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1. INTRODUCTION
It’s been nearly two years since the Train Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) — also known as
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) — was tested for the first time in the South
Central Railway. After scores of trial runs under various conditions across the country, the
railway authorities are preparing to have more full-fledged runs soon. The company Harzer
Schmalspurbahnen GmbH (Harz Narrow Gauge Railways, HSB) operates the metre-gauge
railways in the Harz as an integrated railway-infrastructure and railway-transport company. The
lines with a total length of 140 km form a closed railway network, with no connection to other
railway networks. In Nordhausen Nord there is a track connection to the likewise metre-gauge
Nordhausen tramway. The 400 m brake panels are valid. On request of the regulating authority of
the federal state Saxony-Anhalt, HSB installs an independent safety system which will be
superimposed onto the existing – and already stepwise improved – train announcement and train-
protection system. One of the most widely used and comfortable nodes of transportation system
is train, but occasionally, accidents occur due to collision. It is very difficult to stop such
collisions because of speed of moving trains, which needs a lead distance to stop. There have
been many train accidents all over the world. As per the report from CNN IBN India dates Sept
2011 85% of the train accidents are due to human errors. The primary goal of our train collision
detection system is to identify possible train collision ahead of time and to report these to the
main control room or driver before collision happens. Currently there is no solution to avoid train
collision. Indian Railways have implemented solution based on ACD (anti-collision device)
system. They have inherent problems in Station section and near mountains due to its design
concept of using GPS for track detection and have high cost of implementation. My system is
used to eliminate train accidents by exploiting automated surveillance system, it is based on
RFID, ARM Controller and GSM, which will help eliminate problems stated above.By
implementing this automatic system which could avoid human error and problems with ACD. In
this system each train track is identified by track id, every train reads and sends its track id to
nearby trains. If two trains are on same track id then alert is send to main control room or to the
train drivers.

In January 2011 there was a grave collision between a freight train and a passenger train on the
DB mainline Magdeburg HBF – Halberstadt on the single-track section between Oschersleben

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(Bode) station and transfer point Hordorf. Also here the cause was human error: a train driver
overran a main signal showing stop. Thereafter there was intensive discussion about the
necessity for intermittent train protection (PZB) even on lines for which this had not yet been
mandatory under the Railway Construction and Operating Order (EBO).

Fig.1.1 Tain Collision Avoidance System

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2. LITERATURE SURVEY

Indian Railway has implemented Anti Collision Device (ACD) patented by Konkan Railway.
The ACD system is based on GPS for positioning and track detection. This had its own inherent
problems as it is based on GPS- Standard Positioning, GPS service or coarse acquisition. The
best possible horizontal accuracy is 10m. This is inadequate for detection of rail tracks separated
by a distance of 10–15 feet. The ACD system though in use with the Indian Railways, has its
own inherent problems in Station Sections due to its design concept of using GPS for track
detection that is not viable. Shadowing (near mountains) is a problem in GPS. Cost of
implementation is also high.

2.1 MICROCONTROLLER BASED SURVELLIANCE SYSTEM

Fig. 2.1
Block
diagram
of the
proposed
system

The train
tracks
are divided into segments with individual track segment number. Whenever a train enters a
segment of the track, the track number of that segment of track is read from the Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) tags present at the beginning of each segment of track. This track number
read by the RFID reader is stored and then given to Radio Frequency (RF) Transceivers. The RF
communication is established among the adjacent trains, which are in the range through an
algorithm (which is explained later), so that the track numbers are shared. Now the track number

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of its own from RFID reader is compared with the track numbers of other trains from RF
Receiver. Upon detection of same track number the system will alert the motorman. With no
further action (detected with the help of speed sensor) taken by the motorman after an interval of
human response time, the system will override the motorman by braking the train, with the help
of actuators. In Indian railway system the train tracks are divided into different frames and each
segment there is separate track id number. In the proposed system the Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) tags are attached at the beginning of each segment of track at 10 km
distance. When the train enters in the specific segment, the track number of that segment of track
is read by the RFID reader in the RF receiver. Then this number is stored in the memory of
microcontroller then given to Radio Frequency (RF) Transceivers. The RF transmitter sends this
track id to the base station. And the GSM module sends the SMS to the authorized person to take
appropriate action. In this way the RF communication is established among the train and the base
station. At the base station there is LED is present which is the indication of two trains at the
same track.

