Daza V. Singson existence for a year. They command the biggest following.

They not
only survived but prevailed.
Case
Regarding being a duly registered party, the LDP was granted its
Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments and registration as a political party by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the
was listed as representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was argument of the petitioner that registration is required.
reorganized and 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to
LDP. Because of this, the House of Representatives revised its
representation by withdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to
the newly-formed LDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in
accordance to proportional representation.

Issues

Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable political party

Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to be entitled to

proportional representation in the CA

Held and Ratio

Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v. Tan. In

the said case, 25 Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganized
themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3 Nacionalista
Congressmen, originally chosen, were deprived of their seats by
colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanan’s ad
interim appointment was rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan was
designated in his place. Cunanan contended the validity of the
rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority was merely a
temporary combination; officially, they were still part of the
Nacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that time
was not based on proportional representation. The Court held that
mere shift of votes should not affect the organization of the CA, or
else, it would forever be at the mercy of the House of
Representatives.

The petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent party and has not
yet achieved stability. However, the LDP has already been in
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
DECISION
OZAETA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two
parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An
intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent
irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-
resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and
who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the
subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the
Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner
repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he
gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the
Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for
imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of his detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations
and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information –
which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the
matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the
petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to
determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom
the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to
that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be
determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to
the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any
proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not
necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter
under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range
of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the
witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may
be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to
punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of
the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very
reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to
enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function
without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in
practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees
charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to
defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is
legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist
upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit
as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon
which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable
rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to
say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of
his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable
and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole
case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court
to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or
not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that
he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the
protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination,
unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for
such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of
some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or
to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing
to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for
the trial judge to decide that question.
Case Digest: Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
(Topic: Executive Privilege – Constitutional Law 1)
Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri
Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), was invited by the
respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on
the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project. This project was contracted by the Philippine Government
with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE), which involved the amount of US$329,481,290.
When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that
then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering
for ZTE, offered him P200 million in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN
Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.)
whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on 20
November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent
a letter dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to
dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People’s Republic of China,” and given
the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to
the President, Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details
of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege
is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear
before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri
requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt
for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29
November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that
he did not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if
there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first
appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself.
He added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the
President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and
sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the
impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and
the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and
later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently
ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-
At-Arms until he appears and gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause
Letter and the Contempt Order for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
stressed that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored
on a valid claim to executive privilege in accordance with the ruling in
the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20 April
2006). For its part, the Senate Committees argued that they did not
exceed their authority in issuing the assailed orders because there is
no valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In addition,
they claimed that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three
questions violates the people’s right to public information, and that the
executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means to
conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest levels of government.
Issue:
Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to
answer were covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order
issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.
Discussion:
Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court
laid out the three elements needed to be complied with in order for the
claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the protected
communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by
a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President; and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate
need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive
privilege on the argument that the communications elicited by the
three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process,” and that “the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of
the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
the President’s Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive
privilege and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere
showing of public need by the branch seeking access to such
conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to
show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three
questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead,
the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative
oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs.
Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege
does not violate the people’s right to information on matters of public
concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself
provides that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.”
Held:
The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three
questions are covered by presidential communications privilege, and
that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive
department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the
Senate may issue against him for not answering such questions.
The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008,
citing petitioner in contempt of the Senate Committee and directing his
arrest and detention was nullified.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA)
166 SCRA 533, G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988
Petitioner: Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
Respondents:
1. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
2. Minister of Labor and Employment
3. Abdul Basar (Hearing Officer)
4. Kathleen D. Saco
Ponente: Cruz, J. Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he
was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.
His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA.
The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance.
The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering
the position papers of the parties ruled in favour of the complainant.
The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The
temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby
LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as
the husband was not an overseas worker.
2. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as
violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
Held:
1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was
created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982,
to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to
protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created
earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a)
of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These
cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas
Employment issued by the POEA, include, “claims for death, disability
and other benefits” arising out of such employment. The award of
P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses
was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2,
which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed
a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment.
2. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation.
The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a
significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in
requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient
standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority.
That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair
and equitable employment practices."
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception It is true that
legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot
be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate. Two Tests of Valid Delegation of or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such
Legislative Power There are two accepted tests to determine whether administrative regulation.
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves legislative and quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to
he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, interpret and apply such regulations.
there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed
to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative. The delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power The reason is the

increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields. Power of Subordinate Legislation The
reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the “power of subordinate legislation.” With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by
“filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.”
The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase
and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of
Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the
law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the
prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining
nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered
stable.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title one subject
requirement of the Constitution.
Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of power.
Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition
Discussions:
The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index
or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a
single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.
Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, the
Court states that:
“There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more
persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to
carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular
article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular
commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few
firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other
hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or
understanding between two or more persons, in the form of a
contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for
the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and
commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production,
distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade
without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to
the means while monopoly refers to the end.
Rulings:

The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court has
adopted a liberal construction of the one title – one subject rule. The
Court hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane
to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective
investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less
on imported petroleum.[i][20] We shall, however, return to the validity
of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants .
to the oil market.

Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly
provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of
March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the
Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason.
Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the
date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15
lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is
to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the

aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: “The State shall
regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.
No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.”
Demetria vs. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987
SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition assails the first paragraph of the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977, which provides:
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 or The Budget Reform
Decree of 1977, paragraph 1:
“The president shall have authority to transfer any fund, appropriated
for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment”.
In particular, petitioners claim that the provision violates the following
constitutional provision:
Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution — No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by
law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
The petition additionally argues that:
The provision infringes upon fundamental law by authorizing illegal
transfer of public funds
It is repugnant to the Constitution as it fails to specify objectives and
purposes for which proposed transfer of funds are to be made
It allows the President to override safeguards, form and procedure
prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriations
It amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to the
executive
The threatened, continuing transfer of funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer of
the Philippines are without or in excess of their authority and
jurisdiction.
The defendants assert that:
Petitioners do not have legal standing;
The petition asks for an advisory opinion of the Court since there was
no justiciable controversy.
Abrogation (abolition) of Section 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution of March 26, 1986, allegedly rendering instant
petition moot (debatable) and academic.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition can be dismissed on the grounds that the case
has become moot and academic as Section 16(5) of the 1973
Constitution has been abolished by Freedom Constitution of March
25, 1986 – NO.
2. Whether the petitioners have standing to question the
constitutionality of paragraph 1 of The Budget Reform Decree of 1977
– YES.
3. Whether paragraph 1 of The Budget Reform Decree of 1977 is
unconstitutional in light of Section 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution
– YES.
4. Whether prohibition can lie from one branch of government against
a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter’s sphere of responsibility – YES.
RATIO:
1. The Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and
academic. It should also be noted that the 1987 Constitution carries declare what the other branches had assumed to do as void.
verbatim Section 16(5) Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution Respondents are not acting within their sphere of responsibility and
are hence, enjoined form acting under the unconstitutional provision in
2. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for question.
unconstitutional acts and purposes is a misapplication of funds, which
may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Taxpayers have
sufficient interest in preventing illegal spending of tax money and may
question the constitutionality of statutes concerned with expenditure of
public money.

3. In the 1973 Constitution, it is explicitly stated that one cannot

transfer an appropriation for one item to another. However, it allowed
enactment of a law which authorized transfer of funds in order to
augment an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of
the govt. branch or constitutional body concerned. This leeway is
limited, and was only granted to allow heads of govt. branches some
flexibility in the use of public funds and resources. This limitation
stems from the fact that the PURPOSE and CONDITION for fund
transferring was required.

Paragraph 1 of The Budget Reform Decree of 1977 unduly

overextends the privilege granted in sec. 16(5) because the President
can indiscriminately transfer funds from the Executive Dept.’s
branches to any branch in the General Appropriations Act without
regard as to whether or not 1) the funds are actually savings in the
item from which it is taken, 2) the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which the said transfer is made. Although
there is no complete disregard of the standards in the fundamental
law, it goes beyond the tenor thereof. It puts the bypasses the
safeguards in Sec. 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
on the release of money from the Treasury.

4. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does

not make it so that one branch is subordinate to another. In other
words, all the branches are created equal. When the legislative or
executive branch is acting within the limits of authority, the judiciary
cannot interfere with the former. But the when former acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it is the duty of the judiciary to

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO
III, GR No. 209287, 2014-07-01
Facts:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the
DAP.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains
that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law."
Used constitutional powers under Sec. 25(5) as a guise to use money
out of the treasury without an appropriation made by law... indicate
that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to
allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed
funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising
his... constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987
Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the
appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the
Government.
Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada... had been allotted an additional P50
Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of
Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.
Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration
Program,[1] explaining that the funds released to the Senators had
been part of... the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up
spending to accelerate economic expansion.
He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based
on their letters of request for funding
He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from
(1) unreleased appropriations under
Personnel Services;[2] (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over
appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for
slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support
faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website[3] that the DAP
releases had been sourced from savings generated by the
Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings
had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations,
like... unreleased Personnel Services[4] appropriations that would
lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-
moving projects and discontinued projects per zero-based budgeting
findings;[5] and (2) the withdrawal of... unobligated allotments also for
slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to
the agencies of the National Government.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP's use of
savings,[
Why DAP is legal according to DBM
(1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to
the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the
general appropriations... law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings
for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations
Acts (GAAs) of
2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of
savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in
the use of savings.
Issues:
Procedural Issue:... whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial
determination, and the standing of petitioners.
Substantive Issues:
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
Issue pertinent to Sec. 25
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the 1987 Constitution insofar as:
(a) They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the
term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of
2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b) They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs
not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and
(c) They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the
GAAs
D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause,
(2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it
authorizes the release of funds upon the request of... legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a
temporary restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP,
NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly
implementing the DAP.
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP
was in accord with the GAAs.
Ruling:
Procedural Issue:... a) The petitions under Rule 65 are... proper
remedies
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the...
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
b) Requisites for the exercise of the power... of judicial review were
complied with
(1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the
Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication;
(3) the person challenging the act must be a... proper party; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
and must be the very litis mota of the case
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has
established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to
confer locus standi on each of them.
II.
Substantive Issues
Overview of the Budget System
PAP... c. DAP was not an appropriation... measure; hence, no
appropriation... law was required to adopt or to... implement it... that
no law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the
DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a
program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending; and that
the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the... authority of the
President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully
executed.
Main ratio under Sec. 25(5)

Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn... unobligated allotments
under the DAP... were not savings, and the use of such...
appropriations contravened Section 25(5),... Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
The management... and utilization of the public wealth inevitably
demands a most careful scrutiny of whether the Executive's
implementation of the DAP was consistent with the Constitution, the
relevant GAAs and other existing laws.
a. Although executive discretion... and flexibility are necessary in... the
execution of the budget, any... transfer of appropriated funds... should
conform to Section 25(5),... Article VI of the Constitution
The heads of offices, particularly the President, require flexibility in
their operations under performance budgeting to enable them to make
whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals
under changing conditions.
the power to transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to
meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient
implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in the GAA.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in
allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs,[129] particularly when the
funds are grouped to form lump sum accounts.
The DAP as a strategy to improve the country's economic... position
was one policy that the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill
his mandate under the GAAs.
Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would
be counterproductive
Were Congress to control expenditures by confining administrators to
narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its power of... the
purse but it would not protect the purse itself. The realities and
complexities of public policy require executive discretion for the sound
management of public funds.
In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer
funds within their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the
fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the
separation of powers among the three main branches of the
Government.
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item
to another within the Executive has not been the mere offshoot of
established usage, but has emanated from law itself.
The 1973 Constitution explicitly and categorically prohibited the
transfer of funds from one item to another, unless Congress enacted a
law authorizing the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds for the purpose of augmenting any
item from savings in another item in the GAA of their respective
offices.
was further constricted by the condition that the funds to be
transferred should come from... savings from another item in the
appropriation of the office
PD No. 1177, providing in its Section 44
Section 44. Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall
have the authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project, or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.
The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any
appropriation of the Executive Department in the General
Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another
department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch,
pursuant to the... provisions of Article VIII, Section 16 (5) of the
Constitution.
In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first
paragraph of Section 44 for contravening Section 16(5) of the 1973
Constitution
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the
privilege granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project... or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as
to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not... the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor...
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void
It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the
ratification by the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section
25(5) of Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution,... The foregoing history makes it evident that the
Constitutional Commission included Section 25(5), supra, to keep a
tight rein on the exercise of the power to transfer funds appropriated
by Congress by the President and the other high officials of the
Government named therein.
The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the
Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are
authorized to... transfer appropriations to augment any item in the
GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional
restriction leaves no room for the petitioner's posture, which we
should now... dispose of as untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials
named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the
authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA
is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive.
Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of
a limitation on the President's discretion over the appropriations
during the Budget Execution Phase.
b. Requisites for the valid transfer... of appropriated funds under
Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution... b.1. First Requisite GAAs of 2011... and 2012 lacked
valid provisions to... authorize transfers of funds under... the DAP;
hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional
Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the
Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative.
the GAAs should expressly authorize the... transfer of funds.
Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?
2011 GAA... hereby... authorized to augment any item in this Act from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
2012 GAA... hereby... authorized to augment any item in this Act from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations
Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to
Section 25(5), supra, existed, there still remained two other requisites
to be met, namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were
savings from appropriations within the respective offices; and... that
the transfer must be for the purpose of augmenting an item of
appropriation within the respective offices.
b.2. Second Requisite There were... no savings from which funds
could... be sourced for the DAP
The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP the unreleased
appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments were not actual
savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant
provisions of the GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be...
understood to refer to the excess money after the items that needed
to be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have
been paid pursuant to the budget.[146] The petitioners posit that there
could be savings only when the PAPs for which the... funds had been
appropriated were actually implemented and completed, or finally
discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could not be
realized with certainty in the middle of the fiscal year; and that the
funds for "slow-moving" PAPs could not be considered as savings...
because such PAPs had not actually been abandoned or discontinued
yet.[147] They stress that NBC No. 541, by allowing the withdrawn
funds to be reissued to the "original program or project from which it
was withdrawn," conceded that the PAPs from which the... supposed
savings were taken had not been completed, abandoned or discontinu
We partially find for the petitioners.
The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse.
Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund;
and the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP
The... second principle is that the Executive, as the department of the
Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully
execute the GAA and to spend the budget in accordance with the
provisions of the GAA
The third principle is that in... making the President's power to
augment operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for
flexibility in budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its
own power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power to the
Executive.
But Congress does not... thereby allow the Executive to override its
authority over the purse as to let the Executive exceed its delegated
authority... fourth principle is that savings should be actual. "Actual"
denotes something that is real or substantial, or something that
exists... presently in fact, as opposed to something that is merely
theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical.[150]
The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against
expanding the scope of the power to augment.
The three instances listed in the GAAs' aforequoted definition were a
sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose
of the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the
appropriation being no longer existent.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP
came from "pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased
Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the
year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and
discontinued... projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings."
The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal
basis for the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as
savings.
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a
mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or...
unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from
which savings can be generated.
Appropriations remain unreleased, for instance, because of
noncompliance with documentary requirements (like the Special
Budget Request), or simply because of the unavailability of funds. But
the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to which they
were allocated under the GAAs, and have remained with the DBM
technically speaking. Ergo, unreleased appropriations refer to...
appropriations with allotments but without disbursement authority.
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these
met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut the
congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had
not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis-à-vis
the PAPs... for which Congress had allocated them.
Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring
Opinion that MOOE appropriations are deemed divided into twelve
monthly allocations within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be
generated monthly from the excess or unused MOOE appropriations
other than the
Mandatory Expenditures and Expenditures for Business-type
Activities because of the physical impossibility to obligate and spend
such funds as MOOE for a period that already lapsed. Following this
observation, MOOE for future months are not savings and cannot
be... transferred.
The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of
savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary
spending. They aver that the respondents, by withdrawing unobligated
allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding
for
PAPs with existing appropriations under the GAAs
We agree with the petitioners.
Contrary to the respondents' insistence, the withdrawals were upon
the initiative of the DBM itself. T
The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and
transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased
appropriations; and that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated
allotments and the retention of appropriated funds were akin to the
impoundment... of appropriations that could be allowed only in case of
"unmanageable national government budget deficit" under the
GAAs,[157] thus violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012
and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of allotments.
The assertions of the petitioners are upheld
The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring
unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior
to the end of the fiscal year.
b.3. Third Requisite No funds from... savings could be transferred
under... the DAP to augment deficient items... not provided in the
GAA... an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be
deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Note is taken of
the fact that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear, thus:...
lthough the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to
spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which
included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered
discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for...
that of Congress.
He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs,
given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a
delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the
public wealth resided in Congress, not in the
Executive.[174] Moreover, leaving the spending power of the
Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of
separation of powers. [175]... b.4 Third Requisite Cross-border...
augmentations from savings were... prohibited by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions
may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their
respective offices,"
Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices,
such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from
crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a
deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds... cross-
border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5),
supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the
Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of
Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with...
respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with
respect to their respective Chairpersons.
The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers thusly:
The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring
savings of his department to another department upon the latter's
request, provided it is the recipient department that uses such funds
to augment its own appropriation. In such a case, the
President merely gives the other department access to public funds
