Everyday Shopping to Fight the Italian Mafia

Francesca Forno and Carina Gunnarson

Abstract: The apparent success of political consumerism in spurring social change seems to have
encouraged activists in other social movement sectors to emulate groups and organizations that have
used the market as a political arena. In this paper we examine how political consumerism has been
incorporated among the tactics of the anti-mafia movement by looking at a newly formed
organization: Addiopizzo (‘Farewell, Pizzo “Extortion money”) - a committee formed in 2004 by a
group of students in Palermo, Sicily. As estimated, eighty percent of businesses currently give into
mafia intimidation and pay a monthly tax, or ’pizzo’, which totalled somewhere in the order of $33.5
billion dollars in the 2004 financial year. Addiopizzo has promoted a new ethical role of civil society
to contrast the logic of the pizzo, calling on citizens to take politics into their own hands and
favouring, by bridging, an open and direct alliance between citizens/consumers and shopkeepers. At
present, almost 300 shops have joined Addiopizzo to offer mob-free shopping - thus refusing to hand
over the ‘monthly tax’ to Cosa Nostra (a Sicilian mob) - and over 9,000 consumers have signed up,
declaring themselves willing to make ‘critical use’ of their purchasing power by shopping only at
‘pizzo free’ shops. While tracing the origins, evolution, organizational structure and the system of
alliances of Addiopizzo, in this article the use of the market as an arena in which to deal with
organised crime will be compared with previous methods adopted by anti-mafia organizations in the
past.
Keywords: Italy, Italian Mafia, Anti-Mafia Movement, New Forms of Political Participation, Political
Consumerism

1. Introduction

On 29 August 1991, the Palermitan businessman Libero Grassi was killed outside his house in
Palermo. During the months preceding his death, Grassi had publicly denounced the Mafia in
the press and on television and had encouraged his business colleagues to follow his example.
Instead of enjoying their support, he was criticised, gradually isolated and accused of spoiling
the image of the Palermo business community. Grassi’s request for support from Assindustria,
the industrial association (now called Confidustria) to which he belonged, was disappointing:
“It’s like my report does not concern them”, he said, “I have only received a telephone call
from a few friends, nothing more” (Santino, 2000, 276). In a controversial legal sentence
made by the Court in Catania in March 1991, five months before Grassi’s death, the
prosecutor stated that the legal instruments could not be used to protect the “protected” firm
against Cosa Nostra. The message delivered was that Sicilian firms had to find a way to
coexist with the Mafia, otherwise they would risk loosing their enterprises. (Santino, 2000,
279)
In 2007 - 16 years after Grassi’s assassination - the Palermitan businessman, Rodolfo
Guajana, stated that he refused to pay rackets to the Mafia. In an open letter in the regional
newspaper Giornale di Sicilia, Guajana explained that he, as a Christian, refused to pay for
protection because “the pizzo supports the mafia”. Guajana’s company was later attacked and
destroyed on August 7, 2007. The situation, however, was clearly different this time for a
number of reasons. Guajana was neither killed nor isolated or accused of spoiling the image
of the Palermo business community. On the contrary, he received support from several
associations, among the others Confindustria, which with an official statement on September
2007 announced that the group would expel any members who paid the levy. Moreover,
thanks to anti-racket legislation passed over the years since Grassi’s assassination, Guajana

1
promptly received new localities from State authorities, as a compensation for his material
loss.
The Mafia’s assault to Guajana’s company accelerated the constitution of the first anti-
racket organization in Palermo. In November 2007 forty Palermitan businessmen joined
together to establish the first anti-racket organization in the island’s capital. The association
named “Libero Futuro” (a name that literally means “A Free Future” and indirectly pays
tribute to Libero Grassi) was presented at an official ceremony on November 10, 2007, in
Palermo’s Teatro Biondo. Participants at this event included, among many others, Libero
Grassi’s widow Pina Maisano Grassi, the honorary chairman of the Italian Federation of Anti-
Racket Associations (FAI), Tano Grasso, the president of Confindustria Sicilia, Ivan Lo
Bello, representatives of local civil society organizations as well as several local shopkeepers
with their customers, and a new organization called Addiopizzo, the initiator of this “new
wave” of anti-racket mobilization.
The event at the Teatro Biondo followed three years of mobilization that was originally
initiated by a group of students who had started off by plastering the town with anti-pizzo
fliers, reading “A whole population that pays the pizzo is a population without dignity”. By
importing and adapting the discourse and tactics developed within the political consumerist
movement, the action of Addiopizzo aimed at mobilizing citizens by stressing their personal
responsibility for the maintenance of the pizzo system: “… whenever you purchase a product
from a trader who pays the pizzo you inevitably contribute to the maintenance of this
mechanism, as in the selling price of that product there will be also a part of the costs of the
pizzo” 1 .
Addiopizzo introduced a shift in the repertoire of action that had previously been employed
by anti-racket organizations in Palermo. They called on citizens to manifest their opposition
to the pizzo (and to the Mafia) by making use of their “shopping bag power”, to reconsider
their daily consumption habits and to only make purchases in “pizzo free” shops.

Theory and Method. — In this article we use social movement theory to analyse how political
consumerism has been integrated in the strategy used by anti-racket organizations. In the
following pages we begin by discussing the logic of racket and its importance for the Mafia’s
control over its territory. Thereafter, we discuss how anti-Mafia mobilization was conducted
by civil society actors in the past.
From paragraph 4 on the analysis turns specifically on Addiopizzo. The analysis is
preliminary of two reasons. Firstly, because the organisation is still very new and we cannot
know where it will led. The situation in Palermo is also uncertain, particularly as regards the
development of the Mafia after the arrests of two important mafia bosses, Bernardo
Provenzano and Francesco Lo Piccolo. We do not yet know if and to what extent the Mafia
will accept the anti-racket initiative in the future. Secondly, the analysis is based on a rather
limited number of sources. The available information in print is limited, wherefore the
analysis is mainly based on interviews with Addiopizzo activists and other key actors
involved in current anti racket mobilization in Palermo.
We start by tracing the origins, evolution and organizational structure of Addiopizzo
focusing our attention on meso-level dynamics that may shape and sustain mobilization over
time. Our account starts from the very initial phase of Addiopozzo initiative and uncovers
how mobilization emerged and developed. For the purpose of this analysis we focus on four
stages that are considered crucial in the process of “emergent mobilization” and further spread
of a movement (McAdam et al. 2001), namely: (i) origin of mobilization; (ii) strategy
identification; (iii) creation of a social and organizational base; (iv) diffusion.

1
Pina Maisano Grassi, interview date: 29.05.08
2
 In paragraph 5, we reflect on the dialectic influence between Addiopizzo and its
environment. Departing from the work by Luders (2006), Schurman (2004), Wahlstrom and
Peterson (2006), we will discuss changes in the political, cultural and economic opportunity
structures that may influence or hinder the development of the Addiopizzo initiative.
Finally, in the concluding paragraph, by comparing contemporary anti-racket mobilization
with previous efforts, we advance some hypothesis on the role of political consumerism in
recent anti-racket mobilization.

2. The Mafia’s territorial control through rackets

Territorial control. — The central purpose of a Mafia leader and his group is to gain control
over a specific local territory, to establish and maintain a monopoly of power and protection
in that area. According to Hess, “mafia murders and mafia wars are above all signs of the
struggle for power in a territory or of arguments over territorial borders.” (Hess, 1998, 194).
The transfer of the mafia from a rural to an urban setting has not changed the attachment to
the local territory,:

“The Palermitan mafiosi [...] are born, live and die in the same place. The district is their life,
their famiy live their since generations and they are all relatives... Stefano Bontade... in Santa
Maria di Gesù...Giovanni and Salvatore Inzerillo in Bellolampo... They haven’t moved a
single meter from their kingdom, where they are absolute rulers since decades” (Lupo, 2004,
253).

Despite the internationalisation of the mafia and the control of a local territory represents
several advantages. The local territory guarantees a regular income as a consequence of illegal
economic activities or the imposition of ‘taxes’ on the local shopkeepers or producers. The
territory provides a safe haven for mafia members from law enforcement agencies and it can
be used as a recruitment ground. Organised crime is dependent on labour, for example hit
men, drivers, doctors, mechanics, informants or any other service that is useful for the Mafia’s
purposes. The territory can also be used for money laundering or serve as a base for further
expansion to other territories (Gunnarson, 2008, 59-62). The connection between Mafia,
territorial control and trade with illegal trade with hazardous waste has been increasingly
highlighted recently. The territory controlled by the Mafia is here used as an illegal dump for
all kinds of industrial waste. (Massari and Monzini, 2004; Saviano, 2006)
The territorial control mechanism does not make any difference between different
economic sectors, be it agriculture, construction or other commercial activities. What is
important is that the local mafia enjoys a monopoly of specific economic activities, that other
activities are only permitted with the mafia cosca’s permission and that the local mafia group
receives a share of the profits (Lupo, 2004, 257). The methods for controlling the territory
may vary: from violence and threats to the use of “soft methods”, for example by the spread
of rumours as a way of increasing the reputation and attractiveness of the local mafia boss.
According to Sciarrone, the payment of rackets is systematically underestimated as a means
by which the Mafia controls a local territory (Sciarrone, 2004, 26).

