7.
3 Defense of Relatives
Balunueco v. People
Ponente: Bellosillo, J. 2003
Petitioner: Ricardo Balunueco
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Victim: Senando Iguico and Amelia Iguico
FACTS:
 Around 6pm on May 2, 1982 Servando Iguico (brother of the victim) was being chased by the five-
original accused, Ricardo, Reynaldo, Ramon, and Juanito, all surnamed Balunueco and Armando
Flores. Servando scampered into the safety of Senando and Amelia’s house.
 Senando Iguico (the victim) went out of the house unaware of what was happening. Armando
turned his attention to him and gave chase. Once he was cornered, Senando was ganged up by
the group.
 To shield him from further violence, Amelia put her arms around her husband but was not enough
to detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy. Amelia was also hit on the leg.
 According to Maximo Reyes, NBI Senior Medico-legal officer, declared that on 3 May 1982 he
conducted a post mortem examination on the body of the deceased Senando Iguico and issued
an Autopsy Report, which contained the following findings: 7 (a) two (2) stab wounds and nine (9)
gaping hack wounds; and, (b) cause of death was hemorrhage, acute, profuse, secondary to
multiple stab and hack wounds.
 Of the five (5) original accused,3 only petitioner Ricardo, accused Reynaldo, Juanito, all surnamed
Balunueco, and Armando Flores were indicted in two (2) Informations, the first for homicide 4 and
the second for frustrated homicide.5 Again, of the four (4) indictees, only Ricardo and Reynaldo
were brought to the jurisdiction of the court a quo, while Juanito and Armando have remained at
large. Accused Reynaldo died on 17 November 1986. Accordingly, as against him, the criminal
cases were dismissed. Thus, only the criminal cases against petitioner Ricardo Balunueco are
subject of this appeal.
 RTC found Ricardo guilty of homicide in Crim. Case number 49576 and frustrated homicide in
Crim. Case 49577. It reasoned that the testimony of Amelia Iguico was clear, positive,
straightforward, truthful and convincing.
 CA sustained the conviction of accused Ricardo however it ruled that his conviction for the
wounding of Amelia Iguico should be for attempted homicide only. (Reason: For while intent to kill
was proven, Amelia’s hack wound in her left leg was not proven to be fatal or that it could have
produced her death had there been no timely medical attention provided her, hence, the stage of
execution of the felony committed would only be attempted.)
 Petitioner imputed errors to the CA and invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives
under Art. 11. (par. 2), of the RPC.
 SC affirmed the decision of CA and RTC on the homicide ruling of Crim. Case No. 49576 however
modified Decision in Crim. Case No. 49577 for Attempted Homicide to Slight Physical Injuries for
the wounding of Amelia Iguico.
 reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) in case the provocation was given
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the ruling of CA for both criminal cases of Ricardo is correct.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner
Petitioner appealed to CA with
the following arguments: (a) in
not taking into consideration
the fact that petitioner, if
indeed he participated, had
acted in defense of relatives;
(b) in giving due credence to
the self-serving and baseless
testimony of Amelia Iguico,
the lone and biased witness
for the prosecution; and, (c) in
failing to consider the several
serious physical injuries
sustained by petitioner and
his brother Reynaldo
Balunueco.
LAW/S:
Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code.
The essential elements of this justifying circumstance are the following: (a) unlawful aggression; (b)
by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein.
COURT DECISION/DISPOSITION:
CA
In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce
sufficient proof of the existence of a positively strong act of
real aggression on the part of the deceased Senando. With the
exception of his self-serving allegations, there is nothing on
record that would justify his killing of Senando.
First, Ricardo’s theory that when he reached the crime scene
he found Senando repeatedly hacking his brother Reynaldo
who thereafter retaliated by smashing an axe on the victim’s
head is implausible in light of the seriousness of the wounds
sustained by the deceased as compared to the minor injuries
inflicted upon petitioner and his two (2) brothers. The fact that
three (3) of the assailants suffered non-fatal injuries bolsters
the fact that Senando tried vainly to ward off the assaults of his
assailants.
Second, Ricardo failed to present himself to the authorities. He
may have accompanied the injured Reynaldo to the hospital
after the encounter but still he failed to present himself to the
authorities and report the matter to them. The natural impulse
of any person who has killed someone in defense of his
person or relative is to bring himself to the authorities and try
to dispel any suspicion of guilt that the authorities might have
against him. This fact assumes a more special significance
considering that his co-accused, Juanito and Armando, have
remained at large.
Third, petitioner had a rather erratic recollection of people and
events. He vividly remembered how Reynaldo was injured by
Senando but conveniently failed to recall the events leading to
the fatal wounding of the deceased. At another point, he testified
that Reynaldo axed Senando but later retracted his statement
by declaring that it was in fact Senando who hacked
Reynaldo.15 We observe that the killing occurred within or near
the premises of the deceased. This proves per adventure the
falsity of petitioner’s claim that it was Senando, rather than he
and his kin, who had initiated the unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in Crim. Case No. 49576 finding petitioner
Ricardo Balunueco guilty of Homicide is AFFIRMED, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years, two (2) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, his civil liability
to the heirs of Senando Iguico is fixed at P50,000.00. The assailed Decision in Crim. Case No. 49577 for
Attempted Homicide, on the other hand, is MODIFIED. Petitioner Ricardo Balunueco is found guilty only of
Slight Physical Injuries for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer a straight
prison term of ten (10) days of arresto menor, and to pay the costs.

of Lucrecio Seguritan the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P135, 331.oo as loss of earning
capacity is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner shall further ordered to pay P25,000 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages, and P50,000.oo as civil indemnity.

7.4 Defense of Strangers.

G.R. No. L-56358 October 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUIS B. TORING, DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B.
BERDIN,
FERNAN, C.J.:
Preliminary:  Toring then ran towards the dark portion of the area and went home. There, he left the knife and
proceeded to the hut by the fishpond of one Roman.
 The appellants herein seek the reversal of the October 28, 1980 decision of the Circuit Criminal
 May 26, 1980, 4:00 o'clock in the morning. Toring was sleeping in the hut with his older brother,
Court in Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2170, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Arsenio, when, at around Edgar Augusto, the younger brother of Samuel, shot them. Arsenio was
 the Court found the accused Luis B. Toring guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
hit on the left leg and he stayed two months in the hospital for the treatment of his wound.
MURDER by direct participation as principal; Diosdado Berdon as accomplice thereto; and
 At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 26, 1980, Toring surrendered to two Philippine Constabulary
Carmelo Berdin as accessory after the fact.
soldiers. He was brought to the police of Lapu-lapu City on May 28, 1980.
 When the police asked him about the knife, he used in stabbing Samuel, Toring told them to go to
Facts: Carmelo Berdin because he was the only person who knew where Toring hid it. Asserting that he
was the one who returned the knife to his own house, Toring testified that Carmelo Berdin used to
see him hide his weapons upstairs because Berdin was a frequent visitor of his.
 May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for the last
 For his part, Carmelo, a 5 feet tall, asthmatic 17-year-old whom the court described as "lilliputian,"
canvassing of votes for the candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. As one of
admitted that he witnessed the stabbing incident but he ran away with his group immediately after
the candidates was the daughter of Samuel Augusto, he and the members of his family attended
because he was afraid, he might be shot by Samuel.
the affair.
 He was with Toring when the latter hid the still bloodied knife under a trunk in Toring's house. He
 Members of the kwaknit gang were outside the dancing area which was ringed by benches. A
was familiar with the hiding place of the knife because Toring showed it to him and there were
group which was noted for their bird-like way of dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and
times when he would get the knife there upon Toring's request.
provoking trouble. Its president, "alas" king, was Luis Toring.
 Carmelo corroborated Toring's testimony that on that fateful night, Toring carried the knife tucked
 10:45 p.m., Samuel's daughter was proclaimed the winner in the contest. Beer and softdrinks
at the back of his waistline.
having been served the parents of the candidates Samuel was tipsy when, after his daughter's
proclamation, he stepped out of the dancing area to answer the call of nature.  In court, Toring testified that he never saw Diosdado at the dance. However, in his sworn
statement dated May 28, 1980 and marked as Exhibit D, Toring stated that he took the knife from
 At that moment, barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis Toring, Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado
Diosdado to stab Samuel.
Berdon proceed to a dark area while whispering to each other.
 Confronted with said statement, Diosdado said that when he asked Toring why he implicated him,
 Diosdado Berdon handed a knife to Luis Toring, who then approached Samuel from behind, held
Toring allegedly replied that he "included" Diosdado because of the case the barangay brigade
Samuel's left hand with his left hand, and with his right hand, stabbed with the knife the right side
had filed against Toring.
of Samuel's abdomen.
 According to Diosdado, he did not attend the May 25 dance because of the trouble which erupted
 Upon seeing Felix running towards them, Luis Toring pulled out the knife and, together with
during the dance the night before. He did not have anything to do with the stabbing of Samuel. He
Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon, ran towards the dark.
admitted, however, that a week after the incident, his family went to barrio Andaliw Ronda, Cebu,
 Felix tried to chase the three but he was not able to catch them. He returned to where Samuel had
for their yearly visit to his father-in-law. He stayed there for fifteen days and would have stayed
slumped and helped others in taking Samuel to the hospital.
longer had not his mother informed him of the subpoena addressed to him.
 According to Maria Catalina Sorono, Diosdado Berdon and Carmelo Berdin were poised to deliver
fist blows on Samuel just before Luis Toring stabbed him. Diosdado gave the knife to Luis Toring.
 When she saw the stabbing of Samuel, she shouted for help. Which the three assailants ran Lower Court Ruling. (Circuit Criminal Court) Guilty of Murder.
towards the direction of the fields.
 Samuel was bought Opon Emergency Hospital where he died on arrival. According to the necropsy On October 28, 1980, the lower court rendered a decision discrediting Toring's claim that the killing of Samuel
report, Samuel, who was thirty years old, died due to massive hemorrhage secondary to the stab was justified because it was done in defense of a stranger pursuant to Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal
wound on the abdomen. Code.
o The death weapon, a kitchen knife made of stainless steel and with a red-colored handle,
was recovered from the house of Luis Toring.
 According to Patrolman Pantaleon P. Amodia, the police found out that Luis Toring had left the 1. The lower court found that Toring was the "aggressor acting in retaliation or revenge by reason of
weapon with "Camilo" Berdin. When the police confronted Berdin, the latter led them to the house a running feud or long-standing grudge" between the kwaknit gang and the group of Samuel, who,
of Toring which Berdin entered. When he emerged from the house, Berdin handed the weapon to being the son of the barangay captain, was a "power to be reckoned with." It mentioned the fact
the police. that a year before the incident in question, Toring was shot by Edgar Augusto (Samuel's brother)
and hence, in his desire to avenge himself, Toring, "needed but a little excuse to do away with the
 All three accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. object of his hatred.
2. The lower court could not believe that Samuel brought along his shotgun to the dance because he
was "not reputed to be a public official or functionary entitled to possess a firearm." Otherwise, the
 Toring, alias "Lowe," testified that he was not the president of the kwaknit gang. He went to the
police and the barangay tanod would have arrested him. The court surmised that if Samuel really
benefit dance in the company of Venir Ybañez, Joel Escobia, Ely Amion, Abel Pongase, Abe
carried a shotgun, he certainly must have had a permit or license to possess the same.
Berdon, Genio Berdin and Alex Augusta. Toring and his group were standing outside the dancing
3. It noted that while Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon
area when, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Samuel, a known tough guy ("maldito"),
(Amion), prosecution witness Joel Escobia claimed that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's
approached them and held Venir Ybanez by his collar.
thrusts with the butt of his shotgun. To the court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense because
 Then Samuel thrust the butt of his shotgun on the chin of Joel Escobia, proceeded to another group
in appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with
who were also gangmates of Toring, and again, with the barrel of his shotgun, hit Eli Amion's chest
definiteness the identity of the stranger defended by the accused."
several times.
4. The lower court, however, ruled out the existence of conspiracy among the three accused on the
 Reacting to what he saw, Toring got his kitchen knife which was tucked in his waist, approached ground that there was no proof on what they were whispering about when Felix saw them.
Samuel from the latter's right side and stabbed him once as he did not intend to kill Samuel.
 Accordingly, it held that the accused have individual or separate liabilities for the killing of
Samuel: Toring, as a principal, Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice by his act of giving Toring the
knife, and Carmelo Berdin as an accessory for concealing the weapon. It considered treachery as
the qualifying circumstance to the killing, found no proof as to allegation of evident premeditation
but appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance.
ISSUE:
Did the Appellant acted in defense of his first cousin thereby exonerating him from criminal liability?
All three accused appealed.
 Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel was justified because he
acted in defense of his first cousin
o The first and second requisites referred to are enumerated in paragraph (b) in the same
article on selfdefense as: (a) unlawful aggression, and (b) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.
 Joel Escobia, whose chin was hit with the butt of Samuel's shotgun, is the first cousin of Toring
their fathers being brothers, although no explanation appears on record why they have different
surnames. At any rate, this allegation on relationship was not rebutted by the prosecution.
 The appreciation of the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, however, hinges in this
case on the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Corollarily, the claim of
Toring that Samuel was, at the time of the assault, carrying a shotgun to intimidate Toring's group
must be proven.
 Understandably, no prosecution witness attested that they saw Samuel with a firearm. The
prosecution even recalled to the witness stand Samuel's widow who asserted that her husband did
not own any firearm.
 Going along with the prosecution's evidence, the lower court arrived at the rather gratuitous
conjecture that Samuel could not have had a shotgun with him because no one without a permit
would carry a firearm without risking arrest by the police or the barangay tanod.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed insofar as it convicts Luis Toring as principal
in the murder of Samuel Augusto and Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice thereto.
Held:
The lower court correctly considered the killing as murder in view of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The suddenness of the assault rendered Samuel helpless even to use his
shotgun. We also agree with the lower court that conspiracy and evident premeditation were not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, nighttime cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. There
is no proof that it was purposely sought to ensure the commission of the crime or prevent its
discovery. However, Toring should be credited with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense of relative and the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
While matters dealing with the credibility of witnesses and appreciation of evidence are primarily the lower
court's province, this Court has the power to determine whether in the performance of its functions, the lower
court overlooked certain matters which may have a substantial effect in the resolution of a case.
1. Defense witness Joel Escobia was, besides Toring, the only witness whose sworn statement
was taken by the police on May 26, 1980, the day after the fatal assault on Samuel.
In his sworn statement, Escobia attested that as he was about to dance with a girl, Samuel stopped him,
pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia and asked him, "Do you
like this, Dong?" to which Escobia replied, "No, Noy I do not like that." Samuel then placed the bullet in the
shotgun and was thus pointing it at Escobia when Toring came from behind Samuel and stabbed the latter.
Even on cross-examination at the trial, Escobia did not depart from his statement. In fact, he added that
Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him to eat the bullet.
2. There is no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of Samuel's unlawful aggression
inasmuch as his sworn statement and testimony in court had not been successfully
discredited by the prosecution which also failed to prove that Joel had reason to prevaricate
to favor Toring.
The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the part
of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a relative.
3. Toring himself admitted in court as well as in his sworn statement that in 1979, he was shot
with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore,
that in attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the
lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated
by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and
the Toring brothers. As the defense itself claims, after the incident subject of the instant case
occurred, Toring's brother, Arsenio, was shot on the leg by Edgar Augusto. Indeed, vendetta
appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other. Hence, under
the circumstances, to justify Toring's act of assaulting Samuel Augusto would give free rein
to lawlessness.
7.5 State of Necessity
G.R. No. 149275 September 27, 2004
VICKY C. TY, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
 This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty
before the RTC of Manila.
 accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila
Doctors’ Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino ,payable to Manila Doctors
Hospital in the amount of ₱30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon
its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for "Account Closed" and despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of
the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
 Ty’s mother, Chua Lo So Un, was confined in Manila Doctors – accused "Acknowledgment of
Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.6 As of 4 June
1992, the Statement of Account7 shows the total liability of her mother.
 Ty’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital. The total hospital bills of the two patients
amounted to ₱1,075,592.95.
  Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments. To
assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable
to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of ₱30,000.00, were all deposited
on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the
hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the "Account Closed" advice.
 Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the
demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant
case.
 Ty in her defense that she issued the checks "under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury." she was forced to issue the checks to
obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not
discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.
RTC ruling:
Trial court found that Ty issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital
bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the defense. Thus, on 21 April 1997, the
trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P.
22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
Held:
 The fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to
issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
discharged--for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane
treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is
not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law
 To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-
grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear
exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her
of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s
threats or demands.Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to
commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid
committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital
required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.30
And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had
all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.

CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in
payment of a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of
maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or
a total of forty-two (42) months.
CA ruling:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to
double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is
also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors’ Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs against
the petitioner.

affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of
imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000.00)
equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.

o the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the
checks and the hospital’s knowledge of her checking account’s lack of funds. It held that
B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense,
it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check
and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.
o the Court of Appeals is also not convinced that there was no valuable consideration for
the issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s
mother.17
o In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the
case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals ,wherein this Court declared that in determining the
penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with
due regard to the protection of the social order

ISSUE: whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal
liability
7.6 Fulfillment of duty

YAPYUCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012
Ponente: PERALTA, J:

Facts:
 These are petitions for review on certiorari assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan for cases of murder, frustrated murder, and multiple counts of attempted
murder.
 April 5, 1988 – There was a shooting incident in San Fernando, Pampanga that killed
Leodevince Licup and injured Noel Villanueva.
 Accused who are all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder, and frustrated murder
were the following:
o Members of the Integrated National Police (INP)
 Salvador Yapyuco, Jr.
 Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
 Ernesto Puno
o Barangay Captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen respectively
 Jose Pamintuan
 Mario Reyes
o Either member of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer
 Andres Reyes
 Virgilio Manguerra
 Carlos David
 Ruben Lugtu
 Moises Lacson
 Renato Yu
 Jaime Pabalan
 Criminal Case No. 16612:
o …with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince Licup, attack the latter with
automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney riden by the
victim inflicting multiple gunshot wounds on the body of the victim that results to the
immediate death
 Criminal Case No. 16613
o …with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma
and Raul V. Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota
Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G.
Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of murder directly
by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder by reason of some cause
or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.
 Criminal Case No. 16614
o …with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C.
Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and
having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of murder, but
which did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants' will, namely, the
able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented
his death.
 April 30, 1991 – the accused entered individual pleas of not guilty except Pabalan who died
and Yapyuco who was indisposed
 June 1991 – Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered and entered a negative plea
 May 10, 1991 – Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612 for Mario Reyes,
AANdres Reyes, David Lugtu, Lacson, Yu, and Manguerra
 May 21, 1991 – Yapyuco was also granted bail
 November 21, 1991 – Pamintuan died therefore the charges against him were extinguished
 July 4, 1991 – Pre-trial conference started for the remaining accused
 Prosecution:
o Villanueva, Flores, Calma, DeVera, Panlican and Licup (victims) were at the
residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and
7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30p.m., shortly after the
religious procession had passed. As they were all intoxicated, Salangsang reminded
Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and
open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his
companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at
5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the
road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both
wounded and bleeding profusely.
o In open court, Flores executed a sketch depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw
jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the
house situated on the right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney
had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron
where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions.
He could not tell how many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting,
he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney
when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Naron’s house.
Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan corrected them for not
stopping when flagged.
o At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon
Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to
Salangsang’s house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that
petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a
Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.
o This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased
two armed men, together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and
Licup to another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.Flores claimed
that all the accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except
for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wife’s uncle and with whom he denied
having had any rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which would have
otherwise inspired ill motives. He claimed the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney
were on the passenger side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back or
in any other portion of the vehicle.
 Defense which was only took by Yapyuco:
o According to him, his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu
suddenly received a summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was
instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in
Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for
reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he
decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-
16 rifles with them.
o Regarding the firing of warning shots, they did that because they have identified the
incoming jeepney that it was the target vehicle.
o Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the
time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the
area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements and that he frequently
patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men.
That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all,
comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, the team
composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario
Reyes.
o He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the
occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed.

o Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the accused
after the incident because he was at the time very confused.
 Cunanan and Puno adopted the testimony of Yapyuco without presenting any additional
evidence.
 Decision of the Sandiganbayan:
o The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to
Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by
petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order.
o The acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the
execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent
to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle.
o The fact they had by collective action deliberately and consciously intended to
inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their
defense of lawful performance of official duty.
o The theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there
was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or probable cause to
rely fully on Pamintuan's report that the victims were armed NPA members, and
they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross
inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did.
o There was insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume that the
occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter;
and that the shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned
and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda
concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and
amateurish attempt to gain commendation.
Issues:
1. Whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the
maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police
and the CHDF and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article
11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
2. Whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them
Ruling:
1. No. The requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not
obtain in this case. Yapyuco, in his testimony — which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno
— as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been
offered in evidence by the prosecution, explained that their presence at the scene was in
response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements
on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in
Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to
justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake
of fact.
If the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in
this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is
8
transposed into a judicial admission. The availability of the justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code rests on proof that:
a. the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful
exercise of his right or office, and
b. the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.
The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the
accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal
intent or with fault or
negligence. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them — who were either
police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and
order — were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration
in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect
vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they
may even effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had
just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a crime.
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under
circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed.
The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill
(People v. Ulep).
United States v. Campo has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent
of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is
attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty or
cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results
from the exercise of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing
the death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force.
2. Yes. judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms
employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver — and in fact even the driver
himself — of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise.
The SC find it to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire
directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their
authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the
vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle
to a halt. The evidence found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners' actuations leaned
towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with
all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no
other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or
mere lack of skill. The crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence,
the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
 9
another should be unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without
malice. Petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 30, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the
indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum.
b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince
Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages,
as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.

Baxinela vs. People
G.R. No. 149652,
March 24, 2006
AZCUNA, J.
FACTS OF THE CASE
 Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo L. Baxinela assails his conviction for the crime of homicide by the
Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan1 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 4877, as affirmed with
modification by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23348.
 On February 19, 1997, an Information charging Baxinela with the crime of homicide.
 That on or about the 19th day of October , 1996, early in the morning, at Poblacion, Municipality
of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, while armed with a handgun, without justifiable cause and with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
RUPERTO F. LAJO, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds,
 DIAGNOSIS: Gunshot wound left of arm with fracture of the humerus, penetrating the (L)
thoracic cavity perforating the diaphragm, abdomen, stomach and, intestines and
retroperitoneum with slugs lodging the vertebral column
 CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiopulmonary arrest, Secondary to severe bleeding, Secondary to
gunshot wound." as per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Roel A. Escanillas, Medical Officer III,
Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, Kalibo, Aklan,
 The two version of the story of what happened in the crime are as follows
 Defense alleges that Baxinela proceeded to the Superstar Disco Pub in response
to the information given by Manuba that there was an armed drunken man accosting
several people inside the pub. Once they arrived, they saw Lajo with a handgun
visibly tucked behind his waist. When Baxinela introduced himself as a policeman
and asked why he had a handgun, Lajo suddenly drew on him prompting Baxinela
to pull out his gun and fire upon Lajo, critically wounding him. Thereafter, the defense
claims that Regimen ordered the security guards to bring Lajo to the hospital while
they proceed to the police station to report the incident.
 Prosecution contends that Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen
and Legarda for more than a couple of hours prior to the shooting incident. After
witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to
confront Lajo on why he had a gun with him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind
and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45
caliber service firearm with the other. As Lajo was turning around, to see who was
confronting him, Baxinela shot him. Baxinela then got Lajo’s wallet and fled the scene
with Regimen.
RTC RULING
 found the version of the prosecution, that Baxinela shot Lajo as the latter was turning around
and without having drawn his gun, more convincing, and rendered a decision convicting
Baxinela. The RTC, however, considered in favor of Baxinela the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and provocation. The dispositive portion of the decision is as follows:
o WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused SPO2 EDUARDO BAXINELA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and considering the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and provocation, and applying the
10
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of 4 years of prision correccional medium as minimum, to 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor medium as maximum.
C.A RULING
 modified Baxinela’s conviction by disallowing the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation. Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads as
follows:
o IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from finding the
Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION, that the Appellant is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of
from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Mayor, as Minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY ONE (21) DAYS of
Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum.
 In SC, Early in his testimony, Baxinela maintained that Lajo had already pulled his handgun
and was aiming at him when he fired. Subsequently, when the trial court propounded
clarificatory questions, Baxinela’s new assertion was that the firearm was still at the back of
Lajo.
 The RTC and CA accepted the prosecution’s version. The SC found no reason to disturb such
findings. The SC even points out the difference of Baxinelas story and the difference on what
is written in the police report:
o SPO2 Eduardo Baxinela accosted the victim why he had in his possession a firearm
and when the victim SGT Ruperto Lajo PA was about to get his wallet on his back
pocket for his ID, SPO2 Eduardo Baxinela anticipated that the victim was drawing
his firearm on his waist prompting said policeman to shoot the victim.
 Baxinela claims the justifying circumstances of self-defense and fulfillment of a duty or lawful
exercise of a right or office.
Issues and Ruling
A. (topic of the case) THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SELF DEFENSE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THE
LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER ARTICLE 11 PARAGRAPHS 1
AND 5, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to
prevent and repel and aggression.22 By invoking self-defense, Baxinela, in effect, admits killing
Lajo, thus shifting upon him the burden of the evidence on these elements.
The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of self-defense. It is a condition sine qua
non, without which there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.23 On this
requisite alone, Baxinela’s defense fails. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack on the life and limb of a person or an imminent danger thereof, and not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The attack must be real, or at least imminent. Mere
belief by a person of an impending attack would not be sufficient. As the evidence shows, there

was no imminent threat that necessitated shooting Lajo at that moment. Just before Baxinela
shot Lajo, the former was safely behind the victim and holding his arm. It was Lajo who was at
a disadvantage. In fact, it was Baxinela who was the aggressor when he grabbed Lajo’s
shoulder and started questioning him. And when Lajo was shot, it appears that he was just
turning around to face Baxinela and, quite possibly, reaching for his wallet. None of these acts
could conceivably be deemed as unlawful aggression on the part of Lajo.
(topic of the case) The alternative defense of fulfillment of a duty. In order to avail of this
justifying circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the
offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the
lawful exercise of a right or office.While the first condition is present, the second is
clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked
behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he
confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to
take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all
resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at
that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.
B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE QUALIFIED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED.
The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as a privileged
mitigating circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, it was held that if the first condition is fulfilled
but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the penalty lower
than one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.28 Accordingly, the Court grants
in favor of Baxinela a privileged mitigating circumstance and lower his penalty by one degree. His
entitlement to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also recognized, thereby
further reducing his penalty to its minimum.
11
Baxinela Entitled to Incomplete Defense of Fulfillment of a Duty
The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as a privileged
mitigating circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, it was held that if the first condition is fulfilled
but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the penalty lower
than one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.
Emergency Recit
Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo L. Baxinela was in a pub drinking with two other policemen in as early as 11:00
p.m. of October 18, 1996. At around 12:00 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. there was a minor altercation between the
deceased Sgt. Lajo and another customer at the pub but eventually the two were able to patch things up.
While on his way out, Lajo was followed by Braxinela with a gun already drawn out. From behind, Baxinela
held Lajo’s left arm and asked why he was carrying a gun. Thereafter an explosion coming from Baxinela’s
gun was heard. Lajo, still standing, took two steps and then fell down. The Issue is whether or not
fulfilment of duty may validly be invoked by the petitioner? No. In order to avail of this justifying
circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first
condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo
had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he
confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances,
Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot
be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela
or to the civilians in the pub.

Principles

Requisites of self-defense

The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel
and aggression. By invoking self-defense, Baxinela, in effect, admits killing Lajo, thus shifting upon him
the burden of the evidence on these elements.

The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of self-defense. It is a condition sine qua non, without
which there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. On this requisite alone, Baxinela’s
defense fails.

Defense of Fulfillment of a Duty

In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right
or office.

Pomoy vs People
G.R. 150647, September 29, 2004
J. Panganiban
FACTS
 Tomas Balboa, a master teacher of Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in
Concepcion Iloilo was arrested by some policemen on January 4, 1990 at 7:30 am because
of his connection to a robbery (December 1989). He was taken to the Headquarters of the
321st Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jaladoni, Sara, Iloilo and was detained in
jail along with Edgar Samudio, another suspect for the robbery case.
 At 14:00, Pomoy, a police sergeant armed with a .45 caliber pistol tucked in a holster, went
near the door of Balboa’s jail and directed him to come out for a tactical investigation at the
investigation room which was located on the mail building of the compound. The jail guard on
duty, Nicostrado Espar, opened the jail door and walked towards the investigation room.
 When Pomoy and Balboa reached the main building, 2 gunshots were heard, Pomoy was
holding the .45 caliber pistol and Balboa was lying in a pool of blood 2m away. The
Commanding Officer arrived, disarmed Pomoy and instructed that Balboa be brought to a
hospital but Dr. Palma examined Balboa and said it was unnecessary to go to the hospital
because Balboa was dead.
 Dr. Jaboneta, a medico-legal, estimated that when it was inflicted, the assailant must have
pointed the gun’s nozzle to the right-side front of Balboa.
 Erna Basa, a witness who was working at the camp that day testified that she heard some
noise and exchange of words. When it seemed, there was growing trouble, she opened the
door and saw Pomoy and Balboa who were 3m away from the door, grappling for the
possession of the gun. She was not certain who pulled the gun.
 Eden Legaspi, another witness who was inside the investigation room, testified that she
heard a commotion outside bur remained seated. When the commotion started, Basa opened
the door, she saw 2 persons grappling and 2 shots rang out. She did not leave the place but
she stood up and saw that after the shots, one of the two men fell down.
 Pomoy testified that he was one of the investigators and he got Balboa from the stockade for
the interrogation. When Pomoy was holding the knob of the investigation room and about to
open it, Balboa who was 2m away approached him, grabbed his gun, but he was able to take
the handle with his left hand. Pomoy used his right hand to also hold the handle of the gun.
Pomoy then used his left hand to parry Balboa’s movements. Balboa was holding his right
hand and the 2 grappled.
 Pomoy shared that when the gun was out of the holster, it fired (but it was locked in safety).
During the grapple, Pomoy used his left hand to prevent Balboa and Balboa used his right
hand to take possession. The gun fired which separated both of them and Balboa fell. Sgt.
Alag shouted to stop and Capt. Rolando Maclag got his gun and said that an investigation will
be conducted.
 RTC found Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide because of factual findings.
 CA affirmed the decision with modification on the penalty based on the factual findings that
(1) victim was not able to grab hold of the gun because of Pomoy, (2) The gun had been
locked prior but Pomoy released the lock and deliberately fired the fatal shots, (3) The
location of Balboa’s wounds did not support the assertion that there had been a grappling.
CA said that an accident is not believable because Pomoy shot the victim twice. Moreover,
CA debunked the plea for self-defense because Pomoy failed in proving the attendance of
unlawful aggression. CA disagreed with RTC’s conclusion that there was aggravating
circumstance of abuse of public position.
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner Respondent
CA erred in ruling that it was not an accidental It was a deliberate shooting
shooting
12
CA erred in ruling that self-defense cannot be There was no unlawful aggression to invoke self-
invoked defense
ISSUE AND RULING
1. Whether or not there was accidental shooting
YES, because (1) Pomoy had no control of the gun during the scuffle, the deceased tried to wrest the
weapon from him. It is difficult to imagine that Pomoy could coolly release the safety lock of the gun and
Basa testified to this scenario
(2) Reliance on People v Reyes is erroneous because the gun there is a revolver while in the case at
bar, Pomoy’s gun is a semi-automatic pistol which is prone to accidental firing,
(3) There was grappling because the testimony coincides with the findings of the medico legal,
(4) The elements of accident (a) accused was performing a lawful act with due care, (b) resultant injury
was caused by an accident, (c) there was no intent on the part of the accused are all present. The
consequences of circumstances were beyond the petitioner’s control.
It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer
of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape
and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
(5) The petitioner’s conduct and behavior were remorseful and does not indicate that he was guilty
2. Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense
YES, because he shot Balboa to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger. Although it is
an accident, self-defense contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend himself from
imminent danger. The fatal shots did not occurr out of conscious and premeditated effort.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is
ACQUITTED.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
EMERGENCY CASE DIGEST
Tomas Balboa was arrested in connection to a robbery incident. Petitioner Pomoy, a police sergeant
came to escort him from his detainment to the main building where investigation will be conducted. As
they near to the investigation room, 2 gunshots were heard and Pomoy was seen holding a gun while a
bloodied Balboa was on the ground. Balboa was later pronounced dead. According to witnesses,
Pomoy and Balboa grappled in possession of Pomoy’s gun. Pomoy testified that before they were able
to enter the investigation room, Balboa approached him suddenly and tried to get his gun but he
resisted and the two grappled until the gun fired twice which hit Balboa. RTC ruled that Pomoy was
convicted for homicide. CA affirmed the ruling, discounted Pomoy’s testimony, and debunked Pomoy’s
self-defense claim because of lack of unlawful aggression. SC reversed this decision and acquitted
Pomoy because witnesses’ testimonies coincides with the factual evidence which pointed that there
was unlawful aggression which resulted Pomoy to act in fulfillment of his duty and in defense of himself.

