G.R. No.

113296 January 16, 1998

ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ABUNDIO T. MERCED, doing business under the name and
style of SOUTHERN ENGINEERING WORKS, respondents.

FACTS:

On October 6, 1980, a complaint for a sum of money, attorney's fees and damages
was filed by petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which was raffled to
Branch XVI. The parties' rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidences were heard by Judge Roque
Agton, having assumed office on August 1, 1985. When the judiciary was reorganized under
the Aquino administration, Judge Agton was transferred to another branch of the Regional
Trial Court, but within the same Judicial Region. Meanwhile, Judge Romeo Marasigan, who
assumed office on February 3, 1987, was assigned to Branch XVI.

Sometime on May 1987, Judge Marasigan acted on private respondent's motion for
extension of time to file memorandum. On June 9, 1987 a decision penned by Judge Agton
was rendered in favor of petitioner. Private respondent moved to reconsider said decision, but
the same was denied in an order dated March 1, 1988, issued by Judge Marasigan. Private
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which nullified Judge Agton's decision on
the ground that at the time he rendered the judgment, he was neither the judge de jure nor the
judge de facto of RTC Branch XVI, and correspondingly remanded the case to the lower
court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of Judge Agton is valid.

RULING:

Yes. It is a rule that a case is deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the rules, or by the court. Records disclose that
this case was submitted for decision sometime on March 1987 after the parties' submission of
their memoranda as required by the court, at which time Judge Marasigan was already
presiding in Branch XVI. Thus, the case was submitted for decision to Judge Marasigan and
not to Judge Agton who by then was already transferred to another branch. Judge Agton's
decision, therefore, appears to be tainted with impropriety. Nevertheless, the subsequent
motion for reconsideration of Judge Agton's decision was acted upon by Judge Marasigan
himself and his denial of the said motion indicates that the subscribed with and adopted in
toto Judge Agton's decision. Any incipient defect was cured.

Moreover, for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated

during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. This is in line with the
Court's En Banc Resolution of February 10, 1983 implementing B.P. 129 which "merely
requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge, i.e., in this case, a
judge of the same court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is
promulgated." Branches of the trial court are not distinct and separate tribunals from
each other. Hence, contrary to private respondent's allegation, Judge Agton could not
have possibly lost jurisdiction over the case, because jurisdiction does not attach to the
judge but to the court. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are
not affected by the death, resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge
presiding over it. To remand a validly decided case to the incumbent Presiding Judge of
Branch XVI, as what the CA suggests, would only prolong this rather simple collection suit
and would run counter to the avowed policy of the Court to accord a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition for every action.

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land. Two
of them sold their respective shares to the herein petitioners. By virtue of such agreements,
the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said
lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with
a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-
concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua,
lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold
to the petitioners. Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house
with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. Moreover, the petitioners and
the private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school
together. One of the co-heirs, Tecla Padua, filed an action to redeem the portion of the land
on the ground provided under Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows: “Should
any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-
heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.”

The private respondent contends that no written notice was furnished to her as
required by law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not written notice to the co-heirs need to be strictly written as what is
provided by law in order for the 30 days of redemption to start running.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Although petitioners obviously cannot
argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-
heirs, the court cannot accept the private respondents' pretence that they were unaware of the
sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. The court pronounced: “By requiring
written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of
their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose.
The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in
writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.”

In arriving with such resolution, the court said:

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are
some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of
our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done
even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them.” While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret
the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the
law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for
its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the
letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent
of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is
within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an
alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases
his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means
of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it,
he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:
 Information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation
of Section 3(e), under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. An order of arrest was issued
in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the
Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. Petitioner filed
an urgent motion for acceptance of cash bail bond because of a vehicular happened to her.
On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing petitioner to post a cash
bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance, until June 15,
1991, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before
said court. Petitioner then filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00.

A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining
the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila, from proceeding with the
criminal cases pending before them upon the petition filed by the petitioner.

On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring the arraignment of
petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court

Meanwhile the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner

considering the considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago
intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes.

The petitioner filed directly with the Court so-called "Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending
Incident for Hearing." Petitioner argues that:

1. The Sandiganbayan court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering
that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that
she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court.