but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that department
whose fiscal autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border
transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing
cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers,
whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section
25(5), supra.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed... funds despite the original
revenue targets... not having been exceeded was invalid
The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the
unprogrammed funds was that the revenue collections must exceed
revenue targets; and that the release of the unprogrammed funds was
illegal because such condition was not met.[191]
The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the
unprogrammed funds under the DAP were in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that the
unprogrammed funds could be availed of when any of the following
three instances... occur, to wit: (1) the revenue collections exceeded
the original revenue targets proposed in the BESFs submitted by the
President to Congress; (2) new revenues were collected or realized
from sources not originally considered in the BESFs; or (3) newly-
approved loans for... foreign-assisted projects were secured, or when
conditions were triggered for other sources of funds, such as
perfected loan agreements for foreign-assisted projects.[192] This
view of the DBM was adopted by all the respondents in their
Consolidated
Comment
We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents' view.
Equal protection, checks and balances,... and public accountability
challenges
The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be
raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases,
such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been
discriminated against in the... releases of funds under the DAP. The
reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could
properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their
situation. The requirement was not... met here.
we have already held that the DAP and its implementing issuances
were policies and... acts that the Executive could properly adopt and
do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to
implement strategies to ramp up or accelerate the economy of the
country.
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or...
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative
fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and
whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the
DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by
the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and
other liabilities.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for
certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and
practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National
Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers,
namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments
and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings...
contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to
augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds
despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that
the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-
compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General
Appropriations
Acts.
Principles:
Overview of the Budget System
The Philippine Budget Cycle
(1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution;
and (4) Accountability... c.1. Budget Preparation
The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of
a Budget Call by the DBM
The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call,
which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities and
colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget Call, which... is addressed to all
government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) and
government financial institutions (GFIs)... the various departments
and agencies submit their respective Agency Budget Proposals to the
DBM.
DBM bureaus thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and
come up with recommendations for the Executive Review Board,
comprised by the DBM Secretary and the DBM's senior officials. The
discussions of the Executive Review
Board cover the prioritization of programs and their corresponding
support vis-à-vis the priority agenda of the National Government, and
their implementation.
The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into
the National Expenditure Program (NEP) and a Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF).
NEP provides the details of spending for each department and agency
by program, activity... or project (PAP), and is submitted in the form of
a proposed GAA
Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the
Cabinet, the DBM prepares the budget documents for... submission to
Congress.
The budget documents consist of: (1) the President's Budget
Message, through which the President explains the policy framework
and budget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article
VII of the Constitution,[68] which contains the macroeconomic
assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the expenditures
and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two previous years;
and (3) the NEP.
Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two
categories,... (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current
operating expenditures.
Capital expenditures are the expenses whose usefulness lasts for
more than one year,... and which add to the assets of the
Government,... Current operating expenditures are the purchases of
goods and services in current... consumption the benefit of which
does not extend beyond the fiscal yea
The two components of current expenditures are those for personal
services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating
expense
Public expenditures
(1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on
agriculture and natural resources, transportation and communications,
commerce and industry, and other... economic development
efforts);[71] (2) social services or social development expenditures
(i.e., government outlay on education, public health and medicare,
labor and welfare and others);[72] (3) general government or...
general public services expenditures (i.e., expenditures for the
general government, legislative services, the administration of justice,
and for pensions and gratuities); [73] (4) national defense
expenditures (i.e., sub-divided... into national security expenditures
and expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order);[74] and
(5) public debt.
Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature
of funds, i.e., general fund, special fund or bond fund... public
revenues complement public expenditures and cover all income or
receipts of the government treasury used to support government
expenditures
In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the
following sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues (i.e., compulsory
contributions to finance government activities);[80] (2) capital
revenues (i.e., proceeds... from sales of fixed capital assets or scrap
thereof and public domain, and gains on such sales like sale of public
lands, buildings and other structures, equipment, and other properties
recorded as fixed assets);[81] (3) grants (i.e.,... voluntary contributions
and aids given to the Government for its operation on specific
purposes in the form of money and/or materials, and do not require
any monetary commitment on the part of the recipient);[82] (4) extra-
ordinary income
(i.e., repayment of loans and advances made by government
corporations and local governments and the receipts and shares in
income of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and other receipts);[83] and
(5) public borrowings (i.e., proceeds of... repayable obligations
generally with interest from domestic and foreign creditors of the
Government in general, including the National Government and its
political subdivisions).[84]... c.2. Budget Legislation
The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from
the time Congress receives the President's Budget, which is inclusive
of the NEP and the BESF, up to the President's approval of the GAA
Budget
Authorization Phase, and involves the significant participation of the
Legislative through its deliberations.
Initially, the President's Budget is assigned to the House of
Representatives' Appropriations Committee on First Reading
Appropriations Committee and its various Sub-Committees schedule
and conduct budget hearings to examine the PAPs of the...
departments and agencies.
House of Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GA
The GAB is sponsored, presented and defended by the House of
Representatives' Appropriations Committee and Sub-Committees in
plenary session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third
Reading before the House of Representatives' version is transmitted...
to the Senate
The Senate's Finance Committee and its
Sub-Committees may submit the proposed amendments to the GAB
to the plenary of the Senate only after the House of Representatives
has formally transmitted its version to the Senate. The Senate version
of the GAB is likewise approved on Third Readi
The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel
each to sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose of
discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions
of the GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next... presented
to the President for approv... c.3. Budget Execution
The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the function of the DBM,
which is tasked to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to
issue the programs and guidelines for the... release of funds; (2) to
prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release
allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.
Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)
and a Cash Release Program (CRP). The ARP sets a limit for
allotments issued in general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes
the monthly, quarterly and annual disbursement... levels.
Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the
Budget Execution Phase and is usually accomplished through the
Modified Disbursement Scheme under wehich disbursements
chargeable against the National Treasury are coursed through the
government... servicing banks.
c.4. Accountability
An agency's accountability may be examined and evaluated through
(1) performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability
reports; (3) review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by
the Commission on Audit (COA).
Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan... a. DAP was a program designed
to... promote economic growth
Administration's "blueprint for public policy" and reflects the
Government's goals and... strategies
The Administration would thereby accelerate government spending
by: (1) streamlining the implementation process through the clustering
of infrastructure projects... of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education (DepEd), and (2)
frontloading PPP-related projects[107] due for implementation in the
following year.[108]
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate
the economy through accelerated spending.
In the context of the DAP's adoption and implementation being a
function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the
Budget Execution Stage under its... constitutional mandate to faithfully
execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to
legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during
the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the... act by
which Congress "designates a particular fund, or sets apart a
specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public
treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental
expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense."
'"In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined 'as nothing more
than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that
money may be paid out of the Treasury,' while... appropriation made
by law refers to 'the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to
a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or
dues from the State to its creditors.'"
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully
execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the
budget to adapt the budget to changes in the country's economic
situation.
He could adopt a plan like the
DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs
to be funded under the DAP.
In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in
Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the
ratification by the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section
25(5) of Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, to wit:
Section 25. x x x... x x x x
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized... to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
Requisites for the valid transfer... of appropriated funds under Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5),
supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.
Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already
been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and
disbursement authority.
According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:[159]
"Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever
reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any... type." Impoundment under
the GAA is understood to mean the retention or deduction of
appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case
of unmanageable National Government budget deficit, to wit:
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity,
or project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or
subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be
deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program,... activity, or
project, be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of
appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.

