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11
THE GUERRILLA
Psychological
Aspects of
Guerrilla Warfare
A thesis prepared by
Mr. Howard R. Simpson
School of Naval Warfare
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 13
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 15
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 17
Chinese soldier.
equivalent is a constant recognized Political indoctrination
emphasizing
factor in many military organizations, it the constant threat to the
is largely due to his coming of unit andin
age the nation from "reactionary
elements" and the atmosphere of mu-
guerrilla movements where his function
tual political responsibility in the PLA
has proved indispensable to success.
From the caves of Yenan to the hills facilitates the acceptability of such a
of North Korea the People's Liberation system.
Army (PLA) of Communist China has Despite this constant indoctrination
depended on the political officer or the individual still reflects a certain
cadre as a yeast in their leavening of amount of human independence, and
purpose. the PLA political officer divides his
The footsore intellectual trying to wards into beets-red through and
lecture guerrilla bands on the compli- through, the true party members-and
cated theory of politics has been re- radishes-red on the outside only, those
placed by the hardened, professional who lack party commitment.^
propaganda expert whose role in the Although the PLA's political
PLA has grown to the point where he is methods were developed in a time of
burdened with specific tasks. guerrilla operations, it is now a well-
He is responsible not only for established regular army and should not
morale, political indoctrination, and be taken as representative of a normal
propaganda but he must also arrange for guerrilla fighting force.
assistance to soldiers' families; process In Malaya the Communist-supported
leave, furlough, and marriage applica- guerrillas of the Malayan Races Libera-
tions; allocate blame, praise, reward, or tion Army (MRLA) recognized the
punishment; regulate relations between importance of political indoctrination
unit members and the civilian popula- from the very beginning of their revolt.
tion; observe closely the behavior of Forced to fight in small units and under
military leaders toward their men and constant danger of infiltration by agents
even their conduct of military affairs.2 of the Colonial Police of British Intelli-
This is a complex assignment for one gence, the MRLA saw to it that its
officer no matter how dedicated or political officers were equal or, in some
fanatic he may be. To make their task cases, senior to their military com-
manders.
easier, the PLA political officers have
evolved a system that automaticallyIn Vietnam the political officer or
enlists the common soldier as an assis- cadre has been the backbone of the
tant. revolution. During the period prior to
Under the "morale informants sys- World War II, anti-French political
tem," appointed leaders within the groups with varying loyalties carried on
squad-usually party members-are made a clandestine fight for leadership in the
responsible for daily reports on bad struggle for eventual independence.
morale or any stubborn attitude shown Western political doctrines blended
by their comrades. This spiderweb net- with traditional Asian intrigue to make
work of informants facilitates the politi- French Indochina a perfect operating
cal officer's work. It also provides him terrain for the professional paramilitary
with the mechanics to evaluate the cadre. Violence, corruption, sellouts,
double and triple agents, official and
soldier's psychological reaction to politi-
cal and military situations and events. unofficial "special" operations built an
A Westerner would consider this atmosphere within which only the hard,
spying or informing. Care should clever be professional survived.
taken, however, not to expect such aHo Chi Minh's agents and the French
negative reaction on the part of the intelligence services recruited their own
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18 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 19
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 21
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 23
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24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
They had falsely, but effectively,led by Daniel Breen. The British charac-
shown
that their action could be terrible and terized the attack as an "outrage"
carried out by "dangerous madmen"
implacable. They had falsely, but effec-
and "murderers. "h In Anglo-Saxon
tively, embarrassed the French authori-
ties and made their Vietnamese and terms terrorism is not only outside the
law, it is something that is just not
Chinese collaborators highly uncomfort-
able. done. Thus, to the British, terrorists
Since the close of World War II the must be labeled as bandits and gunmen
Vietnamese people have been bom-
to place them clearly in a criminal
category removed from any political
barded with photos, pamphlets, tracts,
and newspaper stories of Vietminh validation.
