No. L-44570. May 30, 1986. Manuel Guerrero and Maria Guerrero, Petitioners, vs. Hon. Court of APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, Respondents

No. L-44570. May 30, 1986.
*
MANUEL GUERRERO and MARIA GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; “Share tenancy” defined.—The law defines “agricultural tenancy” as
the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally
possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce
or in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural Tenancy Act, as
amended.)
Same; Same.—With petitioner reference to this case, “share tenancy” exists whenever
two persons agree on a joint undertaking
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 137

Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor,
with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in
proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).
Same; “Farmhand” or “Agricultural worker” defined.—In contrast, a farmhand or
agricultural laborer is “any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited to a
farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise, and
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current
agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially
equivalent and regular employment” (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
Same; Statutes; Contracts; An agreement which states that the rights and obligations of
a person allowed by the landowner to cultivate and take care of his coconut farm, shall be
governed by R.A. 1199, is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of said law by R.A. 3844,
which abolished share tenancy and which does not include coconut lands, inasmuch as the
vested rights of a share tenant to security of tenure would be adversely affected thereby.—On
August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead
the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending
Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. On the
basis of this national policy, the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case
at bar and the lower court’s committed grave error in upholding the respondent’s status as
share tenant in the petitioners’ landholding. The petitioners’ arguments are regressive and,
if followed, would turn back the advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement not
only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers. The
phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere
farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is important to note that the
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844)
have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same
have been substantially modified by the latter. However, even assuming such an abrogation
of the law, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed
statute is a mere general principle. Among the established exceptions are when vested rights
are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 108
SCRA 481).
Same; Mere fact that a person was not the one who seeded the land with coconuts does
not mean that he could not be a tenant thereof.—Cultivation is another important factor in
determining the existence of tenancy relationships. It is admitted that it had been one
Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally cleared the land in question and planted
the coconut trees, with the respondent coming to work in the landholding only after the same
were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually
seeded the land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation
is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion
of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the
earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike
rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely
dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the
surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred
years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-
bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the
coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The
fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farmwork from
clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired
laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer.
Same; Added indication of share tenancy is sharing in the harvest.—Further indicating
the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent is their
agreement to share the produce or harvest on a “tercio basis” that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in
favor of the petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive indication of the existence of
tenancy relations per se, the sharing of harvests,
139
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 139

taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the
case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant.
Same; Contracts; Use of the word “tenant” in the contract to cultivate a coconut farm
indicates that the cultivator is a “share tenant” and not a “farmhand” or “worker”.—The
petitioners, however, contend that the word “tenant” in the aforequoted agreement was used
to mean a hired laborer or farm employee as understood and agreed upon by the parties. The
fact that their relationship would be guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines militates against such an assertion. It would be
an absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to govern an employeremployee relationship. If as the
petitioners insist a meaning other than its general acceptation had been given the word
“tenant”, the instrument should have so stated. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the
respondent could not be said to have misconstrued the same. In clear and categorical terms,
the private respondent appears to be nothing else but a tenant.
Same; Statutory abolition of share tenancy did not end the rights of share tenants in
coconut and sugar lands even if leasehold tenancy in these types of lands has not yet been
installed.—Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent’s right
as share tenant do not end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to “uplift the
farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant, strong
and responsible citizens x x x active participants in nation-building”, agricultural share
tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status
of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the government program of land reform.
It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been
implemented. The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its
application and the consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted.
Nonetheless, wherever it may be implemented, the eventual goal of having strong and
independent farmers working on lands which they own remains. The petitioners’ arguments
which would use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or
eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
A.D. Guerrero for petitioners.
Bureau of Legal Assistance for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero,
et al and Apolinario Benitez, et al as to determine their respective rights and
obligations to one another is the issue in this petition to review the decision of the
then Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed in toto
the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 6793-NE (SA-Q) ’73,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. “(1)ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to reinstate plaintiff

Apolinario Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare coconut holding in
question, located at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora Subprovince Quezon and to
maintain said plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof, with all
the rights accorded and obligations imposed upon him by law;
2. “(2)ordering defendants Paulino and Rogelio both surnamed Latigay, to vacate the
said ten-hectare portion and deliver possession thereof to plaintiff Apolinario
Benitez;
3. (3)ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay damages to
plaintiffs in the amount of P14,911.20 beginning from July, 1973 and to pay the same
amount every year thereafter until plaintiff is effectively reinstated to the ten-
hectare portion;
4. (4)denying plaintiff-tenants’ prayer for reconstruction of the copra-cottage; and
5. (5)ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay plaintiff the
amount of P200.00 by way of litigation expenses.
“All other claims of the parties are denied. With costs against defendants-spouses.”
The petitioners adopt the respondent court’s findings of fact excepting, however, to
its conclusion that tenancy relations exist between the petitioners and the
respondents, thus:
“In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants-
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VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 141
spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing
within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora,
Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within
the plantation where he and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was
made to clean the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do
such other similar chores. During harvest time which usually comes every three months, he
was also made to pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the
21-hectare plantation. He had to husk and split the nuts and then process its meat into copra
in defendants’ copra kiln. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds
from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid
P500 a year.
“Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from the
10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts.
He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the
Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacañang, Manila. This led to an
execution of an agreement, now marked as Exh. D, whereby defendants agreed, among
others, to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and
that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1199. The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philip-pines.
“Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare
portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom.
Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to
do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also
caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where plaintiff and his family lived, thus,
making plaintiffs feel that they (defendants) meant business. Hence, this case for
reinstatement with damages.
“The lower court formulated four (4) issues by which it was guided in the resolution of the
questions raised by the pleadings and evidence and we pertinently quote as follows:
1. “(1)Whether or not plaintiff is the tenant on the coconut land-holding in question

consisting of sixteen (16) hectares;
2. “(2)In the affirmative, whether or not he was unlawfully dispossessed of ten (10)
hectares thereof;
142
1. (3)Whether or not the parties are entitled to actual and moral damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.”
This petition for review poses the following questions of law:

