under pressure from their classmates to the veil in
they adopt protest
earlier restrictions. Interviewees that at some
against government reported
entire Muslim
high schools, virtually the female student
body adopted the veil
in a matter of in the weeks that followed, some women
days, although began
to reevaluate their decision.10
Not all were to veil.
Javanese parents happy with their daughters' desire They
feared veiling would mark their daughters as nonconformists, hinder their
chances for employment, and make it difficult to attract a marriage partner (cf.
Brenner 1996). Some of the most vigorous opposition to came from
veiling
8The decision to allow high school students towear thejilbab to school (SK No. 100/C/Kep/D/
1991) was issued by theDepartment of Education and Culture on February 16, 1991, and was
meant to take effect in the 1991-1992 school year in to my inter
(beginning July 1991). According
views, however, even after its announcement in school districts were slow to
Jakarta, many outlying
the new
implement regulation.
9For a detailed social
history
of the
struggle
over
veiling
in state schools in the
greater Jakarta
high
Bogor region,seeRevolusi Jilbab (TheHeadscarf Revolution) byAlwi Alatas and FifridaDesliyanti
(2002). For an insightful
account ofveiling inYogyakartaand Surakarta in theearly 1990s,when the
practice was still relatively uncommon, see Suzanne A. Brenner (1996).
?The of one student from Mada illustrates the often uneasy
experience Gadjah University
dynamics of thischange. Yayuk adopted thejilbab in 1993 when shewas inher second year at a
public high school.Prior to thattime,and despite thenew Jakartaregulation,itwas common knowl
that the school master the veil. In response, and three other
edge opposed girls' wearing Yayuk girls
wrote a letterofprotest to the school authorities."Girls inJakartahad alreadyprotested to theMin
ister of Education in 1990 and were allowed to wear
the veil," said "Our school was late in
Yayuk.
its because itwas in an isolated A few weeks
changing policy region of Java." later, the school master
relented, allowing the to wear veils. of the and twenty of
girls Upon hearing policy change, Yayuk
her classmates came to school A few months later, the school adapted an official
wearing jilbab.
alternate, Islami or "Muslim uniform that consisted of a headscarf, a blouse,
style," long-sleeved
and a long, ankle-length skirt.During this same period, Yayuk explained, the number of veiled
students fell as to realize the seriousness of their decision and pressure
girls began experienced
from parents.
disapproving

families in which one or both parents were as civil servants

employed (pegawai
As of the state, civil servants bore the brunt of policies
negeri). representatives
the early New Order that neither rewarded nor
during encouraged public
government employees interviewed after the collapse
piety. Many middle-aged
of Soeharto's New Order inMay 1998 acknowledged theirpersonal debt to
A surprising number admitted that they,
government programs and pensions.
too, had agreed with the government's earlier of "radical" or
suspicion
"fanatic" Islam and, as a result, were initially opposed
to
veiling (Alatas and
Desliyanti 2002; Brenner 1996).
The 1990s marked the of the Islamic resurgence, and many young
early peak
activists derided the Soeharto government as anti-Islamic. However, thiswas also
a time when the Soeharto to deflect criticism con
regime attempted by courting
servative Muslims and then using regime support for Islam to split the prodemoc
racy opposition (Collins 2004; Hefner 2000; Liddle 1996). As government

became Islam friendly, then, pressures to veil as a symbol of anti
more
policies
In fact, as Soeharto sought to wrap himself in
government protest diminished.
the garb of conservative Islam during his last years, some critical women activists
to insist that was if linked to demands for demo
began veiling only meaningful
cratic reform.11
"Becoming Aware"
to veil as a solidarity dimin

Although pressures symbol of antigovernment
ished with Soeharto's in May 1998, the number of veiled women
resignation
on in and other university cities continued to
college campuses Yogyakarta
as came to realize that not nega
grow. Moreover, Javanese parents veiling did
or
tively affect their daughters' friendships, employment opportunities, marriage
came to view as a a
prospects, many veiling positive phenomenon, expressive of
of the of her faith. In
young woman's deeper understanding requirements fact,
several previously disapproving mothers whom I interviewed in 1999 and 2000
insistedin laterdiscussions that theyhad been "awakened" (tergugah)by their
As a result, they had begun serious study of Islam (penga
daughters' example.
taken up the veil themselves.
jian) and had
In interviews, the majority of young women from secular institutions such as
who have made the commitment to veil report that they
Gadjah Mada University
did so between the ages of seventeen and nineteen, just prior to or during their
first year of university classes. Almost without exception, these women describe
their decision in
pietistic and personal rather than social or political terms, a
result of a deepening a aware"
religious understanding, "becoming (menyadari)
11Comments to this effect were made inmy interviews with young affiliated with
repeatedly people
*
various Muslim women's and nongovernmental organizations.
organizations

