C H A P T E R T H R E E

Doctor Socrates

Who is doctor enough to know how Lt stands now in regard to its health and
sickness?

—Nietzsche1

The Mask of Physidanship

155a8-155e2
L Critias* Deception
Socrates is eager, as we are, to meet this promise of the city. Grid as bids his attendant to
bring Charm ides to them. But more than this. He lias the boy invite Charm ides under a
pretext.2 Channides is to be told that he is to meet A "physician” regarding a recent
complaini. In this curious way, Socrates is selected by Charmides1 guardian to be the
youth’s personal physician and therewith too to become an “advisor to princes.”
This ruse surprises us, perhaps. Bill the present dialogic situation, we remember, is
nor at all an easy one. And Critias knows this. I le knows that, human beings are not
simple, that they sometimes are not in public the same as they arc in private. Thus he
anticipates the youth’s apprehension and foreclosure in the presence of others. Human
self-consciousness resists intrusions (see 158c5-d6). Critias understands too that some
rhetorical artifice is needed to circumvent Charm ides’ potential defenses (cf. I56c7-d4)-
And his skill is proportionate to the task, A means is devised that on the one
hand disguises Socrates1 true intention, yet nn the other allows them to view C
harmide s unobs true ted.
 Socrates is to pretend to he a physician who, tor the ostensible purpose of
treating Charmides, will have to take a closer look at him (l55bl-8). This pretext
also provides just the opportunity Socrates desires to pursue his original
interest. For this reason Socrates accedes to this ploy and dons the mask of a
physician. Tills passage, though brief, is of consequence, It means that the “face”
or appearance of the dialogue will change. It will appear to be one thing, a
medical examination, when in intent it will be another, a psychic stripping,1 2
Socrates1 intention remains the same throughout the whole dialogue (170a2-3),
The deception of Charmides is agreed to be necessary,3 The only thing that
matters, Socrates says unabashedly, is that the youth come (I55b7), Critias
assures him that he will and knows that the mixture of guardian authority and
self-interest will be enough to draw Charmides away from his involvement with
the others. By employing this pretext, though, Critias has changed the character
of the encounter, lie has brought to our attention a defect in Charmides and
therewith a new purpose for their meeting, a diagnostic and therapeutic
intention. However, by appealing to Charmides1 physical well-being, Critias
transforms the meeting into a “physical examination” and diverts attention away
from Socrates' primary interest. As a result Socrates will have to figure out a
way to redirect the discussion back to the soul. Critias4 pretext will thus only
affect the meeting hut not the substance of die conversation to follow.
Before we proceed, this caution is in order. If the actor, Socrates, is to wear
the mask of physician ship to conceal his intention from Charmides— and he
does so to the end of the dialogue (175e3, I76h2; I75b7)—this will have the
consequence that Socrates’ initial concern will be less conspicuous. Lest the
playacting capture our attention wholly and thereby mislead! us, we, the
participating readers, must make the concerted effort to keep the original
question before us. Otherwise, as is often the case, the pretext (or its subsequent
reformulations) becomes the dialogue and the original question that it is
designed to answer is lost.
So far we know, Socrates is not a physician. He only "pretends” to be one. This will
involve a twofold self-conscious act on Socrates’ pari. On the one hand, Socrates will
apeak and act as it lie “knows,” that is, will make believe that he knows, what a physician
is supposed to know- (medicine), (The first mention of "knowledge’' in the dialogue is
tills false or “pretended knowledge” |155h6: episremai].) But on the other hand he must