or
Viet Cong atrocities and terrorism. Although pure fear is the first and
Today they are close to the saturationmost common reaction to terrorism, it
point. The first human reaction after is
so usually accompanied by feelings of
many years of war is to be thankful that
impotence and frustration. The law of
the viewer was not the victim. The "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
second reaction, a bit slower but crucial
tooth" may be universal but, when
in a psychological sense, is the inescap-
applied to the victims of terrorism, it
able impression of Viet Cong omni- lacks practicability. The desire to strike
presence and freedom of action. back is normal, but one must first find
Unfortunately, Americans have often the terrorist to lay claim to his eye or
failed to grasp the objective of the Viet
his tooth. Even a well-organized police
Cong's use of indiscriminate terror andforce or special branch operates with a
have rushed to spread the wordthin ofmargin of probable success.
terrorist action throughout the country, When terrorists strike, the surviving
thus acting as Madison Avenue assistants
victims can seldom take weapon in hand
to an unwanted client--the Viet Cong. and track them down. They must rely
Reactions to terrorism vary depend- on the forces of order. This is an
ing on environment and the people impatient reliance that demands quick
involved. In Sicily, where small-scale results.
but When results are lacking, the
effective terrorism is traditional, theinitial hatd for the terrorist is diluted
people quickly "get the message." They with frustration and resentment. This
go beyond the act itself to interpretnegative
its mixture is often directed at the
significance and meaning. They seldom authorities.
expect or seek protection from the local
Selective Terrorism. Selective terror
authorities. Instead, they know how to
read the language of violence as promul- be highly effective. It was a favorite
can
tool of the Vietminh, and it remains a
gated by the Mafia, and their reactions,
though bathed in an outward show of standard procedure for the Viet Cong in
South Vietnam. Much of the South
emotion, are based on experience and
hardheaded realism. Vietnamese Government's inability to
In France, during the height of OAS regain control of the countryside can be
laid to the success of selective terrorism.
actions, the terms used to describe the
OAS activists were simply "activist" or A government official named as a
"terrorist" depending on the specific hamlet chief to replace a murdered
incident and its result. predecessor who had, in his turn, re-
Anglo-Saxon reactions are con- placed another victim of terrorism, is
siderably different. In Dublin, during
understandably reticent about spending
the winter of 1919, an attempt was the night in the home or room where
made on the life of Britain's Field the previous deaths occurred.
Marshal French by members of the IRA The temptation is strong to leave lhe
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 25
hamlet before sundown and bed down guerrilla's objectives and impatient with
at the district headquarters. This soonthe government's lack of efficiency. The
becomes a habit. The Viet Cong then fill
guerrillas then carry out their attacks in
this leadership vacuum. They enter the a manner that will place the blame on
hamlet at will for a night of lectures,the government while they pose as
songs, and discussions, often withinchampions of the murdered progres-
sives.
pistol range of the closely barricaded
police post. The Individual Terrorist. One of the
The people are aware that their chief
great problems in meeting the threat of
is absent each night, and so are the
terrorism is the difficulty of identifying
police. Neither will normally risk a and isolating the terrorist as an indi-
showdown with the Viet Cong under
vidual. A terrorist plan may originate in
such circumstances. When the time
the office of a locally respected physi-
comes, the Viet Cong assassination
cian, but the person carrying out the
squad will ambush the hamlet chief on
plan may be a 12-year-old boy who has
his way to the district headquarters or,
been paid to lean a bicycle against a
if the police are sufficiently cowed, he
will be shot on the street in full view of
certain wall at a specific time. The boy
is unaware that the bicycle frame is
the people.
stuffed with plastic explosive. Even
Selective terrorism is not always
under brutal interrogation he will be
applied to the enemy. It is often used to
unable to provide useful information,
"readjust" command or political dif-
for the man who paid him was a
ferences within guerrilla organizations
complete stranger. By the time the boy
or between rival guerrilla bands. What
is ushered into police headquarters the
appear to be indiscriminate acts of stranger is on his way to another city.