It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has
the final say on matters of appropriations.[180] For this purpose,
appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a
Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all... monies received from
whatever source by any part of the government are public funds;" and
(2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of
any public money without legislative authorization.
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105
August 19, 1994
Facts: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994
(GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of
Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions
and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed
budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized
members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork
barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating
budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as
prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and
declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled
“AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-
FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same
day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he
imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt
reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And
that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign
Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under
Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the
creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the
appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in
compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the
appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special
Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior
approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on
the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization
Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer
planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel
carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in
the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue: whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission
on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights,
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and
(f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional; whether
or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt
service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is
constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is
actually a part of the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound
basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden
shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a
violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to
repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O.
No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue
discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while
allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain
a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have
been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g.,
R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the
Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the
item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in
question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of
a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and
on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended —
70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines
by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the
National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an “appropriate”
provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special
provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the
said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for
the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all
purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case
at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity
of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2
and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the
Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored
personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that
impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts
entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special
provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings
to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the
language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply
that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or
reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU
members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such
intention must be embodied and manifested in another law
considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief
and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be
amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions
relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional
commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
“necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These
steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
Belgica v. Executive Secretary
* FACTS:
HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin)
has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it
has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The
“Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public
Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects
during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and
Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the
present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design
prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference
shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities
or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this
purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said
priority list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity
of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives
outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence
of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or
beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives.
3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified
by legislators shall be as follows:
a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed
under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure
projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project
menu of Special Provision No. 1; and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft
programs and projects listed under Item A and One Hundred Million
Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B,
the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision
No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable
Special Provisions on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent
(50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester
and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second
semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be
allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy,
Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works
and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is
within the same implementing unit and same project category as the
original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for
the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed
in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from
approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund
shall be limited within the same classification of soft or hard
programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications
and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU
concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and
the funds have been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification
shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM
or the implementing agency, as the case may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be
supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1
and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds
shall be released to the implementing agencies subject to the
conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed
under Special Provision No. 3.
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include
the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The
Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to
help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating
to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was
created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as
amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund
has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects
not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of
the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of
policy subject to judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the
Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa)
and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-
litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system”
under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on…
1.) …separation of powers
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
3.) …checks and balances
4.) …accountability
5.) …political dynasties
6.) …local autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power
* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless
there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied
by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of
the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing
and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury
to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public
funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related
thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the
reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when
there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would
not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the
President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF”
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul
its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence
dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave
violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks
and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the
interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within
which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to
be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest.
The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the
system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous
whistle-blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms
are needed “to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not
merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the
purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the
CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This
is applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on
the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate
controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious
resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly,
so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be
utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called
for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national
budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which
certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most
opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade
judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is
not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the
system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an
exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution
has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant
cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective
capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they
“dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity
of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay
have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from
the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules.
Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in
these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified
as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA
Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete
breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues
involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the
merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against
the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However,
the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire
“Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a
dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt
to re-litigate where the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers
problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the
present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-
relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each
other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well
as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within
a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to
the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release
and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal
analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as
a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of
the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was
actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since
the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as
the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling
in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification
authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was
merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and,
hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare
decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be
funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under
the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3
and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have
also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund
release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF
Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2
under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including
“the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and
the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of
powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor
since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that
respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and,
hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-
delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is
lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of
appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such
fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and
given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators
to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their
own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not
have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s
power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is
forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of
all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the
2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the
lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere
funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e.
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation
of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This
setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts
and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be
subject to the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson
relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of
said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by
line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and
per implementing agency.”
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted
as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing
legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage
of their own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-
enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his
PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a
matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a
case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close
operational proximity between legislators and the Executive
department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the
domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel
System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject
of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as
not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by
law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling
on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score
to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated
how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system
which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the
unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses
graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives –
and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent
any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as
well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally
mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that
LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to
use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted
to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government” states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from
which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited;
second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely
energy development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy
related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains
legally effective and subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may
be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration
purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose,
however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for
any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“.
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure
development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project
as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken
down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective
and subsisting.
Petitioner: Regina Ongsiako Reyes
Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Joseph
Socorro B. Tan
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a
registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation
of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the
amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained
material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status,
residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the
petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and
amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution
cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a
citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But
on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution
denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13,
2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the
Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office
at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of
Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en
banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
Issues:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner
who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath
of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is
illegible to run for office
Discussion:
Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House
of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and
qualification of the members of House of Representative.
In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have
accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s
oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the
oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of
residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a
Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively
abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile
in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of
choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired
her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that
the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she
has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim
that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her
domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she
has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

