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Political Behavior, Vol. 27, No.

2, June 2005 (Ó 2005)


DOI 10.1007/s11109-005-3242-y

ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS


OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Samuel J. Best and Brian S. Krueger


Political participation researchers have developed several evaluative techniques to
assess the representativeness of political participation patterns. Yet, while the Internet
has become a mainstream avenue for political participation in the United States,
current assessments of online participation insufficiently apply these methods. To
incorporate these methods we begin by drawing upon resource theory to inform two-
stage ordered-logit models of online and offline political participation. Our results
suggest that the factors predicting online participation often differ from the factors
that predict offline participation. Even so, we find that those from higher socioeco-
nomic backgrounds tend to disproportionately possess these distinct online determi-
nants. Next, we use a wide spectrum of political opinion questions to determine
whether online participators’ opinions reflect or distort those of the general popula-
tion. Overall, we find that online participation tends to relate moderately with liberal
preferences. However, because offline participation relates to political attitudes simi-
larly, the Internet only marginally advantages the political voice of liberals. Finally, we
discuss the implications of these results.

Key words: political participation; Internet; public opinion; political representation;


resource theory.

A decade after the first graphics-based web browser became widely avail-
able, the Internet has become a mainstream avenue for political participa-
tion in the United States. In terms of relative popularity, some online forms
of political participation now rival traditional forms; for example, nearly as
many U.S. residents contact public officials over the Internet as do by post-
al mail and telephone (CSRA, 2003). And if access to the medium contin-
ues to expand, the gap between the popularity of online and offline forms

Samuel J. Best, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy, University of Connecticut,


1800 Asylum Avenue, West Hartford, CT 06117-2697; Brain S. Krueger, Assistant Professor,
Department of Political Science, University of Rhode Island, 206 Washburn Hall, Kingston, RI
02881-0817.

183

0190-9320/05/0600-0183/0 Ó 2005 Springer ScienceþBusiness Media, Inc.


184 BEST AND KRUEGER

of participation should continue to shrink. Not only a popular venue for


political participation, the Internet also has increased in political impor-
tance. The Internet played a crucial role in Howard Dean’s surprising early
frontrunner status for the Democratic presidential nomination (Levy, 2004),
with nearly 3 million members Moveon.org became the primary mechanism
for mass mobilization against the Iraq War (Wolf, 2004), and Meetup.com
emerged as a major grassroots coordination mechanism for political activists
in the 2004 election (Cornfield, 2004). Given these current patterns, partici-
pation researchers are quickly nearing a time when assessments of political
participation routinely must consider both traditional and online forms. Yet,
nearly all of the best-known work on political participation has paid little
attention to this emerging phenomenon. Moreover, the studies that do con-
sider online participation insufficiently apply the most compelling empirical
approaches to evaluate the representativeness of political participation pat-
terns.
Initially reviewing these evaluative techniques, this paper (1) uses
resource theory to develop models of non-monetary forms of active online
participation,1 (2) assesses how the factors that most powerfully influence
online participation distribute across social categories, and (3) determines
whether online participators’ opinions reflect those of the general popula-
tion. To best comprehend these results for online participation requires
comparison with traditional offline forms of participation. Therefore, at each
stage a parallel analysis of conventional offline participation is undertaken as
well.

ASSESSING THE PATTERNS OF TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION


Mass political participation’s importance to various interpretations of
democratic politics is well understood. One of the most influential—the
instrumental perspective—views participation as vital because it is the
mechanism by which individuals control the collective decisions that materi-
ally affect their lives (e.g. Dahl, 1989; Gant and Lyons, 1993; Hill and
Leighley, 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). And because individu-
als possess equal worth in democracies, these collective decisions should
equally consider the preferences of all citizens. Perhaps best manifested in
the one-person one-vote axiom, the principle of equal consideration
‘‘implies that during a process of collective decision making, the interests of
every person who is subject to the decision must (within the limits of feasi-
bility) be accurately interpreted and made known’’ (Dahl, 1989, p. 86). And
insofar as it is assumed that individuals know best their own interests, they
must communicate these preferences to the political system through partici-
pation in politics. ‘‘Obviously, without this step [the communication of inter-
ests via participation], the interests of each ‘subject’ could not be
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 185

considered, much less given equal consideration’’ (Dahl, 1989, p. 87).


Therefore, without equal participatory inputs into the system, more active
citizens will receive a greater share of the policy benefits compared to their
more docile counterparts.
Given the importance of equal levels of political participation for equal
consideration, a persistent question for empirical political scientists has been
how well the patterns of U.S. political participation approximate this ideal.
One influential approach to empirically evaluating this question classifies
individuals according to relevant social groups (income, gender, etc.) and
then assesses the level of activity across these categories. Essentially, this
evaluative technique determines ‘‘who participates?’’ The answer to this clas-
sic query is familiar; those from higher socioeconomic (SES) backgrounds
tend to participate more than those from lower SES backgrounds (see Lijp-
hart, 1997 for a review). By recently pointing to evidence that suggests class
biased participation patterns influence not only who governs (Radcliff, 1994)
but also directly who receives policy benefits (Hill and Leighley, 1992),
Arendt Lijphart’s 1996 APSA presidential address suggests that unequal par-
ticipation remains ‘‘democracy’s unresolved dilemma’’ (1997, p. 1).
While straightforward and compelling, the ‘‘who participates’’ approach
has been criticized as lacking explanatory power. Perhaps most prominent
among these critics, Brady, Verba, and Schlozman develop a related
approach that seeks to move ‘‘Beyond SES’’ and identify the mechanisms by
which higher SES translates into greater political activity (1995, p. 271).
Instead of asking ‘‘who participates’’ this corollary approach asks ‘‘who
possesses the characteristics that enable participation?’’ Empirically this
approach begins by determining the relative impact of various explanatory
factors on participation and then assesses if the most vital characteristics are
equally distributed in the population. Combining both the who and why
question, their model suggests that higher SES individuals possess larger
stores of various resources, most notably civic skills, that enable them to
overcome the high costs of political engagement (Verba et al., 1995). Lower
SES individuals lacking these resources (excepting free time) participate
less, creating the longstanding SES participation gap.
Whether using the simple or compound version of this general approach
to assess how well the patterns of political participation conform to the
instrumental perspective, one must assume that the nature of the political
messages sent by participators and non-participators diverge. To be sure, at
a descriptive level the messages are clear; because those from higher socio-
economic groups participate at the highest rates, the perceived needs of
these groups should receive the greatest attention from policy makers.
However, political participation often involves sending explicit messages
about political issues. And because there exists little uniformity of
views, even among those from more advantaged backgrounds, unequal
186 BEST AND KRUEGER

participation may not translate into different ideological messages sent to


the political system. Therefore, while studies should assess who possess the
characteristics that enable participation, scholars should also assess whether
participators’ opinions distort those of the general population. Without dis-
torted political opinions, unequal participation across social groups (descrip-
tive distortion), would impact only moderately the policy outputs so central
to the instrumental perspective.2 Using this framework, the most notable
empirical examples of this approach find that voters’ opinions differ only
marginally compared to all eligible voters (Bennett and Resnick, 1990; Wol-
finger and Rosenstone, 1980); however, those participating in nonvoting
activity often display more conservative opinions than the general public
(Verba et al., 1995).

