Pacoy vs. Hon.

Cajigal (GR 157472)

Facts:
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows: That on or
about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death. With the aggravating
circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel
de parte pleaded not guilty to homicide. Pretrial and trial was set by the judge. However, on the same day after
arraignment, the judge issued another order directing the trial prosecutor to amend the information to murder, in view of
the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information, which public respondent registered as having
qualified the crime to Murder. The prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and instead
wrote the word murder in the caption and in the opening parafraph of the Information. On the date scheduled for pre trial,
the accused was to be re-arraigned for the crime of murder. Petitioner objected on the ground that he will be placed in
double jeopardy. Petitioner then filed a motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of double
jeopardy. He alleged that he was validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court I the information for homicide,
and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his
express consent, the subsequent filinf of information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy. Said
Motion to Quash was denied by the responded judge ruling that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not
constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant
in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for
Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the
Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that
with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of “disregard of rank,” the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner then filed for a Motion for reconsideration alleging that contrary to respondent judge’s conclusion that disregard
of rank qualifies the killing to murder, it is a general aggravating circumstance only which only serves to affect the
imposition of the period of penalty. , and that the amendment ordered by the judge was substantial and is therefor not
allowed byt the Rules of Court as the petitioner has already been arraigned. Motion for reconsideration was granted,and
ruled that the original information charging the crime of homicide stands. A petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioner alleging among others that the motion was not really reconsidered as the prayer was for the judge to grant the
Motion to Quash.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from Homicide to Murder.

RULING:
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a newInformation charging the proper offense as contemplated
under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110,
applies only when the offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of
a crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of
the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second
information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a
part of those constituting the latter.

Pacoy vs. Hon. Cajigal (GR 157472)

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded,
it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory
portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be
any effect on the prosecution’s theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense
of petitioner.
TEEHANKEE VS MADAYAG 207 SCRA 134

Facts:

On July 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against Claudio Teehankee Jr. allegedly
committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman. Petitioner Tehankee Jr., was charged with the crme of frustrated murder for the
act of shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which would have caused her death if not for the timely medical
intervention

After the prosecution had rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, but before the
motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file the amended
information. The amended information filed on October 31, 1991 charges Teehankee of murder.
The trial court admitted the amended information. During the arraignment, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the
amended information contending the lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. The judge, then, ordered the plea of "not
guilty" be entered for petitioner. The prosecution was ordered to present its evidence. The petitioner's counsel manifested
that he did not want to take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised. So, the trial court appointed a
counsel de officio to represent the petitioner.
The petitioner now seeks, among other things, for the SC to nullify the respondent judge's admittance of the amended
information, and to compel the judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.
Issue:WON an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the
prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.
Held:Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion
of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal
amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in
the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect
any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder;
hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well
as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated
murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of
the information filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated
murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information.
What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of
execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an amendment
of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.
Crespo vs. Mogul
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to
prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for
estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.

2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the
filing of the information.

3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18,
1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.

4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the
Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court.

5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course.

6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the
judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall
have finally resolved the petition for review.

7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed
the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused.

8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private
prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.

9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that “the motion’s trust being to
induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the
Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court’s
independence and integrity.”

10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary
writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals.

11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment
of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979.

12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980.

13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be
reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits?