I
“Whether or not with the passage of Presidential Decree 1038 only last October 21, 1976,
Republic Act 6389 otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms has repealed in their
entirety the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) and the Agricultural Reform Code
(Republic Act 3844) abrogating or nullifying therefore all agricultural share tenancy
agreements over all kinds of lands, as the one involved in the case at bar—over coconut
plantation—and hence, the complaint below as well as the challenged decision by the courts
below, based as they are on such share tenancy agreements, have lost their validity cessante
ratio legis, cessat ipsa lex.
II
“Assuming arguendo that said laws have not thus been repealed, is respondent Benitez
here-under the undisputed fact of the case as found by the courts below a share tenant within
the purview of the said laws, i.e., Republic Acts 1199 and 3844, or a mere farmhand or farm
worker as such relationship were extensively discussed in Delos Reyes v. Espinelli, 30 SCRA
574.” (Copied verbatim from Petition, p. 31—rollo)
Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who
was dismissed as an employee from the landholding in question and not ousted
therefrom as tenant. Whether a person is a tenant or not is basically a question of
fact and the findings of the respondent court and the trial court are, generally,
entitled to respect and non-disturbance.
The law defines “agricultural tenancy” as the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or
in money, or
143
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 143
in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended.)
With petitioner reference to this case, “share tenancy” exists whenever two persons
agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes
the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several
of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to
be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions (Sec 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is “any agricultural salary or piece
worker but is not limited to a farm-worker of a particular farm employer unless this
Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor
practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
employment” (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
The petitioners contend that the two courts below applied erroneous definitions of
“tenancy” found in repealed laws. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
the Agricultural Land Reform Code have been superseded by the Code of Agrarian
Reforms, Rep. Act 6389, which the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to cite
and apply.
There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms seeks to
abolish agricultural share tenancy as the basic relationship governing farmers and
landowners in the country.
On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and
put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic
Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as
contrary to public policy. On the basis of this national policy, the petitioner asserts
that no cause of action exists in the case at bar and the lower court’s committed grave
error in upholding the respondent’s status as share tenant in the petitioners’
landholding.
144
The petitioners’ arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the
advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement not only towards the leasehold
system but towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing out of share
tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or
hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.
It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the
Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same have been substantially modified
by the latter.
However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of
a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute is a mere general
principle. Among the established exceptions are when vested rights are affected and
obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 481).
The records establish the private respondents’ status as agricultural tenants
under the legal definitions.
Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the land-holding continuously from
1969 until he was ejected from it. Such possession of longstanding is an essential
distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning
of the tenancy law (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition), a tenant being
one who has the temporary use and occupation of land or tenements belonging to
another (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 3254) for the purpose of production (Sec.
3, Republic Act 1199; delos Reyes v. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574). Respondent Benitez
lives on the landholding. He built his house as an annex to the petitioner’s copra kiln.
A hired laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the
same upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more consistent
with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law.
Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy
relationships. It is admitted that it had
145
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 145
been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally cleared the land in
question and planted the coconut trees, with the respondent coming to work in the
landholding only after the same were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it was
not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the land does not mean that he is
not a tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the
tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the
care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by
general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike
rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes
are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed
in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted
only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when
the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or
smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding
and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez,
together with his family, handles all phases of farmwork from clearing the
landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired
laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm
laborer. (delos Reyes v. Espinelli, supra; Marcelo v. de Leon, 105 Phil. 1175).
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondent is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a “tercio basis” that
is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive
indication of the existence of tenancy relations per se, the sharing of harvests, taken
together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case
at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant. The case
of delos Reyes v. Espinelli (supra) clearly explains the matter thus:
“The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or
wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant
par-
146
ticipates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of
harvest.”
Hence, the lower court’s computation of damages in favor of respondent based on the
number of normal harvests. In most cases, we have considered the system of sharing
produce as convincing evidence of tenancy relations.
The petitioners entered into an agreement on May 2, 1973 which in clear and
categorical terms establishes respondent as a tenant, to wit:
AGREEMENT
“This agreement entered into by and between Manuel Guerrero hereinafter referred to as the
landowner and Apolinario Benitez hereinafter referred to as tenant.”
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners, however, contend that the word “tenant” in the aforequoted
agreement was used to mean a hird laborer or farm employee as understood and
agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their relationship would be guided by the
provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines
militates against such an assertion. It would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199
to govern an employer-employee relationship. If as the petitioners insist a meaning
other than its general acceptation had been given the word “tenant”, the instrument
should have so stated. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the respondent could
not be said to have misconstrued the same. In clear and categorical terms, the private
respondent appears to be nothing else but a tenant.
Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners’ counsel of the respondent’s status
as tenant:
“ATTY. ESTEBAN:
“Q You said you are living at San Joaquin, who cause
the sowing of the lumber you made as annex in the
house?
“ATTY. NALUNDASAN:
“Please remember that under the law, tenant is
given the
147
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 147
right to live in the holding in question. We admit him as tenant.
xxx xxx xxx
(Apolinario Benitez on Redirect, TSN, June 25, 1974, pp. 49-50).
The respondent’s status as agricultural tenant should be without question.

Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue
working until such relationship is extinguished according to law.
The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199), the Agricultural Land
Reform Code of 1963 (Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic
Act 6389) and Presidential Decree 1038 (Strengthening the Security of Tenure of
Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands) all provide for the
security of tenure of agricultural tenants. Ejectment may be effected only for causes
provided by law, to wit:
1. “1)Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms and conditions of
the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;
2. “2)The tenant’s failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder’s share
unless the tenant’s failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;
3. “3)Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the
agreement of the parties;
4. “4)Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices;
5. “5)Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;
6. “6)Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family
or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate
family.” (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).
None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been
unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian
Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant and grant-
148
ing him damages therefor.
Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent’s right as
share tenant do not end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to “uplift
the farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified, self-
reliant, strong and responsible citizens x x x active participants in nation-building”,
agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step
towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the
government program of land reform.
It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been
implemented. The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its
application and the consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has to be
enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it may be implemented, the eventual goal of having
strong and independent farmers working on lands which they own remains. The
petitioners’ arguments which would use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code
as the basis for setting back or eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no
merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
appellate court is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Alampay, Paras and Cruz,** JJ., concur.
Feria, J., no part.

Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.
Notes.—Persons who are not tenants on the property are not covered by
Presidential Decree No. 316 which prohibits the ejectment of tenant-farmers in
agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn. (Geronimo vs. Court of
Appeals, 121 SCRA 859.)
The intention of Code of Agrarian Reform is to establish
_______________
** Cruz, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division under Special Order No. 10 dated April 23,
1986.
149
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 149

Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
ownership-cultivation and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Filipino
agriculture and to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices. (Patricio vs. Boyog, 112 SCRA 41.)
No. L-23785. November 27, 1975. *
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs. ELIAS ADILLO,

defendant-appellee.
Agrarian law; Sharehold and leasehold systems in agriculture are distinct from each
other.—The two tenancy systems are distinct and different from each other. In sharehold, the
tenant may choose to
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
91
VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 91
People vs. Adillo
shoulder, in addition to labor, any one or more of the items of contributions (such as farm
implements, work animals, final harrowing, transplanting), while in leasehold, the tenant or
lessee always shoulders all items of production except the land. Under the sharehold system,
the tenant and the landholder are co-managers, whereas in leasehold system, the tenant is
the sole manager of the farmholding. Finally, in sharehold tenancy, the tenant and the
landholder divide the harvest in proportion to their contributions, while in leasehold tenancy,
the tenant or lessee gets the whole produce with the mere obligation to pay a fixed rental.
Same; Notice of reaping or threshing not required under a leasehold system.—There is
thus justification for the view that notice for reaping or threshing is not required by the Act
in leasehold system, because the lessee’s principal obligation is to pay the rental, which is to
deliver a generic thing in the absence of any specific agreement to the contrary, and that the
rental is supposed to be a specific amount, as fixed and limited in Section 45 of the Act,
Without any legal obligation imposed on the lessee to give such notice, the lessor should take
it upon himself to verify from the tenant-lessee the date of reaping and threshing.
Same; Omission in R.A. 3844 of provision in Section 89 of R.A. 1199 penalizing the
reaping or threshing of produce previous to dale net therefor operates as an implied repeal of
said provision.—It will be noted that Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (R.A.
1199) which prohibits either the tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or
thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing and
penalizing any violation thereof by either party is no longer found in the Agricultural Land
Reform Code (R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6389) for the obvious reason that agricultural
share tenancy provided in the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has already been abolished
by the new Code. The omission of such provision as Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954 in the new Code operates as an implied repeal of said provision.
Same; Reaping of threshing of palay without notice to landowner by a share tenant is no
longer an offense.—Specifically Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. 1199), upon
which the accusatory pleading against defendant-appellee is predicted, is no longer carried
in the subsequent agrarian laws and decrees and its violation thereof considered no longer
an offense. As a result it would be illogical to prosecute or sentence defendant-appellee for
sack offense which no longer exists.
Same; Courts hare no jurisdiction to try and convict persons charged with pre-reaping or
pre-threshing under Agricultural
92
People vs. Adillo
Tenancy Act of 1954.—The whole failure of the laws and decrees subsequent to the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 to penalize the acts of pre-reaping and pre-threshing which
constituted the offense defined and penalized under the said Section 39 carries with it the
deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with its
violations.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Alberto J.