ASSESSING THE PATTERNS OF ONLINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION


To assess who possesses the characteristics that predict online participation,
these characteristics must first be identified. Speculation about these explana-
tory factors is not lacking. Some scholars suggest that online participation pat-
terns should simply mirror those of traditional participation. Most
fundamentally, the combination of higher SES predicting both online access
and traditional political participation hampers the Internet’s potential to
transform the patterns of political participation (Bucy, 2000; Davis and Owen,
1998). Even once online, the Internet may still reinforce the disparities
between high SES individuals and those from less advantaged backgrounds
(Murdock and Golding, 1989). This line of reasoning essentially modifies the
substantive logic of the well-known ‘‘knowledge gap’’ theory (Tichenor,
Donohue, and Olien, 1965). Those already engaged in politics are those
endowed with the resources necessary to participate; with the addition of a
new participatory medium, these individuals should continue to draw upon
these same resources to take advantage of this new participatory opportunity.
Yet, the veracity of this reinforcement perspective relies on the assump-
tion that traditional resources should facilitate online political participation.
By relying on resource theory, though, grounds exist to doubt this reasoning.
The resource theory of participation uses a soft rational choice framework
that focuses primarily on the costs rather than the benefits of participation
(Verba et al., 1995). Even politically interested individuals require resources
such as money, time, civic skills, and links to mobilization networks to over-
come the formidable hurdles associated with traditional political participa-
tion. Therefore, given equal motivations to participate in the population,
political activity should stratify by resources. While the common manifesta-
tion of resource theory highlights the importance of resources such as time,
money, civic skills, and connections, the theory does not argue that these
resources matter for all types of political activity. Instead, by assessing the
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 187

probable costs associated with various political acts, the theory deduces the
corresponding resources necessary for a particular form of engagement. For
example, voting, contributing money to a political cause, and time-based
political acts require distinct resources to overcome the unique costs associ-
ated with each activity. This flexibility makes resource theory particularly
useful for identifying the distinct resources needed to overcome the unique
hurdles of the online environment.
A growing literature in human-computer mediated interaction suggests
that the resources necessary to participate in an online environment, prop-
erly conceived, differ significantly compared to the resources necessary to
engage in traditional activity (Bimber, 2000; Kling, 1999; Kiesler et al.,
2000). With the time-enhancing features of the Internet (Bimber, 1999;
Delli Carpini, 2000), the need to have free time in order to act politically
may be reduced. As Bimber suggests, ‘‘the Internet reduces quite dramati-
cally the time and inconvenience involved in contacting a government
office, because an e-mail message can typically be composed and sent in
much less time and with less effort than is required to prepare and mail a
letter’’ (1999, pp. 412–413). Therefore, we do not expect free time to influ-
ence online forms of engagement.
Similarly, civic skills, that promote the effective navigation of the offline
political world, may not facilitate online political participation. Instead, indi-
viduals may rely on new online skills. Even though the World Wide Web
and the widespread use of browsers dramatically increased the usability of
the Internet, the effective use of the medium does require technical profi-
ciency. These Internet specific skills should help an individual overcome the
technical hurdles associated with navigating the Internet just as civic skills
help individuals act in a complex social environment (e.g. Bucy, 2000).
Although no research to date has examined the varied impact of online
vs. offline mobilization efforts, we suspect that many mobilization efforts
conducted face-to-face, by telephone, or by postal mail do not explicitly
encourage online participation. On the other hand, because mobilization
conducted online almost always provides the e-mail and/or World Wide
Web address of a political campaign or organization, and likely even
encourages some online activity, we expect that online mobilization to most
impact online participation.
Finally, although researchers rarely include physical resources (e.g. motor
vehicle) in models of traditional participation, physical resources such as
Internet connection speed and home Internet access may influence the like-
lihood of online political engagement (Leigh and Atkinson, 2001; NTIA,
2000). Although past research suggests that connection speed only modestly
influences online political activity once controlling for other theoretically
relevant factors (Krueger, 2002), a broadband connection has been shown
to increase the likelihood of engaging in a variety of online activity (e.g.
188 BEST AND KRUEGER

Grubesic and Murray, 2002). Faster connections enable users to download


web pages more quickly, facilitating research and information gathering.
And, they ensure the transmission of smoother video and clearer sound,
promoting multimedia applications. Also, a home Internet connection, as
opposed to public or work terminals, theoretically provides individuals with
greater opportunity and increased flexibility to access the medium for online
participation (e.g. NTIA, 2000).
Relying on resource theory, we expect that the unique costs associated
with participation in the online environment will be overcome by online
resources rather than those resources classically considered important for
activity in the offline political environment. More specifically, we expect that
free time, civic skills, and offline mobilization to scarcely influence online
participation whereas physical resources (broadband, home access), online
skills, and online mobilization should importantly influence participation via
the technological medium. If these medium specific resources influence
online participation and individuals possess comparatively more equal levels
of these medium specific resources, then the patterns of Internet participa-
tion may indeed differ from traditional forms.

DEVELOPING AN EMPIRICAL TEST


The two methodological approaches reviewed in the previous sections, (1)
who possesses the characteristics that predict participation, and (2) do
participators’ opinions reflect or distort those of the general population,
provide a strong foundation for assessing the representativeness of political
participation patterns. Consequently, any broad assessment of the patterns
of online participation should incorporate both methods. Yet, to date,
empirical investigations have insufficiently applied these methods.3 Several
recent studies of online participation rely on non-probability samples (e.g.
Johnson and Kaye, 2003; Weber, Loumakis, and Bergman, 2003) that call
into question the generalizability of the inferences. Others assess only
World Wide Web or Internet users (e.g. Krueger, 2002; Norris, 1999, 2002)
making direct comparisons between Internet participators and the general
population impossible. Carrying similar limitations, a study of online voters
in the 2000 Arizona Democratic primary compares these voters to those
who cast their ballots using more traditional means, but exclude non-voters
from the analysis (Solop, 2000). Compounding these shortcomings, the
multivariate models of online participation often incorporate few, if any,
independent variables beyond demographics, which significantly increase
the likelihood of spurious relationships (e.g. Bimber, 1999; Weber et al.,
2003). Even those that do develop a well-informed theoretical model fail to
account for the likely reciprocity between independent and dependent
variables, potentially confusing effect with cause (e.g. Bimber, 2003;
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 189

Krueger, 2002). For example, while not addressed statistically, the possibil-
ity that the dependent variable (online participation) may contribute to the
acquisition of the most influential independent variable (online skills) is
acknowledged in one of the author’s past work (Krueger, 2002). If the
characteristics that independently influence online participation cannot be
demonstrated with confidence, then any evaluation of the distribution of
these characteristics in the population carries uncertain meaning.
In this paper, we seek to deepen the understanding of online political
participation by applying the two classic evaluative techniques. Because the-
oretically informed and statistically sound models provide the necessary
foundation for evaluating who possesses the characteristics that enable
online participation, we begin by using resource theory to develop models
of Internet-based participation. After testing the general hypothesis that
online participation requires medium specific resources, we assess how
those factors shown to influence online participation distribute in the
population. The second half of the analysis uses a wide spectrum of public
opinion questions to determine whether online participators’ preferences
distort those of the general population. Because the implications of these
online participation patterns largely rest on how they compare with offline
participation patterns, at each stage we also undertake a parallel analysis of
analogous forms of conventional offline political activity.

DATA AND MEASURES


As part of a larger project designed to investigate political attitudes dur-
ing the spring of 2003, the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the
University of Connecticut administered a RDD telephone sample of adult,
non-institutionalized residents of the contiguous United States. Telephone
numbers were dialed daily from April 15 through May 30, 2003, with inter-
viewers attempting up to 6 calls to contact potential respondents.4 After
securing cooperation, interviewers used a Computer-Assisted Telephone
Interviewing (CATI) system to administer questions to and record the
responses of 1003 participants. While only the key measures receive a
detailed discussion below, Appendix A contains the question wording of all
measures used in the analysis.
We measure respondent’s level of Internet political participation over the
past 12 months with affirmative answers to the following questions: Have
you used the Internet to contact an elected representative, government offi-
cial, or candidate for office to express your opinion about a local, national,
or international issue [14% of the sample]? Have you signed an Internet
petition about a local, national, or international issue (11%)? Have you used
the Internet to try to persuade another person about your view on a local,
190 BEST AND KRUEGER