2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued
the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the
decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial
comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a
coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the
Sandiganbayan, from interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was
still pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold departure order contravenes
the temporary restraining order previously issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.

3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of
speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but also in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only under stringent
criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
 2. Whether or not he Sandiganbayan disregarded basic principles of judicial comity
and due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order despite
the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable Court.

3. Whether or not the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to
travel and freedom of speech.

RULING:

1. Yes. It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the
accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the
court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since
the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

The court held that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself
to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-
parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as
having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of
the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond
she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion
"she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court.
Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations,
she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized
the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the
aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

2. No. The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all
intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the
lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction
validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is elementary that the mere
pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case
pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when
there is no writ of injunction restraining it. The inevitable conclusion is that for as
long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action
for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court
from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. And,
even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues
to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.

3. No. Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied
from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them.
These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient
exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the
power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers

necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of
prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every
regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands,
matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and
coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter,
even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as
original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.

Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders

necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by
petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during
the pendency of the case.

One final observation by the court:

“We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of

petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system
by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in
the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because
of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this
Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court
will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy
includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial
or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to
leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best
position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions
therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or
implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been
issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust
the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper
 submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where
all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the
lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through the
appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations
therein.”

G.R. NO. 140954. April 12, 2005

HEIRS OF BERTULDO1 HINOG: Bertuldo Hinog II, Bertuldo Hinog III, Bertuldo
Hinog, Jr., Jocelyn Hinog, Bertoldo Hinog IV, Bertoldo Hinog V, Edgardo Hinog,
Milagros H. Pabatao, Lilian H. King, Victoria H. Engracia, Terisita C. Hinog, Paz H.
Besana, Roberto C. Hinog, Vicente C. Hinog, Roel C. Hinog, Marilyn C. Hinog, Bebot
C. Hinog, lordes C. Hinog, Pablo Chiong, Arlene Lanasang (All respresented by
Bertuldo Hinog III), petitioners,
vs.
HON. ACHILLES MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 4, 7th
Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO BALANE, RUFO BALANE,
HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE, respondents.

FACTS:

On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all
surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of
Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog. Bertuldo filed his Answer. He alleged
ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 2, 1980,
executed by one Tomas Pahac with the knowledge and conformity of private respondents.
After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. On November 18, 1997, private respondents
rested their case. Thereupon, Bertuldo started his direct examination. However, Bertuldo died
without completing his evidence.

On August 4, 1998, Atty. Sulpicio A. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as

his services were terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Veronico G. Petalcorin
then entered his appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo. Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to
expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that
private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to
pay the correct docket fees. Private respondents consequently paid their docket fees and filed
for the reinstatement of the case to which the trial court granted. The court denied petitioners’
manifestation that the trial court having expunged the complaint and nullified all court
proceedings since the issues raised is the same with issues in the amended motion to expunge.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari and
prohibition. Alleging that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the case to be reinstated after private respondents paid the docket fee deficiency
since the trial court had earlier expunged the complaint from the record and nullified all
proceedings of the case and such ruling was not contested by the private respondents.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioners can directly file before the Supreme Court.

RULING:

No. Although Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the
Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according
to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's
time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. The rationale for this rule is two-
fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would
cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases,
which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this
Court is not a trier of facts.

G.R. No. 174385 February 20, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge, Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Olongapo City, META TRANS TRADING INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, and HUNDRED YOUNG SUBIC INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:

Indigo Distribution Corporation and thirteen other petitioners (collectively referred to

as lower court petitioners) filed before the respondent judge a petition for declaratory relief
with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction
against the Honorable Secretary of Finance, et al. to nullify the implementation of Section 6
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334, as unconstitutional. The lower court petitioners are
importers and traders duly licensed to operate inside the Subic Special Economic and
Freeport Zone (SSEFZ). By way of background, Congress enacted, R.A. No. 7227, which
provided, among others, for the creation of the SSEFZ, as well as the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). Congress passed R.A. No. 9334. Based on Section 6 THEREOF, the
SBMA issued a Memorandum directing its various departments to require importers in the
SSEFZ to pay the applicable duties and taxes on their importations of tobacco and alcohol
products before these importations are cleared and released from the freeport.
 The memorandum prompted the lower court petitioners to bring before the RTC their
petition for declaratory relief including a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or a TRO to enjoin the Republic (acting through the SBMA) from enforcing
the challenged memorandum. The respondent judge issued a preliminary injunction despite
the Republic’s opposition. The Republic filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The private respondents asked that the respondent judge extend to them the
effects and benefits of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The respondent judge
granted the private respondents’ motions. The Republic moved to reconsider the respondent
judge’s order, arguing that it had been denied due process because it never received copies of
the private respondents’ motions, which was subsequently denied.