ANGCACO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 146664 – February 28, 2002
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
 At around 4 o'clock in the morning of September 25, 1980, Noe Bergante and his brother Noel
Bergante and his cousin Freddie Ganancial were awakened by the sound of gunfire while they
were asleep in their house.
 Petitioner John Angcaco and his co-accused were serving a warrant of arrest issued on
Restituto Bergante, who was wanted in connection with a robbery case.
 Noel informed the policemen that his father was not in the house, having gone to Puerto
Princesa.
 One of them ordered the men in the house to come out. Noel accordingly went to the gate and
later called Noe to also come out of the house.
 Noe and his cousin, Freddie Ganancial, did as bidden. Once they were outside the house, Noe
and Freddie were flanked by petitioner Angcaco on the right side and accused Ramon Decosto
on the left side.
 Decosto pointed an armalite at the two and warned them not to run. Noe and Freddie joined
Noel Bergante. Protacio Edep approached Freddie saying, "You are tough," and pushed him.
Then, shots rang out from the armalite and short firearm of Decosto and Edep, as a result of
which Freddie Ganancial turned around and dropped to the ground face down.
 Although Dr. Romeo D. Valino conducted the postmortem examination on the body of Freddie
Ganancial, it fell to Dr. Alberto H. Lim, Assistant Provincial Health Officer in Palawan, to identify
the medico-legal report of Dr. Valino and to explain its contents in view of Dr. Valino's death
pending the trial of the case.
 Dr. Lim stated that Freddie Ganancial, alias Edgar Gallego, 25 years of age, died as a result
of shock secondary to internal and external hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds on the body
and abdomen, which means that the victim died because of loss of blood resulting in shock
due to a gunshot wound in the abdomen.
 The defense presented as its witnesses Protacio Edep, Ramon Decosto, John Angcaco, and
Lydio Lota, whose testimonies are as follows:
o In the early morning of September 25, 1980, petitioner and his co-accused, led by
Edep, went to the house of Restituto Bergante in Bato, Taytay, Palawan to serve a
warrant for the latter's arrest. When they reached the house, Edep and his men took
positions as they had been warned that Restituto Bergante might resist arrest.
Decosto and Angcaco were each armed with armalites, Lota had a carbine, Felizarte
a revolver, and Edep a carbine and a revolver. Decosto was on the left side of Edep,
around seven to 10 meters from the latter. Angcaco, on the other hand, was on right
side of Edep, around four to seven meters from the latter. Edep called Restituto
Bergante to come out of the house as he (Edep) had a warrant for his arrest.
Restituto's wife replied that her husband was not in the house, having gone to Puerto
Princesa. A commotion then took place inside the house and, shortly after, petitioner
saw a man coming down the house. They fired warning shots to stop the man, but
petitioner saw another person with a bolo near Edep. He shouted, "Sarge, this is the
man who tried to hack you!," and shot the unidentified man, who fell to the ground
face up. At the time of the incident, Decosto was on the left side of Edep, while
13
petitioner, Felizarte, and Lota were on the right side of Edep. They later learned that
the person killed was Freddie Ganancial.
 On January 31, 1996, the RTC finds Angcaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder on the grounds that the defense was unable to disclose the requisites for a
justifying circumstance in fulfilment of a duty and also acquitting his co-accused for
insufficiency of evidence.
 Angcaco filed an appeal to the CA. Subsequently, CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE:
WON Justifying Circumstances on Fulfilment of duty is applicable in this case.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 29, 2000, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that petitioner is found guilty of the crime of homicide and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Freddie
Ganancial, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
HELD:
No. In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante.
The standard procedure in making an arrest was, first, to identify themselves as police officers and to
show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him of the charge against him, and, second, to take the
arrestee under custody. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance of
such duty. No evidence was presented by the deBergante prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent
petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence
as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest the
wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As regards the second requisite,
there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the
arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.
PRINCIPLE: For this justifying circumstance in fulfilment of a duty to be appreciated, the following
mustbe established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or aduty; and (b)
that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
such right or office.
7.7 Obedience of an Order.
CASE: TABUENA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997
Ponente: Francisco, J.
FACTS:
 Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, in his capacity as the general manager of
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) over the phone to pay directly to the president’s
office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation

(PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry
Roberto Ongpin.
 Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then
private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in
black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction
and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused
the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.
14
involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of
liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of
such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on
Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena
therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued
by a superior for some lawful purpose." The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and
Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as
it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).

 On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even
date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the
depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to
Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the
cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery
thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez.
Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received.
 Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another
P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January
1986 for P5 Million. Peralta (Acting Manager) was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request
for a manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor
branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the
money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the
money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office.
 It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts
she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986.
Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-out
public money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to
Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the execution of the
MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited from the felonious scheme. In short, no
conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P5 Million. This is not a
sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed order.
Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious disobedience. In
the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the
President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly
issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation
illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without
question. Obedientia est legis essentia.(Obedience is the essence of the Law)
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and the Resolution dated
December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

 Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large.
On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt because Sandiganbayan
rejected their defense of good faith in relation to obedience to an order of superior.
Sandiganbayan questioned the lawfulness of the memorandum and the conversion of the
money since they delivered it directly to the secretary and not to PNCC.

 Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision
dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

Held:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum
required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential
directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's
superior — the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control
over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in matters
 15
8. Exempting Circumstances (Article 12) court noted that he was in full control of his faculties or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. It
before, during, and after he attacked his two children. the penalty meted to Tibon to reclusion perpetua
8.1 Insanity

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v HONORIO TIBON GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of two Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the c
2010-06-29 | (2) counts of Parricide, and sentencing him in each case parricide on two (2) counts, is AFFIRME
G.R. No. 188320 to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and to pay the MODIFICATION as to penalty. Pursuant to Republi
FACTS: heirs of the victims KEEN GIST TIBON and REGUEL 9346, the penalty of death imposed upon accused-a
ALBERT TIBON P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity. is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligib
 Honorio Tibon and his common-law wife Gina Sumingit lived together as husband and wife. parole.

 They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert (Reguel). ISSUE: Whether the court of appeals gravely erred in not considering the exempting circumstance of
insanity in favor of the accused-appelllant
 They lived together with Tibon’s parents and siblings on the third floor of a rented house.

 Gina went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper, leaving their children to Tibon’s custody. RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

 After some time, Tibon heard from her sister who was also working abroad that Gina was having an
affair with another man. After the revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting his
two children.
 On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant’s mother and his
siblings (Zernan and Leilani), went to Tibon’s room. They saw him with the two children who
appeared to be lifeless and bore wounds on their bodies.
 When Tibon realized that his mother and siblings had seen the children lying on the floor, he stabbed
himself on the chest with a kitchen knife and tried to end his life by jumping out of the window of
their house.
 At the hospital, accused-appellant survived and was treated however, the children could no longer
be revived.
Tibon argues that the exempting circumstance of insanity was established, overthrowing the presumption
of sanity. Combined with Tibon's testimony, Tibon's medical record with the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH) and his strange behavior allegedly show an unstable mind deprived of intelligence. That
he had no recollection of the stabbing incident is further proof of his insanity. His criminal act of stabbing
his children was, thus, involuntary.
Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, rebuts the argument of Tibon by asserting that his
mental state, as ascertained by the NCMH, referred to his condition to stand trial and not his mental state
before and during the commission of the crimes with which he was charged.
Furthermore, Tibon's non-recollection of the stabbing incident does not prove his insanity and amounts
merely to a general denial. The People argues that, contrary to the requirements on establishing insanity,
Tibon was unable to present any competent witness who could explain his mental condition.

 When Gina heard about the incident, she went home immediately and confronted Tibon at the LAWS
hospital where he was confined. He confessed to stabbing their children and begged her for
forgiveness.
The Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
 In court, Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as defense. He said that he could
not recall what happened on the night he allegedly stabbed his two children. He also could not Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
remember being taken to the hospital. He said that he was only informed by his siblings that he had or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished
killed his two children, causing him to jump off the window of their house. by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

 Supported by receipts, she claimed that she spent PhP 173,000 for the wake and funeral of her two
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
children. When asked if she could quantify the damage caused to her in terms of money, she said it deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant
was for PhP 500,000. or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

Gave full faith and credit to the witnesses who testified
against Tibon. In contrast, Tibon's testimony was found
unworthy of belief. In spite of his defense of insanity, the trial
CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and foundArticle
that the12 of the Code states:
defense did not overcome the presumption of sanity. The
appellate court stressed that evidence of insanity after the
commission of an offense may be accorded weight Circumstances
only if which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from criminal liability:
there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. x x x
 16
Circumstance mentioned is not easily available to an accused as a successful defense.

Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. While Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless that person has
acted during a lucid interval, the presumption, under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, is that every human is
sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear
and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity
admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. The
testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding with
the commission of the offense with which he is charged. We agree with the Solicitor General that the
mental records Tibon wishes to support his defense with are inapplicable to the theory he espouses. The
NCMH records of his mental health only pertain to his ability to stand trial and not to his mental state
immediately before or during the commission of the crimes.

The change in Tibon's behavior was triggered by jealousy. He acted out of jealous rage at the thought of
his wife having an affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not equivalent to insanity. There
is a vast difference between a genuinely insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a
frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. We reiterate jurisprudence
which has established that only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

A final word. Parricide is differentiated from murder and homicide by the relationship between the killer
and his or her victim. Even without the attendant circumstances qualifying homicide to murder, the law
punishes those found guilty of parricide with reclusion perpetua to death, prior to the enactment of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines).

The commission of parricide is punished more severely than homicide since human beings are expected
to love and support those who are closest to them. The extreme response of killing someone of one's
own flesh and blood is indeed unnatural and tragic. Tibon must thus be handed down the harshest penalty
for his crimes against his innocent children.

DISPOSITVE

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01406 convicting accused-appellant Honorio Tibon y Deiso of parricide is AFFIRMED with the

PEOPLE V. ROBINOS
FACTS
 On the morning (7:00) of March 25, 1995, 15 year old Lorenzo Robios was in his parents house at
Barangay San Isidro in Camiling, Tarlac. Lorenzo was cooking and heard his parents, appellant
Melecio Robios and the victim Lorenza Robios, who quarelling at the sala. Lorenzo heard his
mother tell appellant. After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five
meters, saw appellant stab Lorenza on the right shoulder with a knife. Lorenza she fell down on the
floor. Upon witnessing the appellant’s attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house
and ran to his grandmothers house where he reported the incident.
 8:00am of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim, was at the house of their
mother, Remedios, at Barangay San Isidro. Benjamin, a resident of Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his
mothers house for the purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening of March 24, 1995,
appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robios, at Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin
was at his mothers house, he received the more distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had
been killed by appellant.
 Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to the victim’s house because he
was afraid of what appellant might do. From his mothers house, which was about 150 meters away
from his sisters home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, “Its good you would see how
your sister died.”
 Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain who called the police station at Camiling, Tarlac.
Members of the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay San Isidro.
The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and barangay folk,
proceeded to the scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping from the house of appellant
and Lorenza. The police told appellant to come out of the house. When appellant failed to come
out, the police detached the bamboo wall from the part of the house where blood was dripping. The
removal of the wall exposed that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing
[his] wife.
 Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant was found was embracing his wife. He
was uttering the words,” I will kill myself, I will kill myself”. Lorenza was no longer breathing. She
appeared to be dead.
 The appellant was taken away by the police and was tied with a rope. However, before he was
pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to a neighbor
of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.
 Lugo examined the body of Lorenza and found her dead. The police ordered for an autopsy.
Appellant was brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be taken to the
Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab wound.
 Case was brought to RTC. Respondent pleaded not guilty.The Chief of Police at Camiling, Tarlac,
prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
17
 The victim Lorenza Robios was 5 months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the
different parts of her body.
 That suspect (Melecio Robios) was under the influence of liquor/drunk who came home and
argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got irked, drew a double knife and delivered
41 stab blows.
 Suspect also stabbed his own body and was brought to the Provincial Hospital.
 Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches long
including handle.
 RTC found the respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion and sentencing him to death.
 Respondent appealed and the case was elevated. Appellant does not refute the factual allegations
of the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by
interposing the defense of insanity. Respondent pleaded exculpation, and interposed insanity. The
defense presented the testimonies of:
 FEDERICO ROBIOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robios, testified that his parents had
occasional quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a person
went [sic] inside their house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his
father told the same thing to his mother and because of this, his parents quarreled and
exchanged heated words.
 LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know
Melecio Robios only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused
isolated himself, laging nakatingin sa malayo, rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured
alone.
 BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he
and the accused were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 oclock in the morning up to 5:30
oclock in the afternoon. He had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in the
counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall in
line in the plaza of the penal colony.
 DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that
as the accuseds inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the latter. Accused
sometimes was lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and without companion,
laughing and sometimes crying.
 MELECIO ROBIOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in
their house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know
that he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not
remember when he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe
that he killed his wife.
 Appellant contended:

 The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from
psychosis or insanity classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.
 The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellants defense of insanity.
 Ruling: Court: The appeal is partly meritorious.
ISSUE:
WON Insanity can be used as an exempting circumstance in this case?
18
that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof
is required to establish its existence. Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required
to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68)
in Criminal Case No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs
of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly
proven. No pronouncement as to costs.

RULING:

NO. It is clear and undisputed that the RTC found the identity of the culprit and the commission of
the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. However, the appellant interposes the defense
of insanity to absolve himself of criminal liability. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely
deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. A
defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing
the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was committed. Only when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance
of insanity be considered. The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind. Accordingly, one who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it Failing this, one will be presumed to be
sane when the crime was committed.

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellants claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and
wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial
evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal
killing of his wife.

There was also the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just
killed his wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a
husband who had realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and
immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done.
His neighbor the Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when the latter confessed to the former
and to the police officers, and even showed to them the knife used to stab the victim.

The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an examination of
the mental condition of appellant, does not provide much help in determining his state of mind at the time
of the killing. It must be noted that she examined him only on September 11, 1995, or six months after
the commission of the crime. Moreover, she was not able to make a background study on the history of
his mental condition prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain social worker to gather data on
the matter.

Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been suffering
from psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime, she likewise admitted that her conclusion was
not definite and was merely an opinion. As correctly observed by the trial court, her declarations were
merely conjectural and inconclusive to support a positive finding of insanity.

Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely
deprived of reason when he killed the victim. Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate

G.R. No. 226494
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JOMAR SISRACON y RUPISAN, MARK VALDERAMA y RUPISAN, ROBERTO CORTEZ y BADILLA,
LUIS PADUA y MITRA and ADONIS MOTIL y GOLONDRINA, Accused-Appellant
FACTS:
 Our victim “AAA” was 15 years old when the incident happened on February 29, 2004, around
11:00 pm. AAA was about to go home when she passed by the basketball court and saw a group
composed of: John Andrew Valderama alias "John John" Luis Padua alias "Buboy" Ranil
Camaymayan alias "Sedeng” Rex Dandan alias "Itoy” Mark Valderama alias "Macmac Jomar
Sisracon alias "Jomar Roberto Cortez alias "Unad Randy Mulog alias "Randy;" and Adonis Motil
alias "Ulo" or "Dondon."
 Respondent Roberto called AAA asked her to approach them because they wanted her to discuss
about the organization that they recently joined. After the discussion, AAA told the group that she
had to go home, but the group insisted that she stay long, then AAA told them she could only stay
until 11:30. The group told AAA to go with them to Ranil’s apartment which was near. The group
went to the apartment with AAA, then Pita eventually joined the group.
 The group arrived at Ranil’s apartment, opened a bottle of Emperador brandy and took a glass
which they used for their “tagay”. They made AAA drink, despite her not being used to liquor. At
11:30 pm AAA told the group that she must go home. Pita and AAA tried to go home but Pita was
forced to go home alone because the group started to strike his nape. AAA also tried to leave but
the appellants blocked her way and threatened her that the group would hurt his brother if she
insisted to leave. The group resumed drinking and AAA felt dizzy after the first 10 mins of drinking.
When AAA was closing her eyes due to being drunk, she felt that she was being carried by Jomar,
and was placed in a “pagpag”. Jomar lowered her shorts but AAA resisted, but to no avail. Jomar
then went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After performing the deed he invited
the others to take their turns. AAA then lost her consciousness. When she was regaining her
consciousness she felt that someone was putting on her dress. She heard footsteps and a
commotion. She was awakened when she inside a mobile unit with her brother and her mother on
their way to a clinic in Camp Crame.They proceeded to the Municipal Hall of Rizal and were brought
to the Office of the Prosecutor at around 1 o'clock of March 1, 2004. Thereafter, BBB was told to
identify the suspects and pointed at five (5) persons, namely, appellants Adonis, Jomar, Luis, Mark
and Roberto. During her identification of the suspects, the parents of the accused, AAA's mother
and brother, and the fiscal were present.
 Thus, the following nine (9) Informations were filed against the appellants and their other
companions: Criminal Case No. 7693, 7694, 7695,7696, 7697, 7698, 7699, 7700, 7701: That on or
about the 29th day of February 2004, in the Municipality of x x x, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Rex Dandan, Randy
Mulog, and Roberto Cortez y Badilla in conspiracy with Adonis Motil y Golondrina, 15 years old,
John Andrew Valderama y Rupisan, 16 years old, Jomar Sisracon y Rupisan, 17 years old, Mark
V alderama y Rupisan, 17 years old, Luis Padua y Mitra, 16 years old and Ranil Camaymayan alias
Sedeng, 17 years old, minors, and with one another by means of force, and intimidation, while the
19
offended party is unconscious, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of AAA, the offended party, a minor, fifteen (15) years of age, against her will and without
her consent, the said crime having been attended by the qualifying circumstance of commission of
the offense of more than two (2) persons, which is aggravated by the circumstances of Treachery,
Evident Premeditation, Abuse of Superior Strength and Nighttime. CONTRARY TO LAW.
 Appellants Jomar Sisracon, ,Mark Valderama y Rupisan, Roberto Cortez y Badilla, Luis Padua y
Mitra and Adonis Motil y Golondrina, all pleaded "Not Guilty." Accused John Andrew Valderama y
Rupisan, Ranil Camaymayan alias "Sedeng," Rex Dandan and Randy Mulog are still at-large.
 In its Decision dated September 13, 2010, the RTC found the appellants guilty as charged and
sentenced them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape as defined and
penalized under Art. 266-A, par. 1 in relation to Art. 266-B, 2nd par. of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. 8353 and in further relation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 8369, and sentencing each of them
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify [the] victim [AAA] the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages. (Criminal Case No. 7693, 7694, 7695,7696, 7697, 7698, 7699, 7700, 7701)
 Respondents appealed to CA but CA affirmed its decision.Dated on Aug 12, 2015, affirmed with
modification the decision of the RTC. Dispositive:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated September 13, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of xxx, Rizal, Branch 76, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In
Criminal Cases No. 7693, 7694, 7695, 7696, 7697, 7698, 7699, 7700 and 7701 appellants
Jomar Sisracon y Rupisan, Mark Valderama y Rupisan, Roberto Cortez y Badilla, Luis Padua
y Mitra and Adonis Motil y Golondrina are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Qualified Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 266-A, par. 1 in relation to
Art. 266-B, 2nd par. of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 8353 and in further
relation to Sec. 5 of R.A. 8369.
 ACCORDINGLY, appellants Roberto Cortez y Badilla is hereby sentence[d] to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each criminal case he was found guilty of. Appellants
Jomar Sisracon y Rupisan, Mark Valderama y Rupisan, Luis Padua y Mitra and Adonis Motil
y Golondrina are hereby sentence[d] to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period for each criminal case they
are hereby found guilty.
 Appellants are also hereby ordered to indemnify [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral
damages; and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as exemplary damages for each criminal
case.
 Appellants are further ordered to pay [AAA] interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate
of Six Percent (6%) per annum until the same are fully paid.
 The respondents filed a petition for certiorari, praying for the reverse and set aside the Decision of
CA and RTC.