national, or international issue (9%)? Have you worked together with others
in an Internet community to try to deal with a local issue or problem (6%)?
Summing these online political acts into a scale reveals an individual’s
overall breadth of political participation on the Internet (alpha = 0.63).
We measure respondent’s level of conventional political participation over
the past 12 months with affirmative answers to the following questions:
Have you personally gone to see, made a phone call to, or sent a postal let-
ter to an elected representative, government official, or candidate for office
to express your opinion about a local, national, or international issue (20%
of the sample)? Have you signed a written petition about a local, national,
or international issue (21%)? Have you telephoned, written a postal mail
letter, or spoken with someone in an effort to persuade that person about
your view on a local, national, or international issue (16%)? Have you
worked together with others in your community to try to deal with a local
issue or problem (24%)? Summing these political acts into a scale reveals an
individual’s overall breadth of offline political participation (alpha = .61).
To measure the key factors theorized to influence non-monetary forms of
traditional political participation, we sought to approximate the measures
designed for the ‘‘Citizen Participation Study’’ (Verba et al., 1995). We mea-
sure respondent’s level of interest in politics using an eleven-point scale. The
number of hours reported free from work, home, and school responsibilities
is used to determine the amount of a respondent’s free time. To measure
civic skills we create a scale giving one point for every activity engaged in the
last 12 months as part of their job, church, or other organization. The job,
church, and organizational activities include: writing a letter, took part in
making a group decision at a meeting, planning or chairing a meeting, and
giving a presentation or speech (alpha = .78). We measure offline mobiliza-
tion with the following question: ‘‘Did anyone from a political party, cam-
paign, or political organization call you on the telephone, send you a letter in
the mail, or come around and talk to you about a political issue’’?
Using the same theoretical framework, adjusted for the medium, we sought
to measure online resources and mobilization. To create the online skills scale
we sum four items: designed a web page, sent an attachment via e-mail,
posted a file to the Internet, and downloaded a program from the Internet
(alpha = .75). Not only does this scale yield a high alpha coefficient, but also
it closely approximates the Internet skills scale used by Krueger (2002) that
displays considerable construct validity. The scale items cover both World
Wide Web and e-mail proficiencies. Further, they vary in difficulty; some
require modest ability while others require a great deal of expertise.
We also include two Internet specific physical resources. We measure
home Internet access using a dummy variable with 1 indicating home
access. To measure broadband access we create an additional dummy
variable; those who report using a cable modem, DSL line, or other
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 191

high-capacity connection are coded 1. Finally, we measure online mobiliza-


tion with the following question: ‘‘Did anyone from a political party,
campaign, or political organization contact you over the Internet about a
local, national, or international issue?’’

MODELING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION


When modeling political participation, the resource and psychological
measures cannot be treated as completely exogenous independent variables.
Participation in politics should create residuals such as higher levels of civic
skill or interest in politics. Verba et al. (1995) clearly demonstrate the prob-
lem with treating resources as exogenous and use an instrumental variable
approach to purge these reciprocal effects from their statistical estimates.
Therefore, to account for this endogeneity we use a two stage ordered logit
estimation procedure. In the first stage models, estimates for each endoge-
nous variable are obtained using instruments that are correlated with the
endogenous variables but not with the second stage model’s error. Next, we
use these purged estimates of the endogenous variables in the second stage
models of political participation.
Instrumental variable equations need robust first stage models. Moreover,
much of the variance explained in the first stage model should come from
the instruments rather than the exogenous variables used in both stages
(Bartels, 1991). If the first stage models are not robust, or if the excluded
instruments do a poor job predicting the endogenous variables, then the two
stage procedure will not represent the true model in a more efficient man-
ner than the simple linear prediction. Our tests indicate that the first stage
models robustly predict the endogenous variables and that the instruments
make a strong contribution to the variance explained (see Appendix B).
We model the political participation scales with political interest, free
time, civic skills, offline mobilization, Internet skills, home access, connec-
tion speed, and online mobilization as well as controls for demographic
characteristics (income,5 education, gender, race, and community size). The
endogenous variables requiring instruments6 include civic skills, free time,
Internet skills, political interest, offline mobilization, and online mobiliza-
tion. A Sargan test confirms the appropriateness of excluding the instru-
ments from the second stage models.

RESULTS
To both test the hypothesis that medium specific resources should most
powerfully influence online participation and assess who possesses the char-
acteristics that enable participation, we first must determine the relative
impact of competing independent factors. The first two columns of Table 1
192 BEST AND KRUEGER

TABLE 1. Online and Offline Political Participation, Second Stage Ordered


Logistic Regression Models

First First
Online Differences Offline Differences
Participation (p10p90) Participation (p10p90)

Age 0.004 (.008) 0.023*** (0.006) 29.9


Gender (male) 0.645*** (0.204) 3.9 0.002 (0.143)
Race (white) 0.559** (0.230) 5.2 0.310** (0.158) 7.6
Education 0.133 (0.110) 0.028 (0.081)
Rural 0.218 (0.280) 0.244 (0.176)
Income (<25) 0.668 (0.419) 0.271 (0.288)
Income (<50) 0.365 (0.327) 0.030 (0.243)
Income (<75) 0.284 (0.331) 0.104 (0.253)
Income (<100) 0.289 (.324) 0.041 (0.255)
Home Access 0.031 (0.376) 0.248 (0.281)
Connection Speed 0.102 (0.218) 0.048 (0.190)
a
Online Mobilization 0.017** (0.008) 1.4 0.004 (0.008)
a
Offline Mobilization 0.007 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003)
a
Internet Skill 0.461*** (0.084) 51.2 0.054 (0.062)
a
Civic Skill 0.096 (0.163) 0.487*** (0.118) 45.8
a
Free Time 0.008 (0.046) 0.013 (0.033)
a
Political Interest 0.480*** (0.158) 15.2 0.326*** (0.110) 26.5
Chi-square (18) 357.78 211.84
Pseudo R2 0.250 0.191
Number 950 950

Note: Coefficients are ordered logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Numbers in
bold indicate the first difference calculated by the change in the likelihood of participating in at
least one political act caused by changing from a low (p10 or minimum for dummy) to a high (p90
or maximum for dummy) level of the independent variables.
*Significant at p < .10, two-tailed test.
**Significant at p <. 05, two-tailed test.
***Significant at p < .01, two-tailed test.
a
Instrumented variable.

display the results from the second stage ordered logit model predicting the
likelihood of engaging in 0 through 4 forms of online political activity. The
two physical resources’ coefficients, home Internet access and broadband,
fail to meet standard levels of statistical significance (p < .10) suggesting
that everything else equal, possession of faster connections and home access
does not independently promote online political activity. The minimal
impact of these physical resources parallels previous findings (e.g. Krueger,
2002). The explanation typically given is that because most Internet users
do not use high-speed connections, Internet applications, including political
applications, generally do not require high-speed connections for effective
use. Our choice of online political acts included in the analysis also may
contribute to this finding; unlike downloading a video from a candidate’s
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 193

website, none of the acts used in the participation scale require a high-
speed connection.
In sharp contrast to the influence of physical resources, human resources,
in the form of Internet skills, increase the likelihood of online political activ-
ity. To assess the magnitude of the non-linear ordered logit coefficients we
calculate the first differences of each statistically significant independent var-
iable (for a discussion see Tomz, Wittenberg, and King, 2003). Specifically,
we evaluate the change in the likelihood of participating in at least one polit-
ical act caused by moving from an independent variable’s 10th percentile to
its 90th percentile while simultaneously keeping all other variables set to
their mean (or zero category for dichotomous variables). The first differences
reported in the second column of Table 1 suggest that the change in the
likelihood of participating in at least one political act caused by moving from
a low to a high level of Internet skill far exceeds any other variable’s impact
in the model (51.2% change).7 By contrast, the cornerstone of the traditional
resource model, civic skills, does not significantly increase the probability of
online participation. Conforming to resource theory, these findings suggest
that traditional civic skills cannot be exported to the online environment for
political use; instead, the Internet requires medium specific proficiency to
overcome the unique hurdles encountered online.
The two mobilization measures also confirm our hypothesis. Online mobi-
lization increases modestly the probability of contacting a public official
(1.4% change). This should not surprise given that individuals mobilized
online should often acquire, and store automatically in their inbox, the
contacting information of at least one public official or political organization.
Although we can only speculate, the small effect size may be attributed to
some individuals perceiving online mobilization efforts as spam. As
expected, the offline mobilization coefficient cannot be confidently differen-
tiated from zero.
Free time, a resource typically found to increase engagement in activities
requiring a substantial commitment of time (Verba et al., 1995), does not
appear to influence the likelihood of online activity. Meeting our expecta-
tions, its coefficient never differs significantly from zero. Greater interest in
politics increases the likelihood of engaging in online political activity.
Moreover, an examination of the first differences indicates that political
interest exerts the second most powerful influence on the likelihood of
Internet political activity (15.2% change). This finding suggests that
although the Internet may alter the resources necessary to participate,
individuals still require the psychological motivation to engage in online
political activity.
The pattern of coefficients for the demographic control variables
indicates that the resource, mobilization, and psychological variables
contribute nearly all of the explained variance in the model. The age,
194 BEST AND KRUEGER

