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CPSXXX10.1177/0010414018774376Comparative Political StudiesNelson-Nuñez

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Comparative Political Studies
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DOI: 10.1177/0010414018774376
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Political Engagement in
the Peruvian Amazon

Jami Nelson-Nuñez1

Abstract
Whether nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) undermine or build
democratic linkages between citizens and governments in developing contexts
is a long-standing debate. This research explores the divergent claims of
whether service-delivery NGOs, by doling out goods, decrease demands made
of governments or whether they facilitate interactions with governments. Using
a mixed-methods approach based on original household data from the Peruvian
Amazon and interviews with community leaders, NGOs, and government, the
research paints a nuanced picture fleshing out aspects of the NGO debate. The
likelihood of pressing for services and interacting with government increases
with more NGO interaction, supporting claims about the positive effects of
NGOs. However, higher levels of NGO activity in communities can have a
deterrence effect on petitioning government for support, a result that likely
hinges on the role of information. The research has implications for the role of
NGOs in affecting government responsiveness and accountability.

Keywords
Latin American politics, politics of growth/development, quality of
democracy, nongovernmental organizations

1University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA

Corresponding Author:
Jami Nelson-Nuñez, Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico, MSC 05-
3070, 1 University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131-001, USA.
Email: jaminunez@unm.edu
2 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

The new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) developed in 2015 and

agreed upon by 193 countries have renewed debate about the role of nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) in building responsive governments capable
of delivering services that combat poverty. Just as the Millennium
Development Goals set in 2000 were viewed as lofty targets, these new goals
are also ambitious, though they are qualitatively different. Rather than seek-
ing progress, such as cutting in half the number of people without access to
clean water, the SDGs aspire to eradicate aspects of poverty—such as hunger
or lack of access to clean water—by 2030. The universality of the SDGs
sharpens the focus on government capacity for service delivery and under-
scores the need to examine the ways in which NGOs can inhibit or facilitate
government action when they themselves engage in service delivery. This
new era, therefore, brings renewed attention to the roles of civil society and
its effect on representation and government accountability.
At present, the literature on NGOs is at odds with itself—with some
researchers arguing that NGOs diminish interaction between citizens and
government, and others arguing that NGOs bolster it. Service-delivery NGOs
have particularly drawn the ire of critics. In comparison with advocacy
NGOs, which focus on mobilization and policy change, service-delivery
NGOs are accused of failing to change the political realities reinforcing pov-
erty. In the pursuit of expanding access to services for excluded groups, skep-
tics see NGOs avoiding the important work of addressing political structures
that fail the poor, or worse, directly undermining the development of respon-
sive local governments.
The entry of NGOs into public service, a space conceived to be the domain
of government, introduces concerns about how alternative providers affect
government accountability and responsiveness (D. Booth, 2012; Obiyan,
2005; Torpey-Saboe, 2015). If, by providing alternative options for citizens,
NGOs decrease the interaction between citizens and government, they may
displace governments in the very sectors where they are needed most to real-
ize the goals of the SDGs. Consequently, governments can become relegated
to a persistent condition of “quasi-statehood,” where outside intervention
prevents states from developing relationships with society, thwarting the
state-building process (Jackson, 1990).
In contrast to these concerns, others have depicted NGOs as part of civil
society, positioning them as essential elements for building and maintaining
democracies. Evidence suggests that NGOs can have profound political
effects, fostering political participation (Boulding, 2014) and fomenting
political pressure (Boulding, 2010, 2014; Murdie & Bhasin, 2011; Murdie &
Hicks, 2013). Whether the facilitating effect of NGOs on citizen engagement
durably structures citizen–government interaction beyond the ballot box,
Nelson-Nuñez 3

however, is unclear. Citizens’ willingness, particularly among the poor, to

seek assistance and interact with government officials is a critical component
of the democratic process.
This article explores how and under what conditions NGOs influence citi-
zens’ engagement with government with respect to service provision.
Citizens’ engagement with government is a distinct form of political partici-
pation, in that, the intent is to petition government for resources, not to
express general support for individuals or parties. This article focuses on
whether engagement with government, in the forms of submitting petitions
and meeting with government officials, is affected by interactions with NGOs
as alternative service providers. The analysis centers on citizens’ strategies as
they seek support in a context where both state and NGOs offer alternatives.
This research utilizes original data based on a household survey in the
Peruvian Amazon. Using an integrative mixed-methods approach (Seawright,
2016), the assumptions of the quantitative analysis are tested by qualitative
interviews with NGOs, community leaders, and government officials.
Contrary to existing arguments positioning NGOs as having either a posi-
tive or negative influence on citizen–government interaction, I argue that
NGOs can have competing effects: bolstering engagement by injecting
resources into poor communities while deterring engagement through a nega-
tive substitution effect. The resource effect facilitates more interaction
between communities and government, even at higher levels of NGO activ-
ity. The substitution effect kicks in at higher levels of NGO activity, deterring
demands for government services.

Contested Perspectives on NGOs

Since the 1990s, the number of NGOs and the resources directed through
them have increased exponentially. Neoliberal policies that constricted gov-
ernment spending were a precipitating factor of the NGO boom. Governments,
with pinched budgets, unloaded service provision onto the nonprofit sector.
NGOs became alternative service-delivery mechanisms, with aid flowing
through them, as opposed to government stemming from the belief they were
more efficient at service delivery (Agg, 2006; Uphoff, 1993). Accordingly,
service-delivery NGOs outnumber advocacy NGOs (Brinkerhoff, 1999) and
they receive the bulk of international aid channeled to NGOs (Kabeer,
Mahmud, & Isaza Castro, 2012). Although data tracking NGOs across coun-
tries are limited, their numbers vary across countries, somewhat mirroring
the flow of aid creating NGO hotspots, such as Haiti and Bangladesh and
conflict-affected areas such as Afghanistan (Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp, &
Thiele, 2009). Within countries, NGOs are known to locate in places with
4 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

higher need and where it is convenient, such as cities or along major transpor-
tation routes (Brass, 2012; Galway, Corbett, & Zeng, 2012).
Apprehension about the effect of NGOs on democracy and development
has risen alongside NGO proliferation. Critics worry that governments will
come to rely on aid agencies to provide basic services (Edwards & Hulme,
1996; Moss, Pettersson Gelander, & Van de Walle, 2006). Research demon-
strates that concerns about the substitutive effects of NGO services may be
warranted as governments redirect spending to other activities in contexts of
increasing NGO activity (Torpey-Saboe, 2015). Banks, Hulme, and Edwards
(2015) argue that when NGOs engage in service provision, they fail to address
systemic problems, anesthetizing citizens through meeting their needs and
failing to address government’s failures via advocacy and mobilization. Some
argue that the change in government behavior in the face of NGO activity is
driven by citizens making fewer demands for support. For example, Mohan
(2002) argues, “Supporting NGOs does not lead to regularized interaction
between society and state and in the process build the strength of both. In
fact, it alienates the two even further and could undermine the longer aim of
building citizenship rights” (p. 146). This view is echoed in an Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; 2008) report that con-
tends that when aid is channeled through parallel service-delivery institu-
tions, “citizens stop demanding an adequate level of services from their own
government, instead looking to donors” (p. 7). When NGOs become primary
service providers, they can undermine democratic accountability (Farrington
& Lewis, 1993; Lorgen, 1998; Wood, 2013). Just as NGOs can flood markets
with their well-intentioned charity distributing used clothes and imported
food, so too, as the argument goes, can NGOs interfere in the demand side of
the political market. Where NGO budgets swamp that of rural municipalities,
pressing governments for benefits can “become irrational” when NGO alter-
natives are more plentiful (Holzner, 2010, p. 243).
Opposing this skepticism of NGOs, other research has drawn a firm con-
nection between NGO activity and political participation. Supporting case
studies and theoretical arguments that NGOs forge stronger citizen–state
relationships (Devine, 2006; Fisher, 1997), scholars have also demonstrated
with large-N analysis that NGOs have significant effects on political behav-
ior, increasing political engagement among women (Goldman & Little,
2015), ramping up voter turnout (Boulding, 2014; Kabeer et al., 2012), and
mobilizing dissent and demands for political change (Boulding, 2014; Murdie
& Bhasin, 2011; Murdie & Hicks, 2013). These political effects of NGOs
have even been cited as shifting election outcomes (Boulding & Gibson,
2009; Brown, Brown, & Desposato, 2002, 2007, 2014) and shaping state
spending (Murdie & Hicks, 2013). This research suggests that interactions
Nelson-Nuñez 5