terror are often selective terror in dis-
The members of the Viet Cong spe-
guise. In Yugoslavia during World War
cial activities cell charged with assassina-
II, Soviet-supported partisans disguised tion and terrorism would seem to have
as Chetniks raided Croatian villages thus
much in common with the professional
turning the Croat population against the
Serbian-dominated Chetnik movement Tonkinese gunmen used by certain
branches of French Intelligence during
led by Mihailovic.?
the Indochina war. The differences how-
The range of targets for selective
ever are considerable. Not only is there
terrorism can vary greatly. Government
the obvious dichotomy in motivation,
officials, military leaders, police offi-
there is also the manifestation of an end
cers, and politicians are standard vic-
to an era of professional terrorism.
tims, but guerrilla movements invariably
match their targets to their political The black-clad, mercenary gunmen
goals. perched on their haunches outside
If a government is weak or vacil- French Intelligence offices in 1953 were
lating, the guerrillas may leave its offi- practitioners of a traditional art. They
cials in peace. They may be of more use followed in their fathers' footsteps,
to the guerrilla movement alive than learned their trade, practiced it, and
dead. On the other hand, a segment of were paid accordingly. The identity of
society under a weak government may their victims meant little to them, and
give signs of impatience and latent they considered their Vietminh counter-
action that could pose a threat to the parts as emotional amateurs.
movement. Today, in Vietnam, the emotional
In such a case, selective terrorism
amateurs have become the professionals.
might be directed at journalists, stu-
Terrorism has become too important to
dents, or labor leaders hostile to the
be left to the simple practitioner, and its
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26 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 27
and dies
supplies was delivered and accepted. Its because of a natural incompati-
bility.
explosion completely destroyed the Psychological attitudes have
hotel and buried in its debris the muti- played a considerable role in this rejec-
lated bodies of those inside. tion process.
In this situation the psychological In Western society the professional
and even the political results of terror- soldier's training, tradition, and code of
ism and counterterrorism became secon- honor have built a wall between him
dary and were pushed aside in order and the complicated world of national
that the blind killing could continue. and international politics. He is trained
The clash of terrorist and counter- to fight, to protect his homeland, and to
terrorist oblivious to those around them perform these tasks to the best of his
can create a vacuum of reaction. professional ability. Even the draftee or
Numbed and sickened by what they conscript
see, follows this code of honor
the population can lose faith
once in a
in uniform.
guerrilla movement or the government's
In modern guerrilla warfare the pro-
efforts to combat it. fessional soldier finds himself up against
Counterterrorism may appear an
toenemy
be a whose every move or tactic is
tempting and expedient method coordinated
to fight with political objectives
guerrilla terrorists, but the counter-
and plans. The traditional procedure of
guerrilla who accepts its use winning
is em- a battle or a war against an
enemy
ploying a tool of negative power. army and then turning the vic-
A tool
tory over to the politicians and diplo-
that may well create new problems
matsfaces.
rather than solve those he already has suddenly become obsolete.
The guerrilla's tactics call for con-
IV--THE COUNTERGUERRILLA stant political-military action. The coun-
terguerrilla commander who ignores this
He who stumbles twice over the
rule may win militarily only to find his
same stone deserves to break his neck.
victory annulled by the enemy's politi-
--Spanish Proverbi cal triumph.
In such situations the counter-
The Problem. From the clash of
guerrilla's psychological attitude can be
Roman Legions with the wild tribes of
a serious obstacle to success. Tradition
Gaul to the quick, deadly ambushes of
and modern technology can combine to
the Vietnam conflict, there has do
been
him a disservice. A man trained over
one constant with few exceptions: the period of time in military pro-
a long
great difficulty experienced by regular
cedures that have proven highly effec-
forces in understanding and effectively
tive will not forego them easily. Rather
reacting to guerrilla warfare. than change his viewpoint to meet a
"Revolutionary war," with itsnew
em-situation, he tends to adapt what
phasis on political action and subver-
he has known and used in the past to fit
sion, has made the modern counter-
the new problem. He thus achieves a
guerrilla's task even more difficult.
hybrid result of dubious value.