1 Socrates* Pretending
This imitation of the physician defines the guise under which the meeting
with Charmides is to take place. It is important for the whole of the dialogue,
not only bearing on the form of the discussion bur its content, as well. Vet.
"pretending” is a complex phenomenon. By way of preparation, then, a con-
sideration of its structure is requisite,5
he constitutionally cognizant at the same time that what he pretends to know is also not
known by him. And only so long as he does not lose sight of this last additional
knowledge will he rightly he said to “pretend.”
Pretending thus presupposes that, despite saving one thing, one also knows that one
does not know. As such, a concomitant knowledge 0/ ignorance is the distinctive
ingredient in pretending (distinguishing it both from knowledge and ignorance) + Since
Socrates will wear the mask oi pretending to the end of the dialogue, it is important for
us to recognize that "knowledge of ignorance” pervades the whole ul the subsequent
discussion in deed (see 17 lb?-9, I 75c.3 tt\). Insofar as Socrates pretends, there can be no
reasonable doubt that tLhe knows that he doesn’t know” (cf. I 75c4-6). There is no greater
proof of possibility than the actuality it soli- In such instances, deeds are more articulate
and evident than words.
This is doubly noteworthy. It cannot be overlooked that the knowledge of ignorance
integral to Socrates' pretending here is also that peculiar mode of knowledge that
distinguishes him from all other men, a man who sought to distinguish himself, not hy
some presumed knowledge but by means of hi?, ignorance (cf. 15Jdd). Thus, even though
the pretext at first appears an uncharacteristic departure from Socrates1 normal
comportment—requiring as it does the conceit of wisdom—we see here that Socrates,
even in feigning what he does not know, remains essentially himself and the same (cf.
153b7-8, ] 70a2-3)- As wo shall see the question of such knowledge—the human wisdom
of Socrates—is at the heart of Charm ides.
The cognitive two-sidedness of pretending is even more telli 11 g. The act. of
protending, in addition to giving us a lens through which to consider the inner being of
Socrates, also assists us in seeing the outer structure of his opposite, so to speak. The
peculiarity of pretending after all is that it brings one to mistake the appearances for rhe
reality. Thus the self-conscious act of pretending introduces us to rhe need sometimes of
calling into question the apparent self-sufficiency of surface looks. Things and people are
not always a* they appear.
With respect, to nor knowing, the pretending physician is at first sight
indistinguishable from Lhe bud practitioner. Both claim a knowledge they do not possess.
Pretending is thus an adumbration of pretentiousness. (The "unknowing pretending1* of
pretentious practitioners is, to be sure, far more consequential.) But us such it is u
revealing example of till unexamined opinion that in their presumed tightness does not
feel compelled to examine itself (of- 17l.c7; l75c6-7). Such opinions, one could say, suffer
from a want of self "knowledge and are, as a result, constitutionally unable to rise above
their ignorance. The pretending theme thus sheds light on the nature of human opinion
as such {I53d3},
Moreover, Charm ides is here playfully en trusted to the care of a Doctor Socrates. But
this so-called Doctor is only pretending. Socrates* ignorance of what doctors arc
presumed to know thus poses the question of unknowledgeable, hence unrigheful,
treatment or rule. Critias had asked Socrates what could possibly keep him from
pretending (I55b7). The answer—of which Crilias seems unaware—is of course
ignorance. Ignorance is the disqualificr, just as knowledge is the necessary prerequisite,
for any rightful rule. Any such position of superintendence-—whether physiciunship,
guardianship, tutorship or statesmanship—is open to this danger. The fundamental
political problem of the rule of ignorance is herewith prefigured.
All the same, such playful pretending remains ambiguous. Socrates’ in ten- tion, we
saw, is different from Criti&s1. For his purpose his lack of a knowledge of physical
medicine may not be a serious deficiency. The question arises whether Socrates might
not, under the cover of pretending, seek to exercise a physici an ship of another sort
about which he is not ignorant.
But this just brings us hack to the element of doubt that hovers around any such act
of seeming different- It is the ambiguity of human multiplicity captured by the term
“duplicity,’* The actor becomes the “hypocrite*1 (tf, I62d2- 3). The notion of pretending
makes us properly skeptical and inquisitive about what we see/' It. requires that we, the
readers, determine for ourselves the truth of the appearances, Socrates’ dramatic
enactment prevents us from displacing the source of judgment from ourselves and
transferring it to some Doctor or other authority. And this is as it should be. Cririas5
manipulativeness is thereby made to serve the process of discovery. Rather titan being a
mere literary device, seasoning the text to whet our interest, the introduction of the
dramatic category "pretending" is a logical and psychagogical means of engaging us
thoughtfully in the dialogue and in the service of its ultimate philosophical intention.
Playfulness is the sister of seriousness.' of a certain "weakness/*1 a heaviness in the
head, that affected him upon rising (155b3'6)» Doctor Socrates is to pretend that he
knows the remedy,
Socrates, as editor of the dialogue, now puts this act of pretending into relief by
interjecting in commentary his observations of events precipitated by Charmides1
coming. By reminding us that the dialogue is being retold and thar the pretending of the
previous day is not edired out, the reader is made to realize that what is to follow cannot
be understood apart from what precedes and specifically from the imitation of the
physician.
Charmides tomes as arranged. And wliat a great commotion he causes, even to the
point of laughter. Everyone is so intent upon having the beautiful Charmides sit beside
them that each pushes his neighbor so vigorously that those sitting at the extremities of
the bench are forced off, the one to stand up, the other to fall sideways. In this way a
space is made between Socrates and Critias, Charmides rakes his place there. This
incident only reiterates what we saw before. Everyone without exception wants to
accommodate the young Charmides. In this regard, Socrates does not differ. Once again
we are vividly reminded of the overwhelming force of Charmides1 commanding presence