education, income and community size measures do not pass standard


thresholds of significance. Two demographic variables, race and gender,
predict the likelihood of online political activity. Whites, compared to
non-whites, possess a moderately greater probability (5.2% change) of
participating in at least one online political activity after controlling for
other relevant factors. Whereas the pattern for race behaves as expected,
the gender coefficient, which demonstrates that everything else equal wo-
men are more likely than men to engage in at least one online political
activity (3.9% change), conflicts with the notion that men dominate the
technological medium. A simple cross-tabular analysis between gender
and online participation reveals that men do participate online at slightly
higher rates than women; 31% of men participate in at least one political
act compared to 29% of women. The negative gender coefficient, then, is
best explained by noting that men disproportionately tend to possess the
characteristics that predict online participation. For example, the relation-
ship between gender and the most powerful predictor of online participa-
tion, Internet skills, is revealing; 30% of men report having at least 3
online skills compared to only 15% of women (also see Table 2). There-
fore, while men participate more online than women, this initial partici-
patory advantage is accounted for by males’ increased Internet
proficiency; once controlling for these skills, women participate online
slightly more than men.
The failure of civic skills and offline mobilization to predict online partici-
pation, combined with the predictive importance of Internet specific factors,
opens the possibility that the patterns of Internet participation do differ
from traditional forms. Yet, if Internet skills and online mobilization also
independently predict offline participation, then new general explanatory
factors for general participation are exposed, rather than Internet specific
factors that potentially distribute more equally in the population. To assess
this we turn to the second stage offline participation model results pre-
sented in the third and fourth columns of Table 1.
Consistent with the online participation model, neither of the Internet
physical resources’ coefficients can be differentiated from zero. Crucially,
the two Internet specific factors, Internet skills and online mobilization,
which do influence online political behavior fail to achieve conventional
standards of significance in the offline participation model. By contrast, civic
skills, the centerpiece of the civic resource model, positively influences off-
line political activity. Though it failed to predict the likelihood of online
activity, civic skill exerts the most substantial impact on the likelihood of
offline activity (45.8% change). Consistent with the online model, political
interest positively influences the likelihood of offline political engagement.
Moreover, just as in the online model, political interest exerts a powerful
influence (26.5% change). These estimates for political interest and civic
TABLE 2. Predictor Variables, Correlation Matrix

Civic Int. Pol. Off. On. Free Home Conn.


Skills Skills Intrst. Mob. Mob. Time Acc. Speed Male White Edu. Inc. >100 Age Rural

Civic Skills 1.00


Internet Skills .32 1.00
Political Interest .22 .15 1.00
Offline Mob. .15 .14 .19 1.00
Online Mob. .15 .35 .17 .19 1.00
Free Time .15 .13 .08 .03 .03 1.00
Home Access .22 .67 .11 .12 .27 .15 1.00
Connect Speed .23 .51 .08 .09 .18 .13 .42 1.00
Gender (male) .06 .11 .11 .02 .04 .19 .02 .08 1.00
Race (white) .00 .06 .03 .20 .07 .07 .09 .04 .00 1.00
Edu .33 .34 .11 .20 .20 .10 .26 .22 .02 .03 1.00
Income (>100k) .13 .19 .07 .07 .06 .02 .16 .17 .08 .14 .22 1.00
Age .14 .30 .08 .21 .00 .36 .23 .20 .06 .27 .00 .00 1.00
Rural .09 .19 .05 .06 .03 .06 .11 .18 .01 .02 .19 .07 .03 1.00

Note: minimum number 987.


Bold indicates significant at p <. 10, two-tailed test.
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
195
196 BEST AND KRUEGER

skills parallel Brady et al.’s two stage model that also finds these two vari-
ables rank as the most powerful non-demographic predictors of conven-
tional political activity (1995).
The two remaining traditional resources’ coefficients, offline mobilization
and free time, cannot be confidently differentiated from zero. Although we
originally expected mobilization to predict offline political activity, the two
stage results from Verba et al. also demonstrate that once accounting for
endogeneity, mobilization fails to exert a significant impact on non-voting
forms of conventional political participation (see Table 15.7, 1995).
Unlike the online model, where as a group the demographic control vari-
ables exert only modest influence, as a whole the demographic variables
exert substantial influence in the offline model. To be sure, most demo-
graphic variables’ coefficients (gender, education, community size, and
income) cannot be distinguished from zero using conventional thresholds.
Race and age positively predict the likelihood of offline participation. Simi-
lar to the online model, whites, compared to non-whites, possess a moder-
ately greater likelihood of offline political activity (7.6% change). Age exerts
an even greater impact on the likelihood of offline political activity. Indeed,
the 29.9 percentage point change in the probability of participating in at
least one act ranks as the second most powerful influence in the model.
Taken together these results confirm our hypothesis that medium specific
resources should most influence online political participation but scarcely
influence conventional political activity. Because a non-traditional resource
(Internet skills) most powerfully determines the likelihood of online partici-
pation, a different type of individual may possess the characteristics that
enable political activity on the Internet. However, novel determinants are
only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for more equal participation.
For example, those that possess the unique determinants of online partici-
pation also may possess the determinants of offline participation. Therefore,
the relationship between the unique determinants of online participation
and offline participation needs assessment. Perhaps more critically, evidence
of a changed pattern only exists if the factors that uniquely predict online
participation distribute more equally across social categories than the factors
that uniquely influence offline participation. Consequently, we also assess
the relationship between the unique determinants of online participation
and the demographic variables. For these associations we turn to Table 2
that reports the predictor variables’ correlation matrix.8
Because civic skills most powerfully predicts offline participation and
Internet skills most powerfully predicts online participation, their relation-
ship and their comparative distribution in the population most crucially
determines whether a changed pattern of participation exists. The correla-
tion (r=.32) between civic and Internet skills demonstrates that those with
high levels of civic skills also tend to possess high levels of Internet skills.
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 197