Armies have been retrained and The same man may have profited
equipped, regulars have been lectured
from the technological advances of mili-
tary
on the ways of the guerrilla, and science during his career. He finds
special
courses have been put together with all
it particularly difficult to put aside his
the benefits of technological data
technological expertise and make the
mental readjustment needed to return
gathering. The results, unfortunately,
often fall short of the desired goal. Itbasics
to the is of guerrilla warfare.
as if a new branch, grafted onto a commanders in Malaya often
British
found it more profitable to train a
weather-tested tree, gradually withers
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28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 29
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30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 31
In the winter of 1952, Vietminh facture that were lashed to it. The
units were pressing hard around the Vietminh dead sprawled over the cases
Catholic town of Phat Diem in the Delta of bloodstained ammunition or floated
of Tonkin. Regular French units, sup- face down in the water. Later, as dawn
ported by Catholic Militia, had tried broke, the commando section boarded
repeatedly but with little success to halt their trucks and departed.9
the infiltration of heavy weapons and Within 24 hours, making use of
ammunition. The enemy continued to intuition, knowledge of the enemy, and
crush isolated Catholic Militia units, technical expertise, they had located the
execute village leaders, and install their most likely route of infiltration. They
own people in key positions. In despera- had then invested their great fund of
tion the local French commander, a patience. Lying quietly in the mud at
proud, tradition-bound, Spahi officer, the edge of the river, chewing on sticky
called for help. It came in the form of a rice in lieu of smoking cigarettes, they
small section from the Commando had waited. Their investment had paid
d'Indochine. off with considerable profit.
The section was made up of French Americans, as "doers," anxious to
and Vietnamese commandos led by aget on with the job and eager to
young captain of mixed blood. Theyproduce results, often find the patience
were in startling contrast to the dashingfactor a difficult technique to master in
Spahi officers from the local armored counterguerrilla operations.
unit who watched the new arrivals with
condescension and slight curiosity. American Attitudes. In a positive
The commandos worked in trousers sense Americans can justifiably ap-
secured over canvas shoes with rubber proach the problems of counterguerrilla
action with a solid base of historical
bands. They wore wool shirts covered
by one or two dark sweaters. The only experience. The Kentucky rifleman with
items of uniform one could call regula-his own scalping knife was certainly a
tion were the black berets pushed down counterguerrilla. Roger's Rangers adopt-
on their foreheads. ed the tactics of their elusive enemy and
For four nights they straggled out atcarried out a highly successful form of
dusk toward the deserted villages andthe "search and destroy" mission. 19
rice paddies. Each morning they re- On the other hand, Americans today
turned, uncommunicative and smeared stand with both feet solidly planted in
with mud. an age of massive technological develop-
On the fifth night a searing rattle ofment where science and the computer
distant small arms fire awoke the sleep- offer challenges and solutions thought
ing Spahis. Lights flashed on in sector impossible a few short years ago.
headquarters. There was excited shout- Here, in a sense, lies the problem.
ing, the revving of motors, and theGuerrilla movements have a way of
grinding of gears as the Spahis and theirthumbing their noses at modern tech-
armored cars prepared to go to the aid nology. Computers can count votes, but
of the commandos. they have yet to analyze a man's politi-
But the commandos were safe. The cal sympathy or emotional involvement
in
infiltrators were dead. Two sampans a cause. Nor can modern science
were floating, bottom up, down a nar-change, through gadgets and highly
row river. Three others had nosed in sophisticated machinery, the basic task
among the bamboo. The young com-of the counterguerrilla--to track and
mando captain was examining the raft eliminate his enemy, often in a situation
his men had swum out to retrieve and of personal confrontation.
