RA 7160

1. Section 2
Case Digest: LCP VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176951 : February 15, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President

Jerry P. Treñas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and
JERRY P. TREÑAS, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,

v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;

MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF
SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON,Respondents.

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the
constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a
component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and
struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the
equal protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the
Cityhood Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws

First issue:

The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative
power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The
Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or
modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again
exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it
provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—
income, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed
modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very
intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for
these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.

R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the
exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also
amendments to the LGC itself.

Second Issue:

Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized
this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit
for cityhood up to the present.

The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are
declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND
LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.

Municipal Corporation – Local Autonomy – Imperium in Imperio

In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by Presidential
Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s
operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In
1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR
shall regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR.
They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection clause and b) it
violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to waive
its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D.
1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is
violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like
cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races
(RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited,
does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The
clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the
law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal
force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal
protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the
local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers)
as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as
Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes.
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and abolish municipal
corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can
also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its
shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened,
impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governments.

2. Section 6 and 7

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as
unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati
only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the
1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will
be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only
450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.

Municipality of Jimenez vs. Hon. Vicente Baz, Jr.

Posted on September 11, 2012
G.R. No. 105746
December 2, 1996
Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to Sec.
68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o
and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the technical dedcription
in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
Municipality of Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of Jimenez, in its answer,
nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban.
This agreement, which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its Resolution
No. 77 dated February 18, 1950, fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held
that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the parties was void since the Board had
no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being vested in Congress
pursuant to the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134. The Provincial Board denied the
motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC
of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial
Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and
the Executive Secretary.
Issues:
1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim
2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. 258 or in Resolution No. 77
of the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental which should be used as basis for adjudicating
Sinacaban’s territorial claim.
Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is
the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a
legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the
Municipality of Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as such by executive order is
later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be
questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporationwhere its legal
existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years
from the act complained of was done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years, yet the
validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that is apparently
desired for its revenue. The State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself has recognized
Sinacaban’s corporate existence. Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering
into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary.
The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part
of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban since it states that:
“Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances/executive orders and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.”
2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de facto status at the time the
1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only
to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution – it cannot be applied to
municipalities created before.
3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now barangays) therein
mentioned. What it says is that “Sinacaban contains” those barrios. The reason for this is that the
technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipality’s territory, is controlling. The
trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the
municipality & consequently to which municipality the barangays in question belong.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not the carrying into effect of the
law but its amendment – and a resolution of a provincial Board declaring certain barrios part of one or
another municipality that is contrary to the technical description of the territory of the municipality is
not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the
technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing
Sinacaban’s claim.
In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the
province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the Decision and
Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983, the governing law
when the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is Secs. 118-119, LGC of
1991 (RA 7160).
Jimenez’s contention that the RTC failed to decide the case “within 1 yr from the start of the
proceedings” as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and the 90-day period provided for
in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. Failure of a
court to decide within the period prescribed by law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case
but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.

3. Section 16

Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)

Posted on October 19, 2012
211 SCRA 464
G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G.
Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market
thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan
Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby
the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned
streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along
G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of
the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the
assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.

Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease & use
of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.

Held:
No.

J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads used for public
service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local
government devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles
already established by law.

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public
use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary for public use/service.
Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then
can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to the
public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use.
The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it can’t be considered approved by
the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions it imposed for the
approval of said ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution and
laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance
the public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of
the inhanbitants pf the local units.

As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the illegally
constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent municipality have the
corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific
public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its time.

ano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1,
1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government
of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying,
selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5
years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said
ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted
them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7
of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect
the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal
fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant
to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration,
development and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery
laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes
the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal
waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and
the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power,
the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioner
vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., respondent
POnente: Puno

Facts:

MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic

services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners of Bel-Air Villagee in
Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of the Neptune Street, a
road inside Bel-Air Village.
December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA requesting Bel-
Air to open Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day,
MMDA apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from
the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against Bel-

Air; and prayed for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining
Neptune St. and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
Court issued a TRO the next day.

After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary

injunction. MMDA question the denial and appealed to the CA. CA
conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune St. then issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA proposed action.

On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding MMDA

no authority to order the opening of Neptune St. It held that the
authority is in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.

Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening of Neptune
St. to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?
(2) Is passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA
may order the opening of subdividion roads to public traffic? (3) Is
Bel-Air estopped from denying the authority of MMDA? (4)Was Bel-Air
denied of due process despite the several meetings held between MMDA
and Bel-Air? (5) Has Bel-Air come to court with unclean hands?

MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent

of the Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it
follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first.

**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power

is lodged primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can
delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other
lawmaking bodies.

**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a

legislative body empowered to enact ordinances, approved resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality.

**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and

administrative region in 1995. And the administration of metro-wide
basic services is under the MMDA.Which includes, transport and
traffice management. It should be noted that MMDA are limited to the
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies and
installation of a system and administration. MMDA was not granted
with legislative power.

Ruling:
(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained
in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent
BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance
or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the
MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune St.

(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although
the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of
Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows
that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on
the present MMDA.

(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became
primarily responsible for the governance of their respective
political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to
addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended
local boundaries. It did not have legislative power.

Petition Denied.

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and

HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,
petitioners, vs
. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO,
respondents
.
G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of
lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to
open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19,
1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on
September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto
R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order
annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the
respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners
from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may
be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary
views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against
laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could
not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n
our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held
in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp
Source: Full Text http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/aug2001/129093.htm
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Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose
when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand
its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor
was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed
the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of
Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all
their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

4. Section 19
Moday vs CADate: February 20, 1997Petitioners: Percival
Moday, Zotico Moday and Leonora ModayRespondents: CA, Judge
Evangelista Yuipco, and Municipality of Bunawan
Ponente: Romero
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur
passedResolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition
for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National
Highway Owned by PercivalModay for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities." TheResolution was approved by Mayor Anuncio Bustillo
and was transmitted to the SangguniangPanlalawigan for its approval. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with
thecomment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available
lots inBunawan for the establishment of the government center." The municipality filed a
 petition for eminent domain against Percival Moday before theRTC. The municipality
then filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the land upondeposit with
the municipal treasurer of the required amount. The RTC granted the motion. Itruled
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves
iteffective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review
theordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section
208 (1) of B.P. Blg.337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent
domain is not one of the actsenumerated in Section 19 requiring the approval of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari
before the CA. The CA held that thepublic purpose for the expropriation is clear from
Resolution No. 43-89 and that since theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur
did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid,expropriation of petitioners' property could
proceed. Meanwhile, the Municipality had erectedthree buildings on the subject
property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, theMunicipal Motorpool,
both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which ismade of
concrete.In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision
andresolution of the CA and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality
of Bunawanis null and void.

Issue:WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal

resolutionwhich was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

H e l d : Y e s

Ratio: Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instantcase, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It
is government's rightto appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use orpurpose. Inherently possessed by the national
legislature, the power of eminent domain may bevalidly delegated to local governments,
other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there mustbe just
compensation. The Municipality's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it isexpressly provided for BP 337, the local Government Code in force at
the time expropriationproceedings were initiated. What petitioners question is the lack of
authority of the municipalityto exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved Resolution No. 43-89. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval
of Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm actionwhich does not render said resolution null and
void. The law, Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grantsthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the soleground that it is beyond
the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.

Municipality of Parańaque vs V.M. Realty

Corporation GR 127820 (July 20, 1998)
Posted on October 4, 2012

G.R. No. 127820

292 SCRA 676
July 20, 1998
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of
Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of
land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed “for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.”
Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously
made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the
latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property
upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.
Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action
because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and
(b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private
respondent’s motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the
complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution by its law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first
requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by
its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the
former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner
involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in
effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

G.R. No. 103125 Case Digest

G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993
Province of Camarines Sur
vs Court of Appeals
Ponente: Quiason

Facts:
This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on whether
the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior
approval of the DAR.

December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the

provincial governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food
and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for
expropriation against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon
motion for the issuance of writ or possession, San Joaquins failed to
appear at the hearing.

San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of

inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The court denied the
motion to dismiss and authorized the province to take possession of the
properties.

San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their
petition. Asked by the CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no need
for the approval of the president for the province to expropriate
properties, however, the approval of the DAR is needed to convert the
property from agricultural to non-agricultural (housing purpose).

CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession
and expropriation of the property until th province has acquired the
approval of DAR. Hence, this petition.
Ruling:
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and
5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source
of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the
suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it
would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest
on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve
or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the
applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant
beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government
units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first
applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of
Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public
purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit

that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be
expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative
policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will
intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial
relation to the public use.