5 Charmides’ Weakness and Ours

Cririas perceives something of this philosophical intention, He rightly understands this
meeting ns an examination (or measurement) and thus uses the recent complaint of
Charm ides to effect. Charm ides had of late complained
and alerted that the desire it sparks can result in immoderate, even violent,
consequences (cf. !54c3-4). Again the power which is his shows itself to the eyes to be
ambiguous (cf, I76b9 ff,)-
In addition we sec that, having exerted themselves in opposite directions and made
place between them, Critias and Socrates are in some sense the two most powerful men
present. In so doing, what was anticipated earlier now becomes dramatically evident.
Socrates and what he represents is no longer at the center of attention of the men of the
palestra. Charmides and what he represents now occupies this position. But by what is
philosophical thoughtfulness displaced! Indeed next to whom does Charmides sit! I Ie
does not yet know that Socrates is the one who knows tile remedy (cf. I55c7).
Once he is told, however, Charmides gives Socrates such an irresistible look that.
Socrates’ previous confidence about their meeting is “knocked down” (l55c5-dl). At this
point, those in the wrestling school draw around them in a circle. The scene is
unmistakable: The place is the palestra; a ring has formed around the participants; the
three contestants are in the middle. The competition will be formidable. The first
takedown, so to speak, goes to Charmides, However, it takes three falls to win. One
wonders how Socrates will be able to overcome this initial setback. Everyone is
watching,