Francisco, J.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Padfico P. de
Castro and Solicitor Alejandro B. Afurong for plaintiff-appellant.
Ernesto S. Tengco for defendant-appellee.
MARTIN, J.:
The decisive question presented to Us in this direct appeal from the dismissal
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in its Criminal Case SC-663 is
whether or not the penal liability of a share-tenant for pre-reaping or pre-threshing
under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199, enacted on August 30,
1954) has been obliterated by the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No.
3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) and the subsequent agrarian laws.
The defendant-appellee Elias Adillo was a share-tenant of one Saturnino L.
Rebong on a parcel of riceland situated at Victoria, Laguna. On January 4, 1962, he
was charged before the Court of First Instance of Laguna for violation of Section 39
of the Agricultural Tenancy Act in that:
“(O)n or about October 3, 1960 in the Municipality of Victoria, Province of Laguna, Republic
of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-
named being then the tenant of a piece of land owned by Saturnino L. Rebong under a share
system, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously reap and thresh a portion of
palay planted on said piece of land without the knowledge and consent of Saturnino Rebong
and even before a date has been fixed for the reaping and threshing of the palay, to the
damage and prejudice of Saturnino Rebong,”
On August 24, 1964, the counsel for the defendant-appellee moved for the quashal of
1
the information on the submission
_______________
1Defendant-appellee was never arraigned, because his whereabouts were unknown, Brief, plaintiff-
appellant, p. 2.
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VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 93
People vs. Adillo
that the Agricultural Tenancy Act, on which the accusatory pleading against
defendant-appellee was based, has been repealed or abrogated by the new
Agricultural Land Reform Code, thereby resulting in the extinction of defendant-
appellee’s criminal responsibility for pre-reaping and pre-threshing under the former
law. The lower court favorably resolved the motion and ordered the dismissal of the
case.
Hence, the present appeal interposed by the State.
The particular provision of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, subject of this litigation,
provides:
“SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing.—It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or
landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time
previous to the date set for its threshing; * * * Any violation of this section by either party
shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general
provisions of law applicable to the act committed,”
In Beltran v. Cruz the Court expressed that although the tenant is given the right
2
under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to determine when to reap the harvest, it is
likewise provided under the Act that the reaping “shall be after due notice to the
landholder” (Section 36, paragraph 1). Pre-reaping or prethreshing is considered a
serious violation, subject to the sanction of dispossession of the tenant (Section 50,
subsection b) and the penalty of a “fine not exceeding Two Thousand Pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court” (Section
57). The “moving idea behind the requirement of the advance notice of the reaping,
and the prohibition of doing it in advance of the date set,” said the Court, “is to enable
the landholder to witness, personally or by representative, the reaping and threshing
operations. Prereaping in the absence of one party, due to unilateral advancing of the
date of the harvest, inevitably generates ill feeling and strains relations between
landholder and tenant due to the suspicion aroused that part of the harvest may have
been illegally diverted. Such suspicion tends to poison the tenancy relation and is
inimical to agricultural peace and progress; wherefore, strict compliance with the
legal and contractual prescriptions as to the date of reaping and threshing are of the
essence of the statutory policy.” This applies particularly to rice share tenancy and
may not be extended to embrace the
_______________
2L-20973, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 611, 612.

94
People vs. Adillo
agricultural leasehold. The two tenancy systems are distinct and different from each
other. In sharehold, the tenant may choose to shoulder, in addition to labor, any one
or more of the items of contributions (such as farm implements, work animals, final
harrowing, transplanting), while in leasehold, the tenant or lessee always shoulders
all items of production except the land. Under the sharehold system, the tenant and
the landholder are co-managers, whereas in leasehold system, the tenant is the sole
manager of the farmholding. Finally, in sharehold tenancy, the tenant and the
landholder divide the harvest in proportion to their contributions, while in leasehold
tenancy, the tenant or lessee gets the whole produce with the mere obligation to pay
a fixed rental. There is thus justification for the view that notice for reaping or
3
threshing is not required by the Act in leasehold system, because the lessee’s
principal obligation is to pay the rental, which is to deliver a generic thing in the
absence of any specific agreement to the contrary, and that the rental is supposed to
be a specific amount, as fixed and limited in Section 45 of the Act. Without any legal
obligation imposed on the lessee to give such notice, the lessor should take it upon
himself to verify from the tenant-lessee the date of reaping and threshing, 4
On August 8, 1961, the Tenancy Act of 19-54 was amended by the Agricultural
Land Reform Code. Agricultural share tenancy was declared “to be contrary to public
policy and shall be abolished.” Nonetheless, based on transitory provision in the first
5
proviso of Section 4 of the Code, existing share tenancy
_______________
3 See Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation, Vol. 2, 1964 ed., p. 208.
4 Manubay v. Martin, L-25846, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 733-735, citing Vol. 3, Montemayor, 2d., pp. 133-
135.
5 “Sec. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy.—Agricultural share tenancy, as herein defined, is
hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and shall be ‘abolished: Provided, That existing share tenancy
contracts may continue in force and effect in any region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the
pertinent provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the end
of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council proclaims that all the government
machineries and agencies in that region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this Code are
operating, unless such contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner exercises his option to
elect the leasehold system; * * *.”
95
VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 95
People vs. Adillo
contracts were allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect, notwithstanding
their express abolition, until whichever or the following events occurs earlier: (a) the
end of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council makes the
proclamation declaring the region or locality a land reform area; or (b) the shorter
period provided in the share tenancy contracts express; or (c) the share tenant sooner
exercises his option to elect the leasehold system. 6
In the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act No. 6389), which took effect on
September 10, 1971 agricultural share tenancy throughout the country was declared
contrary to public policy and was automatically converted to agricultural leasehold
upon the effectivity of Section 4 thereof although existing share tenancy contracts
were again allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect in any region or
locality, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act
No. 1199, as amended, ‘‘until the end of the agricultural year when the President of
the Philippines shall have organized by executive order the Department of Agrarian
Reform in accordance with the provisions of this amendatory Act, unless such
contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner exercises his option to elect
the leasehold system.” 7
Immediately after the declaration of martial law, the President of the Philippines
issued Presidential Decree No. 2 on September 26, 1972, proclaiming the entire
country “as a land reform area.” The proclamation of the entire country “as a land
reform area” in accordance with the first proviso of Section 4 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, as amended, unqualifiedly abolished the sharehold system in the
Philippine agricultural life. To the extreme, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 was
withdrawn from the mass of living agrarian laws specifically in rice and corn tenancy.
On October 21, 1972 the President issued Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipating
the tenant from the bondage of the soil. To safeguard this new right of the tenancy,
Presidential Decree No. 316 of October 22, 1973, was promulgated, interdicting the
ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding until the
promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing the said Presidential
_______________
6Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo, L-25326, 25327, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 110, 111.
7Section 1, RA 6389, 68 OG No. 5, 915, January 31, 1972.
96
People vs. Adillo
Decree No. 27. 8
It will, be noted that Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic
Act No. 1199) which prohibited either the tenant or landholder, without mutual
consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set
for its threshing and penalized any violation thereof by either party is no longer found
in the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389) for the obvious reason that agricultural share tenancy
provided in the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has already been abolished by the
new Code. The omission of such provision as Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954 in the new Code operates as an implied repeal of said provision. It is a
well settled principle of statutory construction that when
“An act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain, operates as repeal of
(my thing omitted which was contained in the old act. and not included in the amendatory
act.” (Construction of Statutes, Crawford, p. 621, citing State v. Mac Cafferty, 25 Okla. 2, 105
Pac. 992).
Also,
“Where the language of the statute as amended is set out in full in an act the old law is not
repealed except as to those parts omitted which are inconsistent with the amendment, the
remainder of the act being a continuation of the original law. (Idem, citing People v.
Montgomery County, 67 N. Y. 109; Reid v. Smoulter, 128 Pa. St. 324, 18 Atl. 445, 5 A.L.R.
517)
Likewise,
“When the legislature declares that an existing statute shall be amended, the legislature
thereby evinces the intention to make the new statute a substitute for the amended statute
exclusively and only those portions of the amended statute repeated in the new one are
retained (Idem, at p. 620, citing State ex rel Nagle v. Leader Co., 97 Mont. 586, 37 Pac. (2)
561).
Thus confronted with the issue as to whether or not the penal liability of a share
tenancy for pie-reaping or pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act
(Republic Act No. 1199) enacted on August 30, 1954 has been obliterated by the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389) and the subsequent
_______________
8Section 1, PD 316.
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VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 97
People vs. Adillo
Presidential Decrees and Proclamations, the solution to the issue seems to be clear
that the injunction against pre-reaping and pre-threshing under the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of 1954 has lost its operative force and effect, and the penal sanction
therein subdued. Specifically, Section 39 of the Act, upon which the accusatory
pleading against defendant-appellee is predicted, is no longer carried in the
subsequent agrarian laws and decrees and its violation thereof considered no longer
an offense. As a result it would be illogical to prosecute or sentence defendant-
appellee for such offense which no longer exists.9
The whole failure of the laws and decrees subsequent to the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954 to penalize the acts of prereaping and pre-threshing which constituted
the offense defined and penalized under the said Section 39 carries with it the
deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged
with its violations. 10
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the information against defendant-

appellee for violation of Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No.
1199) is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Castro (Chairman), Esguerra and Munoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., in the result.
Mukmiar, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
MAKASIAR, J., Concurring:
The basic reason for this concurrence is that the penal provision in Section 57 in
relation to Sections 39 and 50 (b) of Republic Act No. 1199 does violence to the
constitutional guarantee of social justice enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the
Declaration of Principles of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, as well as Section 6 of
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 9 of Article II of the 1973
Constitution on the duty of the State to afford protection to labor. The challenged
penal provision, although not directly impugned as unconstitutional by the pleadings,
should not escape condemnation by this Court, which has the function to enforce the
constitutional guarantees
_______________
9People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225.

