OMISSION

People vs. Silvestre

Facts: Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with Martin Atienza from
the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol, Bulacan.

On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband, Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that
municipality, a sworn complaint for adultery, supported by affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz.
On the same date, May 16, 1930, the Silevestre and Atienza were arrested on a warrant issued by said justice
of the peace.

On May 20, 1930, they were released on bail, each giving a personal bond of P6,000. Pending the preliminary
investigation of the case, Silvestre and Atienza begged the municipal president of Paombong to speak to
Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the complaint, the two accused binding themselves to discontinue cohabitation,
and promising not to live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza voluntarily signed the promise.

The municipal president transmitted the defendants' petition to the complaining husband, lending it his support.
Domingo Joaquin acceded to it and filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint. In consideration of this
petition, the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the adultery case commenced against the accused,
and cancelled the bonds given by them, with the costs against the complainant.

The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Niño, in the same municipality of
Paombong.

On November 20, 1930, Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo
Niño, and under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol,
and remained there.

Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz.
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered
together with the appellants herein after supper, Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the
house, he answered that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said,
had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Silvestre.

Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even Silvestre, who was
about a meter away from him. Alarmed at what Atienza had said, the de la Cruz couple left the house at once to
communicate with the barrio lieutenant as to what they had just heard Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a
hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran
back to it; however, the fire had already assumed considerable proportions. The fire destroyed about 48 houses.

Silvestre listened to Atienza’s threat without raising a protest and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire
to the house.

Issue: Is Romana Silvestre liable as an accomplice to the crime of arson committed by Atienza for failure to give
alarm about the felony that was committed?

Ruling: No - Mere passive presence at the scene of another’s crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy is not punishable. There is no law that punishes a person who does
not report to the authorities the commission of a crime which he witnessed. Therefore, Silvestre may not be held
liable as an accomplice for the omission to report is not a felony.
 People vs. Talingdan

Facts: Friday morning: Corazon, Teresa’s daughter, was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa
meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small
hut owned by Bernardo.

She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet."

When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him."

Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go down the house to
go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants.

She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.

Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room.

Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the presence of persons downstairs, but
Bernardo paid no attention.

Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door.

He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the “batalan.”

The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and
Tobias fired at him again.

Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for help, Bides warned her that
he will kill her if she calls for help.

Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers, the former
threatened to kill the latter if she revealed the matter to anyone.

Issue: Is Teresa Domogma liable as an accessory to Bernardo’s murder?

Ruling: Yes - She may be held liable as an accessory to Bernardo’s murder.

It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she cannot have
the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped
directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she knew it was going to be done
and did not object.

There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed.
She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to have no suspects
in mind when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate.

Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding the conspiracy, after
Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants.

These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime” which is punishable
under Art. 19 of the RPC.
 DELIBERATE INTENT

Manuel vs. People

Facts: On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña. He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking
for a friend.

Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where,
despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed on several
occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. A month later, they were married
before Judge Antonio C. Reyes. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able
to build their home Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their
house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would
slap her.

Sometime in January 2001, took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial
support.

In August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the NSO in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. She was so
embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged
their own vows.

Manuel’s Claim: Manuel testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

People vs. Bitdu: The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from
liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu, the trial court further ruled that even if the
private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally
liable for bigamy.

Manuel insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony.

Issue: Is Manuel guilty of bigamy?

Ruling: Yes - As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by
dolo (deceit). Article 3(2) provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a
felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase
is included in the word "voluntary."

Malice - mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from
which another suffers injury.
When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused,
the law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the
natural or probable consequences of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such
presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent (Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea). In the present case, Manuel is presumed to have acted with
malice when he married Gandalera.

It is the burden of Manuel to prove his defense that when he married he was of the well-grounded belief that his
first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. However, Manuel
failed to discharge his burden since there is no judicial declaration of presumptive death was shown.
 People vs. Puno

Facts: Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika
Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of
Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived
at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).

Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her
husband with Isabelo on the wheel. After the car turned right in a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver.

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was
seated at the rear. He poked a gun at her.

Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from
you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained
P7,000.00 and was taken.

Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they
drop her at her gas station where the money was. The car went about the Sta. Mesa area.

Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly pointed at Ma. Socorro’s neck. He
said he was an NPA and threatened her.

The car sped off north toward the North superhighway. There, Puno asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for
P100,000. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30,000 and one for
P40,000. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused.

Puno turned the car around toward Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again toward
Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her
dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she
jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too.