Held:

The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
G.R. No. 193314 :
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and RODOLFO Y.
ESTRELLADA, Respondents.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for mayor of Baliangao, MisamisOccidental for the 10 May
2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and residence
as BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental
(Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy, in which they argued t hat she had falsely represented her
place of birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San
Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous
domicile, Dapitan City.
On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her
residence in the said barangay since December 2008 when she
purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in
the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former was
overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, petitioner
asserted that the error in her place of birth was committed by her
secretary. Nevertheless, in aCoC, an error in the declaration of the
place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to
disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by
law.
The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which
petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental,
proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal mayor.
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that
respondent was DISQUALIFIED for the position of mayor.
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August
2010 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of
merit and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due
course to or cancelling her CoC.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-
year residency requirement for local elective officials.
HELD: Petitioner failed to comply with theone-year residency
requirement forlocal elective officials.
Petitioner uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The
question is whether she was able to establish, through clear and
positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of choice in
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office,
residence is synonymous with domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v.
Gurayheld as follows:
The term esidenceas so used, is synonymous with omicilewhich
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by
choice. First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality.
Second, an intention to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon
the old domicile.
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof,
as held in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELECand subsequently in
Dumpit- Michelena v. Boado:
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time.
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and
positive proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the
critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year
prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence.
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials
that petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their
barangay. At most, the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that
petitioner was building and developing a beach resort and a house in
Brgy. Tugas, and that she only stayed in Brgy. PuntaMiray whenever
she wanted to oversee the construction of the resort and the house.
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true,
Fernandez v. COMELEChas established that the ownership of a
house or some other property does not establish domicile. This
principle is especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to
establish her bodily presence in the locality and her intent to stay
there at least a year before the elections.

