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Over two thousand years ago, in The Republic, Plato famously referred to the “ancient
quarrel between philosophy and poetry” as part of his argument for banishing poets
from his ideal society. If it was already “ancient” then, clearly the vibrant, sometimes
heated dialogue between poetry and philosophy has a long history. Over the course of
two millennia, this conversation has taken many forms. Philosophers, for example, have
followed Plato’s lead and sought to distinguish their own mode of inquiry from poetry,
or even to elevate it above poetry as a higher pursuit. They have also approached poetry
philosophically, in terms of aesthetics, seeking to define and understand it as a
distinctive genre and human activity. Or they have longed to emulate the freedom,
creativity, and eloquence of poetry in their own field. For their part, poets have drawn
contrasts between poetic expression and philosophical thought, often privileging poetry
in the process. Or they have made claims for their own medium’s ability to be a potent
vehicle for philosophical investigation, or have wished for poetry to share the rigor,
precision, and gravitas of philosophy.
Obviously, this is a long and complicated story, and the list of poets who engage
philosophical themes, or whose work can be discussed in terms of philosophy, is nearly
endless. Few poems, however, address philosophy as explicitly and succinctly as “Uh,
Philosophy,” a poem by A. R. Ammons, written in about 1959, and published in the
collection Northfield Poems (1966). In fact, Ammons’s poem is a potent example of one
of the most recent manifestations of this old debate: the emergence of what I refer to as
“the philosophy poem.” This is a type of poem, written by a wide range of poets in the
20th and 21st centuries, that makes the conversation between poetry and philosophy
explicit. A “philosophy poem” not only explores philosophical problems, but directly
addresses philosophy as a field, depicts the act of reading philosophy, or takes pains to
contrast poetry and philosophy. Such poems frequently mention particular philosophers
by name, quote from philosophical texts, or address specific ideas and concepts from
works of philosophy.
At the same time, such poems rarely seek to present a straightforward treatise on
philosophical concepts. For example, Ammons’s poem is deliberately slippery and
contradictory, winding its way through syntactically complex phrases, doubts,
hesitations, self-corrections, and paradoxes. As such, it embodies an essential feature of
the broader category of “the philosophy poem”: such works are not designed to function
like an essay or scholarly argument, but rather to play out ideas in motion, to dramatize
intellectual debates and problems, and to chart how a mind might grapple with such
ideas and their effects upon our lives.
The philosophy poem moves to the fore in the modernist period: it can be seen in
innumerable poems by Wallace Stevens, like “To an Old Philosopher in Rome” (about
George Santayana) or “Description Without Place” (with its references to Nietzsche), in
William Butler Yeats’ “Among School Children” (with its reflection on Plato and
Aristotle), W. H. Auden’s “In Memory of Sigmund Freud,” or Delmore Schwartz’s poems
In the period since World War II, “the philosophy poem” has flourished to such an
extent that it seems to constitute a mini-genre all its own. Within this mode, poets
appeal to philosophy directly in order to take stock of specific philosophical ideas—often
new or fashionable ways of thinking—and to wrestle with the implications of those
concepts. Robert Hass’s celebrated response to the advent of post-structuralism and
deconstruction, “Meditation at Lagunitas” (1979), is exemplary:
Alongside this well-known example, one could place a whole array of poems, like John
Ashbery’s playful poem “My Philosophy of Life,” which begins:
Ashbery’s rambling, half-serious investigation turns on the lines “then you remember
something William James wrote in some book of his you never read,” ultimately
becoming more of a tribute to “the gaps between ideas” than philosophy proper.
The philosophy poem varies widely in terms of form, subject matter, theme, and
philosophies and philosophers addressed. The mini-genre ranges from Richard Wilbur’s
“Epistemology” to Robert Creeley’s “Reading of Emmanuel Levinas,” from Ann
Lauterbach’s “Platonic Subject” to David Shapiro’s “The Counter-Example” (which
responds to Gottlob Frege), from Philip Whalen’s quotations from Heraclitus in
“Sourdough Mountain Lookout” to David Lehman’s “Wittgenstein’s Ladder” or David
Kirby’s meditation on deconstruction in “Dear Derrida.” It includes, as well, any number
of book-length projects, like Rosmarie Waldrop’s encounter with Wittgenstein in The
Reproduction of Profiles or Susan Howe’s with Charles Sanders Peirce in Pierce-Arrow.