Rackets. — Gambetta describes rackets as the principal instrument to control the local
economy. The local territory is divided between different families who enjoy a monopoly
over taxation in their specific area. By analysing “who pays to whom” it is possible to draw a
map of the local territory of each mafia group. (Gambetta, 1993, 31)

3
 Although rackets represent only small money compared to incomes from drug trade or
arms trade, the importance of rackets should not be underestimated. The mafia imposed fees
guarantees a regular cash inflow to the mafia that can be used for regular spendings such as
salaries to members, payment of doctors, for cars, economic support to emprisoned mafia
members’ families etc. (Schneider and Schneider, 2006, 77-78; Orlando, 2001, 141).
There are also strategic reasons for the mafia to establish ‘cooperation’ with shopkeepers
within their local territory. Shopkeepers are omnipresent and they often know what is going
on in the area. If unknown outsiders are seen in the area, if requests are being made about a
specific person, or if an unidentified person in other ways is behaving in a suspicious way,
this may be useful information for the mafia boss (Gambetta, 1993). A mafia boss controlling
the territory has access to “thousand ears that talk to you and not to the police officer” 2 .
The demand for ‘pizzo’ is also a good training for younger mafia members to establish
themselves, and to learn how to control the economic activities on their territory. (Grasso and
Vasile, 2005, 17-18; Santino, 2000, 274).
Extortion may also be used as a way of increasing the control of the legal firm that may be
forced to employ one of the Mafia’s dependents as a partner. Eventually, the Mafia may take
over the commercial activities of the firm and, for example, use it for money laundering.
(Santino, 2000, 274)
Economic gains related to rackets are not the principal interest of the mafia, however.
More important is to make everybody pay as a sign of the subordination to the mafia family.
“Obviously the protection money which is raised from small business people only makes up a
small part of mafiosi income. When they demand protection money, then it is mainly as a sign
of subjugation, to signify recognition of their authority in a particular territory (…) these days
the market for public contracts or EC subsidies and illegal markets, particularly the drug
market, are financially much more significant.” (Hess, 1998, 196).

What is “pizzo”? — Many alternative terms are used when discussing the cash transfers from
local businessmen to the Mafia; protection money, rackets or extortion. In Sicily, the term
“pizzo” refers to a bird’s beak, used when drinking water, a natural and daily habit (Vasile,
2005, 7).
It is often discussed whether the payment is related to a real or genuine threat. It is often
claimed that protection is fictitious, in the sense that money is paid in order to secure
protection from threats from the provider himself (Hess, 1998, 195). Gambetta makes a
distinction between protection and extortion. The term protection is adequate for economic
actors who pay as a way of avoiding thefts preventing competitors to set up shop in their area.
Protection may also include protection against rival taxing authorities, i.e. other mafia
groupings. (Gambetta, 1993, 175).
Extortion is more adequate as a term when describing the mafia imposed taxes on outsiders
or entrepreneurs who wishes to settle and set up shop in a specific area. The fee may be high
for outsiders to enter a specific market and area: “From the point of view of those dealers
already buying protection, the extra cost imposed on the new entrant is precisely one of the
reasons they pay for protection in the first place: to deter new competitors (…) Whether we
are dealing with extortion or genuine protection depends on whether we are the new entrant or
the protected dealer” (Gambetta, 1993, 32).
Gambetta underlines that protection is offered to real threats. While criminality is generally
and manifestedly higher in mafia dominated areas, the unprotected firm may be more exposed
to thefts or vandalism than firms who are under the protection of a particular mafia leader or
mafia group.

2
Enrico Colajanni, interview date: 27.05.08
4
 It should be recalled there are different other ways of imposing ‘taxes’ on the local
community. As here mentioned, mafia taxes may be imposed directly through the payment of
pizzo, but citizens may be indirectly affected, too, through a position of monopoly on specific
goods and services. For example, a person wishing to build a house, must buy the material on
the local market, otherwise the craftsmen or workers would not accept to do the job; “it’s an
intricate system that everybody must adapt to” (Bolzone, interview, 1/3 2002). Local
businessmen may also be constrained to use services from specific companies. In Carini – a
small city in the proximity of Palermo – entrepreneurs have to use a specific company for
their transports or purchases. There is no need for threats, because everybody knows who is in
charge and there are no other competitors. A person paying a smaller fee may also receive
consumer advice: “I make you pay very little, in return you should by your goods in this
place, instead of that” 3 .
There are also other more innovative ways of collecting the pizzo. Money has been
collected to sponsor parties (feste patronali), to support imprisoned mafia members, or, as
happened in Taranto, to finance the construction of a monument of the mafia boss Antonio
Modeo. (Santino, 2000, 275)

Value of pizzu: situation in Palermo. — As estimated by Addiopizzo, eighty percent of

businesses currently give into mafia intimidation and pay a monthly tax, or ’pizzo’, which
totalled somewhere in the order of $33.5 billion dollars in the 2004 financial year. It should be
underlined, however, that it is difficult to properly estimate how many percent of the local
shopkeepers who pay ‘pizzo’ as very few shopkeepers are willing to admit that they are
paying. (Santino, 2000, 277)
Many point at the difficult situation in Palermo, due to the strong presence of the Mafia.
The Corleone mafia, which ruled Cosa Nostra for four decades, had their base in Palermo.
The most important mafia wars have taken place in Palermo, and this is where killings of
famous people, so-called “illustrious corpses”, have been most frequent. While Catania
represents the economic centre of gravity of Sicily, Palermo is the political and administrative
capital of Sicily. The Regional Assembly has its seat in Palermo, and all major decisions
regarding regional public spendings are made here.
The antiracket-movement has been weaker in Palermo than in other areas, due to the
presence of the Mafia. To quote one of the informants, to establish an anti-racket association
in Palermo is like “building an anglican church inside Saint Peters Basilic” in Rome 4 .

The logic of paying: the social trap. — The personal costs of not paying in a mafia dominated
area such as Palermo may be high for the person who chooses to report threats to the police.
In addition to the risk of material loss, the personal stakes are high. A person who refuses to
pay risks not only his or her personal safety, but also that of his or her family. He or she may
also be forced to leave the territory, as a consequence of the threats. The economic costs for
the non-paying entrepreneur may also be high as customers may be “advised” by the local
Mafia boss to make their purchases elsewhere (Sciarrone, 2004, 26).
The higher the number of shopkeepers that pays, the more negative it is for the individual
not to pay as the risks increase as the unprotected firm may be more targeted by other
“predators”, to use Gambetta’s wording. There may also be norms or a social pressure to pay:
those who are paying for protection would prefer that everybody else pays, too, as a way of
sharing the burden (Gambetta, 1993, 30-31). “We all pay, because when everybody is paying,
we are paying less”, an industrialist in the mafia dominated area of Brancaccio explained
(Santino, 2000, 281).
3
Enrico Colajanni, interview date: 27.05.08
4
Rodolfo Guajana, interview date: 27.05.08
5
 One of our informants talked about the persistence of cultural patterns in Palermo that
makes people less inclined to support local shopkeepers who refuses to pay to the Mafia. If a
local businessman is threatened, people don’t go to his or her store. If the person has reported
a threat or an attack to the police, it is not welcomed, on the contrary: “If somebody puts a
bomb in a shop... people don’t go to this person, they don’t go to this shop any more. When
people discover that he or she has reported to the police they don’t say “bravo”. From that
moment they avoid you, they say that your a sbirro 5 ”(police).
It should be recalled, however, that cultural patterns and attitudes differ between different
social strata and between different territories within Palermo (Gunnarson, 2008). There is a
possibility of individual choice. A person who refuses to pay, is normally not approached by
the mafia 6 . The assassination of Libero Grassi was not only a consequence of his refusal to
pay, but probably also due to his decision to report to the police, to publicly denounce the
mafia and to encourage others to follow his example. Grassi was killed because he was
isolated, but also because “the mafioso’s prestige had been offended” (Santino, 2000, 282).
In the Guajana case, there was a tradition in his family to refuse to pay the pizzo that dated
back to his grand grandfather (‘il bisnonno’). What made the mafia attack was probably
Guajana’s decision to write the open letter and to openly challenge the mafia.
Despite pre-existing cultural patterns or behaviours, there is still the possibility of
transforming cultural practices. Cultural transformation was an important aspect of the
antimafia movement during the 1990s, which we will discuss in the next section of the article.

