1.

CORE QUESTIONS ADDRESSED

What are the fundamental assumptions of realism?
What are the main differences between classical realism and neorealism?
What are the main assumptions of neorealism with regard to the
stability of the international system?
 2. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
Realism entered academic International Relations in the period between
the late 1930s and the early 1940s, mostly as a theoretical answer to the
liberal or ‘idealist’ tradition that dominated the discourse about world
politics since the end of the First World War (-> Theory Concept:
Liberalism and Neoliberalism). Realism accused liberalism of ignoring
the fundamental question of (->) power in world politics while at the
same time overestimating the capacity of humans and states to progress
through learning and increased civilization towards intersubjectively
shared reasoning. Instead of following some ideological assumptions or
normative codes of conduct, realists called upon policy-makers to keep
in mind the most basic challenge for each state in the international sys­
tem: preserving the national security and survival within an anarchical
self-help system, which in a realist logic can only be achieved through
the constant struggle for maximizing power.
Realism claims to rest upon a much older tradition, starting with
Thucydides’ (c. 460-406 BC) account of the ancient Peloponnesian War
that took place between the dominant regional powers of that time, the
city-states of Athens and Sparta. Thucydides,_who was an Athenian
admiral and therefore took part in the war himself, not only describes
the history of the participants, the war and its consequences, but also
refers in his interpretation of the conflict’s causes to Athens as having
become too powerful not to be perceived as a threat by Sparta. The
increase of Athens’ power challenged the dominant status of Sparta in
the region. This, combined with an already present drive for power in
the calculations of Spartan politicians, led to the declaration of war
against the rival. Further prominent examples of realist considerations
can be found in the work of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), where
power as a regulative and constitutive force in politics also plays an
important role, as well as in the theoretical considerations of Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679), a contemporary witness of the English Civil War
who elaborated a theory of states, based upon the legitimate use of vio­
lence through a central authority. Essential for subsequent realist consid­
erations has been the Hobbesian depiction of anarchy, the famous ‘state
of nature’, which he described as a condition where men are engaged in
a war of all against all, constantly struggling for survival, although it
should be noted that Hobbes himself did not think that relations
between states operated on the same basis as relations between indi­
viduals, which is in effect what realists have inferred from his writings.
 Classical realism

The most prominent authors of classical realism are Hans J. Morgenthau,

Edward Hallett Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr. In Politics Among Nations
(1948), Morgenthau elaborates a realist theory of world politics, starting
with the premise that a theoretical approach towards politics should be
considered as an approach towards human beings. Referring strongly to
the anthropological considerations made by Hobbes in Leviathan (1651),
Morgenthau conceptualized humans as rational and egoistic, constantly
seeking to maximize power. According to Morgenthau, these anthropo­
logical premises can be transferred to the behaviour of states in the
international system: ‘politics, like society in general, is governed by
objective laws that have their roots in human nature’ (Morgenthau 1961:
4). Consequently, Morgenthau concludes that states as actors have to
struggle for survival in world politics in the same way that men do in the
theoretical considerations made by Thomas Hobbes. Morgenthau’s inter­
national system is an anarchical self-help system composed of states
which try to pursue their interests, defined in terms of power, against the
interests of other states.
nternational relations