People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil, 1008 (1947).
10
98
People vs. Adillo
of social justice and protection to labor, including the lowly tenants, whenever the
occasion demands. The constitutional issue remains inescapable despite the
enactment of the 1963 Agricultural Law Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844), which merely
raises a doubt as to the continued effectivity of the questioned penal provision of
Republic Act No. 1199. Said penal provision is apparently land-owner oriented. It is
cruel for the State to punish a hungry tenant for pre-threshing or pre-harvesting
without prior notice to the landowner. Pre-threshing or pre-harvesting in order to
enable himself and his family to eat, strikes at the very lives of the tenant and his
family, thus at their basic human right to survive. On the other hand, the risk on the
part of the landowner when his tenant does not give him prior advice as to threshing
or harvesting, involves merely loss at most of a couple of sacks or cavans of palay or
rice, which to the landowner is merely a loss of property rights, which does not
impinge upon his right to live. It has been axiomatic and sanctified by decisions of
this Court that human right must always prevail over property right.
A penalty of a “fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both, in the discretion of the Court” for pre-threshing or pre-reaping without
prior notice to the landowner (Sec. 57, R.A. 1199), is greater than the penalty for theft
of not exceeding P200.00 under paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code. Certainly, a tenant cannot be convicted of theft for such pre-
threshing or pre-reaping for his family consumption a portion of the palay produced
by him because the same is merely chargeable against his share under Republic Act
No. 1199.
As aforestated, the penalty thus prescribed by Republic Act No. 1199 for pre-
threshing or pre-reaping without prior notice to the landlord can be characterized as
a cruel and unjust punishment when applied to an impoverished tenant for whose
welfare the constitutional provision on social justice has been designed in order to
remove ancient inequities which have spawned violent and bloody internecine strife
in our country for decades.
Hence, my vote for the acquittal of the accused herein, since the penal provision in
Republic Act No. 1199 nullifies his right to live.
Order affirmed.
99
VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 99
Evangelista vs. Jarencio
Notes.—Section 36 of the Land Reform Code, R.A. 3844, created in favor of an
agricultural lessee a substantive right to continue in the enjoyment and possession
of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by a court
judgment that is final and executory. (Quilantang vs. Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA 294).
The principle of social justice underlying the Agricultural Tenancy Act is to
translate into reality the dream envisioned by the late President Ramon Magsaysay
that he who has less in life should have more in law. The right of the tenant to change
from one crop sharing arrangement to another is guaranteed to him by Section 14 of
R.A. 1199, as amended, and the initiative and decision to effect that change lies with
him. Any desire of the agricultural tenant to effect a change so as to improve his
economic condition and lighten his financial burden is to be given all the
encouragement possible under the law and in this retard the judicial branch of the
government has its bounden duty not to permit technicalities to stand as roadblocks
to the enjoyment of the tenant’s rights. (Andres vs. De Santos, 55 SCRA 624).
No. L-27797. August 26, 1974. *
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-

appellant.
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished from
agricultural tenancy.—There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a
civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that
of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the
law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land,
whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to
purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law
lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil
law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special
laws.
Agricultural Tenancy Act; A fishpond is an agricultural land.—There is no doubt that
the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act,
which refers to “agricultural land”, specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the
consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46 (c) of said Act provides that “the
consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the
raising of livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties.” This Court has
already ruled that “land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land.”
Same; Words and phrases; Meaning of phrase “immediate farm household."—Only the
members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant
or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the
farm enterprise are included in the term “immediate farm household.”
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked by tenant or
immediate farm household.—The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate
family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act 1199, as amended, defines a
“tenant” as a person who, himself and with the aid available from
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
591
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 591

Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of production sharing
the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder
a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section
8 of the same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes
the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available
from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for
the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household work
the land.
Same; A person who hires others to do work ceases to be a tenant.—A person, in order to
be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm
household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot
be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the
land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned, the land as tenant within the
meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and
privileges of one.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Pasicolan, J.
The f acts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant.
Armando M. Laki for movant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals for the reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved.
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29, 1972,
Atty. Virgilio M. Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, gave notice to
this Court that said appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was survived by his children,
who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano
Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan de Avante. For the purposes of
this case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted by his heirs
herein named. 591
592
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with this
Court advising that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and was
survived by her heirs and successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel,
married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel, married to
Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and Pablo O. Gabriel,
and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by her heirs herein named.
By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for substitution was granted.
In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the Court of
Appeals made the following findings, which We adopt:
“On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond situated
in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and measuring about 169,507 square meters; that
sometime during the last war she entered into an oral contract of lease thereof with the
defendant on a year to year basis, i.e., from January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200,
plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance in the month of January; that
desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond by herself, she notified the defendant in a letter
dated June 26, 1957 that she was terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957; that
upon request of the defendant, she extended the lease for another year; that on November
19, 1958 she again wrote the defendant that he should surrender possession of the fishpond
on January 1, 1959, which demand he however ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the
defendant be ordered to restore the possession of the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200,
plus the amount of real estate taxes, a year from 1959, attorney’s fees and costs.
“The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the Court of Agrarian Relations,
there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon
opposition by the plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant thereafter filed his answer
with counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the land in question was originally leased to him,
also verbally, by the plaintiff’s father, Potenciano Gabriel, in 1923 for as long as the defendant
wanted subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and
the part which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense which would be reimbursed
by
593
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 593
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease for whatever cause; that when
the plaintiff became the owner of the property through inheritance, she told the defendant
that she would honor her father’s contract with the defendant, and likewise assured him that
he could continue leasing the property, whose original rental of P400.00 a year had been
progressively increased to P1,200.00, for as long as he wanted since she was not in a position
to attend to it personally. As a special defense, the defendant reiterated the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance of the case.
“On February 12,1962 the trial court issued an order hereinbelow quoted in full:
‘The plaintiff seeks to eject the defendant from the fishpond described in the complaint which is under
lease to the said defendant, who, however, refuses to vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction
of this Court contending that the action should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations,
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of leasehold tenancy.
‘After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, the parties
were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take cognizance of
the case.
‘It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who originally leased
it from the father of the plaintiff, Upon the death of the said father, the fishpond was inherited by the
plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and is registered in her name. It contains an area of
169,507.00 square meters. The rental is on a yearly basis.
‘It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the
aforecited fishpond since 1956 he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took
over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his
instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of
Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the
dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived separately
since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near the fishpond, the other children
of the defendant are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest—all residing in Manila. None
of these persons has been seen working on the fishpond.
‘The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which we enter this order.
‘After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions
594
of the Tenancy Law, Republic Act No. 1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as amended, it seems clear
that his case does not fall within the purview of said Act. The lease contract is manifestly a civil lease
governed by the New Civil Code. Considering the area of the fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the
fact that neither the defendant, who is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is personally
cultivating the fishpond or through the employment of mechanical farm implements, and the further
fact that the persons named above are not members of the immediate farm household of the defendant,
the conclusion is that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined
by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended.
‘We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide this case. After this order has become final, the plaintiff may request for the setting of the initial
trial.’
The defendant does not contest the findings of facts therein made by the trial court.
“After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the merits, decision was rendered
wherein the trial court, pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil Code, fixed the period of the
lease up to June 30, 1964, the defendant on said date to surrender possession of the fishpond
to the plaintiff and to pay the rentals due the latter. The plaintiff, on her part, was required
upon surrender of possession to her, to pay the defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as
reimbursement of the expenses he incurred in improving the fishpond, and upon failure by
either party to pay the amount due the other, the same would bear interest at the legal rate
until full payment is made.
“A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to this Court and
assigned the following errors:
1. 1.The lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as
that of a civil lease, in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines and not a
leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. 2.The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction, the case being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep.
Act. No. 1199 as amended.
3. 3.The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of the appellant particularly the
basis for the expenditure for the development of the fishpond in question.
4. 4.The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of
595
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 595
1. the appellant in the measely amount of one thousand pesos for reimbursement and
for seven hundred pesos for the cost of the floodgate.
“Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff leased the fishpond
to the defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual rental payable at the end of the
year (Exhibit C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3). It is likewise undisputed
that the work in the fishpond consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow
or if algae would not grow, getting some from the river and putting them in the fishpond,
changing the dirty water with fresh water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of
fingerlings and attending to them; that these were done by defendant, with some help; that
he personally attended to the fishpond until 1956 when he became ill; that thereafter his
nephew Bernardo Cayanan, who was living with him, helped in the work to be done in the
fishpond and his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management, conveying his
instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4–8, Magat).
“Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between the parties
is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,
pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is therefore within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, maintains in effect that since defendant has ceased to work the fishpond personally or
with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No.
1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and
become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
“It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the interpretation
of cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or with the aid of the members of
his immediate farm household." 1
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of Appeals which,
as a general rule, bind this Court. 2
1. 1.Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First,
________________
1Record, pages 63–68.