3. On Antimafia and antiracket mobilization

Antimafia: general characteristics. — A great deal has been written on the Mafia in Sicily,
far less on the antimafia. Santino’s work is probably the most comprehensive analysis of the
antimafia movement in Sicily, spanning over more than 100 years of Sicilian history. Starting
with with the Sicilian workers’ movement in the 1890s, the so called Fasci, continuing with
the mass peasant movement and class struggle during the post-war period, Santino’s work
concludes with an analysis of the anti-mafia movement during the last 40 years. (Santino,
2000)
The earlier anti-mafia movement included landless peasants who engaged in a struggle
against oppressive landowners. The peasant movement had a broad base with hundreds of
thousands of participants, and was among the largest in Europe. The anti-mafia movement
during the 1960s and 1970s were much more limited, and were mainly taking place within the
institutions, for example within the Antimafia Commission. Civil resistance was limited to a
few initiatives, such as Peppino Impastatos ‘Radio Out’ in Cinisi and Danilo Dolci’s
educational program in Partinico 7 .
During the 1980s and 1990s, mass mobilisation followed on the assassinations of several
prominent personalities – the Prefect General Alberto Dalla Chiesa in September 1982, the
prosecutor Giovanni Falcone in May 1992, and Paolo Borsellino in July, 1992. The general
public reacted strongly and mass demonstrations followed on these assassinations. After
Falcone and Borsellino, associational life in Palermo literally exploded and many individual
and spontaneous initiatives were taken to protest against the Mafia, for example hunger
strikes, and the formation of the Comitato dei lenzuoli. During these years, efforts to change
attitudes from below were promoted from both civil society and by the State authorities.

5
Lirio Abbate, interview date: 29.05.08
6
Enrico Colajanni, interview date: 27.05.08
7
Umberto Santino, interview date: 28.05.08
6
 During the 1990s, the political ambition in Palermo underlined the importance of
promoting civil and legal values as a way of breaking the mafia’s mental and territorial
control. A priority for many antimafia associations during these years was to focus on young
citizens and civic education: to prevent these young citizens from acquiring a ‘mafia
mentality’ of distrust and hostility towards public institutions. Those branches of the
antimafia movement that were trying to promote a change in Palermo were now increasingly
considering cultural aspects of the mafia’s power. (Schneider and Schneider, 255-256). The
efforts made by Palermo’s Mayor Leoluca Orlando during the 1990s, were concentrated to
specific sectors: infrastructure, schools and culture. The themes of Orlando’s policy were to
reclaim the city from the Mafia and to give Palermo back to its citizens. A central theme of
his campaign was to make citizens appreciate their own city, to make them proud of it – to
make them love it. Among policymakers it was believed that if people cared for their city,
they would also engage in efforts to change it. (Gunnarson, 2008)
A general characteristic of the antimafia movement in Sicily is that it has reacted on
external events, and has developed in cycles. Strong reactions have followed murders of
prominent politicians, prosecutors or civil servants but periods of activism have been
followed by periods of passivity. Despite the continuous efforts by a small nucleolus of
activists in Palermo, the broader antimafia movement, including political responses, have
been reactive, ad hoc, and followed on emergencies. While the peasant movement of the
second part of the 19th and the first part of the 20th century had a broad popular base, the
number of engaged citizens have been more limited in more recent time (Jamieson, 2000, 39).
As Umberto Santino recalled in his interview: “From the 1980s, with the assassination of
Dalla chiesa, and during the 1990s, with the assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino, we
made big manifestations, but as continuous work in the history of the antimafia I would like
to point out three experiences: 1) the work in the schools, 2) the social use of confiscated
assets, 3) antiracket. All these three experiences have until today remained limited
experiences” 8 .

Antiracket: history and new iniatives. — During the second half of the 1980s and the first part
of the 1990s, extorsion spread and increased in all Italy. The number of cases reported to the
police continously increased during this period. According to the local studies, the number of
cases reported to the police was very low: less than 20 percent. According to a study prepared
by Confesercenti in Palermo, only 11 percent of the extortions were reported. (Santino, 2000,
273)
Anti-racket initiatives have faced more difficulties in Palermo, compared to other areas,
such as Naples and Capo d’Orlando in north-eastern Sicily. Despite the massive reactions
after the assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino in 1992, the payment of rackets remained a
marginal issue during the antimafia campaigns during the 1990s. As previously mentioned,
Libero Grassi’s was murdered in 1991, as a consequence of his refusal to pay the pizzo.
The first anti-racket association, Associazione dei commercianti e imprenditori orlandini
(Acio) was formed in Capo d’Orlando in December 1990. The shopkeepers decided to
establish an association as a reaction to the increasing number of requests, threats and attacks
received from personnalities from a neighboring village. In the legal process against the
extortionists, Acio was representing the civil side. The sentence fell in November 1991 and
condemned the accused persons. The legal process in Capo d’Orlando was followed by other
legal processes, and similar assocations were established in other regions. (Santino, 2000,
283-285)

8
Umberto Santino, interview date: 28.05.08
7
 The anti-racket initiative by local businessmen in Capo d’Orlando in the beginning of the
1990s never inspired their Palermitan colleagues, however. The reason why the local business
community managed to organise an anti-racket assocation in Capo d’Orlando was that the city
was not part of the Mafia’s traditional territory, and the local community was therefore under
less pressure. The persons asking for the pizzo came from Tortorici, a neighbouring village.
Hence, they were not yet established on Capo d’Orlando’s territory. In Naples, the power
structure of the Camorra is less hierarchic and the groupings more independent from each
other, which may explain why pression on the business community is weaker. It has also been
suggested that the anti-racket movement in Naples has enjoyed support from the political
level, which explains the different experiences in Palermo and Naples. (Grasso and Vasile,
2005, 50-51)
The first anti-racket association in Palermo, Libero Futuro, was formed much later, at the
end of 2007, and followed three years of mobilization that was originally initiated by a group
of students eventually known as “i ragazzi di Addiopizzo”. Differently from previous
antimafia efforts of the 1990s that emphasized the importance of civicness and legality by
focusing on aspects of political and civilian citizenship, Addiopizzo made an appeal to
Palermitans in their role as conscious consumers. For the first time, the antimafia struggle was
framed with concepts that addressed Palermitans as economic citizens.

4. The Addiopizzo Rebellion

Addiopizzo goes public. — Waking up on 29 June 2004, the citizens of Palermo found
hundreds of small stickers all around the centro storico (the historical city centre) that read:
“A whole population that pays the pizzo is a population without dignity”. The message did
not have a reference to a particular group or person, but, was addressed to all Palermitan
citizens. The day after, local radio and TV stations commented the stickers in their daily news
editions. Just a couple of days later, on July 1st, the attachini (bill stickers) – a group of seven
friends, all around their thirties - explained their motivation in an interview in the regional
newspaper Giornale di Sicilia and in an open letter published on the same day in the
Palermitan edition of la Repubblica.
Both in the interview and in the open letter the message conveyed was clear: everyone is
accountable for the mechanisms that uphold the practice of extortion of money. Addiopizzo
pointed at the indirect effects of simple everyday actions and asked to Palermitan citizens
make use of their “shopping bag power” as a way of opposing to the Mafia’s territorial power.

Have we ever thought that while doing our daily shopping we give money also to the Mafia?
Certainly not, nevertheless this is what we do. If the bakeries, the tobaccos, the bars, the fish
markets, the cinemas, the toy stores, etc. where we do our shopping are forced to pay the pizzo,
part of the money is given to the Mafia, even if it’s a small percentage, it’s our money […].” 9

From that point on Addiopizzo worked in order to create conditions for the emergence of
new alliances between conscious consumers and resisting shopkeepers. In order to achieve
this task, Addiopizzo activists imported and modelled their action on contemporary social
movements that work “in and thorough the market” as a way of promoting social change
(Micheletti 2003; Micheletti 2009; Schurman, 2004; Wahlstrom and Peterson, 2006).
In what follows we aim to provide an initial account on the internal and interactive
dynamics that shaped Addiopizzo mobilization by focusing on four stages that are considered

9
Extract of the letter published on the Palermitan section of la Repubblica, July 1, 2004
8
crucial in the process of “emergent mobilization” and further spread of a movement
(McAdam at al. 2001). The four stages are:
(i) Origin of mobilization - This initial stage of mobilization involves the invention,
importation, and diffusion of a “shared definition concerning the alterations and
likely consequences of possible actions undertaken by some political actor”
(McAdam et al. 2001, 95) and is considered a crucial stage during the initial phase
of mobilization. As argued by McAdam, collective action results from a number of
interactive conversations through which shared meanings and collective identities
are shaped (McAdam 2003). Protest is more likely also to spring out form an initial
catalyst that tiger an emergent group to react to new threats or to identify an
opportunity for the realization of the groups’ interests. Local friendships and
kinship ties as well as pre-existing mobilizing infrastructures may facilitate initial
mobilization.
(ii) Strategy identification – To be able to mobilize support, challengers utilize
strategies they judge as potentially effective to reach their goals. To be efficient,
contentious actions should be at the same time innovative - to signal to other parties
a change - and familiar - to be understood by others 10 . Movements also sometimes
emulate each other. In order for emulation to take place, activists must see that their
issues and identity are similar to other movements which they copy. They must also
believe that adopting the tactic of others has a reasonable chance of providing
success also for their own cause (Mayer and Boutcher 2007).
(iii) Creation of a social and organizational base – In order for mobilization to take
place challengers have to create an organizational vehicle. Group may set up a
entirely new organization and a supporting collective identity or, they may
appropriate an already pre-existing organization and the routine collective identity
on which it rests (McAdam 2003).
(iv) Diffusion – This last stage refers to how mobilization is extended to new groups of
citizens. Without some kind of diffusion, action would remain confined within the
initial group of site of mobilization (McAdam and Rucht 1993). Empirical research
has pointed out that mobilization is primarily influenced by relational diffusion
channels – e.g. movement organizations and social networks – and by news media.
Diffusion is also responsible for mobilization scale shift (McAdam et al., 2001,
McAdam, 2003).