Fig 2.2 Base station unit

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Figure 1.2 shows the android device which is present at the base station which is used as a
receiver. On the android device the different track ids are displayed. If two trains are travelling
on the same track then system sends the same track id to the base station at the base station there
is sensor is present as shown in figure 3. The two track ids which are same are senses by the
sensor and given to the microcontroller. The microcontroller sends the signal to the LED and
GSM module. The LED is blinked which is the indication of the two trains in the same track.
Simultaneously the GSM module sends the SMS through GSM network to the authorized person
to take appropriate action. In this way it avoids the collision.

At crossing or unmanned gate

Fig.2.3 Crossing Unit

2.2 ALGORITHM FOR RF COMMUNICATION

The main aim of this algorithm is to achieve reliable communication between trains through half
duplex mode. The algorithm follows a time division protocol without synchronised clock among

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the devices. Hence there is a susceptibility of data collision due to no synchronisation. This is
removed by the introduction of randomness in the selection of instant for transmission.[4] This
proposed algorithm is suitable for communication of small data which remains constant over a
considerable period of time. In our proposal it is an 16 bit data, which remains constant for a
minimum of 1 minute to several minutes depending on the speed of the train i.e. as long as the
locomotive remains in the corresponding track segment of 2 to 4 km. In areas where GSM
network is poor then neighbouring trains compare track numbers through RF receiver and
transmitter and inform the driver to take appropriate action.

 The RF receiver in all the systems of the locomotives will be active all the time, except at the
instants when its own transmitter is active.

 From the instant the track number is read by the system, the system will transmit it on three
random instants (calculated from the speed of train measured by the ADC) over a period.

 The speed of the train and the instant at which the track number is read, are considered the
sources of randomness.

 The same way of transmitting at three instants is repeated for subsequent periods of interval.
This period is maintained constant for all the modules.

 The time interval for which the transmitter is active is taken as the minimum time taken by it
to transmit the track number completely.

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3. BACKGROUND

3.1 JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM

The following are the justifications of the proposed surveillance system,

 The proposed system is fully automated. Hence it will surpass the human negligence.

 Track number plates are RFID tags which are more reliable than other ways communicating
the data (track number) to system. These are not affected by natural interference and nuisance.

 With the proposed way of track numbering, the track numbers can be repeated outside RF
vicinity of previous track segments. This result in use of less number of bits (16 bits) for track
numbers especially in case of large rail network, leading to less computation stress on
microcontroller.

 Microcontroller with built-in peripherals needing less external components is used, lead to low
complex system that facilitates ease of programming and reconfiguring the entire system.

 As RF Transceivers are programmed to communicate three times, at randomly selected time

slots within a second, the possibility of data collision is reduced.

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3.2 HSB EXISTING TRAIN PROTECTION SYSTEM

On 1 February 1993 when the narrow-gauge railways in the Harz were taken over by HSB, the
safety for the train journeys followed the regulations of the former Deutsche Reichsbahn
(German Imperial Railway, DR). The operation was thereby carried out according to the
regulations of the so-called simplified secondary railway service (train control operation). There
were three train control areas: Nordhausen Nord, Wernigerode Westerntor and Alexisbad.
However, the systems in Wernigerode station were controlled by the DR movements inspector.
The safety of the railway operation thereby largely relied on the correct handling of the
responsible operating staff. The dispatcher kept a corresponding occupancy log, which
documented the occupied or free line sections on the basis of the reports of the train staff. The
train drivers always received permission to drive from the dispatcher via radio on the basis of the
timetable. They had to stop at a preset point and ask again for permission to drive.

When train traffic to the Brocken was taken up again on 15 September 1991 (Figure 2), there
was a strong increase in the train density on the section Wernigerode – Drei Annen Hohne –
Brocken. This led HSB to consider whether – in the long-term – the train-control operation
between Wernigerode and the Brocken was still the correct way to operate.

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Fig 3.1 Impression Harz Narrow Gauge Railways

Deliberations were speeded up after two trains collided in August 1994 on the densely wooded
stretch with numerous curves between Drängetal and Steinerne Renne stations in the
Thumkuhlen valley. Human error had caused the accident: the driver of the train heading for
Wernigerode left out the planned crossing in Drängetal station and had driven his train beyond
the destination of the last permission to drive.

