G.R. No.
137650 April 12, 2000 considered by the RTC, as they were not presented in her
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Doctrine: Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man
and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together
conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property
acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that
each made an actual contribution to its acquisition.
Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution
will not result in a co-ownership.
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were the plaintiffs in an
action for ejectment filed before Branch 82 of the MTC of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos and Gina Tumlos.
In their complaint the said spouses alleged that they are
the absolute owners of an apaprtment building; that
through tolerance they had allowed the Tumloses to
occupy the apartment building for the last seven years,
since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was
agreed upon that after a few months, defendant
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the
other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month
both as rental, which agreement was not complied with
by the said defendants; that they have demanded
several times the defendants to vacate the premises, as
they are in need of the property for the construction of a
new building. Spouses have also demanded payment
incurred for the last seven years. Such demands were
unheeded thus this present action of the spouses.
The MTC promulgated its decision on January 22, 1997.
The defendants appeals to the RTC, alleged in their
memorandum on appeal that Mario Fernandez and
Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they
acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was
further alleged that they lived together in the said
apaprtment building with their two (2) children for
around then (10) years, and that Guillerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the
other apartments, until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of is marriage. It was
also during the early part of 1996 when Mario accused
her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless
jealousy.
ISSUE: WON Guillerma Tumlos is a Co-owner of the said
apartment under Article 148.
HELD: The Supreme Court rejected the claim that
Guillerma Tumlos and Mario Fernandez were co-owners
of the disputed property. The claim of co-owenrship was
not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. No other evidence
was presented to validate such claim, except for the said
affidavit/position paper. As previously stated, it was only
on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited
with the petitioner-husband without the benefit of
marriage, and that she bore him two children. Such
contentions and documents should not have been
affidavit/position paper before the trial court MTC.
Even if the said allegations were true, the claim of co-
ownership still fails. Mario Fernandez is validly married to
Lourdes Fernandez, Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property
relation governing their supposed cohabitation is that
found in Article 148 of the Family Code. “it is clear that
actual contribution is required by its provision, in contrast
to Article 147 of the Family Code which states that efforts
in the care and maintenance of the family and
household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. Such provision is not
included in article 148 of the Family Code.
If actual contribution of the party is not proven then there
is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares
as stated in Agapay, supra.
G.R. No. 169698 November 29, 2006
LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent.
Doctrine: It is not disputed that the parties herein were
not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner
Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at
the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their
property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 8 of
the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, …only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions ...9 Proof of actual contribution is
required.
FACTS
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the
President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired
the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and
Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married
man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in
consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their
union, two children were born. However, after the birth of
their second child, their relationship turned sour until they
parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a
complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition
between them of a parcel of land with improvements
located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint, docketed in said
court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the
subject property was acquired during his union with
Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the
property is co-owned by them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the
property in question was acquired by Yolanda sometime
in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto
was transferred by the seller in Yolanda’s name without
his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any
objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still
thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt
of information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in
partner to live in the disputed property, when he
demanded his share thereat as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupo’s allegations.
According to her, she acquired the same property for
Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱2,600,000.00)
using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it
thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman.
Trial Court said that the contested property is owned
common by him and Yolanda and ordered the partition
into two equal parts.
CA reversed the the trial court’s decision saying that it
was the exclusive property of Yolanda.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the CA in its Resolution of September 16, 2005,5 Lupo is
now with the Supreme Court via the present recourse
arguing that pursuant to Article 144 6 of the Civil Code, he
was in no way burdened to prove that he contributed to
the acquisition of the subject property because with or
without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed
a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article 4847 of
Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by
either or both of them during their extramarital union,
such property would be legally owned by them in
common and governed by the rules on co-ownership,
which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.
ISSUE
WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of
Yolanda
RULING
YES. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not
capacitated to marry each other because Lupo Atienza
was validly married to another woman at the time of his
cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property regime,
therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man. Under this regime, …only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. (Cariño v. Cariño, 351 SCRA 127
(2001)). Proof of actual contribution is required. (Agapay
v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302).
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of
property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
(Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez,
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718; Atienza v.
Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006).
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the
parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof
applies because this provision was intended precisely to
fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. (Saguid v.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678).
Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there
was no provision governing property relations of couples
living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even
if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article 256, F.C.).
The applicable law being settled the burden of
proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponent’s defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below
is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The
law gives the defendant some measure of protection as
the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the
court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff
warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence.
It is the petitioner’s posture that the respondent,
having no financial capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts
of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed
therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are
burdened by the fact that his claim to the property
contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to
Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of
Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and
between the respondent and the vendor of said
property, to the exclusion of the petitioner.
The claim of co-ownership in the disputed
property is without basis because not only did he fail to
substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase
thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining
to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the
benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his
mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts,
which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner
failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must
be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere to the aforestated declarations of Editha in her waiver of
allegation is not evidence. rights.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has a superior legal right over
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children
the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility of the deceased?
that the real property covered thereby may be under
co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate Held:
or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is
issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law.
stated, petitioner’s evidence in support of his claim is
either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial court’s Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:
finding that the disputed property falls under the purview
SEC. 8. Terms Defined.—For the purposes of this
of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to
Act, the following terms shall, unless the context
petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, herein
indicates otherwise, have the following
respondent was able to present preponderant evidence meanings:
of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-
ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently xxx
established that she derived the funds used to purchase
the property from earnings, not only as an accountant (e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the
but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign following:
currency trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She
presented her clientele and the promissory notes (1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive
evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also support from the member;
presented her bank account statements and bank
2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial
adopted, and illegitimate child who is
capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not
property.
reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over
twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally
or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally; and

Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by

law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
G.R. No. 173582 January 28, 2008 evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a
beneficiary and because the deceased has no
YOLANDA SIGNEY, petitioner, legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate
vs. minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the
death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO,
clear that for a minor child to qualify as a “dependent”
and GINA SERVANO, representative of GINALYN and
the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21
RODELYN SIGNEY, respondents.
years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.

Facts: In this case, the minor illegitimate

Rodolfo Signey Jr. a member of the SSS, died on May 21,
2001. In his member’s records, he had designated
petitioner Yolanda Signey as primary beneficiary and his
four children with her as secondary beneficiaries.
Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public
respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that the
deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano, with
whom he had two minor children.
Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself
filed a claim for the same death benefits which she also
declared that both she and petitioner were common-law
wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa was the
legal wife. In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed
an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that
she was the legal wife of the deceased.
children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April
1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate
child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified
as a dependent under the SSS
Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a
share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said
legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the
deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as
the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased,
are entitled to 100% of the benefits.

SSS denied the death benefit claim of the petitioner and

found that the marriage between the deceased and the
petitioner is null and void because of a prior subsisting
marriage contracted between the deceased and Editha
as confirmed by the local civil registry of Cebu. However,
it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of
the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries
under the SSS Law.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in

which she attached a waiver of rights executed
by Editha whereby the latter waived any/all claims from
Social Security System (SSS), among others due to the
deceased RodolfoSigney Sr. SSC affirmed the decision of
the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to the SSS field
investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage
showing that the deceased was married to Editha, than