of their religious The terms use to describe their

responsibilities.1 they
are those learned in Quranic classes, and
experience religion study groups,
Muslim student associations teach that,
campus religious circles (haiaqah).
a cover her
under Islam, woman's religious responsibilities require that she
to include all parts of the
aurat?typically understood body except the face
and the hands?in the presence of men who are not muhrim or close kin.13
worn a headscarf as a
Even young women who may have briefly part of religious
school uniform cited a changed religious awareness as their reason for deciding to
wear it
continuously.
Oci,14 a student in her second year at Gadjah Mada University, describes her
to veil in terms. She says that she
decision just such personal and pietistic began
towear the veil consistently at the beginning of her second semester of college. A
fewyears earlier, she had attended a modernistMuslim (Muhammadiyah)high
school where female students were required
towear the headscarf as
part of their
school uniform, but were allowed to take it off after classes?and most
they
students did.
After a while we we wear it all the

(menyadari) that
realized really should
time. The Qur'an women should wear the veil. But
strongly suggests that
most of us wore it to school and on the way home we took it off. I
only
started thinking seriously about wearing it
consistently during my first
semester in I was hesitant the religious conse
college, but because
are
quences very heavy (konsekuensinya sangat berat). I just couldn't
decide. Finally, I did a specialprayer thathelps you to choose between
two After that I decided to wear it and
things, the sholat Istikharah.
I've worn it ever since.
As Oci notes, the ethical standards and behavioral restrictions associated with
are most Muslims to as
veiling weighty, and regard the decision adopt the veil
a divide. It is widely held, for example,
something of great behavioral that
veiled women should not be loud or boisterous; hold hands with a member of
sex is her fianc?); go out in
if he
the opposite (even public after evening
caf?s or clubs; wear or
prayers; patronize makeup fingernail polish; smoke,
dance, swim, or wear or ride on the back of a motorcycle
tight clothing;
on to an unrelated male driver. When a young woman in
holding jilbab violates
any of these prescriptions, she exposes herself to
public moral censure, severe
in some cases. She may be friends, and
reprimanded by family members,
women the commitment to veil also make a commitment to

12It goes without saying that who make
abide by thefivebasic pillars of Islam, inparticular,to carryout dailyprayers (sholat)and an annual
fast
month-long (puasa).
13In normative terms, this includes all men, with the exception of one's husband, father, father-in
law, sons, one's own male slaves, male servants who have no desires
stepsons, brothers, nephews,
are too sex (Shahab 2003, 55).
toward women, and young
boys who young to understand
14To protect their all names are nicknames or
privacy, respondents' pseudonyms.

or she may even be on the street. Most

coworkers, challenged by total strangers
who decide to veil are told that after doing so, they should be
importantly, those
konsisten dan konsekuen, "consistent and responsible in their behavior," and
must
pakai terus,
"wear it continuously"?that is, not put it on one day and
take it off the next.15 In fight of these expectations, most young women think
and hard before the veil. Those who do not veil describe themselves
long donning
as "not to commit to the standards and
yet ready" (belum siap) weighty ethical
behavioral restrictions of veiling.16
Because is considered a serious personal and religious commitment,
veiling
women to veil is influenced
resist the suggestion that their decision by social
or environmental such as those made or fianc?s.
pressures, by boyfriends
that such pressures exist, women insist that the most
Although acknowledging
on their decision to veil is God's commands as
important influence expressed
in the of Islam. Young women insist that
religious responsibility
must
teachings
be individually embraced in order to be truly significant, and they reject the
notion that the obligation should ever be
imposed.1
Veiled Insecurities
normative awareness and

Despite this widely
accepted script of religious
personal transformation, it is clear from interviews and life histories that, in
a in the decision of
fact, social pressures and incentives do play significant role
many young women to veil.
Among the most critical influences are those
to is that at Gadjah Mada
related campus life. One striking index of this fact
University, the proportion of women veiling
increases dramatically between
1
The seriousness of the commitment is reflected in the stated intentions of young women who
have made the decision to veil, who that, "God will wear the
uniformly reported willing," they
veil until theydie.
new is associated with students, white-collar
16For these reasons, among others, the veiling widely
workers, and the middle class that are seen as the time for reli
generally?groups widely having
and a consistent with its
wearing.
For similar reasons, the majority of poor
gious study lifestyle
women who labor as domestics do not wear the headscarf. These women
working-class typically
that they do not veil because of the of their and clean
explain physical requirements jobs?cooking
call for and ease of movement. In addition to these reasons,
ing?which practicality "practical"
however, it is worth that women view the behaviors associated
noting poor generally religious
with committed five times a not out unescorted after evening prayers,
veiling (prayer day, going
as lives.See Lind
fasting,and religious study) simplyincompatiblewith thedemands of theirdaily
for an interesting account of Indonesian workers in
quist (2004), however, veiling among migrant
an area of social
rapid change.
With the exception of some female members of the women's of the conservative Islamist
wing
organization, theMajelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Council of Indonesian JihadFighters), the
women I interviewedstronglyopposed the idea of imposed or enforced veiling and pointed to
Aceh as an of how enforced does not work. cited reports of women
example veiling They simply
areas where is in order to avoid harass
donning headscarves when entering those veiling required
ment Muslim and them off as soon as they leave the enforcement zones.
by religious police taking

