A1. ARISTOTLE VS.

SOCRATES (PROTAGORAS) ON AKRASIA According to Socrates, it is

impossible to knowingly do what is worse. Aristotle, while disagreeing with Socrates in
important respects, nevertheless states that “the position that Socrates sought to establish actually
seems to result” (p. 124).
Compare and contrast Socrates vs. Aristotle on knowledge and weakness of will. At a minimum,
your answer should explain:
The philosophical debate on akrasia, or weakness of will, presents a significant divergence
between Aristotle and Socrates. While Socrates, as depicted in Plato's "Protagoras," asserts the
impossibility of knowingly acting against one's better judgment, Aristotle offers a nuanced
disagreement, acknowledging some validity in Socrates' view but ultimately diverging in his
understanding of akrasia.
a. How, according to Aristotle, Socrates is right in one respect and wrong in another respect
regarding knowledge in the weak willed agent;
Aristotle concedes to Socrates in one key aspect: the role of knowledge in moral action. Socrates
argues that no one willingly chooses the worse over the better, and that all wrong actions stem
from ignorance. Aristotle agrees that knowledge plays a crucial role in moral decisions.
However, he diverges by asserting that knowledge alone is not always sufficient to prevent
akrasia. For Aristotle, the presence of knowledge does not guarantee right action, as individuals
can act against their better judgment due to passions or desires.
b. Why Aristotle disagrees with Socrates on the issues they disagree about;
Aristotle's disagreement with Socrates centers on the complexity of human psychology and
moral responsibility. While Socrates maintains that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance,
Aristotle sees this as overly simplistic. He introduces the concept of incontinence (akrasia),
where an individual, despite knowing what is right, fails to act accordingly due to conflicting
desires or emotions. Aristotle recognizes that human beings are not purely rational creatures and
that their actions are influenced by a range of factors beyond mere knowledge.
c. How Aristotle’s disagreement with Socrates allows Aristotle to understand weakness of will
in a different way
Aristotle's view allows for a more nuanced understanding of moral weakness. Unlike Socrates,
who sees moral failure as a result of ignorance, Aristotle acknowledges the complexity of human
nature, where individuals can be torn between rational judgment and irrational desires. This
perspective introduces the idea of moral struggle and the possibility of failing to act virtuously
despite knowing better. Aristotle's approach to akrasia encompasses the internal conflict between
reason and desire, offering a more comprehensive view of human moral psychology.
While Aristotle respects Socrates' emphasis on knowledge in moral action, he diverges by
highlighting the limitations of knowledge in ensuring virtuous behavior. This disagreement leads
Aristotle to a more layered understanding of akrasia, recognizing the role of irrational desires
and emotions in moral decision-making, and thus offering a more realistic portrayal of the
human moral experience.
B2. DAVIDSON ON THE POSSIBILITY OF WEAKNESS OF WILL Davidson provides three
claims that seem to generate a contradiction:
P1. If an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do y and he believes himself free to do either
x or y, then he will inten<onally).
P2. If an agent judges that it would be be>er to do x than to do y, then he wants to do x more
than he wants to do y.
P3. There are incontinent actions
Davidson provides an account of how weakness of will is possible. Provide an objec-on to
Davidson’s view. At a minimum, your answer should explain:
Donald Davidson's analysis of akrasia, or weakness of will, presents a philosophical puzzle
through three propositions that seem contradictory at first glance. His resolution to this puzzle,
however, is not without its vulnerabilities. This critique will focus on a specific aspect of
Davidson's solution, raise an objection, and explain the significance of this objection in the
broader context of his account.
(a) The specific aspect of Davidson’s solution that you will criticise
Davidson attempts to resolve the apparent contradiction by differentiating between two types of
evaluative judgments: all-things-considered judgments and prima facie judgments. He suggests
that when an agent acts incontinently, they are acting against their all-things-considered
judgment (what they believe is best overall) in favor of a prima facie judgment (what seems
desirable in the moment). This distinction is crucial for Davidson to maintain that a person can
act against their better judgment while still acting intentionally and rationally.
(b) An objection that provides some significant reasons to doubt Davidson’s solution; and
The objection to Davidson's solution lies in the practical application and distinction of all-things-
considered judgments versus prima facie judgments. This differentiation can be seen as overly
simplistic and not reflective of the complexity of human decision-making processes. In real-life
scenarios, it is often challenging to neatly categorize judgments as either all-things-considered or
prima facie. Human beings frequently face situations where the line between a momentary desire
and an overall judgment is blurred, and these categories can influence each other dynamically.
Moreover, Davidson's model seems to allow for a convenient bypass of moral responsibility by
attributing incontinent actions to prima facie judgments. This perspective could potentially
undermine the seriousness with which moral and rational lapses are viewed, as it provides a
systematic excuse for acting against one's better judgment.
(c) An explanation of how your objection threatens to raise an important/significant doubt about
Davidson’s account
This objection raises significant doubts about the practical applicability and moral implications
of Davidson's account. By oversimplifying the decision-making process into two distinct
categories, Davidson's model may fail to capture the nuanced and often intertwined nature of
human judgments and desires. This oversimplification can lead to a misunderstanding of the
nature of akrasia, reducing its complexity to a mere conflict between two types of judgments.
Furthermore, the moral implications of this model are concerning. If incontinent actions are too
easily excused as the result of prima facie judgments, it might lead to a diminished sense of
personal responsibility and an inadequate understanding of the moral weight of our actions. This
could potentially weaken the ethical framework within which we understand and evaluate human
actions, especially those involving moral and rational failures.