with NGOs, which inject resources in communities and facilitate associa-

tional participation, can translate into political demands necessary for foster-
ing more responsive government.
The dualistic perceptions of the effect of NGOs—undermining versus aid-
ing citizen–government relationships—call for further exploration. Scholars
have pointed to differences among NGOs to explain why some seem to help
citizen–government relationships, whereas others hurt them. The distinction
of international versus grassroots NGOs is one such answer (Banks et al.,
2015; Obiyan, 2005). Alternatively, others argue the type of NGOs, specifi-
cally service delivery versus advocacy, is the critical cleavage that sorts the
NGOs that help democracies from those that undermine them.
The difficulty with labeling some types of NGOs as good and others bad is
that such categorization is easy to do in theory but does not bear out in reality.
In developing contexts, the line between international and local is often
blurred. International funding sources have increasingly sought to move away
from big development contractors to support grassroots organizations, such as
United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) recent goal
to ensure 30% of funding be directed to small NGOs engaging at local levels.
Similarly, the distinction between service delivery and advocacy is fuzzy in
practice. NGOs frequently engage in multiple approaches with traditional
advocacy NGOs branching out to provide services and service-delivery NGOs
engaging in advocacy work to realize their goals. For example, Murdie (2014),
whose analysis draws clear distinctions between service-delivery and advo-
cacy NGOs, still argues that service-delivery NGOs affect local political con-
texts through forms of advocacy by addressing policy climates, assisting
organized movements, and pressing governments for better services.
Moreover, studies that have tested differences in the types of NGOs on politi-
cal behavior have found limited traction in such distinctions. Brown, Brown, and
Desposato (2008) explore whether NGOs that are politicized are more likely to
effect political change than nonpoliticized NGOs and find no significant differ-
ence. Kabeer et al. (2012) also test whether different types of NGOs in Bangladesh
facilitate political engagement. They find all types of NGOs facilitate numerous
aspects of political participation, although service-oriented NGOs are less
impactful than NGOs that expressly focus on social mobilization.
What is likely to be the source of the disagreement between the two camps
is not that there are two different types of NGOs, but that there are two different
arguments about NGOs being made. Although on the surface, it looks as though
these arguments are diametrically opposed, they are in fact talking about two
different phenomena. The first camp says that NGOs upset the relationship
between citizens and government by squeezing government out of service pro-
vision. The second says that NGOs open avenues of communication and
6 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

interaction between citizens and governments. The difference between these

arguments hinges on mechanisms—in the former, the mechanism is substitu-
tion, in the latter, it is facilitation. In the next section, I develop a theory that
incorporates the possibility for both facilitating and substituting effects.

Theory
An alternative explanation of these divergent perspectives—beyond the
assertion that certain types of NGOs are “good” or “bad”—is that NGOs
produce countervailing effects; they can mobilize citizen engagement with
government while providing service alternatives to government that could
ultimately lead to the displacement of government as a service provider.
These counteracting outcomes could happen concurrently in any given con-
text, but one outcome may be more pronounced given certain conditions. In
this section, I build on arguments that NGOs facilitate political participation
when they provide resources in poor communities. I then explore the condi-
tions—namely, the role of asymmetric information and high levels of NGO
activity—that can negatively affect political engagement.

NGOs as Facilitators of Citizen–Government Relationships

The flow of resources into economically marginalized areas increases the
possibilities of political mobilization. According to Boulding (2014), NGOs
can facilitate political participation via two pathways: by fostering interac-
tions between citizens and by injecting resources that make political partici-
pation easier. Resources could include infrastructure that makes the trek to
government offices easier, communication equipment, and services that alle-
viate constraints to political participation, such as hunger and health prob-
lems. Keck and Sikkink (1998), whose work focuses on advocacy NGOs,
draw attention to other resources NGOs provide. They argue interactions
with international advocacy NGOs provide local actors with access, leverage,
and information. Drawing from Boulding and applying Keck and Sikkink’s
arguments to service-delivery NGOs, I posit that service-delivery NGOs,
even if they are simply providing goods and assistance, provide essential
resources that affect political participation.
NGOs create access to government for citizens in both purposeful and inci-
dental ways. Because some NGOs directly engage with governments as a best
practice, they create connections to political leaders that then become path-
ways for political engagement for the individuals and communities with whom
they work. Moreover, some NGOs explicitly facilitate dialogue between citi-
zens and governments. By bringing together communities and government
Nelson-Nuñez 7

leaders, NGOs enhance communication to identify needs and build common

support for projects. These conversational spaces NGOs help to create by
offering resources for projects increase citizens’ engagement with govern-
ments. Alternatively, NGOs may not act as direct facilitators of citizen–gov-
ernment interactions, instead choosing to work directly with communities.
Even in cases where NGOs do not engage government, they can still open new
avenues for citizen–government engagement. NGOs providing services are
likely to converse with other NGOs engaged in similar work, work with other
communities, and interact with government, even if in minimal ways, building
networks that can spread knowledge about the key players in government to
whom communities need to speak for specific requests.
In line with these connections to government, service-delivery NGOs can
also provide leverage for citizens in petitioning for goods and services. As
formal organizations, often with authority deriving from expertise or
resources, NGOs can command more legitimacy with government officials
than individual citizens. With endorsements or support from NGOs, citizens’
requests for support can have more weight with government officials. Even
service-delivery NGOs working in communities that do not aim to engage in
advocacy work can provide independent information about the nature and
severity of citizens’ needs to government. Moreover, by providing limited or
partial support, NGOs leave gaps in service provision that citizens can pres-
sure government to fill. Such gaps could result from project design where
NGOs provide only a portion of a project to encourage greater project partici-
pation on the part of recipients. Service gaps provide very specific requests
for government support, which are more likely to get approval. More defined,
executable requests are politically lucrative for incumbents as they can claim
credit for enabling projects that have proportionally more benefit for less
investment of government resources.
Perhaps, most important of the contributions of NGOs in poor communi-
ties is information. NGOs are a resource for information about political pro-
cesses, distribution of government services, and even development innovations.
NGOs can provide information that can assist citizens’ ability to petition gov-
ernment, including providing citizens information about rights, the processes
by which citizens can pressure government, and even service provision levels
in other communities. NGO activity can also provide information about inno-
vative approaches and stimulate demand for different goods and services. As
Murdie and Hicks (2013) argue, international NGOs can shape new policy
preferences and provide resources to social groups that are instrumental in
their diffusion and adoption. Although they demonstrate these mechanisms
across countries, parallel effects could happen at local levels between com-
munities when the provision of services in one community by an NGO can
prompt interest in neighboring communities for similar benefits.
8 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

Because of the resources NGOs bring to communities, not only from

investments and services but also via the connections to government they can
provide, the leverage or legitimacy they can wield, and the information they
share, when individuals and communities interact with NGOs, they are more
like to interact with government, meeting with government officials and
seeking government resources.