ISSUE:
WON the respondents, invoking their privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Art. 68 par. 2
of the RPC, are exempted from criminal liability.
RULING:
YES. The respondents are still criminally liable after invoking their privilege of mitigating
circumstance of minority under Art. 68 par. 2 of the RPC
It is indisputable and proven in court that the appellants, except appellant Roberto, are all minors
when the crime was committed. Jomar was then 17 years and 4 months old, Mark was 17 years and 10
months old, Adonis was 15 years and 11 months old, and Luis was 16 years and 11 months old. Section
6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.
20
prevent the commission of the crime; and 4. appellants are fully aware that the crime they were about to
commit is rape, which is a heinous crime. All these circumstances point to a conclusion that the appellants
were all aware that they were committing a wrongful act.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Jomar Sisracon y Rupisan, Mark Valderama y Rupisan, Roberto
Cortez y Badilla, Luis Padua y Mitra and Adonis Motil y Golondrina is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, the Decision dated August 12, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05986,
affirming the Decision dated September 13, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of x x x, Rizal, Branch 76,
finding each appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape as defined and penalized under
Article 266-A and Article 266-B, par. 1, in relation to Article 266-B, 2nd par. of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and in further relation to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the same
crime on two (2) counts only and that the same appellants shall indemnify AAA the amount of ₱l00,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages per People
v. Jugueta33 for each count. Furthermore, this case is REMANDED to the court of origin for its
appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

According to the above provision, the minor appellants herein, all above 15 but below 18 years of
age, shall only be exempt from criminal liability if they did not act with discernment. In Madali, et al. v.
People,25 this Court held that discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this particular case,
the prosecution was able to prove the presence of discernment. As ruled by the RTC:

Discernment is the mental capacity to understand between right and wrong. It would be recalled
from the testimony of victim [AAA] that the accused being tried in Court took steps in guarding the
premises to ensure that she is prevented from leaving the apartment. Victim [AAA] was unable to leave
the apartment because they blocked her way. The group even threatened to harm the brother of the
victim if she persists on leaving the place. Furthermore, when the brother of the victim discovered the
beastly act committed upon his sister and in a shouting manner questioned them as to why they raped
his sister, they ran away. Which acts are clearly indicative that they were aware that what they've done
is wrong. Therefore, the close participation of the accused that led to the consummation of their evil
designs undoubtedly supports the belief that they acted with discernment.

The CA, as well, aptly ruled that the minors in this case acted with discernment, thus:

Moreover, in the instant case, We rule that the appellants committed the crime of rape with
discernment taking into consideration the following circumstances, namely: 1. appellants took advantage
of [AAA]'s helplessness when she was intoxicated resulting to her unconsciousness; 2. appellants
prevented her from going home when appellants Jomar and Adonis blocked her way out of the apartment
while John guarded the door; 3. Randy acted as lookout to warn his co-accused of any intrusion as would
 21
PEOPLE v. SUSAN LATOSA Y CHICO She was having an affair with a certain Col. Efren She allegedly only saw Sta. Inez twice but
(GR No. 186128, Jun 23, 2010) Sta. Inez (Sta. Inez), a policeman. admitted that Sta. Inez went to the precinct when
he learned of the shooting incident.
Petitioners: SUSAN LATOSA Y CHICO 2.) Sassymae testified that she heard Sta. Inez She claimed that they testified against her
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES tell appellant "bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak because they were manipulated by her brother-
mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok". in-law, Francisco Latosa.
FACTS:
3.) Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum Denied that she was terminated from her job at
showing that appellant was terminated from her the Philippine Public Safety College due to
 On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, appellant and her husband Major
Felixberto Latosa, Sr. (Felixberto) together with two (2) of their children, Sassymae Latosa teaching job by reason of immorality. immorality for having said affair. She claimed
that she was terminated because she had
(Sassymae) and Michael Latosa (Michael), were at their house in Fort Bonifacio.
incurred numerous absences from her work as
she grieved the death of her youngest brother
 Felixberto, Sr. was then asleep and had lost interest in her work after his death.
4) The Firearms Identification Report concluded Accidental shooting, as she was handing the
 Sassymae saw appellant take Felixberto Sr.'s gun from the cabinet and leave. She asked her that appellant fired two (2) shots pistol to him it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto,
mother where she was going and if she could come along, but appellant refused. Sr. who was still lying down.

 Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy ice cream at the
commissary. Appellant gave her money and asked her to leave.
 After Sassymae left, appellant instructed Michael to follow his sister, but he refused as he was
hungry. Appellant insisted and further told Michael not to make any noise as his father was
sleeping.
The prosecution established the following circumstantial evidence:
(1) Susan Latosa, the accused, asked her twins to do errands for her. She first asked Sassymae to go
to Commissary to buy ice cream, thereafter, she asked Michael to follow his sister at the Commissary
which according to the prosecution witnesses was not the usual thing the accused would do;
(2) Thereafter, it was only the accused and the victim who were left alone in the house;

 Appellant went back inside the house and turned up the volume of the television and the radio (3) After the witness Michael, son of the accused and the victim left and proceeded at the barracks
to full.[7] Shortly after that, she came out again and gave Michael some money to buy food at located at the back of their house, Susan Latosa was seen running away from the house by Michael's
the grocery. friend named Macmac;

 Michael bought ice candy and returned to the barracks located at the back of their house. (4) Immediately thereafter, Michael Latosa went inside the room of their barracks and saw his father
Michael thereupon saw his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos who told him that he saw appellant with sort of a hole in the head, blood on the nose and had a gun in his left hand (TSN, May 5, 2003, pp.
running away from their house. 7-8, 12-13);

 Moments later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something had happened in their (5) The cause of death of the victim Felixberto Latosa was intracranial hemorrhage due to gunshot
house. Michael replied in the negative then entered their house. At that point, he saw his father wound of the head (per Medico-legal Report No. M-052-2002, Exh. P);
lying on the bed with a hole in the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.
(6) Susan Latosa's paraffin test yielded positive result for the presence of gunpowder nitrate in her right
 Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about what happened. Sgt. Ramos hand;
told him that appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office.
(7) The point of entry of the gunshot wound found on the victim was located at the left temporal region
as evidenced by Medico Legal Report No. M-052-2002 (Exhibit P);
 Sassymae arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left
hand.
(8) The victim was a right-handed and the gun was found on the latter's left hand;
 (9) Sassymae Latosa [testified] that she heard Col. Sta. Inez [tell] her mother, ..."bakit mo inamin. Sana
Arguments pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok." (TSN, May 19, 2002, p. 13); and
Prosecution Defense
1.) Felixberto Latosa, Jr., one (1) of the legitimate She claimed that she first met Sta. Inez when her (10) The children testified that they were informed by the victim regarding the threat of Sta. Inez to the
sons of appellant and the victim, also testified that youngest brother was killed on June 6, 2001 by whole family who allegedly has an amorous relationship with their mother. Francisco Latosa presented
sometime in December 2001, their father told him unidentified men. Sta. Inez was the one (1) who a memorandum that accused was terminated from her teaching job by reason of immorality.
and his siblings over dinner about a threat to their assisted her.
lives by a certain Efren Sta. Inez. Issue and Ruling:

 Whether the exempting circumstance of accident was established by appellant.

 22
Whether the exempting circumstance of accident was established by appellant.
NO, the Court finds no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings of the
RTC as affirmed by the CA that appellant's version is undeserving of credence. It is doctrinally settled Ruling:
that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan Latosa y Chico is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008
the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby AFFIRMED with
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in MODIFICATION. The amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00.
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily,
findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan Latosa y Chico is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00.
With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Principles:

The basis of appellant's defense of accidental shooting is Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt from criminal
liability:

4. Accident 4. Any person who, while performing 1. Person is performing a lawful act
a lawful act with due care, causes 2. With due care
an injury by mere accident without 3. E causes injury to another by mere
fault or intention of causing it. accident
4. Without fault or intention of causing it
1. compulsion of irresistible force.

EMERGENCY RECIT CASE DIGEST:

SUSAN LATOSA Y CHICO was convicted of parricide by both RTC and court of appeals. She
filed a Notice of Appeal on May 12, 2008 to the SC. The SC AFFIRMED the decisions of the lower courts.

Facts:
Susan Latosa, the accused, asked her twins to do errands for her. Thereafter, it was only the
accused and the victim who were left alone in the house. After the witness Michael, son of the accused
and the victim left and proceeded at the barracks located at the back of their house, Susan Latosa was
seen running away from the house by Michael's friend named Macmac. Moments later, a certain Sgt.
Ramos arrived and asked if something had happened in their house. Michael replied in the negative then
entered their house. At that point, he saw his father lying on the bed with a hole in the left portion of his
head and a gun at his left hand. Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about what
happened. Sgt. Ramos told him that appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall
office. Then, Sassymae arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his
left hand.
Issue:

People vs Toledo
Callejo, Sr. J.
Facts:
 Sept. 16, 1995. 9:30 in the evening. Toledo went to his friend, a blacksmith, to obtain his
bolo. On the way home, he passed by the group of Ricky Guarte drinking gin (Lani Famero,
Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez) at the house of Ricky’s parents (Eliza and Manuel). Toledo
asked them to stay quiet, he then proceeded to sleep in his own abode. After accompanying
his uncle to its home, Ricky went back with the group and decided to sleep in their house,
however they heard stones being thrown to the roof three times. Upon looking he saw
Toledo, so then he went to Toledo’s house and asked why he was stoning the house. Toledo
stabbed him in the abdomen, although sent to the hospital he died during the operation.
 Toledo’s version: Ricky and his group were making noise at 9:30 pm and he asked them to
keep quiet, however Ricky got upset and asked him for a duel. Ricky pushed his doors and
pushed his sala set while holding a balisong. He then went upstairs to get his bolo and open
the door. He only pointed the bolo to Ricky but accidentally stabbed him in his stomach. He
then surrendered at the Barangay on Sept 17.
 Trial Court: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender
 He the appealed to the CA. He asserted in the RTC and in the CA that he is exempt from
criminal liability for the death of the victim. CA affirmed and said he cannot change his theory
or use of defense from Art 12 of the RPC to Art 11.
Issue: W/N Toledo is liable for homicide under (Self-defense) Art 11?
Resolution: No. The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault or
intention on his part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear and convincing
evidence. “We find the testimony of the petitioner incredible and barren of probative weight.” Further,
appellant’s plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of self-defense
cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent
evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.
People v Concepcion
G.R No. 136844. August 1, 2002
Petitioner : People of the Philippines
Respondent : SPO1 Rodolfo P. Concepcion (accused-appellant)
Ponente : Quisumbing, J.
Facts
 November 24, 1997 (between 10:00 and 11:00 pm)
Maximo Sison and Arturo Yarte (witnesses of the prosecution) testified that:
 Lorenzo Galang, victim, got involved in a quarrel at the town plaza of Brgy Cut-cut IIand was
brought to the barangay hall for questioning.
 Shortly after, Rodolfo Concepcion, appellant, arrived and fired his rifle twice or thrice past the
ears of the victim, who was then sitting, but not injuring him.
 Appellant thrust the barrel of the gun against the abdomen of the victim and there was an
explosion.
23
 The victim was shot in the thigh and then to the chest.
The victim died.
According to Concordia Galang, victim’s mother
 The victim worked at the Hacienda Luisita and was earning P1,000 more or less a week and
he was 27 yrs old when the victim died.
 According to appellant:
 The shooting was only accidental
 The appellant was investigating the victim for the latter’s disorderly behavior at the town plaza
because Lorenzo was drunk and unruly he even challenged Concepcion for a fight.
 At this juncture, appellant fired 2 shots in the air but Lorenzo grabbed the barrel of his gun.
The gun accidentally fired and Lorenzo was it.
 Estelita Baluyot and Milagros Villegas (defence witnesses) corroborated the appellant’s story.
They were bystanders who saw the event happen
 RTC rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of the crime MURDER
“Wherefore, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
punished and defined by Art. 248 in relation to RA 7659, accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P 50,000.00 for his loss of life; p 120,000.00 as expected income; P
100,000.00 as moral damages; and P 10,000.00 as attorney’s fee.”
 Appellant filed his notice of appeal
 The lower court gravely erred in not finding that the injuries sustained by the deceased were
unintentionally inflicted while accused-appellant was in the course of performing his lawful
duty as a police officer
Issue: Whether appellant is exempt from criminal liability under Arrt 12 (4) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling :
 NO. The appellant is not exempted from criminal liability under Art 12 (4) of the RPC.
 The defendant admits the commission of the offense and raises an exempting circumstance
under Art 12 (4) of the RPC as a defense
 The following requisites must concur:
1. That the accused was performing a lawful act with due care
2. That the injury is caused by mere accident
3. That there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury
 However, his defense utterly failed to discharge this burden.
 The victim was unarmed and the appellant had an armalite and a handgun.
It is highly inconceivable that an unarmed man could pose bodily harm to another who is heavily
armed.
 The appellant’s gun discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the victim’s body.
 The autopsy report shows that the victim had 3 gunshot wounds : one the right nipple,
another at the mid-femur (thighbone), and another above the knee.
 … appellant guilty of HOMICIDE. The penalty for homicide under ART 249 of the RPC is
reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and one
aggravating circumstance of treachery. The penalty should be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant’s sentence should be within the range of
prision mayor as minimum, and the meduim period of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 24
 P 50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, P 50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P 10,000.00 as attorney’s fee.
Dispositive portion : “Wherefore, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tarlac Branch 65, in
Crminal Case No. 9776, convicting appellant Rodolfo Concepcion of the crime of murder, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant if found guilty of the crime homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 8 years ad 1day or prision mayor as minimum and 14 years, 8 months, and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximun. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P
50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P 50,000.00 as moral damages, P 848,00.00 as lost earnings, P
10,000.00 as attorney’s fee, and the costs.”
 25
People v Baron RULING:

G.R. No. 158209 NO. The threat of future injury, as presented by the defense in his version, is insufficient. The
compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity for the accused (Baron) to escape.
The appellant’s attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting that he acted under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury fails to impress the Court. The circumstantial evidence
FACTS: presented by the prosecution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant and his co-accused
conspired to commit robbery with homicide.
Prosecution’s version:
 On June 28, 1995, Juanito Berallo, a tricycle driver, parked his tricycle infront of a bakeshop PRINCIPLE:
when he was approached by Baron and asked if he could take him and his friend to Hacienda
Caridad for P30.00. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE (Paragraph 4 and 5)
 Berallo agreed and the appellant, together with Villatima and Bargo, rode the tricycle.
Fear of an equal or greater injury .Elements:
 On June 29, 1995, SP02 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide
incident. 1.) the existence of an uncontrollable fear;
 Berallo was seen lying dead in a sugarcane plantation in Hacienda Sta Ana, 20 meters away 2.) that the fear must be real or imminent; and
from the highway. 3.) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed
 According to the post-mortem examination, Berallo sustained 15 stab wounds, inflicted by
more than one person and 5 of which were fatal. People vs Feliciano
 The follow up investigation of the police team identified Baron as one of the suspects.
 Baron did not deny that he and his co-accused detached the motorcycle from the sidecar and GR No 190179, October 20, 2010
took the mototr to the house of VIllatima’s aunt.
Facts:

Version of the Defense:

 Baron was on his way to the public transport terminal when a tricycle, with two passengers,  On February 22, 2006, at around 10 pm, PO2 Monte received a telephone call from a
passed by and asked if he wanted a ride to Segundo Diez. On their way, the two passengers
declared hold-up. Armed with guns, the passengers tied the hands of the driver and dragged concerned citizen reporting that an illegal drug trade was being operated by a certain Janggo
him towards the sugarcane fields. As Baron was left in the tricycle, he lost sight of the three,
at the Rodriguez Compound at Pasig City. A buy-bust operation against Janggo was then
ane he suspected that the two killed the driver (Berallo).
 When the two passengers came back, they detached the sidecar of the tricycle. They brought organized along with the concerned citizen named Buboy.
Baron with them and drove the motorcycle to Taytay Martesan. They returned to Cadiz City
the following morning and the two even accompanied him to his house. The two passengers  PO2 Monte was designated as poseur-buyer and, for that purpose, he was given two P100
threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not to report the incident to the police.
marked bills. After coordinating with the PDEA, the buy-bust team and the confidential
 On June 30, 1995, policemen came to Baron’s house and asked where the motorcycle was
taken. informant went to the target area.