In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear

and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III,
Villanueva, Duhaylungsod, Estrellada,Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol,
Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation, Maghilum and Javier.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as
a voter only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency
requirement as a voter. This minimum requirement is different from
that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running
for public office.

First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual

and physical resident of Brgy. Tugassince 2008. However, they
declared in the same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray The Petition is DENIED.
while her house was being constructed in Brgy. Tugas.

Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and

Estrellada asserted that in December 2009, construction was still
ongoing. By their assertion, they were implying that six months before
the 10 May 2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her
house at Brgy. Tugas.

Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only

visited Baliangao occasionally when they stated that "at times when
she (petitioner) was in Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of
Lourdes Yap while her residential house was being constructed."
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v. COMELEC, GR No. 136781,
2000-10-06
Facts:
On1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred
twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated.
the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13)... party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had
obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system.
Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC
PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement)
filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of
Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged...
that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under
the Constitution, was mandatory.
It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote
requirement and the three-seat limit... under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually
sit in the House.
Comelec Second Division... granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also
ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to
the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives.
In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote...
requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it
identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should
supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First,
"the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives."
Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the
Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party
system."
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been
proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least two
percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.
They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only
parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of
the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House
of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for
each,... should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the
winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Issues:
7941
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or
is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the...
time?
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Ruling:
Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be
nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional
seats.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets... down only the percentage of the total
membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA
7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote
"proportional representation" in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and... underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation
that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system in order to be... entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House
of Representatives. Thus the... relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the
law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to... additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown
presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by...
representatives chosen by them.
But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have
the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of... small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and... progressive ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful
local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent
requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the
function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements,
Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party,
organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two
percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of
various... interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single
group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-
list seats, if not the entire House.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and
the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the
initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the... number of
votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed
by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the
total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties... shall
be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first
party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other
parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties... cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is
determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified
party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same
number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won
by... the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to
that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to
which the first one is entitled.
Principles:
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the
number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we...
need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-
list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their
total number of votes."