the two heavy mortars of Chinese manu- To fight guerrillas one must know
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32 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
them. This implies a deep degree of action during the early 1950 's,
guerrilla
the myth of Malaya was born. American
personal involvement or total immersion
in an insurgency situation. In a officials,
psycho- watching the slow disintegra-
tion of
logical sense, most Americans seldom gothe French position in Indo-
china,
beyond getting their feet wet. flew to Malaya to see how a
This is
particularly true of the draftee successful
in Viet- counterinsurgency campaign
nam, but it also applies to thewas being handled and rushed back to
profes-
Saigon to urge the French to adopt the
sional Special Forces officer working
British methods.
with the Montagnards. Both men know
that they are serving a limited amount While certain procedures were ap-
of time and that their lives are not propriate for adoption, counterguerrilla
techniques, like certain wines, do not
bound to the people with whom they
travel well.
are working.
During the most dangerous and try- The British in Malaya had some
ing actions there is the mental re- prime assets: independence was around
assurance of another life and another the corner, and the government could
develop a firm national policy on the
land that constitutes a form of psycho-
future of the country; the Malay ma-
logical escape hatch. This can be posi-
jority of the population was opposed to
tive as a morale factor but negative to
total commitment. Although this was the Chinese-dominated rebels; the rebels
were isolated from any significant out-
true of the British soldier in Malaya and
side aid, and their sources of food
the French parachutist in North Viet-
supply were comparatively easy to
nam, it is particularly applicable to the
control. 11
American serving for 1 short year in
Vietnam. In addition, the British psychological
For every American commander who warfare effort concentrated on explain-
understands the guerrilla and guerrillaing to the Malay population that the
warfare there are still those who com- fight was not between Malayan Commu-
plain that the enemy will not "standnists and the security forces but be-
and fight" a posture that anyone with atween the Malayan people and Chinese
Communists. Thus the traditional
basic understanding of the guerrilla
would hardly find unusual. Raids Malayan antagonism toward the Chinese
against American military installations and distrust of Chinese motives played
and airfields carried out by Viet Conginto the hands of the government.! 2
commandos are often described as sneak Transplanting the techniques that
were successful in Malaya and expecting
attacks or terror raids. Such catch
phrases may be useful for propagandato thrive in Indochina proved to
them
purposes. They become dangerous be a delusion. Moving Chinese squatters
when, through repetition, the from
user their makeshift shacks on the edge
of the Malayan jungle and placing them
begins to believe them himself.
in an efficiently operated resettlement
Thus a highly successful, well-
village was considerably different from
planned commando action is labeled a
uprooting Vietnamese from their ances-
"sneak attack" with the implication
tral village and relocating them in a
that only through stealth and treachery
makeshift, inefficiently run refugee
was such a raid possible and the coun-
camp.
terguerrilla, if not alert, falls once again
Even more important, psycho-
into the psychological trap of under-
logically, was the fact that the Commu-
estimating his enemy.
nist-dominated Vietminh were, to the
The Myth of Malaya. In the hurried
average Vietnamese, a liberation army
search for a key to success in counter-
made up of Vietnamese fighting colo-
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 33
ning directly
nialism. No amount of propaganda or from Lao Kay, near the
imported techniques could convince
Chinese border, to Dien Bien Phu. They
them that independence was justalso immobilized 14 battalions of Viet-
around
minh regulars by their actions and were
the corner as long as the French Expedi-
of invaluable assistance in locating and
tionary Force remained in Indochina.
recovering hundreds of French pris-
Tribal Groups and Ethnic Minorities.
oners.! 5
Working with another people in combat-
Despite their loyal service, these local
ing an insurgency within their own
partisans were abandoned at the close of
territory brings new responsibilities and
the Indochina war. An unrealistic radio
problems for the counterguerrilla. This
message went out to these groups when
is especially true where Western cadres
the French and the Vietminh reached an
work with tribal groups and ethnic
agreement in 1954. They were to sur-
minorities. As guerrillas often render
operate
to the nearest authorities of the
from an isolated jungle or mountain
People's Army of North Vietnam. They
environment or, in more advanced
would then, supposedly, be treated as
phases of an uprising, move large units
prisoners of war. A minority of these
through the cover of jungle or moun-
men led by their French officers
tains, the inhabitants of such areas
managed to fight their way out of the
become important actors in the insur-
jungles of North Vietnam and Laos. The
gency drama.
remainder were not heard from again.