The Republic responded to the respondent judge’s actions by filing the present
petition. In their defense, the private respondents point to the procedural defects in the
petition that the Republic did not observe the hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the principle of hierarchy of courts needs to be strictly followed in the
present case.

RULING:

The court ruled in the negative. While the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed
require that recourses should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher
courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of exceptions under well-defined
circumstances. In several cases, we have allowed direct invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the ground of special and important reasons clearly
stated in the petition; when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
when demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and
justified our immediate and direct handling of the case.

G.R. No. 101041. November 13, 1991.

HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE BERNARDO LL. SALAS and GEORGE CARLOS, respondents.

FACTS:

A civil case, (Gloria Naval v. George Carlos) for recovery of ownership of a parcel of
coconut land was filed and subsequently raffled to the sala of the petitioner, Judge Adriano
Villamor. While the civil case was pending there, respondent Carlos filed 5 criminal cases for
qualified theft against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were also assigned to
the sala of Judge Villamor. A decision was rendered in favor of Naval who was declared the
lawful owner and possessor of the disputed land.

Thereafter, respondent Carlos, through counsel, moved to activate the archived

criminal cases which were dismissed by the judge. Dissatisfied with the outcome of the
administrative case, respondent Carlos filed a civil action for damages against Judge
Villamor. Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied by Judge Aleonar. A
Manifestation was filed by Judge Villamor praying Judge Salas to dismiss the civil case but
the motion was denied by respondent Judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judges Aleonar may take cognizance of the actions for damages
against Judge Villamor.

RULING:

No. No Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much less declare as
unjust a judgment of another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof liable for
damages without running afoul with the principle that only the higher appellate courts,
namely, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are vested with authority to renew and
correct errors of the trial courts. To allow respondent Judge to proceed with the trial of the
actions for damages against the petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal court would in
effect permit a court to renew and interfere with the judgment of a co-equal court over which
it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of a Court of First
Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere with each other’s
cases, judgments and orders. The Supreme Court has already ruled that only after the
Appellate Court, in a final judgment, has found that a trial judge’s errors were committed
deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be
levelled against the latter.

G.R. No. 93262 December 29, 1991

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, QUEENSLAND HOTEL or MOTEL or QUEENSLAND
TOURIST INN, and TEODORICO ADARNA, respondents.

FACTS:

Davao Light filed a collection suit against Queensland Hotel and Teodorico
Adarna with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On 3 May 1989,
the trial court issued an Order of Attachment, and the corresponding Writ of Attachment on
11 May 1989 after complying with the requirements which included the payment of an
attachment bond. On 12 May 1989,, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of
attachment was served upon Queensland and Adarna. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized
properties belonging to the latter.
Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment on the ground that
at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of Attachment were issued, the trial court had
not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the persons of the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against
defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter’s person by service of summons or
his voluntary submission to the court’s authority.
RULING:
Yes. It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been commenced
and jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff has been vested in the court, but before the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or
his voluntary submission to the court's authority), nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff
or the court. It is wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during this period should be
defendant on, or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over the
defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is one thing; quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or
over the subject-matter or nature of the action, or the res or object hereof.
There is thus ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of the
filing of the complaint and the day of service of summons of the defendant. During this
period, different acts may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court, which are unquestionable
validity and propriety.
Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action
or at any time thereafter." The phase, "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers
to the date of the filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the date that
marks "the commencement of the action;" and the reference plainly is to a time before
summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying
quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced — by the filing of the complaint
and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and
obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down
by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the
defendant.