Those who possess the most important determinant of online participation


also tend to possess the most important determinant of offline participation.
Even so, this relationship should not be overstated. Knowing the civic skill
level of individuals only explains about 10% of these individuals’ Internet
skill level (r2=.102); alternately considered, 30.4% of those with zero civic
skills possess two or more Internet skills. Not surprisingly, given their posi-
tive correlation, Internet skills and civic skills show a similar pattern of asso-
ciation with the demographic variables. In general those from high SES
backgrounds disproportionably possess both Internet skills and civic skills.
And most of the associations compare closely, the correlation coefficients
for income, education, gender, race, and community size each differ by less
than .10. Age acts as the lone exception; age shows a greater negative asso-
ciation with Internet skills (r=.30) compared to civic skills (r=.14).
Internet skills and civic skills positively associate with each other and
SES. Combining these insights with the multivariate findings suggests that
although individuals must draw upon a different set of skills to participate
online, those individuals who already possess offline civic skills are those
most likely to possess online skills. Moreover, the finding that those from
high SES backgrounds tend to have both sets of skills suggests that even
those who possess Internet skills, but not civic skills, still generally come
from more advantaged backgrounds thereby reinforcing the longstanding
pattern of unequal participation.9 The one striking exception to this pattern
is age. Although older individuals tend to participate in traditional political
activities more than younger individuals even after controlling for various
theoretically relevant factors (see Table 1; also Verba et al., 1995, Appendix
F), age does not independently influence online participation. Moreover,
the bivariate association between age and Internet skills (r=.30) suggests
that younger individuals disproportionately possess the most important raw
materials needed to participate online. While the Internet generally rein-
forces the patterns of participatory inequality associated with conventional
political participation, the new medium may close the longstanding partici-
patory divide between older and younger adults.
Although online mobilization only weakly predicts online participation, it
deserves attention because it does not influence offline participation. The
.19 correlation between online and offline mobilization suggests that those
mobilized offline also tend to be mobilized online. And, those from high
SES backgrounds tend to disproportionately receive both online and offline
mobilization messages. The two mobilization measures’ correlation coeffi-
cients closely mirror each other for income, education, gender and commu-
nity size. Older adults (r=.21) and whites (r=.20) also tend to receive
traditional mobilization messages more so than younger adults and non-
whites. However, in the online environment young adults (r=.00) and non-
whites (r=.07) receive online mobilization messages at approximately the
198 BEST AND KRUEGER

same rate as older adults and whites. Taken together, these results for
online and offline mobilization tend to parallel the results for Internet and
civic skills. The unique determinants of online participation, with the excep-
tion of age, do not distribute more equally in the population compared to
the unique determinants of conventional political activity.

ASSESSING PARTICIPATORY OPINION DISTORTION


In and of itself, the skewed demographic makeup of participators should
increase the attentiveness of policy makers to these social groups’ needs. Yet,
while the above evaluative technique is instructive, it fails to appraise the
political opinions held by online participators. Because participation often
involves the transmission of ideological messages to the political system, the
type of political opinions held by participators, not simply their demographic
makeup, more importantly influences the policy-making process (for a dis-
cussion see Gant and Lyons, 1993). To assess whether online participation
associates with a distinct political perspective we turn to Table 3 that dis-
plays the results of the correlation analysis between online participation and
general political predispositions, social issues, economic issues, foreign af-
fairs, and Internet regulation. In each case, the political attitudes have been
coded such that higher values represent more conservative positions. As a

TABLE 3. Political Participation and Political Attitudes, Correlations and


Partial Correlations

Online Offline Online Offline


Participation Participation Participation Participation
(correlation) (correlation) (partial correlation) (partial correlation)

Ideology .09*** .02 .08*** .03


Party Identification .01 .01 .04 .02
Bush Approval .09*** .09*** .10*** .08***
Affirmative Action .12*** .07** .10*** .05*
Marijuana .13*** .09*** .08*** .04
Abortion .01 .05 .01 .03
Universal Medical .09*** .10*** .07** .06*
Minimum Wage .09*** .10*** .06* .05*
Progressive Taxation .02 .02 .01 .01
Iraq War .10*** .11*** .10*** .11***
Internet Access .01 .04 .01 .01
Library Content .13*** .11*** .10*** .10***
Internet Sales Tax .08** .01 .05* .01

*Significant at p < .10, two-tailed test.


**Significant at p < .05, two-tailed test.
***Significant at p < .01 two-tailed test.
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 199

result, negative correlations indicate that relative to the general population


online participators hold more liberal attitudes whereas positive relationships
signal that online participators hold more conservative attitudes.
The first three rows of Table 3, column 1 display the correlations
between online participation and general political predispositions (ideology,
partisanship, and presidential approval). Online participators tend to be
modestly more liberal and less supportive of President Bush than the gen-
eral public; no relationship can be confidently established between online
participation and party identification. While the results do not signal a boon
for Democratic candidates if the U.S. moves toward widespread online vot-
ing, liberal candidates, irrespective of their party affiliation, may benefit.
The fourth through sixth rows of Table 3, column 1 display the correla-
tions between online participation and three currently salient social issues,
university affirmative action, the criminality of marijuana, and abortion.
While abortion attitudes appear unrelated to online participation, online par-
ticipators do display more liberal attitudes toward higher education affirma-
tive action and the criminalization of marijuana possession. And, comparing
the magnitude of the correlation coefficients suggests that no other predispo-
sition or issue correlates more strongly with online participation than the
criminalization of marijuana. The comparatively strong relationship suggests
that the Internet may prove fertile ground for mobilizing activists in favor of
various state level initiatives and referenda that would liberalize marijuana
laws. Some past research also points to the uniqueness of political participa-
tors’ attitudes toward marijuana. In a study comparing voters and non-voters’
attitudes using the 1972 American National Election Study (ANES), Gant
and Lyons (1993) found only one significant attitudinal difference; electoral
participators held more liberal views toward marijuana. Although the results
presented here suggest that this participatory opinion distortion perhaps has
endured over time, we cannot ascertain the consistency of this opinion dis-
tortion because the ANES dropped the marijuana question after 1976.
The sixth through ninth rows of Table 3, column 1 display the correla-
tions between online participation and economic attitudes (universal medi-
cal coverage, increases in the minimum wage, and the progressive income
tax). Online participators, while more liberal with regards to general politi-
cal predispositions and social issue attitudes, hold more conservative atti-
tudes toward government sponsored universal medical coverage and
increases to the minimum wage. The relationship between the progressive
income tax and online participation cannot be confidently differentiated
from zero. These results are notable because they mirror past studies’ find-
ings; when participation does relate to conservative attitudes, these attitudes
tend to concern issues related to government spending and the welfare
state rather than general political predispositions or social issues (e.g. Ben-
nett and Resnick, 1990).
200 BEST AND KRUEGER

The 10th row of Table 3, column 1 displays the correlation between


support for the war in Iraq and online participation. While we would
prefer to use multiple questions to tap the foreign affairs opinion dimen-
sion, the dataset includes only one question. Even so, we would expect
that alternate questions focusing on military spending or multilateralism
to primarily reproduce this underlying dimension. Reflecting the liberal
skew found in the general predisposition and social issue correlations,
online participators show less support for the Iraq war than the popula-
tion at large. Past studies find few consistent differences between partici-
pators and non-participators with regard to foreign affairs (Bennett and
Resnick, 1990; Gant and Lyons, 1993). However, Bennett and Resnick
did find that over time participators consistently provide more support for
foreign intervention when asked whether the United States ‘‘would be
better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with
problems in other parts of the world’’ (1990, p. 798). Their result con-
trasts with our finding that shows participators less supportive of U.S. for-
eign involvement; of course, the generic isolationism/interventionism
opinion question used by Bennett and Resnick from 1984 to 1988 only
compares bluntly with our measure of support for a current war.
Finally, political issues pertaining directly to the Internet, particularly the
government’s role in providing access as well as regulating content and com-
merce, have become increasingly important. The last three rows of Table 3,
column 1 display the correlations between online participation and attitudes
regarding government sponsored Internet access, government regulation of li-
brary Internet content, and the creation of a tax on Internet sales. While the
relationship between online participation and attitudes toward government
funded Internet access cannot be confidently established, compared to the
general population, online participators are less supportive of government
regulation of obscene library Internet content and the taxation of Internet
commerce. This result suggests that if online political activists feel the gov-
ernment regulation of the medium goes too far, then these activists likely
would use the Internet to defend the autonomy of the medium.
Considering the direction and magnitude of these correlation coefficients
as a whole underscores the overall relationship between online participation
and political opinion. Of these 13 correlation coefficients, seven demon-
strate a significant negative relationship, two a significant positive relation-
ship, and four cannot be confidently differentiated from zero. This suggests
that online participation usually relates with more liberal attitudes, some-
times does not relate with political opinion, and least often relates with con-
servative attitudes. Yet, the absolute value of these correlation coefficients
(from .08 to .13) suggests that all these relationships are weak; a prudent
overall assessment would suggest that the political messages sent by online
participators skew in a liberal direction, but only slightly. If the messages
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 201