This has often been true in guerrilla Caught up in a struggle of sophisti-
war, and it was emphasized again during cated political theories and international
World War II when mountain people- intrigue, minority groups are often used
the Dyaks in Borneo, the Kachins in by both sides without understanding the
Burma, and the Meo in Indochina- issues at stake. Their service and loyalty
worked with Allied special forces as counterguerrillas are often based on a
against the Japanese.
highly personal relationship with the
The effectiveness of these small eth-
Western officers who may be acting
nic groups in guerrilla and counter- directly or indirectly as their com-
guerrilla operations is based on their manders. Much of this attitude is linked
knowledge of terrain, endurance, track- with a recent colonial past.
ing ability, courage, and determination When the 3rd Thai Battalion began
to eliminate unwelcome trespassers. In to disintegrate at Dien Bien Phu, one
Malaya the Senoi Praak, a small ab- whole company deserted when its com-
original force numbering not more than mander, Captain Guilleminot, was
300, killed more MRLA guerrillas dur- wounded. The Thais felt their bond of
ing the last 2 years of the insurgency fidelity to the French had been severed.
than the total accounted for by all other They had been fighting for Guilleminot
security forces. 13 and not for a vague government in
The local partisan groups in upper Saigon or the abstraction of the world
Tonkin and Laos organized by Frenchbattle between the "free world" and
officers of the GCMA14 during the "communism. "16
Indochina war reached a total strength The brutal but real dictates of politi-
of 20,000. The operations of these units cal necessity that force a counter-
permitted the evacuation without losses guerrilla leader to abandon those he has
of the fortified camp of Nasan, the led to the doubtful mercies of the
reconquest by Laos of the provinces of enemy or the vague promises of an
Phong Saly and San Neua without the unfriendly government can have a
help of regular troops, as well as the serious effect on the man involved both
interdiction of an important road run- as a person and as a soldier.
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34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
groups and ethnic minorities and an tive machine and the economic organi-
zation are cogs in a complex system
awareness of the psychological and which it is relatively easy to block. The
human consequences brought on by any higher degree to which a country has
sudden change in policy or political evolved, and the more complex its
accommodation. structure, the more opportunities it
offers for subversive action . . . the
V--THE FUTURE European countries are fragile. 2
In an urban atmosphere the guerrilla,
It is time to realize that most like a chameleon, must undergo changes
modern war is guerrilla in character. to fit his new environment. He is so
-Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingatclclosely integrated with the people that
his enemy will have a difficult time
During World War II active guerrilla
isolating him from support and informa-
warfare became the immediate concern
tion. On the other hand, his proximity
of field commanders on both sides of
to the authorities and his unavoidable
the conflict. It was no longer the sole
exposure to many individuals will make
domain of a small group of experts nor him extremely vulnerable to detection
was it limited to a specific geographic and betrayal.
location.