The technical support of the train control operation for the line Wernigerode – Drei Annen Hohne
– Brocken was then planned via an electronic signal box (EStw). In preparation for this on 1
January 1999 the operation was switched from the regulations of the former DR to the
regulations of the Association of German Transport Companies (Verbande Deutscher
Verkehrsunternehmen, VDV). From 2000 to 2002 the EStw was brought into operation stepwise
from Wernigerode to the Brocken. The dispatcher is in Wernigerode. The lack of occupancy of

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the stations or stretch of track to be driven by the train was from then on checked by axle-
counting circuits and the safe permission to drive communicated from the dispatcher to the train
driver via combination signals showing drive. Thereby dispatcher error could be virtually
excluded from the regular operation from Wernigerode to the Brocken. Also the probability for
train driver error was significantly reduced, as the destinations for permission to drive were now
main signals showing stop instead of the previous trapezoid-shaped panels before the station
entrance and stop signs before the station exit.

In 2004 the Nordhausen tramway started continuous operation with dual-system vehicles
between their network and the HSB station at Ilfeld. As the train traffic on this section of the line
also increased significantly, the section Nordhausen Nord (excluded) to Ilfeld (included) was
also equipped with an EStw. Nordhausen Nord station retained its mechanical signal box with
geographical interlocking panel, whilst between Drei Annen Hohne and Ilfeld stations traditional
train-control operation continued, as on the Selke Valley Railway.

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3.3 ADVANTAGES OF THE SYSTEM

Following are the advantages of the existing system.

Heavy machinery is crucial for many industries, but it can also be hazardous for users,
pedestrians, and property. However, collision avoidance systems can make operation of these
systems safer and more efficient by boosting visibility and safety while reducing liability.

(a) Cost effective , economical and small in size.

(b) No personal skilled are required to operate the system.

3.4 DISADVANTAGES OF THE SYSTEM

We are sending SMS through GSM but because of some network problem it may be delayed so
OTP service can be used.

1.The system fails on a curved path as it only works in line-of-sight

2.Cannot prevent rear-end, side-track collisions
3. Range of the IR system depends on IR transmitter power, which is inversely proportional to
reaction time; the more the power, the lesser the reaction time
4. The system is affected by weather conditions such as rain and storms that interfere with the
IRD.

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3.5 APPLICATIONS

3.6 CONSEQUENCES

As a result PZB was stipulated for normal-gauge railways, as soon as a line has more than one
passenger train. On the other hand EBO regulations for narrow-gauge railways were not
changed. The regulatory authority came to the conclusion that the benefits of introducing PZB
did not justify the expense, particularly as – in contrast to normal-gauge railways – the vehicles
were not equipped for it. Thereby it remained the case that for narrow-gauge railways the
regulatory body can order equipment with train protection.

Notwithstanding this regulation there were intensive discussions about possibilities for further
improvement to the safety of the HSB operation with the Ministry for Regional Development

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and Transport of the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt (MLV). MLV demanded sustainable
measures. However, it soon became clear that the necessary finances for equipping the lines as
well as the vehicles of the HSB with PZB could not be met.

With this background a system developed by the German Aerospace Center (Deutsches Zentrum
für Luft- und Raumfahrt, DLR) in the scope of the research project Railway Collision Avoidance
System (RCAS) from 2005 became interesting. With this system there is no need for any line
equipment; the trains communicate directly with each other and in the very unlikely case of a
possible collision of two trains there is a warning alert. The investment necessary for this system
is only around 10 to 20 percent of that for PZB equipment. At the initiative of MLV the system
was presented to HSB.

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Fig.3.2 Miniaturized railway traffic test facility

4. FUNCTION AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE TRAIN COLLISION

AVOIDANCE SYSTEM

4.1 GENERAL

The new train collision avoidance system brings the TCAS/ADS-B procedure from aviation to
the rail, where this type of Safety Overlay System had not yet been used. Central to this system is
the regular exchange of relevant information about position, direction of travel and speed, via
train-to-train radio communication without a base station

Fig. 4.1 System Animation

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All leading rail vehicles, i.e., locomotives, motorcars and possibly control cars, are equipped
with a vehicle unit. This comprises a positioning and a communication component. The latter
sends the own driving parameters continually via radio directly to all trains in the immediate
surroundings and at the same time receives this information from other vehicle units in the
vicinity. It can identify situations of potential conflict by comparison of own and received data.

