Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No.

136781. October 6, 2000]

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition
for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives
although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as
the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party
is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.
BANAT VS COMELEC

Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least
2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional
seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20%
share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides
that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will
be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections,
there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to

Party-List Representatives

Hence,

(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the
ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million
votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a
seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph
1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.

LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-
lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total
55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of
the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for
the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their
deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections
provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation),
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people
defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately
ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country
shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-
list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-
list system.
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary

December 8, 1994

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.

The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
two separate district. Second, it also violates Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing
that the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:

(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?

(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?

(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical
consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the
provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise
provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:

The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections

December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital
Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing
of the official.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there
will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the
armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941