2Tolentino vs. De Jesus, L-32797, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 167, 171–172; Evangelista & Co. vs. Abad
Santos, L-31684, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 416, 423; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, L-27488, June 30. 1970, 33
SCRA 737, 743; Ramirez Telephone Corp. vs. Bank of America, L-22614, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 191,198.
596
1. was the relationship between the appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy
or a civil law lease?
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease.
The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil
law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the
law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the
agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work
the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. 3
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the
following requisites must concur:
1. 1.That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. 2.That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household;
3. 3.That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the
aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household;
4. 4.That the land belongs to another; and
5. 5.That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount
in money or in produce or in both. 4
Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?

There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond
and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to “agricultural land”, specifically
mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section
46 (c) of said Act provides that “the consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds,
saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be governed by
stipulation
________________
3 Crisolito Pascual, Labor and Tenancy Relations Law, 3rd edition, page 492; Jeremias U.
Montemayor, Labor Agrarian and Social Legislation, 2nd edition, Vol. III, pages 534–535; Guillermo S.
Santos and Artemio C. Macalino, The Agricultural Land Reform Code, 1963 edition, page 300.
4 Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263.
597
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 597
between the parties”. This Court has already ruled that “land in which fish is
produced is classified as agricultural land." The mere fact, however, that a person
5
works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within
the purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee
unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.
Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has an
area of 169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The question of
whether such a big parcel of land is susceptible of being worked by the appellant’s
family or not has not been raised, and We see no need of tarrying on this point. So,
We pass to the third requisite, to wit, whether the tenant himself personally or with
the aid of his immediate family worked the land.
Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of
leasehold tenancy with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee’s father, such tenancy
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally
because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant’s
immediate farm household work the land in question. Only the members of the family
of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm
enterprise are included in the term “immediate farm household" The record shows
6
who helped work the land in question, and We quote:

“It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the
aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar
Pangilinan took over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the leased
property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and
Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the
laborers who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the
defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived separately since he
_________________
5 Tawatao vs. Garcia, L-17649, July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 566, 571, citing Molina vs. Rafferty, 36 Phil.,
167 and Banaag vs. Singson Encarnacion, 46 O.G. 4895.
6 Section 5 (o), Republic Act No. 1199.
598
got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near the fishpond, the other children
of the defendant are all professionals: a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest—all residing in
Manila. None of those persons has been seen working on the fishpond." 7
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land.
Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a “tenant” as a
person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s
consent for purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits
the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the
person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from
within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for
the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household
work the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy exists when a person, who either
personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of
cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm
household, belonging to, or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed
amount in money or in produce or in both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid
available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore,
who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires 8
others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is
considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5
and 8 of Republic Act No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges
of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo
_________________
7 Order of the lower court of February 12, 1962, Record on Appeal, pages 37–38.
8 De Guzman vs. Ungson, 93 Phil., 645, 647; Omega, et al. vs. Solidum, et al., 93 Phil. 457, 460.
599
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 599
that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this
case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations. 9
1. 2.Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that the

Court of First Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case at bar,
this being a case of civil law lease.
2. 3.We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned errors as
these are issues involving findings of facts which have been settled by the
lower court, and unless there is grave abuse of discretion, which we do not
find in the record of the case, We shall not venture to discuss the merits of the
factual findings of the court a quo.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original
parties, as named in this decision. In consonance with the decision of the lower court,
the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should deliver
the possession of the fishpond in question to the heirs and successors-in-interest of
appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee
Trinidad Gabriel the accrued rentals from January 1, 1960, at the rate of Pl,200.00 a
year, until the actual delivery of the possession of the fishpond as herein ordered,
with interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Decision affirmed.
Notes.—Abandonment by tenant. The act of an agricultural
________________
9 Dumlao vs. De Guzman, L-12816, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 144, 147; Lastimoza vs. Blanco, L-14697,
January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 231, 234; Tuvera vs. De Guzman, L-20547, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 729,
731; Casaria vs. Rosales, L-20288, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 368, 370.
600

Linsana Overland Trans. Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
tenant in leaving the land he was cultivating amount to abandonment of the
landholding, because a tenant has possession of landholding only through personal
cultivation, and such conduct constitutes a ground for the dispossession of the
tenant. Gagola vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-19740, Dec. 17, 1966.
Where respondent tenants left their landholding because of an agreement with the
landlord that the life of their tenancy relationship should subsist only during the
existence of the mortgage entered into between the landlord and a third person and
it was shown that petitioner landlord told the tenants that they had to leave because
the term had expired, such conduct of the landlord would not in itself constitute a
wrong since no force or threat was used, and in the absence of a finding that
respondent tenants left against their will or that they were forcibly turned out of the
premises, petitioner landlord may not be required to pay damages to his tenants by
virtue of Republic Act 1199 for the law merely gives the tenant the right to compel
the owner of the land to continue to employ him. Santiago vs. Calumpag, L-14615,
Oct. 31, 1964.
———o0o———
Nos. L-46281-83. August 19, 1988. *
COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA),

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO COSICO, HERMOGENES COSICO
and LUCAS COSICO, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199); Concept of Share Tenancy.—In
determining the nature of the relationship of the parties in the instant case, it would be well
to review the concept of a share tenant as against that of an agricultural worker. Share
tenancy or agricultural tenancy is defined as: “x x x the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or
to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money or in both (Section 3,
Republic Act 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended).” “x x x share tenancy exists
whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one
party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or
several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be
divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions.
(Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166 (25), RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).”
Same; Agricultural Land Reform Code; Agricultural Worker, defined; Employer-
employee relationship must exist between a farm employer and a farm worker.”—x x x. A ‘farm
worker’ is any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farm worker
of a particular farm employer unless this Code (Agricultural Land Reform Code, supplied)
explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not
obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment. The term includes ‘farm laborer
and/or farm employer.’ An ‘agricultural worker’ is not a whit different from a farm worker.
“From the definition of a ‘farm worker ‘thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
569
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 569

Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
(COCOMA) vs. Court of Appeals
should be an employer-employee relationship between the farm employer and the farm
worker. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements
that are generally considered are the following: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power
to control the employee’s conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important
index of the existence of relationship.”
Same; Same; Share Tenant and Agricultural worker, distin-guished.—Further, in one
case, the Court compared an agricultural worker with a share tenant, and set out the
following distinctions, among others, between the two: “x x x. The agricultural laborer works
for the farm employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether
the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the
agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest. “Since
the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and
employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the
other hand, the landholder has the ‘right to require the tenant to follow those proven farm
practices which have been found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and
to use fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the
requirements of the land.’ This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not the
control exercised by employer. x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; From the evidence adduced, it is clear that the private respondents
are not mere agricultural workers, but are share tenants of petitioners.—The record of this
case is bare of evidence to support the conclusion that the private respondents are mere
agricultural workers. Unlike ordinary laborers, respondents did not observe regular hours of
work. They did not work in shifts. Petitioner COCOMA could not even remember the number
of days that private respondents worked on the land for each agricultural year. While
petitioner kept a record of the full amount paid to respondents for each agricultural season,
it did not keep an accurate record of the actual number of days respondents reported for work.
The petitioner did not lay down regulations under which respondents were supposed to do
their work. Neither did petitioner prescribe the manner by which the private respondents
were to perform their duties as farmworkers. We do not find that degree of control and
570