4* The Wisdom of Cvdias

Charmides’ effect on Socrates is marked. Previously, Socrates says, he was boldly
confident of conversing easily with him (155c6-7), Now, at close sight, his boldness is
overwhelmed. Thus, even though Socrates had seen the effect diuL Chatmidcs1 beauty
had had on the others, he still misjudged the youth* Socrates had only seen him from a
distance (cf- 1531'11 -2); now up close, he is perplexed and at an impasse. Who is this
Channides?
In the process of re La ting this discovery, Socrates addresses the (ot herwisc
anonymous) auditor to whom he relates the dialogue. This time he does so in a unique
way. He calls him “Noble One” (155d3: t> gennada; previously he had heen addressed
simply os "comrade or friend” [I54b8, I55c5]). With this we are informed that the
dialogue—its interchanges along with its narrative commentary is addressed to a specific
hind of soul {cf. 1 b7b7 -S) *
Socrates now relates something extraordinary. He says that he saw inside Charm
ides3 cloak, was inflamed and no longer in himself (155d3-4)* Is Chae- ruphon’s predict
ion about Charm ides1 whole look borne out? Is Socrates inflamed with Love of the
beautiful and outside himself with passion, as it would appear? A sense of tefined
modesty might shy away from such indiscretion and away from looking further (cf. 161
a4). At first glance, then, what is involved is moderation understood as continence.
Yet Socrates has seen something new that brings about a complete reversal of
confidence and requires a change in his earlier estimate. What is seen is not what was
expected. Were it the case that what is beneath Charmides’ cloak was simply Like his
great visible looks, no such reversal would have resulted. Does Socrates only see a body
beneath the cloak? If so, does he no longer think that the soul is the true measure of one's
being?1''
The new and penetrating vision beneath the cloak of Charmides brings Socrates to
recall a piece of advice of the poet Cydias about matters of crus, (Socrates acknowledges
the human importance of advice [contrast 165a4- 61.) This advice, moreover, earns its
author rhe attribution "most wise" (155d4i the only use of the superlative of sophos in
die dialogue). Let us listen; An approaching faum, uncircunupect before a linn, becomes a
serving of ineat (I55d6-el), This is the most wise proverb.
Our predilection to see a figure of simple erotic entrapment here encounters a
fundamental incommensurable,10 The elements of the image are the reversed. Here the
beloved is compared to the lion, while the inflamed lover is compared to the vulnerable
fawn. The image, then, is problematic. We are left with the literal truth of these wise
words. A fawn's response to the proximity of a lion cannot he anything except
apprehension for his own preservation, Asa metaphor it depicts the natural antagonism
of animal species (cf. I6lb8 and I74hll; I57c5-6P l76dl-3). In this world of nature, neither
the fawn nor the lamb cun lie down beside die lion utnd survive, The wisdom of Cydias is
hence not that of continence. ■■ Does beauty cloak a beast? Such questions remain to be
answered. But it is true that* in a manner unintended by Chaerephon, Socrates will no
longer pay attention to Charm ides’ face.
A principle is thereby established for the dialogue, Socrates will persist in his original
intention. However, his pretended physicianship will now be a circumspect one
{euUxbeitt). His pastime, otherwise threatened, is not now precluded. This is the positive
side of Cydias* wisdom in matters of love, here philosophy* 1 fence he admits ro Charm
ides, it “with difficulty,” that he knows a remedy for the head (I55e3), We must attend to
how Socrates, while finding hiniscll in idle presence of, indeed caught by, such a creature,
is yet not made mincemeat (see the last line of the dialogue, 176d5). This is the dramatic
problem of Chartnides, the illustrative deed presented to the attentive auditor and
reader*