Hypothesis 1: Citizens’ interaction with NGOs is associated with a higher

probability of engaging the government for goods and services.

NGOs as Wedges in Citizen–Government Relationships

Despite the positive effect on political engagement that NGOs engender, they
can also weaken citizen–government relationships in certain conditions.
Thinking of citizens’ strategies in pursuing goods and services illuminates
how and when NGOs can disrupt citizen–government relationships. I posit a
simplified model where individuals or communities have three options when
seeking assistance from service providers: approach governments, approach
NGOs, or approach both. For the myriad of needs individuals or communities
have, the choice of “both” is optimal as there would be little reason to not
seek assistance from any organization that can help.
The likelihood that citizens shift away from seeking assistance from gov-
ernment is low and conditioned by particular circumstances. The scope of
NGO coverage is one such condition that can affect displacement. In many
cases, the support of NGOs is limited by their budgets and scope. Yet, where
NGOs are sufficiently numerous and are at least somewhat successful in
delivering goods and services, then citizens may have no further incentive to
press government for support. This is contingent on citizens having reason to
prefer NGOs over government. In contexts where governments are con-
strained by a lack of resources and low bureaucratic quality, people are likely
to favor working with NGOs that appear with resources and willingness to
help. The ability of NGOs to deliver goods and services would also need to
be sufficiently comprehensive as to meet the multitude of needs of communi-
ties. Their collective service provision must have breadth, covering a wide
array of needs, and depth, providing substantial ongoing support. Moreover,
citizens would need to be able to reach NGOs in a timely way. This is a rather
strong proposition but could feasibly happen, at least for some amount of
time, in pockets or particular communities that attract high numbers of NGOs.
Thus, where NGOs are quite numerous and their activities extensive, citizens
will be less likely to be engaged in seeking support from local governments.
Nelson-Nuñez 9

Why might NGOs facilitate contact with government when minimally

present but hinder it when extensively present? I argue that the issue at stake
is not just one of saturation, but of information. Communities in a developing
context have multiple needs—it is unlikely that all of them could be met by
NGOs or government alone. Extensive contact with NGOs does not reduce
interaction between governments and citizens because they substitute the role
of government in service provision, but because the environment is one of
asymmetric information. Although communities know where government
offices are and how to petition them, they may not have that information
about NGOs. When NGOs do appear, they often provide additional informa-
tion about how to successfully petition government, but governments may
have no such information about how communities can ask NGOs for help.
For this reason, if NGO presence is not extensive, they will act as facilitators
for community–government interaction because of the information and
resources NGOs provide. NGOs will not supplant government service provi-
sion, however, because communities have no reliable way to contact NGOs.
When NGO presence is extensive, contact they have with the community is
more routinized and predictable. Communities will petition government at
lower rates because they can reliably request NGOs for services.

Hypothesis 2: In contexts where activity of service-delivery NGOs is

extensive, citizens’ interaction with NGOs is associated with a lower prob-
ability of petitioning the government for goods and services.

Method
I use an integrated mixed-methods approach to assess ways in which NGOs
affect citizens’ engagement with government. I begin with large-N analysis
of household survey data conducted in a poor context with variation in NGO
activity. I then leverage qualitative interviews to assess the validity of the
quantitative findings (Seawright, 2016). The qualitative approach also per-
mits further analysis of mechanisms that might explain whether and how
contact with NGOs could affect engagement with local government.

Context and Cases

The data come from rural communities, or centros poblados, in Loreto, the
poorest region of Peru where a third of the population is living in poverty
(OPHI, 2017).1 Needs for support are substantial as most rural communities
rely on subsistence agriculture, have no or limited electricity, and are missing
10 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

critical infrastructure for water, sanitation, and transportation. The communi-

ties in this study, which range in population from 50 to 250 people, are all
remote, most without dependable cell phone coverage. The difficult terrain
and weak communications infrastructure make for a “low information” con-
text—one where knowledge of need as well as service provision is limited
among communities and governments.
Decentralization has delegated to lower levels of government the responsi-
bility to provide a variety of goods and services (McNulty, 2011). Both
regional and local municipal governments are engaged in service provision,
but communities are directed to approach local governments first. Communities
can request support from government through “solicitations,” which are made
by sending a representative with paperwork describing the request and provid-
ing evidence that most community members back the request. Communities
also have opportunities to informally request support through interactions
with government officials. Individuals can further approach government to
pursue private benefits, such as scholarships. In the case of Loreto, talking to
government officials and requesting support provide better leverage in exam-
ining interactions between citizens and government than other forms of politi-
cal participation such as voting, which is obligatory, and protest, which is rare
despite its prevalence in other areas of Peru. Petitioning governments for spe-
cific needs, however, is common and a well-known formal process for seeking
support.
In addition to local governments, NGOs serve as an important source of
support for poor communities. NGO activity is high in the region due to high
rates of poverty and interest in preserving natural resources in the Amazon.
Information on the number of NGOs in Loreto is limited. The official NGO
list is provided by the Peruvian Agency of International Cooperation (APCI),
the central government’s agency regulating NGOs. The registry indicates 46
NGOs are active in Loreto but there are certainly more as several NGOs oper-
ating in the area did not appear on the registry. Unfortunately, the registry does
not provide information about the extent or exact location of each NGO’s
activities.
Most NGOs in Loreto deliver services. Figure 1 shows that of the NGOs
on the official list, the projects listed for all but three of them distribute goods
and services (Loreto Regional Government, 2012). This does not mean NGOs
providing services do not engage in advocacy; rather, they are registered as
having primarily service provision activities. It is difficult to categorize
NGOs as Peruvian or international. Many are local, in that, they are Peruvian
nonprofits or are run by Peruvians and even these frequently receive support
from international donors or employ international personnel. For example,
one Peruvian NGO in the area is registered as a Peruvian nonprofit. The staff
Nelson-Nuñez 11

Figure 1.  APCI 2012 NGO registry in Loreto.

APCI = Peruvian Agency of International Cooperation; NGO = nongovernmental
organization.

are Peruvian but its director is an American and substantial funding comes
from Western philanthropists. Conversely, the example of Rotary International
demonstrates how international organizations become highly localized.
Rotary International injects funding into developing contexts, but local
Rotary organizations, which are registered as Peruvian nonprofits, also fund-
raise locally and employ local staff.