ANNOTATED
supervision essential to the presence of an employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and respondents and before that, between Fule or Escudero, on the one hand and
respondent, on the other.
Same; Same; Cultivation is an important factor to determine the existence of share
tenancy. Cultivation, defined.—Now well-settled is the rule that cultivation is an important
factor in determining the existence of a share tenancy relationship. As to the meaning of
cultivation, this Court has already held that: “x x x. The definition of cultivation is not limited
merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion to growth
and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by
general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike the rice,
the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug
on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the
surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred
years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-
bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the
coconut trees applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The
fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farm work from
clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired
laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer.”
Same; Same; Same; Sharing of harvests, if taken together with the other factors
characteristic of tenancy, strengthens respondents’ claim that they are share tenants of
petitioners.—Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondents is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7
basis in favor of the petitioner COCOMA. Though not a decisive indication per se of the
existence of tenancy relationship, such sharing of the harvests, taken together with the other
factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim
of respondents that, indeed, they are tenants.
Same; RA 3844; Procedure; Sec. 155 of RA No. 3844 provides that, except expropriation
cases, the Court of Agrarian Relations shall not be bound strictly by technical rules.—
In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg,
571
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 571

this Court ruled: “Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not ‘restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the
order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said matter
for determination has been established by competent evidence during the hearing.’ ” Further,
R.A. 3844, Section 155, provides: “SEC. 155. Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. x x x
The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court: Provided, That in
the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy pending before
them, the Courts without impairing substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by the
technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in expropriation cases.”
Same; Words and Phrases; Landholder, defined.—Thus, assuming, without conceding,
that respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico are considered tenants of the land, petitioner
COCOMA submits that, being only an agent of defendants Fule and Escudero, it can not be
held liable for the acts of its principals. Petitioner’s contention is not in accordance with
applicable laws, because—“A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who,
either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the use or
cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system,
or a price certain or ascertainable under the leasehold system.” In accordance with the above
provision, petitioner COCOMA is the landholder of the subject landholdings for (a) it is a
“juridical person” being a domestic corporation established under the laws of the Philippines;
(b) it is the “legal possessor” of the land for it has the sole management and administration
thereof; (c) it has authorized or retained the private respondents to cultivate the land; and
(d) it has shared the harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully, making it appear that they
are laborers instead of tenants.
Same; Same; Same; A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in case of transfer
of legal possession of the subject property.—Further, in several cases, this Court sustained
the preservation of the landholder-tenant relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession:
“x x x in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship
between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being
of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the trans-
572

ANNOTATED
feree or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to
maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them
protection against unjustified dismissal from their holdings.” (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil. 675);
“x x x that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce obligation
incurred by the former landholder in relation to said land, for the reason that ‘such obligation
. . . falls upon the assignee or transferee of the land’ pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since
respondents are in turn free to proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it
is not iniquitous to hold them responsible to the tenant for said obligations. Moreover, it is
the purposes of Republic Act 1199, particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right of the
tenant to receive his lawful share of the produce of the land is unhampered by the transfer
of said land from one landholder to another.” (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154).
Therefore, petitioner, being a landholder, can be held liable to private respondents for their
shares in the coconuts harvested from the landholding in question.
Same; Evidence; Substantial evidence is all that is required in agrarian cases.—As to
the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private respondents’ thirty percent (30%)
share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made by the Court of Agrarian Relations and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, is erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from
such computation, as it is a part of the findings of fact and conclusions drawn therefrom by
the respondent appellate court. Such findings and conclusions should not be disturbed on
appeal, in the absence of proof that they are unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that
the Court of Appeals had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary. In Bagsican
v. Court of Appeals, it was held that: “x x x in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere
substantial evidence.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Gancayco, J.
F.M. Poonin & Associates, for petitioner.
Manuel A. Cordero, for respondents.
573
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 573
PADILLA, J.:
Petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated 19

**
May 1977, in CA G.R. No. SP-05096-R entitled “Pedro Cosico, Hermogenes Cosico,
and Lucas Cos-ico, plaintiffs-appellees versus Rosario Vda. de Fule, et al., defendants,
and Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. defendants-appellants,” which
affirmed the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, dated 26 January 1976, in
***
CAR Case Nos. 2236, 2237 and 2238, finding private respondents Pedro Cosico and
Hermogenes Cosico to be share tenants of the coconut landholdings of the petitioner.
The facts of the case:
The owners of the coconut land in question located in Bo. Imok, Calauan, Laguna,
consisting of fifteen (15) hectares, more or less, are the spouses Pedro Rulloda and
Salud Sanchez. Prior to, and including the years 1964 up to 1971, Rosario Paraiso
Vda. de Fule (Fule, hereafter) obtained legal possession of the land by virtue of a
yearly contract of sale (pakyaw) of all the coconut produce and other fruits from said
land. In 1972, Fule did not renew the contract but spouses (Pedro Rulloda and Salud
Sanchez) executed a similar contract with Eddie A. Escudero, which was renewed
every year until 1975. 1
During the period prior to 1964, Fule had utilized the services of Pedro,
Hermogenes and Lucas Cosico as caretakers over four (4) hectares each of the land
in question, paying them for their services in cash, which was equivalent to 1/7 of the
proceeds of the sale of coconuts harvested from the land they each caretook. As
caretakers, the Cosicos would check or visit said plantation to see whether there was
stealing in the plantation, and they would report to her (Fule). They lived in a place
about 2 and 1/2 kms. away from the land in question. They had no work animals to
cultivate the land with; they used bolos to clean and clear the land by cutting grass
and
_______________
** Penned by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco with the concurrence of Justices Venicio Escolin and Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.
*** Penned by Judge Alberto A. Reyes.
1 Rollo at 7-10.
574
burning them. Private respondents (Cosicos) alleged that they also planted coconut
trees and other permanent trees in the land, for which they have not allegedly been
paid. The tasks of harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts were
performed by laborers hired and paid by Fule or her coconut buyer. And when
respondent Pedro Cosico was hired to gather coconuts in the land, he was paid for his
labor. The payment for his labor was separate from his 1/7 share received as
caretaker. 2
Defendant Fule became a member of the petitioner COCOMA from 1964 to 1972,
while Eddie A. Escudero became a member of the same cooperative-corporation from
1972 to 1975. During the time that the land was under contract with these persons,
petitioner COCOMA claims to have acted as their agent in providing management
and marketing services. 3
Consequently, from 1964 up to 1975, petitioner COCOMA hired allegedly for and
on behalf of Fule and Eddie A. Escudero, the necessary laborers to harvest and
transport the coconut produce from the land. Among these workers were respondents
Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico who were recommendees of Fule, and who were hired
to clean the land of grass, shrubs, dried coconut leaves and husks. The work done in
the land and the expenses incurred therefor were approved and paid by Fule and
Eddie A. Escudero, through petitioner COCOMA. And all the cleaning and planting
expenses were covered with receipts duly signed by the laborers. 4
During all the time that petitioner COCOMA was rendering management and
marketing services in the land in question, all the proceeds from the sale of the
coconut produce thereof, less the necessary expenses mentioned above, were paid and
delivered, after every harvest season, to said Fule and Eddie A. Escudero,
respectively, in compliance with the terms of their marketing agreements with
petitioner COCOMA. 5
_______________
2 Id. at 71.
3 Id. at 8.
4 Id. at 71.
5 Ibid.
575
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 575
On 9 October 1971, or after seven (7) years from 1964 that all the workers had been
receiving their wages as hired workers in said land from Fule and later from Eddie
A. Escudero, through the petitioner COCOMA, the respondents Pedro, Hermogenes
and Lucas, all surnamed Cosico, started to claim to be the tenants in three (3)
separate portions of said land-holding, consisting of about four (4) hectares each, more
or less. They instituted individually CAR Cases Nos. 2236, 2237 and 2238 against
defendants Rosario Paraiso Vda. de Fule and Villa Escudero Corporation (VESCO).
Respondents later amended their complaint in said cases by including, petitioner
COCOMA as defendant. 6
On 26 January 1976 the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) rendered a joint
decision in the three (3) cases, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. 1.Declaring plaintiffs Pedro Cosico (CAR CASE No. 2236) and Hermogenes Cosico
(CAR CASE No. 2237), as true and lawful tenants of the Coconut Marketing
Association (COCOMA), its duly authorized representatives, successors in interest
and/or assigns, over four (4) hectares each of coconut land described in their
respective complaints;
2. 2.Declaring, furthermore, plaintiff Hermogenes Cosico as the true and lawful tenant
of defendant COCOMA, its duly authorized representatives, successors in interest
and/or assigns, over that four (4) hectares of coconut land described in CAR CASE
No. 2238, which is contiguous to that referred to in CAR CASE No. 2237;
3. 3.Declaring that no tenancy relations exists between defendant COCOMA and Lucas
Cosico, plaintiff in CAR CASE No. 2238;
4. 4.Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest and/or
assigns, to immediately reinstate plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico to
the landholdings mentioned in the next preceding paragraphs and to maintain them
in peaceful possession and tenancy thereof, on a sharing arrangement of 70-30 in
favor of the defendant COCOMA on the proceeds of the net harvest until such time
as said parties shall have mutually agreed on fixed rentals;
_______________
6 Ibid.
576