Origin of mobilization. — In the case of Addiopizzo, it is important to note that mobilization

emerged as result of reflection among a limited group of people, not as a consequence of a
particular event that lead to strong reaction and mass mobilization. Contrary to antimafia
mobilization in the past, Addiopizzo has established despite the lack of previous dramatic
events such as, for example, the assassination of famous prosecutors or politicians.
The initiative emerged in a situation of stalemate where many Palermitans were tired of
the antimafia discourse. It was more the result of reflection, than a reaction on an external
event. As one member of the core initial group of Addiopizzo put it, everything started with
the idea of seven friends to open a pub in the Palermo city centre:

The original plan was to open a pub somehow different from the other ones that it is possible to
find in Palermo. Our motivations were mainly two: we wanted to create a space where we could

10
Repertoire of contention, i.e. the whole set of tactics social movements have to make their claims, are at
once a structural and a cultural concept. As Charles Tilly has argued, repertoires not only are what people do
when they are engaged in conflict with others, but what they know how to do and what other aspect them to do
(Tilly, 1986).
9
 start our own business based on the commercialization of fair-trade products, something that did
not exist in Palermo before. Aside this, we were interested in creating a space where certain issues
could be discussed: from fair trade to the effect of globalization as well as other issues more related
to our specific territory. A project that, in our minds, had both a political and economic aim. 11

As soon as the plan started to concretize, a friend external to the group and who had some
experience in setting up new businesses, helped the seven friends to calculate the initial costs
for opening a pub. Among the various expenses, the “pizzo” was enlisted. This cost was
something that nobody in the group had considered before. As one of our interviewee said, it
was here the discussion about extortion money started:

This was how we started to think about this problem. From that moment we started to speculate
about what we would do if someone came and asked us the pizzo. If we accepted to pay we would
have sort of become a party to the crime. The call to the whole population came from here. 12

In the formation of the first core group of activists, local friendship and kinship ties clearly
mattered. In this case, what also appeared to have played a rather important role was the
common experience of the seven friends in groups and organizations that had participated in
the so-called Global Justice Movement (GJM).
Core activists’ previous experiences were important for two reasons. First, the participation
of the seven core members in events and demonstrations after the so called Battle of Seattle
had reinforced their friendship and kinship ties making it easier to develop a shared identity
and a common group level account and understanding of the situation in Palermo. Moreover,
their experiences in the Global Justice Movements made it easier for them to identify a new
line of action to change the situation in Palermo.
As argued social movement can influence one another both indirectly, altering through
their action the opportunity other movement face in future, or directly though shared personal
(Meyer and Boutcher, 2007, 83). Once the protest cycles initiated at Seattle declined, activists
either returned to work primarily for their own organizations or filtered into diverse groups.
As also this case shows, regardless what they do, activists brought back to Palermo not only a
different world view, but also a new arsenal of tactics. 13

Strategy identification. — When Addiopizzo started to mobilize, market-based actions were

already well known among certain strata of the Italian population: mainly middle classes,
young and better educated. As well as in all Western Europe, Italians were increasingly
showing their willingness to take part in consumer boycotts and buycotts (Forno and
Ceccarini, 2006, Ferrer-Fons 2006)
The rise of the GJM constituted an important opportunity for the diffusion of marked-
based actions. As far as the diffusion of these practices is concerned, it is clear how the
demonstrations that followed after Seattle contributed to generate a different cultural climate
in which multinationals, the rules of the market and global financing were targeted as the
major causes to social injustice and an increase of environmental problems (Forno e
Ceccarini, 2006; Forno, 2007).
The success of political consumerism in spurring civic mobilization and social change
seems to have encouraged Addiopizzo activists to emulate groups and organizations that used
the market as a political arena. Addipizzo thus incorporated market-based actions among the
tactics to fight organized crime. As one of our informants noted: “To us, who have been part
11
Addiopizzo [a], interview date: 28.05.08
12
Addiopizzo [a], interview date: 28.05.08
13
Thus finding seem consistent also with Tarrow’s definition of protest cycle. As noted, when protest cycle
come to an end they nevertheless leave always some kind of residue behind them (Tarrow 1994)
10
of the Social Justice Movement, the idea of applying market-based action to the problem of
our territory, Palermo and the Mafia, was sort of a natural thing to do.” 14
In the view of Addiopizzo’s activists, when compared with previous forms of actions used
by anti-racket mobilization, marked-based actions had several advantages. First, they allowed
citizens to daily manifest their opposition to the Mafia’s territorial power through a concrete,
simple and almost costless act. Second, consumer-oriented marked-based activities were also
less risky as they could be conducted more anonymously. Finally, making the market the
privileged arena for action, this form challenged the Mafias control of the local territory
through citizens’ “shopping bag power”.

Creation of a social organizational base. — The contentious nature of Addiopizzo clearly

required the constitution of an original organizational vehicle. Setting up a totally new
organization required commitment and efforts on the part of the initial core group of activists.
However, its message departed from previous strategies and thus signalled a change, which
helped to attract and maintain media attention over time. On their side, activists made a quite
skilful use of the media, both old and new.
Together with the stickers the “attacchini” left an e-mail address that functioned as a sort
of collector of like-minded people. The role of Internet was important, although the
organisation never relied only on new means of communication. As one informant told us:
“Through this e-mail address, as well as through the personal contact each of us had, being a
member of other organizations, we were quickly able to reach and involve other people.” 15
The first who joined the organization were mainly members of other groups or people with a
well defined social profile. University students played a quite central role.
The main action carried out for the first months by the group was plastering the City with
flyers and posters. This initial billboarding activity proved important for two reasons: to
attract new members and to rise citizens’ awareness on the practices of extortion.
The billboarding activity were intensified after the opening of a website on the net. Here,
posters and stickers were made available for anyone to download. Addiopizzo’s website –
which was made accessible via the Internet on the 29 August 2004, the day of the anniversary
of Libero Grassi’s assassination – become soon a venue for generating networks as well as a
‘space’ for discussions and thrashing out issues of common concern.
The first campaign entitled “contro il pizzo cambia i consumi” (change consumption
against the pizzo) was launched few months later. In only few weeks Addiopizzo activists
were able to raise 3.500 signatures. The list of conscious consumers rebelling against the
racket was integrally published by the Giornale di Sicilia in May 2005. During the same
month the group formally registered as a committee.
In the second year of activity, Addiopizzo started to elaborate strategies that did not only
include consumers, but that gradually involved other key actors such as shopkeepers and
producers. In the beginning, the idea was to concentrate on retailers that had never paid the
pizzo. As one informant said “We started off from those who never paid, people we knew
personally.” 16 It was in this way the first list of 100 “pizzo free shops” was created. The list
was later presented during the first “pizzo free party” in 2005. The party was held in Piazza
Magione in the Kalsa popular quarter where both Falcone and Borsellino were born. This
yearly event involves hundreds of people, mostly young, and takes place every year in the
beginning of May.
Over the years Addiopizzo activity has further diversified. Beside the “pizzo free party”,
another important event is the meeting among retailers and industrials organised each August

14
Addiopizzo [b], interview date: 28.05.08
15
Addiopizzo [a], interview date: 28.05.08
16
Enrico Colajanni, interview date: 27.05.08
11
on the anniversary of Libero Grassi’s assassination. Significant is also the activity that
Addiopizzo carries out with schools. On March 4 2008, Addiopizzo opened also its own shop
called “punto pizzo free”, a shop entirely dedicated to the commercialization of pizzo free
products.
During the year, Addiopizzo members are also often engaged in the organization of various
activities in support of resisting shopkeepers. They also take part in events organized by other
organizations. In line with the non-partisan character of the group, Addiopizzo tries to have a
dialogue with both right-wing and left-wing political forces.
Its non-partisan and pragmatic character, the presence of a collective leadership, flexible
structures as well as the reliance on collective decision making, are other characteristics of
Addiopizzo that may differentiate the initiative from previous experiences in the fight against
the mafia.
Despite its flexible structure, Addiopizzo – which has now 70 members of which 20 are
very active - is rather formalized. It has a written statute, written programs, defined offices (a
president, a spokesman, a chairperson, an administrative committee, an assembly a part-time
paid secretary) and an office. The group also enjoys a certain amount of financial support
from different sources: from private donations (through its website), from selling gadgets (t-
shirts etc.), from grants and sponsorships.