RULING: YES.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of
the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
 Dimatulac v Villon
FACTS: SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. A complaint
for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin
Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit,
Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a
certain “Danny,” and a certain “Koyang/Arding.” Judge David conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable
cause, issued warrants for the arrest of the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat and Yambao were arrested; while only
Yambao submitted his counter affidavit. After the prelim investigation, the judge found reasonable ground to believe that
Murder has been committed and the accused are probably theperpetrators thereof. He recommended the issuance
ofwarrants of arrests and provided no bailAsst.Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation.
It is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprioor upon motion of private respondents. The
offense committed was only homicide (NOT murder) and all Yabuts were in conspiracy with one another. The 2 requisites
of murder qualified by treachery were absent. She also recommended bail of 20k each. (note: the Yabuts were not under
the custody of the law)Before the information for Homicide was filed, theheirs of Dimatulac filed an appeal on
theresolution of Ass. Prov. Pros. Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary ofJustice (SOJ)alleging mainly that Alfonso-Flores erred in
lowering the crime from Murder as originally filed to Homicidedespite the glaring presenceof treachery,
evidentpremeditation, etc. (Take note of Rule 70-NPS Rules on Appeal in Syllabus1)1 Appeals form Resolutions of
prosecutors to the Sec. of DOJ Notice of the appeal was furnished to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Alfonso-
Flores ignored this and proceeded to file the information for Homicide which the Prov. Prosecutor (Manarang) approved
and certified Private prosecutor (counsel for private complainants) filed a motion to defer proceedings (i.e. arraignment)
before the RTC in view of his client’s pending appeal with the SOJ YABUTs opposed motion to defer
proceedings/arraignment arguing that the pendency of theappeal before the SOJ was not a ground to defer arraignment
and they had a right to a speedy trial[invoked the case of Crespo v. Mogul.RTC judge denied motion to defer
arraignment.RTC Judge setthe arraignment. Privateprosecutor moved to inhibit the judge, and filed a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the judge from proceeding with the arraignment. RTC Judge voluntarily inhibited himself and then the
case wastransferred toherein respondent Judge Villion.Petitioners filed manifestation informingJudge Villlon him of the
cases pending before the SOJ and the prohibitioncase before the CA. Judge ignored this and set the arraignment. Yabuts
entered their plea of not guilty. Petitioners moved to set aside arraignment but to no avail. SOJ Guingona FINALLY came up
with a resolution of the appeal.He directed the Provincial Prosec. To amend the info against the accused from homicide to
murder. But he wrote to Provincial Prosec. Again and SET ASIDE his order to amend the info from homicide to murder,
considering the appeal was moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused but Mallari must be
included.Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, denied. CA also dismissed the
petition. Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus to reverse the order of
respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents; order that
no further action be taken by any court in criminal case until this petition resolved; and order Sec. of Justice and the
prosecutors concerned to amend the information from homicide to murder. ISSUES1. WON the provincial prosecutor erred
downgrading orlowering the crime charged from Murder to Homicide [YES]2. WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with
the arraignmentof the accused and denying motion to set aside arraignment[YES]3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself
and his order to amendthe information from Homicide to Murder [YES]HELD:Petition GRANTED. The orders denying the
Motion toDefer Proceeding/Arraignment and denying the Motion to SetAside Arraignment are declared VOID and SET
ASIDE. Thearraignment of private respondents is likewise declared VOIDand SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of SOJ is
SET ASIDE andhis initial order REINSTATED. The Office of the ProvincialProsecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to file with the
RTC theamended information for Murder.Issue #1: WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the
crime charged from Murder to Homicide [YES]There was No Basis for the Reinvestigationor downgrading of the Offense
from Murder toHomicide. Warrants of arrest were issued against the Yabuts but they were never arrested/or surrendered
and never brought into the custody of the law. How can the Ass. Prov Prosec. Conduct a reinvestigation then lower the
crime from murder to Homicide? (Note that they re-appeared after crime was downgraded).She should have also waited
for the resolution of the Sec of Justice, but instead entertained the motion for reinvestigation, accepted counter-affidavits
and recommended bail. REMEMBER! They were never brought into the custody of the law.Petitioners had the right to
appeal to the DOJ under Section 4 of Rule 112of the Rules of Courtand DOJ Order No. 223 S. 1993 recognizes the right of
both offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions inpreliminary investigations or reinvestigations. Thesec.
speaks of “dismissing criminal complaint”petitioners herein were not barred from appealingfrom the resolution holding
that only homicide was committed,considering that their complaint was for murder. By holdingthat only homicide was
committed, the Provincial Prosecutor'sOffice of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint formurder.Appeal to the
Sec. of Justice should not be dismissed motu propio on account of the Yabut’s arraignment. The bar on Sec 4does not
apply!The cases of Crespo v Mogul forecloses the power of authorityof the SOJ to review resolutions of his subordinates in
criminalcases despite an information already having been filed in court.The SOJ is only enjoined to refrain, as far as
practicable, fromentertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action ofthe prosecutor once a complaint or
information is filed in court. There was clear and indecent haste on the part of the public prosec. In the filing of the
information for homicide depriving the State and offended parties of due processs. Issue #2: WON Judge Villion erred in
proceeding with the arraignmentof the accused and denying motion to set aside arraignment[YES]Judge Villon set
arraignment of the accused almostimmediately upon receiving the records of the case from theformer RTC Judge. He
should have gone over the case and noticed the multiple motions, manifestations and uttervehemence of the petitioners
to hear their cause. The judge had COMPLETE control over the case and any disposition rested on his discretion + was not
bound to await the DOJ resolution on appeal. But he committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of
theYABUTs on the assailed information for homicide denying due process. Actions:nullifying without jurisdiction, the denial
ofthe motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the motion toreconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs
and theirplea of not guiltyIssue #3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information from
Homicide to Murder [YES]DOJ relinquished its power of control andsupervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the
Asst. Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrenderedtothe latter's inappropriate conduct even hostile
attitude,which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial tothe best interest of the service.TheDOJ could have
joined cause with petitionersto set aside arraignment and, in the exercise of itsdisciplinary powers over its personnel, the
DOJ could havedirected the public prosecutors concerned to show cause whyno disciplinary action should betaken against
them for neglectof duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
PP vs. Ma. Theresa Pangilinan GR. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
FACTS: Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9 checks with the aggregate amount of
P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon Malolos' presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on
Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan. On December 5,
1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan also filed on
December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question". On March 2, 1998,
Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. Malolos, then, raised the matter before the DOJ. On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed
the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in connection with
Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving the other checks were dismissed. So, two counts of violation for
BP 22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed against Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon City. On June 17,
2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest”
before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City, alleging that the criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
The motion was granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC. According to the
RTC, the offense has not yet prescribed "considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997". Dissatisfied, Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme
Court for review but it was referred to the CA "for appropriate action". On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision
of the RTC and recognized Feb. 3, 2000 as the date of the filing of the informations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such
offense. 2