Survey method.  The household survey, supported by a National Science Foun-

dation grant, employed random sampling within stratifications of 23 com-
munities in the municipalities of Indiana, Las Amazonas, and Mazán to
include a total of 285 individuals (see appendix for summary statistics). The
analysis draws on two dependent variables to measure engagement. The first
is a measure of whether individuals have attended a meeting or have spoken
with an elected official in the past 3 years. Approximately 28% of respon-
dents reported such an interaction. To compare, in the 2010 Peru Americas-
Barometer, 25% of rural respondents reported interaction with government
officials (AmericasBarometer, 2010). The second is a measure of whether an
individual has asked a government official for assistance. This is more com-
mon as 62% of respondents reported doing so. This is also much higher than
the incidence of a similar measure in the AmericasBarometer, which is 20%
for rural respondents, most likely as all respondents in the current study are
poor and, therefore, more likely to seek assistance.
12 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

The independent variables of interest capture different types of contact

with NGOs, following the lead of Brass (2010). The first asks whether respon-
dents are aware of NGOs working in their community in the last 5 years, of
which 65% were. Respondents are also asked to name NGOs that have been
active in the community. Very few could name more than three with two thirds
of respondents unable to name any. The final “name” measure is dichotomous,
coded as whether someone can or cannot name an NGO in the community.
Respondents were also asked whether they received benefits or services from
an NGO and 47% indicated that they had, a high number but consistent with
the frequency with which NGOs visit communities in the area. Finally, respon-
dents were asked how many times in the last 2 years they attended a meeting
or spoke with someone from an NGO. Two thirds of respondents had not,
whereas one third attended anywhere between one and 30 meetings. Because
the distribution is long tailed, I use a dichotomous measure of attendance with
any meeting attendance coded as one.2
Although these NGO contact measures could be conceived as a theoretical
continuum of interaction with NGOs, ranging from awareness of NGOs work-
ing in the community to receiving benefits from them, such a continuum does
not bear out. Individuals may not remember an NGO name even if they have
received benefits. And, receiving benefits may not necessarily require atten-
dance at a meeting. The four measures are, however, highly correlated and,
therefore, included in separate models to examine varying impacts of different
forms of NGO contact while avoiding problematic multicollinearity. These
measures do not distinguish categories of NGOs because, as discussed in the
qualitative findings, communities tend to lump NGOs together vaguely as
organizations that help communities in need.
A measure of NGO activity in each community is also included. Because
there is no complete directory with information on which NGOs are working
in communities, this measure is derived from the names of the NGOs that
respondents cited in the survey. Across all individuals in each community, the
measure sums the number of unique NGOs named. The average across com-
munities is 3.3 NGOs, varying from one to six. A drawback of this measure
is its reliance on individuals’ abilities to recall NGOs and the possible undue
influence from individuals who list several NGOs.
In each model, I control for factors typically included in political partici-
pation models, including political knowledge (J. Booth & Seligson, 2009)
and demographic factors, such as gender, age, and education. Political knowl-
edge is derived from an index of questions that would be relevant for rural
and peri-urban communities in the area, including the name of the mayor, the
number of years the mayor serves, the process of recalling a mayor, and the
number of years the president of Peru serves. Because interpersonal trust and
Nelson-Nuñez 13

social capital are included in political participation models (Brehm & Rahn,
1997; Finkel, Sabatini, & Bevis, 2000; Keele, 2007), I include a measure of
community participation asking respondents the number of times they help
their community or neighbors in a typical month. Responses range from
never to daily, with an average of 3 times per month.3
Two potentially important variables are notably missing in the quantitative
analysis. First, a prior vote for the incumbent mayor could be relevant to the
question of whether people are likely to have contact with government. If
rewards or punishments in terms of services are doled out for communities
based on their voting records, then this could explain individuals’ likelihoods
of interacting with government officials. Unfortunately, past voting behavior
questions were problematic in pilot surveys with high rates of nonresponse.
The question was omitted in the survey but is discussed in the qualitative
work that explores possible omitted variables.
In other contexts, political ideology would be a relevant factor in explain-
ing petitions and interactions with government. However, in the Peruvian
context of a highly fragmented party system where parties have not necessar-
ily pursued policies congruent with a left–right orientation (McNulty, 2011),
the role of political ideology is unclear. The survey teams found that political
ideology questions led to high rates of abstention, long-response times, and
signals that people were confused by the questions.
Finally, I control for community size as numbers of households as reported
by the Peruvian 2007 census. Eight communities were missing from the cen-
sus (having been established after 2007), in which case, the number of house-
holds was estimated by a local NGO working in the area.

Qualitative Method
Because of the limitations of the survey data, follow-up semistructured inter-
views were conducted in 20 communities. Communities were selected accord-
ing to Seawright and Gerring’s (2008) “diverse cases” approach to maximize
variation on the independent variable of NGO activity, targeting communities
with high, medium, and low levels of NGO activity. Thirty-three interviews
were conducted with members of the community who were elected to a lead-
ership position. In most cases, this was the teniente gobernador (Lieutenant
Governor), who serves as the community’s primary leader. Interviews also
targeted the agente municipal, an elected position that acts as the liaison
between the community and the municipal government. Other interviewees
included community members in charge of the Parent Teacher Association
(PTA) and liaisons for the vaso de leche program, a national government
transfer for children. Given limited time and access to communities, the
14 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

qualitative work targeted leaders, who tend to have the status of primus inter
pares, because they are most likely to know details about community needs,
ongoing and past interactions with local government, and interactions with
NGOs. In addition, interviews were conducted with officials in the local and
regional governments representing these communities as well as with NGOs
active in the area.
The interviews aimed to look for evidence of causality of NGO presence
influencing political engagement, and if present, the conditions under which
this relationship is positive or negative. This included searching for temporal
evidence to address endogeneity issues and factors that might indicate an
omitted variable. In addition, the interviews served to investigate different
mechanisms through which NGOs could affect interactions with govern-
ment, such as access, leverage, and information that might originate from
working with NGOs.

Results
Results in Tables 1 and 2 yield interesting findings about the effect of NGOs
in poor communities. Neither awareness of NGOs nor the ability to name an
NGO working in the community significantly affects engagement with local
government. Attending a meeting with an NGO, however, is significantly
correlated with both outcome variables. If an individual has met with an
NGO, her probability of meeting with a government official is nearly dou-
bled, from 23% to 40%. Although statistically significant, the impact of
receiving benefits from an NGO is weaker on meeting with government offi-
cials, increasing from 23% to 33%. In terms of asking for assistance from
government, both NGO meetings and benefits have approximately the same
effect, shifting the predicted probability from 57% and 54%, respectively, to
70%. These results suggest that individuals’ contact with NGOs is related to
a higher likelihood that one talks with government officials and asks for
assistance from government. This is true only for “deeper” interactions with
NGOs. In other words, whether someone is generally aware of NGOs work-
ing in the community or can name them has no effect but if an individual
meets with an NGO or receives benefits from one, he or she has more interac-
tion with government.
The overall levels of NGO activity in communities tell a slightly different
story. More NGO activity in one’s community means individuals are more
likely to talk with government officials. This is not true for whether individu-
als seek assistance from government. Demonstrated in Figure 2, the relation-
ship between NGO activity and asking for assistance is not linear but
curvilinear. As NGO activity increases from one to three, the probability of
 Table 1.  Met With a Government Official.

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

NGO awareness 0.242 (0.282)  
Able to name NGO 0.149 (0.272)  
Attended NGO meeting 0.793** (0.310)  
Received NGO benefits 0.496* (0.273)
NGOs activity in community 0.255*** (0.097) 0.227*** (0.082) 0.227** (0.108) 0.250** (0.106)
Age 0.002 (0.011) 0.002 (0.010) −0.001 (0.012) 0.003 (0.011)
Female 0.197 (0.377) 0.157 (0.378) 0.187 (0.415) 0.213 (0.394)
Education 0.118*** (0.033) 0.117*** (0.038) 0.102*** (0.033) 0.109*** (0.034)
Political knowledge 1.285 (0.848) 1.208 (0.863) 1.350* (0.806) 1.312 (0.857)
Contributes to community −0.031 (0.033) −0.032 (0.032) −0.013 (0.037) −0.032 (0.035)
Community size 0.016 (0.011) 0.018 (0.011) 0.017* (0.009) 0.017 (0.011)
Constant −4.224*** (1.022) −4.055*** (0.939) −4.091*** (1.047) −4.299*** (1.064)
Observations 252 262 237 249
Pseudo R2 .097 .090 .117 .104

Cluster standard errors in parentheses. NGO = nongovernmental organization.