Neorealism
key c o n c e p ts in

Neorealism, or structural realism, agrees with the realist conception of

power as essential for understanding world politics. But in contrast to
classical realism’s focus on human nature, neorealism highlights the
absence of a central authority in the international system and the rela­
tive distribution of power among the states as structural causes for a
competition on security in the international system. According to
Kenneth N. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979), it is not the
motivation of the actors involved but the political structure in which
they are embedded that helps explain how international politics works.
This political structure is always characterized by an underlying order­
ing principle. Waltz differentiates between two ordering principles: in a
state of hierarchy, units are in a relationship that can be described as
authority or subordination. In consequence, Waltz strongly identifies
hierarchy with domestic politics, arguing that, as already described by
Hobbes, within a nation the war-prone state of anarchy is overcome by
an authoritarian political structure. But, since this overarching authority
is missing in world politics, Waltz associates international politics with
(->) anarchy. As he argues further, anarchy eliminates functional differ­
entiations between units. From a structural realist point of view, within
an anarchical international system all states are like-units and in conse­
quence what becomes relevant for explaining international politics is
not unit-level variation, such as different types of regimes, but the dis­
tribution of capabilities between these units. Structural realism is inter­
ested in providing a rank ordering of states in order to be able to identify
the great powers within an international system. This number of great
powers determines the structure of the international system - the polar­
ity (number of poles) of the system (Donnelly 2009: 36-7; Dunne and
Schmidt 2007: 98). In consequence, states have to be aware of the dis­
tribution of power in the international system and be sensitive towards
the relative gains of others, in order to ensure their own security.
To achieve the primary objective of survival within this self-help sys­
tem, states have to enter into a competition concerning the distribution
of capabilities and (military) power (-> Security Dilemma), especially
since they can never be certain about the intentions of other states.
Once a state is confronted with an adversary who has become powerful
enough to be perceived as a potential threat, Waltz argues that it can
only choose the option of balancing (-> Balance of Power) against this
great power. According to neorealists, two options of balancing exist: a

realism and neorealism

state at risk can either choose to increase its own military capacities, i.e.
through military expenditures (internal balancing), or it can seek to

theory concept:
build strategic alliances to jointly balance against the great power (exter­
nal balancing). Hence, states are interested in balancing to correct a
‘skewed distribution of relative power in the international system’
(Layne 1993: 12). Because balancing against a great power, or (->) a
hegemon, is determined by the anarchical structure of the international
system, it is considered an automatism. States have to balance because
of the structural pressure of anarchy - they cannot help it. In conse­
quence, neorealists see international political outcomes, such as conflicts
between great powers, as caused by the specific structure of the inter­
national system at a particular time, or how Donnelly describes it: ‘The
Cold War, in this account, was not “caused" by anyone but was the “natu­
ral” result of bipolarity’ (Donnelly 2009: 37; see also Mearsheimer 2007:
78-80).
Within the history of International Relations as a discipline, Waltz’s
structural realism is usually referred to as defensive realism, as opposed
to the theoretical approach termed offensive realism by John J.
Mearsheimer. Although Mearsheimer shares most of the basic assump­
tions made by Waltz, he disagrees in one particular point, the question
about ‘how much power states want’ (Mearsheimer 2001: 21). According
 to Waltz, it is not conducive for states to attempt to maximize their
power and become the leading world hegemon, since the structure of
the international system will automatically produce counterbalancing
activities, such as the creation of balancing coalitions by great powers
which will finally lead to the decline of the hegemon. Therefore, Waltz
argues, states should rather pursue the possession of an ‘appropriate
amount of power’ [Waltz 1979: 40). In contrast, from an offensive real­
ist point of view, it makes perfect sense to pursue as much power as
possible, in particular hegemony, since it is ‘the best way to ensure one’s
own survival’ [Mearsheimer 2007: 72). Offensive realists do not ‘buy’ the
argument that hegemony automatically produces successful counterbal­
ancing activities - with reference to historical examples they rather
conclude that most of these activities are not successful, in particular
since the hegemon has a more advantageous position within such a
conflict and therefore offence hardly ever pays. That it is indeed possible
to become the world’s hegemon is usually illustrated by the overwhelm­
ing military capacities of the United States in the nineteenth century
and in particular since the end of the Cold War [Mearsheimer 2007: 76).
international relations

Neoclassical realism
key co n ce p ts in

A new, intermediate approach towards the realist study of International

Relations emerged in the late 1990s. Although authors such as Gideon
Rose [1998) or Randall L. Schweller [1996) admit that the structure of
the international system provides a fruitful approach towards the under­
standing of world politics, they argue for the incorporation of additional
explanatory variables on the individual or domestic level. In including
these factors they refer back to variables already introduced by classical
realism such as the perceptions of state leaders or the motivations of
states. In this logic, factors on the domestic or individual level are inter­
vening variables between the distribution of power [independent vari­
able) in the international system and the foreign policy of states
[dependent variable) [Donnelly 2009: 33; Dunne and Brian 2007: 99).