Diffusion. — By making the market its privileged arena for action, and by appealing citizens
on their societal roles (as consumers, retailers, industrialists, producers, etc.) rather than on
other lines of distinction, Addiopizzo was able to align with interests, values and beliefs of
groups and organizations that went beyond the traditional anti-mafia actors in Palermo.
The encounter with Tano Grasso, the honorary chairman of the Italian Federation of Anti-
Racket Associations (FAI), was described as crucial by Addiopizzo’s activists. 17 On the one
hand the recognition of such an important personality was significant to reinforce activists’
identity, on the other Grasso’s knowledge and expertise in dealing with organized crime was
considered essential at a moment when Addiopizzo’s popularity was growing and an
increasing number of shopkeepers and businessmen refused to pay protection money.
After the encounter with Grasso, the idea to establish the first anti-racket organization
started to become concrete. In Grasso’s view, Addiopizzo’s mobilization created the
opportunity to achieve what he had tried to do for more that fifteen years without success. As
one informant said:

When the action of Addiopizzo stated to gain its first successes, Tano Grasso said: nobody will be
able to set up an anti-racket mobilization in Palermo but you. Since our first encounter he has
always followed us, demonstrating that he had perfectly understood the value of our initiative.
Then we followed a training for about one year. The initial idea was to arrive to the constitution of
the anti-racket organization much later. Then the Mafia’s assault to Guajana’s company accelerated
the process and Liberofuturo was officially founded on August 29, 2007. 18

Over the years Addiopizzo has periodically promoted actions with other branches of the
Palermitan anti-mafia movement. In addition to activities with schools, mentioned above,
Addiopizzo has also collaborated with the Centro Peppino Impastato (the Sicilian Centre of
Documentation on the Mafia, founded in 1977 by the historian Umberto Santino), with
Libera, an association established in 1995 which deals with civic education and the social use
17
As one member of Addiopizzo recounted: “At that time we were mainly manifesting with this idea of
consumers’ co-responsibility. A substantial change was receiving credit from Tano Grasso who came to
Palermo and told us that the idea was genius and posed us in front of the dilemma of how we could have
developed it further” [Addiopizzo [a], interview date: 28.05.08]
18
Enrico Colajanni, interview date: 27.05.08
12
of confiscated real estate, as well as with some recently formed actors, such as the Palermitan
branch of BancaEtica, that opened in November 2007. Collaboration between these actors is
indicated by the number of shared members and the number of joint activities and events.
A part from these organizations, Addiopizzo has been able to establish links and coalitions
with other actors not traditionally involved in the anti-mafia mobilization. The collaboration
with Adiconsum - one of the largest Italian consumer organizations – has, for example, been
important in Addiopizzo activity. In 2006 Adiconsum sponsored one of the first Addiopizzo’s
campaign titled “I pay who does not pay” (“pago chi non paga”), a campaign that had the
support of several other consumer associations such as of Lega Consumatori, Adoc, Aduc,
Sicilia Consumatori and Unione Nazionale Consumatori.
Moreover, recent anti-racket mobilization was followed by interesting changes also within
the main industrialists and retailers’ regional organizations. In 2007, both Confindustria
Sicilia and FIPE 19 (Federazione Italiana Pubblici Esercizi) developed their codes of conduct
ratifying and implementing the instruments against the practice of extortion of money and
officially stating that whoever pays protection money and works in conjunction with the
Mafia is excluded from their association.
The goodwill of executives, the diffusion of a managerial script about accountability, and
the rise of norms of “ethical conduct” among the Palermitan business community can be
reasonably seen as one of the outcome of the Addiopizzo rebellion,

The ecology of protest. — Despite the role played by Addiopizzo’s in revitalizing the fight
against organized crime, political consumerism still remains very limited in its scope. Despite
an increase of almost 100 units per year, the total number of shops that have joined
Addiopizzo list is in total 279, while consumers amount to up 6944.
The location of shops and consumers tell us something about the diffusion and degree of
mobilisation. The distribution of shops that have joined Addiopizzo’s listing is unevenly
distributed on the Palermitan territory: only in six areas of 27 the number of shops exceded
ten shops. All these areas are in central Palermo (Libertà, Politeama, Castellamare, Resuttana-
San Lorenzo, Malaspina-Palagonia, Tribunali). Almost 49 percent of the 213 shops/producers
on Addiopizzo’s list for Palermo were located in the areas of Libertà and Politeama – the
most elegant areas in Palermo – where all the famous Italian brands can be found. The third
biggest agglomeration of Addiopizzo shops are located in the Castellamare area round Via
Roma, Via Maqueda and Via Vittorio Emmanuele. The area attracts a different social stratum
than that of Libertà, but is equally popular for its shopping possibilities. In four areas –
Tommaso Natale-Sferracavallo, Boccadifalco, Altarello, and Brancaccio-Ciaculli – none of
the local shops or producers had adhered Addiopizzo’s initiative.
Libertà, Politeama and Castellamare are the most important shopping areas of central
Palermo, which may to some extent explain why most shop on the list, are found here.
Support from customers and the surrounding environment may also make shopkeepers more
motivated to refuse to pay rackets. Libertà is the wealthiest area of Palermo, and ranks high
on all socio-economic indicators: unemployment is low, access to services is high, the area is
peaceful and citizens have a higher educational level than elsewhere. In Libertà, 1,231
consumers and eleven schools have joined the list, which is far more than in any other area in
Palermo. In the four areas where none of the shopkeepers had joined the list, the socio-
economic conditions are much weaker, particularly in Brancaccio and Altarello, and the
number of critical consumers very limited (Tab. 1).

19
FIPE is the leader association in the sector of restaurants and catering, in which operate over 230,000
businesses including bars, restaurants, discotheques and bathing establishments employing 750,000 people, with
an annual sales revenue exceeding 70,000 billion liras, http://www.fipe.it/fipe/index.htm.
13
 Table 1. Numbers of shops, consumers and schools that have joined Addiopizzo in Palermo 20 .
Area No. Listed shops No. Critical consumers No. Schools
1. Libertà 52 1231 11
2. Politeama 52 544 2
3. Castellamare 25 82 2
4. Resuttana-San Lorenzo 17 785 9
5. Malaspina-Palagonia 12 437 8
6. Tribunali 11 162 1
7. Partanna Mondello 6 209 2
8. Montepellegrino 4 234 2
9. Cruillas-CEP 4 190 0
10. Palazzo Reale 4 86 1
11. Uditore-Passo di Rigano 3 336 6
12. Villagrazia-Falsomiele 3 158 3
13. Santa Rosalia-Montegrappa 3 135 0
14. Zisa 2 352 3
15. Cuba-Calatafimi 2 294 1
16. Oreto-Stazione 2 284 3
17. Mezzomonreale-Villatasca 2 233 2
18. Settecannoli 2 133 2
19. Monte di Pietà 2 91 2
20. Arenella 2 55 0
21. Noce 1 196 3
22. Pallavicino 1 148 0
23. Borgo Nuovo 1 100 1
24. Tommaso Natale-Sferracavallo 0 205 0
25. Boccadifalco 0 122 0
26. Altarello 0 78 2
27. Brancaccio-Ciaculli 0 64 5
Total in Palermo 213 6944 71
Source: Addiopizzo, www.addiopizzo.org, 080806

When analysing which categories of shops that have joined the initiative, it is evident that
very few shopkeepers or producers have joined Addiopizzo’s initiative this far. Thus for the
conscious consumer the alternatives offered for critical consumption remain limited.
Addiopizzo classifies the shops that have joined their initiative in seven categories: food and
drinks, clothes, health/well-being, services, leisure, travels, house/furnishing. About 24
percent of the shops on Addiopizzo’s list were found in the category “leisure” (culture, music,
entertainment, sports, coffee shops, book shops etc). About 20 percent of the shops are found
in the category “food and drink” (alimentary stores, farms, agriturismo, bars, ice-cream shops,
wine bars, restaurants). The third biggest category is “house and furnishing”. Almost 18
percent of the shops are in this category that includes furniture, design and construction.
“Services” represent about 15 percent of the shops including hardware shops, publicity,
graphic design, bank and finance, and other services provided to public and private companies
As regards alimentation, perhaps the economic activity that has most impact on daily
consumption, few shops or supermarkets has joined. Only one of the biggest supermarkets –
Coop – had joined Addiopizzo’s list. Standa, Upim and Auchan were not on Addiopizzo’s
list. As regards clothes, very few shops are enlisted. Many of the most elegant stores for
clothes or shoes along Via Libertà had not joined the list (MaxMara, Sisley, Rinasciente,
Fransal, Hermès). Neither had commercial chains such as Benetton, Promod, Zara or Mazzara
joined the initiative. None of the most important bookstores in Palermo - Flaccovio, Feltrinelli
and Mondadori - were on Addiopizzo’s list either. For a presentation of the category of shops
that have joined the Addiopizzo listing, their absolute and relative number (Table 2).