the first year of schooling and later female students describe them
years.18 Many
selves as
having been confused and
insecure when they first came to the univer
its
sity and experienced overwhelming freedom and diversity. Campus religious
organizations, friends and family members, religious teachers, and Islamic pub
lications all reinforce a message of the dangers of free interaction between the
sexes and press the case for as the solution.
veiling
For many young women, is the first sustained
college period away from home.
Most women who live away from home take up residence in rental rooms or
women
boarding houses (kost) with other students. Surprisingly, these boarding
houses have few regulations concerning male guests or curfew hours.19 Although
in the 1970s, the convention was that owners would arrange for
boarding house
live-inhousemothers (ibu kost)for each of theirrentalproperties, in the 1980s,
the requirement came to be widely disregarded. During those years, the combi
nation of a and liberalizing social trends leftmost
booming student population
with little or no adult
boarding houses supervision. Today, what regulation
there is in boarding houses often comes from the young female residents them
selves, and standards vary considerably from house to house.
Even for young women who continue to live at home, participation in
college
courses involves a lengthy commute alone or with a friend on a bus or
typically
motor scooter. In the course of commuting, young women
point out, they
come into close proximity of many young male strangers. Women report that
young men on motor scooters pose a At
particular problem. stop lights, Yogyakar
ta's intersections are with scooters, the majority driven
clogged by young males.
Some of those young men take clear pleasure in the freedoms of urban living and
feel few of the inhibitions on interaction with young women that in
apply village
or women that in environ
neighborhood settings. Young complain unsupervised
ments such as these, they are vulnerable to unwelcome advances and even
phys
ical harassment. Veiling, many young women insist, offers a significant symbolic
defense against unwelcome male advances while nonetheless
allowing young
women to their freedom of movement (cf. 1973).
enjoy Papanek
For their own part, women
widely report that veiling helps them feel "calm"
more in control of their in inter
(tenang) and feelings and behavior, particularly
actions with members of the opposite sex. Others describe more "self
feeling
assured" (lebih pe-de/percaya diri) about speaking up in class or asking questions
when male students are present. Yet others describe the veil as a constant
18AninformalsurveythatI conducted inAugust 2001 atGadjah Mada Universitycompared veiling

among students who had come to campus to take the entrance exam and students
returning
who had come to register for classes. The results revealed that the percentage of returning students
who veiled was twice thatof studentsapplyingforadmission.
19Women students who made the decision to take up the veil at and those who
younger ages typi
came to for school and found themselves in a similar either
cally Yogyakarta high predicament,
livingalone in a boarding house orwith distant relativeswithwhom theydid not feel fullyat ease.

one that helps keep them from overstepping the bounds of

physical reminder,
moral propriety.
These themesof heightened self-confidence and moral self-control run
narratives I collected from young women. While
through all of the veiling they
that certain limitations on their behavior, those who
recognize veiling imposes
have made the commitment to veil say their decision carefully
they weighed
and view the limitations as positive, not negative. While framed by women as
first and foremost a personal moral commitment, the "new veiling" neutralizes
at least some of the tension that young women experience between urban
itsmoral threats.
living's freedoms and
Contesting Interpretations
women interviewed?veiled or not?are aware

Virtually all of the young keenly
of the moral ambiguities of modern urban life.Nonetheless, there is a category of
women who indicate that view the act of in notice
Javanese consistently they veiling
terms. In women in my the
ably less self-conscious particular, the sample from
Sunan National Islamic University, most of whom are of
Kalijaga graduates
Islamic boarding schools have a different attitude
(pesantren), surprisingly
toward veiling than young women who come from less religious or secular back
A of National Islamic University students come from
grounds. higher proportion
traditionalist Muslim families, in particular, those with ties to Indonesia's largest
Muslim the Nahdlatul Ulama (Feillard
organization, thirty-five-miUion-strong
women fromthese families
1995). Raised indeeplypious (santri)Muslim families,
are farmore at the nondenominational Gadjah Mada
likely than their counterparts
to have socialization in their
University undergone rigorous religious early years.
Rather than being associated with a conversion-like experience in young adulthood,
thewearing of the veil (typically the less enveloping version known as the kerudung)
for these women is a normalized feature of early childhood.
at Islamic live and study segre
Girls boarding schools (pesantren) typically
from boys (Dhofier 1999). The recitation of the Qur'an and the study of
gated
the traditions of the (in Indonesian, hadits) and traditionalist religious
Prophet
commentaries (kitab kuning, literally "yellow scriptures") are elements in
key
a com
their education. The veil has always been part of their school uniform and
them as an anak soleh, "pious youth." For these young
munity life, marking
women, then, the veil is not a symbol of a religious transformation or a break
with an impious past but rather a comfortable symbol of their identity as obser
vant members of the traditionalist Muslim community. Ironically, however,
because it is such a naturalized part of their upbringing, the veil's
precisely
salience for these young women is less marked than it is forwomen
ideological
who have undergone a conversion-like passage to
veiling.
Now a first year student at the National Islamic University, Uul started
the kerudung at age five. She recounts, "I wore it to school and whenever
wearing