On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM.

Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000 check at
PCI Bank, Makati.

Issue: Can Puno be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged?

Ruling: No - There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time
they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation.

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-à-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can
rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty and not where such restraint
of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders.
United States vs. Ancheta: It has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the
accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds
the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the
incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
 People vs. Delim

Facts: Marlon, Ronald, and Leon together with Manuel alias Bong, and Robert, all surnamed Delim were indicted
for murder of Modest Manalo Bntas, who was adopted by the father of the accused.

On January 23, 1999, Modesto was forcibly taken by defendants who were armed from his home; Marlon poked
his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim; Rita and Randy
(his wife and son) being warned not to leave the house. His body was discovered 4 days later by Randy and his
relatives. The accused were found guilty for murder.

The Information read:

“That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house
of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring with one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth,
brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded
and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior
strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.”

The trial court rendered judgment finding accused guilty of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death.

Issue: Should Delim be held liable for murder or kidnapping?

Ruling: Accused should be held liable for murder - In determining what crime is charged in an information, the
material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime in relation to the penal law violated are controlling.
Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be
alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. In this case, kidnapping was merely used as a means
to consummate the crime of murder.

People vs. Puno: For kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the
malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is
merely incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor.

Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender
actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure
to act. Specific intent involves a state of mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the
prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the State in a prosecution for a
crime requiring specific intent. Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. Specific intent may be proved
by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the
accused as established by the evidence on record.

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to
engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution
need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not
show guilty and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime
charge such as murder. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to
deprive the victim of his/her liberty.
 MISTAKE OF FACT

US vs. Ah Chong

Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed,
he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door.

After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, “Who is
there?” but received no response. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out
again, “If you enter the room I will kill you.” But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been
placed against the door, and believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.

Issue: May Ah Chong be exempted from criminal liability for mistake of fact?

Ruling: No - Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the
intruder under Art. 11(1). He must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.

People vs. Oanis

Facts: Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first
sergeant and asked that he be given four men.

The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector.

Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where
the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned
out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.

Issue: May Oanis be exempted from criminal liability for mistake of fact?

Ruling: No - Both accused are guilty of murder.

Ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.

Appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the
room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the
victim was unarmed.

“No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be
subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
 MALUM PROHIBITUM AS EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT OF MENS REA

Reyes, 2017: Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the
nature of things, the crime itself. (US vs. Go Chico)

Padilla vs. Dizon

Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against
respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least,
to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in People vs. Lo Chi Fai, acquitting said accused of the
offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country.

The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught
by a Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM
officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the
time of his apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments
(380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in various currency denominations without any authority as provided
by law.

At the time the accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which he was
supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips.

The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently raffled to Branch 113,
presided by herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.

Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take
out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through other persons, through the
mails or through international carriers except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under
existing international agreements or Central Bank regulations.

Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not
exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of establishing the amount of
foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with
them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in
the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:

Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange .— That any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase
and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be
guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal,
(minimum of 12 years and I day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than fifty thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos.

At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the
garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines
9 to 1 0 times, although the only dates he could remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and
July 8, 1986; that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines and
also to play in the casino; that he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in business with
him.

When he came to the Philippines, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen which he tried to
declare but the Central Bank representative refused to accept his declaration, until he could get a confirmation
as to the source of the money, for which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to him.

He also testified that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in some business with him in the
Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in a common fund, hence, every time anyone of them
came to the Philippines, they would declare the money they were bringing in, and all declarations were handed
to and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for the defense. When
asked by the court why he did not present all of these declarations when he was apprehended at the airport, his
answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he does not
understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-examination that the reason he was
going back to Hongkong bringing with him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because
of the fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread. It was because of
this fear that he was urged by his associates to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the
Philippines.

The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:

The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused wilfully violated Section 6 of Circular
No. 960. The fact that the accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when he was about to depart
from the Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation of Section 6.

What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign currencies out of the country was done
the very intention. It is that which qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that clear intention to violate
and benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by overt acts of a person.

Issue: Is absence of willful intention to violate Central Bank Circular No. 960 a valid defense?

Ruling: No - The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that
to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the
accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate
intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita.
 Magno vs. CA

Facts: Magno was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have
complete equipment that could make his venture workable. While he was going into this entrepreneurship, he
lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus,
petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Teng, Vice President of Mancor
Industries for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor.

Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy
the equipment needed, Teng referred Magno to LB Finance advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that
Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate
petitioner and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty
per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since
petitioner could not come up with such an amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a
third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it
was Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on the condition that the same would be paid as a short term
loan at 3% interest.

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance
would lease the garage equipment and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the
same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment was delivered to Magno who in turn issued a
postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Teng. When
the check matured, Magno requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he was no longer banking
with Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, Magno issued another set of six (6) post dated checks. Two (2) checks dated
July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of
the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Teng, on the request of Magno as they
were not covered with sufficient funds.

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipment.
It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Teng was the one who advanced the warranty
deposit. Magno with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never
came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed."

Issue: Can Magno be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22?

Ruling: No - The element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason is inversely applied in this case.

From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the
warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey
Gomez, to whom Magno was introduced by Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties, he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered
by L.S. Finance Management.
 Garcia vs. CA

Facts: On May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the
Alaminos, Pangasinan, Philippines, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, et al. conspiring with, confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from 6,998 votes, as clearly disclosed in the total
number of votes in the 159 precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, to 1,921, with
a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except Garcia who was convicted as follows:

Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section
27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering
that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6)
YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next
degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further,
she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.

Garcia appealed before the CA and raised the various errors of the appellate court in affirming the decision of
the RTC. One of such errors is that the reduction of the votes of candidate Pimentel was clearly not intentional
or willful.

Issue: Can Garcia be held liable for violation of R.A. No. 6646, Sec. 27(b)?

Ruling: Yes - Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the
acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
crime is committed.

In crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only
because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

Sec. 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 provides that any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers
who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the
board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered
votes must be considered guilty of an election offense.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed
due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within
a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the
law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number
of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921,
which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.17Petitioner
likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our
mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in
the COC.

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921 votes and
statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly
attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement
of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged,
especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another.
 Cuenca vs. People

Facts: Cuenca was a special watchman and security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency. In that
agency, they were more than forty security guards. It was the practice in the agency that when the security
guards reported for work, they were provided with firearms and ammunition, which they would return after their
tour of duty.

On January 3, 1963, the accused was detailed at the Philippine Savings Bank as security guard. He was wearing
the uniform of the agency and was armed with a pistol, Ithaca, .45 cal., with Serial No. 1009738, which had a
magazine containing seven rounds of ammunition. The firearm and the ammunition were provided by the agency.
The firearm was not always used by him alone, as at other times the same firearm was used by the other security
guards. On the date and the place mentioned, Pat. Paul Sabate, who was stationed at Plaza Miranda as security
officer of the stage show, arrested the accused for illegal possession of the said firearm and ammunition. When
asked to produce his license to possess the firearm and ammunition, the accused told him that he was a special
watchman and security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency to which the firearm and ammunition
belonged, and the license to possess the same was in the office of the agency. The accused told Pat. Sabate
that the owner of the agency was one Mr. Forbes, who had the license for the said firearm and ammunition.
According to Pat. Sabate, the agency was under the supervision of the Manila Police Department.

It appears that the agency has no license to possess the firearm and ammunition in question; hence, neither the
accused nor the agency is a licensed possessor of said firearm and ammunition. The accused claimed that he
was made to believe in the agency that Mr. Forbes had license to possess them.

Issue: Can Cuenca be held liable for illegal possession of firearms?

Ruling: No – Cuenca was entitled to assume that his employer had the requisite license to possess said firearm
and ammunition and to turn them over to him while he was on duty as one of the regular security guards of the
Bataan Veterans Security Agency, the same being a duly licensed security agency.

Clients or employees of the security agency, are entitled to presume, in the absence of indicia to the contrary
that it has complied with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. What is more, Jose Forbes had told appellant that
the firearm and ammunition in question were duly licensed, and, as an employee of the agency, appellant could
not be expected to demand from his employer proof of the veracity of the latter's assertion before relying thereon.

The security agency may legally engage the service of competent persons to discharge the duties of special
watchmen and security guards, and provide them, as such, with the corresponding firearms and ammunitions.
The agency is thus supposed to obtain the license necessary therefor.
 People vs. Dela Rosa

Facts: On December 9, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa, Cresencio Reyes and Rodolfo Quimson,
surrendered to Kagawad Valeriano Rigor of Sitio Kadampat, Bolo, Labrador, Pangasinan claiming they want to
lead a new life. They informed him that Benjamin Nano, alias Kumander Tamang, a member of the NPA, was
shot by one of them. The four had with them a short shotgun and a bag containing several sticks of dynamite.
Kagawad Rigor offered them breakfast and afterwards went to the police station to report the presence of four
(4) surrenderees in his house.