assigns to deliver to plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico the amount of
P28,994.00 representing the 30% share of the said plaintiffs from the coconuts
harvested from the land in question for the period covering November 12, 1971 up to
June 4, 1975;
assigns to render an accounting of the harvests of the land for the period starting
June 5, 1975, up to the present and to deposit to the Court, the equivalent of the 30%
share of the aforementioned plaintiffs, for delivery to said plaintiffs;
assigns, to pay plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico the amount of Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) or Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) each, as expenses
of litigation and other incidental expenses; and
4. 8.Denying the claim for damages of all three defendants; All other claim and
counterclaims are denied for lack of merit.”7
On 19 February 1976, petitioner COCOMA appealed the CAR decision to the Court
of Appeals. On 19 May 1977, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered a
decision, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law and
supported by substantial evidence, the same is hereby affirmed in toto without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.” 8
Hence, the instant petition of COCOMA.

The four (4) issues raised by the petitioner are: (1) whether or not the private
respondents are share tenants in the coconut land in question; (2) whether or not
private respondent Hermogenes Cosico can be adjudged a share tenant and the
COCOMA ordered the reinstate him in the land involved in CAR Case No. 2238 when
Hermogenes Cosico is not even a plaintiff in said Case No. 2238, but one Lucas Cosico;
(3) whether or not
_______________
7 Court of Agrarian Relations Decision, January 26, 1976; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
8 Court of Appeals Decision, May 19, 1977, p. 8; Rollo, p. 29.
577
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 577
COCOMA, contending to be a mere marketing agent which provides management
and marketing services to the members of the cooperative, can be held directly liable
to the private respondents-tenants for their share in the coconuts harvested; and (4)
whether or not the computation of the alleged shares due the respondents Pedro
Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico, made by the trial court is patently erroneous because
the same was based on a wrong number of coconuts harvested and on conjectured
prices.
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that private respondents were merely
caretakers, of Fule and, later, Eddie Escudero, whose task included clearing the land
by cutting grass and burning them to smudge the coconut trees to make them bear
fruits, planting of coconuts, and other fruit bearing trees, and harvesting, gathering,
9 10
picking and hauling coconuts, and that, as caretakers, private respondents were paid
11
separately in cash. Hence, the petitioner would like this Court to believe that since
12
private respondents were mere caretakers who were paid in cash for their services,
they were therefore, hired laborers, not share tenants.
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
In determining the nature of the relationship of the parties in the instant case, it
would be well to review the concept of a share tenant as against that of
an agricultural worker.
Share tenancy or agricultural tenancy is defined as:
“x x x the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or
legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former
and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former
agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either
in produce or in money or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, as amended).”
_______________
9 Brief for Petitioner, p. 18.

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 11.
12 Ibid., p. 18.
578
“x x x share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for
agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with
either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in
proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166 (25), RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code). 13
On the other hand, the Court has defined an agricultural worker as follows:
“x x x. A ‘farm worker’ is any ‘agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to
a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code (Agricultural Land Reform
Code, supplied) explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice
and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment.’ The term
includes ‘farm laborer and/or farm employer.’ An ‘agricultural worker’ is not a whit different
from a farm worker.
“From the definition of a ‘farm worker’ thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there
should be an employer-employee relationship between the farm employer and the farm
worker. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements
that are generally considered are the following: (1) selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power to control
the employee’s conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important index of
the existence of relationship.” 14
The above-mentioned characteristics of an agricultural worker or farm worker do not

exist in share tenancy.
Further, in one case, the Court compared an agricultural worker with a share
tenant, and set out the following distinctions, among others, between the two:
_______________
13 Manuel Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44570, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 136.
14 De Los Reyes vs. Espineli, G.R. No. L-28280-81, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 574.
579
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 579
“x x x. The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he receives a
salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the
share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on
the amount of the harvest.
“Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of
employer and employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former over the
latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the ‘right to require the tenant to follow those
proven farm practices which have been found to contribute towards increased agricultural
production and to use fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices adapted
to the requirements of the land.” This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not
the control exercised by an employer. x x x” 15
The record of this case is bare of evidence to support the conclusion that the private
respondents are mere agricultural workers. Unlike ordinary laborers, respondents
did not observe regular hours of work. They did not work in shifts. Petitioner
COCOMA could not even remember the number of days that private respondents
worked on the land for each agricultural year. While petitioner kept a record of the
full amount paid to respondents for each agricultural season, it did not keep an
accurate record of the actual number of days respondents reported for work. The 16
petitioner did not lay down regulations under which respondents were supposed to
do their work. Neither did petitioner prescribe the manner by which the private
respondents were to perform their duties as farmworkers. We do not find that degree
of control and supervision essential to the presence of an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and respondents and before that, between Fule or
Escudero, on the one hand and respondents, on the other.
Petitioner, in an attempt to support its pretense that private respondents are only
hired laborers, not share tenants, claims that private respondents are mere
caretakers who paid for their services as such, and whose work consists of clearing
and
_______________
15 Ibid.
16 t.s.n., July 31, 1974, pp. 93-106.
580
cleaning the land, planting the coconut and other fruit-bearing trees, and harvesting,
gathering, picking and hauling coconuts.
We do not sustain the petitioner’s pretense.
Now well-settled is the rule that cultivation is an important factor in determining
the existence of a share tenancy relationship. As to the meaning of cultivation, this
17
Court has already held that:

“x x x. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing
of the land. It includes the promotion to growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the
ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a
unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need
harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance,
the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees
are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins
when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or
smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and
watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with
his family, handles all phases of farm work from clearing the landholding to the processing
of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows
that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer.” 18
It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be considered
the cultivator of the land. 19
In Marcelo v. De Leon, plaintiff therein argued that the defendant was not a tenant
inasmuch as the latter did not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit-
bearing trees because they were already full-grown; that he did not do the actual
gathering of the fruits but merely supervised the gathering; that after deducting the
expenses, he gave one-half of the fruits to the plaintiff all in consideration of the land.
_______________
17 Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra.

18 Ibid.
19 Latag v. Banog, G.R. No. 20098, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 88.
581
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 581
Ruling in the above-mentioned case, this Court held:
“Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the above description of the
relationship. He knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better
production, uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc.
Those chores obviously mean ‘working or cultivating’ the land. Besides, it seems that
defendant planted other crops, (i.e. cultivated the lot) giving the landowner his corresponding
share. 20
Applying the foregoing precedents to the case at bar, and given the kind of work
performed by respondents on the land-holding in question, the Court holds that
respondents are share tenants, not hired workers, of the petitioner.
Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondents is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a
1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner COCOMA. Though not a decisive
indication per se of the existence of tenancy relationship, such sharing of the
harvests, taken together with the other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be
present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondents that, indeed, they
are tenants.
To prove petitioner’s claim that the private respondents are hired workers and not
its tenants, petitioner would rely mainly on the receipts signed by respondents and
other persons tending to show that they were paid by petitioner for services rendered
especially for cutting grass. 21
This Court cannot re-examine the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, except
for unusual and urgent reasons which however do not exist in this case. “Whether a
person is a tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the findings of the
respondent court and the trial court are, generally, entitled to respect and non-
disturbance. 22
The conclusion then, anent the first issue, as borne out by the evidence on record,
is that private respondents Pedro and
_______________
20 105 Phil. 1175, G.R. No. L-12902, July 29, 1959.