I went far away from the house. I didn't think about it.All of my sisters and my
friends wore it and my aunts and my mom did too so I wanted towear it. It was
tradition. Now it just feels more comfortable to veil; it's a part of my
identity."
Her roommate Nung in the pesantren, the veil was not
explains that wearing
was or even discussed; it was a normal
something that problematized just
feature of pesantren life. "When I was in the pesantren, we didn't
really
discuss wearing the jilbab. We more time for
spent talking about, example,
Islamic laws or as mar
surrounding buying and selling maybe, regards women,
course we had to wear the veil. It was
riage and divorce. Of required, but
we
just didn't talk about it in any detail."

In contrast to their veiled counterparts from secular school most
backgrounds,
of these women report that they
never had to make an
anxiously self-aware
decision to veil. important, their commitment to is colored
Equally veiling by
fewer political overtones than is the case for, so-called women raised
born-again
in
nominally Islamic (abangan) families. The latter tend to see veiling as part of
a a
religious transformation, the result of lengthy process of deliberation and
turmoil, sometimes political, sometimes pietistic, often both. In contrast, for
Muslim women from traditionalist is an
backgrounds, veiling important but
largely taken-for-granted element of their religious upbringing and community.
A small but vocal
minority of students in this group question not only the
motivations of those who have to veil but also the
recently chosen meaning
and necessity of itself. In and student
veiling public meetings publications,
these neotraditionalist activists ask whether the stricter forms of
veiling promoted
an effort to
by militant student groups represent impose "Arab culture"
on Indo
nesian women, who own authentic tradition of
already have their veiling and
A few even whether it is for Muslim women to
modesty. question necessary
veil at all. In this it is
regard, interesting that the most assertively feminist of
Muslim women in come not from the
young Yogyakarta consistently campus of
the secular
Gadjah Mada University but from the National Islamic
University,
where the great majority of students are from Muslim
staunchly backgrounds.
Indeed, in Indonesia as a whole, Muslim feminism is
primarily
a
phenomenon
of young and women from traditionalist Muslim families, only sec
middle-aged
or or secular Muslims.20
ondarily distantly associated with modernist
A student at the National Islamic
fourth-year University, Irma exemplifies
many of these qualities of the traditionalist Muslim student. Irma attended a
affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama on the north coast of
pesantren Java and is
now her bachelor's thesis in Quranic
finishing interpretation. Irma is well
known on campus as a student activist and Muslim feminist.
Although she has
20I use the term "Muslim feminist" or "feminist Muslim" because, these women are
although
concerned with of most as too individualistic
aspects gender equality, reject Western feminism
and do not accept theWestern feministcritique of the
family (see also Dzuhayatin 2001; Van
Doom-Harder 2006.).

worn the veil since childhood and says that it is a valued part of her upbringing,
she has recently taken to wearing it less consistently. She has "a problem," she
with the notion that women should wear the veil in order to
explains, prevent
men from their base desires and She whether it is
pursuing sinning. questions
the responsibility of women to control men and asks, "Why can't men control
themselves?" Like some other Muslim feminist activists, Irma still wears the
veil when necessary?for example, when
attending classes, religious services,
or other formal On other occasions, however, she engages inwhat
gatherings.
she describes as "social protest" and puts aside the veil entirely.
Figure 1. Muslim boarding school students.

As I have mentioned,the religious training to which most young women

are which two hours of
includes instruction mandated in
exposed, religious
all state schools, teaches that it is the of Muslim
responsibility (kewajiban)
women to cover their aurat. The most often cited in support
argument
of veiling is that the Prophet Muhammad instructed his wives to veil
for their protection and to identify themselves as "good, pious" women (see
Al-Ghifari 2002, 15; Asy-Syayi 2000, 42; Shahab 1993:59). Moreover, it is
in men to women who do not veil sin them
said, inviting temptation and sin,
selves. This widely cited normative view
places responsibility for male lust
on women.
squarely
Both arguments are to women like Irma who come from con
objectionable
Muslim toMuslim femin
fidently pious backgrounds but find themselves drawn
ist ideas. In
public forums on women's issues, Irma points out that veiling is no
protection against sexual violence and rape. Invoking what she describes as
Islamic principles of egalitarianism, she points out that the claim that women
should veil for their own the view that any
protection unwittingly promotes
woman who does not veil deserves to be harassed. Irma and other Muslim fem
inist activists insist that "what's most
important is the veil in one's heart" (jilbab
hati), that is, the purity of one's faith.What's outside (the particular form of one's
attire) doesn't matter?so as it ismodest. women
long, of course, Although young
like Irma accept that are own
they responsible for controlling their sexuality, she
and her friends reject the idea that
they should be held responsible for the