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

15
16
Table 2.  Asked the Government for Assistance.

Variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10

NGO awareness 0.162 (0.243)  
Able to name NGO 0.130 (0.291)  
Attended NGO meeting 0.567** (0.271) 0.606** (0.278)  
Received NGO benefits 0.741** (0.291) 0.761*** (0.277)
NGO activity in community −0.060 (0.118) −0.061 (0.103) −0.065 (0.110) −0.076 (0.113) 0.940** (0.410) 0.851* (0.444)
NGO activity in community −0.155** (0.067) −0.142** (0.070)
squared
Age 0.004 (0.010) 0.004 (0.009) 0.000 (0.012) 0.004 (0.010) 0.001 (0.011) 0.005 (0.010)
Female 0.474 (0.369) 0.439 (0.363) 0.450 (0.379) 0.492 (0.367) 0.504 (0.370) 0.531 (0.359)
Education 0.122** (0.051) 0.120*** (0.045) 0.113** (0.055) 0.114** (0.056) 0.113** (0.052) 0.115** (0.053)
Political knowledge −0.354 (0.622) −0.202 (0.653) −0.066 (0.691) −0.158 (0.669) −0.096 (0.679) −0.200 (0.661)
Contributes to community 0.005 (0.026) 0.005 (0.025) 0.018 (0.031) 0.012 (0.025) 0.020 (0.031) 0.013 (0.025)
Community size 0.006 (0.009) 0.007 (0.009) 0.010 (0.008) 0.009 (0.008) −0.005 (0.008) −0.005 (0.009)
Constant −0.612 (0.840) −0.681 (0.733) −0.852 (0.937) −1.085 (0.877) −1.547 (0.962) −1.674* (0.917)
Observations 250 261 235 247 235 247
Pseudo R2 .030 .028 .046 .058 .060 .068

Robust standard errors in parentheses. NGO = nongovernmental organization.

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
Nelson-Nuñez 17

Figure 2.  Effect of NGO activity in community.

NGO = nongovernmental organization.

asking for support increases from .55 to .70. It thereafter drops to .39 for
communities with six NGOs.
These nuances of how individual contact versus NGO activity in the com-
munity influences interaction with NGOs lead to the question of how context
shapes the effect of one’s individual interaction with NGOs. I do not find any
significant interactions. The effect of a person meeting with NGOs or receiv-
ing benefits on whether she meets with government officials or asks for assis-
tance is not shaped in a significant way by the level of NGO activity in his or
her community.
Of the other variables in the models, only education is robustly significant.
The effect of education could be to make people more aware of processes of
interacting with government or more efficacious. It is likely that education
contributes to assuming leadership roles in a community as well, such as
becoming a government liaison for the community. Other controls of age,
political knowledge, the frequency with which people contribute to commu-
nity projects, and community size are insignificant.
Due to the nature of the data taken at a single time point, the results need
to be interpreted carefully. One main concern is that the effect of NGO con-
tact on government contact is spurious, potentially explained by personal
characteristics that lead some individuals to be more efficacious in asking for
help—from NGOs and governments alike. Moreover, with cross-sectional
data on NGO contact, there is also a concern about selection effects of where
18 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

and with whom NGOs are likely to work. NGOs and governments are likely
to be active in overlapping spaces, in part, due to accessibility of rural com-
munities. A further concern is endogeneity as individuals could turn to NGOs
because of contact with government—either because they are redirected or
because NGOs fill gaps that government does not. The follow-up interviews
with community leaders, NGOs, and mayors, therefore, provide an important
supplement to these initial quantitative results.

Qualitative Results
The aim of the interviews with community members, NGOs, and government
officials was to explore the community priorities, and their interactions with
governments and NGOs. The qualitative research provided leverage to
explore whether the quantitative findings bear out in a different research
modality and to interrogate the results of the models, exploring the concerns
of endogeneity, omitted variables, and spurious relationships. They further
explore the mechanisms by which NGO contact affects interactions with gov-
ernments. This section elaborates on four sets of findings: (a) how communi-
ties seek support and why, (b) the conditions that explain when NGO activity
can deter solicitations to government, (c) the mechanisms through which
NGOs facilitate more citizen–government relationships, and (d) evidence
supporting causality.

Strategies in seeking support.  To what degree are NGOs and governments viable
service providers? To some extent, every community visited interacted with
both government and NGOs. Every community had contact with NGOs within
the last 5 years, although there was variation in levels of support from NGOs
across communities. The range of interaction with NGOs in the last 5 years was
two to six. The frequency of contact also varies, leaving some communities
without any contact in the last year and others with regular monthly contact.
Two communities capture the variation quite well. The community of
Palmeras Dos has substantial contact with NGOs throughout the year. They
have received a water system and school supplies from a local NGO as well
as a paved walkway, a bridge, and a second water system from an interna-
tional NGO. They further have a connection to an NGO that partners with an
ecotourism agency regularly bringing visitors to the community. The NGO
channels donations from tourists toward the community’s needs, including
support for electrification and computers for the local school. San Lucas,
however, had contact with two NGOs in 5 years and neither visited in the last
year. One visited the community once promising projects, and never reap-
peared to execute them. The San Lucas leaders are hopeful more NGOs will
Nelson-Nuñez 19

visit, despite their lack of follow through. Meanwhile, in Palmeras Dos, lead-
ers seem to have concrete plans for NGO projects and feel confident that
some might pan out.
Government “presence” in communities, however, is quite different from
that of NGOs. Governments are always present, in the sense that people are
well aware of the processes to request assistance. Formal petitioning and
meetings at government offices were the most common forms of interaction.
Although leaders felt government officials rarely visit, they felt like they could
access officials when in need. Getting petitions or requests approved, and
more important, receiving the goods and services promised is a different issue.
Both NGOs and government are perceived as possible service providers. The
interviews began with a focus on the community’s needs and its contact with
government. Although NGOs were only part of the interview at the end, they
were often brought up naturally by respondents earlier in the interview. In one
case, when asked what level of government is most helpful to the community,
the respondent volunteered “truly, it’s the NGOs.” There was no consistency in
what types of services people expect of government versus NGOs, suggesting
that people see both NGOs and governments as providers for a range of services.
For example, when asked what project he wanted to see in his community and
who he would approach for help, one community leader responded,

We want a medical post and we will ask an NGO [for it]. We trust that an NGO
can help because they helped us with the water system . . . [Other communities]
have medical posts. The government gave them to them. It is a good idea and
we hope that an NGO will help.

