SANCHEZ V.
PEOPLE the police operative of the subject narcotics from Sanchez
FACTS: Sanchez was charged for violation of Sec. 11 of Article
II of RA 9165 for the possession of shabu. He pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.
Prosecution’s Version of Facts
 SPO1 Elmer Amposta together with other CSUs
Hernandez, Tagle, and Monzon, acted on the information
that Jacinta Marciano was selling drugs to tricycle
drivers. They were dispatched to Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus,
Cavite, to conduct an operation.
 While at the place, they waited for a tricycle going to,
and coming from the house of Jacinta. After a few
minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez
coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle.
After catching up with it, they requested Sanchez to
alight. It was then they noticed Rizaldy holding a match
box.
 SPO1 Amposta asked Sanchez if he could see the
contents of the match box which the latter agreed to.
While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small
transparent plastic sachet which contained a white
crystalline substance. Suspecting that it was a regulated
drug, the group accosted Sanchez and the tricycle driver.
They were brought to the police station.
 The forensic chemist from NBI found that the said
susbtance was shabu.
Defense’s Version of Facts
 Sanchez denied all the allegations of the prosecution. He
said that he and Darwin Reyes were on their way hope
where they transported a passenger, when their way was
blocked by four armed men riding an owner-type
jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and
Darwin. He protested and asked what offense did they
commit. The officers told him that they had just bought
drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he merely
transported a passenger there but the policemen still
accosted him and he was brought to Imus Police Station.
 On cross-examination, the accused admitted tht it was
the first time that he saw the police officers at the time
he was arrested.
The RTC ruled that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto, in
actual possession of shabu. It stated that the police
operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez
was in possession of the said dangerous drug and suspicion
was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying
was found to contain shabu.
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the
findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and
upheld the conviction of Sanchez. According to the CA, there
was probable cause for the police officers that he was seen
leaving the residence of a notorious drug dealer, where,
according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities were
being perpetrated. It also conccluded that the confiscation by
was pursuant to a valid search.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sanchez was caught in flagrante
delicto hence a search warrant was no longer necessary.
RULING: NO. It is observed that the Court of Appeals
confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest with stop-
and-frisk principle.
A stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and should
not be confused with the search incidental to a lawful arrest
envisioned in Sec. 13 Rule 126.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search. The law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made, the
process cannot be reveresed. The arresting officer may
search the person of the arrestee and the area within which
the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy,
and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime.
As held in Terry v. Ohio, the Terry stop-and-frisk serach is a
limited protective searcch of outer clothing for weapons.
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him to reasonably conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as apoliceman and makes reasonable
inquiries, he is entitled for the protection of himself.
The two-fold interest of stop-and-frisk are:
1. The general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause
2. The more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police office to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.
IN THE CASE AT BENCH, neither the in flagrante delict arrest
nor the stop-and-frisk principle was applicable to justify the
warrantless search and seizure made by the police
operatives. The search preceded the arrest of Sanchez . There
was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Under Sec. 1
of Rule 113, arrest is the taking of a person into custody that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. Sec. 2 of the same rules provides that an arrest is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
It appears that SPO1 Amposta after they caught up with the
tricycle just noticed Sanchez holding a match box and
requested if he could see the contents. The arrest was made
only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu
inside the boxx. What happened in this case was a search
first before arrest was effected. This does not qualifiy under a
valid warrantless arrest under Sec. 5 Rule 113*.
The evidence on record reveals that no physical act could be
properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the
minds of the police operatives that he had just committeed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. He was
merely seen by the police operatives leaving the residence of
a known drug peddler. IT has not been established either that
the rigorous conditions set in par. B of Sec 5 of Rule 113 have
been complied with. The police officers had no personal
knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu from the
notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug
when he boarded the tricycle. The police officers had no
inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of
the known drug dealer. Nowhere in the prosecution evidence
does it show that the drug dealer was conducting her
nefarious drug activities insidde the house. There was no over
manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just
engaged in, was actually engaging in, or was attemptin to
engage in the criminal activity of ilegally possessiong shabu.
There is no valid stop-and-frisk. This is an act of apolice
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat
him for weapon/s or contraband. The police officer should
properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer
clothing for possible concealed weapons. The apprehending
officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or
contraband concealed.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstance
sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify a
stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house
of a drug pusher and boarding a tricylce without more, were
innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not
give rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police
officer of any belief that he had shabu in his possession.
Lastly, the OSG characterizes the seuzure of the subject shabu
from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in plain view. The SC
disagrees.
Under the plaint view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.
The following are the requisites:
1. the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular
area
2. the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent
3. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
It is readily apaprent that the seizure of the subject shabu
does not fall within the plain view exception. There was no
valid intrusion. Sanchez was illegally arrested. The subject
shabu was not inadvertently discovered and it was not plainly
exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was alledly inside
amatch box being then held by Sanchez and was not readily
apparent or transparent to the police officers.
PEOPLE V. ANDAYA
FACTS: Accused Pablito Andaya was charged with violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for selling shabu. The RTC and
CA found him guilty of the crime charged.
A team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de
Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar and asset Bagsit
was constituted to conduct a buy-bust in Batangas City. Two
(2) pieces of P100.00 bills both duly marked “X” were
recorded in the police blotter. Upon reaching the designated
place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and
occupied different positions where they could see and
observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Pablito’s
house. Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly.
The asset gave Pablito the marked money. The asset received
something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying
consummation of the transaction was given. The team
members approached Pablito and the asset introduced
themselves as police officers and arrested accused.
ISSUE: Is the non-presentation of the confidential informant
fatal to the prosecution’s case?
HELD: YES, the non-presentation of the confidential
informant is tantamount to saying that the prosecution failed
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. A
buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of
entrapment of the drug pusher. The justification that
underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the
suspect is arrested in flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has
just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is
attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the
arresting police officer or private person. Proof of the
transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal
prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the
burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug
beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He
was designated to be the poseur-buyer himself. It is notable
that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on
the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer.
The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-
bust team that the transaction had been consummated
between the poseur-buyer and Andaya. However, the State
did not present the confidential informant/ poseur buyer
