28. Sps.

Yu (petitioners) vs PCIB (respondent) (aka ​Dagupan Sangla Lupa​)

Art. 36 on Prejudicial Questions

Facts: Sps. Yu mortgaged their land title, interest and participation over several parcels of land
located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International
Bank as security for the payment of a loan in the amount of 9,000,000.00 Php. As the
petitioners failed to pay the loan, PCIB, the respondents, filed a petition for extra judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage in the Dagupan RTC. This was approved. Soon after, the
auction came about and the respondents, PCIB, emerged as the highest bidder. 2 months
before the redemption period expiration, PCIB filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession
before the Dagupan RTC. The petitioners, Sps. Yu, filed a motion to dismiss and to strike out
testimony of Rodante Manuel that the certificate of sale is void on the grounds that it violates
Article 2089 of the Civil Code about the indivisibility of mortgage by conducting two separate
foreclosures. The motion was denied and that petitioners once again filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that the pendency of the annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial
issue to the earlier filing of the ex parte petition for writ of possession.

Issue: W/N the annulment of certificate of sale and petition for the issuance of writ of possession
raises a prejudicial question.

Ruling: No. Motion was denied on the grounds that the principle of prejudicial question is not
applicable because the case pending in the RTC is also a civil case and not criminal in nature.

Key takeaways:
1. Prejudicial question - a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt of
the accused

Requisites of Prejudicial Questions:

a.​ ​Civil case involves facts intimately related to the criminal case.

b. ​The resolution of the issue raised in the civil case will be a determinant of the accused’s

innocence.

c.​ ​Jurisdiction to try must be lodged in another tribunal

25. Constantino (petitioner) vs. Mendez (respondents) (aka FUBU gone wrong)

Article 21 on compensation for damages done

Facts: Amelita Constantino met Ivan Mendez at a restaurant located at Sta. Cruz Manila. They
felt an instant connection with each other. On their next date, Ivan Mendez professed his love to
Amelita Constantino and with the promise of marriage uttered by Ivan Mendez, Amelia
Constantino agreed to have sexual intercourse with Mendez. After said intercourse, Mendez
confessed that he was, in fact, married. This confession did not hinder the two from having
sexual intercourse whenever Mendez is in town.Constantino got pregnant and whenever she
pleaded for support, Mendez always seemed unfazed. Because of this, Constantino filed a case
for recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Mendez prayed for the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action.

Issue: W/N Amelita Constantino is entitled to claim for damages.

Ruling: No. As regards for Amelita’s claim for damages which is based on articles 193 and 214
of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan’s promise of marriage, she surrendered her
virginity. We cannot but agree with the CA that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis
for recovery. Damages can only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire.

Key takeaways on Article 21:

1. Article 21 distinguished from article 20:

-Art. 21: the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
-Article 20: the act is contrary to law.
22. Pe vs. Pe (Rosary Incident)

Art. 21 on compensation for damages done

Facts: A married man, who was the adopted son of a relative of a girl’s father and who had the
same family name as the girl, became very close to the girl and her family. In fact, the members
of the family considered him as one of them. In 1952, the man thus frequented the house of the
girl (Lolita) on the pretext of desiring to teach her how to pray the rosary. The two immediately
fell in love, and met each other in clandestine trysts, over the objections of the family. One day
in 1957, the man wrote Lolita a note asking her to have a date with him. Lolita went to him. Her
parents, brothers and sisters now sue the defendant under Article 21.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable to compensate for damages done to petitioner in
light of Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Ruling. Yes. The Supreme Court, applying Art. 21 ruled that indeed, he, a married man, has
seduced Lolita through an ingenious and tricky scheme, to the extent of making her fall in love
with him. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy.
19. University of the East (petitioner) vs. Jader (respondent) (Pina-march nung grad, pero failed
pala)

Art. 21 on compensation for damages

Facts: Jader was enrolled at the University of the East-College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In
the first semester of his last school year, he failed to take the regular final examination in
Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He applied for the removal of the
INC, upon paying all test fees, he took the test and got a grade of 5. After this, the faculty and
members of the college of UE Law met for deliberation about candidates for graduation, Jader’s
name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for LL.B. Every activity and
recognition regarding the graduation rites were all pointing towards plaintiff’s graduation for said
course: his name was included in the invitation, he went up the stage, his mother and brother
assisted in placing the hood, and his tassel was turned from left to right and he was handed a
rolled white sheet of paper, symbolical of the law diploma, and lastly, his relatives took pictures
of the event. In his preparation for the bar exams, he found out that he was not legible in taking
said exams due to grade deficiency. Consequently, he sued UE for moral damages, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when
he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations. UE, in response, denied liability in said
complaint that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for LL.B
because his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students.