RTC ruled that BARON is GUILTY of Robbery with Homicide. Penalty is DEATH.  Upon reaching the house, PO2 Monte saw a man standing in front of it whom the informant
 Baron appealed before the CA that the RTC erred in finding him guilty and in not appreciating
identified as Janggo. They approached Janggo and then saw a woman standing on the
in his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible fear and/of uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury. doorway. The informant introduced PO2 Monte to Janggo as a regular buyer of shabu. The
CA: AFFIRMED and MODIFIED RTC ruling. Death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
 CA concluded that requisites for the exempting circumstance were lacking. The alleged latter then asked PO2 Monte how much he intended to buy, to which he answered, P200.
threat, if at all, was not real or imminent. Baron had the opportunity to escape when he was
 While PO2 Monte was talking to Janggo, he noticed two women and a man seated inside the
left at the tricycle, but he instead waited as if he was one of the malefactors.
house. Janggo then asked the woman standing near the doorway if she had any shabu. The
ISSUE:
woman then pulled a plastic sachet from her right pocket which she handed to Janggo, who, in
WON Baron may use the exempting circumstance to evade criminal liability.
turn, handed it to PO2 Monte.

 Upon receiving and examining the plastic sachet, PO2 Monte took off his baseball cap, the pre-
arranged signal to signify the consummation of the sale. At this point, PO2 Monte identified
himself as a police officer and grabbed the left arm of Janggo.
 When PO2 Caparas arrived at the scene, PO2 Monte shouted that there were more persons
inside the house. PO2 Caparas then apprehended the woman standing near the doorway,
while PO1 Vega and PO1 Mapula cornered the three other persons inside the house.
 Janggo was identified as accused-appellant Feliciano, along with the other accused-
appellant. All of them were brought to the police station for further investigation, after which
they were brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for
the mandatory drug examination.
 On defense, the appellant testified that on the night of their arrest, they were preparing dinner
when certain police officers just barged inside their house. The police officers then put them
under arrest without any reason or explanation and despite their protests. Accused appellants
further claimed that the police officers asked them to produce P10,000 in exchange for their
release. Failing to produce the amount, charges were then filed against them. The RTC found
them guilty of the offense, and was later affirmed by the CA.
Version of the Defense
 In contrast, accused-appellants interposed the defense of denial. Live-in partners Feliciano and
Laurora claimed that, at the fateful night of their arrest, they were preparing dinner when certain
police officers just barged inside their house.The police officers then put them under arrest
without any reason or explanation and despite their protests. Accused-appellants further
claimed that the police officers asked them to produce PhP 10,000 in exchange for their
release. Failing to produce the amount, charges were then filed against them.
 The testimony of Ruelo is corroborative of the story of accused-appellants. He said that he was
staying at the house and that he is the brother of Laurora. He confirmed the statement of his
26
co-accused that the police just barged inside the house and, without any reason, put all of them
under arrest after searching it.
Issue: 1) W/N the seized the seized drugs can be used as evidence despite being the result of an
unlawful arrest
2) W/N the accused are guilty of the charge despite the arresting officer’s non-compliance
with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under R.A. No.
9165.
Held:
1) Yes. Accused-appellants contend that the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation
had sufficient time to obtain a warrant of arrest considering that they were already in possession
of pertinent information, i.e., the letter-complaint from the Barangay Captain. Thus, they argue
that the police officers had no basis to show any urgency upon which to justify a warrantless
arrest.
The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that
is resorted to for trapping and capturing criminals. It is legal and has been proved to be
an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and
legal safeguards is undertaken. Appellant’s argument that the police officers should have
instead secured an arrest warrant is misplaced and untenable considering the nature of the
offense involved, the obscurity of the transgressors thereof, and the unpredictability of the
transaction subject of the offense.” Moreover, it has ruled time and again that a buy-bust
operation is employed to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.
Clearly, in this case, the buy-bust operation was proper. All the essential elements of the crime
of illegal sale of drugs have been established, i.e.,
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale took place. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt
by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.
2) Yes. The law itself lays down exceptions to its requirements regarding the chain of
custody. Thus, non-compliance with the provision is not fatal. In fact, it is settled that
non-compliance with Sec. 21 of the IRR does not render an accused’s arrest illegal
or make the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
 27
Moreover, no proof was adduced to support the claim that the integrity and the evidentiary

value of the seized drugs were compromised. Thus, this Court finds no reason to overturn the

finding of the trial court that the same drugs seized from accused-appellants were the same

ones presented during trial. As it were, the chain of custody of the illicit drugs seized from

accused-appellants remains unbroken.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

On appeal to the CA, accused-appellants disputed the lower court’s decision finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. They argued that the lower court erred in admitting the seized
dangerous drugs as evidence considering that the arrest was unlawful. Further, they contend that the
prosecution failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of the drugs.

The CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

PRINCIPLE:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.

While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting
criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment,
has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or
punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the ‘decoy solicitation’
of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present
and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense
is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him,
free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a
supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the
original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as
his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists
the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no
defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a ‘spotter,’ detective,
or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

Roberto Chang vs People of the Philippines
Petitioners: Roberto E. Chang; Pacifico D. San Mateo
Respondents: People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Carpio Morales
FACTS:
● Roberto E. Chang - (former) Municipal Treasurer of Makati tasked to examine/ investigate tax
returns of private corporations/companies operating within Makati, and determine the
sufficiency/insufficiency of Income Tax
● Pacifico San Mateo - (former) Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit
Division, Makati Treasurer’s Office
● June 18, 1990 - Makati Treasurer’s Office examiners conducted an examination of the books
of accounts and other records of Group Developer’s Inc. (GDI) from January 1985-December
1989 to verify the correct amount of tax due from its business operations and found out that
the company had a tax deficiency inclusive of penalty of P494,601.11.
● April 1991 - A year after, Mario Magat (Chief Operating Office of GDI), upon receiving the
assessment notices, referred the issue to the Accounting Department which informed him that
the computations requested from municipal auditors to validate the assessment had not been
received. Later, Magat talked to San Mateo via phone. At that time, San Mateo had been calling
GDI’s Accounting Department asking for someone with whom he could talk about the
assessment. Magat asked San Mateo to determine and solve the insufficiency of Income tax
Assessments of GDI.
● May 15, 1991 - Magat met San Mateo and Chang for lunch and agreed that if GDI could pay
P125,000 by the end of this month, there is a possibility that the assessment be “resolved”.
The settling of money, as agreed, would not be going to the Municipality.
● May 29, 1991 - San Mateo went alone to Magat’s office at GDI to pick up the check for the
settlement of GDI’s deficient tax liability. Magat, who misunderstood the agreement that the
money would not be going to the Municipality, gave the Manager’s Check payable to the
Municipal Treasurer of Makati which made San Mateo refused to accept because it was not
agreed. Magat then informed San Mateo that he need to consult with the top management of
GDI for settling the money.
● June 6, 1991 - Magat met again with San Mateo and Chang for lunch but at this time, he was
advised by the two that GDI had only two options to consider in paying the tax: either pay the
assessed amount of P494,601.11 to the Municipality or P125,000 to them for settlement of the
assessment. Later, Magat consulted the president of GDI then referred the matter to the NBI.
● June 12, 1991 - Magat met NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco who advised him to file a
complaint with NBI. Later, Magat gave a sworn statement before the NBI.
● After several days, Magat contacted San Mateo and told him that he would deliver the
P125,000 on June 19, 1991.
● June 19, 1991 - Magat informed the NBI about the payment. The NBI formed a team to conduct
an entrapment operation.
- Magat met San Mateo, Chang and Edgardo Feraren (Driver
Clerk of Makati Treasurer’s Office) for lunch and told them that GDI was ready to pay
the money. He later handed the brown envelope with money upon the showing of
Certificate of Examination reading “No Tax Liability Involved” by Chang. At that
instant, the NBI agents announced that they were being arrested.
● July 2, 2004 - Sandiganbayan convicted San Mateo and Chang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act while Feraren was acquitted.
ISSUE and RULING:
Whether or not entrapment or instigation was transpired on June 19, 1991 which proven by the
Sandiganbayan that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court found no merit on the petition and affirmed the decision of the
Sandiganbayan on convicting San Mateo and Chang. It argued that all of the elements provided in Section
28
3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act are present. These elements are: (1) The offender is a
public officer; (2) The offender requested/received a gift, present, share, percentage, benefit; (3) These
gifts requested/received are on behalf of the offender/other person; (4) These gifts requested/received
have connection with a contract/transaction with the government; and (5) The public officer has the right
to intervene in his official capacity. Indeed, San Mateo and Chang demanded P125,000 from Magat as a
reward for them in doing their official duty as public officers of the Municipal Treasurer of Makati in
determining the insufficiency of Income Tax Assessments of GDI and resolving that issue. Moreover, the
petitioners made an agreement with Magat that the money which was supposedly be given to the
Municipality should be handed to them personally that made Magat suspicious and referred the matter to
the president of GDI and relied to NBI.
With regard to San Mateo’s and Chang’s argument that the operation conducted by the NBI
was an instigation and not an entrapment, the Supreme Court argued that it was an entrapment. The
NBI as an entrapper resorted a way to trap and capture the actual commission of the crime by the
petitioners while receiving the money amounting to P125,000. The convicted public officers were caught
red-handed in receiving the money. Likewise, it was already established that San Mateo and Chang have
the criminal intent to execute their plan, that is to take the money on their behalf and would not be given
to the Municipality at the time they advised Magat that in order for the GDI to prevent their closure, it will
either pay P494,601 to the Municipality or pay the amount of P125,000 to them as a reward for their
service rendered as public officers. Indeed, the NBI planned to catch the execution of the crime to be
committed, and was committed by San Mateo and Chang.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Sandiganbayan decision is AFFIRMED.
PRINCIPLES:
- Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Section 3(b)) elements:
a) The offender is a public officer;
b) The offender requested/received a gift, present, share, percentage, benefit;
c) These gifts requested/received are on behalf of the offender/other person;
d) These gifts requested/received have connection with a contract/transaction with the
government; and
e) The public officer has the right to intervene in his official capacity.
- Entrapment
- Law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal
while in the actual commission of the crime.
- the mens rea (criminal intent) originates from the mind of the criminal
- the idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him
- Instigation
- Law officers induced the accused to commit the crime
- The law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused
who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.

People vs Court of Appeals and Eladio Tangan (2001)
G.R. No. 103613 | 2001-02-23
Subject: Acquittal of accused cannot be questioned via certiorari or appeal (violation of accused's right
against double jeoprady); Incomplete self-defense, as a privileged mitigating circumstance, requires the
presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; The shooting was not accidental; The lack of
unlawful aggression from the victim belies the claim of incomplete self-defense; A person is responsible
for all the consequences of his felonious act; The element of 'lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself' is absent; Sufficient provocation, as ordinary mitigating circumstance,
cannot be appreciated; Passion and obfuscation, as ordinary mitigating circumstance, cannot be
appreciated; Under present laws, if an unlicensed firearm is used in murder or homicide, such use of
unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance and no longer considered as a
separate offense; Retroactive application of laws or rules apply only when the same is favorable to the
accused; Imposable penalty; Civil indemnity and moral damages
Facts: At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone
on Roxas Boulevard. He had just come from an intelligence operation. At the same time, Generoso
Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard
with his uncle, Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada Hotel.
Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's
way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path. Tangan accelerated and overtook
Generoso and Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking
his lane. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-turn. Generoso passed
him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out. As the
Mirandas got near Tangan's car, Generoso loudly retorted, "Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang
sasakyan ko?" Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Tangan pointed his hand to
Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, "Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang
pinagmamalaki mo?" Tangan countered, "Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?" With this, Tangan went to his car
and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat. What happened next is the subject of conflicting
versions.
The prosecution claimed that Tangan shot the victim point-blank in the stomach at a distance
of about one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that when he grappled with Generoso and
Manuel Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell to the ground and accidentally fired, hitting the victim.
Tangan was charged with homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, and he was separately
charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.
After trial, the lower court (RTC) acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but
convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the
ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of
passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor.
Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but
increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000. Tangan filed a petiton for review under Rule 45 to the
Supreme Court to question the CA decision.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave
abuse of discretion, likewise filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the Supreme Court, where it
prayed that the CA's judgment be modified by convicting Tangan of homicide without appreciating in his
favor any mitigating circumstance.
29
Held:
Acquittal of accused cannot be questioned via certiorari or appeal (violation of accused's right
against double jeoprady)
1. In the recent case of People vs. Velasco and Galvez, we held that the prosecution cannot
avail of the remedies of special civil action on certiorari, petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in
criminal cases. Previous to that, we categorically ruled that the writ of certiorari cannot be used by the
State in a criminal case to correct a lower court's factual findings or evaluation of the evidence.
2. The Solicitor General's petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that no mitigating circumstance
be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant and that the penalty imposed on him be correspondingly
increased, constitutes a violation of Tangan's right against double jeopardy and should be dismissed.
3. Rule 117, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is clear:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information. xxx
Incomplete self-defense, as a privileged mitigating circumstance , requires the presence of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
4. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13 (1), in relation to Article 11 (1), of the Revised
Penal Code.
5. Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance;
hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused. In order
that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of
self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
6. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to
establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense,
complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of
defense will have no basis.
The shooting was not accidental
7. After analyzing the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court found that when the
accused (Tangan) took the gun from his car and when he tried to get out of the car and the two
Mirandas saw the accused already holding the gun, they started to grapple for the possession of the
gun and it went off hitting Generoso Miranda at the stomach. The court believes that contrary to the
testimony of the accused, he never lost possession of the gun for if he did and when the gun fell to the
ground, it will not first explode or if it did, somebody is not holding the same, the trajectory of the bullet
would not be perpendicular or horizontal.