At the police station, Patrolman Gasline Fernandez recorded the report in the police blotter. Cpl. Crispin Cancino,
the station commander, brought along several policemen and proceeded to the house of Kagawad Rigor. When
the group arrived, only Kagawad Rigor and Cpl. Cancino entered the house. The other policemen stayed outside
to secure the area. Inside the house, Kagawad Rigor introduced the surrenderees to Cpl. Cancino and showed
him the short shotgun and the bag containing several sticks of dynamite. Then, all accused, except Rodolfo
Quimson, who was left behind to guide the police in recovering the body of Kumander Tamang, were brought to
the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Headquarters in Lingayen.

In Lingayen, they proceeded at the municipal building and called on Mayor Calixto Pancho. The surrenderees
had their picture taken with Mayor Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterward, they were brought to the police
headquarters, where their statements were taken by Cpl. Arsenio Paragas and Cpl. Cipriano Castillo. Meanwhile,
the charred body of Benjamin Nano was recovered by the police in Sitio Tebel Patar.

The following day, Cresencio Reyes informed the police that there were firearms left buried in Sitio Tebel Patar.
Reyes pointed to the hiding place which was covered by banana leaves. When the banana leaves were removed,
the police unearthed two (2) long barreled shotguns.

Issue: Is dela Rosa liable for illegal possession of firearms?

Ruling: No – dela Rosa may not be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Dela Rosa's possession was
harmless, temporary and only incidental for the purpose of surrendering the ammunitions to the authorities.
Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the first element of animus possidendi.

The kind of possession punishable under PD No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either
physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same.

It is not enough that the firearm was found in the person of the accused who held the same temporarily and
casually or for the purpose of surrendering the same. Admittedly, animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such,
what goes on into the mind of an accused, as his real intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and
coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession.

People vs. Leo Lian: We rejected the argument of the accused that the charge against him should be dismissed
because there was no animus possidendi on his part. In said case, the accused contended that he was on his
way to the municipal hall to surrender the firearm when he met some of his friends. He then forgot about the
firearm, until the police officer unceremoniously seized the same from him, affording him no chance to surrender
it himself.

People vs. Lubo: That animus possidendi is determinable from the prior and simultaneous acts of the accused.
 Ysidoro vs. People

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the
Sandiganbayan for illegal use of public property (technical malversation) under Art. 220 of the Revised Penal
Code.

On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done,
the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried
Garcia, the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction
materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Polinio, an officer of the MSWDO in charge of
the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told
Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already
distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.

Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining
the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two
boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the
accounting department regarding the matter. On being consulted, Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal
Accountant’s Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying
the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries.

Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent
need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive
audit of their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its transactions.

Issue: Is good faith a valid defense for technical malversation?

Ruling: No - Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The
offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal
offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely
irrelevant.

The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has three
elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under
his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied
is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Ysidoro claims that
he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes
of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.

Evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133
appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.6 This appropriation was based on the executive budget7 which
allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social
Services8 which covers the CSAP housing projects.9 The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s
intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.

Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP’s
needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs.
 NEGLIGENCE OR LACK OF FORESIGHT

People vs. Pugay

Facts: The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to
run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was
held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.

Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic
book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These
persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby,
they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline
from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay
not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set
Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.

The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people
around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.

Issue: Should accused be held liable for the death of Miranda?

Ruling: Yes - Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its
contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of
this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to
exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al., this Court ruled as follows:

A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful,
and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all
manner of danger and injury.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the
deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter
on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it shall be conceded that as part of their fun-making
he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility.

Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a
felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the
instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.
 Ivler vs. San Pedro

Facts: In August 2004, Jason Ivler and spouses, Evangeline and Nestor Ponce were involved in a Vehicular
accident. Ivler was charged in Pasig MeTC with two offenses which are, Reckless Imprudence resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries and Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. Ivler posted for bail
for both cases. Petitioner Ivler was found guilty for the first offense and then he moved to quash the second
offense, citing double jeopardy.

Pasig MeTC rejected his claim and he raised this matter to the RTC, where he posted for the suspension of the
second proceeding. Pasig RTC did not act on the petitioners motion, went with the proceedings, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest. It was only a week later, when RTC issued its resolution on the matter of the rejection
to suspend the proceedings.

Issue:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered
his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband.

