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KEVIN J. MIDDLEBROOK

grouped under the progovernment Aliança Renovadora Nacional (Na-

tional Renovating Alliance, ARENA), later renamed the Partido Demo-
crático Social (Democratic Social Party, PDS). However, beginning with
the large-scale defections from the PDS in ∞Ω∫∂–∫∑ that led to the forma-
tion of the rival Partido da Frente Liberal (Party of the Liberal Front,
PFL), conservative elements dispersed to form a multiplicity of parties.
The largest of these were the PFL and the PDS (which, following mergers
with the center-right Partido Democrata Cristão [Christian Democratic
Party, PDC] in ∞ΩΩ≥ and the Partido Progressista [Progressive Party, PP] in
∞ΩΩ∑ became, respectively, the Partido Progressista Reformador [Reform-
ist Progressive Party, PPR] and then the Partido Progressista Brasileiro
[Brazilian Progressive Party, PPB]). But during the ∞Ω∫∑–ΩΩ period a total
of sixteen other parties on the center-right and right of the partisan spec-
trum elected a member of the national congress or a governor or fielded a
presidential candidate who won at least ≤ percent of the valid vote.
Moreover, conservative politicians have demonstrated remarkably low
party loyalty, whether in comparison to leftist parties in Brazil or political
parties in most other countries. Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power
observe that divisions within the Right do not follow clear ideological or
programmatic lines; indeed, there appear to be only minor issue differ-
ences among Brazil’s many conservative parties. As a consequence, party
identification is weaker with conservative parties than with leftist parties,
and party mergers and party switching are very common. For example, of
the ≤∑π deputies elected in ∞ΩΩ≠ on conservative party tickets, there were
≤≠∞ instances of party switching between ∞ΩΩ∞ and ∞ΩΩ∑.
One of the most striking aspects of Brazilian conservatives’ post-∞Ω∫∑
experience was that, despite considerable electoral success, there was little
evidence of national party building. In marked contrast to the Right’s
efforts to strengthen national party organizations in Chile and El Sal-
vador, most Brazilian conservative parties retained a strong identification
with particular regions. For example, the PFL (the conservative party with
the largest representation in congress between ∞Ω∫∏ and ∞ΩΩ∫) was not a
significant electoral presence outside the Northeast until ∞ΩΩ∫. Although
some center-right and rightist parties expanded their geographic base dur-
ing the ∞ΩΩ≠s, most did not. As a result, it was common for some parties
to dominant the political scene in particular states and have virtually no
presence at all in others.
The Right’s electoral strength during the late ∞Ω∫≠s and ∞ΩΩ≠s rested
primarily on conservative forces’ continuing capacity to use clientelist
ties and patronage-based networks to mobilize a multiclass constituency.
Through an exhaustive analysis of survey data concerning the characteris-
tics of party identifiers and an examination of electoral results, Mainwar-