G.R. No. 127536. February 19, 2002

CESAR JARO, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), and ROSARIO VDA.
DE PELAEZ, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for prohibition before the Provincial Adjudicator against the
herein petitioner. She alleged that she and her late husband, the late Igmedio Pelaez were
instituted as tenants of a parcel of coconut land originally owned by the late Rosenda Reyes y
Padua. In 1978, Ricardo Padua Reyes, the heir of Rosenda, sold the land to petitioner who,
respondent alleged, now wants to eject respondent from the land.
Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. In ruling that respondent
was not a tenant, the Provincial Adjudicator noted that the affidavits presented as evidence
were conflicting and the inconsistencies therein was material to the resolution of the case.
Respondent appealed the adverse decision to the DARAB. The DARAB issued its decision
reversing the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.
Petitioner contended that the DARAB decision and resolution are void because of
respondent’s alleged failure to pay the appeal fee when respondent appealed the decision of
the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB. The non-payment of the appeal fee would have
rendered the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, which was favorable to petitioner, as the
final adjudication of the case. The DARAB then would have no jurisdiction to rule on the
case and the eventual dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would amount to
nothing because the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision would still stand as final judgment.
Petitioner alleged that DARAB’s disregard of the fundamental principles of evidence
tainted the decision with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, making its decision a mere scrap of paper.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’ contention is correct.

RULING:
No. A perusal of the decision of the DARAB does not show that its rulings are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. The term "grave abuse of
discretion" has a technical and settled meaning. Grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of power amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or
the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive legal duty or a virtual refusal to perform such duty.
The perceived errors committed by the DARAB, if at all, merely amount to errors of
judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. The errors that a court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction differ from errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Such an error does not make the court’s decision
void and it may serve only as a ground for reversal if it is shown that prejudice has been
caused by it. An error of judgment can be reviewed only by an appeal. On the other hand, an
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders a
judgment void or at least voidable and which error is correctable only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.
G.R. No. 119900. August 16, 2001.

SUNNY MOTORS SALES, INC., Petitioner,

v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE OSCAR L. LEVISTE,
as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 97, Quezon City, and MS.
LOLITA L. SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FACTS:

Private respondent Lolita L. Santiago entered into a contract of lease with Ludivina L.
Genito from a portion of a 4,398 sq. m. property which she used as warehouse for scrap
metals. The parties stipulated that the lease was for a period of two (2) years with a monthly
rent of P10,000.00 Santiago paid advance rent equivalent to one (1) year, or P120,000.00, at
the inception of the lease.
 On December 16, 1994, barely three (3) months after the lease commenced, petitioner
Sunny Motors Sales, Inc., employing guards from Enriquez Security Agency, suddenly
entered into possession of the whole 4,398 sq. m. property of Ludivina L. Genito, including
the portion leased to respondent Santiago and barred the latter from entering and using the
same.
Respondent Lolita L. Santiago filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City a
complaint against Ludivina L. Genito and Sunny Motor Sales, Inc., for damages with
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. Petitioner Sunny Motors Sales,
Inc., filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
contending that the amended complaint filed with the regional trial court is not an action for
damages and injunction but one of forcible entry, which is exclusively cognizable by an
inferior court. RTC denied the motion. Petitioner Sunny Motors Sales, Inc., filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision, affirming the jurisdiction of RTC and dismissing outright the petition of the
herein petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether the regional trial court has jurisdiction over the complaint for damages with
temporary restraining order, and/or preliminary injunction.

RULING:
No. The allegations of the complaint reveal that petitioner’s cause of action is for
forcible entry with damages. In forcible entry, the deprivation of physical possession of land
or building is effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Clearly,
respondent Santiago alleged that petitioner "employing guards from the Enriquez Security
Agency suddenly entered into possession of the whole 4,398 sq. m. property of defendant
Genito, including the portion leased to plaintiff" (respondent Santiago) and that "the entry of
defendant Sunny Motors (petitioner) into the leased property and consequent dispossession of
plaintiff thereof is a glaring violation of the latter’s rights and interest provided under the
lease contract." She still remained in possession of the leased premises but such possession
was disrupted following her forcible eviction therefrom. In her complaint, respondent
Santiago was seeking to be restored into possession of the leased premises with damages on
account of Genito’s breach of her obligation under the lease contract and Sunny Motors
Sales, Inc.’s entry to the property through force. In which case, respondent Santiago’s cause
of action as presented in her complaint is for forcible entry over which the regional trial court
has no jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 78206. March 19, 1990