Ruling:

1. No - The court finds that Ivler’s non-appearance did not divest him of personality to maintain his petition
and protection from prosecution from double jeopardy.
2. Yes - Under the Constitution, There is the protection afforded for the accused to shield him from double
jeopardy. Reckless Imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on Persons and Property are material
only to determine the penalty. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether
reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our
penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly barred the
second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court grants the
petition and reverses the order (arrest and dismissal of second case). The court dismisses Criminal Case no.
82366 against petitioner Ivlers on the ground of double jeopardy.
 TRANSFERRED INTENT (ART. 4, PAR. 1)

Villareal vs. People

Facts: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (including Leonardo "Lenny" Villa) of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).

On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were "briefed" and brought to the Almeda Compound in
Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. The rites were scheduled to last for three days.

The neophytes were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included:

1. Indian Run – which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes;

2. Bicol Express – which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs;

3. Rounds – in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged
with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist
blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and

4. Auxies’ Privilege Round – in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the
neophytes.

They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic plays, play rough basketball,
and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on
their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they
endured on the first day of initiation.

After a while, accused alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused.
Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical
pain.

Lenny received several paddle blows. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk
that he had to be carried to the carport. The initiation for the day was officially ended. They then slept at the
carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings.
Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they
realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans
rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Issue: Is absence of animus interficendi (felonious intent to kill) or animus inuriandi (felonious intent to injure) a
valid defense to exempt the accused from criminal liability?
Ruling: No - The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean that the accused fraternity members
are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by
means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man
in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precautions against
the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.

However, the Court reiterated that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.

Accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain
on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
 ABERRATIO ICTUS

People vs. Guillen

Facts: On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affiliated with any particular
political group, had voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946, Manuel A. Roxas,
the successful candidate, assumed the office of

President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen,
he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises
made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according
to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the
approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence, he determined to assassinate the President.

After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity
presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de
Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and
surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform
erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousands of listeners
of... the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American
citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.

He thought of two hand grenades which were given to him by an American soldier in the early days of the
liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whiskey.

He decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10,
1947.

When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which
also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades, in a plant pot located close to the platform, and
when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he... stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a
distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his
speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.

General Castaneda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and, without losing his
presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the
general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and,... covering the President with his body, shouted
to the crowd that everybody should lie down.

The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the
platform.

It was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela who died on the following
day as a result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade.

Issue: Should the accused be found guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death
of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva et al?

Ruling: No – In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted
with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with Art. 4,
criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another
act performed without malice. In order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that neither
malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene. However, where such intention exists, the act should be
qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor.
 ERROR IN PERSONAE

People vs. Sabalones

Facts: One June 1, 1895, respondents including Sabalones, armed with firearms, attacked and ambushed
individuals riding in two vehicles resulting to the death of two persons and injury to three others.

According to a witness presented, Sabalones was implicated in the killing of Nabing Velez because of the
slapping incident involving her father-in-law, Federico Sabalones Sr. and Nabing Veles, which took place prior
to the death of Junior Sabalones.

The conclusion of the trial and the CA that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial
statement of Beronga and the testimony of Binghoy. These pieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants
believed they were suspected of having killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group
to retaliate against them.

The RTC observed that “they went to their grisly destination amidst the dark and positioned themselves in
defense of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang of supporters of the recently slain Nabing Velez.”

Issue: Is this a case of aberratio ictus?

Ruling: No – the case is not one of aberration ictus but one of error in personae (mistake of identity)

Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in "conjecture" in ruling that there was aberratio ictus in
this case. This allegation does not advance the cause of the appellants. It must be stressed that the trial court
relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that
appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the
appellants, this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court
in the discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial statement of
Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of evidence sufficiently show that
appellants believed that they were suspected of having killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they
expected his group to retaliate against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims' vehicles which they mistook
to be carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were
mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court has held that "mistake in the identity of the victim carries
the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended

victim."

Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-taken. The case is better
characterized as error personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather than aberratio ictus which means
mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow.
 People vs. Opero

Facts: On the morning of April 27, 1978, A little girl was found roaming around the second floor of the house
International Hotel. The janitor told the guards that she was from room 314. Upon reaching room 314, The
security guard found a dead body belonging to Liew Soon Ping. Liew Soon Ping dead faced down on the bed
with both feet tied, her body is bloated and a towel covered her mouth. They called her wife, Dr. Hong, who was
in Cebu. He came back immediately and found their personal effects worth P30,221 to be missing. Upon
examination, They found that the cause of death was asphyxiation by suffocation due to the pandesal stuffed in
her mouth.