RULING: Yes. Sec. 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides— “xx The institution of the criminal
action shall interrupt the running period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.”
Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases, “[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall,
unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:… after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years.” Under Section 2 of the same Act, “[t]he
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should
be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. The affidavit-complaints for the violations were
filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000
because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of “prejudicial question”. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice
after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City. Clearly, it was
respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for
accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
PILAPIL vs IBAY-SOMERA
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.

Facts :

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and respondent and respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila
and had a child , Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local court in Germany
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouse.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for adultery before the prosecutor of
Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez
issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

Issue: Is the action tenable?

Ruling:

Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon sworn written
filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence since the raison
d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the
time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on the matter
of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is dismissed.

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information
requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed
before the courts, viz.

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.—If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he,
or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity
to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.Within five (5) days from
his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to
the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses recognized by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform
the parties of such action.No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or
his deputy. x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
People vs. Delfin
Facts:
On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-year-old fisherman from
Navotas City—was killed after being gunned down at a store just across his home.
On 13 March 2001, the Rael Delfin was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.
Part of the information reads: That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said weapon one EMILIO
ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot wound,
which caused his immediate death. CONTRARY TO LAW.4
RTC FOUND HIM GUILTY, CA AFFIRMED
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Delfin assails the validity of the information under which he
was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy between the date of the
commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of
November 2000" and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000.
Delfin protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the commission
of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against him and
consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.
Issue:
Whether or not the discrepancy on the date of the commission of the murder would render the
Information against Delfin invalid.
Held:
No. In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not
necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules
of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of
commission be approximated.
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an
information of a date of commission different from the one eventually established during the trial
would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution.
In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the
evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of the
information.
The inaccurate allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is
obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder as having been
committed on the 27th of September 2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to the month
when the crime was committed. Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by
the evidence presented by the prosecution.
The Court sustains the information for murder, under which Delfin was tried and convicted, as
valid.
People v. Manansala
G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013

Judgment

Rule 120 Section 5 (When an Offense Includes or is Included in another)