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats
than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties
and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula
does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is... no
such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off
could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is
not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of...
qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely
not end up in such constitutional contravention.
BANAT VS COMELEC
Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the
party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a
party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-
list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it
garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to
the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if
garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3
seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must
garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it
mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there
would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed
20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a
new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of
this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate,
questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It
also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are
allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the
lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in
the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5
seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted
for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats
allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives ÷ 0.80) x
(0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling
– meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed
20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However,
it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of
the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment.
The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there
are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we
increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of
the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This
allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the
seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of
the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this
case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the
second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for
the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-
lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it
against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not
be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the
party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x
(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79
remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still
get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more
than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and
additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats
shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in
rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow
major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from
participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no
prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word
“party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution
in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of
the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that
only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no
one party shall dominate the party-list system.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and
organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941)
and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280
groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s
(PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National
Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the
elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing
of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En
Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether
the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the
Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo
Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections,
under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly
shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented."

Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral

parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This
means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure

ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list
system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to
deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are
excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-
list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,
leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from
the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while
his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite
his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his
constituents to be represented
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law,
it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in
a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to

discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.

However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of

the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be

exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution.
The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
Jimenez vs Cabangbang (G.R. No. L-15905)
Facts:
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958,
Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to
the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly
three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such
strategists have had collusions with communists and that the
Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to
place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor
Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may
or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such
an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to
collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the
case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR
he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication
endowed to members of Congress. Whether or not the said letter is
libelous.
HELD:
Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going
to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein,
they shall not be questioned in any other place.” The publication of the
said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of
their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the
time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in
session when the letter was published and at the same time he,
himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in
thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made
by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to
support Jimenez’ action for damages. Although the letter says that
plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded
to as “planners”, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it
should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that “it is of course
possible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting tools of the plan of which they
may have absolutely no knowledge”. In other words, the very
document upon which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that
they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans,
and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC
does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point
of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are
officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the
control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff,
and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein
described as “planners” include these two (2) high ranking officers.
Petition is dismissed.
Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)
FACTS:
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding,
asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust
the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate,
Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his
speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the
tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were
left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session
and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the
Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the
Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject
matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will be against
the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer
is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera
vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over,
by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even
if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged
affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in
this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the
Supreme Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with
the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may
participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after
this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at
most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most
injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate,
that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will
of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of
the President of that body being amenable at any time by that
majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more
senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence
of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved
could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow
of a doubt.
Osmena Vs. Pendatun
Facts:
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech
entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged
then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently,
House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to
investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that
if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be
subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the
Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress.
Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred
that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and
Congress has the power to discipline its members.

Issue:

Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

Held:

No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines

parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic
world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered
disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s
petition is dismissed.
Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013
J. Perlas-Bernabe
Facts:
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate
of candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth
Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party.
Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that
Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East
Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC
that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Canadieng, Ormoc City. In this
regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla
prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a
Resolution6 granting Juntilla’s petition without any qualification. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify
Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O.
JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I.
GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of
Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency
requirement.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution dated May 4,
2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted
the said resolution with finality “in order to enable his substitute to
facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution.”
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed
her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance10
from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute
candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional
post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the
COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En
Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution
No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the
recommendation of the said department to allow the substitution of
private respondent.
The substitution complied with the requirements provided under
Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678
dated October 6, 2009.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the
following:
xxxx
2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A
SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ: (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Issue: Whether or not there is valid substitution.
Held: No. A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a
petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy.
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to
assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain
particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification
under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions
between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is
hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s possession of a permanent
resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of
certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts
under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to
violations of other penal laws. In particular, these are: (1) giving
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2)
committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending
in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the
OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision
(Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of
the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate
for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had
already been elected.
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is
still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed
to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do
not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while
the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as
prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in
question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of
the above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a
CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a
person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a
person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also
made a false representation of the same in the CoC. The nature of a
Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v.
COMELEC, where the Court illumined:
Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the
cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but
on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidates states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section
78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office.
If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the
CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has
already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with
the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly
in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation,
while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the
misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare
significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this
relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person
committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in
the determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled
or not. What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to
deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one’s
ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still
considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on
the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to
and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a
candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is
considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga v. COMELEC
(Talaga), the Court ruled that:

xxxx

While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely

prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.