The urban guerrilla may also face a
Since World War II guerrilla warfare more subtle and complicated set of
has remained a constant in a world psychological pressures than the guer-
undergoing rapid political change. rilla
In a operating from a mountain base.
period of nuclear deterrence, guerrillas
His presence in a city may put him in
have been active in Greece., Morocco,
close touch with his family, tempting
Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Angola, Laos,
him to carry out repetitive personal
Vietnam, Bolivia, and Venezuela. This
contacts of great danger. Involvement in
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 35
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36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 37
pressures
motors. In two and one half years this and attitudes, a chapter was
devoted to the counterguerrilla.
unit killed or captured 420 Vietminh
officials and messengers without losing a page is being written, a front
As this
man dead or captured. Much of their
page dispatch in The New York Times
success was due to a deep knowledge of the fighting in Saigon in these
describes
their enemy and his character.4 words: "The tenacity of the enemy
A substantial contribution to the
continues to surprise top military
success of future riverine operations
spokesmen ... It also baffles the Ameri-
involving the guerrilla can come from cana and South Vietnamese ground
thorough understanding of the psycho- troops." The dispatch quotes an Ameri-
logical aspects active within a particular
can infantryman fighting through the
environment. Such a base of knowledge,rubble and dust on the outskirts of the
coupled with bold, simple, commando- city. "Every day we think we got him
type action may accomplish more than this time, and he keeps coming back. "5
any impressive array of new boats and
It would be too facile to explain such
technological equipment.
"tenacity" as a product of psychological
conditioning alone. The writer does
Conclusion. In examining guerrilla
movements, both past and present, thisconclude that a recognition of the
study has concentrated on the psycho- psychological aspects of guerrilla war-
fare is not only essential to an under-
logical influences affecting the guerrilla
and the importance of such influences standing of the problem but is often the
key
as factors in guerrilla action. Because he to success or failure in both guer-
is equally affected by psychological rilla and counterguerrilla operations.
FOOTNOTES
1. Emesto Guevara, Che Guevaro on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 32
2. Karl von Clausewitz, On War (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 461.
3. Jacques Duchemin, quoted in Roland Gaucher, Les Terrorists (Paris: Editions Alb
Michel, 1965), p. 262.
4. M. Korobeinikov, "Soviet Military Psychology," Soviet Military Review , April 1967,
39.
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38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
1. Paul Rosenzweig, The Book of Proverbs: Maxims from East and West (Ne
Philosophical Library, 1965), p. 43.
2. Louis Untermeyer, ed. Modern British Poetry , 5th ed. (New York: Harcourt
1942), p. 135.
3. James E. Cross, Conflict in the Shadows , the Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 35.
4. Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 44.
5. Howard R. Simpson, "A Dirty, Dangerous Business," Foreign Service Journal , April
1963, p. 49.
6. Ibid.
7. Cross, p. 34.
8. Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: the Communist Insurgent War , 1948-1960 (Hamden, Conn.:
Archon Books, 1966), p. 122.
9. Howard R. Simpson, A Combat Correspondent s View, The National Observer, 13
May 1963, p. 14:1.
10. An unorthodox force, recruited from American colonists with Indian fighting experi-
ence, that carried out effective raids in enemy territory during the French and Indian wars.
11. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter- Revolutionary War: the Strategy of Counter-
Insurgency (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1966), p. 319.
12. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: a Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice
(New York: Stuart, 1965), p. 172.
13. Sir Robert G.K. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger,
1966), p. 153.
14. Groupements dc Commandos Mixtes Aeroporte.
15. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, a French View of Counterinsurgency (New York:
Praeger, 1964), p. 109.
16. Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966), p. 228.
17. Special Administrative Section.
18. Jean Yves Alqucr, quoted in Orville D. Menard, The Army and the Fifth Republic
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), p. 48.
V-THE FUTURE
1. Orde C. Wingate quoted in Charlton Ogburn, Jr., The Marauders (New York: H
1959), p. 4.
2. J.M. Nemo, "The Place of Guerrilla Action in War, Military Review, November 1957, p.
104-105.
3. Hencker, p. 182.
4. Simon Mays, "Brigade Fluviale," Indochina Sud Est Asiatique, October 1953, p. 54.
5. Gene Roberts, Last Enemy Stronghold in Saigon Is Hammered, The New York limes,
11 May 1968, p. 1:4.
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GUERRILLA WARFARE 39
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
It i
arm
The
a go
Sir
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