Figure 3. High school students inMuslim uniform.
behavior of men. "Men's weaknesses should be addressed by men,

not
by sacrifi
cing the freedom ofwomen!" The decision to veil, Irma insists,must never be the
result of male pressures or gender
inequality.
Holdouts
Of course, not all Muslim women choose to veil; a min

university significant
were in the
ority still do not. Twenty years ago, members of this group majority,
but their numbers have declined precipitously. Dina, a farm technology student
at Mada University and the daughter of nominally Muslim
Gadjah (abangan)
is representative of these
parents, nonveiling holdouts.
Dina is from an industrial town to the north of
Yogyakarta, where her father
works for the state Department of Small Businesses and her mother is a

Figure 4. A veiled motorcyclist.
Dina describes her parents as "still Javanist" (masih kejawen). She

pharmacist.
says that throughout her childhood, her parents stressed the importance of
as the head of the family, using
respecting her father's position undisputed
refined Javanese speech (kromo) to address elders, and appreciating the tra
ditional arts. Dina has studied classical Javanese dance since she was a child
and continues to perform at weddings and cultural events.
Dina does not wear the veil.21 She says that she is "not yet ready"
and then admits that she may never be. She says simply that she feels that
"we don't need to depend on the veil to differentiate good women from bad;
what's important iswhat's inside." She cites the example of young women who
wear the veil and go to dance clubs and caf?s. the value of the jilbab.
"They lower
I think veiling is a positive symbol, but only ifthose who wear itbehave responsibly."
are not members of the most measures,
Although they Javanese nobility, by
Dina's
family would be considered members of Java's bureaucratic elite, the
priyayi, of the family's appreciation

because for Javanese arts, their status as
attitude toward reli
government employees (pegawai negeri), and their casual
matters. Like many of her generation, however, Dina has come to dis
gious
tance herself from many of the priyayi elements in her She
background.
insists, for example, that although she plans to work after college, she has no
interest inworking for the state because of its associations with patrimonialism.
dancers who take up the veil must because of the dance tradition's
21Javanese stop performing
costumes and sensual dance movements, both of which invite the male gaze.
form-revealing

|?|a^#ftS>:???te::::
t?F>
% -}; :
Figures 5 and 6. women inMuslim uniform.

Working

Figure 7. A stylish shopper.
to have a more democratic her

She also says that she hopes relationship with
children than she had with her parents?for example, by using Indonesian
rather than Javanese and insisting on her husband's active participation in
child care, something that amounts to a conscious rejection of the unequal
status relations inherent in the priyayi worldview.
On matters of Islam, likemost of the young women whom I interviewed with
a Dina also has no interest in?and even
nominally Islamic family background,
objects to?her parents' continuing performance of many Javanist traditions,
such as the presentation of ritual offerings to one's ancestors. She says,
is religious education and their

Although my family Muslim, my parents'
of Islam aren't that deep. For on a certain
understanding example,
evening during Bamadan [the Islamic fasting month], my mom puts out
ancestors (leluhur). I know from my own
offerings for the religion classes

Figure 8. Funky headscarves.
that it's not allowed to do that. One time my

musyrik (polytheism); you're
mother was me to pray over the
menstruating and asked offerings. She
wanted me to invite the ancestor spirits to come and enjoy the
offerings.
I said, I recited a different prayer. I asked God to
"okay," but forgive my
as well as the sins of
parents my ancestors. Then I ate the offerings myself!
Dina's to comments are illustrative of

objections veiling aside, her general trends
among the younger generation of what was once the least Islamized segment of
the Muslim student population. The influence of the Islamic resurgence is
today
even these once
powerfully apparent. By comparison with twenty years ago,
nominal or secularist Muslim students are today eager to appear to
responsive
Islam's normative demands.22
For a of Islamization and the decline of in the 1990s, see

survey analysis demographic Javanism
SaifulMujani (2003).

Figure 9. Jilbab and jeans at themall.
Beyond the Veil
Contemporary social developments other than veiling have had an equally

dramatic impact on young Muslim women's lives, though their effect may be
less immediately apparent. Many of these to do with increased
developments have
educational and employment opportunities that were not available to women a
generation ago (cf. Smith-Hefner 2005). Most of the young women I interviewed
are among the first generation of women in their families to receive a
college
Ina, for is a student at Mada
degree. example, fourth-year Gadjah University.
Her mother never she was forced by her
completed high school because
parents into an at the age of seventeen. her
arranged marriage Despite
limited schooling, Ina's mother has all of her to put off
encouraged daughters
marriage and continue their education; her two oldest have
daughters graduated
and are now in
working Jakarta. Ina, like the majority of young, middle-class
women to finish her
today, also intends university studies before marrying.
She says that not to do so is unthinkable:
"People would say, Kok kawin
masih mudahl 'How come she's marrying, she's so
young!'" Moreover, when
she and her friends do marry, itwill be to a man of their
they fully expect
own
choosing.
Consistent with this stated intention, the statistics on age at firstmarriage in
Indonesia continue to rise with increasing levels of education. Age at marriage
is
increasing for both males and females, but it is rising most dramatically for
females (Blackburn 2004; Jones 1994; Oey-Gardiner 1991). In a related devel
opment, the percentage of marriages arranged is also In my
by parents falling.