sent via online participation do indeed influence the policy making process,
as the instrumental theoretical perspective suggests, then on balance we
expect policy makers to move slightly in a liberal direction. The two excep-
tions (universal medical and minimum wage) demonstrate that online par-
ticipators hold more conservative economic attitudes. Consequently, the
generally liberal skew in the policy-making process resulting from online
participation does not extend to economic policies. Online participation
should bolster more conservative economic policies.
Because different political contexts can encourage participation from a
particular ideological segment of the population, a cross-sectional snapshot of
online participation could be misleading. Liberals particularly may be moti-
vated to act politically. If so, then the patterns from the previous analysis re-
flect the political context rather than something distinct about the online
environment. Since we would expect the broader political context to influ-
ence both offline and online participation, comparing online participation
and offline participation’s relationship to political attitudes helps control this
context. In other words, if offline participation also relates modestly to liberal
attitudes, then we would suggest that liberals particularly are motivated to
engage politics online and offline. If, however, offline participation does not
relate to political attitudes or positively relates to conservative attitudes, then
the results would suggest that the Internet is a medium that encourages a
distinct ideological message. For this comparison we turn to the correlations
between offline participation and the political issues (Table 3, column 2).
An overall inspection of the first two columns of Table 3 demonstrates
the continuity of the coefficients. Of the seven correlations that indicate a
relationship between online participation and liberal attitudes, offline par-
ticipation also relates with liberal attitudes on five occasions, while two
additional coefficients cannot be confidently determined. Offline participa-
tion also does not relate to the political attitudes that do not significantly
covary with online participation. Of the two correlations that indicate on-
line participation relates to more conservative attitudes, offline participation
also relates to more conservative attitudes. Moreover, in the seven cases
where online and offline participation each significantly relate to political
attitudes, online participation relates more strongly with liberal attitudes
three times, relates less strongly with conservative attitudes two times,
relates less strongly with liberal attitudes once, and on one additional occa-
sion displays no difference. Even so, none of these differences are notable;
the maximum difference is 0.05. In sum, although a close inspection of the
pattern of coefficients suggests that online participation correlates with lib-
eral attitudes slightly more consistently and slightly more strongly than off-
line participation, the major implication of these results is continuity.10
Because the political messages sent to the political system by offline partic-
ipators mirror those sent by online participators we do not expect the
202 BEST AND KRUEGER

policy making process to change dramatically because of the introduction


of the Internet.
Finally, we also consider how Internet participation relates to political
attitudes after controlling for various demographic factors. This allows us to
determine whether online participators’ opinions are due to their demo-
graphic profile or whether they are distinct above and beyond their socio-
economic makeup. To this end, the last two columns of Table 3 present the
partial correlation coefficients between both participation scales and the
political attitudes after controlling for the demographic variables.
Not surprisingly, of the four issues that do not covary with online partici-
pation (column 1, Table 3), the partial correlations remain insignificant (col-
umn 3, Table 3). Considering the nine issues that did display a significant
bivariate association with online participation, after controlling for demo-
graphic characteristics, all retain the same sign and continue to be distin-
guishable from zero. This result suggests that the relationship between
online participation and political attitudes cannot be explained simply by
the demographic profile of online participators. Even so, the demographic
profile of online participators does account for some of the bivariate rela-
tionship between online participation and political attitudes; seven relation-
ships attenuate, one remains unchanged, and one strengthens slightly.
Comparing online and offline participation’s partial correlations do little to
change the implications of the bivariate comparisons. Of the seven issues that
display a significant bivariate correlation with offline participation, after con-
trolling for demographic characteristics six retain the same sign and continue
to be distinguishable from zero. Similar to online participation’s partial corre-
lations, six of these relationships weaken once controlling for demographic
factors; one remains unchanged. Overall, even after controlling for demo-
graphic characteristics, online participators tend to hold liberal attitudes
slightly more consistently and slightly more strongly than offline participators.
But again, because the difference between the partial correlation coefficients
never exceeds .05, the continuity between the political opinions of online and
offline participators should be stressed rather than their slight differences.

DISCUSSION
In this paper we use two classic evaluative techniques to analyze the repre-
sentativeness of Internet political participation patterns. Using resource the-
ory to inform the two stage ordered logit models, the first technique identifies
the characteristics that facilitate online participation as well as the distribution
of these characteristics in the population. As we have seen, the Internet alters
the types of resources necessary for political activity, potentially advantaging a
new type of individual. However, our follow-up analysis indicates that Inter-
net and civic skills correlate with each other and distribute similarly across
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 203

demographic categories. This finding implies that although a new resource is


required to participate online, those with the conventional resources required
to participate offline also disproportionately possess the new medium specific
resource. Moreover, even when a new set of individuals are advantaged in the
online environment, such as those who possess Internet skills but not civic
skills, the positive association of Internet skills and socioeconomic status sug-
gests that apart from lacking civic skills, they look remarkably similar to those
participating in the offline environment. Because we expect policy makers to
pay disproportionate attention to the needs of those most active in the politi-
cal system, these results suggest that online participation should reinforce the
policy advantage of the most privileged members of society.
The one exception to this general pattern of similarity, age, deserves spe-
cial attention. Studies consistently demonstrate that younger individuals
engage politics at a much lower level compared to older citizens; they are
less likely to display interest in politics, vote, participate in other non-voting
political activity, and encounter mobilization efforts (Delli Carpini, 2000;
Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995). Also, older individuals participate in tra-
ditional political activities at much higher rates than the young even after
controlling for numerous theoretically relevant factors. Indeed, the results
from this analysis suggest that age is the second most important predictor of
offline activity. Yet, we demonstrate that younger individuals, everything
else equal, do not participate less in the online environment. Moreover,
everything else is not equal. Younger individuals possess higher levels of the
most influential predictor of online political activity, Internet skills, which
should exert a powerful positive influence on younger individuals’ likelihood
of participation. While the Internet typically reproduces the participatory
advantages held by high SES individuals, the implication of age’s irregular
result is noteworthy. Because age does not independently predict online
political activity and younger individuals possess higher levels of the most
critical determinant of online participation, the speculation by some scholars
that the Internet may reverse the political disengagement of the youngest
members of the adult population receives some validation (Delli Carpini,
2000). Of course, younger individuals disproportionately wielding the
resources needed to participate in the online environment matters little if
their motivation to do so continues to lag behind older citizens.
Although this initial assessment technique does illuminate who pos-
sesses the characteristics that facilitate online participation, it fails to
directly assess whether online participators’ opinions reflect or distort the
opinions of the general population. Therefore, we also consider the polit-
ical preferences of participators across a broad range of relevant issues
and predispositions. Taken as a whole, online participation modestly
relates to liberal political preferences even after controlling for several
demographic variables. This result suggests that the messages communi-
204 BEST AND KRUEGER

cated by online participators about political issues likely skew in a liberal


direction, albeit only slightly. However, because the parallel analysis of
offline participation suggests that conventional participation also relates
modestly with liberal preferences, we attribute the online participation/
liberal association more to the political context considered in the analysis
than anything unique to the online environment. In other words,
although online participators currently skew in a liberal direction, the
online environment, at least compared to the offline environment, only
marginally advantages the political voice of those with a particular per-
spective. Therefore, if these current patterns remain, and the U.S. moves
toward online voting, as has happened (e.g. 2004 Michigan Democratic
Presidential Primary) and as some suggest is inevitable on a wider basis
(Alvarez and Hall, 2004), then we would not expect one party to reap
substantial electoral returns. The ability to contribute financially online
perhaps ranks as a more pressing political phenomenon that also
deserves consideration. Although we do not examine online financial
political contributions, insofar as the political acts considered here relate
to political preferences similarly, we would not expect that groups and
candidates from one ideological perspective markedly to better harness
the fundraising potential of the Internet compared to offline channels.
Finally, the results of this study should not be overemphasized. In partic-
ular, given the strong evidence that suggests online participation may help
activate the youngest segments of the adult population, any conclusions
drawn about the newfound political influence of young adults must consider
the efficacy of the new medium to influence politics relative to traditional
avenues. If policy makers and other targets of online participation consider
many types of Internet participation inferior to analogous conventional
activity, as suggested by some scholars (e.g. Bucy and Gregson, 2001), then
even this new pattern of online participation merely represents much sound
and fury signifying little. Because it remains unresolved to what degree on-
line political activity influences policy makers and other citizens, and the
answer to this question crucially determines the instrumental implications of
this new participatory medium, considerable work remains to fully under-
stand the implications of online political opportunities.