3. METHODOLOGIES
Realism is a rationalist approach to world politics referring in various
applications to rational-choice theory. Rationalism is based on the con­
cept of the egoistic individual who always seeks to maximize their
individual benefits. Like other rationalist approaches to social behaviour,
realism assumes that patterns of individual or state action can be under­
stood as the result of a prior rational calculation of these actors. This
logic of action is termed ‘logic of consequentiality’, as opposed to the
‘logic of appropriateness’, where actors are depicted as embedded into
a specific social structure and therefore follow norms and rules because
they are perceived as legitimate and rightful (-> Theory Concept: Social
Constructivism). Furthermore, realism provides the actors involved with
specific assumed priorities constraining the available options for action:
actors in realism seek to maximize power. Moreover, the choices an
individual can make are determined by the specific structures in which
the actions take place: as the structure of the international system is
assumed to be anarchical, states seek to maximize their relative power
by increasing their capabilities, for instance through military expendi­
ture or economic growth. In order to explain decisions made by actors
in specific constellations, realism turns to rationalist (->) game theory
(for an overview of rationalism see for instance Fearon and Wendt
2002 ).

4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS

realism and neorealism

In realism, world politics are power politics and therefore it is no sur­

theory concept:
prise that empirical applications of the theory usually refer to the poli­
tics of the great powers of the time. During the Cold War, this was
naturally the rivalry between the two ‘superpowers’, the US and the
Soviet Union, and mainstream debate in neorealism at that time analysed
the consequences of bipolarity. This debate about the results of polarity
is closely related to the previously mentioned discourse between defen­
sive and offensive realism. But instead of focusing on the question about
how much power states want, authors concentrate on the prospects of a
particular international political structure for temporary peace.
Against the historical background of the Cold War rivalry between
the US and the Soviet Union, and in addition to the relative decline of
US hegemony in the 1970s, Kenneth N. Waltz reaches the conclusion
that bipolar international systems with two major powers tend to be less
conflict prone than uni- or multipolar ones. With polarity conceptual­
ized as the number of major powers within an international system, he
argues that in a bipolar constellation the distribution of capabilities
between the two adversaries is quite predictable. This thought is based
on the assumption that the probability of miscalculating the power of
the rival, a perception that would trigger balancing activities, is rather
 unlikely. A balance of power, opening up opportunities for temporary
stability, can be achieved relatively easily [Waltz 1979: 161-3). On the
contrary, within a multipolar international system the situation is more
complex, owing to the fact that every state is confronted with at least a
few potential adversary states, trying to estimate their capabilities and
intentions in the near future. Furthermore and as already mentioned, a
unipolar system also tends to produce conflict due to the structural
demand for balancing. Following Waltz, a bipolar system is thus more
stable than a unipolar one, while a multipolar is the least stable of the
aforementioned alternatives.
After the end of the Cold War a theoretical debate within neorealism
started referring closely to the prospective stability of the unipolar sys­
tem with the US as the sole remaining superpower: the majority of
neorealist scholars like Kapstein and Mastanduno (1999), Wohlforth
(1999) or Mearsheimer (2001) reversed Waltz’s argumentation stating
that a unipolar system is more stable and therefore more peaceful than
any other. Wohlforth argues that the predominance of American hegem­
ony in the post-Cold-War era should not only be recognized as histori­
cally unique, but also that the benefits of such unipolarity should be put
nternational relations

into perspective. According to Wohlforth, the immense power advan­

tage of the US makes a great power struggle for hegemony unlikely in
key c o n c e p ts in