own survey of 200 university students, females cited age as the ideal
twenty-five
cited In the same survey, only 11 percent
age formarriage; males twenty-eight.
of women reported that their parents hoped to arrange their marriages,
whereas 32 percent of their parents' marriages had been
arranged.23
Recognizing their lessening control over the choice ofmarital partner for their
over where the will live (Koning 2000)?
offspring?and, increasingly, newlyweds
to the importance of their
middle-class Javanese parents have begun emphasize
towork so that can take care of themselves and their chil
daughters being able they
dren if things should go wrong. Parents underscore the sacrifices they have made to
educate their children. The great majority also agree that for a young woman to get
a and then not towork would be an enormous waste of time and
college degree
state that want their
money (rugi sekali). Equally surprising, many parents they
to educate themselves and work "so that theywill not be too
daughters dependent
upon their husbands." This counsel, with its cool-headed assessment of
practical
women's vulnerabilities to unreliable husbands, stands in striking contrast to the
a
pattern that Hull reported generation earlier (Hull 1982).
or a women I interviewed report
Veiled not, full 95 percent of the university
that they expect to work both before and after marrying. Women echo the con
cerns of their parents. want to work so that so that won't be completely
They
on their husbands and so that their relationship will be "more
dependent
are also aware of the sacrifices their parents must make in order
equal." They
to finance their education; to repay some of that debt.
by working, they hope
Others plan to help in the educational a or other rela
support of younger sibling
tive. On a less idealized level, most young women also point out that in a modern
economy, a woman's income is to maintain a to a

required family according
reasonably middle-class standard.
All this is to say thatwomen who prefer not towork and plan to stay at home to
care for children, as Hull a are a
reported generation ago, today fast-dwindling
matter in cultural terms, many middle-class women have
minority. To put the
wind of a new narrative of personal and self-development. They
clearly caught
cite what they describe as the solitude and boredom of staying at home all
their mothers) and talk about their desires for "self-actualization" and
day (like
This mix of indi
"realizing their potential." complex motives?monetary, religious,
vidualistic, and self-actualizational?reminds us that, like the Islamic resurgence as
a whole, influences that are responsive to both the
veiling has heterogeneous
desire for greater religious piety and the mobility and prosperity of the new
middle class (Hefner2000; see alsoMacLeod 1991; Ong 1990;White 2002).24
23These for the are very similar to those Hull. In her

figures parental generation reported by study,
accounted for 25 percent to 35 percent of the marriages among (rural) middle
arranged marriages
class women 1982, 88). These women would be of the same generation as the mothers of the
(Hull
women in my
college study.
24See Kenneth M. (1998) for a argument for the role of Indonesian arts and artists
George parallel
in the Muslim assertion of middle-class modernity.
promoting

New Trends, New Debates: Disco, Funky, and Caf? Headscarves
For reasons of
piety and protection, modesty and mobility, then, veiling has
become common among middle-class women.
increasingly Javanese By the early
2000s, the phenomenon had become so com
pervasive that students jokingly
mented that veiling had become a de facto for women
requirement attending
to the virtual sea of headscarves on the streets and campuses
university. Adding
in and around in 2002 and 2003, two univer
Yogyakarta, large private Muslim
sities introduced female students to wear to class. A
policies requiring jilbab
number of new, more explicitly "Muslim" enterprises?including several
banks, restaurants, nursery schools, bookstores, and food stores?have also

made for female employees. One
consequence of this
veiling mandatory
for headscarves has beenthe proliferation of stores
rapidly expanding market
and boutiques offering Islami clothing and a wide array of fashions.
Muslim-style
In a not unlike that which has occurred elsewhere in the Islamic
development
world,2 what was once a uniform of Islamic is
relatively piece apparel rapidly
diversified in a manner consistent with the differentiated
becoming religious
and class structures of contemporary Indonesia.
more new now seen in are those
Among the striking styles of veils Yogyakarta
made of expensive gauzy, silk, and chiffon fabrics with colorful, eye-catching pat
terns and embroidered lace or bead trim.When these new-style scarves are worn
with the ends wrapped around the chin and then tied behind the head in glamor
ous movie-star fashion, they are called variably disko (disco), kafe (caf?), gaul
(social), or fongki (funky) veils. In its boldest incarnations, this fashionable vari
ation on the theme may be complemented with tight jeans, open-toed
veiling
sandals, form-fitting blouses, or, in a few rare cases, even T-shirts
high-heeled
with
exposed midriffs. Commonly associated with wealthy young women who
attend expensive private schools and spend their leisure time shopping in Yogya
karta's modern malls, these new styles have encouraged veiling as a fashionable
trend (ngtren). The result has been not only a notable increase in numbers and
on and around campus but also as towhether
styles of veils increasing uncertainty
is indicative of commitment or a fashion
veiling actually religious merely
statement.
When I returned to in women students