Over the past decade or two, such examples have seemed to multiply, including recent
poems like Erin Belieu’s “The Body is a Big Sagacity” (which addresses and responds to
Because Ammons’s poem “Uh, Philosophy” so pointedly and playfully reflects on the act
of reading philosophy and shows a speaker thinking his way through the implications of
certain philosophical ideas, it encapsulates many of the features of the philosophy poem
and seems to anticipate its flowering over the ensuing decades. It is hardly surprising
that Ammons, of all poets, would write such a poem, as he is generally considered one of
the most overtly philosophical of contemporary poets. Much like Wallace Stevens, who
devotes his entire body of poetry to ruminating on the relationship between imagination
and reality, Ammons’s poetry endlessly weighs, tests, and ponders the dialectical
tensions between a set of interconnected binaries. In Willard Spiegelman’s words,
“Ammons tells us over and over that his main theme, perhaps his sole one, is the
relationship between the one and the many, and this old pre-Socratic dichotomy, along
with variants (inside versus outside, up versus down, center versus periphery, freedom-
verging-on-entropy versus stability-turning-into-imprisonment), is his obsession” (112).
In poems, interviews, and essays, Ammons announces that his poetry is one long
meditation on the nagging philosophical problem of how to reconcile unity and
diversity, the general and the particular, abstract ideas and concrete particulars.
I understand
reading the modern philosophers
that truth is so much a method
it’s perfectly all
right for me to believe whatever
I like or if I like,
nothing:
I do not know that I care to be set that free
I am they say
at liberty to be
provisional, to operate
expediently, do not have to commit myself
to impeturbables, outright
legislations, hardfast rules:
they say I can
prefer any truths
whatever
suits my blood,
The poem suggests Ammons’s uneasy relationship with philosophy itself. Even the title
“Uh, Philosophy,” with its slangy stuttering, seems designed both to evoke and then
undermine the idea of “a philosophy” (as in “let me tell you about a philosophy I read
about”). With that initial “uh,” Ammons seems to ironically undercut the validity, the
efficacy, the grandeur of philosophy as a pursuit. In the end, the poem seems to pull
away from philosophy itself in favor of a kind of negative capability—an acceptance of
not-knowing, an embrace of the concrete sensuous world, that Ammons presumably
associates with poetry (as opposed to “philosophy” proper). Ammons articulates a
similar idea about the inutility of philosophical truths or absolutes in another well-
known early poem, “Gravelly Run”: “no use to make any philosophies here: / I see no /
god in the holly, hear no song from / the unbroken weeds: Hegel is not the winter /
yellow in the pines” (56).
But by doing so, Ammons does not really wash his hands of philosophy entirely. Instead,
he seems to throw his lot in with one particular branch of modern philosophy with great
importance to poetry: American pragmatism. Indeed, I read Ammons as a poet deeply
invested in the American pragmatist tradition—the lineage that stems from the more
grounded and skeptical side of the many-faceted Emerson, moves through the thought
of William James, Peirce, and John Dewey, to modernist poets like Wallace Stevens,
Robert Frost, and Marianne Moore, down to the “New American Poetry” of the 1950s
and beyond. In recent years, many critics have examined the influence of pragmatism on
modernist literature, and especially on American poetry. Following the lead of Richard
Poirier, critics have argued for pragmatism’s importance to modernist figures like Henry
James, Stevens, Frost, Moore, and Gertrude Stein, to the African-American tradition of
W. E. B. DuBois, Alain Locke, Ralph Ellison, and Amiri Baraka, to the jazz and blues
tradition, and to the postwar poetry of Frank O’Hara, John Ashbery, David Antin, Susan
Howe, and others. [1] But Ammons has been absent from those discussions, and his
“Uh, Philosophy” is a fairly early Ammons poem, one that catches him at a transitional
moment as he struggles to leave behind the mystical, visionary poems of his earliest
work and moves toward the more pragmatist outlook he would soon adopt. As they turn
away from the unity and finality of a monistic outlook and accept a universe of flux and
diversity, Ammons’s poems register a deep ambivalence about both the gains and losses
of such a view. For example, in the poem “Guide,” he acknowledges the dangers of any
unifying or totalizing view of the world: “you cannot come to unity and remain
material: / in that perception is no perceiver: / when you arrive / you have gone too far.”