PAULINO ZAMORA, LAURENTINO MEJORADA, PLACIDO JOSON, AGAPITO

MEJORADA, EZPERANZA ALAMBAN, CELEDONIO RINAN, POLICARUSO T.
BUSIG, FRANCISCO T. PILAPIL, JR., CELSO CABUNGCAG, RICARDO
CUGDAN, GERARDO TABON, TERESA MARTEL DY, LINO CACAYAN,
PACIENCIA D. MEJORADA, GREGORIO OUANO, JUSTINIANO BAJAO,
ROMULO PADILLA, PEDRO ALBA, ANANCORITO B. TAN, BRAULIO REGIS,
SEGUNDO ANG, CERUNDIO ACERO, ROSARIO D. TANG-AN, COCOMIA
CANETA, EDILBERTO G. BAJAO, EUGENIA N. PUPOS, JACINTO M.
BALISTOY, VIDAL T. AGUILAR, LUCIO R. AGUILAR, ESMAEL T. WAHIMAN,
ALUD PABULARIO, LEONILA LLORENTE, BERNABE BATAHOY, MODITO
JUMARITO, AGUIDO REMEGOSO, ANTONIO TAGAYLO, EMELIANO LAGBAS,
BRIGIDO AYUMAN, NATIVIDAD CABALDO, BERNARDINO DACAR, NICOLAS
E. YALMORIDA, DAMIAN LAGBAS, HILARIO MAGALLANES, FELIX ABAD,
SERVANDO SIMON, GALMACIO BACHARPA, GIL GACATGAT, DEMETERIO
JAGAPE, EUSEBIO PADERO, VICENTE MANZANO, JOSE CO, PEDRO
BALILI, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MEDINA RECREATION CENTER, INC.,
FELOMINO DELEGENCIA, JUAN PANKIAN, MELECIO BERSABAL, CATALINO
IPANAAG, MATEO DELEGENCIA, DEMOSTENES LIMBACO, Respondents.

Mario D. Ortiz, for Petitioners.

FACTS:

Petitioners organized an unregistered partnership called Medina People’s Cockpit

Association in 1967. A decade after their establishment, a corporation called Medina
Recreation Center Incorporated was created, where the properties of the former unregistered
partnership was transferred.
Petitioners alleged that there are irregularities in the transfer of properties. They filed
a complaint against the private respondents first in the Security and Exchange Commission,
and later, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. Petitioners first claimed that
they are stockholders of said corporation but they later withdrew their complaint from the
SEC and amended their original complaint in the Court of First Instance, as allowed by the
trial judge, to make it clear that they were suing not as stockholders of the corporation but as
members of the association. The defendants moved to strike out the amended complaint and
also to dismiss the original complaint for lack of jurisdiction. On January 23, 1985, the court
placed the disputed properties under receivership. The defendants (private respondents
herein) filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction with the Court of
Appeals. CA issued a temporary restraining order on October 7, 1985, enjoining the trial
court from further proceeding with the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the Court of First Instance (RTC) has the appropriate jurisdiction
over the case.

RULING:

No. The Court affirmed the finding of the respondent court that the petitioners are
actually suing as stockholders of the corporation and not as members of the association. This
is clear from their opening statement in the letter-complaint they filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission where they categorically declared that they are bonafide
Stockholders.

The Court concludes that it is really the Securities and Exchange Commission and not
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental that has jurisdiction over the case in question.
And as it has been established that the petitioners are suing as stockholders of the Medina
Recreation Center, Inc., there should also be no question that their claim against the private
respondents, as the officers of such corporation, comes under the concept of an intra-
corporate dispute. In their complaint, they allege that the private respondents fraudulently
transferred their properties to the corporation and are now managing them to the detriment of
the petitioner’s interests. This is undoubtedly a matter falling under Section 5 of P.D. No.
902-A, wherein SEC has jurisdiction to hear and decide these kind of cases.