21 Exh. “9” to “9www”.
22 Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
582
Hermogenes, both surnamed Cosico, are share tenants of the land in dispute.
On the second issue, petitioner questions the recognition by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals of respondent Hermogenes Cosico as tenant in the landholding
where his co-respondent Lucas Cosico claims to be the tenant, when the former is not
even a party to the separate case filed by the latter and he (Hermogenes Cosico) did
not allege such tenancy in his own amended complaint. In other words, it is
petitioner’s submission that even if respondent Hermogenes Cosico were to be
considered a tenant in the landholding described in his amended complaint, the court
had no legal basis, however, in declaring him also a tenant of a landholding described
and claimed by another person in another case in which he (Hermogenes) is not a
party and which he did not claim to be a tenant of, in his own complaint. 23
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.

It should be noted that the three (3) cases filed by the three (3) private respondents
were jointly tried and their common evidence showed that, although Hermogenes and
Lucas Cosico were supposed to have separate holdings, from 1956, of four (4) hectares
each, both of them worked the two (2) holdings jointly in their entirety, but it was
only Hermogenes Cosico who received the tenant’s share from the whole. In other
words, it was Hermogenes Cosico who acted as sole tenant of the two (2) holdings.
Hence, the latter’s recognition by the Court of Agrarian Relations and the Court of
Appeals; as the tenant in the holding also claimed by Lucas Cosico. The facts,
therefore, warranted Hermogenes Cosico’s recognition as the tenant in both
landholdings. 24
In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, this Court ruled:

“Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not ‘restricted to the specific relief claimed
or demands made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the
_______________
23 Rollo at 57.
24 Ibid.
583
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 583
purpose of settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said matter for
determination has been established by competent evidence during the hearing.’ ” 25
Further, R.A. 3844, Section 155, provides:

“SEC. 155. Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. x x x
The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court: Provided, That
in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy pending before
them the Courts without impairing substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by the
technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in expropriation cases.”
We now move to the third issue.

It is contended by the petitioner COCOMA that it has never been a landholder of
the land in question, since it was, at no time, owner, lessee or sub-lessee of the land,
or buyer of the coconut produce thereof, or usufructuary or legal possessor of the
same, or even an assignee of any right affecting it. Thus, assuming, without
conceding, that respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico are considered tenants of
the land, petitioner COCOMA submits that, being only an agent of defendants Fule
and Escudero, it can not be held liable for the acts of its principals. Petitioner’s
contention is not in accordance with applicable laws, because—
“A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for
a consideration either in shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain or
ascertainable under the leasehold system.” 26
In accordance with the above provision, petitioner COCOMA is the landholder of the
subject landholdings for (a) it is “juridical person” being a domestic corporation
established under the laws of the Philippines; (b) it is the “legal possessor” of the land
_______________
25 27 SCRA 7, G.R. No. L-20700, February 27, 1969.

26 Sec. 5(b) of RA 1199.
584
for it has the sole management and administration thereof; (c) it has authorized or
27
retained the private respondents to cultivate the land; and (d) it has shared the
harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully, making it appear that they are laborers
instead of tenants. 28
Petitioner, being a landholder, as defined by law, is therefore subject to the rights,

obligations, and limitations provided for under the agrarian laws.
There is also no question that, in this case, there was a transfer of the legal
possession of the land from one landholder to another (Fule to petitioner COCOMA).
In connection therewith, Republic Act 3844, Sec. 10 states:
“SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.—
The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer
of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholdings, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.”
Further, in several cases, this Court sustained the preservation of the landholder-
tenant relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession:
“x x x in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship
between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being
of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser
of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in
the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against
unjustified dismissal from their holdings.” (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil. 675);
“It is our considered judgment, since the return by the lessee of the leased property to the
lessor upon the expiration of the contract
_______________
27 t.s.n. of July 31, 1974, pp. 110-111, inter alia.

28 Court of Agrarian Relations Decision, pp. 10-12.
585
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 585
involves also a transfer of legal possession, and taking into account the manifest intent of the
lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e., to provide the tenant with security of tenure in all
cases of transfer of legal possession, that the instant case falls within and is governed by the
provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended by Republic Act 2263.” (Joya v.
Pareja, 106 Phil. 645)
“x x x that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce obligation
incurred by the former landholder in relation to said land, for the reason that ‘such obligation.
. . falls upon the assignee or transferee of the land’ pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since
respondents are in turn free to proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it
is not iniquitous to hold them responsible to the tenant for said obligations. Moreover, it is
the purposes of Republic Act 1199, particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right of the
tenant to receive his lawful share of the produce of the land is unhampered by the transfer
of said land from one landholder to another.” (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154.)
Therefore, petitioner, being a landholder, can be held liable to private respondents
for their shares in the coconuts harvested from the landholding in question.
As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private respondents’ thirty
percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made by the Court of Agrarian
Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is erroneous, this Court finds no
compelling reason to depart from such computation, as it is a part of the findings of
fact and conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent appellate court. Such
findings and conclusions should not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of proof
that they are unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court of Appeals
had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary.
In Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, it was held that:
“x x x in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence.
“x x x xxx xxx
“Under this rule, all that the appellate court has to do, insofar as the evidence is
concerned, is to find out if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. So much so that
the findings of fact of the Court
586
of Agrarian Relations, if supported by such evidence, are conclusive on the appellate
tribunal.”29
The respondent appellate court, in the case at bar, acted correctly when it ruled:
“On the whole, we are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing findings of fact of the Agrarian
Court in the absence of any proof that are unfounded or where arbitrarily arrived at or that
the court had failed to consider important evidence to the contrary. It is well-established that
so long as the findings of fact of the Agrarian Court attain the minimum, evidentiary support
demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, such findings cannot be
reversed by the appellate tribunals. In the present case, We do not find any cogent reason to
adopt a conclusion different from that reached by the court a quo. 30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed.

Note.—The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been designed to promote
economic and social stability. Being a social legislation, it must be interpreted
liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent, which is “to achieve a dignified
existence for the small farmers” and to make them “more independent, self-reliant
and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.”
(Catorce vs. Court of Appeal, 129 SCRA 210).

No. L-44570. May 30, 1986. Manuel Guerrero and Maria Guerrero, Petitioners, vs. Hon. Court of APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, Respondents

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No. L-44570. May 30, 1986. Manuel Guerrero and Maria Guerrero, Petitioners, vs. Hon. Court of APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, Respondents

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No. L-44570. May 30, 1986.

VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 137

138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 139

PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

1. “(1)ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to reinstate plaintiff

1. “(1)Whether or not plaintiff is the tenant on the coconut land-holding in question

This petition for review poses the following questions of law:

(Apolinario Benitez on Redirect, TSN, June 25, 1974, pp. 49-50).

The respondent’s status as agricultural tenant should be without question.

Feria, J., no part.

VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 149

No. L-23785. November 27, 1975. *

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs. ELIAS ADILLO,

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Alberto J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

the information on the submission

2L-20973, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 611, 612.

proviso of Section 4 of the Code, existing share tenancy

ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the information against defendant-

MAKASIAR, J., Concurring:

9People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225.

TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-

VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 591

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Pasicolan, J.

The f acts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

1. 1.Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First,

1Record, pages 63–68.

1. 1.That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?

who helped work the land in question, and We quote:

1. 2.Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that the

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of

600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nos. L-46281-83. August 19, 1988. *

COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA),

VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 569

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 571

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated 19

1. 5.Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest and/or

Hence, the instant petition of COCOMA.

9 Brief for Petitioner, p. 18.

The above-mentioned characteristics of an agricultural worker or farm worker do not

Court has already held that:

17 Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra.

20 105 Phil. 1175, G.R. No. L-12902, July 29, 1959.

Petitioner’s contention is without merit.

In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, this Court ruled:

Further, R.A. 3844, Section 155, provides:

We now move to the third issue.

25 27 SCRA 7, G.R. No. L-20700, February 27, 1969.

Petitioner, being a landholder, as defined by law, is therefore subject to the rights,

27 t.s.n. of July 31, 1974, pp. 110-111, inter alia.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Petition denied. Decision affirmed.

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