Issue: Is Opero liable for robbery or murder of the victim?

Ruling: The court affirmed the lower court’s decision that Oprero was guilty of robbery with homicide. While it
Oprero’s intention was to simply rob the victim, his actions inadvertently caused the death of the victim. Stuffing
the pandesal was done with the intent of preventing the victim from making a scene. What is important in this
case that death was a result by reason or on the occasion of robbery. (People vs. Mangulabnan)
 PRAETER INTENTIONEM

People vs. Albuquerque

Facts: This case is an appeal of a previous decision of the court that found Gines Alburquerque guilty of homicide
against Manuel Osma. Albuquerque's daughter, Pilar had relations with Osma and bore a child. Alburquerque,
who was suffering from paralysis at that time, wanted the two to get married and he talked to Osma about this.
Osma, appeared to refuse, which led to Albuquerque inflicting Osma with a wound on the base of the neck,
causing his death.

Alburquerque did not intend to cause the victim’s death. His intention was only to injure the victim. However, due
to the fact that he had partial paralysis, he could not control his right arm and the blow landed on the base of the
neck.

Issue: Was Alburquerque guilty of homicide, even if his intention was not to kill the victim?

Ruling: Yes - A person who performs a criminal act is responsible for all consequences of said act, regardless
of his intention. The court affirms that Alburquerque did not intend to kill the victim. His only intention was to
threaten the victim into marrying his daughter. Due to his lack of control over his arm, he inflicted a fatal wound
on the victim. Article 4 par. 1 states that Criminal Liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony,
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The result is greater than the intention
of the accused, which was to intimidate the victim into marriage. In this case however, there is the presence of
mitigating circumstances such as the lack of intent to cause a fatal injury, as well as surrendering himself
voluntarily to the authorities and having acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, the accused is
given a sentence that is lower in degree (reclusion temporal to prison mayor).
 CAUSATION

Bataclan vs. Medina

Facts: On September 13, 1952, A Medina Transportation bus left Amadeo Cavite. At about 2:00 in the morning,
The bus was speeding on the highway in Imus Cavite and one of the front tires bust, resulting in the vehicle to
zigzag until it fell on the side of the road and turned upside down. Some of the passengers managed to get out,
except for 4 passengers (one of them was Juan Bataclan). Those who were able to get out called for help. After
such time, ten (10) men came to their rescue, one of them carrying a lighted torch. These men presumably went
near the vehicle, and the vehicle upon contact with the lighted torch, caught on fire. This resulted in the deaths
of the four passengers still trapped inside the bus.

Issue:

1. What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers, the negligence of the driver, resulting in
the overturning of the bus, or the fire that burned the bus?
2. Is the owner of the bus criminally liable for the resulting deaths of his passengers?

Ruling: Yes - The driver of the bus was liable for the resulting deaths because due to his negligence, he failed
to warn the men to not bring the torch too close to the vehicle. Some passengers note that the driver and the
conductor was walking to and fro the site, hence, they must have smelled and detected the spilled gas, resulting
from the overturning of the bus. The coming of the men with torch was to be expected because they called for
help. Since it was a rural area, they did not have access to lamps or lanterns to light their way. The lighted torch
was more accessible to them. The events that followed after the overturn of the bus was only natural and logical.
In this case, The proximate cause of the deaths was the overturning of the bus.

Proximate Cause: Acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under the circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefron.
 Wacoy vs. People

Facts: Prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 2004, he
was eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay, Benguet, when he heard a
commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner
Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in that position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after
which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac
punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.

At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum" and
was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his ileum, i.e., the point where
the small and large intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum
was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and
while he was revived through cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation.6

Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually, died
the next day.

Issue: Was Aro’s death a case of death by tumultuous affray as defined in Art. 251 of the RPC?

Ruling: No - In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of
which Aro died. On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy
and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting
punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there
a reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident. Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who
assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray.

Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac's act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause of the
latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically for the crime of Homicide.
 People vs. Iligan

Facts: On October 21, 1980 at around 3:00 am, Esmeraldo Quinones Jr. and his companions. Zaldy Asis and
Felix Lukban were on the way home after attending a fiesta dance. They passed by the accused, Fernando
Iligan, and his nephew, Edmundo Asis ang Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them, which prompted Asis
to punch him. The accused, Iligan, drew his bolo and hacked Quinones Jr and missed. Quinones jr. and his
group ran away but on the way back to Quinones Jr.’s house Iligan and his group caught up and hacked
Quinones Jr’s head. Asis and Lukban ran away and when they came back to get Quinones Jr, found him dead.