the foreseeable future as its outstanding position offers no opportunity

for counterbalancing, whether by individual states or by alliances.
Additionally, its status of being the only remaining superpower provides
the US with the possibility to constantly increase its capabilities, thus
widening the gap between the hegemon and other states and making the
unipolar structure of the international system enduring (Wohlforth
1999: 7-8).
These pro-unipolarity arguments have been opposed by Christopher
Layne and others, pointing out that preserving the unipolar status of the
US after the Cold War is impossible and therefore an illusion (Layne
1993: 7). This goes back to the arguments stated by Waltz - according
to Layne, anarchy produces a further systemic constraint against unipo­
larity: sameness, i.e. the tendency of smaller states ‘toward imitating
their rivals’ successful characteristics’, in order not to fall behind (Layne
1993: 15; Waltz 1979: 127).
Other realist scholars, such as Michael Mastanduno, have emphasized
the importance of ‘perceptions of threat’ for the decision of whether
balancing is necessary. In his balance-of-threat logic, he argues that
the decision of states to counterbalance a hegemon is based on the
behaviour of the superpower itself, thus offering the interpretation of a
so-called benign hegemon, who is apparently no threat to the immedi­
ate security of his neighbours (Mastanduno 1999: 146-51). A further
addition to the balancing assumption was made by fellow neorealist
Stephen M. Walt, who doubted the assumption of balancing as struc­
tural automatism. Walt reached the conclusion that it might be more
attractive for weaker states to bandwagon, thus enjoying benefits such
as protection or preferential trade agreements, than opposing the
hegemon directly through balancing. Therefore, the antonym of balan­
cing within neorealist theory is bandwagoning. Nevertheless, because
bandwagoning always includes the risk of relatively losing power while
strengthening the relative power of others, it is not considered as a pref­
erable option by the majority of neorealist scholars.
Because realism has not only been involved in explaining inter­
national political outcomes, but additionally aims to provide practical
advice to policy-makers particularly in the US, a number of realist schol­
ars have been concerned with the rise of new great powers and espe­
cially the future role of China, since the beginning of its extraordinary
economic growth in the 1980s. Realism focuses on the question of how

realism and neorealism

the expanding economic capacities of China might translate into mili­
tary potentials, thus leading to an increase of China’s power and a

theory concept:
change in the international order. More specifically, questions are raised
about whether China can rise peacefully, and whether China’s power
capacities will become so great that they would re-establish a bipolar
structure of the international system (Kaplan 2005; Deng 2001).

5. CENTRAL CRITICISMS
Realism has frequently been criticized for not providing a coherent and
comprehensive theoretical framework: classical realism, according to its
critics, accepts the anthropological premises made by Thomas Hobbes
without questioning and simply translates them into world politics. In
consequence, subsequent realist scholars referred to sociological or
structural causes of violence, such as emphasized in the works of
Niebuhr or John J. Herz. Furthermore, Morgenthau provides the reader
neither with an explicit definition of power, nor with a precise distinc­
tion between power and interests. This close linkage between power and
interests makes his interpretation of power tautological. Neorealism
seeks to overcome this problem by defining power as measurable capa­
bilities of states.
 Moreover, neorealism has displayed a poor predictive record, in par­
ticular since it failed to forecast and explain major developments in
international politics, such as the end of the Cold War, the development
of regional integration, as well as the emergence of a (->) security com­
munity in Europe in the 1990s and the growing incidence of intrastate
conflict, in particular in Africa.
In the discipline of International Relations, realism has become
engaged in two main debates: the first, also referred to as the ‘neo­
neodebate’, took place in the 1980s between neorealist scholars and
neoliberals. While the majority of neorealists claimed that cooperation
under anarchy can only be a temporary phenomenon and necessarily
rests upon the support of a hegemonic power, it became evident after
the relative decline of US hegemony in the 1970s that the theoretical
answers provided by neorealism did not explain the reality. Although
neoliberals started with the same assumptions as neorealists, such as the
premise of rational actors and the state of anarchy in the international
system, they came to a different conclusion, namely that cooperation
can be rational behaviour. Neorealists, such as Grieco (1988), tried to
provide a theoretical answer to this criticism by pointing to the impor­
CP tance of relative gains in an anarchical international system. Nevertheless,
c
O realism remains poorly equipped to explain the variety of international
c '+ -*
03 cooperation (-> International Regimes).
CP
H— * CD The second, most fundamental, criticism of realism was articulated by
Q.
a) _ Alexander Wendt (1992) in his article ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of
o CO It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’. According to Wendt, the
c c
o o anarchical state of the international system does not translate directly
o V-<
03
into a self-help system of power politics (Wendt 1994: 394). In contrast
>,
CD C to the neorealist account of structure as being an exogenous factor to
CD the study of world politics, Wendt argues that structure is something
c that is socially constructed by actors, through interaction, discourse and
perception. In this logic, what neorealists claimed to be an inevitable
force which determines the actors involved, is rather a socially constructed
logic, which can be influenced and changed by the actors involved (->
■_______
Social Constructivism).
186

6. CORE READING
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1961) Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 3rd edn, orig. pub. 1948). Defines the field of realist International
Relations theory.