during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction
between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have
been no issue against that, except that none of the members
of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction,
if any, between Andaya and the poseur-buyer due to their
being positioned at a distance from the poseur-buyer and
Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction
The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses
for the Prosecution in those instances could be excused
because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated
the accused. In this case, however, it was different, because
the poseur-buyer and the confidential informant were one
and the same. Without the poseur buyer’s testimony, the
State did not credibly incriminate Andaya. The members of
the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply
declaring that they had seen from their positions the poseur-
buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave
something to the poseur-buyer.
Moreover, the arresting members of the buy-bust team
interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as
the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their
interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the
testimony of the poseur-buyer, unfairly threatened the
liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that threat to
perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would
deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the credibility
of the poseur-buyer who supposedly gave it.
Hence, the prosecution failed to prove accused Andaya’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE V. COGAED
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from
Barangay Lun-Oy (Pangasinan) and during a checkpoint, the
driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police
telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s
bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked
the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied
that he did not know what was inside and that he was just
transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed
subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of
marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and,
whether the marijuana confiscated is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the
marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that
meets all the requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a
judge.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable
even when warrantless. The known jurisprudential instances
of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk”
search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of
reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry
searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law
enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced
with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies
in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may
be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer.
It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere
suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the
purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception.
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer
clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case,
and there was no approximation for the probable cause
requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was
not even the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person
searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed
responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to
Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance.
This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed
and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension of Cogaed was
not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were
present when the arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not
committing, or was about to commit a crime. There were no
overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that
time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time;
hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable
warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights
even if we assume that he did not object when the police
asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be
lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the
issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to
go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through
unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it
is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It
ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses,
papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are
upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed
were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of
the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence
left to convict Cogaed.
PESTILLOS V. GENEROSO
FACTS: In the morning, an altercation in Quezon City ensued
between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. Atty.
Generoso called the Central Police District, Station to report
the incident. Acting on this report, Desk SPO1 Monsalve
dispatched SP02 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and to
render assistance. SP02 Javier, together with augmentation
personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman
Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one
hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty.
Generoso badly beate.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who
mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the
petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.
The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills
Police Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately
survived the attack.
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully
arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the
police station only as a response to the arresting officers'
invitation.
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest
took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours
before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene.
The police officers could not have undertaken a valid
warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that
the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
ISSUE:
W/N there is valid warrantless arrest
RULING:
Yes.The court held that petitioners were validly arrest
without warrant. The requirements of a warrantless arrest
are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that: When an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it.
The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just
been committed; and second, the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense
has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed
it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. The
element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances",
however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires clarification. Circumstances may
pertain to events or actions within the actual perception,
personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the
scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has
not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a
warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the
circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine
the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the
gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to
comply with the element of immediacy. In other words, the
clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within
which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.
With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the
police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime, it is reasonable to conclude
that the police officers had personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless
arrests.
Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the
subsequent inquest proceeding was likewise appropriate.
PEOPLE V. VILLAREAL
FACTS:
- PO3 Renato de Leon was riding on his motorcycle when
he saw appellant Nazareno Villareal from an 8 to 10
meter-distance in Caloocan.
- Villareal was then inspecting a plastic sachet containing
shabu
- De Leon approached Villanueva whom he recognized as
someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug
possession but the latter tried to escape
- He was apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver
and was brought to the police station
- In his defense, Villanueva was walking when a man who
was riding a motorcycle called him from behind
- He was approached, instructed not to run, then was
frisked, and took his wallet
- Appellant was brought to the police station where he
was detained and mauled
- He was also asked questions with a gun right beside his
ear each time he failed to answer about a stolen
cellphone
- The trial court convicted appellant of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs and such was established properly
through an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest
- The appellate court sustained conviction finding a clear
case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest
ISSUE: Whether or not the in flagrante warrantless arrest was
valid
HELD:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless
arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
xxx
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to
operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the
other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had
committed it.
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under
paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while
under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just
been committed.
The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with
his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters
and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible
and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram)
inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3
de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough
that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact
have been committed first, which does not obtain in this
case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against
appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely
impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s
previous charge for the same offense.
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even
for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of
the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been
committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as
referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations
would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily
stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s
previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous
requisites laid out under Section 5.
ROALLOS V. PEOPLE
Facts: This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which calls to annul and set
aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals where it affirmed
with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) finding Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes (Roallos) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual abuse
punished under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and
Discrimination Act." Roallos asserted that his arrest was
illegal since the same was effected without any warrant of
arrest. He said he was not informed of his rights when he was
arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary
investigation.
Issue: Whether or not Roallos’ claim that his arrest was illegal
for lack of warrant of arrest , non-information of his rights
when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any
preliminary investigation tenable.
Held: Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he
was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that he was
not afforded a preliminary investigation is untenable.
An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
At the time of arraignment, Roallos did not raise any
objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack
of a proper preliminary investigation. He actively participated
in the proceedings before the RTC. Therefore he is deemed to
have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has
effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito
Escobido claiming that Ariel Escobido (live-in partner of
Corazon and son of Charito) was picked up by police
officers for allegedly selling drugs.
 An errand boy gave a number to the complainants. When
they called the number, they were instructed to go to the
Gorordo Police Station in Cebu.
 In the said police station, they met “James” who
demanded 100,000 (later on lowered to 40,000) in
exchange for the release of Ariel.
 After the said meeting, the complainants went directly to
the NBI wherein the NBI formed an entrapment
operation.
 The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz through
the use of mark-money.
 Jaime dela Cruz was brought to the forensic laboratory of
NBI where he was required to submit his urine for drug
testing. The test yielded positive for presence of
dangerous drugs.
 Based on dela Cruz’ testimony, he was contending that
he refused to the drug examination and requested to call
his laywer but it was denied by the NBI.
 RTC – found dela Cruz guilty of violating Sec. 15 of
RA9165; ruled that all the elements were present: 1)
accused was arrested 2) accused was subjected to drug
test 3) confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous
drug
 CA – affirmed RTC ruling; ruled that extracting urine from
one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation.
ISSUE: WON the drug test conducted upon Jaime dela Cruz
was legal?
HELD: NO. FIRST, the drug test in Section 15 does not cover
persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but
only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. To
make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is
tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that
accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion.
SECOND, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-
testimonial compulsion. We are aware of the prohibition
against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions
to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial
compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal
cause of the arrest. In the instant case, we fail to see how a
urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion.
The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held
that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug
testing was “merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside
the concept of a custodial investigation.”
LASTLY, the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is
incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine
extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his
rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances. Such acts were in violation of Sec 2 and Sec 17
of the 1987 Constitution. In the face of these constitutional
guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the
arrest is being made.
ANTIQUERRA V. PEOPLE
Facts: Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol
in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified men rush out of
a house and boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a crime,
the police officers approached the house. When they peeked
through the partially opened door, they saw Antiquera and
Cruz engaged in a pot session. The police officers entered the
house, introduced themselves and arrested Antiquera and
Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a
jewellery box which contained shabu and unused
paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty of illegal
possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The court
affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest was invalid.
Held: Yes, there was unlawful arrest because the
circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in
flagrante delicto. Admittedly, the police officers did not
notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street
where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its
partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted
their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the
view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-
mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the
search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
LEVISTE V. ALMEDA
Facts: Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by
Information, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael
de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner was placed under police
custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. After
petitioner posted a bond which the trial court approved,he
was released from detention, and his arraignment was set.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the
evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine the proper offense.
Issue: Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested
without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation
belongs only to the accused.
Held: No. The Court holds that the private complainant can
move for reinvestigation.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to
challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge
against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended
Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended
Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his
arraignment. During the arraignment on March 21, 2007,
petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised
were still pending resolution by the appellate court, thus
prompting the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for
him.
The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment
from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation applies "only if he voluntarily enters
his plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto." There must be clear and
convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish his right to question the existence of probable
cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party
does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally
relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible.

From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably

infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him
from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so
timely invoked.

In addition, all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a
criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the case
and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case
after the information had been filed in court, the proper
party for that being the public prosecutor who has the
control of the prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where
the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in
the criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute,
the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity
of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.

In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may

be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or
consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-
investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to
withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of
the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but
shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.

Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for

reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having
brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution
is thus equipped with discretion – wide and far reaching –
regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial court’s
approval of the resulting proposed course of action.