The equipped vehicles determine their own position in the network with very high precision. The
entire network topology is stored in the positioning unit like an atlas with all tracks and points in
stations and on multi-track railway lines. It also includes local inclinations, curves and
superelevations. GPS serves only for rough positioning. In this network the device finds its
position continually with an inertial measuring unit (IMU). The vehicle path measurement by
odometry can be included, but isn’t essential.

The software continually evaluates the operating situation and in critical situations can signal the
train driver with up to five configurable warning alerts, so that trains in danger of colliding can
be stopped in time. Thereby – although it would be possible – in the basic version the system
does not intervene directly with the train control. Rather, it functions as a train-driver assistance
system. Possible collision points are ascertained dependent on path and speed, so that alarm
signals don’t come unnecessarily early.

The system works in the 400 MHz band on a secure frequency, licenced for this purpose. GSM-R
would require a network of base stations along the lines, take a long time to establish
connections and is expensive; all of these points are exclusion criteria for the concept.

Depending on operating conditions and topography the radio connections reach from around 1
km up to n x 10 km. As an example, in the Harz the roughly 15 km linear distance and visibility
Wernigerode – Brocken are covered, and on a demonstration run on the high-speed line Rome –
Naples two trains travelling towards each other with a relative speed of 560 km/h positioned
each other at a distance of 33 km.

The new system supplements rather than replaces other safety technology which may already be
present. If an operated line section still doesn’t have a technical train protection such as PZB or
line train protection (LZB), the new system supports the train driver by recognising critical
situations long before they appear on the visual horizon. With the two accidents mentioned above

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human error was the main reason for the collisions. However, also in the case of technical
problems and with deviation from regular operation, the direct, real-time communication
between the trains and the autonomous conflict recognition offer the shortest reaction times and
paths to avoidance or reduction of damage. The so-called remaining collision probability is
significantly reduced through diverse independence of the information sources, communication
paths, sensors and procedures. Furthermore, the concept as train-autonomous system is
particularly attractive from an economical point of view, as the investment only increases with
the number of existing or operated leading vehicles and not with the length of the line. In
addition, a migration strategy is inherently given: equipped vehicles can use the system whilst
vehicles which are not equipped remain for the time being with the actual safety standards. In
this way the system can be introduced stepwise, i.e., one vehicle after another.

Fig.4.2 Display in the driver cab

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4.2 TREATMENT OF POINTS

The treatment of points on the path is particularly interesting. If they are trailing, the further path
is always clearly defined; a simultaneous vehicle movement on the other track, i.e. a threatening
side-on collision, is discovered by the system. On the other hand, with facing points there are
different situations. If, behind the point either tracks are free or both tracks are occupied, the
system can react clearly, i.e., in the latter case it calculates both paths up to a probable collision
point. Although normally one of the two tracks is free and the point set correctly towards this
track, as the system acts independently of route logic, the potential danger is calculated for both
driving paths behind the point. The operator can set parameters to determine if and when an
alarm is given in the more dangerous case. It would be possible, for instance, to have a
forewarning corresponding to the signal colour yellow which should have the significance drive
on sight and the concrete danger warning only then when the IMU actually detects the movement
on the false track. For HSB it has been decided only to trigger an alarm in this case. This
decision lies with the appropriate railway company and regulating authority.

5 . INTRODUCTION OF TRAIN AVOIDANCE SYSTEM AT HSB

The decision to introduce the new train collision avoidance system for HSB as the first operators
worldwide was not easy. Even for this system a seven figure Euro investment is necessary.
Therefore, it was first decided to carry out a trial installation on two stream engines in March
2014, to test whether the system works in the regular HSB operation. On the one hand it
concerned the basic functioning capability and on the other the special conditions of the HSB.
This involved operation on steam engines and under the special climatic conditions of a railway
with more than 1000 m altitude difference in the network – especially in winter and thereby in
particular on the Brocken – as well as possible radio shadows through the woods, rockfaces and
tunnels.