FACTS: On October 18, 1994 the PNP-Olongapo City conducted a test-buy operation against
Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied
for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC-Olongapo City to authorize the search for and seizure
of
prohibited drugs in Manansala’s residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City. SPO4 Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by the Barangay
Chairman conducted the search of Manansala’s house at around 5:30 a.m. the next day. The search
yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team
recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of PhP 655.00 that
included the two marked PhP 50.00 bills used during the test buy.
All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that effect,
along with his father, Jose Manansala, and Barangay Captain Manalang. The certification listed the
following seized articles:
1) one kilo, more or less, of suspected dried marijuana leaves;
2) rolling paper;
3) money amounting to PhP 655.00
SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they turned
over
the seized articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m. of October 20, 1994, the
seized articles were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga
for qualitative examination.
The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report with findings on qualitative examination that
the specimen gave POSITIVE result for marijuana. Manansala pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, First Asst. City Prosecutor Manalansan filed a motion for the admission of an amended
information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under
Section
4 of R.A. No. 6425 to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law. But the
RTC did not act on the motion.
Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters earlier summarized. In
his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a frame-up stating that
military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and arrested him without any warrant, and
brought
him to an office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club located on Magsaysay Street in Olongapo
City
known as Dorris 2. His captors mugged and then detained him when he refused to admit the sale and
possession of marijuana. They turned down his request to be brought to a hospital for the treatment of
the injuries he thereby sustained. As of the time of his testimony, he conceded that he could not identify
his captors and whoever had maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court when
the latter testified at the trial.
The RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 of R.A.
6425,
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
The crime charged in the information was a violation of Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended by
Republic
Act No. 7659, which provides:
Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any such transactions.
Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty
of
the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8 of the same law.
Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person

who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof.
On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC that the trial court
had erred in convicting him for illegal possession of prohibited drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate
theory that the offense of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 was necessarily
included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4.
The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing, falling under the more
embracing term known as "drug pushing". The alleged act of allegedly knowingly selling or pushing
prohibited drugs by the accused was however, not sufficiently proven. The member of the team who is
alleged to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the accused was not presented as a
witness, hence, the testimony of SPO4 Bolina, to the effect that during the surveillance conducted prior
to the application of the search warrant, a member of the team acting as poseur buyer was able to buy
marijuana from the accused, cannot be given weight, being hearsay.
However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a member, was able to find
marijuana
leaves in the custody, possession and control of the accused, in the course of the enforcement of the
search warrant and has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, without
controversion but the denial of the accused, which like alibi, is the weakest defense, the trial court was
convinced that accused is guilty instead of violating Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act as
amended, a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the
accused have been charged with. In light of these circumstances, the RTC has no option that to find
accused guilty and liable for the crime proved. Since the date of the commission of the crime as proved
is October 19, 1994, the provisions of R.A. 7659, in so far as the imposable penalty is concerned, will
find application.
On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction and affirmed with modification the decision of
the lower court. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of R.A. 6425
necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof under Section 8 of the same law
HELD: Yes.
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission
of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The element of sale must be
unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. In this case, the trial court correctly held that
the prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that accused was indeed guilty of the
offense of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of the same.
While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present
circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof,
except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs
not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use
by the seller. In this case, it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated
from accused were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, we find
that
the court a quo committed no reversible error in convicting the accused-appellant of illegal possession
of
dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of
R.A. 6425 necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by the records, it has
been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that the lawful search conducted at the house of the accused
yielded a total of 764.045 grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP Forensic Chemist. Thus,
on the face of the positive testimony of the prosecution witness and the presentation of the corpus
delicti,
it is indubitable that a crime had in fact been committed and that accused-appellant was the author of
the
same.
It is as prevailing doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana,
except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not
covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably
intended
for some future dealings or use by the accused.

The elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, are as follows: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.
Although not epressly stated, delivery is given stress, which implies prior possession of the prohibited
drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of the
prohibited
drug, affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale
of prohibited drugs, the Court will thus determine appellant’s culpability under Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
The involvement of a single object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal
possession
as the crime proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in the information to
be
the subject of the illegal sale is considered competent evidence to support the conviction of the accused
for the illegal possession. As such, the illegal possession is either deemed absorbed by or is considered
a necessary element of the illegal sale. On the other hand, any other illegal substance found in the
possession of the accused that is not part of the subject of the illegal sale should be prosecuted under a
distinct and separate information charging illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be flagrantly
violated.
The illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug
pushing
or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The right of Manansala to be informed of
the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated simply because the information had
precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of
dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to
account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. The crime of illegal sale of
marijuana defined and punished under Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior
possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal
possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which
is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court, the rule then applicable, an offense
charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of
the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
The Court AFFIRMED the decision.
RATIO: Rule 120 Section 5. When an Offense Includes or is Included in another. An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Ivler vs. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010
FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first
delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information
for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler
sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a
prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense
from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or
simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted
belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile,
the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion
the effect of this ruling.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATIONvs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA, SR.,Presiding,
BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, “JOHN DOES” and “PETER DOES, respondents. G.R. No. 169588.
October 7, 2013. NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court ofBaguio
City FACTS: Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was authorized to render any motorvehicle immobilized by
placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.Balajadia and the other respondents dismantled, took and
carried away the clampsattached to the wheel of the vehicles, which took place on May 7, 2003. Jadewell filed acomplaint
for robbery against the respondents with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003. However, the Informations
were filed with the MTC on October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed amotion to quash. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: The
MTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case and Jadewell‟s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Jadewell‟s petition for certiorari with RTC was likewise denied. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
CONTENTION OF JADEWELL: They argued that the filing of the criminal complaint withthe Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information beforeCourt, is the reckoning point in determining
whether or not the criminal action had prescribed. CONTENTION OF BALAJADIA: Respondents argued that Zaldivia
v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial
proceedings.Thus, the SC, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the ProvincialProsecutor
was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the allegeddate of the commission of the crime on
May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003 tolled the
prescription period of the commission of the offense

HELD: No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of anInformation tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.The respondent judge was correct when he
applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of a municipal ordinance in
Rodriguez, Rizal alsofeatured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed
onMay 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed withthe Metropolitan Trial
Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the
Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information
with the Municipal Trial Court. The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it
resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to
ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll
the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the above
interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor‟s office if, intentionally
or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should
not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain
language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem
here sought to be corrected
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs.
HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 257 of Parañaque and MA. FE F. BARREIRO, respondents.

FACTS: The City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an information for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro,
herein private respondent, based on the complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc., herein
petitioner. Before the scheduled arraignment on August 5, 1999 could take place, respondent
judge Rolando How issued an order resetting the arraignment on the ground that private
respondent had filed an appeal with the Department of Justice. The case was further reset twice
but before the scheduled hearing on November 18, 1999, private respondent again asked for the
deferment of the arraignment. Due to this motion, respondent judge issued an order further
deferring the arraignment until such time that the appeal with the DOJ is resolved. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration to the order, but the same was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus questioning the orders issued by respondent judge regarding
the indefinite suspension of the arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice has been resolved. Petitioner further submits that this instant petition raises
"a pure question of law of first impression" since "it involves the application and interpretation of a
law of very recent vintage, namely Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998." Petitioner mainly relies on Section 7 of said law that states that: "SECTION 7.Time
Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. — The
arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or
from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is
pending, whichever date last occurs. . . ." By issuing the assailed order, respondent court
allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused
until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice has been resolved.

HELD: Yes. Petition devoid of merit. The Court ruled that the decision to suspend arraignment to
await the resolution of appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. A
court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the issue of
whether or not sufficient ground existed to file information. This is in line with the pronouncement
in the Crespo case that courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion over criminal
prosecution. Thus, public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
suspended the arraignment of private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. We are not
unmindful of the principle that while the right to a speedy trial secures rights to the defendant, it
does not preclude the rights of public justice. However, in this case, petitioner as private
complainant in the criminal case, cannot deprive private respondent, accused therein, of her right
to avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in a criminal case. The immediate arraignment of
private respondent would have then proscribed her right as accused to appeal the resolution of
the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice since Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993
forestalls an appeal to the Secretary of Justice if the accused/appellant has already been
arraigned. Hence, in this case, the order suspending the arraignment of private respondent
merely allowed private respondent to exhaust the administrative remedies available to her as
accused in the criminal case before the court could proceed to a full-blown trial. Conversely, in
case the resolution is for the dismissal of the information, the offended party in the criminal case,
herein petitioner, can appeal the adverse resolution to the Secretary of Justice. In Marcelo vs.
Court of Appeals, this Court aptly pointed out that: "the trial court in a criminal case which takes
cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or
for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the
resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon
only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the
Department of Justice." The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order suspending the
arraignment of private respondent before the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent
could be heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. It was well within the power of
public respondent to grant the continuance since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998
clearly confers this authority.