But he also notes that this recognition is “the sin you weep and praise”—it is an
unsettling wisdom, one that makes the speaker simultaneously “glad and sad.”
To return to the poem’s opening stanza, when Ammons refers to modern philosophy’s
attitudes about “truth,” “method,” the will to “believe” in whatever one wishes, and
relativism, he immediately gestures toward key words and concepts of modern
philosophy, and especially to buzzwords from the pragmatist lexicon. It almost sounds
as if he has just read and set aside James’s chapters on “What Pragmatism Means,” “The
Will to Believe,” and “Pragmatism’s Conception of the Truth” (with its argument that
pragmatism “is a method only” and “does not stand for any special results”), or perhaps
a more recent text in dialogue with pragmatism, like Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and
Method.
Ammons invokes the pragmatist preference for plural truths and its skepticism of
monism and absolutes. At the same time, he also echoes the familiar (and much
debated) negative characterization of pragmatism as envisioned by its detractors—that it
is little more than a blithe endorsement of a profound relativism, a philosophy that
holds one can believe whatever one wants or even nothing at all. The poem
acknowledges that such a stance may be liberating, but also recoils from this perhaps
troubling notion and its ramifications:
to impeturbables, outright
legislations, hardfast rules.
Ammons again echoes some of the terms used to define, and at times criticize,
pragmatist philosophy as an outlook which calls for us to respond to the world
provisionally, and to view “truths” as merely expedient (“what in short is the truth’s
cash-value in experiential terms?” James famously asks).
To explain further the idea that truths grow out of the flow of experience rather than
existing eternally on some ideal plane of universal truth, Ammons seems to echo
James’s famous description of experience as a “blooming, buzzing confusion” we must
navigate moment by moment:
From these modern philosophers, Ammons says he has learned that “philosophy is / a
pry-pole, materialization, / useful as a snowshovel when it snows.” Although Ammons
presents this in a somewhat negatively charged manner, pragmatists have always argued
that philosophy should be a useful tool, to be employed in our everyday lives, rather
than considered a final answer that ends our quest for answers to irresolvable
metaphysical questions.
Noting that philosophy can also be used to “knock people down with / or back people up
with,” and that “the philosophy gives clubs to / everyone,” Ammons claims, “I prefer
disarmament.” In this way, the poet pulls back from the fray, the free-for-all quarrels of
philosophic debate in a post-“Truth” context. “Isn’t anything plain true” the poem
wonders rather poignantly. Well, no, the pragmatist would answer, not if you think
“true” means some lasting, permanent quality inherent in an idea or thing, rather than
something that happens to an idea in the course of experience.
Ultimately, Ammons’s poem seems to reel with queasiness, the vertigo that comes from
accepting the anti-foundationalism of modern philosophy:
if I had something
He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a
priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and
origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and
towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper
sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma,
artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth.
This privileging of facts, the close observation of concrete detail, and attentiveness to the
contingency and flux of experience become the hallmarks of Ammons’s poetry from this
point forward—a stance crystallized most succinctly and memorably in Ammons’s most
famous poem, “Corsons Inlet,” which he would write soon after “Uh, Philosophy”:
Within the realm of “Uh, Philosophy,” however, Ammons is less comfortable with the
notion that “there is no finality of vision.” He balks at the idea that experience and facts
must be revered above all else; the strictures of such a worldview seem too severe, too
constricting. These philosophers, he avers, insist that “I must halter my fancy / mare /
with these blinding limitations: / I don’t know that I can go along with that either” (96).
