William Co vs.

New Prosperity Plastic Products

June 30, 2014 G.R. No. 183994

FACTS:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a complaint for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner William Co. In the absence of Uy and
the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed in June 9, 2003. Uy received a copy
of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day
after. On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to revive the Criminal Cases which
was granted. Co filed a petition challenging the revival of the criminal cases. Assuming that the
criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended
party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court’s issuance of
the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Even assuming that the one-
year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003, when Uy received the June 9,
2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.

ISSUES: 1) Whether the one-year time bar of their revival is computed from issuance of the
order of provisional dismissal
2) Whether the actual number of days in a year is the basis for computing the one-year time bar.

HELD: 1) The dismissal of the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9,
2003 Order and not after notice of the offended party. However, the second paragraph of the new
rule should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year
after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution
without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to
comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
2) The Court, taking into account 2004 as a leap year, still hold the motion to revive the criminal
cases against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a
regular year or a leap year.

SPOUSES Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97973, January 27, 1992

FACTS:
In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on the decision made by
herein respondent Court of Appeals – sustaining the right of private respondent Pe to repurchase
a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands
acquired through free patent. Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB. The lot was developed into
commercial-industrial complex. Pe failed to pay the mortgage after more than 7 years, DPB
foreclosed the mortgage. Pe leased the lot to DPB; the former failed to redeem such property
within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe filed a case to repurchase.
The RTC and CA affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint
against CA, alleging, among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision regarding the five-
year period in foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge vs. Angeles and instead
relied on the ruling in Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) which was applied
retroactively.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the foreclosure sale
by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge vs. Angeles and instead applied retroactively
the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?

RULING:
Yes. At the time the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still the Monge case,
hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar. However, the respondent court
applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby rendering a decision in favour of the private
respondent. But the Supreme Court sustained the claims of the petitioners. The court said that
though they are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the court stressed
that: “while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Art 4 of the
Civil Code which states that “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided.”” Moreover, the Court emphasize that “when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and
a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively xxx.” Therefore
respondents cannot rely on the Belisario ruling because it should be applied prospectively and
not the contrary. CA erred in its decision regarding the case. Wherefore, such decision was
reversed and set aside.

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Hon. Jose Feliciano
G.R. No. L-24022, March 3, 1965

FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice,
thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of
the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was
approved. The President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency
authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an
invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners contend that the
importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that
there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452.

HELD:

NO. The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively
to private parties, thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. RA 2207 provides
that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as
to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the
President may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. The
two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different
circumstances. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative
expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to effect a repeal by
implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing
law, hence there was no repeal.