20
Note that the numbers in this table only include members within the City of Palermo.
14
 Table 2. Category of shops that have joined the Addiopizzo listing (total number and %)
Category Number Percent
Leisure (tempo libero) 66 23,7
Food and drink 57 20,4
House and furnishing 50 17,9
Services 43 15,4
Tourism 24 8,6
Clothes 21 7,5
Health, wellbeing, estetics 6 2
Other 18 6,4
Total 279 100
Source: Addiopizzo, www.addiopizzo.org, 080806

It is possible that individual shopkeepers who refuse to pay rackets have an influence on
their neighbours and business colleagues. This may explain why 25 shops have joined
Addiopizzo in Castellamare, where only 82 critical consumers are reported.
The pressure and influence of different mafia groupings on the local territories may also
explain why the initiative has more difficulties to establish in some areas than others. Some
territories in Palermo are more closed to external influence than others. The industrial area of
Brancaccio is particularly interesting since it is an area controlled by the mafia family
Graviano. It was here that the local parish priest Pino Puglisi was killed in 1993, due to his
resistance to the mafia. The area is part of Palermo, but is quite isolated from the rest of the
city. Public communications are poor, and there are few reasons for non-residents to visit the
area. The area is “psychologically distant” from the rest of the City. None of the shops in this
area had joined Addiopizzo. In the Zisa district, another area traditionally dominated by the
Corleone mafia (the area was part of Totó Riina’s territory), only one shop and one antimafia
association had joined the anti-racket list. Another area where the Mafia presence is strongly
felt is Monreale, a small hill-town 8 chilometers south-west of Palermo. Here, only 5 shops or
producers had joined the list. A part from the pharmacy, none of these shops performed
economic activities that affected daily consumer habits. For a description of the shops,
consumers and schools that have joined Addiopizzo in Palermo.
This point recalls the need to analyze the evolution of the Addiopizzo initiative by taking
into account the characteristics of the initiative’s wider environment. Our final paragraph it is
dedicated to an analysis of the interactions between Addiopizzo and the “world around” it
(Mayer, 2004).

5. Addiopizzo and the “world around”

Social movement literature has long recognized the significance of the broader social and
political context for the emergence, strategic choices, and efficacy of protest movements. As
claimed by political opportunity scholarship within the social movement literature,
environmental conditions can either constrain or facilitate mobilization.
In this last paragraph of our analysis by departing from the work by Luders (2006),
Schurman (S004) and Wahlstrom and Petterson (2006) we will discuss changes in the
political, cultural and economic structures that may have influenced the evolution of
Addiopizzo initiative ever time. Despite the fact that external conditions has been widely
recognised as key shapers of mobilization, it is only recently that the attention of scholars has
started to focus on systems of opportunity aside those related to the domestic political sphere.
In particular, there are still very few studies that consider the influence of economic
institutions in the analysis of mobilization. As Schurman and Munro have argued: “This
dearth of attention to economic phenomena is even more surprising in light of the fact that so
many contemporary movements have turned their attention away form the state and are
15
directly targeting firms, industries, and global economic institutions as a means of eliciting
change” (2008, 7).
Departing from the work by Luders (2006), Schurman (2004), Wahlstrom and Peterson
(2006), in this last part of our analysis we will discuss changes in the political, cultural and
economic opportunity structures that may have influenced the development of the Addiopizzo
initiative.

Political opportunity structure. — Regarding political opportunity, studies have pointed to

diverse sets of variables concerning the characteristics of political configuration of power,
namely the institutional features of the State and the strength/weakness of the judiciary. These
may generate important political openings and closures for mobilization.
The local political system in Palermo may be described as closed and with few possibilities
for citizens without personal contacts to influence public decisions. In the beginning of the
1990s, according to a report from the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Palermo, the number of
politicians and officials in stable relationships with the mafia had increased to the extent that
the mafia groups had contacts with key officials en employees in ‘every local authority office
of interest to mafia groups’ (Vannucci, 1997 57). After the fall of the First Republic (1992-
94), new parties and new political regroupings emerged. Even if many parties expressed their
commitment to fight the mafia – particularly during the years following the murders of
Falcone and Borsellino in 1992 – this conviction was less clear and less explicit after the mid-
1990s. Efforts to increase the transparency of the system were initiated during Mayor Leoluca
Orlando, but his policy soon returned to the clientelistic tradition. It seems quite
uncontroversial to state that, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Antimafia has hardly been
a priority on the political agenda on national level or local level. The political system is
frequently described as difficult to analyse or understand. 21 The electoral successes of
Berlusconi and Forza Italia in Palermo and Sicily, has not added clarity on the antimafia
stance of the party. On the contrary, Berlusconi’s centre-right alliance is believed to be the
inheritor of the clientelistic networks of the Christian Democratic party. Francesco Musotto, a
member of the European parliament was arrested in 1995 for mafia collusion, but eventually
acquitted in 1998. Another force behind the creation of Forza Italia, Marcello dell’Utri, was
also been indicted and condemned for mafia collusion (Schneider and Schneider, 2006, 78-
79). It can be argued that this institutional unwillingness/incapability to deal with organized
crime, was a reason behind Addiopizzo’s turn toward the market as an arena for politics.
Nevertheless, important achievements have been accomplished in anti-mafia and anti-
racket legislation and several new laws have been adopted. The most noteworthy law is the
so-called Rognoni-La Torre law which in 1982 created the crime of “association of a Mafia
type”. Since 1982 investigators have been able to pursue crime by means of the association,
instead of having to prove the crime (Jamieson, 2000, 28-29). The Rognoni-La Torre law
incorporated law 646 regarding asset tracing, freezing and confiscation powers, that had
existed since 1965. The seizure and confiscation of illegally acquired assets, and their
redeployment toward socially beneficial ends, have been halting and often disappointing in its
effects” (Schneider and Schneider, 2006, 78). Moreover, two laws in support to victims of
extortion were passed in 1992 after the murder of Libero Grassi and the experience of
antiracket of Capo d'Orlando. The first law passed in 1992 (Act. 172) and required that the
victim complained, and that he or she had suffered damage as a result of intimidation or an act
of reprisal of the Mafia. The law guaranteed victims of extortion a compensation for material

21
An experienced Palermitan journalist described the situation as ‘marmalade’ – it was no longer evident
who was for or against the mafia even if everybody claimed to be against it. Neither the political Right, nor the
Left has promoted the antimafia since the middle of the 1990s. Even if many claimed they were against the
mafia, it was less clear who was only paying lip service to the cause. (Bolzone, 1/3 2002).
16
losses, including loss of income. The second law, passed in 1996 (Act. 108), offered a five-
year loan at zero percent of interest to those who collaborates with the institutions The
purpose of the law was to encourage victims’ reintegration into the labour market. Another
important law was approved in 1999 (Act. 44), which is considered one of the most important
legal instruments to fight rackets. To get access to the solidarity fund, it is not any more
necessary to report to the police, it is enough to have the conviction to refuse the extortionists
and to provide all the necessary information to the law enforcement agencies. It is neither
necessary to have suffered material damages, but the law may be applied for persons who
have suffered from threats, for example if a person is hindered to make purchases in his or her
commercial activities. All the material loss can also be compensated for (Conticello, YEAR,
27). The application of the various laws has not always produced the desired results due to
delays in the procedure and in the absence of a strong political motivation. They nevertheless
constitute potential opportunities for resisting economic actors.
In general law enforcement agencies seem less affected by the lack of transparency and
loss of political momentum. With support from advanced legal instruments, prosecutors have
successfully and independently continued its fight against the mafia. The most obvious
success during the last years was the arrest of Cosa Nostra’s superboss Bernardo Provenzano
on April, 11, 2006. Provenzano had escaped law enforcement agencies for more than four
decades and was captured in a small house close to Corleone. Another recent success was the
capture of Francesco Lo Piccolo on November, 5, 2007. Lo Piccolo was one of the most
powerful bosses of Palermo and was believed to be the successor to Provenzano.