5. Circumspection
Eager to resume his pastime, Socrates has returned to the palestra. There he inquires
about the state of the youth, encourages Critias ro call his ward, and toward this end even
adopts the mask of Chanilides* physician- Moreover, like the others, he sought to have
Charm ides sir beside him. But, as we see, this only brings him shoulder to shoulder with
danger* He is now, he says, in the presence of a lion. And this could not have been
avoided [despite 1Jdao- 6). Even though he had seen the effect Charm Ides' rule had on
others, he could not see at a distance what was cloaked deep within. His victory in the
pushing bout is at best a relative one. His strength only introduces him to what is more
powerful, if not indeed irresistible. This fawn sits beside a lion.
The problem announced at the very beginning of the dialogue (1 S3b4), that of
Socrates’ survival, reemerges. Here, however, the danger is internal, at home* Though we
do not yet know how this is sot the danger is somehow Charm ides. This is puzzling, for
from beauty and youth we customarily infer innocence and benignity.
The saving thought called to mind by SITCrates, the wisdom of Cydias, is
circumspection. There is nothing profound about circumspection, however, except that it
is indispensable- Fawns, and all who are vulnerable, must not venture too close. Above
all, they must not risk recklessly enraging the lions of this world. This recalls Socrates’
earlier invocation of the mason's image. His measurement of Charmides, he said, would
not be conspicuous. At that time, such precaution may have seemed unwarranted*
Socrates' assessment of imminent danger here gives cause, Nor. to do so in such
circumstances would be self-endangering, The mimetic parallel of Socrates’ opening
response shows itself to be prospectively perceptive (J5.3u5-6, b7-8).
In preserving Socrates' dialogic life, circumspection provides for the continuation of
his pastime* ll is that without which anything we consider good iit irself is, in such
circumstances, endangered. Socrates’ brand of db agnostic philosophy—as any such
social, psychological, ethical or political engagement is not without its risks, especially as
it seeks a public forum for discussion, he it the palestra, marketplace or wherever* But
how can a fawn not become a victim of a lion? Some would have it that Socrates is so sell-
less as to he careless, that he never takes precautions,J; This is evidently an
overstatement. Here, he acknowledges, some dangers are unavoidable. The quest ion
thus becomes the mode his caution takes. Indeed Socratic speech is not the Tree wind1’
he sometimes wants us to think it is.35 Socrates will have to develop a mode of dialogic
care such that what is provocative does not provoke the powerful, what is incisive docs
not appear to cut llie scrutinized, what is probing does not awaken the lion within the
soul. Such a careful mode of speech is Socratic dialectic. In part it is inLended as an
alternative to the unwary and impenetrating innocence of an immature vision as ir is to
the obsequious ves-saying of Charm ides’ blind admirers. Otherwise Char mi' des would
he truly “irresistible” (of, I61b8 and l76d3-5), We have, then, to attend to his Cydian
mode of speech in the dialogue.
But as with all such matters of practical judgment, the question of responsibility
arises. What is to prevent one from misleaming, indeed perverting, the lesson of the
wisdom of Cydias? What is to prevent one from understand' ing one’s own. affairs in such
a way that this aphorism of self-preservation serves, not as a situation-specific prudential
maxim, but, generalized, as a universal, imperative? What is to prevent one, in short,
from drawing the hasty conclusion that one should seek one’s own preservation in all
things first and foremost? Indeed, if understood apart, from the therapeutic and phil-
osophical ends here in view, such a self-orientation readily degenerates into a willful
expediency and exclusive self-interest (sec 161K3 ft, and Chapter Six herein), h this the
secret advice Socrates would have his auditor learn? This question will have to be
answered* It rests on how one conceives one’s own affairs and hence on what one thinks
one’s good is (cf, I64c7 ff*, I74bl0 and Chapter Ten §6),
Here we see the reason for the invocation of a poet for an inspiration that is
otherwise imlofty, it not common. The aegis of ancestral wisdom and poetic insight
shields its core from facile generalization and misreading. Indeed all ahstrusenew, being
a mode of inconspicuousness, serve?? as a logical obstacle to the violation of qualified or
limited truths. All truths are nor. universal s, The circumspect wisdom of Cydias is
embodied in the circumspect manner in which it is introduced.
The New Science
155e2-l57c7
6* The Twofold Remedy
"What is it?" Charmides wants to know, after Socrates manages somehow to concede that
fie knows the treatment for the head (154e4)* Charmides’ first question stems from his
self-concern with his physical debility* What’s more, he expects the remedy to be readily
forthcoming, a matter of course. A simple question, a simple answer (contrast 159a3 ff.)-
Human health is not a complicated affair for him. This is our first look at Charmides.
For Socrates, hy contrast, human health is not a simple matter. Indeed it is
characteristic of him that health is understood as uncommonly complex. He proposes not
a single but a twofold prescription: if, in addition to a certain leaf or drug-remedy, one at
the same time (hama) chanted a certain incantation or charm, then and only then would
“complete health” result (155e5-8).14 What this means above all, he now makes plain, is
that a physical remedy by itself is not sufficient, indeed would be no benefit whatsoever
to cure what ails Charmides. The Doctor is no narrow specialist. He has in view more
than the health of a part. The youth LS about to undergo more than he asks,
Charmides assumes that the remedy is due him simply, “1 will write down the charm
from you,” he says facilely (156a I-2), as if the charm did not require careful
administration (cl. 176b ff.}. Yet writing something down from another could he but an
external mode of appropriation, rrearing the charm as it ir were but an item of exchange,
involving no real effort of internal assimilation tin his part (cf. I55e6). Like other
admirers, Socrates is expected to submit to his wishes.
Because of this, however, Socrates does something that, from Charmides1 point of
view at least, is extraordinary (although in keeping with Socrates1 earlier resistance).
Doctor Socrates does not grant, the ret]nest (cf. I54d7). Rather, Charmides1 expectations
meet with a question. Needn't the prospective patient, Socrates asks, first persuade the
Doctor that he should receive the treatment (156a3)? This physician is selective (cf.
I66d4, 17 6d5). Before he w ill begin treatment, he must have cause. Sickness, it would
seem, is not cause enough. Something more is required for complete health than the
simple restoration of body function.
Charmides is taken aback and laughs.111 This time his Looks are not enough to get
him what he wants. Or, are wre to presume, as the others do, that beautiful looks are a
universal means of persuasion applicable to all questions, supplanting even good
reasons? Seem res’ preliminary question may not he so immoderately laughable, then.