I followed up to inquire whether he would ask the government as well. He

responded bluntly, “well yes,” as if the question was unnecessary. Also, there
was no evidence that communities distinguish between different types of
NGOs. Most respondents believed NGOs to be, as one respondent said,
“groups that bring the priority services we need.” Many believed all or most
NGOs have international connections.
The perception of service provision overlap by the government and NGOs
is consistent with services communities have received. Both NGOs and gov-
ernments have provided support in areas of housing improvement, drinking
water, sanitation, agricultural extension, health services, emergency food
supply, education, and infrastructure. The specialization in service provision
that can be observed stems from sectors the government consistently sup-
ports, such as school buildings and teacher salaries. NGOs are more likely to
contribute charitable goods, such as school supplies and clothing. They are
also more likely to provide support for entrepreneurial endeavors, such as
small cooperatives.
20 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

Attempting to quantify and compare the levels of support in each com-

munity from NGOs (collectively) versus governments (of any level or
branch) is challenging because credit attribution to governments and NGOs
is often murky. Sometimes projects were NGO–government collaborations
but people had varying ideas on whether the project was actually provided by
the government or the NGO partner. For example, in one community, the
teniente gobernador credited the government and the NGO equally for build-
ing the water system, whereas the agente municipal said the government just
put their name on it but should not be given any credit. In contrast, one leader
believed governments ask NGOs to help and give them permission, so even
if a project was completed by an NGO, they had the government to thank for
it. He said,

The process is that the central government and NGOs make agreements. Then
they look for where the need is and go there. NGOs never go on their own to a
place. It’s always that they have to have an agreement with the president so that
the president can guarantee their work.

Although this is clearly not the case for NGOs and where they choose to work
in Peru, this leader’s perception was that the responsibility could ultimately
be attributed to the government for any NGO services.
If both NGOs and governments are options, how do leaders decide who to
approach for support? Part of the answer is preferences. The interviews pro-
vide a clear consensus: Leaders prefer to work with NGOs rather than gov-
ernment. For instance, one respondent said, “The NGOs are concerned.
While the government asks us for documents, NGOs come and work.” In the
words of another,

When NGOs come, they have a meeting and say what they want to do. They get
the community’s permission. And they do it. Right away. But when the
government comes, it will take a long time. It takes too long. With the NGOs,
it takes no time at all.

This is where the limitations of government responsiveness suffer in com-

parison with NGOs. Solicitations to government are costly for communities as
they require constant pressure of sending a member to follow up on the request.
For some communities, this can mean more than a day of travel and the cost of
staying in the city. In one community where the leader was relatively optimistic
about government, community representatives visit the government twice
weekly. He was unsure what could help make requests more successful so they
would not have to go so often. He believed local government has the resources
Nelson-Nuñez 21

to help but it’s a matter of keeping up pressure. In his words, “If we want the
mayor to help, we have to insist. Really insist.” He added matter-of-factly that
a solicitation for “something important” will simply take 2 to 3 years to come
to fruition.
Although the cost of solicitations is high, the cost of completion can be
higher. When requests are officially granted, leaders feel they have little
recourse to ensure the promised support is delivered. Even when petitions are
granted, trips to pressure government to complete their promises continue.
Per one community leader, “The government offers, but doesn’t follow
through. They only give hope. But NGO projects are completed.” Another
laughed when I asked her whether NGOs or governments complete projects
faster. She said, “NGOs are faster. Peruvians are liars sometimes.”
Thus, NGOs wield a certain legitimacy with communities—even when
they are unknown or unproven. In one community, the last two NGOs to visit
promised projects and never came back. Expecting this failure to make the
teniente gobernador weary about NGOs, he still stated that he would prefer
to work with them than government. He explained that they have done a lot
of good things for communities in the area and that someday, hopefully, they
would help his too. Despite their failed promises to his community, he
remained interested in working with NGOs—perhaps, in the same way that
people continue to buy lottery tickets even when they have never won.
The choice of who to approach for support, however, is not just driven by
preferences, and relatedly, cost. In some cases, it is driven by a sense of duty.
After ranting about how slow the government can be, one leader explained he
still petitions government out of responsibility—both his, as a leader to go to the
government, and the government’s to provide for communities. Although few
respondents invoked ideas of democratic obligations, many said that they go to
the government because they must. As one plainly clarified, “We have so many
needs.” Like NGOs, governments represent possibility—one tool in a very lim-
ited toolset to address the scarcities and challenges poor communities face.

Wedges or facilitators?  Overall, the interviews suggest NGO activity is associ-

ated with more interaction with government officials, particularly with
respect to meetings with government officials. Although this pattern holds
true across most communities, there are hints of exceptional cases where too
much NGO activity has deterred interaction, at least in terms of communities’
willingness to commit to making formal solicitations at government offices.
One of those communities with high NGO activity and rare government
interactions is Palmeras II, the outlier community discussed above. In another
community with comparatively high NGO activity and rare contact with gov-
ernment, the leader of the community asserted,
22 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

The government doesn’t know [our] reality. They have bad relations with the
community. But the NGOs are more in touch. The two [government and NGOs]
have the same rights, the same obligations . . . well the government has more
obligation. But the NGOs always say how they can help, especially if the
community does its part . . . if it does half. The authorities make us tired to go
see them. We don’t want to go sometimes because we don’t receive anything.
We are already tired of going.

The qualitative interviews shed light on a critical factor that seems to

shape this conditional relationship: limitations of NGO support. Community
leaders describe NGOs as inconsistent and unpredictable in their interactions
with communities, leaving them little choice in requesting support of govern-
ment throughout the year when needs arise. Few leaders could identify a
phone number or an address of NGOs with whom they have worked.
Everyone interviewed was aware that you can ask local governments for
assistance via certain processes but most communities are at the mercy of
NGOs’ visits. Rural communities cannot call up NGOs or knock on their
doors to ask for help in the same way they can with local governments.
Although nearly everyone preferred NGO services, communities are not
clear about how to proactively obtain more support from NGOs.
Respondents were also aware of the limitations of NGOs. Most respon-
dents believed NGOs have a lot of resources, but they did not feel NGOs
would agree to do everything they needed. Conversely, government is always
present and represents one way, however improbable, that communities are
able to get help. However, where NGOs heavily support communities, per-
ceptions of these limitations seem to fade and leaders’ confidence that they
will have opportunities to ask NGOs for specific requests is much higher. As
such, although leaders still do not know how to reach NGOs who have
worked in their communities, they can wait for their visits to the communi-
ties, which take place more frequently.

NGO resources and interactions with government.  Why do NGOs seem to be

associated with more frequent interactions with the government? The role of
resources NGOs provide to poor communities was a clear thread throughout
the interviews. Keck and Sikkink’s view of international NGOs as part of a
larger international network creating connections is an apt description for the
service-delivery sphere in local municipalities. The presence of NGOs work-
ing within a municipality creates more opportunities for connections—a
denser network linking communities, NGOs, and governments.
NGO connections helped communities to make inroads working with gov-
ernment to get additional support. In a third of communities, people mentioned
Nelson-Nuñez 23

NGOs helped them in approaching governments for assistance in various ways.