Yogyakarta August 2002, reported that
this perceived flaunting of a key religious symbol had led to the emergence of
campus vigilante groups who were attempting to rein inwhat they considered to
be inappropriate behaviors on the part of young women in veils. Male militants
were to have women clad in stylish veils, as well as veiled
reported stopped
women out after or in the company of men who were
evening prayers walking
not close relatives. The militants would women
approach the and berate them
women were name of the jilbab." In some
with claims that the "besmirching the
White's excellent discussion of veiling inTurkey (White2002).

25Cf. Jenny

reported instances, women had their veils pulled off; in several cases, their male
were beaten. Muslim feminist activists I interviewed reported
companions they
no felt secure out late for also
longer staying political meetings. They complained
that they could not find male escorts willing to accompany them to their boarding
houses for fear of being accosted by members of these
groups.26
The new veils have also been the of bitter denunciations con
trendy target by
servative Islamist organizations such as the Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters
(MajelisMujahidin Indonesia,M MI), a group thatwas heavily involvedinbattles
with Christians in eastern Indonesia from 1999 to 2004 (see Hefner 2005). In an
interview that I conducted the group's executive director, Irfan Awwas, in
with
Awwas
stated that his organization
July 2003, bluntly regards the growing
trend toward the wearing of sexually alluring jilbab as a serious threat to the
Islamic social order for which the council is struggling. In their view, veiling is
a but important step toward the implementation of Islamic law (in
preliminary
Indonesian, syariah).
Awwas went on to remark that the MMI as a
regards the trendy headscarves
subterfuge
for deliberately anti-Islamic behaviors such as promiscuity, drinking,
In an
drug use, and prostitution. intentionally provocative statement, he said that
he considered the phenomenon to be part of a wider insti
conspiracy?possibly
gated by Christians and Jews, he added?to undermine Islam.2 He suggested
that the MMI was actions to counteract the "eroding"
considering taking
effects of improper veiling, but he declined to elaborate on
precisely what
those measures might entail.
Veiled Progress? Different Visions of Islam, Different Communities of
Engagement
different forms that Javanese veiling

Jilbab, kerudung, cadar, fongki?the
takes represent different visions of Islam, different constructions of community,
and different ways of engaging modern pluralism. Hardly a symbol of domestic
seclusion, for many middle-class Javanese, the "new veil"

or is a
jilbab symbol
of modern Muslim womanhood as in varied modern environments:
expressed
university campuses, government offices, big cities, and employment markets.
The new veil allows middle-class women to live away from home, attend
men
26These groups, purportedly
made up of young associated with the Gerakan Pernada Kabah
(Kabah Youth Movement), the youthwing of theUnity and Development Party (PPP), seem to
have largelydisappeared from the political scene by 2003 after a clamp-down by the police in
the aftermathof theBali bombing.
2
The view
that veils were introduced by Christians and Jews is an uncommon one, to say the
funky
least. Overthe course of the four years of my research, I never once heard any other person make
the claim. Although its to the was unusual, the theme of Christian and
application topic of veiling
Islam is nonetheless a one in the
Jewish conspiracies against pervasive publications sponsored by
MMI (see Hefner 2005).

school, work, and even have careers without opening themselves to the unwel
come advances of male It also women deal with their own inse
strangers.28 helps
curities while moving into what were, just a few years ago,
predominantly male
social spaces. For some politically minded young women, the veil also represents
a its images of women as fulfilled
rejection of Soeharto-era femininity, with
consumer-homemakers or nurturers of future citizens
self-sacrificing loyal
(Brenner 1996, 678). At the same time, middle-class women who veil visually dis
tance themselves from found in
popular depictions of modern "career women"
Indonesian novels and on television soap operas. Those depictions portray
woman as sexy
"temptresses" who sport the latestWestern fashions and place
theirglamorous jobs and lifestyles
above theirfamilies (Aripurnami1996).
For many young women from pesantren (Muslim boarding school) back
the less restrictive is a familiar and natural
grounds, kerudung symbol of their
connection to and identification with the traditionalist in which
community
were raised and educated. Some members of this group have embraced a
they
liberal, even feminist vision of Islam and of women's roles within it. Others
have joined the growing group of "born-again" Islamists and have
exchanged
their looser kerudung for the more severe and enveloping jilbab. In its least fash
ionable and most deliberately the new veil symbolizes the
unalluring form,
wearer's commitment not to a stricter norms but
only interpretation of Islamic
also to a disciplined community defined by pervasive controls on dress,
lifestyle,
and interactions with the opposite sex. The most militant participants in this com
to toe. None of
munity adopt the full chador, covering themselves from head
these groups, however, has a monopoly on the definition of Muslim
modernity,
nor has any to
yet been able control the continuing innovations and interpret
ations on women's
veiling and roles.
In to the a
responding then, question posed generation ago by Valerie Hull?
do changes in family patterns and women's roles among the educated middle
class represent progress or regress?we can now
quite confidently say that Java
nese Muslim women progress in the fields of education
have made considerable
and employment. Equally in the aftermath of the Islamic
important, however,
resurgence, women's roles have experienced social pressures entirely unantici
pated byWestern researchers in the early 1970s. Many of these trends are diffi
cult to map along a single scale of social progress, such as those widely used in
studies of development and modernization in the 1960s and 1970s. The
growing incidence of veiling is a of just such an