APPENDIX A: QUESTION WORDING


Dependent Variables

Internet Political Participation: Next, I will now list some activities that
people perform on the Internet. For each, please tell me if you have done
it in the last 12 months. First...
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 205

Have you used the Internet to contact an elected representative, government offi-
cial, or candidate for office to express your opinion about a local, national, or
international issue? Have you signed an Internet petition about a local, national,
or international issue? Have you used the Internet to try to persuade another per-
son about your view on a local, national, or international issue? Have you worked
together with others in an Internet community to try to deal with a local issue or
problem?

Offline Political Participation: Next, I will list some activities that people
sometimes take part in to stay active in their community and to express
their beliefs. For each, please tell me if you have done it in the past
12 months. First...
Have you personally gone to see, made a phone call to, or sent a postal letter to
an elected representative, government official, or candidate for office to express
your opinion about a local, national, or international issue? Have you signed a
written petition about a local, national, or international issue? Have you tele-
phoned, written a postal mail letter, or spoken with someone in an effort to per-
suade that person about your view on a local, national, or international issue?
Have you worked together with others in your community to try to deal with a lo-
cal issue or problem?

Completely Exogenous Independent Variables

Age: What year were you born?

Gender: Interviewer records gender

Race: What racial or ethnic group do you most identify yourself with?
African–American, Asian, Hispanic, White, or some other group?

Education: What is the highest grade of school, or year of college, you


have completed and gotten credit for?

Rural: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview telephone number classi-


fication
206 BEST AND KRUEGER

Income: For classification purposes only, is the total yearly income of all
the members of your family now living at home less than $50,000, or
$50,000 or more?
(For those who respond less than $50,000) Is it less than $25,000 or $25,000 or
more? (For those who respond $50,000 or more) Is it $50,000 to less than
$75,000, $75,000 to less than $100,000, or $100,000 or more?

Home Access: Do you ever use the Internet from home?

Connection Speed: What type of connection do you use most often


when you connect to the Internet, a cable modem, a digital subscriber line
(DSL), a dial-up modem, or something else?

Endogenous Independent Variables

Online Mobilization: Did anyone from a political party, campaign, or


political organization contact you over the Internet about a local, national,
or international issue?

Offline Mobilization: Did anyone from a political party, campaign, or


political organization call you on the telephone, send you a letter in the
mail, or come around and talk to you about a local, national, or interna-
tional issue?

Political Interest: Using a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being ‘‘a total lack of
interest’’ and 10 being ‘‘a great deal of interest,’’ how interested are you in
politics?

Free Time: In general, about how many hours each day do you have free
from the responsibilities of employment, home care, child-care, and school
to relax, socialize, and recreate. In other words, about how many hours a
day do you have free from any immediate responsibility.

Civic Skills: Next, I am going to read you a list of activities that people
sometimes have to do as part of their job, church or organizational involve-
ment. After I read each one, please tell me whether or not you have
engaged in that activity in the last 12 months as part of your involvement
with your job, your church, or other organizations you belong to. First...
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 207

Have you written a letter? Have you gone to a meeting where you took part in
making decisions? Have you planned or chaired a meeting? Have you given a pre-
sentation or speech?

Internet Skills: Next, I am going to read you a list of tasks that can be
performed on the Internet. Some people have done these tasks, while oth-
ers have not. What about you? First...
Have you sent an attachment with an email? Have you posted an audio, video, or
image file to the Internet? Have you personally designed a webpage? Have you
downloaded a software program to your computer from the Internet?

Instruments

Work Status: Are you currently employed full-time, employed part-time,


retired, temporarily laid off or not employed?

Religious Involvement: How often do you attend religious services,


meetings, or gatherings besides weddings and funerals?

Civic Organizational Involvement: How often do you go to group


meetings of organizations like fraternal groups, community groups, school
groups, or civic groups?

Years in Community: How many years have you lived in your present
community?

Home Ownership: Do you rent or own your current residence?

Recreational Activity: How often do you participate in recreational activ-


ities with others in your community?

High School Writing: Did you write for your high school newspaper,
yearbook, or club newsletters?
208 BEST AND KRUEGER

High School Officer: Were you an officer in a high school club or orga-
nization?

High School Computer Class: Did you ever take a computer course in
high school?

High School Typing Class: Did you ever take a typing course in high
school?

High School Government: How active were you in your high school
government?

Parental Discussion of News: How often did your parents or guardians


discuss local and national news while you were growing up?

Television: About how many hours in a typical day do you watch televi-
sion or do you not watch television?

Marital Status: Are you now married, single, divorced, or widowed?

Adults in Household: How many adults live in this household who are
18 years old or older including yourself?

Children in Household: How many children live in this household who


are 17 years old or younger?

Foreign Travel: Have you traveled to a country outside the United


States?

Number of Phone Calls Needed to Reach Respondent: Computer-As-


sisted Telephone Interview record.
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 209

Internet Years: Now I would like you to think back to when you first
started using the Internet. How many years have you been using the Inter-
net?

2000 Presidential Vote: Did you vote for Al Gore, George Bush, Ralph
Nader or some other candidate in the 2000 presidential election or did you
not vote in the 2000 election?

Region: Computer-Assisted Telephone Interview classification.

Program a VCR: Have you ever personally programmed a VCR to tape


something on television while you were away from home?

Political Predispositions and Issues

Ideology: In politics today, do you consider yourself a liberal, moderate,


or conservative?
Partisanship: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republi-
can, a Democrat, an independent or what?

Bush Approval: Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Bush


is handling his job as President?

Affirmative Action: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with


the following statement. Admissions to colleges and universities should be
considered solely on the basis of students’ abilities without regard to their
race.

Marijuana: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the follow-
ing statement. The government should treat the possession of small
amounts of marijuana as a criminal offense.

Abortion: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following
statements. The government should allow women, in consultation with their
doctors, to determine whether or not to have an abortion.
210 BEST AND KRUEGER

Universal Medical: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the
following statement. The government should provide an insurance plan,
which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone.

Minimum Wage: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the
following statement. The government should increase the minimum wage
from five dollars, fifteen cents an hour.

Progressive Taxation: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with


the following statement. People with high incomes should pay a larger share
of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.

Iraq War: Would you say that you oppose or support the war in Iraq?

Internet Access: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the
following statement. The government should help poor Americans pay the
costs of home Internet access.

Library Internet Filter: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree


with the following statement. Public libraries should use filtering mecha-
nisms to screen out obscene material on computers even if they also filter
out constitutionally protected free speech such as breast cancer information.
Regressive Internet Tax: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree
with the following statement. The purchase of products over the Internet
should be subject to taxes.

APPENDIX B: COLLINEARITY AND TWO STAGE DIAGNOSTICS


Collinearity Diagnostics
Although all multivariate models contain some multicollinearity, overall
our tests indicate that excessive multicollinearity does not seriously plague
the estimates. Calculating the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each
independent variable does suggests that the highest VIF (Internet
skills = 10) approaches what some consider a problematic threshold (Fox,
1991); although others suggest that VIF’s need to reach 20 (Tabachnick and
Fidell, 1996) or even 30 before indicating serious problems (Chatterjee,
Hadi, and Price, 1999). Compared to the standard error of a perfectly
orthogonal independent variable (VIF = 1), the standard error of a variable
with a VIF of 10 inflates by a factor of approximately 3, decreasing the pre-
cision of the estimate (Fox, 1991).
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 211

Therefore, to demonstrate the stability of the Internet skills coefficient,


we re-run the model after removing a clearly insignificant variable (home
access) that also correlates with Internet skills. The results of the original
estimates and the new estimates are reported in Table A.1. Next, we calcu-
late the VIF’s for the new model; the Internet skills VIF equals 3 and all
variables show a VIF of less than 5. Not surprisingly, an examination of the
change to Internet skill’s standard error (from .084 to .051) indicates that
the precision of the Internet skills estimate improves in the new model.
That said, in both models, we have at least 99.9% confidence that the Inter-
net skills coefficient differs from zero. In addition, because the analysis uses
the point estimates of all statistically significant variables, and the Internet
skills coefficient changes only marginally (from .461 to .466), the substantive
conclusions remain unaffected.