One NGO provides books and school supplies to help with primary education,
for which the government supplies the building and teacher. Although the
NGO’s support was limited, when the community needed help in getting a bet-
ter teacher (teacher absenteeism is a problem in rural areas), the NGO provided
information on the official process to demand a new teacher, the legal rights of
communities in making such requests, and even a specific official to contact.
The community was ultimately able to successfully press the government for a
new teacher. This highlights the important role of information, and the critical
difference between government and NGOs: Whereas NGOs can potentially
provide information about how to petition government, government cannot
provide information about how to petition NGOs.
In many cases, NGOs are intentional about cooperating with local govern-
ments. The push to help build good governance at local levels through capacity
building means many NGOs have turned to collaboration as a means of carry-
ing out projects (Brass, 2016; Bukenya, 2013). Such an explicit role for gov-
ernment in NGO projects can in turn augment interaction between governments
and communities. As an example, one mayor interviewed described a project
the UNICEF initiated brokering conversations between the mayor and com-
munity leaders to identify ways to rebuild the community after flooding. As a
result, the mayor visited the community for the first time and had multiple
interactions with community members to plan and execute the projects.
In addition to creating connections, an NGO can provide leverage for
communities in negotiations. One government official said some NGOs
accompany communities when they come to ask for support. He believed that
when an NGO representative comes with families that are asking for scholar-
ships, the government is more likely to give them. Pressing why that is, he
said when NGOs come along, people in government know there is someone
vetting a person’s need. In effect, NGOs address information asymmetries,
signaling to government where resources would best be spent, at least accord-
ing to them. This government official’s view was reflected by a community
leader in another municipality. He said, “When NGOs are working with a
community, it is good. It tells the government that the community is orga-
nized and is a good community to work with.”
From the community’s perspective, these accompanied visits can also help
pressure the government because NGOs are offering resources and acting as
outside observers of the government. When a large NGO project to build a
cacao farm stalled because the community needed farming tools that they had
been unable to get from the government, the leader asked the NGO to visit the
government with him. When the NGO representative did, the solicitation for
24 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

tools was finally granted. The leader did not think they would have received
them so quickly without the NGO at his side.
These examples show how NGOs can alter the nature of community–gov-
ernment interactions. Perhaps in these cases, without the NGO, communities
would have visited the government for some sort of help anyway. But the
presence of the NGO appears to have shaped the outcome of such visits, lead-
ing to more successful interactions. Such legitimacy of NGOs stems not only
from their role as outside observers but also from the weight they carry due
to resources they offer. Their contributions, especially when they are only
partial, provide incentives for citizen–government cooperation. For instance,
“participatory approaches” that many NGOs use to ensure greater sustain-
ability in projects, particularly infrastructure, often require that communities
provide a portion of a project to cultivate ownership and commitment to the
project. In the sample, four communities working with an NGO to build a
water treatment system were required to contribute portions of the project, so
they turned to local governments to procure the things they needed, such as
motorized pumps. One leader mentioned the NGO directly suggested they
approach the government for help. Although that NGO stated it has no inter-
est in collaborating with government in a separate interview, it provided
information on how communities can most effectively approach government
for help. The NGO director said her organization is aware local governments
have a fund specifically for rural water services. Her organization informs
communities about it and encourages them to seek government support spe-
cifically asking about the fund.
Three of these four communities had previously solicited the government
for water services prior to the NGO’s offer to help. Yet, when the NGO began
collaborating with the communities, the nature of their requests to govern-
ment was changed by the NGO’s contribution to the project. Smaller, more
defined goods are easier to extract from government than large infrastructure
commitments. Moreover, these more specific requests are easier for govern-
ments to provide as larger projects require more resources and more bureau-
cratic steps. As a result, these more limited requests are more successful. This
support and information from NGOs may not necessarily encourage more
contact with government, in the sense that communities would have likely
contacted governments without the advice or support of NGOs. Yet, the
impact of NGOs might change the quality of those interactions, and to the
extent that these interactions with government are more positive, they could
increase the efficacy of communities, thereby leading to greater political par-
ticipation in the long run.
An important implication is that governments may ultimately spend less in
areas where NGOs are active. In the example of water infrastructure,
Nelson-Nuñez 25

supplying parts of a system such as the water pump would be a request to

government of around 3,000 soles. This amount is less than the cost of the
government building an entire system, which can run in excess of 150,000
soles. Therefore, aggregate spending patterns might show that government
decreases spending due to NGO presence whereas health and development
outcomes improve, consistent with Torpey-Saboe’s (2015) findings. It would,
however, be misleading to characterize such a pattern as evidence that NGOs
crowd out government. Instead, in these cases, NGOs, by sharing the burden
of costs with government, have facilitated government spending where gov-
ernments have faced barriers too high to tackle alone.
Information, particularly in a low information context such as Loreto, is a
powerful resource for communities. Beyond information about processes,
rights, and contacts, NGOs can provide information about needs and solu-
tions to poverty that can facilitate more frequent and more successful com-
munity–government interactions. Community leaders were prompted in
interviews to identify two projects they would like to see carried out in their
communities. Later, they were asked whether a similar project had been com-
pleted in neighboring communities. In eight communities, leaders mentioned
neighboring communities had a resource they wanted, such as latrines, a
bridge, or a medical post provided by NGOs. Of these eight instances, six
leaders said they plan to ask the government for these services and two said
they would try to ask the same NGO. In one example, the leader said what her
community needs most is a road and a bridge. Pressing further, I asked
whether other communities have a bridge and path similar to what she wanted
for her community, to which she listed two, both of which received them
from an NGO. When asked who she plans to ask for help to get these goods,
she indicated they will approach the government. When I asked her why the
government instead of the NGO, she said that it was the government’s respon-
sibility. I followed up to ask whether she could contact the NGO as well and
she said “only if they come to visit.”

Thinking through causality.  The findings, thus far, support patterns that emerge
in the regression analysis. I turn now to describe what evidence the qualita-
tive work can provide to address concerns of omitted variable bias and endo-
geneity. There are two possibilities of how the causal arrow may be directed
from government interaction to contact with NGOs. One theory could be that
when people have contact with government, they are more likely to interact
with NGOs because government directs people to them. This was not evident
in qualitative interviews. Communities relied on the initiative of NGOs to
visit them. In addition, because governments lack information about NGOs,
government officials are usually unable to make such referrals. The NGO
26 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

registration process, which yields incomplete information anyway, occurs at

the national level and is shared at the regional level, but not necessarily with
local levels of government, so local governments are not systematically
informed about NGO activities.
Another possibility is that NGOs and governments are both active in the
same contexts. What Chambers (1983) calls “tarmac” bias in the Amazon is
accessibility via dirt roads and rivers. Communities closer to the city are more
likely to interact with both NGOs and governments. This bias, however, is less
concerning in this research. If the sample were expanded to include more
remote villages in the Amazon, then a pattern of interaction with both NGOs
and governments based on proximity to urban areas would likely emerge. The
sample of communities for this research is comprised of communities with a
relatively high degree of accessibility, although variation certainly exists.
However, in the survey sample, there is no correlation between distance to the
city and either NGO activity or interaction with government.
The most problematic issue in linking NGOs to political participation is
whether more efficacious individuals or communities are more likely to seek
out NGOs and government. Although the qualitative work helps, this remains
a concern. I find no significant correlation between NGO contact and mea-
sures that might relate to efficacy, including social trust, community meeting
attendance, and frequency with which individuals contribute to community
needs, with the exception of education, which is positively correlated. That
said, interviews with community leaders indicate they are the ones who are
most likely within communities to have interactions with NGOs and with
governments, suggesting an area for further research of investigating the dif-
ferences in the ways NGOs affect regular citizens versus leaders.
The concern about efficacy can also operate at the community level, par-
ticularly if NGOs select more efficacious or organized communities with
which to work. Among NGOs in this area, some do indeed select communi-
ties based on whether they effectively signal an ability to follow through in
collaborations. Even then, these are minimal efforts communities need to
show, such as having more than half of the community at a meeting. And,
although such requirements are made by some NGOs, most others select
communities geographically and by perceived need.
The other question between efficacy and NGO activity is which way the
causal arrow runs. I found some, albeit limited, evidence communities felt they
had become more efficacious after collaborating with NGOs. For example, one
community leader stated, “We have meetings two times each month, really
when there’s need. Before [the NGO], we didn’t have regular meetings. Almost
never before.” Another leader, speaking about success of solicitations, said,
Nelson-Nuñez 27

To petition government, we have to be united. Working with NGOs taught us.