The autopsy, however, showed that Quinones Jr. was involved in a vehicular accident and was killed
subsequently. The post mortem exam and the birth certificate showed that Quinones Jr.’s death was due to
“shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident.”

Issue: Was Iligan liable for Quinones Jr’s death, given that it was not the hacking that killed him?

Ruling: Yes - Quinones Jr’s involvement in the vehicular accident does not take away Iligan’s criminal liability.
The court rules that while Iligan did not directly cause the victim’s death, The hacking was the proximate cause
of the victim's death. Following the hacking incident, The victim was weakened which sent him to the cemented
highway, and then run over by a vehicle.
 Urbano vs. IAC

Facts: Urbano went to his ricefield located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Javier. He found
the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had
overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Javier and
Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier
admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A
quarrel between them ensued.

Urbano unsheathed his and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying
the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked
him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When
Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to their local hospital in a very serious condition. Javier had lockjaw
and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde found that Javier’s serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
Javier died the following day. Urbano was then charged and later on found guilty for homicide.

Urbano filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial based on an affidavit of Brgy. Capt. Soliven which
stated that a typhoon swept Pangasinan, affecting the irrigation dam in the ricefields of San Fabian making it
suitable for catching mudfishes. Brgy. Capt. Soliven saw Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals.

Issue: Can Urbano be held liable for the death of Javier?

Ruling: No - The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for
acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom."
(People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his
wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals. At the very least,
Urbano may be held guilty for inflicting slight physical injuries. However, Urbano’s criminal liability was wiped out
by Javier’s own negligent act.
 People vs. Abarca

Facts: This case is an appeal from the previous decision of RTC-Leyte sentencing Francisco Abarca to death
for murder with double frustrated murder.

While the accused was in manila to review for the 1983 bar examinations, His wife had an illicit relationship with
Khingsley Koh. One day, He caught them having sexual intercourse in the Abarca residence. The two also
caught him upon which, Koh got his revolver and Abarca ran away. He looked for a weapon and returned to a
mahjong session hangout to look for Koh. He found Koh and shot him, and two other people (Arnold and Lina
Amparado). Koh died and the other two were hospitalized for their injuries.

Issue: Whether or not the judgement of conviction was correct.

Ruling: No - Abarca was entitled to the provisions of Art 247 of the Revised Penal Code which states, “Any
legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.”. Having sufficed the elements of such [i.e. 1)
surprised his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another person. 2) kill any or both of them immediately
after], Abarca was not liable for the death of Khingsley Koh. However, he was still liable for the injuries he caused
Arnold and Lina Amaparado because he had no intent to kill them. His sentence was modified to arresto mayor
instead of the death penalty.
 IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES

Intod vs. CA

Facts: On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod et. al went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter,
Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany
the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Intod et al. all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's. Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Intod et al. fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her
son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the
gunfire.

Intod and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men
left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we
will come back if (sic) you were not injured"

Issue: Is Intod liable under Art. 4(2) of the RPC?

Ruling: Yes - The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

Legal Impossibility vs. Factual Impossibility - Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the
motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.

Ex: Killing a person already dead falls in this category.

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent
the consummation of the intended crime.

Ex: A man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds
the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
 Jacinto vs. People

Facts: Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997
in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc.,
and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank
account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the
former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle
of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks
payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had
apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH.
Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch,
who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check
deposited in his account had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter
to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca
explained that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a
phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle
at Mega Foam.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it
equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise
of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed
petitioner a BDO check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam.
Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that
the BDO check bounced. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject
check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in
August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.6

Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank
account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his
house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange
for the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the
woman who rediscounted the check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and
dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to
pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then holding the
bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby
Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed
to meet again on August 21, 2007.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline
Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided
not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca
and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted
from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino.
However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00 marked money previously
given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each
to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been
watching the whole time.

Issue: May accused be held liable for theft?

Ruling: No - In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same
was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime
of qualified theft was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or
the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.

The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the
cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People that under
the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, there is only one operative act of execution by
the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another.

There can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam,
she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment
in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the
dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft.

Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash replacement should not
be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked
money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.