particularly poignant example
and culturally
unanticipated ambiguous change.29
What is clear is that years of religious education in Indonesian schools have
resulted in an enthusiastic embrace of some features of "Western-style"
2
The new veil is, inWilhelmina Jansen's terms, "workable" (Jansen 1998).
29Michael Peletz's book Islamic Modern (2002) offers an example of a pattern
similarly ambiguous
of social control and freedom in matters of Islam and in
sexuality Malaysia.

development and a heightened skepticism toward others. Equally important?

and long overlooked by many Western researchers?religious and professional
to
education have combined bring about widespread rejection of many of the
sexual and social customs once associated with
the elite culture of the Javanese
mar
priyayi: mystical practices, the cloistering of young women, early arranged
in the
riages, and hierarchical relations family.
At the same time, however, the proliferation of
religious organizations,
Islamic programs in the media, and study groups devoted to the question of
women in Islam indicates that the terms of Indonesia's Islamic resur
gender
are but settled. a
gence anything Veiling provides particularly striking example
of this unfinished transformation. The practice also serves as a reminder to
Western observers that however uniform it may appear from a distance, the
veil is, and will in its
likely remain, anything but uniform politics and sexual
meanings.
Acknowledgements
The materials reported on in this article are part of a larger project on Muslim Java
nese inYogyakarta, Central Java. Support for the
youth and contemporary social change
research in Indonesia was provided by a Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Grant and a
was
Spencer Foundation Small Grant. This write-up generously supported by the
National Endowment for the Humanities. I would like to thank Robert W. Hefner,
Ken George, Byron Good, Mary-Jo Delveccio Good, Pieternella van Doorn-Harder,
Michael G. Peletz, Ann Waltner, and three anonymous reviewers forproviding detailed
on earlier versions of this paper. I also
commentary and helpful suggestions for revisions
want to thank the Indonesian students who were so enthusiastic about my project and
to share their with me. In thanks to Laode Arham,
willing experiences particular, go
Astri Arnawengrum, Insaptriningsih, Eko Prasetyo, Hidayatut Thoyyibah, and Prasetio
Utomo for their insightfulobservations and assistance.
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Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto Indonesia

Author(s): Nancy J. Smith-Hefner

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

1970s and 1980s witnessed a

Nancy J. Smith-Hefner (smhefher@bu.edu) is an Associate Professor in the Department of

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

school students and on campuses in cities such as

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shoulders, with some the chest. The colors among reli

public employmentand theprofessions,heightened social and spatialmobility,

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that the new is neither a traditionalist survival nor an antimodernist reac

Models of Gender and Class in Java

A small on women and the family in Java

issues, as well as more informai interviews with teachers, and and

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in civic and the expansion of extrafamilial social participation (Hull

1996; Tiwon 1996)?priyayi women were tomore severe social controls

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

were not to engage in

counterparts. In short, among educated middle-class women, Hull saw a trend

(Hull 1982, 90).

Women and Contemporary Social Change

detail byMadelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis (1992) and Julia I. Suryakusuma (1996).

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

dernization, formost middle-class Muslims, veiling is a symbol of engagement in

reminded, ismultiple in its

In some it should be the was not until the

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comes to gender (cf.Abu-Lughod 1998; Haddad and

The Politics of Veiling

One reason that Hull

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

families in which one or both parents were as civil servants

racy opposition (Collins 2004; Hefner 2000; Liddle 1996). As government

to veil as a solidarity dimin

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of their religious The terms use to describe their

After a while we we wear it all the

women the commitment to veil also make a commitment to

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or she may even be on the street. Most

normative awareness and

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

18AninformalsurveythatI conducted inAugust 2001 atGadjah Mada Universitycompared veiling

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one that helps keep them from overstepping the bounds of

women interviewed?veiled or not?are aware

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

just didn't talk about it in any detail."

This content downloaded from 155.97.150.99 on Sat, 11 May 2013 14:26:24 PM

Figure 1. Muslim boarding school students.

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As I have mentioned,the religious training to which most young women

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Figure 3. High school students inMuslim uniform.

behavior of men. "Men's weaknesses should be addressed by men,

Of course, not all Muslim women choose to veil; a min

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Figure 4. A veiled motorcyclist.

Dina describes her parents as "still Javanist" (masih kejawen). She

priyayi, of the family's appreciation