Two Stage Diagnostics


We ran several diagnostic tests that assess the robustness of the first stage
models, the relative robustness of the excluded instruments in the first stage
models, and the exogeneity of the excluded instruments. Because few statis-
tical packages include diagnostics for two stage ordered logit, we rely on the
common diagnostics available from two stage least squares.
Instrumental variable models require robust first stage estimates. How-
ever, no accepted standard seems to exist regarding the level of robustness;
two recent articles using an instrumental variable approach report a wide
range of first stage R-square—from .05 to .47 (Lau and Pomper, 2002; Vav-
reck, Spiliotes, and Fowler, 2002). The freetime R-square (.38), the political
interest R-square (.24), the civic skills R-square (.33), the Internet skills R-
square (.68), the online mobilization R-square (.16) and the offline mobiliza-
tion R-square (.25) fall within this range.
Within the first stage models, the excluded instruments should contribute
a large percentage to the model’s R-square (Bartels, 1991). Again, no stan-
dard percentage contribution to the R-square exists, though the same recent
articles report percentages between 14 and 45. The percent contribution
from the excluded instruments in the freetime model (63), the political
interest model (79), the civic skills model (58), the Internet skills model
(28), the online mobilization model (35) and the offline mobilization model
(48) suggest that the excluded instruments strongly predict the endogenous
variables relative to the other independent variables in the model.
We also assess the validity of the instruments using a Sargan (1958) exo-
geneity test. This tests the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage participation models.
The Sargan statistics fail to achieve even a liberal level of statistical signifi-
cance in either model (p > .10); therefore the null hypotheses cannot be re-
212 BEST AND KRUEGER

jected. This suggests that the chosen instruments are exogenous and can be
confidently excluded from the second stage model.

TABLE A1. Second Stage Ordered Logistic Regression Models Including


and Excluding Home Access

Online Participation Online Participation


with Home Access without Home Access

Age .004 (.008) .003 (.008)


Gender (male) .645 (.204) .647 (.225)
Race (white) .559 (.230) .558 (.299)
Education .133 (.110) .132 (.121)
Rural .218 (.280) .222 (.314)
Income (<25) .668 (.419) .666 (.486)
Income (<50) .365 (.327) .364 (.352)
Income (<75) .284 (.331) .286 (.362)
Income (<100) .289 (.324) .288 (.364)
Home Access .031 (.376)
Connection Speed .102 (.218) .098 (.250)
a
Online Mobilization .017 (.008) .017 (.007)
a
Offline Mobilization .007 (.005) .007 (.005)
a
Internet Skill .461 (.084) .466 (.051)
a
Civic Skill .096 (.163) .093 (.166)
a
Free Time .008 (.046) .008 (.051)
a
Political Interest .480 (.158) .482 (.182)
Chi-square (18,17) 357.78 355.53
Pseudo R2 .250 .250
Number 950 950

Note: Coefficients are ordered logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at p < .10, two-tailed test.
**Significant at p < .05, two-tailed test.
***Significant at p < .01, two-tailed test.
a
Instrumented variable.

NOTES
1. Following others (e.g. Conway, 1991; Verba et al., 1995) we consider passive and active
forms of political participation distinct. Moreover, passive forms of political activity, such as
reading a newspaper, would conform poorly to the instrumental theoretical approach taken
in this analysis that centers most fundamentally on influencing the political system. There-
fore, we only consider active forms of political participation. Similarly, we consider mone-
tary and non-monetary forms of political participation distinct (for a discussion see Verba
et al., 1995). Unfortunately, despite the importance of monetary forms of online political
activity, and its conformity to the instrumental perspective, the very low incidence of online
political financial contributions (3% of American public) found in national surveys (Corn-
field, Rainie, and Horrigan, 2003) prevents us from undertaking a parallel stand alone analy-
sis of monetary online political participation.
2. For an extended discussion of the instrumental importance of both participatory opinion
distortion and participatory descriptive distortion see Voice and Equality, Chapter 6 (Verba
ANALYZING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF INTERNET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 213

et al., 1995). In summary, they ‘‘base [their] understanding of participatory representation


on a wide range of politically relevant characteristics. These are characteristics whose visi-
bility to a public official might make a difference in their response to citizen participation.
They can be anything about an activist that might have an effect on government action.
Politically relevant characteristics naturally include policy preferences. However, they also
encompass a broad range of social and economic characteristics that make government pol-
icies relevant to an individual among them certain demographic characteristics’’ [italics in
original] (1995, p. 170).
3. Because we focus on online participation, this review excludes studies that use some form
of Internet use to predict classic offline participation (e.g. Bimber, 2003; Shah, McLeod,
and Yoon, 2001; Tolbert and McNeal, 2003).
4. The response rate was 41.4%. Although not as high as some national surveys such as the
National Election Studies or the General Social Surveys, research has shown that lower
response rates do not necessary yield lower quality data (e.g. Keeter, Miller, Kohut, Groves
and Presser, 2000).
5. Because the majority of missing cases result from incomplete responses to the income mea-
sure, we create dummy variables for each category of the income measure as well as an
additional category for refusing to respond to the income measure. The greater than
$100,000 category is used as the excluded reference category in the models and the refusal
category is removed from the tables to ease interpretation. This technique retains all of the
non-income information in the model for those cases that lack a response to the income
measure. We also re-ran the analyses with an ordinal income measure. The results do not
markedly differ in terms of substance or significance.
6. Instruments should predict the endogenous variables but not directly influence political par-
ticipation after controlling for other theoretically relevant variables. Using this criteria we
include the following instruments: Job status (not working, working part-time, working full-
time), religious involvement, civic organizational involvement, the number of years residing
in the community, home ownership, the amount of time spent in community recreational
activities, whether respondents wrote for their high school yearbook, whether respondents
were officers in a high school club or organization, time watching television, marital status,
the number of adults living in the household, whether a child lives at home, whether the
respondent traveled outside of the US in the past year, the number of phone calls necessary
to reach the respondent, the number of years connected to the Internet, participation in a
high school computer class, participation in a high school typing class, whether the respon-
dent has ever programmed a VCR, the level of involvement in high school government, de-
gree of parental discussion of current events while growing up, voting in the 2000 election,
as well as measures for the region of the country.
7. For example, those with a low Internet skill level possess a 1.7% chance of participating in
at least one political act while those with a high skill level have a 52.9% chance. The
51.2% difference is the percent change in the likelihood of participating in at least one
political act.
8. Because we seek to assess the distribution of these characteristics in the population, rather
than assess the independent influence of demographic variables on these characteristics,
we use bivariate data analysis.
9. To check this expectation, we re-ran the correlation matrix for those individuals who do
not possess any civic skills. Internet skills continue to positively correlate with SES (In-
come = .28, Education = .24, Rural = .16, Gender = .08, Race = .10, Age = .34) sug-
gesting specifically that those who do not posses civic skills, but do possess Internet skills,
disproportionately come from high SES backgrounds.
10. We also consider the possibility that online participators, compared to offline participators,
hold more polarized political opinions. To assess this we ‘‘fold’’ each political issue such
214 BEST AND KRUEGER

that higher values represent more extreme positions. Because the correlations between the
folded issues and online and offline participation never differ by more than .05, the evi-
dence suggests that online participators are not more polarized than offline participators.

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