Issue: W/N Jader can claim for damages on the ground of UE’s negligence.

Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court held that UE was liable for damages in the grounds that it is a
contractual obligation of UE, as an educational institution to timely inform and furnish sufficient
notice and information to their students about their academic standings as is stated in Art. 19 in
the Civil Code.

On the other hand, UE is not liable for moral damages as was stated in his initial complaint that
he suffered emotional pain when he found out he cannot take the bar exams. SC pointed out that
the very least a student, more so, a law student can do, is to take the initiative to do follow ups
with regards to their academic standing and that the actual emotional damages was brought about
to himself by the plaintiff.
16. Magbanua (petitioners) vs IAC (defendant) (AKA Pinagkaitan ng tubig sa irrigation)

Facts: The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents alleging that they are shared
tenants, and that the latter divert the flow of water from their farm lots which caused the drying
up of their landholdings and asked to vacate their areas for they could not plant palay due to
lack of water. The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered the
defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the
reinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision
because the former believe that as shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as
agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings.

Issue: W/N the petitioners were entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

Ruling: Yes. Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs are entitled to a measure of moral
damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts
mentioned in Article 21 of the same code and the latter stipulates that: “any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damages.”
13. Garcia (petitioner) vs. Recio (respondent) (AKA Australian Divorce Decree)

Facts: Rederick A Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia but obtained a decree of
divorce just two years after their marriage in 1989. Garcia, the respondent, after he became an
Australian citizen in 1992, he married the petitioner in 1994. In 1998, the petitioner filed
for an annulment on the ground of bigamy because Recio allegedly had a subsisting marriage
prior to their marriage on 1996. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had
been validly dissolved by a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney.

W/N the divorce decree granted in the Australian Family Court is valid pursuant to Art. 15 of the
Civil Code

Ruling: Yes, the decree SHOULD have been valid. The time he procured the divorce decree, he
was no longer a Filipino citizen. However, it is Recio’s, as the respondent, duty to present said
document to the judiciary to establish his legal capacity to remarry because a duly authenticated
and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.
10. Barreto (plaintiff) vs. Gonzales (defendant) AKA divorce sa Nevada

Art. 15 (Nationality Principle)

Facts: Manuela Barreto Gonzales and Augusto Gonzales are citizens of the Philippines. They
were married in the city of Manila on January 19, 1919 and live together until 1926. They
voluntarily separated. They had 4 children of which they have mutually agreed that Manuela,
plaintiff, would still support their children by means of doling out 500 pesos monthly. After this
agreement, Augusto went to Nevada and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the
ground of desertion, shortly after moving to California and returned to the Philippines to marry a
Filipino citizen. After said return, his wife, Manuela Barreto Gonzales, filed in the CFIM
requesting the court to confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of the State
of Nevada.

Issue: W/N the divorce obtained by a Filipino citizen in Nevada is valid and binding in the
Philippines

Ruling: No. Decrees or grants obtained abroad cannot compel the courts to approve of their
own actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of this country in a manner which our
government believes is contrary to public order and good morals. Article 15 clearly states that
laws relating to family rights, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
7. D.M Consunji (petitioner) vs CA and Maria Juego (respondent) AKA 14th floor death drop
DMCI

Art. 3 on ignorance of the law/ Art. 6 waiver of rights

Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker for D.M Consunji, fell to his death while in the line of
work. His wife, Maria Juego, availed death benefits under the Labor Code’s provision on the
State Insurance Fund, without knowing that she could also recover a higher amount under the
Civil Code. D.M.C.I alleged that respondent Maria Juego knew of the two choices of remedies
available to her and yet chose to claim the benefits from the ECC, and that such actions is an
implied action that she already waived her rights for a much higher compensation in terms of
damages.

Issue: 1. W/N the waiver exercised by Maria Juego is valid.

2. W/N the claim of DMCI of Maria Juego’s ignorance of the law’s provisions valid.

Ruling: 1. No. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of

understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to
assert them.

2. No. The argument has no merit. The application of Art. 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws.
3. PITC (petitioner) vs. Judge Angeles (Respondents) AKA SOCPEC

Facts: PITC, issued an Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, which states that
applications to the PITC for importation from China must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed export program of Philippine products to China. Private respondents, Firestone and
Remington both applied for authority to import. They were granted the spot to import from
China. Subsequently, they failed to comply with undertakings to submit export credits. Further
application from private respondents were now being withheld by petitioners until they came to a
point that they were barred from importing goods from China.

Issue: Whether or not AO SOCPEC 89-08-01 is null and void on the ground that it was not
published in accordance with article 2 of the CC.

Ruling: Yes. The questioned AO, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of
Article 2 of the CC. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all because its purpose is
to inform the public. The AO under consideration should be published for it to be effective since
its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.