8. The theory of the prosecution that the shooting took place while the three were grappling for the
possession of the gun beside the car of Tangan is completely in harmony with the findings and
testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding the relative position of the three and the precarious nearness of the
victim when Tangan pulled the trigger of his gun. Dr. Ibarrola explained that the gun was about two (2)
inches from the entrance wound and that its position was almost perpendicular when it was fired. It was
in fact the closeness of the Mirandas vis-a-vis Tangan during the scuffle for the gun that the Tangan
was compelled to pull the trigger in answer to the instinct of self-preservation.
The lack of unlawful aggression from the victim belies the claim of incomplete self-defense
9. The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending
himself but from the victim.
10. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Likewise, the exchange of insulting
words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not
be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault. There being no
lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.
A person is responsible for all the consequences of his felonious act
11. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him.
It may be said that the former had no intention of killing the victim but simply to retain possession of his
gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of the gunshot wound, though the
shooter may not have the intention to kill, does not absolve him from culpability. Having caused the fatal
wound, Tangan is responsible for all the consequences of his felonious act. He brought out the gun,
wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun may be taken from him, he fired and fled.
The element of 'lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself' is
absent
12. The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is not
supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan
was in effect the one who provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done
by Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as creating
so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation for the other party to act violently.
Sufficient provocation, as ordinary mitigating circumstance, cannot be appreciated
13. The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation under Article 13,
paragraph 4, has no factual basis. Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete self-defense is
different from sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it
pertains to its absence on the part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating circumstance,
it pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party. Besides, only one mitigating circumstance
can arise out of one and the same act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the blowing of horns,
cutting of lanes or overtaking can be considered as acts of provocation, the same were not
sufficient. The word "sufficient" means adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong and must
accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. Moreover, Generoso's act of asking for an explanation from
Tangan was not sufficient provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill or injure Generoso.
Passion and obfuscation, as ordinary mitigating circumstance, cannot be appreciated
14. The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation under Article
13, paragraph 6, has no factual basis. For the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation to be
appreciated, it is required that (1) there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
30
condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover
his normal equanimity.
15. In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly acted upon an impulse for there was no sudden
and unexpected occurrence which wuld have created such condition in his mind to shoot the victim.
Assuming that his path was suddenly blocked by Generoso Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no
longer be treated as a startling occurrence, precisely because he had already passed them and was
already the one blocking their path. Tangan's acts were done in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness,
for which no mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can arise.
Under present laws, if an unlicensed firearm is used in murder or homicide, such use of
unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance and no longer
considered as a separate offense
16. Under the laws then existing, homicide was penalized with reclusion temporal, but if the homicide
was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty shall be death. The death penalty,
however, cannot be imposed on Tangan because in the meantime, the 1987 Constitution proscribed
the imposition of death penalty; and although it was later restored in 1994, the retroactive application of
the death penalty is unfavorable to him.
17. Previously, the accused may be prosecuted for two crimes: (1) homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code and (2) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. 1866.
However, P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294, which provides that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in murder or homicide, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance and no longer considered as a separate offense, which means that only one offense shall
be punished - murder or homicide.
Retroactive application of laws or rules apply only when the same is favorable to the accused
18. However, this law cannot apply retroactively because it will result in the imposition on Tangan of
the maximum period of the penalty. Moreover, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information. Being favorable,
this new rule can be given retroactive effect as they are applicable to pending cases. In any case,
Tangan was acquitted of the illegal possession case.
Imposable penalty
19. Consequently, Tangan should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. Pursuant to
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, if the prescribed penalty is composed of three periods, and there
is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the medium period shall be applied.
20. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be that
which, in view of the attendant circumstances, may be properly imposed, which in this case is reclusion
temporal medium with an imprisonment range of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
the next lower degree which is prision mayor with a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. Hence, petitioner Tangan is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Civil indemnity and moral damages
21. The death indemnity of P30,000.00 was correctly increased by the appellate court to P50,000.00 in
line with jurisprudence.
 31
22. Moral damages are awarded in criminal cases involving injuries if supported by evidence on record,
but the stipulation of the parties in this case substitutes for the necessity of evidence in support thereof.
Though not awarded below, the victim's heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 which is considered reasonable considering the pain and anguish brought by his death.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL, accused-
appellant.
GR NO. 135701
FACTS:
 On or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 15, 1996, at Barangay Tambulan,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, Elbert Callet, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one ALFREDO SENADOR with the use of a hunting
knife.
 According to the medico legal report, a stab wound measuring two (2) cm. in length, 0.3 cm.
in width and eleven (11) cm. in deepness located at the left side of the trunk, about two (2)
cm. above the left clavicular bone of the victim is the cause of his death.
 The evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 15, 1996, at 5:00 p.m., the victim,
Alfredo Senador, his 12-year old son, Lecpoy Senador, and Eduardo Perater were at the flea
market of barangay Tambulan, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. There were many people in the
vicinity. Some were playing cara y cruz while others were playing volleyball.
 Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were beside each other as they watched a cara y cruz game.
Alfredo sat close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot. Lecpoy and
Eduardo sat on a piece of wood and on a stone, respectively.
 Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were beside each other as they watched a cara y cruz game.
Alfredo sat close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot. Lecpoy and
Eduardo sat on a piece of wood and on a stone, respectively.
 Then, out of nowhere, the accused, Elbert Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the
latter on the left shoulder near the base of the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively,
Alfredo stood up and managed to walk a few meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and
Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Alfredo died shortly thereafter.
 In the defense of the accused: Allegedly, at 3:00 p.m., the accused, Elbert Callet, played
volleyball near the flea market. After two (2) games, he stopped playing. It was past 4:00 p.m.
He stayed at the flea market and watched as others played volleyball. While watching the
game, he was hit on the left side of the body by Alfredo's elbow. He asked Alfredo why he hit
him. Alfredo retorted, "Are you angry?" Next, Alfredo grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it.
He pleaded with Alfredo to let go of his arm, but Alfredo warned that he would be his third
victim if he would get angry with him. As Alfredo was pulling out a hunting knife from his
waist, he (the accused) managed to stab him first. Thereafter, he ran towards the municipal
hall to surrender.
 The Regional Trial Court charged the accused ELBERT CALLET Y SABANAL guilty beyond
a scintilla of doubt for the crime of MURDER penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without
any aggravating circumstance, the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA
with all the accessory penalties provided under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
 The accused appealed, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the accused should be charged for the crime of murder even if he has no
intention to commit so wrong a grave
RULING:
32
 Yes, lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on
the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted.
The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind,
without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what
he did, and he must be held responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating
circumstance.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from, finding the accused, ELBERT CALLET, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12995, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay the legal heirs of the victim, ALFREDO SENADOR, the amount of P50,000.0
PEOPLE v. TORPIO
G.R. No. 138984. June 4, 2004
Ponente: Callejo, Sr.
FACTS:
 Anthony Rapas and Dennis Torpio were drinking liquor. When Torpio did not want to drink
anymore, Rapas got angry and then bathed defendant with gin. Rapas then boxed and tried to
stab him with a batangas knife but failed to hit as the latter was crawling under the table.
 Dennis Torpio was able to escape and ran towards home. His family was awakened, his mother
shouted as Dennis was taking a knife and appearing bloodied. Manuel Torpio woke up and
tried to take the knife from Dennis but failed and, in the process, wounded or cut himself in his
left hand. Dennis left with the knife, passed by another route towards the seashore and upon
reaching the cottage where Anthony and their companion Porboy Perez were, looked for
Anthony.
 Anthony upon seeing Dennis sensed danger and he fled by taking the seashore. But Dennis,
being accustomed to the place and having known the terrain despite the dark knew, upon being
suggested by somebody whom Dennis claimed to be Rey Mellang, that there is only one exit
Anthony could make and, thus, he went the other way through the nipa plantation and he was
able to meet and block Anthony.
 Upon seeing the shining knife of Dennis, Anthony tried to evade by turning to his left and
Dennis thus hit the back portion of Anthony. Anthony ran farther but he was caught in a fishing
net across the small creek and he fell on his back.
 It is at this juncture Dennis mounted on Anthony and continued stabbing the latter. He left the
place but did not proceed home, instead, he went to the grassy meadow near the camp and
there slept until morning. He then went to a certain police officer to whom he voluntarily
surrendered and together they went to the police headquarters.
 The trial court found defendant guilty of murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation
but found mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party
preceded the act; the accused acted to vindicate immediately a grave offense committed by
the victim, and voluntary surrender.
 The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, as the penalty was reclusion perpetua, that
there was no treachery as he did not consciously adopt a mode of attack to ensure the
accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense
that the victim might offer nor there was evident premeditation as the prosecution failed to prove
that he had planned and prepared any plot to kill the victim.

 Further, no direct and positive evidence had been shown that sufficient time had elapsed
between his determination to commit the crime and its execution to enable him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.
 He argues that he is guilty only of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was treachery or evident meditation
2. Whether all the mitigating circumstances the trial court found are present.
RULING:
1. NO. It should be clear that treachery and evident premeditation, must be proven with equal
certainty as the commission of the crime charged. Such circumstances cannot be presumed;
nor can they be based on mere surmises or speculations. In case of doubt, the same should
be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, there was no evidence showing any method
or means employed by the defendant in order to ensure his safety from any retaliation that
could be put up by the victim. Defendant only acted to avenge Rapay's acts done against him
and confronted Rapay while bleeding from his wounds. Evident premeditation requires that
the execution of the criminal act by the accused be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In this case, there is no evident premeditation as it
was not shown that defendant had definitely resolved to commit the offense and had reflected
on the means to bring about the execution following an appreciable length of time. The
utterance of defendant that he must kill Rapay was not considered by the Court as a product
of serious and determined reflection. The interval between the time when the appellant made
this statement and when he actually stabbed Anthony was not sufficient or considerable
enough as to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The Court held that
defendant should only be guilty of homicide.
2. NO. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and the immediate vindication of a
grave offense were only present. Voluntary surrender was present as defendant lost no time in
submitting himself to the authorities by going to Boy Estrera, a police officer. The immediate
vindication of a grave offense was appreciated as defendant was humiliated and wounded by
the Rapay. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased , it was nonetheless a grave offense.
Sufficient provocation, however, cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense. The two circumstances should only be considered as one
because it arose from one and the same incident.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 18, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35,
in Criminal Case No. 5217-0 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The appellant Dennis Torpio y
Estrera is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. He is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the said victim, the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000) as civil
indemnity, Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000) as temperate damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000) as attorney’s fees. SO ORDERED.
EMERGENCY RECIT DIGEST:
Anthony Rapas and Dennis Torpio were drinking liquor. When defendant did not want to drink anymore,
Rapas got angry and then bathed defendant with gin. Rapas then boxed and tried to stab him but failed
he was crawling under the table. Defendant was able to escape and went to his house. There, defendant's
father tried to stop him from pursuing Rapas - but failed to do so. Defendant then looked for Rapas and
successfully stabbed him. The morning after, he voluntarily surrendered to the police.
33
PEOPLE v. OLOVERIO
G.R. No. 211159. March 18, 2015.
Ponente: Leonen
FACTS
 Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the seconds
before the commission of the crime. It may build up and strengthen over time until it can no
longer be repressed and will ultimately motivate the commission of the crime.
 That at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 2, 2003, at Brgy. Belen, Palompon,
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused met the victim, DOLFO GULANE, while the latter was walking on his lonesome, and
with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, stab the said victim using
a sharp-pointed bolo, which the accused has provided for the purpose, thereby hitting and
inflicting mortal wounds on the different parts of the body of the aforesaid victim causing his
instantaneous death. Oloverio was arraigned on January 25, 2005, where he pleaded not guilty.
Trial on the merits ensued.
 According to the prosecution, on October 2, 2003, at around 3:00 p.m., Rudipico Pogay (Pogay)
and Dominador Panday (Panday) saw Rodulfo Gulane walking about five (5) meters away from
them with Oloverio trailing behind him. Oloverio allegedly tapped Gulane’s right shoulder and
hacked him on the chest and extremities with a bolo until Gulane collapsed on the ground.
Oloverio then allegedly took Gulane’s money from his pocket.
 Pogay heard Oloverio shouting the words, "Patay na ang datu sa Brgy. San Pablo!" ("The rich
man in San Pablo is already dead!") Gulane managed to tell Oloverio, "Man luba ka man, Ling?"
("Ling, why did you stab me?") After, Gulane died. Panday proceeded to inform Gulane’s family
of the incident
 In his defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of the incident, Gulane had been
accusing him of having an incestuous relationship with his mother. He allegedly kept his cool
and told Gulane to go home, but the latter continued to mock him by asking in a loud voice,
"How many times did you have sexual intercourse with your mother?" He allegedly asked
Gulane to go home again but the latter angrily replied, "Who are you to tell me to go home?
 Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by drawing his own bolo.
They grappled with it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up stabbing Gulane, which resulted in
the latter’s death. Accompanied by a barangay tanod, Oloverio went to the municipal hall to
surrender to the authorities. He admitted that he stabbed Gulane because he could no longer
bear the insulting remarks against him.
 Romulo Lamoste (Lamoste), then Barangay Captain of Barangay Belen, Palompon, Leyte,
alleged that Gulane and Oloverio had an altercation before the incident. He alleged that
Oloverio’s daughter had once confided to Oloverio that Gulane wanted to touch her private
parts. About a month later, he allegedly heard Gulane ask Oloverio "in a joking manner about
his incestuous relationship with his mother." Oloverio allegedly got mad and they ended up
fighting, but Lamoste was able to subdue them. He, however, admitted that he was not present
during the incident.
 On January 29, 2010, Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte rendered its
Decision finding Oloverio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
 The trial court ruled that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not
present in this case since it could not co-exist with the presence of treachery. The only
mitigating circumstance it found present was of voluntary surrender. As murder was punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death, it imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
dispositive portion reads:
 Wherefore, as to the proffer of mitigating circumstances of Passion and Obfuscation as defined
by Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated, what can be appreciated only is
the voluntary surrender which is covered by Art. 13 par. 7 of the Revised Penal Code.
 So from the evidence extant from the records, the court finds the accused Marcelino Oloverio,
GUILTY of the crime of Murder as the evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and therefore sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. The voluntary surrender is none availing as reclusion perpetua is not a divisible
penalty as defined by the Revised Penal Code.
 The accused Marcelino Oloverio is also ordered to pay Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos
damages to the heirs of Rodulfo Gulane. The case records were forwarded to the Court of
Appeals on May 6, 2010.
 On January 29, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the conviction. It
found that Oloverio failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that Gulane
"committed an unlawful act which sufficiently caused him to act with passion and obfuscation."
The Court of Appeals found that Gulane’s act of insulting Oloverio before the stabbing was
unsupported by evidence. Instead, it found that treachery was present since Gulane was
unsuspecting when Oloverio suddenly attacked him. The court also noted that Gulane was
already 83 years old and might not have had a chance to defend himself. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of
Oloverio’s voluntary surrender. It, however, modified the award of damages to include moral,
temperate, and exemplary damages. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2010 of the RTC, Branch
17, of Palompon, Leyte in Criminal Case No. P-1163 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that with respect to the
trial court’s award of Php50,000.00 damages, this should be understood to represent the civil
indemnity. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Rodulfo Gulane Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, Php25,000.00 as temperate damages, and Php30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. All damages shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
 On March 18, 2013, Oloverio filed his Notice of Appeal, which was favorably acted upon by the
Court of Appeals. In compliance with this court’s Resolution dated April 2, 2014, Oloverio and
the Office of the Solicitor General separately manifested that they were no longer filing their
supplemental briefs before this court since they have already stated their arguments in their
briefs before the Court of Appeals. Upon review of the case records, this court resolves to
modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio is guilty
only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. He is entitled to the mitigating
circumstances of passion and obfuscation and of voluntary surrender. Murder is the act of
killing a person under the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The provision states: For murder or homicide, the prosecution must also be able to prove the
accused had the intent to kill. The witnesses, Panday and Pogay, positively identified accused-
appellant as the one who stabbed Gulane with a bolo. Panday stated that he saw Rodulfo
Gulane killed by Marcelino Oloverio. That Marcelino Oloverio held the right shoulder of Rodulfo
Gulane then stabbed him many times and there was strucking the victim. Pogay also testified
that [Marce]Lino [Oloverio] stabbed Gulalane and when Gulane fell down, Lino said “Patay na
ang datu sa Barangay San Pablo.”. Many times did Oloverio stabbed Gulane and there was
also a hacking blow. Their testimonies were consistent with the medico-legal findings that
Gulane died due to multiple stab wounds. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals also
found that the witnesses had no ill motive to testify against accused-appellant. The intent to
kill is established not only by the number of stab wounds found on Gulane, but also by accused-
appellant’s own admission that he stabbed Gulane. The presence of treachery, however, has
not been sufficiently established. Since treachery has not been proven, the crime is merely
homicide. The penalties of the accused-appellant must be modified accordingly.
ISSUE: Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present
ARGUMENTS
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the
accused must be able to prove the following elements:
34
1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and
2. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity.
In People v. Lobino: It has been held that "[T]here is passional obfuscation when the crime was
committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason."
"The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which naturally
result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the
mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-
control, because the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the
commission of the offense." Moreover, "the act producing the obfuscation must not be far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might have recovered his normal equanimity." (Emphasis supplied)
RULING
YES. There was neither a reason given why Gulane acted that way towards accused-appellant nor
any evidence to show that accused-appellant had previously wronged him. The prosecution
did not deny that Gulane insulted accused-appellant on various occasions. The witnesses
could not state with reasonable certainty that Gulane did not provoke accused-appellant a
few minutes before the incident; they could only testify to the incident itself and the seconds
which preceded it. In view of these considerations, we find that the mitigating circumstance
of passion and obfuscation is present in this case.
According to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals considered accused-appellant’s voluntary surrender
to the authorities as a mitigating circumstance. We find no reason to disturb this conclusion.
Considering that there are two (2) mitigating circumstances in accused-appellant’s favor, the
imposable penalty must be that which is next lower to that prescribed by law. Article 64 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code provides:
ARTICLE 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. — In cases in
which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible
penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in
accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the
application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
As the exact length of time cannot be determined with certainty, the trial court shall determine the
exact period of preventive imprisonment that may be credited in accused-appellant’s favor.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Marcelino
Oloverio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE v. GENOSA
G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004
Ponente: Panganiban
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the
"battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts,
however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no
immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative
provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysis"
she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9
and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she
suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on parole,
because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the
pendency of this case.
FACTS:
 Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City and
rented a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte
 On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary
and that was the last time he heard from Ben. He also noticed that since then, the Genosas'
rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
 On November 18, 1995, Steban who is living near the rented house of the appellant noticed
the foul odor on the house of the couple and since it is uninhabited, he broke in and found the
lifeless body of Ben in the bedroom. After what he saw, he immediately reported to the mother
of Ben, Iluminada Genosa of her son's mnisfortune. Meanwhile, in the morning of the same
day, the police after recieveing a report regarding the incident went to the house and found in
one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was,
leaning against a wall.
 The postmortem examination of the medico-legal yielded the findings quoted in the Information
for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was
'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed
fracture of the occipital.
 Appellant admitted killing Ben
 Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She
allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a
chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television.
According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold
of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help.
Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing
his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant
outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her 'You might as
well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was aware that there was
a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade
35
cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop
the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was
about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
 Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot,
though, but in the bedroom
Version of the Defense
o Alex the brother of Ben testified that he cannot remember the date of marriage of the two. He
said that the couples always quarreled when Ben is drunk.
o Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic
married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the marriage
went along, Marivic became already very demanding and also physically injuring Ben on the
long run.
o Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual
drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on
the bed, and sometimes beat her.
o A number of witnesses testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben
o Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband
who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her
and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be
admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and
hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995
o Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
 Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September
1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
 On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT
finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and further found
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
DEATH.
 On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the
re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo
to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted
the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome”
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and
Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the
Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUES:
1. Whether appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome”as constituting
self-defense
2. Whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa

RULING:
1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered
woman syndrome”. A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives
or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified
as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman
may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.” More graphically, the battered
woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases:
(1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or,
at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual --
grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard
to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-
defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the
following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,
sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was
a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.
She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or
even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however,
taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. The
first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
36
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted
in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of
her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively
as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from
the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party
attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-
spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed
her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and
impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission
of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum;
to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her,
the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs
de oficio.
 37
PEOPLE v. GONZALEZ reasonable doubt of the complex crime of 2. However, with respect to the injuries
G.R. No. 139542. June 21, 2001. Murder with Double Frustrated Murder. sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, the appellee
Ponente: Gonzaga-Reyes 5. The trial court committed reversible error disagrees with the contention that the appellant
when it failed to appreciate the mitigating is liable only for slight physical injuries. The
FACTS: circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of injuries sustained by both children are head
 In the afternoon of October 31, 1998, both the families of the private complainant Noel intention to commit so grave a wrong, injuries and could have caused their death if not
Andres and that of the accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the provocation or threat on the part of the offended for the immediate medical attention given them.
exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. The appellant was driving with his grandson and three party immediately preceded the act, incomplete 3. As regards the pleaded mitigating
housemaids, while the private complainant was driving with his pregnant wife Feliber defense of relative, and voluntary surrender. circumstances, appellee asserts that none can
Andres, his two year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar 6. The trial court committed reversible error be considered in favor of the appellant. There is
Valdez. when it failed to find that the shooting incident evidence on record that the appellant did not
 At the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant was accidental. voluntarily surrender to the police and it appears
Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the complainant Noel Andres was headed 7. The trial court committed reversible error from the testimonies of witnesses that he
straight along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost collided. Andres was able to when it gave credence to the testimonies of entertained the possibility of flight but his car
timely step on the brakes. The Gonzalez continued driving along his way while Noel prosecution witnesses Elmer Ramos and was stuck in traffic along the exit of the memorial
Andres drove behind the appellant’s vehicle for some time and cut him off when he Moises Castro. park. His pretense of incomplete defense of a
found the opportunity to do so. Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the 8. The trial court committed reversible error relative is belied by his own admission that when
Gozalez’ car window. Andres then repeatedly shouted at him, “Putang ina mo, ang when it disregarded the basic principle that the he saw that Noel Andres did not have a gun he
tanda-tanda mo na gago ka pa.” accused is presumed innocent and his guilt lowered his hand holding the gun. There was
 On his way to his FX Andres met another man, whom he later found out to be the must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. allegedly no threat on the life of his son at the
appellants son, Dino. It appears that the altercation was far from over because again 9. The trial court committed reversible error time of the shooting, no uncontrollable fear nor
Andres had a shouting match this time with Dino. In a matter of seconds, the appellant when it ordered Accused-Appellant to pay for irresistible force that would mitigate the
alighted from his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres’ the civil liabilities. commission of the offense.
vehicle at an angle away from Andres. The single bullet fired hit Feliber Andres on the 4. The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the
forehead near the temporal region above the left eye which caused her death, while the pecuniary awards granted by the trial court. The
two children sustained injuries with metallic fragments of the bullet on their faces, one appellee alleges that it is not denied by the
at the cheek and the other below his left eye. appellant that Feliber Andres was a 38 year old
 The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts registered nurse at the time of the shooting.
of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. The trial court ruled that, Although she was then unemployed on account
in the case at bar, the accused is positive of the crime of murder. When he alighted with of her pregnancy, she still had earning capacity
a drawn gun to protect his son and released all the safety measures of his gun as he and the trial court properly applied the salary of
fired and missed at Noel who was then unarmed, but instead hit Kevin Valdez, John a government nurse under the salary
Kenneth Andres and Feliber Andres which resulted to the death of the latter, standardization scheme in the computation of
demonstrate that the accused has executed the two (2) conditions to generate treachery damages for the loss of earning capacity.
enough to qualify the crime committed to murder.
ISSUE / HELD:
ARGUMENTS: 1. WHETHER THERE IS TREACHERY IN THE CASE.
NO. The SC ruled that for treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the
ACCUSED-APPELANT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE employment of means of execution that would insure the safety of the accused from
The appellant, Gonzalez, avers that the trial 1. The Solicitor-General agrees with the retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity to
court erred on the following: appellant that the crime was not attended by the defend himself and 2) the means employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by
1. The trial court committed reversible error qualifying circumstance of treachery and hence the offender. However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a conclusive
when it found that treachery was present. the crime committed by the appellant for the finding of treachery and any doubt must be resolved, like the fact of the commission of
2. The trial court committed reversible error death of Feliber Andres is homicide, not murder. an offense, in favor of the accused. The pictures indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX
when it presumed that there was treachery by The appellee takes into consideration that the at an angle away from Noel Andres and that Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in
taking judicial notice of the feature of the shooting was preceded by a heated argument. It particular. It is not disputed that the appellants car was directly behind the complainants
automatic pistol involved in this case. also appears that the shooting was done FX and that Gonzalez who was then seated at the driver’s seat alighted from his car,
3. The trial court committed reversible error impulsively. There is no evidence that the took a few steps then fired at the left side of the FX. Whether Noel Andres was seated at
when it violated the constitutional right of the appellant deliberately employed the means of the driver’s seat inside his vehicle when Gonzalez fired at the FX, as the prosecution
accused-appellant to due process when it took attack to insure execution of the crime and at the asserts, or was standing by the door of the driver’s seat outside his vehicle, as the
judicial notice of the feature of the automatic same time eliminate the risk of retaliation from defense submits, it is clear that the shot was fired away from Noel Andres.
pistol involved in this case without notice. the private complainant. The appellee also The SC further noted that the appellant did not act belligerently towards Noel Andres even after
4. The trial court committed reversible error agrees with the appellant that the trial court the latter cut off the appellants path. Andres stated in court that the appellant did not alight from
when it found Accused-Appellant guilty beyond erred in equating the use of an automatic pistol his car nor opened his window until he, Andres, tapped on it. For his part Gonzalez categorically
with treachery. stated in court that he did not point his gun nor threatened Andres during their short spat.

Gonzalez, although he had his gun in his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter
was having an altercation with the appellants son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he perceived
that his son was in imminent danger. Whether he overreacted or he shot at Andres vehicle out
of rage over Andres aggressive behavior, one thing appears to be clear, that the shooting was
not done in cold blood. It is undisputed that the windows of the FX are heavily or darkly tinted
so that a person outside would not see if anybody was inside. The pictures of the FX on record
confirm the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses that the other passengers
of the FX were not visible from the outside. Gonzalez admitted in court that Noel Andres
mentioned that he has passengers with him while he was shouting and cursing at Gonzalez
but there is no indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers when he
fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a conclusion that Gonzalez
deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain undue advantage over the intended nor the
actual victim. Without any decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered;
thus the crime committed is homicide.
The SC also do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is determinative of treachery, unless
it is shown, and it is not herein shown, that the appellant deliberately used the gun to insure
the commission of the crime and to render the unarmed victim defenseless. As discussed
above, the encounter between the appellant and the Andresses was a chance encounter and
the appellants gun was in the glove compartment of his car even before he left his house. The
shooting was clearly a spur of the moment or impulsive decision made by the appellant
preceded by a heated altercation at the instance of the private complainant.
38
Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful
aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez.
d. On Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong. This mitigating circumstance is
obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused
to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the
time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellants use of a gun,
although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably
placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun
is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is hereby found guilty
of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed
against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto
menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby sustained.
SO ORDERED.

As regards the injuries sustained by the two children the SC ruled that the crime committed are
two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines whether the crime committed
is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused
which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim.

2. WHETHER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES PLEADED BY THE DEFENSE HAS

MERITS
NO. The SC ruled that:
a. On Voluntary Surrender. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the
appellants pretense of voluntary surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant
drove away towards the gate of the memorial park while he was questioning him after the
shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked his path the appellant could
have fled the scene of the crime.
b. On Passion and Obfuscation. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
is also not obtaining. For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown
that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by
the intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time
from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused’s
mind; and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from
a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. Noel Andres act of shouting at the appellants son, who
was then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as
it is claimed by the accused. Besides, the appellants son, Dino was shouting back at Noel
Andres. It was not a case wherein the appellants son appeared helpless and oppressed
that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the FX of Noel Andres. The same holds true
for the appellants claim of provocation on the part of Noel Andres. Provocation must be
sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must
be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according
to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the
appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation
to shoot at the complainants vehicle.
c. On Incomplete Self-defense. The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of
 39
PEOPLE v. ENGUITO that the real intention of accused-appellant was to surrender the victim to the police for mauling
G.R. No. 128812. February 28, 2000 him, his act of pursuing the victim, who was a passenger of the motorela, resulted in the injuries
Ponente: Gonzaga-Reyes of the driver and the other passenger of the motorela. Upon seeing that Achumbre was trying
to jump out of the motorela, accused-appellant should have known that by closely following,
FACTS: pushing and bumping the motorela, he could injure the passengers, which is what happened
 On or about September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme was driving a motorela, together with his in this case. Moreover, accused-appellant ignored the pleas of Rosita Requerme, the other
wife Rosita and another passenger, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre, who is the deceased in this passenger and wife of the driver of the motorela, for him to stop bumping and pushing the
case. The deceased was picked up by them on their way home and requested them to bring motorela. Instead, he persisted resulting in the motorela turning on its side and in the opposite
him to his house. direction. Verily, the act of accused-appellant in relentlessly pursuing the motorela is a
 While on their way, a white vehicle, which was later on identified as a Ceres Kia automobile manifestation of his intention to perpetrate the crime.
bearing Plate No. 722, intentionally hit and pushed the motorela that they were riding and
violently kept pushing it causing it to turn around facing the direction from where it came from 2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the conviction
and fell on its right side. of accused for the Crime of Murder with the use of motor vehicle
 Rosita testified that while she was struggling out of the motorela she noticed that the white
vehicle went up the elevated catwalk or pathway pursuing Achumbre who was hit when he was No. The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle.
already at the railing (barandilla). Then she observed that the white vehicle drove away without The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means
even caring to see what happened to them. thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the
 The spouses/victims were brought to the police station while the Achumbre was brought to the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. Accused-appellant already noticed the
hospital who was declared dead on arrival. deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop
 It was later on found out upon investigation that said incident was predicated on the earlier the vehicle after hitting the deceased who was hit when Achumbre was at the railing of the
fight which transpired between Achumbre and the driver of the motor vehicle, Thadeos Enguito, Marcos Bridge. Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was
the accused in this case. already more than one kilometer away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle
 As a result of the death of Achumbre, his wife filed a criminal complaint against the accused. upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him. Appellant contends that he
The Regional Trial Court found him guilty with the crime of Homicide with less serious physical should have been convicted of the crime of homicide with two mitigating circumstances of
injuries, taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle which acting in passion and voluntary surrender; and had the charge been homicide he could have
was alleged in the information. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter modified the crime pleaded guilty. These mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated in his favor. Accused-
to Murder due to the aggravating circumstance. The accused went to the Supreme Court appellant's state of mind after he was mauled in the fight that transpired between him and
imputing error on the decision of the Court of Appeals. Achumbre and before he crushed the latter to death was such that he was still able to act
reasonably. For passion to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved
to show causes sufficient to produce loss of self-control and to overcome reason. The turmoil
and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the
sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to
ARGUMENTS: deprive him of his sanity and self-control.
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence shows
 Even if it be assumed that the real intention of  He could not be guilty of any physical injuries
that accused-appellant was further pursued by the police. Appellant himself testified that he
accused-appellant was to surrender the victim suffered by the spouses Requerme because
stopped his vehicle just after the police mobile stopped but admitted having "stopped farther
to the police for mauling him, his act of the direct cause of the motorela turning on its
than the police mobile". SPO3 Catiil further testified that appellant did not surrender but only
pursuing the victim, who was a passenger of left side was the act of Felipe in guiding the
stopped his vehicle when its right tire was already flat. His testimony was corroborated by PO3
the motorela, resulted in the injuries of the vehicle while the proximate cause is the thrust
Makiling who was patrolling the portion of Marcos Bridge. He testified that he saw the vehicle
driver and the other passenger of the which resulted when Achumbre suddenly
being driven by accused-appellant already destroyed and the right portion of the vehicle a little
motorela. jumped out of the motorela.
bit lower as it was running flat. Clearly, accused-appellant could have eluded arrest but his
 Accused-appellant could have easily sought  It was his intention to apprehend and situation became futile when his vehicle suffered a flat tire.
the assistance of the police that he noticed surrender the deceased to the police for his
nearby instead of taking the law into his own previous act of mauling him but in the process, DISPOSITION:
hands. he killed the deceased. WHEREFORE, the decision convicting accused-appellant Thadeos Enguito of the complex crime of
Murder with Less Serious Physical Injuries and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
ISSUES AND RULING: hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of
deceased Wilfredo Achumbre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P1,680,000.00 for loss of
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed error in finding the accused guilty of less serious earning capacity; P 16,300.00 as actual damages; P 50,000.00 as moral damages; and to further pay the
physical injuries suffered by Felipe Requerme. spouses Felipe and Rosita Requerme the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.
No. The argument is devoid of merit. The defense disregards the basic rule in criminal law that PRINCIPLES:
a person is responsible for all the consequences of his unlawful or wrongful act although such  Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the
consequences were different from those which he originally intended. Even if it be assumed maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime.
 40
 The death penalty being the maximum period of the penalty for murder should be imposed for
the complex crime of murder with less serious physical injuries considering that under Article
63, an indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.
 41
DE VERA v. DE VERA
G.R. No. 172832. April 7, 2009.

FACTS:
That on or about the 31st day of July, 2003, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Geren A.
De Vera being previously united in lawful marriage with Rosario Carvajal Tobias-De Vera,
and without said marriage having been legally dissolved, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with accused Josephine Juliano y
Francisco, who likewise has previous knowledge that accused Geren A. De Vera’s previous
marriage with Rosario T. De Vera is still valid and subsisting, said second marriage having
all the essential requisites for its validity. Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded "Guilty."
However, in a Motion4 dated April 8, 2005, he prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his
plea in the meantime in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Geren’s motion and appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in the determination of the penalty to be imposed. The
court finds accused Geren A. de Vera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy
as charged in the Information and there being two (2) mitigating circumstances (Plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender). Rosario moved for MR for the modification of the court’s
judgment of conviction against Geren, because of the allegedly mistaken application of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which was denied. Geren applied for probation
which was granted. Rosario instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA which
was dismissed, MR denied.

ISSUE: Whether there was voluntary surrender

HELD:
Yes. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself
to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without
these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability
of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore,
cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.

In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1,
2005, the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime
of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, Geren
surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail. After the accused posted bail,
there was no more need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest. Mere filing of an information
and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender
"involuntary."