Cultural opportunity structure. — Likewise political opportunity structure, cultural

opportunity structure in society may be open or closed to a movement’s message. Citizens
may be more or less receptive to the message delivered by a movement. Cultural opportunity
structures may include a number of factors. Wahlström and Peterson (2006) have suggested
for example that values, myths, world view, class-consciousness and media representation
represent all factors that may facilitate or hindered mobilization.
Regarding the cultural opportunity system, we can highlight some factors in the general
societal structural environment that may have influenced Addiopizzo’s emergence and
development. The first regard the state of civicness in Palermo. Unfortunately there is a lack
of systematic surveys of citizens’ attitudes in Palermo. Worth noting is that the political
efforts during the 1990s, after the assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino, focussed on the
importance of creating a more conscious citizenship in Palermo. After the years of mass
engagement in the beginning of the 1990s, however, the general interest in the Antimafia
issue decreased. Many of Palermo’s most urgent problems such as traffic, housing,
unemployment and the reconstruction of Palermo’s historical centre, Centro storico, remained
unsolved and there was a general tiredness of Antimafia rhetoric. Still, considering the
cultural transformation of the city during the last two decades, many Palermitans would
probably agree there is a somewhat stronger sense of Palermitan identity today than before,
and an increased conscience about the necessity of fighting the Mafia. The Mafia is talked
about, not least in schools. Compared with the violent years of the 1970s and 80s the City is
much safer than before and the streets are visibly more crowded in the evenings. A couple of
decades ago the city centre was emptied after dark, because of both fear and a self-imposed
curfew (Gunnarson, 2008, chapter 5).
Many informants highlight the possibility of a generational change and refer to the fact that
many of the founders of Addiopizzo have been influenced by the events following on the two
judges. The members are described as “the children of the Falcone-tree”, referring to the tree
growing outside Falcone’s apartment in via Notarbartolo in central Palermo, and which

17
became a symbol for the continued fight against the mafia. It remains however to be studied
to what extent these values are shared by a broader social stratum.
The last observable change pertain the media. The lack of media interest for mafia issues in
the local and national press was a recurrent issue among members of anti-mafia organization
in the past. Important sentences or interventions by law enforcement agencies hardly made the
frontline of the news. This is not a factor that has worried actors within Antipizzo. On the
contrary, as we analyzed in previous part of this paper, media played an important role and
press coverage was constant, particularly by the regional newspaper Giornale di Sicilia,
which offered free commercial space for Addiopizzo’s initiative. The important successes of
the law enforcement agencies in recent years have probably also added to an increased
coverage on the mafia. The capture of Provenzano was, of course, spectacular and made the
head news of most Italian national medias. Thus the chances of receiving coverage for
Addiopizzo might have increased as it involved a theme that was already under the focus of
media attention. Another important factor was the role played by new information
technologies, such as Internet.

Economic opportunity structure. — The socio-economic situation of Sicily is still

characterized by very weak economic performance. The per capita income is lower than the
average of other regions of southern Italy and the economy is still dependent on transfers of
public money form the central State in combination with a strong presence of organised
crime. In addition, high school drop-out rates is high and the infrastructure and social services
inefficient.
For what concerns Sicily, the region is ‘autonomous’ and enjoys quite a lot of legislative
autonomy. It means that its Regional government can intervene to establish legislation
directly and it can also establish policies which differ from the national policy. Beside being
more autonomous, Sicily have historically received important financial resources transferred
from central government, through the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. This fact has influenced the
development of an economic model that has been characterized by an economy dependent on
external financial transfers, mainly from the central State, with a concentration of businesses
in the traditional industrial sectors. Until the 1980s, the Sicilian production model was
dominated by a traditional companies and large companies engaged in public works. This
configuration was due mainly to the policies for ‘Mezzogiorno’ that transferred large amounts
of financial means from the central State to the island. This situation has led to a deteriorated
political culture that is not geared to produce projects, but to receive public funding. It has
also had deteriorating effects on business culture, because entrepreneurs focused on sectors
beneficial to large investment flows from the central State. The Sicilian economy has always
been an economy based on a substantially protected market, linked to public spending - an
economy without autonomy as the social economist Carlo Trigilia named it (Triglia 1992).
This system, however, entered into crisis at the beginning of the 1990s for two reasons:
The financial crisis of the State which has reduced cash flows to the Mezzogiorno. This was
the period of Tangentopoli. This period saw the collapse of all major groups linked to the
world of public works but, at the same time, freed a number of entrepreneurial new energies.
The consequence was a quite radical downsizing of traditional industrial sectors which was
compensated by the rise of new sectors in the economy, particularly in wine, tourism,
retailing and banking. In the beginning of the 1990s, small companies started to develop in
various sectors. Most of these companies began to measure themselves with the market and,
thus, developed skills and abilities very different from traditional Sicilian business. The
North-West area of Sicily has, for example, seen the emergence wine production. The South-
Eastern part of the island is instead observing a trend of more mixed development involving

18
tourism, chemical industry and some manufacturing related to data processing and PV (the so-
called Etna Valley).
Over time, these companies find a broader social representation. In recent years Sicily has
seen an increasingly strong emergence of a new generation of businessmen, without political
connections. Today this world has increased its political and social representation. Within
Confindustria, for example, only one of nine presidents has activities in the traditional
sector 22 .

Table 3. Opportunity structures checklist

• Political
8 Closeness of political system (openness during Orlando, but personalised)
9 Development in anti-mafia and anti-racket legislation
9 Recent successes of the law enforcement agencies (arrest of Riina, Provenzano, Lo Piccolo).

• Cultural
8 Still a lack of civicness among the general public
9 Emergence of a new generation – I “figli dell’albero di Falcone”
9 Media attention / Diffusion of new media and the Internet

• Economic
8 A capita income lower than the average of other regions of southern Italy and an economy still in large part dependent
to transfers of public money form the central state. In addition, a high school drop-out rate and the presence of
infrastructure and social services objectively inefficient.
9 Less money transferred from the central state and consequent development of a more competitive economic sector
(less “sviluppo senza autonomia”)
9 New generation of businessmen and consequent change in Confindustria leadership

The mafia: a major stakeholder. — As seen, the initiative coincides with a possible
weakening of the mafia since the arrest of Bernardo Provenzano in April 2006 and other
important arrests made by the Police and law enforcement agencies.
The influence of Cosa Nostra on politics seems more developed in Palermo and Sicily than
in other regions in the Mezzogiorno. This may be explained by the stronger organisation of
Cosa Nostra than the other mafia groupings, but is also related to the fact that Sicily is an
autonomous region with its own finances. The regional autonomy gives the Sicilian mafia a
more direct control over the Region’s finances than in the other regions in southern Italy,
which is why Sicily and Palermo continues to be the main operating territory for Cosa Nostra.
Even if the mafia is an institution outside the state, the mafia also exists inside the state and
is involved in numerous activities, for example the use of public finances, the procurement of
public contracts, through the control of preference votes, and through its influence on policy-
making. (Santino, 1997, 8).
The Mafia may also condition the future development of Addiopizzo. It may accept the
movement as long as it is not too successful. If it gains in importance, there is a risk that
major actors in the anti-racket movement would be targeted. Despite the presence of Cosa
Nostra in Palermo, it is possible for the individual to refuse paying for protection. There are
examples of shopkeepers in Palermo who have refused paying without being harassed or
killed 23 . The mafia accepts a civil resistance, but only to certain limits. The Addiopizzo
initiative is still quite limited in their success considering that only 300 of Palermo’s about
10,000 shopkeepers have joined. There is also a risk if major personalities within the
movement are exposed in media.

22
Ivan Lo Bello, interview date: 27.05.08
23
Enrico Colajanni, interview date: 27.05.08; Rodolofo Guajana, interview date: 27.05.08
19
 A possible success of the antimafia movement would be a continued shared responsibility
and an avoidance of initiatives that are personalised or too closely related to a principal leader
within the anti-racket movement. There is therefore a pragmatic reason for not exposing
single leaders or activists openly, and to create a massive support for the movements. Despite
the recent changes, the situation is still vulnerable. As commented by the President of Libero
Futuro (the first anti-racket movement in Palermo), the movement would die if the mafia
killed someone 24 . The importance of shared responsibility is nothing unique for this
movement, but is general for other actors – state or non-state actors – involved in the fight
against the mafia. An unresolved dilemma for the initiative is that it is dependent on a support
from the general public for a continued success. To change their attitudes, however, more
efforts need to be made in public to gain their support. Exposure in media, may challenge the
mafia, however, and eventually provoke a reaction.