Before we did not work in groups, it was each one for his own side . . . Now,
we work together and show the government we are united.

Most leaders felt the changes from NGO activity were around improved qual-
ity of life—clean water, better schools, and so forth. For some, though, these
improvements may have durable effects on attitudes and behaviors in com-
munities. One leader confessed he originally felt the water system an NGO
helped to build was a bad idea when it was proposed by the NGO. After a
year with the new system, he said he changed his mind and now wonders
what more can be done in the community.
The qualitative research did indicate one factor missing in the quantitative
results merits further investigation: the role of clientelistic relationships. This
was not a factor systematically covered in the qualitative research but it did
arise in conversation with one community. The leader said “the government
only gives to people who are part of the mayor’s political party.” But most
other interviews were not so clear on this issue. Many discounted the degree
to which such clientelistic relationships even work, saying they are tired of
hearing campaign promises. Overwhelmingly, communities discounted can-
didate promises as meaningless. Our understanding of ways NGOs might
shape citizen–government interactions, however, would be broadened by fur-
ther research exploring the effects of NGOs across contexts where clientelism
can drive public goods provision.

Conclusion
The dual perspectives of NGOs, hurting governments and helping govern-
ments, suggests a need to more systematically identify the conditions under
which NGOs contribute to building stronger local governance structures
and when they undermine such development. These conflicting perspec-
tives on the effects of NGOs on citizen–government relationships have
been difficult to observe and isolate because of the paucity of data, and
relatedly, difficulty in collecting data that can address very real concerns of
endogeneity and confounding effects. This research considers the NGO
debate in a particular context—one that focuses on NGOs delivering ser-
vices in poor communities where local governments face significant con-
straints in addressing poverty. It introduces original household data in
Loreto, Peru, exploring citizens’ engagement with NGOs and local govern-
ments, bolstered by qualitative interviews of community leaders, NGOs,
and local government officials.
28 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

I find NGOs have both positive and negative effects on interactions citi-
zens have with local government regarding service provision. Interaction
with NGOs, such as attending NGO meetings or receiving NGO benefits, is
associated with more interaction with governments, both meeting with gov-
ernment officials and requesting help from them. However, NGO activity in
communities has a curvilinear effect on seeking support from the govern-
ment, such that at higher levels of NGO activity, communities are less likely
to press the government for support.
This research hints at the possibility of perils presented by a saturation of
NGOs. The need to approach government for help remains as long as NGO
presence is limited. In the context of Loreto, Peru, communities rarely know
when NGOs will visit and are unclear of where NGO offices are located. In
addition, the needs and numbers of communities exceed the capacity of the
NGOs in the area. As such, government, however unreliable or bureaucratic it
may be perceived to be, remains to be a viable source of support for poor
communities.
Although this research is based on a particular context, the results help to
reconcile the competing claims around NGOs and their effect on citizen–
government relationships. The negative effect of high levels of NGO activ-
ity in this context accord with more extreme cases of NGO activity, such as
Haiti where the flood of NGOs has stifled citizens’ connections to govern-
ment (Schuller, 2012), or Bangladesh where the boom in NGOs has been
credited with significant improvement in development outcomes whereas
the quality of governance has deteriorated (Kabeer et al., 2012).
This research links service-delivery NGOs to the wider research on
NGOs by looking more holistically at the way the resources NGOs provide
shape interactions with government. The qualitative work shows NGOs not
only change the nature of interactions with government but also increase
their frequency. Service-delivery NGOs are affecting communities beyond
the direct effects of the services they bring. Interviews suggest NGOs pro-
vide information about, and even directly facilitate interactions with, gov-
ernment. In some cases, this facilitation occurs in the form of advocacy as
even traditional service-delivery NGO representatives sometimes accom-
pany individuals to meet with government. In other cases, NGOs connect
communities and governments through collaborative projects. With the
injection of resources to execute projects such as sanitation systems or cul-
tivation of new crops, NGOs bring both communities and governments to
the table.
Although many NGOs opt to collaborate with government, others remain
circumspect that interactions with governments will slow progress or intro-
duce political elements they hope to avoid. I find that even interactions
Nelson-Nuñez 29

between communities and NGOs that avoid governments can alter the way
citizens interact with local government. Because of NGOs’ budget limitations
and because NGOs often seek to share the burden of projects with communi-
ties to cultivate buy in, governments provide resources that can close the
gaps. As such, NGO activity can refocus interactions between citizens and
governments around more specific needs and help to share information about
rights and processes to improve the odds government will respond to citizens’
requests.
Overall, this research is supportive of claims that NGOs are playing
important roles in developing contexts. The focus on NGOs engaging in ser-
vice delivery helps to address the most critical concerns about negligent
interference in local governance systems and the probability of building more
responsive governments over time. It also suggests important conditions
under which this relationship can corrode, namely, when NGOs become so
pervasive in their assistance and their activity that they replace government
as a source of support.

Appendix

Variable N M SD Minimum Maximum

Talked or met with government official 281 0.278 0.449 0 1
Asked government for assistance 280 0.618 0.487 0 1
Aware of an NGO in the community 271 0.646 0.479 0 1
Able to name an NGO 286 0.312 0.467 0 1
Attended an NGO meeting 255 0.341 0.475 0 1
Received service or benefit from an NGO 267 0.468 0.500 0 1
NGOs active in community 285 3.270 1.554 1 6
Age 278 43.849 15.180 18 89
Female 286 0.552 0.498 0 1
Education 277 5.953 3.588 0 18
Political knowledge 286 0.600 0.266 0 1
Times per month helping community 274 3.168 4.228 0 30
Community size (households) 285 40.112 13.786 19 70

NGO = nongovernmental organization.

Acknowledgments
This research has benefited from the time and contributions of many people. The
author would like to thank Kendra Koivu, Carew Boulding, Mala Htun, Sara
Niedzwiecki, William Stanley, Benjamin Read, Richard Wood, Jennifer Cyr and the
30 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

excellent suggestions and comments provided by three reviewers and the editors of
Comparative Political Studies (CPS).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was funded by a National
Science Foundation Grant OISE 1065050.

Notes
1. According to the Peruvian national statistical institute, a centro poblado is the
concentration of at least 20 contiguous houses in a rural area.
2. To compare with other contexts is difficult given limited data on interactions with
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The 2005 Latinobarometer includes a
question on whether an individual has contacted an NGO to solve a problem.
Averages across countries are 23% and range from 13% (Nicaragua) to 45%
(Brazil). Contact with an NGO in rural Peru was 25.3%. In Kenya, Brass (2010)
finds between 25% and 50% are aware of NGOs working in their communities.
She finds 25% have been contacted by an NGO.
3. Income is not included as there was little variation in the sample communities,
which all face high rates of poverty.

ORCID iD
Jami Nelson-Nuñez https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2001-6494

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Author Biography
Jami Nelson-Nuñez is an assistant professor of political science at the University of
New Mexico. She studies the politics of service delivery and the challenges govern-
ments and NGOs face in providing services critical to combating poverty.