PEOPLE v. TARAYA
G.R. No. 135551. October 27, 2000
TOPIC: Mitigating Circumstance – VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
FACTS:
 Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are relatives, were
charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the death of Salvador Reyes.
 Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995. Prosecution witnesses Mariano
Adillo, David Angeles and Gregorio Reyes testified against the accused appellants. Their
statements were countered by Armando Bilara, Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez
and the accused appellants themselves.
EYE WITNESS (David Angeles, Jr) – *MOST IMPORTAND STATEMENT/FACTS OF THE CASE*
 He had known JONAR for some ten years, ARLY for about five years and AMPIE for three
years. He never had any misunderstanding with anyone of them.5
 According to David, in the late evening of 24 September 1995, he was at home and could
hardly sleep as he was suffering from a backache.
 He went out of the house to relieve himself. On the street he saw AMPIE brandishing a one-
foot long bolo. Behind AMPIE were ARLY and JONAR.
 AMPIE approached a man who seemed to be urinating. AMPIE then held up the head of the
man and slashed his neck once while his companions ARLY and JONAR stood nearby ready
to assist AMPIE.
 The victim was able to free himself and ran towards David until he dropped a few meters from
the house. Immediately AMPIE, ARLY and JONAR ran to their respective homes. David later
learned that the victim was Salvador Reyes.
 David was certain of whom he saw because the place was illuminated. He went back to the
house and ten minutes later he saw people lurking outside with flashlights.
 He went out when he heard somebody ask why there were bloodstains around. He kept quiet
as he was reluctant to divulge what he saw, and he feared the consequences should he be
involved.
 A few days passed and since his conscience still bothered him, he decided to reveal what he
had witnessed. He gave a sworn statement to the police.
ARGUMENTS OF THE ACCUSED
 Accused appellants appealed, arguing that Ampie should not be charged with murder since
he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was also armed with a pipe that night,
which disqualifies treachery in the case.
 They further asserted that Arly and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador
Reyes. They were implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims which were not supported by clear
evidence.
 They insisted that Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he surrendered
himself at the police station at his own will.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador
2. Whether Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a a mitigated sentence
RULING:
1. No conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when:
a) Two or more persons come to an agreement
b) The agreement should be concerning the commission of a crime
c) They should decide to commit the crime.
42
It does not require that such agreement occurred for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the
crime; it is sufficient that at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same purpose and were
united therein.
The Court ruled that David Angeles’ testimony was not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar
in the crime. There had been no certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted
cooperation on their part as to likewise render them liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence
failed to convince the court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed had been conspiracy
among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and Arly.
2. He is not eligible. As to the issue of Ampie’s voluntary surrender, the court emphasized that for
one to avail of mitigating circumstance for voluntary surrender, the following requisites must be
present:
(1) the offender had not been actually arrested;
(2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent;
(3) the surrender was voluntary; and
(4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed.
When Ampie surrendered, a pending warrant of arrest had already been issued. His arrest by
that time was already imminent. Therefore, he is not eligible for a mitigating sentence.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant Ampie
Taraya is concerned, the decision of 6 February 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Siniloan, Laguna,
Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 4324, with the modification that he is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of homicide only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prison mayor medium as
minimum to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, with
all the accessory penalties thereof, and to indemnify the heirs of Salvador Reyes in the sum of ₱50,000
as civil indemnity for his death; (2) ACQUITTING on ground of reasonable doubt accused-appellants
ARLY CANTUBA and JONAR ESTRADA and ordering their immediate release from confinement, unless
their further detention is justified for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
shall submit a report of their release within five (5) days from receipt of notice of this decision.
PEOPLE v. DAWATON
G.R. No. 146247. September 17, 2002.
FACTS
Esmeraldo Cortez was inviting over guests to his house on September 20, 1998. His brother-in-law Edgar
Dawaton and kumpadre Leonides Lavares arrived at 12:00 noon. Domingo Reyes arrived shortly
thereafter. The group, all of which are residents of Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora,started
drinking. Came 3:00 pm, they decided to transfer to the house of Edgar Dawaton's uncle Amado after the
group has finished four bottles of gin. Upon arriving at the elder Dawaton's house, they proceeded at the
balcony and continued their drinking spree there. The elder Dawaton was not home at the time of their
session. Leonides, due to his drunkenness, opted to sleep on the wooden bench (papag) at the balcony
area, as the three continued drinking until they finished another bottle of gin.
At around 3:30 pm, Edgar stood up and left for his house. He went back with a stainless knife ranging 2-
3 inches in length, and used it to stab the sleeping Leonides near the base of his neck. Awakened by the
sudden attack, Leonides was distraught of his companion's deed against him. Edgar gave him another
stab on the upper part of his neck, spilling blood on the arm of Leonides. Leonides tried to escape for his
life, but the bigger Edgar grabbed him from the collar of his shirt and stabbed him multiple times. Leonides
still managed to move 20 meters away from the elder Dawaton’s house, but he dropped in front of the
Cortez residence. From that point, Edgar continuously stabbed him until Leonides expired. After the
 43
incident, he fled to the house of his uncle Carlito Baras, where he was arrested by the authorities, who
found him when people surrounding the body of Leonides pointed them to Edgar's whereabouts.

THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THE ACCUSED guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced to
death. The accused argues that trial court erred in imposing the death penalty despite the attendance of
mitigating and alternative circumstances in his favor.He avers that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty

ISSUE: whether accused-appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty

RULING:
NO. The guilty pleading of Edgar to the lesser offense is of no merit. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code
does not present any attenuating circumstance referring to a scenario wherein the accused pleads guilty
to a lesser offense (in this case, homicide). Furthermore, the accused did not secure the consent of the
prosecution to allow him to plead guilty to a lesser offense (Sec. 2,Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure). The prosecution has consistently maintained its stand that murder, accompanied by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, must be imposed against Edgar. Hence, the assailed decision of
the court finding the accused EDGAR DAWATON guilty of MURDER qualified by treachery is AFFIRMED.

PRINCIPLES
1. The Supreme Court (SC) has specified the errors of the trial court in the imposition of the death
penalty sentence, to wit:
a) The presence of the mitigating circumstance of intoxication was not taken into account by
the trial court. The accused was drunk at the time of his commission of the crime, and
there was no indication of his frequency of alcohol intake.
b) The presence of the said mitigating circumstance should entail the imposition of the lesser
penalty, the crime being punishable by two indivisible penalties, namely reclusion
perpetua and death. Under Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, the lesser penalty
must be the one imposed in the presence of a mitigating circumstance. Hence the
modification of the sentence of the trial court by the SC, from death to reclusion perpetua.
2. Treachery is involved in the commission of the crime. There is no question to that, since it is
proven by the prosecution witnesses that at the time of the commission, the victim was drunk
and fast asleep, and that Edgar unexpectedly started to attack the victim in his sleep. Hence
the victim lacked the opportunity to defend himself from the attack.
a. The guilty pleading of Edgar to the lesser offense is of no merit. Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code does not present any attenuating circumstance referring to a scenario wherein
the accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense (in this case, homicide). Furthermore, the
accused did not secure the consent of the prosecution to allow him to plead guilty to a
lesser offense (Sec. 2, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). The prosecution
has consistently maintained its stand that murder, accompanied by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, must be imposed against Edgar.
b. The presence of a grenade being threatened to be used by the victim, as mentioned in
another version of the facts prepared by Edgar, is not merited. The prosecution witnesses
belied it and maintained that the victim was fast asleep and not in a belligerent manner
against the accused. In fact, they claim that the attack was so unexpected, the two having
been in good terms to each other prior to their drunkenness.

LEGRAMA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 178626. June 13, 2012.
Ponente: Peralta
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in finding petitioner guilty of
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and the Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
 September 5, 1996- COA (Zambales) issued PAO Office No. 96-093 directing an Audit Team
composed of two State Auditor 1s and Auditing Examiner II, to conduct an examination of the
cash and account of petitioner
 October 1, 1996- COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts
of Ms. Legrama. The report showed that petitioner’s cash accountability was short of
₱289,022.75 and that there was an unaccounted Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the
amount of ₱863,878.00, showing a total shortage in the amount of ₱1,152,900.75. Included in
the shortage is the amount of ₱709,462.80, representing the total amount of various sales
invoices, chits, vales, and disbursement vouchers, which were disallowed in the audit for lack
of supporting documents. From the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to restitute
the initial amount of ₱60,000.00
 December 15, 1998- Municipal Mayor Romeo D. Lonzanida in connivance and conspiracy with
co-accused Municipal Treasurer Cecilia U. Legrama are charged with the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds. That while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking
advantage of their official positions, and committing the offense in relation to their respective
functions, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of
confidence, take, misappropriate and convert to their personal use and benefit, the amount of
44
₱1,152,900.758 from such public funds, to the damage of the government, in the aforesaid
amount.
 Both petitioner and Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash
bonds
 petitioner and Lonzanida pleaded not guilty
Sandiganbayan
Prosecution: Testimoy of the Audit Team Leader Bulalacao
Defense: Testimonies of the Legrama and Lonzanida
SB held:
Lonzanida - is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the
cash bond returned to him.
Legrama - is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
SUPREME COURT
Government auditors discovered the shortage and informed petitioner of the same, petitioner failed to
properly explain or justify the shortage that was subject to her accountability.
Petitioner:
 Petitioner denied that she put the amount involved to personal use and presented various sales
invoice, chits, vale forms, and disbursement voucher to prove her claim.
 Petitioner even went further by testifying that the total amount of ₱681,000.00 appearing in a
disbursement voucher were cash advances given to the mayor during the height of the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption (June 1991)

Court:
 Official receipts, chits or vales, even if they are in the name of the municipality, but nonetheless
issued to it for transactions as far back as the year 1991 are immaterial to the instant case.
 The date when the eruption occurred was way before the period subject of the audit. Thus has
been disallowed by the COA for lack of necessary supporting papers. Even if the said
disbursement voucher had been completely accomplished, it would nonetheless be disallowed
because it covers a transaction which is not subject of the audit
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 30, 2007 and
the Resolution dated May 30, 2007 of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION(on
penalty)
45
d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.
* prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, either by direct or circumstantial evidence,
that the public officer appropriated, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take public property or public funds under his custody.
*”Presumption of law” is installed when upon demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property which he is accountable would be
prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to personal use.

In relation to our topic:

Petitioner voluntarily surrendered and gave partial restitution the amount she malversed
 Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article
13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution should
be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the two
circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty are both present even though the two mitigating circumstances are treated
in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Article 13 RPC, Mitigating Circumstances:
Paragraph 7 - That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court
prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
Paragraph 10 - And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and
analogous to those above mentioned.
 Restitution is tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the accused, it was proper
for the Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of
petitioner.
 Computation of Penalty: absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of two
mitigating circumstance, the prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, which has a range of ten (10) years and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. In accordance with paragraph 1, Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code and considering that there are no other mitigating circumstance
present, the maximum term should now be the medium period of prision mayor maximum to
reclusion temporal medium, which is reclusion temporal minimum and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be anywhere within the period of
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Hence, the penalty imposed needs
modification. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to: suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Other infos:

Art. 217, RPC, Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.

Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds
or property, wholly or partially, or shall, otherwise, be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property

The essential elements common to all acts of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
are:
a) That the offender be a public officer;
b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and

CANTA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 140937 February 28, 2001
FACTS:
 Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case upon its
birth on March 10, 1984. The cow remained under the care of Erlinda Monter for some time.
 Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody of the animal, first, to Generoso Cabonse,
from October 24, 1984 to March 17, 1985; then to Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March 2,
1986; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until March 14, 1986 when it was
lost.
 It appears that at 5 o’clock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze
in the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However,
when he came back for it at past 9 o’clock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the
cow gone.
 He found hoof prints which led to the house of Filolmeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal.Upon instructions of the owner,Gardenio and Maria
Tura went to recover the animal from Florentino Canta, who was at that time Barangay Captain
of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte.
 Accordingly, the two went to Florentino’s house. On their way, they met petitioner who told
them that if Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself. Nevertheless, petitioner
accompanied the two to his father’s house, where Maria recognized the cow. As petitioner’s
father was not in the house, petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day
so that they could talk the matter over with his father. However, petitioner never called them.
 Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte. As a
result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio where called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted
taking the cow but claimed it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented
two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and another dated February 27, 1985,
to support his claim.
 Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the national
treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and female. On the reverse side of
the certificate is the drawing of the cow with cowlicks in the middle of the forehead, between
the ears, on the right and left back, and at the base of the forelegs and hindlegs.
 All four caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same one they had taken care of, based
on the location of its cowlicks, its sex, and its color. Gardenio described the cow as black in
color, with a small portion of its abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a cowlick in the middle
of the forehead, another at the back portion between the two ears, and four cowlicks located
near the base of its forelegs and hindlegs.
 On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under agreement which he had
with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that the petitioner take care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva
in consideration for which petitioner would get a calf if the cow produced two offsprings.
Petitioner claimed that the cow in question was his share and that it was born on December 5,
1984,however, was lost on December 2, 1985 and reported the loss to the police of Macrohon,
Padre Burgos, and Malitbog, on December 3, 1985.
 Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he has seen cow the at
Pilipogan, under the care of Gardenio Agapay. He, therefore, went to Pilipogan with the mother
cow on March 14, 1986 to see whether the cow would suckle the mother cow. As the cow did,
petitioner took it with him and brought it, together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino
Canta.
 Maria Tura tried to get the cow, but Florentino refused to give it to her and instead told her to
call Narciso so that they could determine the ownership of the cow. As Narciso did not come
the following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he told his son to take the cow to the
Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told.
46
 Three days later, Florentino and Exuperancio were called to the police station for investigation
where he presented a certificate of ownership of Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985 and a
statement executed by Franklin Telen, janitor at the treasurer’s office of the municipality of
Padre Burgos, to the effect that he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the
name of the petitioner Exuperancio Canta on February 27, 1985.
 The statement was executed at the preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by the
petitioner against Narciso.
 Petitioner’s Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the Municipal Treasurer, who
stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the
municipality of Padre Burgos.
 On the other hand, Telen testified that he issued the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
to the petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the instance of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to
February 27, 1985.
RTC Ruling
January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of violation of P. D. No. 533,
otherwise known as the anti- cattle rustling law of 1974. In giving credence to the evidence for the
prosecution, the trial court stated:
 Base on the statemaent of the witnesses and the affidavit presented, no doubt Accused
Exuperancio Canta who actually took the cow away without the knowledge and consent of
either the owner/raiser/caretaker Gardenio Agapay.
 That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and stealth considering that
it was made at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his shelter-hut forty (40) meters away
tethered to a coconut tree but separated by a hill.
 The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by claiming ownership.
He, however, failed to prove such ownership.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution is failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt the criminal intent
of petitioner in taking the disputed cow
RULING:
Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He cites the following circumstances to
prove his claim:
1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in question would suckle to the mother
cow, thus proving his ownership to it;
2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in the Certificate of Ownership
of Large Cattle issued on February 27, 1985 in his name, and found that they tally;
3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after taking it, and later to the
police authorities, after the dispute arose as to its ownership; and
4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation of P.D No. 533.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur:
(1) A large cattle is taken;
(2) It belongs to another;
(3) The taking is done without the consent of the owner;
(4) The taking is done by any means, methods or scheme;
(5) The taking is with or without intent to gain; and
(6) The taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person or force upon
things.
These requisites are present in the case.
o First, there is no question that the cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner’s only defense is
that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow he
had lost.

o Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the custody of the
caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding
the animal for the owner, Narciso.
o Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen antedate
it to prior to the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question.
o Fourth, petitioner adopted “means, methods, or schemes” to deprive Narciso of his possession
of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain.
o Fifth, no evidence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the commission
of the crime.
47
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum which is within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree, i. e., prision correccional maximum to prision Mayor medium, and the maximum of which is
prision mayor in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to suffer to prison term of four (4) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor maximum, as maximum.

In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the knowledge and permission if its
owner. If he thought it was the cow he allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the
settlement of his claim. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides that “the true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property.” What petitioner did in this case was to take the law in his own
hands. He surreptitiously took the cow form the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, which act
belies his claim as good faith. We hold that the evidence fully supports the finding of both the trial Court
of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. There is therefore no reason to disturb their
findings.

The decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two respects. First, accused-appellant
should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender.
The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements:
1. the offender has not actually been arrested;
2. the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; and
3. the surrender is voluntary.
In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint
had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. For surrender to be
voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention
to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and capture would require.
In petitioner’s case, he voluntary took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it
unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus save them the trouble of having to recover the
cow from him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should be
considered in favour of petitioner.

Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner found guilty of violation of $2(C) of P.D No. 533, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However it Erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and
1 day of prison mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium,
as maximum.
The trial court apparently considered P.D No. 533 as a special law applied $1of the indeterminate
Sentence Law, which provides that “if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence
to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fix by said law
and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.” However, as held in
People v. Macatanda, P.D No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the
intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal Code to the offense of theft of large cattle. In
fact, $10 of the law provides:

The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revise Penal Code, as
amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees,
orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime, the penalty to be imposed in the case should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be