The first point could be confirmed by the trials. Additional test runs were also carried out, in
particular to see how the system reacts to different possibly-critical operational constellations in

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situations which virtually never occur in regular operation. It was thereby ascertained, that
threatening collisions on single-track lines and with trailing points were recognised and alerted
through a warning signal. On the other hand, before the facing points at the crossing stations, as
expected, the manufacturer settings triggered warnings to the train drivers, which from the
operational point of view must be considered as false alarms. For the acceptance of such a
system with train staff, however, this cannot be constructive. Therefore, together with MLV HSB
has decided to suppress the alarm for calculated possible collision points in stations and in the
first instance only activate the system for tracks on the open line. The shunting stop signs have
been set as the limit. Thereby for impending accidents, such as the collisions at Hordorf and in
the Thumkuhlen valley, there will be an alarm.

A pragmatic approach was chosen for the approval of the system through MLV. It was agreed
that the current operating procedures provide a safe railway operation. With the new system a
likewise safe system will be added, which can warn of possible collisions. The two systems
function completely independently of each other. The probability that an error will occur in both
systems can be multiplied, whereby the probability for the occurrence of an accident is
significantly reduced again.

Operationally it was decided that the system will only signal the highest level, i.e., imminent
threat of collision. In this case the train must stop and the train driver must receive new
permission to drive before the journey can be continued.

There is a test point comparable with the 2000 Hz test magnets of the PZB in the exit area of the
operational works at Wernigerode and also at four further selected points on the HSB network. If
the onboard equipment shows a fault at the Wernigerode site the vehicle will not be operated. If
the equipment fails once underway there will be no operational measures until all vehicles have
been equipped. How to proceed in this case once all vehicles are equipped is currently being
considered.

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Fig.5.1 Introducing a train collision avoidance system

With this background, the train collision avoidance system and the first operational experience
on two HSB steam engines could be presented at the InnoTrans 2014 in Berlin. The decision to
introduce the system had basically already been taken. After the financing through the federal
states Saxony-Anhalt and Thüringen was secured, HSB awarded the contract for the supply and
installation of 31 vehicles units at the beginning of 2015, and a further five units for the named
test points and for mobile use. This should take place in 2016 and enable the commissioning of
the entire system by the first half of 2017. For the steam engines the system is powered by a
battery with >48 hours operating time (Figure 4) and displayed in the driver’s cab (Figure 5), for
motorcars there is a display in every driver’s cab and the supply comes from the onboard
network.

The system supplier is the company Intelligence on Wheels (IoW), founded in 2012 from DLR
for the purpose of marketing the RCAS technology. Vehicle units and function can be viewed for
reference at HSB.

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6. RESULT

With the change of guard in Rail Bhawan, the new minister CP Joshi is all set to scrap the
decision taken by his predecessor Mukul Roy about installing Anti-Collision Device (ACD) in
the trains to check accident. Now a new system Train Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) will
be adopted instead of ACD.

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7. CLOSING COMMENT

The system is particularly suitable for – although in no way limited to – the operation on regional
lines or industrial railways and sidings, as well as for temporary deviation from regular
operation, e.g. at building sites. Thereby construction vehicles or line workers can also be
equipped with mobile devices.

During the preparation of this report at the beginning of February 2016 there was a frontal
collision of two non-DB EMUs on the single-track DB line Holzkirchen – Rosenheim by Bad
Aibling. According to current knowledge the cause was human error: a mistake in which the
technology of a normally working signal box was overridden. Basically, this must be possible
when faults occur in railway operation, although there can be no protection against mistakes in a
system which inherently allows technology to be overridden. The train collision avoidance

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system presented here can thereby fill in certain gaps in the safety. HSB implements this step on
their network and comparable railway companies now have the possibility to follow suit.

CONCLUSION:

Collision avoidance systems are especially useful as it automatically alerting train collisions and
accidents at level crossing gate. Implementing this system in railways we can save human lives.
The scenario of accident in trains due to collision will be controlled with the help of this project.

With the change of guard in Rail Bhawan, the new minister CP Joshi is all set to scrap the decision taken
by his predecessor Mukul Roy about installing Anti-Collision Device (ACD) in the trains to check accident.
Now a new system Train Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) will be adopted instead of ACD.

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REFERENCES

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[2] K. Kathirvel, S.Palaniappan “Collision Avoidance of Trains by Creating Mutual

Communication Using Embedded System”, IJCSMC, Vol. 4, Issue. 4, April 2015

[3] G.Anjali bissa , S.Jayasudha , R.Narmatha and B.Rajmohan , "Train Collision Avoidance
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[6] Kurhe Jyoti, Gophane Prajakta, Kadam Madhuri, Panchal, Anubha "Train Collision Detection
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