6. Conclusion

Similarities and differences between previous anti-mafia efforts and the initiative by
Addiopizzo. — There are several similarities between previous anti-mafia efforts and the
Addiopizzo initiative, but also some important differences.
When it comes to similarities Addiopizzo addresses the individual citizen and the personal
responsibility in the fight against the Mafia. In order to combat organised crime, citizens –
and not only the State – need to be involved in the fight. The methods used are not based on
direct confrontations with the Mafia, but represent a “soft method” in the sense that
Addiopizzo’s initiative aims at changing citizens’ values and attitudes. They point at
everybody’s individual responsibility to reflect on their own values and behaviour.
Addiopizzo’s objective to call on citizens’ personal responsibility is not new, but resembles
the aims and ambitions promoted by Antimafia activists, schools, churches, and antimafia
associations during the 1990s. Centres like “Istituto di formazione politica - Centro Pedro
Arrupe”, la “scuola di formazione etica-politica Giovanni Falcone”, the social centre “San
Francesco Saverio”, and the association “Inventare insieme – Centro Tau” work with
attitudinal change at the same time as they offer access to sporting facilities, library,
education, economic support or information of various kind. The purpose of many of these
activities was to present an alternative behavior and lifestyle that was not supportive to the
Mafia’s interests, and ultimately aimed at breaking the Mafia’s mental and territorial control.
The Addiopizzo initiative reminds of the words written on the banderole in the church of
Brancaccio “If everyone makes something” (“Se ognuno fa qualcosa”) or the wall painting in
an area in Palermo’s historical centre: “Albergheria is reborn by us” (Albergheria rinasce da
noi”). Other messages conveyed by “The Sheets Committee” after the murders of Falcone and
Borsellino was: report to the police when you have witnessed a crime, always ask for a
receipt, don’t accept bribery or corruption, refuse to exchange votes for any type of favour,
boycott Mafia business, don’t buy contraband cigarettes, learn to do your duty, intervene to
prevent young people from acquiring a Mafia mentality, educate your children to legality,
solidarity and tolerance (Jamieson, 2000, 131-132).
Nevertheless, the Addiopizzo initiative also differs from previous anti-mafia efforts on
several points. A first difference from previous antimafia movements is that Addiopizzo
presents a more concrete line of action for citizens opposing to the Mafia and makes an appeal
to Palermitans as “economic citizens”. The strategy offered underlines the importance of daily
reflection on daily choices and consumer habits. It calls on citizens to be conscious consumers
24
Enrico Colajanni, interview date: 27.05.08

20
and to use their “shopping bag power” as a way of fighting organised crime. The strategy
offered was not only negatively formulated – “to pay rackets is wrong, denounce the
racketeers and boycott shopkeepers who continue to pay” – but positive in the sense that it
was supportive to shopkeppers who refuse to pay for protection. The framing of the initiative
here reminds of the school program conducted in Palermitan schools during the 1990s. The
program started as an “antimafia programme” but was later renamed the “legality
programme” as teachers believed that a message should be more positively formulated – it
should not only be against the Mafia, but for something else.
Another difference from previous antimafia mobilisation in Palermo is that the initiative
was inspired from external events rather than internal events in Palermo. The initiative was
launched by a group of students who had not previously been engaged in the Antimafia
movement, but who shared experiences from other social movements. The group was inspired
by the WTO protests in Seattle in 1990, the Attac movement, and the Italian network Rete
Lilliput and adopted the international discourse to fit the local territory and realities in
Palermo. A third important difference is that the initiative started as a result of reflection
among a limited group of people, not as a consequence of a particular event. Previous anti-
mafia movements have often followed cycles; starting with an assassination on important
representative of the State, causing mass reactions, and eventually fading out. Many
associations were created after the assassination of Falcone and Borsellino, but many also
disappeared after a short period of activism. Addiopizzo established despite the absence of a
dramatic event and sprang from a different situation where many Palermitans were tired of
antimafia rhetoric after the mobilization of the 1990s.

Can Addiopizzo make a difference?. — Despite the success of Addiopizzo in launching a new
strategy, the initiative still has a limited support by shopkeepers, producers and consumers in
Palermo. Only about 300 shops have joined the initiative this far and there are limited
possibilities for citizens wishing be conscious consumers. As regards alimentation, only Coop
has adhered to Addiopizzo, and for clothes very few shops are enlisted. Despite the positive
development in recent years, the initiative is still limited in space and, quoting Santino,
“critical consumption remains a desire, because it is not possible to practice here”25 . Another
limitation is that the initiative is supported by a specific and well-educateted strata. It remains
to be seen to what extent the initiative is able to attract a broader clientele.
Another limitation is that the penetration of the territory is uneven. Only in six areas of 27
in Palermo the number of shops exceeded ten shops. All these areas are in central Palermo
(Libertà, Politeama, Castellamare, Resuttana-San Lorenzo, Malaspina-Palagonia, Tribunali).
Almost 49 percent of the 213 shops/producers on Addiopizzo’s list for Palermo were located
in the areas of Libertà and Politeama. The third biggest agglomeration of Addiopizzo shops
are located in the Castellamare area round Via Roma, Via Maqueda and Via Vittorio
Emmanuele. In four areas – Tommaso Natale-Sferracavallo, Boccadifalco, Altarello, and
Brancaccio-Ciaculli – none of the local shops or producers had adhered Addiopizzo’s
initiative.
Why these differences within Palermo? We have here presented some possible explantions
that need to be further explored. A first explanation is that Libertà, Politeama and
Castellamare are the most important shopping areas of central Palermo, which explain why
most shops on the list are found here. The number of shops is merely a reflection on the high
density of shops. Another explanation is that support from customers and the surrounding
environment may make shopkeepers more motivated to refuse to pay rackets. Libertà is the
wealthiest area of Palermo, and ranks high on all socio-economic indicators. Here, 1,231

25
Umberto Santino, interview date: 28.05.08
21
consumers and eleven schools have joined Addiopizzo’s list, which is far more than in any
other area in Palermo. A third explanation is that the influence of different mafia groupings on
the local territories put severe restraints on the initiative’s possibility to establish in some
areas. In the industrial area of Brancaccio, where the local economy is strongly conditioned
by the local Mafia, none of the shops or producers had joined the list. In the Zisa district,
another area traditionally dominated by the Corleone mafia, only one shop and one antimafia
association had joined the anti-racket list. In Monreale, also reknowned for a strong Mafia
influence, only 5 shops or producers had joined the list. None of these shops or producers was
engaged in economic activities related to daily consumption, however.
Another challenge for Addiopizzo is that different strategies are required when
approaching different groups of shopkeepers and producers. As Addiopizzo activists said,
they started by approaching shopkeepers that refused to pay, i.e. shopkeeper who were
already convinced to not pay for protection to the Mafia. Reasons to pay vary considerably
between different producers and shopkeepers, however. Some pay because they are afraid,
others pay because they have an economic interest that is shared by the Mafia, some business
is already a part of the Mafia’s business, or perhaps owned by the Mafia. Not all shopkeepers
or producers have an interest in not paying and some may be less motivated – or not
motivated at all – to join the initiative. Due to these different incentives to join, a diversified
strategy that may exclude some businesses is required, and Mafia interests, once again, limit
the possibilities of Addiopizzo.
Another limitation is the difficulty to change consumer habits. Which are the economic
incentives for the average citizen to abandon their previous consumer habits? Are moral
incentives enough to mobilise the masses? If products are cheap enough, people may probably
have more incentives to change their daily consumer habits. An important limitation is that
the presence of Mafia business distorts market mechanisms. Lower prices can be offered by
mafia producers as they are not paying taxes, they don’t respect established salaries or other
labour law restrictions; they impose threats on competitors, and are in many other ways able
to compete with lower prices than legal business. One of our informants said that “people go
where it’s cheap, and the mafia has very cheap stores” 26 . In addition, their may be practical
reasons for not being a conscious consumer. Due to the unequal spread of pizzofree shops
over the territory, people may tend to go to shops closely, instead of making a conscious
economic decision to make their purchases in stores, bars or restaurants that have joined the
Addiopizzo-list.
Another limitation for a further spread of Addiopizzo’s intiative is the need for trust and
cooperation between the stakeholders. As pointed out by several informants, there are still
doubts to what extent members in Confindustria have stopped paying for protection. Despite
Confindustrias’ strong position against rackets, some informants expressed doubts on the
capacity of Confindustria to expel members who are continuing to pay. There are also
examples of firms that are “very dirty” and who have problems with the law enforcement
agencies that have tried to join anti-racket organisations as a last desperate act, before loosing
their firm 27 .

26
Rodolfo Guajana, interview date: 27.05.08
27
Enrico Colajanni, interview date: 27.05.08
22
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24
Interviews

(1) Tre ragazzi di Addiopizzo [a] [b] [c], data intervista: 28.05.08
(2) Enrico Colajanni, Presidente di Libero Futuro, data intervista: 27.05.08
(3) Pisa Maisano Grassi, Vedova di Libero Grassi, data intervista: 29.05.08
(4) Steni di Piazza, Direttore della filiale di Banca Etica di Palermo, data intervista:
26.05.08
(5) Umberto di Maggio, responsabile locale di Libera a Palermo, data intervista: 26.05.08
(6) Calogero Parisi, Presidente della “Lavoro e non solo” cooperativa dell’Arci che aderisce
a Libera, data intervista: 30.05.08
(7) Ivan Lo Bello, Presidente della Confindustria Sicilia [e del Banco di Sicilia], data
intervista: 27.05.08
(8) Rodolfo Guajana, Imprenditore “no pizzo” vittima del racket delle estorsioni, data
intervista: 27.05.08
(9) Umberto Santino, Direttore Centro Siciliano di Documentazione "Giuseppe Impastato",
data intervista: 28.05.08
(10) Lirio Abbate, Giornalista, data intervista: 29.05.08

25