In “Uh, Philosophy,” Ammons, like James, seems to reject the idea of a philosophy
overly reliant upon facts and concrete observation. Even more so, he celebrates his own
reluctance to go into battle armed with the blunt “club” of philosophy in the first place:
In the end, he seems to elevate the imaginative freedom and creativity of the poet over
the intellectual combat of the philosopher:
At first blush this sounds like a defense of poetic license and creativity and a final
dismissal of philosophy. However, as Lieberman observes, Ammons ironically ends up
pretty much where the poem began—upholding the “freedom” to believe what one wants
to believe (to line up facts as one pleases). As the poem itself notes, this is the very
stance that he initially attributed to modern philosophy and “refused” at the start of the
poem (or at least that he thinks he rejected earlier). [2] By charting all the paradoxes
and uncertainties of the speaker’s dialogue with himself, the poem depicts a troubled
mind, one that is simultaneously suspicious of and attracted to the lessons of modern
philosophy.
This passage, like the hymn “Amazing Grace,” suggests the speaker once was blind but
now can see: he used to be trapped in a fruitless search for the absolute, but now has
found a philosophy that has released him from that quest. This philosophy has taught
him, as he hopes to teach others, to find “lovely liberation” in a view of the
“nothingness” that characterizes the world. As in many Stevens poems, like “Evening
Without Angels,” “On the Road Home,” or “The Latest Freed Man,” where human
beings see the universe de-divinized and are thereby freed to embrace its sensuous
particularity, here Ammons suggests that once the quest for “Truth” is relinquished, the
world becomes a glorious riot of particular details, each valuable in its own right. This
philosophy, which sounds an awful lot like pragmatism, “allows freedom to fall / back
from the thrust of the absolute into the world // so manifold with things and beings: the
hollyhock, / what a marvel, complete in itself: the bee, / how particular, how
nothingness lets him buzz // around…” (380).
Ammons’s direct contemplation of such philosophical themes paves the way for the
wealth of more recent “philosophy poems” that I discussed at the outset, which would
include Charles Wright’s “Reading Rorty and Paul Celan One Morning Early
June” (1995). Wright, like Ammons, tries on a philosophical concept, again drawn from
pragmatism (in this case from the neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty), and
weighs its implications for how we view the universe around us:
If sentences constitute
everything we believe,
Both Ammons and Wright, like Stevens before them, respond to pragmatist ideas about
truth, language, and perception, and examine how they might change our experience
and understanding of the sensual, concrete world. If there is no such thing as
transcendence, no single explanations, no complete perception or absolute truth, it is
less cause for despair or nihilism than for elation. Poets fueled by the insights of
pragmatism often resemble Stevens’s “Latest Freed Man”—“tired of old descriptions of
the world,” he woke up one day and “escaped from the truth,” only to discover
“everything being more real,” “everything bulging and blazing and big in itself” (187).
[1] For example, see Richard Poirier’s The Renewal of Literature and Poetry and
Pragmatism, Jonathan Levin, Ross Posnock, Timothy Parrish, Joan Richardson, Frank
Lentricchia, Lisi Schoenbach, and Paul Grimstad. For recent studies that focus
specifically on pragmatism and American poetry, see Andrew Epstein, Michael Magee,
Ann Marie Mikkelsen, Raphael Allison, and Kacper Bartczak.
[2] Ammons’s language is strikingly similar to Marianne Moore’s in this poem (as are its
oddly shaped stanzas)—more so than most other Ammons poems. Specifically, Ammons
echoes the themes and language of “In the Days of Prismatic Color” (which similarly
meditates upon “truth” and longs for “plain” verities: “complexity is not a crime, but
Works Cited
Ashbery, John. Can You Hear, Bird. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1995.
Lentricchia, Frank. Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, William James, Wallace
Stevens. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1988.
Posnock, Ross. Color and Culture: Black Writers and the Making of the
Modern Intellectual. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998.
Parrish, Timothy. Walking Blues: Making Americans from Emerson to Elvis. Amherst,
MA: U of Massachusetts P, 2001.
Wright, Charles. Negative Blue: Selected Later Poems. New York: Farrar, Straus, 2000.